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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20171105T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20171105T170000
DTSTAMP:20260406T215920
CREATED:20171116T084903Z
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SUMMARY:Jeremy Koons Faculty Research Workshop
DESCRIPTION:A new book manuscript by Jeremy Koons\, associate professor of philosophy at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar (GU-Q)\, was featured recently in a CIRS Faculty Research Workshop. The manuscript The Ethics of Wilfrid Sellars was studied and discussed by specialist scholars from Europe\, the Middle East\, and South Asia during a full day event on November 5\, 2017. \n\nThe manuscript explains that\, suitably developed\, Sellars’s ethical theory has the potential to develop the tools to answer pressing moral questions. These include questions on moral statements\, moral reasoning\, moral judgments and motivation\, and how we fit morality into a scientific view of the world. Additionally\, Koons shows that elements of Sellars’s theory can be enriched by contemporary philosophical work—work by later Sellarsian philosophers\, by philosophers working on group intentions and cooperative rationality\, and more. In resolving these tensions\, and updating Sellars’s theory with more recent work in the field\, what emerges from Koons’s manuscript is a strikingly original and comprehensive theory that has much to contribute to contemporary debates. \n\nThe CIRS Faculty Research Workshop is a closed-door\, one-day seminar that brings together select renowned scholars for a focused discussion of a GU-Q faculty member’s book manuscript during its final stages of development. All participants receive the entire manuscript in advance of the meeting and each scholar leads a focused group discussion on assigned chapters. \n\nThis research workshop featured a talented group of internationally-recognized philosophers who specialize in Sellarsian and pragmatist philosophy. Participants engaged in a series of structured sessions on how this nearly neglected body of ethical theory has the potential to contribute to current philosophical debates on how best to answer crucial moral questions.  \n\nParticipant Amir Saemi\, faculty member at the School of Analytic Philosophy at the Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences\, said: “It is very exciting to know there will be a book long discussion of Sellars’s ethical works. No doubt that such a book would be a huge contribution to the current moral philosophy. I congratulate Dr. Koons for undertaking such a valuable project.” \n\nAttendees included Bana Bashour\, American University of Beirut; Arudra Burra\, Indian Institute of Technology Delhi; Dionysis Christias\, University of Patras; Anjana Jacob\, GU-Q; Bhaskarjit Neog\, Jawaharlal Nehru University; Amir Saemi\, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences; Lucas Thorpe\, Boğaziçi University; Jack Woods\, University of Leeds; and\, Bill Wringe\, Bilkent University. \n\nSee the workshop agendaRead biographies of participants\n\nJeremy Koons received his Ph.D. in Philosophy from Georgetown University in Washington\, D.C. His research focus is ethics\, epistemology\, metaphysics\, and philosophy of religion. Koons is author of Pragmatic Reasons: A Defense of Morality and Epistemology (Palgrave\, 2009)\, and co-author\, with Michael P. Wolf\, of The Normative and the Natural (Palgrave\, 2016).   \n\n 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/jeremy-koons-faculty-research-workshop/
CATEGORIES:CIRS Faculty Research Workshops
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20171108T124500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20171108T134500
DTSTAMP:20260406T215920
CREATED:20171121T132553Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T093451Z
UID:10001353-1510145100-1510148700@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:US-Iranian Relations in the Age of Trump: Back to the Future?
