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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20180411T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20180411T200000
DTSTAMP:20260407T014333
CREATED:20180329T114412Z
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SUMMARY:The UAE in the Red Sea and East Africa
DESCRIPTION:The Center for International and Regional Studies invited\, Islam Hassan\, CIRS Research Analyst\, to present his study\, co-conducted with Nael Shama\, at a Dialogue event on April 11\, 2018. Hassan noted that\, for the past decade\, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has had foreign policy objectives in the Red Sea and East Africa in its pursuit of security and influence in the Middle East. The country has been heavily engaged in establishing military bases and acquiring operational and management rights over ports and economic zones in and around the Red Sea. This foray into one of the most important global shipping lanes is coupled with a significant naval presence in the Gulf of Aden and the Bab al Mandab Strait. Additionally\, the presence of private Emirati security companies in the region has expanded for the purposes of conducting anti-piracy operations and providing protection for UAE ships. \n\nDuring the long years of Sheikh Zayed Al-Nahyan’s rule (1971–2004)\, the UAE’s foreign policy was more idealistic than realistic and more reactive than proactive\, according to Hassan. It was “pan-Arabist at the zenith of pan-Arabism in the 1970s; turned slightly pan-Islamist in the heyday of pan-Islamism in the 1980s; and then became increasingly pragmatic in the decades that saw the decline of ideologies\, the 1990s and after\,” he argued. And in the precarious early years of the UAE federation\, founded in 1971\, Zayed had to contend with the ordinary challenges of state formation. Iran’s occupation of three Emirati islands in the same year meant that the UAE “was put on test from the first day of its formation\,” Hassan said. \n\n\n\n \n\nAfter the death of Sheikh Zayed\, the UAE witnessed five major developments on the domestic and regional levels: the massive wealth the country has generated in recent years; the 2011 Arab uprisings; the country’s intense rivalry with Qatar; the tension between the US and the UAE during the late years of the Obama administration; and the new leadership’s outlook. \n\nThe UAE’s economy enjoyed significant growth in the last decade. Since 2004\, the country’s GDP has more than doubled\, placing the country at third-highest in the Arab world for GDP per capita. This economic robustness has encouraged the new leadership to search for increased political influence and foreign investment opportunities\, especially in the Red Sea countries whose economies have been rising in recent years\, and are expected to grow in the future\, according to Hassan. \n\nSince 2011\, the Arab landscape changed dramatically\, especially following the uprisings. “A pan-Arab awakening that crossed borders with ease and unleashed deep forces of change; the Arab Spring sent shock waves throughout the ruling establishments in the Gulf monarchies\,” said Hassan. The UAE was not immune to the uprisings\, which struck the shores of Bahrain and neighboring Oman\, and echoed inside the UAE itself. Fear of potential spillover effects rose\, he said. With urgent appeals for reform and equality\, “particularly worrying to the Emirati leadership” was the potential for the local Al-Islah Islamist movement to become more active and influential. These regional developments were coupled by “deep cracks that have swept the GCC\,” and\, consequently\, the competition that has taken root with other Gulf states\, including Qatar\, he said. \n\n“A pan-Arab awakening that crossed borders with ease and unleashed deep forces of change; the Arab Spring sent shock waves throughout the ruling establishments in the Gulf monarchies.” \n\nHassan explained there were also three nearly simultaneous developments that “poisoned the strategic UAE-US alliance:” the gradual US shift from the Gulf region to the Asia-Pacific region; the US administration’s tacit embrace of the Arab Spring; and the landmark nuclear deal in 2015 with Iran. These developments cast doubt on the US commitment to maintaining its long-standing security umbrella over the Gulf region. Additionally\, fallout with Washington contributed to the strategic reformulation in the foreign policy of the UAE\, whose contours began to emerge more clearly after 2011. This included a disposition towards using military means\, he said. \n\nThe aforementioned domestic and regional developments were interpreted through the prism of “the overly ambitious new leadership” (Khalifa bin Zayed as the President of the UAE\, and Mohamed bin Zayed as Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi) that rose to power in 2004. The new leadership has a regional and international outlook that is conspicuously different from that of their reserved father\, according to Hassan. They tend to be more pragmatic\, realistic\, and confrontational in dealing with regional challenges. So rather than merely focusing on diplomacy\, mediation\, dialogue\, and foreign aid—tools used by Sheikh Zayed—the new leadership has sought influence through military engagement\, massive foreign direct investments internationally\, and military and naval presence beyond the country’s vicinity\, particularly in the Red Sea\, East Africa\, Yemen\, and Libya\, he said. \n\nThis foreign policy change\, which the UAE witnessed during the past decade or so\, involved not only a change in means (from soft to hard power)\, but also in goals (seeking security and pursuing increased regional influence)\, Hassan said. “These two objectives—security and influence—have been the driving motivations behind the UAE’s intervention [through economic investments