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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190116T124500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190116T134500
DTSTAMP:20260404T180950
CREATED:20190204T132909Z
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SUMMARY:Fundamentalist Metamorphosis: Hezbollah’s Ideological Evolution from Idealism to Pragmatism
DESCRIPTION:On January 16\, 2019\, CIRS invited Middle East analyst Massaab Al-Aloosy to discuss his research on “Fundamentalist Metamorphosis: Hezbollah’s Ideological Evolution from Idealism to Pragmatism.” During the talk\, he mapped out the trajectory of Hezbollah (“Party of God”)\, a political and militant Shiʿa Islamist movement\, from its origin to the present. The organization came into existence following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982\, and was primarily concerned with ending Israel’s occupation in Lebanon and supporting the Palestinian cause.  \n \n \nBefore it was officially organized in 1985\, Hezbollah worked as a clandestine operation inspired by several geopolitical events\, including the Iranian Revolution and the overthrow of the shah in 1979\, and Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionized Shiʿa theology\, which was exported to Shi’a communities\, including those in Lebanon. Aloosy said that Khomeini “gave a directive for the clergy in ruling the country and being involved in politics. This had great ramifications in the region as a whole\, but specifically for the Shiʿa and the Arab world.” \n \n \nAnother event inspiring Hezbollah’s actions was Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 in its attempt to uproot the Palestinian Liberation Organization from southern Lebanon. According to Al-Aloosy\, “This was a massive shock for the Lebanese and the Arab world\, to see an Arab capital invaded by Israelis forces.” This event profoundly affected the Shiʿa in the Lebanon because of their constant friction with Israel\, leading Hezbollah to launch military operations against Israeli targets\, including an Israeli encampment—one of their most devastating attacks against the Israeli Defense Forces (IDS). \n \n \nHezbollah “reflected much of Iran’s revolutionary rhetoric; the oppressed versus the oppressors; siding with the people; creating revolutions throughout the region.” \n \n \nHezbollah sent an open letter to the world in 1985\, declaring its goals. “It reflected much of Iran’s revolutionary rhetoric; the oppressed versus the oppressors; siding with the people; creating revolutions throughout the region\,” Al-Aloosy said. One goal was to create an Islamic state\, which proved extremely ambitious because Lebanon is a “multi-confessional\, multi-religious\, multi-ethnic\, multi-sectarian country.” Another goal was to destroy Israel; Hezbollah “considered Israel as a cancerous gland\, which should be completely destroyed; and they would not stop until they liberated every inch of Palestine\,” he said.  \n \n \nIn 1989\, Saudi Arabia gathered many Lebanese politicians together and paid them handsomely to sign an agreement to end the Lebanese civil war and amend the divided political system\, he said. Hezbollah was initially against the Taif Agreement\, but later decided it was necessary to engage in Lebanese politics. Taking this pragmatic step\, Al-Aloosy said\, Hezbollah “had a revolutionary outlook that had completely changed with accepting the political system.” \n \n \nDuring the 1990s\, Hezbollah underwent a process of “refashioning Islamism\,” Al-Aloosy said. In the 1980s\, their positions had been quite extremist\, but over time\, “they changed all of this rhetoric\, and they tried to change the interpretation of what they said.” Hezbollah’s focus was on Israel\, and their perspective had become more nationalistic than Islamist. For example\, Al-Alsoosy said that the rhetoric became: “We are here to liberate Lebanese land\, mainly. This is our objective.”  \n \n \nThe quest for an Islamic state remained\, however\, but it was “indefinitely postponed\,” Al-Aloosy noted. Additionally\, Hezbollah acknowledged that the goal of an Islamic state did not mean that it will be imposed by force\, and it had to come with the consensus of all Lebanese. “You can imagine how impossible that would be\,” Al-Aloosy said\, “not even the Shiʿites themselves agree on an Islamic state.” Reaching a consensus among Lebanon’s many communities—including Sunnis\, Christians\, and Druze\, among others—was considered an almost impossible feat\, he said.  \n \n \nFurther\, in 1999\, Ehud Barak was elected Prime Minister of Israel on a platform of withdrawing Israeli forces from Lebanon\, which occurred in 2000. Despite this\, Hezbollah continued its attacks on Israel from 2000 to 2006\, but these were not as intense as those of the 1990s. In 2006\, “a big miscalculation by both Hezbollah and Israel happened\,” he explained. Now under the premiership of Ehud Olmert\, Israel decided it would destroy Hezbollah. In 2006\, a war erupted between Israel and Hezbollah\, lasting for over a month. Hezbollah was not destroyed in this conflict\, but\, since then\, the border between Israel and Lebanon has been comparatively quiet. \n \n \nSyria\, throughout the 1990s\, had been using Hezbollahs’ attacks to pressure the Israelis to the negotiating table\, Al-Aloosy said\, but Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon deprived Syria of a very important negotiating tool with the Israelis. With the civil uprising in Syria in 2011\, “this was yet another event that served to make Hezbollah’s ideology more pragmatic and less idealistic\,” Al-Aloosy said. Instead of siding with the oppressed\, Hezbollah chose to side with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.  \n \n \nIn conclusion\, Al-Aloosy argued that Hezbollah has transformed from an offensive force against the Israelis to liberate the south of Lebanon\, into a deterrent force. Hezbollah continues the rhetoric of liberating Palestine\, he said\, but does not actually do much about it. Hence\, “when it comes to creating an Islamic state\, it is very clear this goal is unattainable especially in the sectarian mosaic of Lebanon. Thus\, they engaged in changing the rhetoric and changed their outlook indirectly.” \n \n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Khansa Maria\, CURA Publications Fellow \n \n \n \nMassaab Al-Aloosy received his PhD and Masters of Art in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Previously\, he worked with the World Peace Foundation and is currently working as a producer with the Al Jazeera Network. He is the author of a forthcoming book\, titled Changing Ideology of the Hezbollah Insurgency and Civil War in the Middle East. \n \n \n 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/fundamentalist-metamorphosis-hezbollahs-ideological-evolution-idealism/
CATEGORIES:Distingushed Lectures,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190120T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190121T160000
DTSTAMP:20260404T180950
CREATED:20190226T131458Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T092505Z
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SUMMARY:Russia and the Middle East Working Group I
DESCRIPTION:On January 20-21\, 2019\, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) held the first working group under its research initiative on “Russia and the Middle East.” Over the course of two days\, scholars were convened to discuss different aspects of Russian-Middle Eastern relations\, including: Russian “responsibility to protect” in the Middle East; Russian “sovereign democracy\,” Middle Eastern investments in Russia\, migration between Russia and the Middle East\, ISIS in the North Caucuses\, Russia-GCC relations\, the Yemeni civil war\, and Russia-Iran and Russian-Maghreb relations. \n\nRoy Allison started the working group discussions with his presentation on “Russian vs. Western “Responsibility to Protect” in the Middle East.” Allison suggested that RTP is too narrow for understanding normative claims-making competition between Western States and Russia in the Middle East. He added that Middle East is just one theater among others where Russia and the West have been competing over international norms relating to sovereignty and rights\, as well as international justice and international order. Germane to this discussion\, Allison suggested that the West is not a united bloc when it comes to normative claims making in the region\, as a number of Western countries\, such as the United States\, currently appears to have slightly withdrawn. Allison highlighted a number of areas that could benefit from in-depth study\, among which: the reception of Russian legal and normative claims by Middle Eastern states\, the controversy of international legal claims\, and the development of laws and norms about drones and other efforts to fight transnational terrorism. \n\nFollowing Allison’s discussion\, Viacheslav Morozov presented on the “Prospects of Russian ‘Sovereign Democracy’ in the Middle East.” Morozov argued that while Russia is not actively promoting sovereign democracy as a principle as strenuously as has done previously\, the thinking behind sovereign democracy still exists in Russia’s foreign policy approach. There is complexity to determining exactly whether sovereign democracy is a model of governance that evolved in Russia or whether it is more of an ideology. Sovereign democracy is characterized by direct intervention by the state in running state affairs and the emphasis in “sovereign democracy” is on sovereignty rather than democracy. The rationale is that individual rights can only be protected when there is a strong state that can act as the vanguard of rights. In this line of thinking\, sovereignty is understood as being non-interventionist. But given that democracy is an empty signifier\, similar to “humanity\,” Russia is questioning the universality of international constitutions. Finally\, Morozov discussed the applicability of the Russian model of democracy in the Middle East.  \n\nCaner Bakir shifted the working group discussions to “Russia: An Emerging Market for Middle Eastern Investments?” Bakir claimed that Middle Eastern foreign direct investments in Russia are increasing\, particularly by the United Arab Emirates. However\, the share of Middle Eastern investments in Russia’s inward foreign direct investments is significantly small. Such reality provokes questions around Middle Eastern multinational corporations. Bakir proposed a number of areas related to Middle Eastern multinational corporations that deserve study. Among such topics: the dynamicity\, drivers and challenges of multinationals; the impact of multinationals on state bureaucracy; the difference in multinational corporations’ behavior from one sector to another; the competitive advantages of Middle Eastern multinational corporations; and what Middle Eastern multinational corporations can offer to the Russian economy. \n\nAndrei Korobkov discussed another aspect of Russian-Middle Eastern relations\, particularly: “Contemporary Migration Patterns between Russia and the Middle East.” Korobkov stated that Russia and the Middle East\, given their multiethnic histories\, have always been key players in global migration patterns. However\, particularly with the creation of the modern state in the Middle East and fall of the Soviet Union\, Middle Eastern countries and Russia have followed the European model of immigration\, by developing strict naturalization policies. Korobkov added that while the numbers of Middle Easterners immigrating to Russia—as students\, former students\, refugees\, or spouses of Russians citizens—have been increasing\, only two to three percent of Russians intending to leave Russia say they want to immigrate to the Middle East. Finally\, Korobkov claimed that environmental and political factors will continue to drive migration from the Middle East to Russia.  \n\nSergey Markedonov focused the discussion on “Russia\, the Islamic State\, and Wilayet Qawkaz.” Markedonov argued that the Middle East is of symbolic importance for Russian foreign policy\, particularly with the ongoing Syrian conflict. Russia discovered new horizons in the Middle East that could help in Russia’s desire to compete once again with the United States for global dominance. However\, besides the Russia-US rivalry\, Markedonov claimed that the Islamic States in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is yet another major driver behind Russia’s recent involvement in the Middle Eats. ISIS is seen as one of Russia’s main security threats. The North Caucuses’ allegiance to ISIS and the establishment of the Wilayat Qawkaz have become a security priority to the Russian government. Markedonov delved deeper into investigating Russia’s state-Islam relations.  \n\nNikolay Kozhanov shifted the discussion to “The Drivers of Russia-GCC Relations Post 2011.” Although the Soviet Union always had interest in forming closer ties with the Persian Gulf states for geostrategic motives\, the Soviet Union and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf had had troubled relations instigated by ideological differences. With the fall of the Soviet Union\, and particularly with the ascendance of Vladimir Putin to power\, Russia started becoming increasingly pragmatic in its foreign policy. Kozhanov argued that over the past few years\, Russia has been attempting for a rapprochement with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states; an attempt with high chances of success. However\, Kozhanov highlighted the fact that Russia does not have diplomatic experience is dealing with the GCC states\, with exception of Kuwait to a certain extent. The attempt of rapprochement is driven by Russia’s economic and security interests at the backdrop of sanctions imposed on Russia\, Russia’s relations with the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)\, and the government’s pursuit to maintain a higher oil price. Kozhanov stressed the argument that the willingness for a rapprochement between Russia and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf is not one-sided. For the GCC states\, better relations with Russia are important given Russia’s increasing involvement in the Middle East\, particularly in Syria. As far as oil and gas production are concerned\, it is in Saudi Arabia’s interest to have Russia “dance around” OPEC. Saudi Arabia is also interested in economic diversification. To that end\, Russia could be a potential investor\, and exporter of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) given Saudi’s current troubled relations with its main LNG exporter\, Qatar. However\, it is important not to limit the economic relationship between Russia and the GCC states to merely oil and gas. Russia also has developed economic relations related to high-tech and agriculture in the region. In conclusion\, Kozhanov suggested that Russia’s close relations with Iran will remain an obstacle to solidifying its ties to the GCC. Further complications are caused by the current geopolitical rift between Qatar and its neighbors\, as Russia is reluctant to pick sides in the matter. \n\nSamuel Ramani focused his discussion on “Russia and the Yemeni Civil War.” Ramani argued that Russia has been reluctant to pick sides in Yemen unlike in Syria. However\, it has been trying to bring conflicting parties to the dialogue table. In such attempt\, Russia has been banking on its historical relations with Yemen\, particularly South Yemen. Hence\, Ramani claims that when studying Russia’s current mediation role in Yemen\, one has to consider the Soviet Union’s role in the Yemeni civil war and unification process in 1990. Ramani claimed that one of Russia’s strategic interests in having a stable Yemen is to use it as a naval base to project power in the Red Sea. In addition\, the administration in Russia has been finding ways to project and build up on its soft power to reintroduce itself as a key player in international institutions and multilateral negotiations. These attempts by the current Russian administration are palpable in Russia’s addressing of the humanitarian situation in Hodeidah\, and the sending of a humanitarian convoy to whitewash its image in the Middle East\, and project an image better than that of the “destructive” United States internationally. Ramani added that Russia’s diplomatic engagement with the Houthi rebels is worth exploring. Russia has consistently maintained its stance on inviting Houthis to the negotiation table while supporting the arms embargo and criticizing the Houthis’ missile attacks on Saudi and assassination of Ali Abdullah Saleh. However\, Russia appears to have a disaggregated image of the Houthis. They draw a distinction between radical Houthis and the Houthi leader. Ramani also