DESCRIPTION:In an October 13\, 2017 speech\, US President Donald Trump rejected the 2015 Iran nuclear deal—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—the arrangement made between Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany. The agreement had lifted economic sanctions on Iran and placed strict limits on its nuclear program\, and was a signature achievement of President Barack Obama. US legislation enacted in response to the agreement requires the president to certify every ninety days that Iran is in compliance with the agreement. Trump’s refusal to certify Iran’s compliance in October did not immediately pull the US out of the deal; instead it shifted the responsibility onto Congress\, which now has sixty days to decide whether to reimpose sanctions on Iran\, which could kill the historic deal.  \n\n  \n\nTrump has frequently criticized the agreement\, which he called “an embarrassment” and “the worst deal ever.” In his speech\, he claimed that Iran had been on the verge of total collapse before the deal\, and the country would have collapsed had it not been for the previous administration’s lifting of sanctions. Daniel Brumberg\, co-director of Democracy and Governance Studies at Georgetown University\, called this assertion “demonstrably crazy and false and baseless\,” and said “anybody who has an understanding of how this system works knows that it is simply false.” Brumberg delivered a talk\, “US-Iranian Relations in the Age of Trump: Back to the Future?” at the Center for International and Regional Studies on November 8\, 2017. He described Trump in a January 2017 article as “a narcissistic personality” and said his projections in domestic and foreign policy were a reflection of that narcissism\, adding\, “This is dangerous.”   \n\n  \n\n“I make the argument that those arguing for renegotiation know that this will not succeed. This is just a tactic to weaken support. They know that there can’t be a renegotiation of the deal and they don’t really want one at all.” \n\n  \n\nBrumberg said that Trump’s own advisors favored certification of the agreement and did not want to abandon it\, but it was well known that Trump was raging about it. They had to find a way to channel his rage into a more productive approach\, and they found a “compromise” by removing Trump from having to regularly certify that the Iran deal is in fact working. After he has been so publicly outspoken against it\, this avoided the potentially catastrophic consequences of him outright quitting the Iran deal.  \n\n  \n\nTrump’s speech would be interpreted in Tehran as the United States has decided to forgo the agreement and is getting ready to find a sanction-based or military-based solution\, said Brumberg. “It revives the perception that runs deep along the hardliners in Iran that ultimately for the US\, the only solution to Iran is to have regime change\,” he said. Iran’s Supreme Leader\, Ali Khamenei\, told Iranian President Rouhani in 2015 that he was wasting his time with the nuclear deal and the US would renege on the agreement\, according to Brumberg. And in the wake of Trump’s speech\, the hardliners now feel vindicated\, he said. “Now there’s this clampdown on the reformists and this motley coalition of forces that Rouhani has put together at a crucial time in Iranian history.” In the next few years the critical matter of who will succeed the Supreme Leader will be determined. In that sense\, Brumberg said\, as far as the hardliners are concerned\, “the speech could not have come at a better moment. It worked beautifully—almost as if they had written the script themselves.”   \n\n  \n\nBrumberg said that politically\, for Iran’s own internal politics\, it’s a disaster\, “but it is also a disaster for US foreign policy.” He said that because there isn’t a coherent alternative to the agreement\, Trump’s decision to undermine and sabotage it leaves the US without any policy at all. “When you don’t have a coherent policy\, when there’s a vacuum\, the chances for war increase. Now they’ve increased that much more.” It’s making everyone justifiably nervous\, he said.  \n\n  \n\nFor many years the US-Iran policy was incoherent and was basically forged on the basis of tactics and no clear strategic view\, Brumberg explained. For a long time the consensus policy had been maintaining and increasing sanctions\, and applying more pressure with the hope that the regime would change\, he said. But crippling sanctions never stopped Iran’s nuclear program\, and they acquired more centrifuges and more capability over time.  \n\n  \n\nAmerican policymakers didn’t want to choose because the choice was difficult to make\, Brumberg said. You have to go beyond tactics and have a strategic view of what you want to achieve and how you’re going to achieve it\, he explained. The problem for the US has been a short menu of choices. Brumberg said he is “thoroughly dubious” about alternatives to the JCPOA\, but he offered war as one possibility\, which some Congress members have advocated. “There’s no such thing as a short-term war\,” he said\, and “there’s also no such thing as an overnight attack.” The military would say a short-term attack will provoke a long-term war\, he explained. His other suggested strategies include engagement and diplomacy\, with some sort of negotiated outcome; or containment and deterrence\, which can go along with diplomacy and be blended in different ways.  \n\n  \n\nBrumberg explained that Obama supported the agreement because of the lack of a better alternative. He had inherited a very weak hand after the G.W. Bush term\, and the choice was an agreement or no agreement. “Once you decide on an agreement you’re going to negotiate. And negotiation means that each side gives in on certain kind of things\,” he said. The agreement is not just a US-Iran agreement and it is supported by the international community. He believes it is still a good agreement that provides controls and intents and supervision of Iran’s program for the next 20 to 25 years\, and possibly longer.  \n\n  \n\nBrumberg asserted the possibility that if this agreement were to hold\, and there would be an evolution in Iran’s own political system\, it might actually help over time to open up the space in Iran\, because from the perspective of the hardliners\, “conflict with the United States is fundamental to their existence\,” he said. “As soon as you don’t have that conflict their position is being undermined.” After the nuclear agreement was struck\, there was a very sharp reaction backlash from the hardliners\, he said\, which was a measure of how seriously they took the agreement. The backlash was against Rouhani and his people\, because from their perspective the deal was strengthening their domestic positions. Rouhani had been calling for international peacemaking and a world without violence\, Brumberg said.  \n\n  \n\nIf you look at Trump’s speech and the critiques of many of the experts who know the situation\, you can see that in terms of his criticisms of the agreement\, they really fell short\, Brumberg said. Trump either misrepresented the agreement or he distorted the facts on many issues. He said the agreement was about one thing only: nuclear weapons. Had the Iranians been asked to negotiate on the zero-enrichment of uranium policy\, or terrorism\, Hezbollah\, or Israel\, there never would have been an agreement\, he argued. \n\n  \n\nBrumberg said\, there’s a “nix or fix” scenario\, meaning let’s fix or renegotiate\, or nix it. He argued that you can’t renegotiate an existing agreement like this; you can start or propose new talks\, but you don’t renegotiate\, which Trump is pushing. “I make the argument that those arguing for renegotiation know that this will not succeed. They are waiting for the nix part. This is just a tactic to weaken support. They know that there can’t be a renegotiation of the deal and they don’t really want one at all\,” he said. Most of the critics of the nuclear deal actually want regime change\, however that’s going to happen. Blumberg’s solution is to use the elaborate mechanisms provided in the agreement for addressing concerns. “Jettisoning the agreement is no way of dealing with this challenge\,” he said.   \n\n  \n\nDaniel Brumberg is Co-Director of Democracy and Governance Studies at Georgetown University. He spent ten years as a Special Advisor to the United States Institute of Peace; and also served as a consultant to the US Department of State and the US Agency for International Development. He is the author of Reinventing Khomeini\, The Struggle for Reform in Iran\, (University of Chicago Press). He coedited Conflict\, Identity\, and Reform in the Muslim World: Challenges for US Engagement (USIP Press) with Dina Shehata; and Power and Political Change in Iran with Farideh Farhi (Indiana University Press). \n\n  \n\nArticle by Jackie Starbird\, Publications and Projects Assistant at CIRS.
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/us-iranian-relations-age-trump-back-future/
CATEGORIES:American Studies,Dialogue Series,Regional Studies
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20171112T124500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20171112T134500
DTSTAMP:20260406T215920
CREATED:20171130T081452Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T094642Z
UID:10001354-1510490700-1510494300@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Parental Discrimination over Diverse Schools: Evidence from a Randomized Online Survey in Denmark
