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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20171009T124500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20171009T134500
DTSTAMP:20260406T215746
CREATED:20171016T100021Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T094739Z
UID:10001347-1507553100-1507556700@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:A Taste of Pakistan: Music & Food from the North
DESCRIPTION:On October 9\, 2017\, Waleed Zahoor\, Publications Intern at Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS)\, and a senior student at Georgetown University in Qatar\, was invited to hold a rabab recital\, a stringed instrument known as the lion of instruments played mainly in Afghanistan\, Iran\, and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. Santosh Kulkarni\, a seasoned musician\, accompanied Zahoor by playing rhythmic beats on the tabla. The event titled\, “A Taste of Pakistan: Music & Food from the North” was attended by a sizeable audience of faculty\, staff\, students\, and members of the Pakistani community in Qatar. Delicacies from Northern Pakistan including chapli kebab were served for the guests. \n \n \nZahoor started the performance by introducing the rabab to the audience\, many of who were listening to the instrument for the first time. He shared details about the structure and making of the artistic instrument\, carved from a single piece of wood and decorated with intricate inlays of pearl. Zahoor also talked about the history of rabab\, noting that attestations for rabab can be found in Persian texts dating back to 7th century CE. He also discussed the religious significance of rabab in Sikhism and Sufi Islam\, and elaborated on how the instrument was played in Khanqahs in Iran and Afghanistan. \n \n \n \n\n\n\n\n\n \n \n \nIn the hour-long recital\, Zahoor played a diverse selection of songs in Burushashki\, Dari\, Hindi\, Pashto\, Persian\, and Urdu. He introduced the songs as he played them and translated verses from the songs for the audience. Zahoor also shared the romantic Pashto folk tale of Adam Khan and Durkhanai and the story of Mullah Mohammad Jon and Ayesha\, a tale of two lovers from Afghanistan. Zahoor quoted famous poets and discussed how the rabab has left its mark on Persian and Pashto poetry as it is frequently mentioned by revered poets including Amir Khusrow\, Ferdowsi\, Ghani Khan\, Hafez Shirazi\, Muahammad Iqbal\, and Rahman Baba. Zahoor ended the performance with a short improvisational piece that he played with Santosh\, his partner on the tabla. \n \n \n  \n \n \nWaleed Zahoor is a senior at Georgetown University in Qatar\, majoring in International Politics. He works as a Publications Intern at the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS). Zahoor has a deep interest in Pashtun history\, culture\, music\, and poetry\, and is a self-taught rabab player.
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/taste-pakistan-music-food-north/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Race & Society
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20171015T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20171016T160000
DTSTAMP:20260406T215746
CREATED:20171031T083207Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T093502Z
UID:10001348-1508058000-1508169600@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Water and Conflict in the Middle East Working Group I
DESCRIPTION:On October 15-16\, 2017\, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) held a working group under its research initiative on “Water and Conflict in the Middle East.” Over the course of two days\, experts engaged in group discussions aimed at identifying a series of original research questions related to competition and cooperation over water in the Middle East. Topics discussed included: water conflict in the Middle Eastern context; trans-boundary water conflicts and cooperation in the Middle East; water scarcity and conflict in Iraq\, Yemen\, Jordan\, and Lebanon; and the political and social constraints to achieving food security in water-scarce areas. Scholars also discussed ISIS and its attempts to strategically control water in parts of the Middle East\, as well as how Turkey’s recent attempts to build dams on the Euphrates are affecting its relations with Iraq and Syria. Two working group sessions were also held with a specific focus on water and politics in the GCC states. The subject was discussed both with a focus on domestic political dilemmas faced by different Middle Eastern countries contending with scarce water resources at a national level\, as well how inter-state relations in the region are influenced by tensions or competition over shared water resources. \n\nMuch of the Middle East is comprised of arid zones with limited available water resources. Over the past decades\, the capacity of the region’s limited water resources to meet national needs has been further stretched by rapid population growth. Simultaneously\, the mounting effects of pollution and waste have led to a significant deterioration in both the quality and quantity of water. In addition\, poor water governance and development strategies at a national level have increased the gap between supply and demand. At the broader level\, an increasing regional exposure to changing climatic events such as global warming is also of great concern. Water insecurity