and military presence] in the Red Sea and East Africa.” The UAE’s economic aid to East African countries has increased twentyfold between 2011 and 2013\, Hassan reported. The country’s “heavy investment with cash and guns” in the Red Sea region has included supplying economic aid\, building ports\, providing maritime services\, and establishing military and naval bases. \n\nThe regional competition over the Red Sea\, and its islands\, ports and straits\, has intensified in recent years with Egypt\, Turkey\, Saudi Arabia\, the UAE\, and Qatar\, and is likely to continue in the foreseeable future\, according to Hassan. “The transformation that has taken place in the foreign policy of the UAE over the past few years has been huge. It has not only involved a change in foreign policy means\, but also in the identification of new foreign policy problems and goals\,” he said. Whether the UAE can sustain such distant foothold in the Red Sea and East Africa despite competition with regional and international powers\, and maintain its alliance with Saudi Arabia and Egypt\, which allows the country to be active in areas always considered strategic depths of the two regional powers\, are things for time to unfold\, he said. \n\n  \n\nArticle by Khansa Maria\, CIRS Student Assistant. \n\n\n\nIslam Hassan is the Research Analyst at the CIRS\, Georgetown University in Qatar. His current research interests include state-building in the Gulf States and comparative politics and international relations of West Asia and North Africa. He coedited “The State of Middle Eastern Youth\,” a special issue of the journal The Muslim World (2017). His publications also include “The GCC’s 2014 Crisis: Causes\, Issues and Solutions” (in Arabic and English\, with Al Jazeera Research Center\, 2015); and “Jordan on the Brink\,” International Journal of Culture and History (2016). \n\n 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/uae-red-sea-and-east-africa/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20180412T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20180412T120000
DTSTAMP:20260407T014333
CREATED:20180606T113844Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210829T140628Z
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SUMMARY:CURA Seminar: Water and Conflict in the Middle East
DESCRIPTION:On April 12\, 2018\, CIRS convened its first CURA Discussion Seminar under the center’s new initiative: CIRS Undergraduate Research Advancement. The seminar was introduced to support the research needs of undergraduate students at Georgetown University in Qatar\, and to provide them with opportunities to hone their research skills. As part of the seminar\, CURA fellows discussed and critiqued two papers from the CIRS research initiative on “Water and Conflict in the Middle East.” \n\nMohammed Al-Jaberi (class of 2019) started the conversation with a brief summary of Marcus DuBois King’s article\, “A Watershed Moment: Hydropolitical Trends and the Future of Iraqi Kurdistan.” This paper addressed the increasingly contentious issue of water stress on the region\, due to Iraqi Kurdistan’s emerging socio-political trends\, as well as environmental changes such as demographic pressures; dam building by Iran and Turkey; declining water quality; recurring drought; climate change; and earthquakes. The author concluded that if the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) did not at least recognize the latter trends’ increasing threat to security\, they would further compromise the regions’ water security. King theorized that in order to avoid the adverse impact on Iraqi Kurdistan\, the KRG must place water stress as a priority and develop a comprehensive strategy to address the issue. \n\nRawan Al-Khulaidi (class of 2018) presented Nael Shama and Islam Hassan’s article “In Pursuit of Security and Influence: The UAE in the Red Sea and East Africa.” The article explored the ways through which the United Arab Emirates has attempted to assert its authority over the Red Sea and its ports\, showing the importance of the Red Sea and East Africa in the new Emirati leadership’s strategic interests. The article demonstrated how the UAE’s actions and policy arrangements in relation to the Red Sea and its ports reflect a larger change in its foreign policy\, which has been evolving for over a decade. This change in Emirati foreign policy is driven by the UAE’s economic wealth; the “rise of Islamism in the region;” the UAE’s military agendas in the border states of the Red Sea – especially those of Djibouti and Yemen; the political environment of the UAE post-Zayed; the shock of the Arab Spring politically and socio-economically; and\, finally\, UAE-US relations. \n\nFollowing the presentation of each paper\, the CURA fellows engaged in an insightful discussion on the structure and organization of the paper\, the employed theoretical and conceptual frameworks\, and the clarity of the argument. By focusing on the topic of water and conflict in the Middle East\, the students were able to employ the tools and skills of their respective majors—namely international politics\, culture and politics\, international economics\, and international history—to assess\, critique\, and provide feedback on the papers. Following the discussions\, Mohammed Al Jaberi and Waleed Zahoor (class of 2018) presented the fellows’ comments and feedback at the CIRS Working Group\, “Water and Conflict in the Middle East.” \n\nFor the participants’ biographies\, please click here. \n\nArticle by Amie Hewka\, CURA Fellow at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/cura-seminar-water-and-conflict-middle-east/
CATEGORIES:Regional Studies,Student Engagement
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20180415T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20180416T160000
DTSTAMP:20260407T014333