DESCRIPTION:The education achievement gap between ethnic minorities and majority populations is persistent and even widening in the United States and Europe\, according to Mongoljin Batsaikhan\, Assistant Professor in Economics at Georgetown University in Qatar. At a Center for International and Regional Studies talk on November 12\, 2017\, Batsaikhan explained that the leading explanations for the gap include segregation\, discrimination\, peer dynamics\, and identity\, which are factors that often play out early in children’s lives.  \n\nIn 2015\, Batsaikhan and his colleagues conducted a research study into how the ethnic composition of daycare institutions affects parental preferences in Copenhagen\, Denmark. The team wanted to understand why people discriminate\, and why segregation and discrimination are very persistent over generations. Many economic studies have documented the existence of discrimination\, and segregating school children is known to have detrimental effects on ethnic-minority children\, he said. Additionally\, the environment in which kids grow up is important in forming their attitudes around diversity.  \n\nThis study looked at parents’ preferences in choosing schools because parents tend to put a great deal of thought into school choice. The research team wanted to see how parents made their choices and whether they could find discrimination in the selection process. They were motivated by these questions: Does the diversity of the environment affect the children’s preference and racial tolerance? And\, looking at parental preferences in daycares\, how are they shaped by the ethnic composition of the daycare institution? \n\n“It seems we have quite a lot of evidence that the environment kids grow up in is very important in forming a preference toward diversity.” \n\nThe motivation for the project was simple\, Batsaikhan said. He referenced the Civil Rights Movement in the United States and its efforts to end racial segregation and discrimination beginning around the 1950s. The landmark US Supreme Court case “Brown v. Board of Education” banned the segregation of black and white children in public schools in 1954. Yet\, African Americans in the US continue to face discrimination nearly sixty years later. “A lot of areas and schools have some sort of an ethnic clustering and segregation even now\,” Batsaikhan said. Pointing to the Black Lives Matter movement today\, he said\, “People don’t just go out to the street and randomly protest. They feel discriminated against. The existence of discrimination is real.”  Due to historical reasons we have this sorting and segregation problem\, he said\, and it persists today. The black/white achievement gap widened in the US in the 1990s\, he said. “You would expect it would shrink when you remove the segregation\, but it persisted and the gap persisted\,” he said. The same thing has also been happening in Europe and in Denmark. When comparing ethnic Danes with minority children\, often times the gap is greater\, he said. \n\nParents’ school choice is a form of sorting\, as are issues like neighborhoods with high tax rates and expensive housing that make it prohibitive for lower-income residents to enroll children in preferred schools\, Batsaikhan said. Inside the school\, the composition of the student population also has an effect on kids’ performance. “It’s not just the educational performance\,” he said\, “It is also exposure to a diverse community that will affect their future attitudes toward diversity.” Segregation creates a very strong sense of identity and people start labeling themselves and others (e.g. white\, black\, Asian)\, Batsaikhan said. Segregation affects children’s preferences and this was the motivation for this research\, he said\, “because parents’ preferences toward diversity become intergenerational.” \n\nEconomics literature has found that social interaction networks play a role in the formation of discriminatory beliefs toward other people\, Batsaikhan said. A key question in the study was: If you have a bit of a diverse environment\, will that affect children’s preference and racial tolerance? “It seems we have quite a lot of evidence that the environment kids grow up in is very important in forming a preference toward diversity\,” he said.  \n\nBatsaikhan shared a 2004 study that found discrimination in employment hiring when an African American-sounding name was used in job applications. When the name of the applicant was changed to a white-sounding name\, and everything else remained the same on an identical CVs\, those with white-sounding names were more likely to be called for an interview. Economists then try to answer: What kind of discrimination it is: taste-based or statistical? Batsaikhan’s team attempted to answer this question using a randomized trial\, a type of method to identify causality. They also used a Muslim-sounding name for the purpose of manipulating preferences and then to change parents’ perception by introducing additional information.  \n\nThe Copenhagen Daycare Survey was carried out as part of a large project on daycare assignment mechanisms. The web-based survey was distributed to parents with a child aged 7-19 months. A sample of 5\,000 was drawn randomly from city administrative registers and the response rate was about 50 percent. When the surveys were returned\, they were merged with  data held by Statistics Denmark\, which holds extensive background information on citizens\, such as a parent’s education and income.  \n\nIn the survey\, participants were initially asked to choose between two institutions that were based on sample testimonials from parents with children enrolled in daycare. Institution A was a highly-structured daycare\, which is a preferred style of daycare in many cultures. Institution B values freedom in instruction and children play outdoors for much of the day. Northern countries tend to value this free-play institution more than structured daycare.  \n\nSeven different surveys were sent randomly\, and each survey had six testimonials from parents sharing examples of what that liked about their school. Testimonials included a) the names of the parent and child behind the quote; b) the names plus the profession of the parent; c) no name or profession. Treatment choices included: a) only Danish-sounding names; b) a Muslim-sounding name; c) and the names with the parent’s profession included. A control group had no names associated with the testimonial.  \n\nThe researchers first examined the role of the Muslim-sounding name in the survey to determine if there was a difference in the reactions to a minority name in the free-play institution versus the structured institution. The survey revealed that 75 percent of parents preferred free-play to structured daycare. The structured daycare was preferred by ethnic-minority parents\, parents with lower education\, low-income parents\, families where the father earned more\, and when the child being placed in daycare was a boy.  \n\nInterpretation was as follows:  \n\nEstimation 1.  Comparing the responses of having an ethnic name in a free-play vs. structured institution; the latter had a negative and significant effect on the probability of preferring the structured institution.  \n\nEstimation 2.  Changing the information about the ethnic background of the mother (a Muslim-sounding name) in the free-play institution had no significant effect on the probability of preferring the structured institution.  \n\nRegarding the type of discrimination\, the researchers raised the question: Is there any effect on the preferences of information about the profession of the person behind the quote? The results showed that additional information about parent’s profession did not change the attitude toward the daycares with ethnic-minority names. This indicates that the discrimination is not statistical\, at least the missing information is not associated with the profession or skill of the ethnic minority parents. \n\nFinally\, the researchers explored who preferred the structured daycare because that is where the discrimination exists. The initial exploration indicates that low educated mothers and ethnic minorities and low income families tend to choose the structured daycares. The team is planning to further explore this and identify who tend to discriminate more against the diverse daycares. \n\nMongoljin Batsaikhan is Assistant Professor of Economics at Georgetown University in Qatar. His research field is Applied Microeconomics\, with a focus on social norms\, discrimination\, entrepreneurship\, and small and medium enterprises in developing countries. His work has been published in Management Science\, Economic Inquiry and Journal of Public Economics. He is a CIRS Faculty Fellow for 2017-2018. \n\nArticle by Jackie Starbird\, Publications and Projects Assistant at CIRS. \n\n  \n\n  \n\n 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/parental-discrimination-over-diverse-schools-evidence-randomized-online-survey/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Race & Society
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20171128T124500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20171128T134500
DTSTAMP:20260406T215920
CREATED:20171221T170255Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T094631Z
UID:10001355-1511873100-1511876700@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Tensions in the Middle East: A Tentative Assessment
