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SUMMARY:The Marib Puzzle: A Case of Stability and Economic Activity in War-Torn Yemen
DESCRIPTION:Mohammed Al-Jaberi\, a GU-Q senior majoring in Foreign Service and Arab Studies\, and a CURA Publications Fellow\, presented his research on “The Marib Puzzle: A Case of Stability and Economic Activity in War-Torn Yemen\,” at a CURA Focused Discussion on April 3\, 2019. Al-Jaberi\, a citizen of Yemen\, returned to his country this past year to conduct research towards his academic thesis in which he addresses the complexity of the war in Yemen\, the political symbolism of the city of Marib\, and the war’s sociocultural and political impacts on the country. \n\nFocusing his study at the local level\, Al-Jaberi examined two cities: the port city of Aden\, and the city of Marib in the center of Yemen. His primary research question was: “Why does Marib have more stability and economic activity compared to the temporary capital\, Aden?” Al-Jaberi defined “stability” as the absence of local conflict\, sustainable access to public goods and services\, and the resilience of the local government. In order to answer the central research question\, he examined trade\, commercial activities (semi- and fully-legal)\, and the money injected into Yemen by coalition forces—especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. \n\nGiving background to when the ongoing war in Yemen began\, Al-Jaberi argued that there are two significant and contested dates: September 21\, 2014\, is when Houthi rebels took over the capital city of Sana‘a and overthrew President Hadi; and March 25\, 2015\, is when Saudi Arabia intervened militarily with a coalition force in Yemen. Coalition supporters assert that the war began on the former date\, whereas Houthi rebels deny that the conflict is actually a civil war\, claiming that it is a Saudi-led aggression. The answer to this debate\, Al-Jaberi said\, depends on how one classifies the current conflict\, and he posed the following questions: “Is it a civil war? Is it a transnational aggression? Should we blame Saudi Arabia for it? Should we blame the Houthis?” Thus\, he attempted to address the widespread tendency to oversimplify the war in Yemen by framing it in terms of only two sides. \n\n“Corruption\, poverty\, patronage networks\, the absence of a meaningful nation-state\, and the fragility of the system have all compromised Yemen’s current standing.” \n\nAl-Jaberi identified three major causes of the war: the failure of a transitional process after the 2011 Arab uprisings; the inability to resolve historical grievances in terms of North and South Yemen; and Yemen’s limited role in the international community. “Corruption\, poverty\, patronage networks\, the absence of a meaningful nation-state\, and the fragility of the system have all compromised Yemen’s current standing\,” he said. Because of these issues\, “Yemen has become a playground for international powers to exercise their influence and to enact their hegemony\,” Al-Jaberi argued. \n\nThe reality in Yemen today is its division into three different states: the Sana‘a area is under Houthi control; Aden and the south are controlled by the UAE and its affiliated forces; and “the ‘Marib state’ is a center that contains political actors within President Hadi’s camp who want to maintain a unified Yemen\,” Al-Jaberi argued. Of these three states\, the literature\, media coverage of the war\, and the behaviors and actions of foreign delegations visiting the country conclude that Marib appears to be the only stable region in the country\, he said. Though interviews\, analyses\, and time spent in Yemen\, however\, Al-Jaberi said\, “I found that stability\, and stable economic activity\, in the two regions of Aden and Marib was not absolute\, but a matter of relative reality.” The war in Yemen has become normalized\, and is a “lucrative business\,” he said. \n\nAl-Jaberi concluded by highlighting the two outcomes of his research. He argued that stability in Yemen is being directly affected by two different systems: patronage networks operating in Marib\, on the one hand\, and the UAE and Saudi Arabia operating in Aden\, on the other. The first concerns the shift from the historical center of Yemen—the capital Sana‘a—to Marib. He argued that this was not an example of successful local governance; rather\, it is due to historical political elites “with their tribal\, military\, religious\, technocratic connections” maintaining power by shifting to a different city. Those who operate and control the government of President Hadi “are part of a network of patronage that controls everything\,” Al-Jaberi said. Thus\, the increase of economic activity in Marib is due to redirecting resources\, rather than the actual creation of new businesses. The second concerns how the economy of Yemen is being further politicized by the discrepancies between how the South is being influenced by UAE\, and how the North is being influenced by the Saudi Arabian monarchy. \n\n  \n\nArticle by Khushboo Shah\, CURA Administrative Fellow \n\nMohammed Al-Jaberi (class of 2019) is graduating from Georgetown University in Qatar with a B.S. in Foreign Service and M.A. in Arab Studies. His research interests revolve around development\, state-building\, and political Islam. He is currently working on a documentary film on the economic and personal struggles of young participants of war in Aden. In addition to his role as a CURA Publications Fellow at CIRS since 2016\, he has held internships at Teach for Qatar\, the United States Embassy in Doha\, and Qatar Foundation.