CREATED:20180520T082633Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T092906Z
UID:10001368-1523782800-1523894400@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Water and Conflict in the Middle East Working Group II
DESCRIPTION:On April 15–16\, 2018\, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) hosted the second working group meeting of its research initiative on “Water and Conflict in the Middle East.” Over the course of two days\, scholars came together to present their research papers on a variety of topics including\, water mismanagement in the Middle East\, the “weaponization” of water by the Islamic State\, Hydropolitical trends in Kurdistan\, community-based water practices in Yemen\, Emirati activities in the Red Sea and East Africa\, Turkish hydro-hegemony\, and groundwater use in the Middle East and North Africa. \n\nHussein Amery commenced the working group by presenting his draft article on “Water Mismanagement and Conflict in the Middle East.” In his article\, Amery highlights how competition for water supplies between riparian states has become more intense due to the significant increase in water demand. This increase in demand has been a result of a number of factors such as rapid population growth\, the improved quality of life\, climate change\, and geophysical conditions. Amery suggests that distrust between different water stakeholders within a country\, unilateral development along international water basins\, and gross mismanagement of water resources accentuate the problems facing several Middle Eastern states and raise the specter of water conflict. Amery’s paper is focused on two case studies: the Egyptian-Ethiopian conflict over the Grand Renaissance Dam over the Nile river\, and the completion between different riparian states along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. While filling a huge reservoir\, as part of a new large dam project\, is the principal trigger of conflict in the aforementioned cases\, historical distrust between governments\, water mismanagement\, as well as political instability remain the structural triggers for these conflicts. \n\nTobias von Lossow presented his paper on the “Weaponization of Water in the Middle East: ‘Lessons Learned’ from IS.” In this article\, von Lossow examines how actors engaged in armed conflict use water resources as instruments of power and war. The Islamic State weaponized water both as a tactic of war\, and also used water as a political and social tool for garnering people’s support and for state-building purposes. While von Lossow agrees that historically there have been numerous instances of water being deployed as a strategic weapon during conflict\, he suggests that the way in which IS weaponized water was different from what had previously been seen.  \n\nMarcus DuBois King’s article on Iraq examines hydro-political trends within Iraqi Kurdistan. Although Iraqi Kurdistan enjoys abundant water resources\, water stress has been increasing over the last few years. Water stress is being driven by changing demographics\, an increase of dam construction in neighboring countries\, and an overall declining quality of water. King argues that as water stress increases in the region conflict over water resources will inevitably increase. He concludes that water stress is likely to have an adverse impact on the security of Iraqi Kurdistan unless the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) recognizes addressing water stress as a priority and subsequently develops a comprehensive strategy to achieve that goal.  \n\nHelen Lackner shifted the discussion to “Revitalization of Community-based Water Practices in Yemen.” Lackner claims that in recent decades\, there have been calls for public participation in addressing most development issues\, whether rural or urban. Insofar as water management in Yemen is concerned\, for many years the rules of customary water management were the officially recognized mechanisms by the state. However\, these rules were transformed through political\, social\, and economic changes. Such transformation was driven by both domestic dynamics and external funding agencies. Lackner claimed that these developments had a significant impact on state institutions. The domestic- and external-led development interventions limited the control of water resources to state-bureaucrats and pro-state private beneficiaries. Finally\, Lackner argues that these developments coupled the rhetoric of ‘community empowerment’\, which has not empowered the community as much as it prioritized the concerns and interests of a minority at the helm of the state. \n\nIslam Hassan presented his co-authored article with Nael Shama on “In Pursuit of Security and Influence: The UAE in the Red Sea and East Africa.” The article highlights how in order to safeguard its stability and security at home\, thwart the threat of the burgeoning den of militant Islamists in Somalia\, Yemen\, and other East African states\, secure its trade relations and oil transportation routes\, and extend its regional influence\, the UAE decided to retain a strong foothold in East Africa. The control of ports and islands\, and the establishment and administration of military bases\, training centers\, and economic zones in the Red Sea\, the Arabia Sea\, the Gulf of Aden and the Mandeb Strait has offered the UAE the chance to achieve these objectives. As illustrated by this case study\, the authors argue that UAE’s foray into the Red Sea and East Africa is a manifestation of a significant transformation in the foreign policy of the UAE over the past few years. This transformation has not only involved a change in foreign policy means\, but also in the identification of new foreign policy problems and goals. \n\nPaul Williams discussed his article on “Turkish Hydro-hegemony and the Impact of Dams”. By focusing on the last three main dams of the