poses a significant challenge as well\, impacting economic growth\, and potentially leading to social and political instability. In many of the countries instead of investing in changing the culture of water usage and improving mechanisms for distribution\, states have opted instead to expand citizens’ access to water through unsustainable means of water provision and expanding subsidies. Such behavior has intensified rather than mitigated water challenges across the region. At the national level there is a need for further research on water policies and practices\, and what the social and political dynamics are that undergird them. \n\nScholars of the region have devoted considerable attention to studying the effects of above-ground shared water resources\, and there is already an extensive body of work on the three main transboundary river basins of the Middle East\, namely the Jordan River\, the Nile\, and the Tigris-Euphrates. What was raised during the working group was the need to examine trans-boundary or shared groundwater\, particularly with regards to water conflict and cooperation in the Middle East\, as this remains as an understudied subject. The region has a large number of groundwater aquifers\, both renewable and non-renewable that are shared across multiple national borders. Aquifers are shared between Turkey and Syria\, Syria and Jordan\, Lebanon and Israel\, Egypt and Libya\, as well as Kuwait\, Saudi Arabia and Iraq amongst others. It is important to have a greater understanding of how states are navigating shared use of groundwater resources in the Middle East. \n\nFocusing on water scarcity and conflict in Iraq\, four critical issues stand out. The first issue has to do with Iraq’s geographical environment. It is a downstream state located at the tail end of the Tigris and Euphrates. This makes the country at risk of disruption in water supply caused by intentional or unintentional practices by the upstream countries. The issue of geographical location is coupled with climate change\, permanent desiccation of Marshlands\, change in microclimates and cross-boundary sandstorms\, and divergence of priorities from investments into wetland infrastructure steered by political movements. The second issue facing Iraq is related to the hydro-politics of an emerging Kurdistan. After Kurdistan declared independence that was met by rejection from the Iraqi government along with Turkey\, Iran and a number of other states\, the future of Kurdish participation in multinational treaties is hard to imagine. The third issue has to do with water disputes between Iraq\, Turkey\, and Iran. Iraqis argue that Turkish and Iranian policies have damaged ecosystems in northern Iraq. Finally\, Iraq faces a critical issue of water being used as a weapon. Non-state actors can use dams and water infrastructure\, given their vulnerability as targets\, as strategic and psychological weapons. These four issues are affected by poor water governance\, climate change\, and the continuous migration and displacement patterns. \n\nTurning to Yemen\, a significant portion of water resources are underground\, and renewable water resources provide less than 10 percent of the estimated national need. Conflict over water in Yemen is not directly related to the current civil war\, although of course the impact of violent conflict on people’s water access is undeniable. Broader dynamics predating the civil war remain at heart of the Yemeni water crisis. Four main areas deserve further in-depth research. First\, there is a critical need to expand available data sets on Yemen’s water resources\, and a need to develop and deploy data collection methods that are more applicable to the socio-political structures of the country. Second\, issues related to management of water distribution and water flow\, wells management\, payments for domestic water supplies\, and major food projects remain significantly understated in Yemen. Third\, scholars need to pay attention to the local politics in Yemen insofar as tensions between households and peoples are concerned\, and the impact of that on the increasing water and food security risks. Finally\, there is a need to study agricultural activities that require less water\, are drought resistant\, and have high value. \n\nLebanon and Jordan are no different from other countries in the region with regards to limited natural resources not being the reason behind their water scarcity\, but rather external and internal factors. With regards to the external factors\, Jordan has issues with Lebanon and Syria insofar as the Upper Jordan is concerned\, besides the issue of sharing the Jordan River with Palestine and Israel\, and the Disi Aquifer with Saudi Arabia. For Lebanon\, issues of water diplomacy revolve around the sharing of the Jordan River\, an aquifer with Israel\, and the Aasi and Kabir Rivers with Syria. This is in addition to the Wazani Aquifer and Hasbani River which were controlled by Israel during the occupation. With regards to the internal factors\, the water infrastructure in Lebanon is perished\, given that water infrastructure in some areas of Lebanon predates a century. Additionally\, besides issues of pollution and climate change that are common factors across the region\, the influx of refugees and displaced people adds significant pressure to Lebanon and Jordan’s water resources. \n\nThe aforementioned cases share a