DESCRIPTION:Mehran Kamrava and Gerd Nonneman\, both Professors of Government at Georgetown University in Qatar and experts on Middle East politics\, gave a talk entitled “Tensions in the Middle East: A Tentative Assessment” at GUQ on November 28\, 2017. They presented a broad overview of some of the major developments occurring in the region\, particularly in Syria\, Iran\, Lebanon\, and Saudi Arabia\, and some of the implications for Qatar and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). \n\n  \n\nKamrava opened with some background on the region since the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011. He explained that a decisive factor in influencing the outcomes of the uprisings was whether militaries abandoned their civilian leadership during the uprisings. In Tunisia and Egypt when the armed forces did abandon ostensibly civilian leaders\, there was a transition of power. Where the military did not abandon their civilian leadership\, or where the military itself was fractured\, there were different outcomes—mostly in the form of civil wars\, as seen in Syria\, Yemen\, and for somewhat different reasons\, Libya. \n\n  \n\n                                 \n\n                                                                  \n\nThe fracture of the post-uprising political system in these cases resulted in civil wars\, and civil wars facilitated and were also brought on by weak states—or collapsed countries. In Syria\, the top command of the armed forces stayed with the civilian leadership\, and Syria degenerated into a tragic and bloody civil war. “That afforded the opportunity for a number of external actors to step into Syria in the same way they had stepped into Libya and then later in Yemen\, to try and expand their influence\,” Kamrava said. In 2012 and 2013\, Syria became a battlefield for external actors. “What we have had is a stalemate in Syria\, in which now the fate of Syria is being decided by non-Syrians.”  \n\nIran’s self-interest drove it to be involved in Syria\, and those interests dictated that Iran prop up the existing Syrian regime\, Kamrava said. Iran and Russia became involved on the side of the Syrians at the same time that Qatar\, Saudi Arabia\, and initially Turkey\, were trying to foster the collapse of Syrian regime. “Iran’s intervention and proactive involvement in Syria on the part of the regime only fed into and reinforced a sectarian narrative that had previously been framed by the Bahraini government and Saudi government\, and Iran really only reinforced and added fuel to the sectarian fire through it’s own activities and initiatives\,” he said. \n\n  \n\n“Always on the verge of implosion\,” is Lebanon\, whose political system is so inherently fragile that the country is susceptible to the slightest pressure from within or from the outside. The fragility of its political system has continued since Lebanon’s long civil war ended in 1991. That weakness of the Lebanese central authority continued\, and the weaknesses gave birth to the armed group\, Hezbollah. Kamrava said it’s important to remember that Hezbollah is a Lebanese entity. “It is a political group that is also armed\, but it is also a political group that has engaged in an awful lot of civil society activities.” Hezbollah is also a close Iranian ally\, which has been a point of contention for Israel\, and also lately for Saudi Arabia. \n\n  \n\nSince 2013\, Saudi Arabia has adopted a radically different foreign and domestic policy—as compared to any time in its history—because of the ascendance of new political actors in the Saudi system\, namely the king\, Salman\, and his son\, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman. Kamrava said Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic and foreign policy initiatives have repeatedly hit roadblocks since 2013. “The war in Yemen was supposed to be a two-month endeavor and it still continues two years on with no end in sight. The blockade of Qatar was supposed to be a two-week endeavor and it still continues with Qatar in no mood to settle. The competition with Iran has not gotten anywhere. Saudi efforts in Syria have reached a deadlock\, and Saudi Arabia is now trying to organize its own Syrian opposition and it hasn’t gotten anywhere. And the forcible resignation of the prime minister of Lebanon seems to have backfired\,” he said.  \n\n  \n\nDespite these setbacks in foreign policy\, Kamrava argued\, Mohammad bin Salman appears to have had a number of successes on the domestic front. His domestic social and cultural reforms\, curtailing the powers of the religious police\, his anti-corruption drive\, and his attempts at dismantling the Saudi “deep state\,” all seem extremely popular with most Saudis and have so far not elicited any serious challenges. \n\n  \n\nNonneman agreed that Saudi Arabia\, and Mohammad bin Salman (“MbS”) in particular\, are worth focusing on because of the country’s regional superpower status\, its recent record of increased assertiveness\, and the striking changes in domestic and foreign policy that have been in evidence—not least in the Qatar boycott. Yet he pointed out that the role of Mohammad bin Zayed (“MbZ”)\, the Crown Prince but de facto ruler of Abu Dhabi\, is crucial in understanding many of these developments\, given his own ambitions for Abu Dhabi and the UAE\, and his influence on MbS. \n\n  \n\nHe noted that when it comes to the UAE’s role in the boycott or other regional issues\, it is important to distinguish the role of Abu Dhabi and its leadership. In UAE foreign policy\, the sheikhdoms that really count have always been Abu Dhabi and Dubai\, which