argued that there seems to be an ostensible synergy between Iran and Russia when it comes to perceived solutions to the Yemeni civil war. Both countries prefer diplomatic dialogue and object American military intervention. \n\nGhoncheh Tazmini sharpened the discussion on Russian-Iranian relations by presenting on “Iran: A Strategic Partner or a Provisional Counterweight?” Tazmini claimed that the relationship between Iran and Russia\, at least on the surface\, is inconsistent. There is a degree of ambiguity around the quality and durability of Russian-Iranian relations. Such ambiguity is stirred by actions such as the Russian delay in constructing a contracted light water reactor in Iran from 1995 to 2003\, and the delay in delivering the Russian S300 missiles\, which were dispatched a decade later. At the same time\, Russia has supported Iran’s economy by inviting it to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana and supporting a three-year provisional free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union in 2018. As far as Iran is concerned\, the Iranian leadership allowed Russian boots-on-ground on its territory\, which is undoubtedly against the Iranian revolutionary\, anti-imperialist narrative. Tazmini also claimed that Russian-Iranian relations have developed after the fall of the Soviet Union. Since then\, the intensity and depth of Russian-Iranian relations have been significant. Having said that\, Tazmini highlighted the importance of studying the Russian-Iranian relations through the prisms of ideations\, preferences\, and identities. \n\nYahia Zoubir concluded the working group discussions with his presentation on “Russia’s Maghreb Moment.” Historically\, particularly during the Soviet Union era\, Zoubir claimed\, Algeria was the Soviets’ only partner in the Maghreb region. While it could be argued that Libya was military aligned with the Soviets\, politically it was not. In recent years\, Russia has been seeking a grand ingress to the Maghreb. Russia sees the Maghreb states as potential economic partners. Hence\, the Russian government is in talks about establishing a free trade zone in Morocco and has recently signed a number of contracts with Maghreb states. These contracts include agricultural agreements with Morocco; tourism agreements with Morocco and Tunisia; and oil and gas\, and infrastructural cooperation with Algeria. Zoubir explained that one of the reasons behind Russia’s increasing interest in the Maghreb is that\, unlike the Americans and Chinese\, the Russians see the Maghreb as an extension of the Mashreq. Hence\, its importance stems from the Middle East’s importance to Russian interests. In addition\, the Maghreb is part of the Mediterranean; a region Russia has interests in. In forging stronger relations with the Maghreb states\, Zoubir claimed that Russia banks on the Russian oil and gas companies operating in Algeria\, and its relations with the Algerian military. \n\nIt is worth mentioning that this research initiative will be published in an edited volume by CIRS in the near future. \n\nTo view the working group agenda\, click hereTo read the participants’ biographies\, click hereRead more about this research initiative\n\nParticipants and Discussants: \n\nRoy Allison\, University of Oxford\, UKZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarCaner Bakir\, Koç University\, TurkeyIslam Hassan\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarAndrei Korobkov\, Middle Tennessee State University\, USNickolay Kozhanov\, European University\, RussiaAnatol Lieven\, Georgetown University in QatarSergey Markedonov\, Russian State University for the HumanitiesSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarViacheslav Morozov\, University of Tartu\, EstoniaAbdul Rehmaan Qayyum\, Georgetown University in QatarSamuel Ramani\, University of Oxford\, UKGhoncheh Tazmini\, London Middle East Institute at SOASTatiana Usova\, Georgetown University in QatarElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarLuciano Zaccara\, Qatar UniversityYahia H. Zoubir\, KEDGE Business School\, France\n\nArticle by Islam Hassan\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/russia-and-middle-east-working-group-i/
CATEGORIES:American Studies,Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190127T124500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190127T134500
DTSTAMP:20260404T180950
CREATED:20190220T131604Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T092502Z
UID:10001385-1548593100-1548596700@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Taking Measure of American Foreign Policy
DESCRIPTION:CIRS invited Richard L. Russell\, professor at the National Defense University in Washington\, DC\, to deliver a talk titled “Taking Measure of American Foreign Policy” on January 27\, 2019\, in which he shed light on the Trump administration’s foreign policy. He began by noting that halfway through Trump’s term in office is an appropriate juncture for an assessment of his administration’s foreign policy\, but a definitive doctrine still cannot be identified. “It’s really hard for me to discern a ‘Trump doctrine.’ I mean\, beyond ‘Make American Great Again’ or ‘America First\,’” Russell said. “Maybe that captures the tone of the administration’s foreign policy\, but it doesn’t\, in my view\, capture a substance.” \n \n \nRussell used two international relations theories—realism and liberalism—to analyze the direction of Trump’s foreign policy\, but noted that it was hard to label Trump as either realist or liberal since the president does not fit into either school. Russell explained that Trump does not qualify as a liberal\, because he pays no regard to global democracy. Typically\, the United States promotes democracy abroad in order to minimize international risks\, but Trump “doesn’t promote democracy\, he doesn’t celebrate it\, and he doesn’t honor it. In fact\, personally\, he favors authoritarian states\,” like Turkey\, Egypt\, and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore\, Russel explained\, Trump has alienated leaders of Western democracies\, including the French\, German\, and British authorities. \n \n \nFurther\, Russell argued that Trump does not fit into the liberal model because of his “disdain for multinational institutions\,” as was evidenced by his backing out of the Paris Agreement on climate change and his scorn for NATO. The president has had harsh words for the United Nations\, the World Trade Organization\, and the World Bank—international institutions that became the fabric of international relations after World War II\, which foster economic\, political\, and social stability internationally\, he said. \n \n \nTrump “doesn’t promote democracy\, he doesn’t celebrate it\, and he doesn’t honor it. In fact\, personally\, he favors authoritarian states.” \n \n \nNeither does Trump fit the realist model\, Russell explained. While some might consider the president to be a realist\, Trump has no appreciation for international balances of power. Traditionally\, nation-states balance power to prevent the outbreak of international violence according to realist theory\, but Trump is not working to accomplish this\, Russell said. For example\, while Trump is concerned about China’s trade policy\, he does not balance militarily or politically against China. Similarly\, the president has not counterbalanced Russia in Europe or the Middle East. Paradoxically\, Russell said\, while the Trump administration’s documents reflect a realist philosophy\, they bear “no resemblance to what President Trump talks about.” \n \n \nRussell explained that Trump thinks in terms of bilateral relationships and emphasizes the importance of nation-states at the expense of multi-actor alliances. “It is true that the nation-state is the pinnacle of power in international society\, but all nation-states operate in a web of interconnected economic\, political\, and cultural exchanges\,” and Trump is not disposed to even acknowledging this fact\, Russell noted. For example\, instead of communicating with Japan and South Korea\, with which the US has formal alliances\, Trump focuses on dialogue with North Korea. “That’s not the way to facilitate the formal treaty obligations that the United States has with the security partners in Asia\,” Russell said. \n \n \nTypically\, a US president surrounds himself with people who share his philosophy or worldview\, but Trump’s government is internally fractured\, Russell noted. Even before his election\, many traditional Republicans refused to support him. As a result\, Trump has relied on congressional and military staff to fill posts in his administration\, in the process blurring the lines between the military and civilian government. This\, coupled with the fact that Trump has removed two national security advisors in two years\, leaves him with an extremely fractured and inefficient team\, Russell said. The interagency process—the multilayered decision-making process used by the executive branch in all recent administrations—is also breaking down\, Russell said. Important decisions\, like withdrawing from Syria\, are made by Trump without consultation or critical expertise\, and by neglecting the diplomatic corps. Currently\, there is no Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East\, for the Pacific\, or for Europe\, and many diplomatic posts are currently vacant. \n \n \nIn conclusion\, Russell argued that Trump has managed to alienate the Intelligence Community during his time in office\, and civil-military relations are at an all-time low. Since the president views the military as his political base\, and has drafted military officers to fill national security positions\, “Trump runs the risk of politicizing the military at the senior levels and in the rank-and-file\,” Russell argued. Contrary to the president’s behavior\, the US has always had “a military that’s apolitical—that is to say\, it serves the US Constitution\, not a president.” As a final word\, Russell noted that the Trump administration is “breaking a lot of traditional norms that have held in both Republican and Democratic administrations in American foreign policy.” \n \n \nRussell noted that the views he shared during this talk were his alone and not the views of the NESA Center or the US government. \n \n \nArticle by Khansa Maria\, CURA Publications Fellow \n \n \n \nRichard L. Russell is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington\, DC. He also is a Lecturer at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. He received a PhD in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia and previously had appointments as Adjunct Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University’s Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service and Research Associate at Georgetown’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. Russell has published three books on intelligence\, American foreign policy\, and weapons proliferation in the Middle East. \n \n \n  \n \n \n 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/taking-measure-american-foreign-policy/
CATEGORIES:American Studies,Distingushed Lectures,Regional Studies
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