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/marib-puzzle-case-stability-and-economic-activity-war-torn-yemen/
CATEGORIES:Regional Studies,Student Engagement
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190407T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190408T170000
DTSTAMP:20260611T155818
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SUMMARY:The GCC Crisis: Qatar and its Neighbors Working Group I
DESCRIPTION:On April 7-8\, 2019\, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) held the first working group under its research initiative “The GCC Crisis: Qatar and its Neighbors.” The two day meeting brought together several scholars to discuss a range of topics. These included\, Qatar’s management of the crisis; the UAE’s perspective and position on the regional crisis; the roles of Oman\, Kuwait\, Iran\, and Turkey during the rupture of GCC relations; the impact of maritime law in the lead up to and the immediate aftermath of the dispute; economic readjustments in Qatar during the embargo; the effects of the crisis on the Qatari stock market; reconfigurations of nationalism and national identity in Qatar; and\, public opinion in Qatar after the blockade. \n\nMehran Kamrava commenced the working group with a presentation titled “Small State: Crisis Politics.” Kamrava highlighted the lack of nuanced\, academic study of the GCC crisis and suggested that the current crisis needs to be contextualized within the context of broader and older tensions in regional relations\, particularly those between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Such tension is a natural result of a small state being in proximity of a much larger state with regional ambitions. Much of the policymaking\, state narrative\, and perspectives of Qatari decision makers is driven by the fact that Qatar is a small state. Kamrava proposed several research questions\, including: What does the crisis tell us about how small states manage their supply chains during times of crisis? Have Qatari nationalism and national identity gained greater salience over tribalism and kinship? What is it about Qatar’s decision-making process that has enabled the state to respond effectively to the current crisis? And\, is there more to the notion of “subtle power?” \n\nDavid Roberts followed with a presentation on “The Unhappy Neighbor: The View from the UAE.” Roberts applied the notion of “ontological security” in international relations to the ongoing GCC crisis. Roberts suggested that the ontological security concept can provide us with interesting insights into the UAE’s foreign policy\, as well as the motivations behind Mohamed bin Zayed’s foreign policy objectives. Roberts argued that states may prioritize ontological security over physical security\, and\, as a result\, often undertake specific actions in the foreign policy domain that may not meet any hard security concerns or interests. Ontological security could be applied to conducting an individual-level analysis by studying the moral principles of the UAE leadership and how these translate into the country’s assertive foreign policy\, as seen in the country’s current leadership’s rise to power in 2004. \n\nMuna Al-Marzouqi discussed “The Blockade of Qatar and Maritime Law\,” highlighting four main research areas. First\, Al-Marzouqi maintained\, there is a need to examine how the maritime blockade on Qatar is contributing to the fostering of international maritime trade and strengthening maritime trade partnerships with countries such as Oman. Second\, there is need for a legal analysis of issues related to disturbed shipping liability caused by the blockade. Third\, there is the issue of the hijacking of Qatari fishing boats by the UAE. Finally\, Al-Marzouqi posed the question of whether the maritime blockade can be considered as an act of aggression under international law. \n\nSteven Wright focused his discussion on “Economic Readjustment in Qatar after the Blockade.” Wright highlighted five areas of potential research. To start\, the shifting trade flows and changing economic linkages that have occurred since the rupture in regional relations need further examination. Wright asked: How has the loss of 40 percent of imports previously coming through Saudi Arabia and the UAE been addressed by Qatar? There was a spike in trade with Iran at the beginning of the blockade\, as Qatar tried to quickly find new means of addressing its need for critical imports\, particularly in food and agricultural products. However\, more recently the percentage of trade between the two states has dipped to even lower than what it was before the blockade. New trade relations have been formed with a number of African and Asian countries\, and the shift away from Iran may well be due to deliberate political considerations and a calculated desire of the Qatari leadership to limit its reliance Iran. \n\nAlso important\, according