are ruled by separate ruling families: the Al Maktoum in Dubai and the Al Nahyan in Abu Dhabi\, Nonneman explained. For many years after the UAE’s seven constituent emirates came together in 1971\, the federal constitution and the first president\, Abu Dhabi ruler Sheikh Zayed\, had brought a balance between unity and continued diversity—including in foreign policy and defense: Dubai had retained its separate defense force until 1997. This balance was managed to the benefit of the wider federation and of Dubai and Abu Dhabi in particular\, each of which had much to offer the other. \n\n  \n\nTwo shifts occurred in the UAE to change this picture\, Nonneman said. First\, Sheikh Zayed\, the charismatic founding leader of the UAE\, died\, leaving his son Mohammad bin Zayed as the power behind the throne of the new emir of Abu Dhabi\, Sheikh Khalifa. MbZ was very different: “sharp\, very ambitious for Abu Dhabi’s status and role\, very strongly military- and security-oriented in his world view\, and not particularly good at taking on board conflicting opinions.” There was\, though\, still a balance with Dubai and its ruler\, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid. Then came the financial crisis of 1998\, where Dubai suffered grievously and might have come close to bankruptcy\, had it not been for some $20 billion dollars of support from Abu Dhabi. So the power relationship has shifted\, with Dubai losing much of its autonomy in matters of foreign and security policy. Hence\, also\, the much better relations between the Al Maktum and Qatar’s Al Thani\, and Dubai’s much more pragmatic attitude towards Iran\, ceased to have the effect they once had\, he said. \n\n  \n\n“Mohammed bin Zayed was likely the main instigator of the level of vitriol directed at Qatar\, and of the harshness of the boycott\,” Nonneman suggested\, “out of his concern to contain any Qatari challenge to his policy concerns regarding Iran\, the role of political Islam\, and his essentially autocratic vision of rule—as well as any Qatari pretenses at regional prominence.” In much of this he found a sympathetic ear in MbS. Of course there had been frictions before in the GCC\, and even limited armed clashes\, but “never has there been anything like this—cutting off of social and kinship relations\, and buckets of vitriol being thrown at other ruling families.” The apparent and public attempts at regime change in Qatar\, “that was a novelty\,” he said.  \n\n  \n\nUnderstanding this shift requires an appreciation for how leadership and decision making have shifted in both the UAE and Saudi Arabia\, where Nonneman drew a parallel between leadership in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. “Decisions are made more impetuously than before\, without serious consideration of alternatives\, and without feedback from the sorts of voices that might have questioned lines of thinking.” One of the positives of the old Saudi system was there was always a variety of voices heard in decision-making circles\, and “policy was carefully calibrated and possible consequences and pros and cons debated. That’s gone.” In MbS’s court\, “there is nobody who dares question what he has decided.” The handling of the operation in Yemen\, the boycott against Qatar\, and the virtual kidnap of Lebanese Prime Minister Harari\, are examples of this much-narrowed decision-making environment\, he said. \n\n  \n\nNonneman agreed with Kamrava that the domestic reform agenda of MbS in Saudi Arabia is popular and holds out promise. Yet he cautioned that the key to success will not just be new social freedoms: it will be jobs—one of the key pressure points for the Saudi economy. “If the jobs don’t appear within the medium term\, then I fear a lot of latent resentments are going to bubble back up again\,” he said. \n\n  \n\nWhat does this mean for Qatar and the blockade? Nonneman said that there was little left in the toolbox of the boycotting countries—as the military option is off the table and Qatar has the wherewithal to sustain the blockade indefinitely. He did have one concern\, regarding the potential of Iran being drawn into wider regional conflicts. “If\, for instance\, the original Saudi plan had worked—of removing Hariri as the fig leaf for Hezbollah’s presence in Lebanon—it might have led to a wider military conflict.” If such dynamics brought Iran into direct conflict with Israel and the US\, it “would bring Qatar into a very difficult spot\,” he suggested.  \n\n  \n\nKamrava said there is usually very little cost to countries that impose sanctions on others; they have fewer incentives to settle and to resolve the conflict. Saudi Arabia has very little incentive to end the blockade against Qatar. “For the foreseeable future I don’t necessarily see a resolution\,” he said\, “but the rupture is there to stay for some time.” \n\n  \n\nArticle by Jackie Starbird\, CIRS Publications and Projects Assistant.
