CIRS Newswatch: Expert Insights

Diana Buttu, Practitioner in Residence at GUQ

Since the beginning of the Zionist project, Israel has long had the goal of expanding the territory it controls. This is why one can see that, with the Partition Plan of 1947, Zionist attacks were not confined to the areas illegally “allocated” to the “Jewish state” but were aimed outwards. This is also why Israel made a “pre-emptive” (i.e. illegal) attack against Syria, Egypt, and Jordan in 1967, and continues to illegally occupy and colonize the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights in violation of international law and of international decisions.

More recently, Israeli leaders have made it no secret that they intend to annex the West Bank, recolonize the Gaza Strip, and take land from Lebanon and Syria. Under the guise of perpetual war, this is precisely what Israel has done: it has gone deep into Lebanon, using the same tactics that it used in Gaza; Israeli settlers have continued their takeover of Palestinian lands in the West Bank; and the Israeli army remains in Syria and in Gaza, with Israeli attacks on Gaza continuing daily.

Speaking on the second day of the US/Israel attack on Iran, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu said that he had “yearned” for this strike for 40 years, evoking Biblical references comparing Israel to Samson. Once this war is over—if at all, for I see that Israel has normalized the bombing of Iran, Lebanon, and Gaza, and the assassination of their leaders—the question the world will need to confront is whether Israel operates above the system of law and order that was put into place after the Second World War or whether the rules are simply not applicable. In other words, will Lebanon and Palestine be forced to “negotiate” a return of their lands? Will Iran be forced to “negotiate” an end to an illegal bombing campaign? Or, will we see a system that finally confronts the country that has made a mockery of the international legal system?

Noha Aboueldahab, Assistant Professor of International Law at GUQ

Many international lawyers are clear on the illegality of the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran, launched on the 28^th February 2026. The main reasons: the absence of a UN Security Council resolution authorizing such use of force, and the absence of any credible U.S./Israeli claims of the right to self-defense. Gulf states, including Qatar, were deeply engaged in mediation efforts between the U.S. and Iran at the time of the start of the war. The U.S. and Israeli unlawful use of force against Iran resembles Israel’s illegal attack on Qatar’s mediation efforts between Hamas and Israel, when it launched missiles at negotiators on Qatar’s territory in September 2025.

The U.S. has not been silent on international law – quite the opposite. Shortly before the war, Trump stated that he is guided by his “own morality” and that he does not “need international law”. Pete Hegseth made his thoughts on international law equally clear during the war: “No stupid rules of engagement…no politically correct wars.”When the U.S. sank Iranian ships rather than capture them in accordance with international law, Trump explained that “his people” told him “it’s more fun to sink them.”

In the nearly two months of this war, several other international law-related concerns have emerged, implicating and/or affecting not just the main parties to the conflict (Iran, Israel, the U.S.), but also regional (Gulf) states, Lebanon, and the U.K. These include violations of the laws of war, including war crimes, and state complicity in acts of aggression, as outlined in Article 16 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, ‘Aid or assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful act.” Iran’s retaliatory attacks that target civilian infrastructures are also unlawful.  As some international lawyers note, the U.S. and Israel can end Iran’s unlawful retaliations by ending this illegal war of aggression.

Paul Musgrave, Associate Professor of Government at GUQ

Iran’s expansion of its war with Israel and the United States has been waged largely by what was once called “push-button” means. Rather than soldiers launching assaults or pilots dueling in the skies, Iran has relied on ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and one-way attack drones. Countries such as Qatar have shown their own technical prowess, using anti-drone and anti-missile defenses to blunt these attacks.

The recent weeks also hint at what future Gulf conflicts might look like. Sophisticated defenses against precision-guided attacks have proven their value, but aggressors are learning too. A future conflict could feature attacks by larger swarms of more agile drones and varied warheads on ballistic missiles—including cluster munitions that force defenders to choose between draining their magazines or accepting dispersed harm.

Defenses will have to adapt, combining exquisite, high-end systems with cheaper counter-UAV layers. Contrary to some Western commentary, Qatar has not been shooting down $10,000 drones with multimillion-dollar interceptors—but more sustainable defenses against lower-end threats can and should be developed. Efforts along these lines are reportedly already underway.As anti-air missile ranges expand to several hundred kilometers, Gulf countries may face a lack of permissive airspace even over their own territory. The expansion of the front lines to the skies over Doha and Dubai would place a premium on defensive swarms, electronic warfare, and long-range counter-battery fires, potentially using systems like the US Army’s PRSM or South Korea’s Hyunmoo. These capabilities are costly, but the wealthier, better-equipped side retains meaningful advantages—ones the GCC is positioned to exploit. In any event, it is costlier to be on the weaker side.