to Wright\, are the significant changes in the energy sector since the blockade\, most noticeably in the behavior of the large state-owned oil and gas companies. Wright suggested that since the GCC crisis began\, there has been an intensification in the role of Qatar Petroleum\, and in particular its subsidiary Qatar Gas\, in actively undertaking international engagements and building partnerships with international energy companies. These new developments\, and how they impact Qatar’s long-term energy policy\, can benefit from deeper examination. \n\nSince the start of the crisis\, Wright maintained\, a strong narrative has appeared in Qatar around the need to develop self-sufficiency and to more actively involve the private sector towards this goal. Since the blockade\, great emphasis has been placed on achieving self-sufficiency and security in food and agriculture. Two years on since the blockade\, Qatar is now a net exporter of poultry products. Also\, there has been a considerable upsurge in company registration in Qatar’s financial center. Wright proposed that there is a need to study whether this increase indicates anything significant.  \n\nWright’s final point revolved around the question of how the Qatari economy has adjusted to the attack on the country’s currency? Following the blockade\, there was threats of war\, but a more significant threat was that of debasing the currency. However\, Qatar has a strong credit rating\, and there was a massive upsurge in the bond market\, which made it easier for the country to secure its currency. Lastly\, in-depth analysis of Qatar’s logistical supply management during the blockade merits further study. \n\nAlanoud Al-Maadid led a discussion on the impact of the blockade on GCC stock markets. Al-Maadid focused on the financial performance of the stock markets\, the high degree of market integration between GCC countries\, and how positive or negative political and business news have impacted the performance of the regional markets since the Gulf crisis. Al-Maadid’s data demonstrates the most of the political news content in GCC newspapers leans towards the positive\, while economic or business news reporting is often considerably more negative. She noted that when the stock market is in an upwards or strong position\, the impact of negative news appears insignificant. However\, when the stock market is in a weaker position\, the impact of negative news seems to have a significant impact. Additionally\, political news appeared to have less impact of on the stock market than business and economic news. Al-Maadid highlighted the GCC’s “cross-border effect\,” arguing that the boycott of Qatar has negatively affected all GCC countries’ stock markets\, and\, if lifted\, it will have a positive cross-boundary impact for all stakeholders involved. \n\nAbdullah Al-Arian discussed the Muslim Brotherhood factor in the GCC Crisis. Al-Arian provided some insights into why the Muslim Brotherhood is so vigorously targeted by several GCC monarchies\, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Al-Arian suggested that one of the primary reasons behind the distrust and dislike of the Brotherhood is the view that it cannot be “bought off” or co-opted by the Gulf states’ leadership. In addition\, the Brotherhood’s transnational networks allow it to accumulate cross-border support and to potentially mobilize national populations across borders. The Brotherhood has frequently called for political reform\, and its anti-monarchical stance instills unease in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Further complicating the matter is the different variations of Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated organizations in the Middle East\, which makes it challenging to suppress the organization entirely or to it shut it down. \n\nAl-Arian suggested that there are several potentially interesting areas of study to be undertaken. First\, the overall impact of limited movement on the group due the blockade\, needs to be studied. Second\, the study of broader political order\, needs in depth analysis. It is important to study whether Muslim Brotherhood groups are being used as proxies for political gains by the blockading countries. A third question to consider is whether the anti-Muslim Brotherhood stance is a form of regional Islamophobia being deployed by Gulf rulers in order to garner international support. Finally\, it is important to have a deeper understanding of why Qatar has adopted a pro-Muslim Brotherhood position\, and what benefit it perceives to accrue from its relationship with the Brotherhood. \n\nAbdullah Baabood led a session on the role of Oman during the crisis. Baabood stated that Oman has been caught in the crossfire during the blockade\, and while the leadership of Oman has tried to balance its relations with its various Gulf neighbors\, the Omani public has demonstrated a more openly