Southeast Anatolian Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi or GAP)\, Williams highlights how Turkey has exhibited positive and negative types of basin-centric hegemony. He argues that the legitimacy of Turkey’s hydro-hegemony and GAP depends not only on Turkey’s measurable progress towards meeting infrastructure targets\, but also on the perception of GAP’s by both Turkey’s basin neighbors and intended beneficiaries living in Southeast Anatolia\, including large numbers of ethnic Kurds. He concludes that Turkey’s past threats to halt flow or its actual stoppages and its intended use of dammed water to flood guerrilla transit routes could alienate both the downstream states (relatively silent during the Syrian civil war) and Kurdish nationalists. Such broadcasting of dams as military objects\, Williams argues\, could make them targets and trigger conflict between the different stakeholders. \n\nElizabeth Wanucha concluded the working group discussions by presenting an article on “Supply\, Use\, and Implications of Groundwater Use in the Mideast/North Africa: A Review” co-authored by Mark Giordano\, Katalyn Voss\, and Signe Stroming. Giordani et al. argue that groundwater in the Middle East/North Africa has emerged as a critical resource to support the drinking water supply for booming population centers as well as agriculture expansion to promote food security. While we know groundwater resources are overused in most of this region\, as elsewhere\, an overall\, quantitative understanding of the available groundwater supply and use is missing as is an understanding of the social and political mechanisms that could help ensure equitable and sustainable management. In their paper\, Giordano et al. investigate the interplay between the technical understanding of groundwater resources in the Middle East/North Africa and the political\, economic\, and social dimensions driving use. They summarize the existing data on groundwater supply and demand\, discuss emerging points of tension among groundwater scarcity\, food security\, and global markets\, and highlight the challenge of transboundary water management as it relates to shared groundwater aquifers as well as the interplay between international rivers and their respective groundwater basins.  The authors conclude with a commentary on the need to leverage emerging technologies and data to better understand trends in groundwater supply and use across the region\, but more importantly\, suggest approaches for dealing with the short and long term political consequences likely to emerge as groundwater resources continue to diminish\, competition for water resources increases\, and food availability declines. \n\n  \n\nFor the working group agenda\, click hereFor the participants’ biographies\, click hereRead more about this research initiative\n\n  \n\nParticipants and Discussants: \n\nHussein A. Amery\, Colorado School of MinesMohammed Al-Jaberi\, Georgetown University in QatarZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarIslam Hassan\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMarcus DuBois King\, George Washington UniversityHelen Lackner\, University of LondonAnatol Lieven\, Georgetown University in QatarSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarJackie Starbird\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarTobias von Lossow\, Freie Universität BerlinElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarPaul A. Williams\, Bilkent University\, TurkeyWaleed Zahoor\, Georgetown University in Qatar\n\n  \n\nArticle by Islam Hassan\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/water-and-conflict-middle-east-working-group-ii/
CATEGORIES:Environmental Studies,Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20180426T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20180426T170000
DTSTAMP:20260407T014333
CREATED:20190714T104559Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T092826Z
UID:10001397-1524733200-1524762000@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Migrant Workers and Health in Qatar: Research Roundtable I
DESCRIPTION:The Center for International and Regional Studies collaborated with Qatar-based partners to study the health of migrant workers in Qatar with a roundtable meeting on April 26\, 2018. The project considers the state of healthcare provision to this segment of the population with a goal of contributing to the formulation of policy guidelines with suggestions for improvements to the state of migrants’ health. Currently\, there is limited scholarship on health and temporary labor migration in the context of the Gulf region\, most of which is anecdotal and journalistic. These accounts highlight the poor conditions of migrant workers’ health\, particularly in relation to their vulnerable position in Gulf society. \n \n \nThe research roundtable served as a preliminary brainstorming session with discussants from a variety of academic\, policy\, legal\, and healthcare backgrounds who addressed some of the broader issues on the overall state of migrants’ health in Qatar. The discussion was divided into broad themes regarding the social and political contexts of labor migrant conditions and healthcare in Qatar and the legal and regulatory framework. The participants highlighted areas in need of improvement and pointed out shortcomings that need to be addressed. The experts presented their research to provide a better understanding of migrant workers’ health conditions and healthcare delivery within Qatar. The primary research questions that emerged from this session will inform the agenda of a second research meeting\, to be hosted by in the near future.
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/migrant-workers-and-health-qatar-research-roundtable-i/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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