Most important is the development of stronger maritime defenses. The conflict has underscored the importance of the Strait of Hormuz and the difficulty of reopening it once closed. Given the global importance of the strait, no single country should bear the burden of defending it alone. Yet it is also clear that the GCC and Iraq have a particular interest in shielding their commerce from hostilities. A capable multinational naval and aerospace force would blunt any aggressor’s ability to hold the global economy hostage and preserve the sovereignty of GCC countries.

Abdullah Al-Arian, Associate Professor of History at GUQ

Hopes were high on April 8, 2026, when Donald Trump announced a “double-sided ceasefire” to halt a war that had taken thousands of lives, left West Asia in flames, and sent shockwaves through the global economy. Hours after warning that “a whole civilization will die tonight,” Trump called Iran’s proposal a “workable basis” for negotiations. Yet, within twenty-four hours, the talks in Pakistan collapsed, with JD Vance blaming Iran’s refusal to accept U.S. terms.

While the abrupt breakdown surprised many observers, it was consistent with a broader trajectory in recent U.S. diplomacy. Since unilaterally withdrawing from the 2015 nuclear agreement (JCPOA), Washington has faced a persistent credibility deficit in its engagements with Tehran. More significantly, diplomacy has increasingly functioned as an extension of warmaking. Twice in the last year, negotiations have served as cover for escalatory military actions.

This pattern was evident in the latest round of talks. Despite initial signals of flexibility, U.S. negotiators returned to the same maximalist objectives articulated prior to the conflict. The preceding thirty-nine day military campaign failed to achieve its core aims, whether constraining uranium enrichment or eliminating Iran’s missile production capabilities, yet these goals were carried forward largely unchanged. The implicit assumption appeared to be that diplomacy could deliver what military force had failed to secure.

Personnel choices further underscore this approach. Rather than relying on the institutional diplomatic corps, the Trump administration has elevated political allies such as Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, whose roles blur the line between diplomacy and political alignment. Voices in Washington and across the region have noted that both are widely perceived as “Israeli assets”—an assessment that helps explain the expansion of U.S. demands beyond earlier negotiating positions and toward alignment with Israeli strategic priorities.

In this context, the failure of the April 2026 ceasefire talks was less a diplomatic misstep than a predictable outcome. It reflected a framework in which diplomacy is not designed to resolve conflict, but to continue it by other means. Though it was only the first round of talks, Vance stated flatly that the U.S. had offered its “best and final offer.” Notwithstanding Iran’s declared desire for a permanent deal, based on recent Israeli and American practice, any agreement will likely be considered temporary, granting the U.S. the ability to achieve immediate aims such as restoring access to the Strait of Hormuz, while retaining the ability to resume military action at any time.

Looking ahead, the more consequential question may not be whether an agreement is ultimately reached, but whether it can be enforced. While reopening the Strait of Hormuz remains a clear U.S. priority, recent regional developments raise doubts about durability. Constant Israeli violations of ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon, coupled with the absence of meaningful enforcement mechanisms, underscore the limits of agreements that rely on political will alone. The genocide in Gaza has laid bare the paralysis that now defines the international legal order and its governing institutions.

Mehran Kamrava, Professor of Government at GUQ

The shape of the security arrangement at the end of the Israeli-American war on Iran is yet to be determined. But a few facts are already evident. To start, the United States is far more concerned with Israel’s security than it is in providing protection to its allies in the Persian Gulf. As Trump’s repeated posts on social media indicate, he is willing to commit genocide and other war crimes to achieve his goals if conventional warfare does not yield the results he wants. On the Iranian side, the Islamic Republic is the only country to have withstood military attacks by two nuclear powers and to have fought them into a stalemate. Tehran sees this as a major victory. Iran also has the capability and, more importantly, the willingness to attack military and industrial targets across the Gulf region regardless of the diplomatic costs it suffers in the process. And the so-called Axis of Resistance, especially insofar as the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iran’s Iraqi proxies are concerned, is not as dead and irrelevant as it was assumed to be before the war. Combined with other considerations, these factors are likely to have several consequences in the coming months and years. Clearly, the GCC is likely to diversify its existing security partnership. Also, as the Qatari government has already indicated, Iran cannot be ignored or simply wished away. The recent war will push the regional arms race to new heights, as countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE will do what they can to match and surpass Iran’s missile capabilities. There will also be greater emphasis on domestic arms production in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar. At the same time, both individually and collectively, the GCC states are likely to continue, or to reestablish, their diplomatic relationships with Iran. All things considered, the regional security arrangement in the Persian Gulf is likely to be very different from the one we have come to know over the course of the last few years.