pro-Qatar stance in the midst of the crisis. While Kuwait played a more proactive role to play in mediating between the UAE/Saudi Arabia and Qatar\, Oman has demonstrated an active interest in supporting a resolution of the ongoing dispute. Oman has a more complex and multicultural make-up than most of its GCC neighbours\, as well as a different pattern of historical development\, which has made its leaders more attuned to the need for compromise and peaceful accommodation. Oman is also suffering economic strains\, which has been worsened by plummeting oil prices\, and is facing increasing pressure from its own citizenry for better employment and financial conditions. Powerful neighbors like Saudi Arabia and the UAE have taken advantage of this and at times have further manipulated the situation to gain an upper hand. Economic concerns and domestic political stability are occupying most of the Omani leadership’s attention\, which leaves it with little capacity to actively engage in resolving regional issues or taking a very strong stand in the matter. \n\nJuan Cole focused on Iran’s role in the GCC crisis. Cole suggested that Iranian-Qatari relations are not usually of any great significance or importance to either state\, but every once in a while relations are galvanized as was seen at the onset of the breakdown in GCC relations.  Iran is not a militarily aggressive state\, nor does it have hegemonic interests in Qatar\, although occasionally there are tensions with Qatar in regards to the North Field gas reserves\, which are shared by both states. In Syria\, Iran and Qatar have been supporting opposite sides in the conflict\, not due to ideological reasons\, Cole suggested\, but because Iran has critical\, realist interests in the preservation of the Assad regime.  Cole stated that it would be beneficial to the exciting literature to carry out a study on whether there is any long term traction to the Iran-Qatar relationship—will Qatar aim to strengthen and develop its economic and political relationship with Iran\, or was the closeness early on in GCC crisis just a temporary marriage of convenience? Is there something significant in terms of the GCC crisis serving as a turning point in Qatar-Iran relations\, or will this continue to be a relationship based on ambiguities? \n\nBulent Aras shed light on the role of Turkey during the crisis\, and specifically its active support for Qatar as opposed to Saudi Arabia.  It is important to study Turkey’s military presence\, military cooperation\, and joint defense arrangements with Qatar during the crisis\, and what it signifies about Turkey’s expanding role in the region. Turkey’s deployment of military personnel to Qatar after the blockade directly provoked concern from NATO and European states. But whether the surge in Turkish military presence in Qatar was done out of genuine and strategic considerations or merely for symbolic reasons requires deeper analysis. Do Turkey’s growing military and economic relations with Qatar reflect the AK Party’s broader ideology of supporting the Muslim Brotherhood\, or have these relations expanded as a result of other strategic and realist interests? Aras adduced that it may be a combined reflection of both nationalism and ideology that is driving this relationship\, while also remembering that perhaps the support to Qatar is being extended mainly by Erdogan and the AK Party rather than the country itself. \n\nJocelyn Mitchell discussed how the Gulf crisis has led to reconfigurations in Qatari national identity\, as well as different forms of expressions of nationalism. Mitchell suggested that nationalism can be conceptualized and studied at many different levels. In one respect\, nationalism is ideational and serves as an ideology of who belongs and who does not to a particular imagined political community. Civic nationalism is constructed and developed\, comes with various legal criteria and legal instruments\, and is based on rights and duties of states and citizens towards each other. Civic nationalism can be more exclusive or more inclusive\, based on how it is legally defined. Ethnic nationalism tends to be innately more bounded\, as is based on common language and shared cultural heritage\, which means it is hard to include broader groups within it. The sorts of nationalism that emerge in different contexts and eras change. This change\, Mitchell suggested depends on lived experiences of social groups\, and the means by which states try to develop or integrate parts of both civic and ethnic nationalism. \n\nFollowing on from the GCC crisis\, Mitchell suggested three particular areas of research regarding Qatari nationalism. First\, to what extent is nationalism and national identity in Qatar changing\, especially from one based on a regional ethnic narrative to one that is local ethnic and/or local civic national narratives? Second\, if the various Qatari social groups