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/tensions-middle-east-tentative-assessment/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Regional Studies
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20171129T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20171129T170000
DTSTAMP:20260406T215920
CREATED:20180221T103603Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T093351Z
UID:10001357-1511942400-1511974800@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Supporting Social Science Research in a Turbulent Middle East Roundtable Meeting
DESCRIPTION:On November 29\, 2017\, CIRS convened a one-day roundtable meeting to bring together scholars of the region with extensive experience in carrying out social science research\, to have an in-depth conversation on the topic of “Supporting Social Science Research in a Turbulent Middle East.” Over the course of a day experts engaged in a vibrant and open conversation on how the research community can address the multiple challenges encountered when carrying out studies on the Middle East. \n \n \nAmong other things\, participants in the focused discussion discussed the value\, replicability\, and statistical significance of Middle Eastern case-studies; methodological issues relating to the merits of quantitative and qualitative research\, as well as the potential usefulness of alternative methodological approaches adapted to conflict zones; data challenges due to lack of existing data or lack of access to (and confidence in) existing data; challenges of  supporting and funding safe fieldwork in societies and countries that are in the midst of war or facing authoritarian clamp-downs; challenges related to censorship and academic freedom; the impact of restrictions and immigration controls that limit  travel and free mobility of researchers both within the region and from the region to the West\, limit research collaboration across borders\, and diminish access to participation in international conferences; the role of the ever evolving sanctions regime and the constraints of funding or working with scholars in states which have sanctions imposed upon them; and finally the whole host of ethical and moral challenges related to protecting researchers\, protecting informants\, protecting scholars at risk\, protecting sensitive data\, protecting vulnerable communities\, and protecting the rights of scholars trying to carrying out “sensitive research” that confront social values and norms in some parts of the Middle East. In the introduction to our meeting\, we urged scholars participating in the discussion to not only highlight and reiterate the difficulties and dismal prospects for social science research in the Middle East\, but to also help us understand their own experiences in navigating challenges\, and identify for us what the possibilities for managing this difficult time are. \n \n \nKey points that emerged out of the discussions were: \n \n \n\nConditions for social science research in MENA region are particularly challenging due to region-wide restrictions on academic freedom\, increasing securitization and rigid control of the social sciences under authoritarian regimes\, the existence of deeply divided societies\, social sensitives that limit research topics\, and the impact of  US sanctions regime\n\n \n\nThe academic community of social science scholars in and of the MENA region is weak and not unified. There is a need for greater development of region-wide network of social scientists who can work with and support each other.\n\n \n\nMechanisms for integrating ethical concerns into social science research projects are not effective. Institutional Review Boards are only there to oversee initial proposal submissions\, but there are serious shortcoming when it comes to maintaining ethics throughout the research process. Among other things discussed were the social science researcher’s obligations to ensure that his or her research is used responsibly\, and also avoiding making false promises and raising the hopes of research subjects by promising that the study will make a real-life difference.\n\n \n\nComplicated and oppositional ideas of the role of the social science researcher working in the Middle East. Some participants insisted that prioritizing and maintaining scientific objectivity is the most important thing that social scientists can do. Others had very different ideas and suggested social science researchers also have a mandate to “do good” and contribute towards the improvement or betterment of problematic conditions.\n\n \nIt is worth mentioning that CIRS will publish the findings of the roundtable meeting in the near future. \n \n \n  \n \n \n\nRead more about the research initiative \n\n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nAbdullah Al-Arian\, Georgetown University in Qatar\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar\nAbdallah Badahdah\, Doha International Family Institute\nLaurie A. Brand\, University of Southern California\nAfyare Elmi\, Qatar University\nMichael Ewers\, Qatar University\nJustin Gengler\, Qatar University\nSuzanne Hammad\, Qatar University\nIslam Hassan\, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar\nIslah Jad\, Qatar University\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar\nMilli Lake\, London School of Economics\nBeverley Milton-Edwards\, Queen’s University Belfast\nSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar\nFirat Oruc\, Georgetown University in Qatar\nMary Schmiedel\, Georgetown University\nSeteney Shami\, Arab Council for the Social Sciences\nShaida Sonde\, Georgetown University in Qatar\nJackie Starbird\, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar\nElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar\nValbona Zenku\, Georgetown University in Qatar\n\n \nArticle by Zahra Babar\, Associate Director of Research at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/supporting-social-science-research-turbulent-middle-east-roundtable-meeting/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Race & Society,Regional Studies
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2018/02/events_127628_46136_1537875224-1.jpg
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