are being incorporated into a new form of nationalism\, how is this being done\, and what are the mechanisms for new inclusions? Lastly\, if the forms of nationalism and national identity are changing in Qatar\, in what areas are these changes occurring\, especially in the political and legal realms\, or in terms of new socio-cultural behavior and norms? \n\nThe working group’s final presentation was by Justin Gengler. Gengler discussed the importance of public opinion\, especially as a powerful tool for gathering data. Although Qataris have remained politically supportive of their state\, especially since 2017\, research needs to be conducted on various aspects of public opinion\, especially citizens’ negative response to the payment of taxes; how many people blame the state for the crisis; whether or not social relations between citizens and non-citizens have changed; and the changes in tribal differences within the society. Gengler believed that these questions would return interesting results and seeking answers to them is essential to understanding the blockade. \n\nThe scholars discussed a range of issues related to the blockade and also identified key gaps in research. The issues discussed at the working group included the role of various countries\, their ties with Qatar\, and the use of tools such as public opinion. \n\nTo view the working group agenda\, click hereTo read the participants’ biographies\, click hereRead more about this research initiative\n\nParticipants and Discussants:  \n\nAbdullah Al-Arian\, Georgetown University in QatarAlanoud Al-Maadid\, Qatar UniversityMuna Al-Marzouqi\, Qatar UniversityIan Almond\, Georgetown University in QatarBulent Aras\, Sabancı University\, TurkeyAbdullah Baabood\, University of Cambridge\, UKZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarChaïmaa Benkermi\, Georgetown University in QatarJuan R.I. Cole\, University of Michigan\, USJustin Gengler\, Qatar University Islam Hassan\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarJocelyn Sage Mitchell\, Northwestern University in QatarKhushboo Shah\, Georgetown University in QatarJames Reardon-Anderson\, Georgetown University in QatarDavid B. Roberts\, King’s College London\, UKElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarSteven Wright\, Hamad Bin Khalifa University in Qatar\n\nArticle by Islam Hassan\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/gcc-crisis-qatar-and-its-neighbors-working-group-i/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190416T124500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190416T140000
DTSTAMP:20260611T155818
CREATED:20190521T060437Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T092035Z
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SUMMARY:The History and Evolution of American Torture and Secret Prisons (1898–2008)
DESCRIPTION:GU-Qatar senior Ritica Ramesh presented her thesis research at a CURA Focused Discussion on April 3\, 2019\, in a talk entitled “History and Evolution of American Torture and Black Sites (1898–2008).” Ramesh outlined the history of the US government’s use of torture as an official policy in its warfare\, going back to the Philippine-American War of 1898. Her initial interest in this topic developed during a semester abroad at Georgetown’s main campus in Washington\, DC\, when she was researching the criminal justice system\, prisons\, and punishment in the US. \n\nRamesh takes the cases of the Philippine-American War (1898–1902)\, the Vietnam War (1965–1972)\, and the Global War on Terror (2001–present)\, to demonstrate how the US government has devoted massive resources to the study and development of torture\, and how various techniques have evolved over the last century—including the construction of “the ideal physical space in which to conduct torture\,” she said.  \n\nRamesh explained that although the United Nations Convention against Torture includes the physical and psychological aspects of torture in its definition of the term\, it is difficult to find a concrete definition of torture due to the political nature of the practice\, and because the definition has changed throughout history. Another important term is “black sites\,” which she said are “usually—but not always—classified facilities that operate in an extralegal capacity\, where clandestine military or intelligence operations are carried out.” The definition of black sites is contested and does not constitute a legal term; this is important because the US government has used black sites extensively to carry out torture. \n\n“After the abolishment of slavery in 1865\, torture against African Americans became more institutionalized\, and this continued in the form of convict leasing and chain gangs.” \n\nWhile Ramesh’s primary thesis was on torture conducted by the US government abroad during wartime\, the development of torture in early American history took place on American soil. “American torture is closely linked to the domination of Native Americans as well as African Americans\,” she said. As part of a domestic imperial project\, American military forces frequently targeted indigenous peoples through reservation policies imposed in the late 1700s. During this time\, people were forced into concentration camps\, starved for days on end\, and torture was used as a form of punishment\, she said.  \n\nSlaves\, especially Africans\, faced horrendous abuses throughout American history. Slavery was a form of torture\, along with practices such as branding people with hot metal\, brutal beatings\, and rape. Ramesh reported\, “After the abolishment of slavery in 1865\, torture against African Americans became more institutionalized\, and this continued in the form of convict leasing and chain gangs.” She pointed out that in the American south\, African Americans “were arrested for pretty much just existing\,” and were compelled to perform exhaustive labor without pay under the convict lease system. When that practice was banned\, another exploitative scheme arose—that of chain gangs. These are examples of how “the use of torture very much existed in America much before the American colonial project moved abroad\,” Ramesh said. \n\n“When the American colonial project began in 1898\, America brought with it a very punitive system of policing and punishment that it fully exploited in the Philippines\,” Ramesh said. During the Philippine-American War\, “local Filipinos were seen as savages who needed harsh methods in order to be civilized like the whites. This really drove much of the American ideology during the Philippine-American War\,” Ramesh said.  \n\nInterrogators in the Philippines experimented with torture techniques\, including stress positions and beatings\, and many Filipinos were imprisoned in concentration camps\, where overcrowding\, starvation\, and diseases were very common\, according to Ramesh. One of the foremost torture techniques used for the purposes of obtaining confessions in the Philippines was the “water cure\,” in which water was forced into a victim’s throat and nose to induce a sensation of drowning. It is extremely painful and known to cause severe psychological trauma. This was a precursor to the torture technique known as waterboarding today\, which is illegal under US and international law. However\, the Central Intelligence Agency was discovered using waterboarding in secret prisons following the 9/11 attacks\, justified as “enhanced interrogation.”  \n\nBy the Vietnam War\, other torture methods had been developed\, particularly psychological control. The US government created a program called MKUltra\, which studied the usefulness of LSD and other drugs for the purposes of interrogation and torture. The Phoenix Program marked the first time in American history that the government recognized the importance of conducting torture in a specialized physical space. Additionally\, Ramesh reported\, the US Army and the CIA created interrogation manuals that were used in military training curricula beginning in the late 1980s\, but especially after 9/11 to increase effectiveness of torture in places like Guantanamo Bay. “The practice of torture abroad as well as in the domestic sphere are closely interlinked and cannot be separated\,” she said. \n\nAfter 9/11\, the CIA opened black sites all around the world\, including in Thailand\, Afghanistan\, Cuba\, and Iraq\, Ramesh said. However\, when these illegal sites were discovered\, public anger over US torture practices drove the government to establish floating prisons\, which allowed the military to evade international law as well as domestic law\, and the practice of torture was continued. \n\nPresident Trump was vocal about his positive views on torture during the election campaign and throughout his presidency. Although a US senate investigation found that torture is not actually effective\, Ramesh said\, Trump has openly said that he would bring back the CIA’s enhanced interrogation program and water boarding\, because he believes that it works. The rise of international law and norms has not deterred the use of torture\, Ramesh said\, but it has only encouraged the US government to come up with new evasive strategies.  \n\nRitica Ramesh (class of 2019) is a Georgetown University in Qatar senior majoring in International History with a certificate in American Studies. She served as president of the Human Rights Club and was a founding member of the Future is Female Program. Her main research interests are American history\, and the US criminal justice system.  \n\n  \n\nArticle by Abdul Rehmaan Qayyum\, CURA Research Assistant 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/history-and-evolution-american-torture-and-secret-prisons-1898-2008/
CATEGORIES:American Studies,Race & Society,Student Engagement
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