common factor with regards to water issues. While one ought not to undermine the scarcity of water resources in the Middle East\, the most critical water issues lie beyond water resources. In other words\, the non-biophysical constraints limit any technical solutions for water issues in the Middle East. Examples of non-biophysical constraints include\, among other factors: socio-political stability\, security\, land tenures\, and low farm-grade prices. These constraints are coupled with the issue of addressing the wrong problem. Decision-makers focus on finding the technical solutions for water issues while neglecting the aforementioned non-biophysical constraints that are at the core of water issues in the Middle East. \n\nShifting the discussion to non-state actors and management of water resources\, one can see that ISIS boldly uses water as a weapon. While\, for example\, in April 2014 ISIS withheld the Fallujah Dam to stop water-flow and to deprive Shiites downhill in Baghdad from access to water\, the group did not damage the water infrastructure in Iraq. ISIS realized its need for water for its own uses and electricity\, and for the populations living within seized territories in order to win their support. Such behavior by ISIS raises questions about the definition of “weaponization” of water. Would preventing access to water based on race\, religion\, culture\, etc.\, during times of dispute and competition over shared resources be considered weaponization of water? Is targeting water infrastructure similar to using water as a strategic tool? The example of ISIS also raises questions around the use of water by hybrid violent actors: state actors\, non-state actors\, militias\, regional powers\, international powers\, etc. Under what circumstances is water used for strategic purposes? And what are the drivers and motivations behind such use? In addition\, there seems to be a gap in the literature on studying the cooperation between militant groups and international organizations to supply water to deprived people. \n\nIn terms of hydro-politics and relations with neighboring countries\, participants discussed the case of Turkey and its relations with Iraq and Syria. Although competition over shared water resources is usually assumed among neighboring countries\, in fact cooperation seems to be more prominent. Nonetheless\, the extent to which one party dominates the cooperative arrangement remains unclear. In other words\, how does hydro-hegemony develop? In Turkey’s case\, for example\, scholars ought to explore Turkey’s technocratic and technoscientific approach in its pursuit to hydro-hegemony over shared water resources with Syria. There is also a gap in the literature on the neighboring countries’ perceptions towards Turkey’s hydro-hegemony. For example\, to what extent are the Turkish water installations in southeast Anatolia seen as having an impact on the downstream countries? On a different note\, there is limited literature on the pressure added to Turkish water resources as a result of the government policies toward hosting refugees. \n\nWhile discussing hydro-hegemony\, the participants highlighted another form of seeking hegemony over water. Particularly\, they discussed the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) quest for hegemony over the Red Sea. Over the past decade\, the UAE has been in a race to acquire operational and management rights over ports and economic zones along the Red Sea. This race was coupled by a significant Emirati naval presence in the Gulf of Aden and Bab Almandab Strait\, in addition to Emirati private naval security companies. The Emirati activities in the Red Sea provoke the assumption that the UAE aims to claim hegemony over the Red Sea\, which embraces one of\, if not the\, most important global shipping lanes. In this regards\, questions were raised about the rationale and objective of the UAE’s pursuit to hegemony in the Red Sea\, and how international relations theory can explain such behavior by a small state; the various strategies of the UAE to claim such hegemony\, and what that tells us about small states behavior; and the responses of regional actors\, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia\, and international players\, such as the United States\, China\, and Israel to Emirati activities in the red Sea. \n\nThe working group concluded with a session devoted to the GCC crisis that began in the summer of 2017\, and its impact on Qatar’s water security. The current GCC crisis did not develop suddenly and in a vacuum\, but rather had its roots in the earlier diplomatic imbroglio of 2014\, when Saudi Arabia\, the UAE\, and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Doha\, and subtly threatened to close borders. In response\, Qatar started preparing for a worst-case scenario\, and enhanced strategic plans to contend with emergency conditions\, particularly with regards to food and water. Given that Qatar relies heavily on imported food products\, it started building closer trade ties with Iran and Turkey. Also since 2014\, Qatar’s General Electricity & Water Corporation (Kahramaa) invested in lowering leakage in its water infrastructure\, which reached below five percent in 2017. In addition over the past three years\, Qatar has been investing in local industrial base for potable water\, which was clear when the locally produced potable water quickly replaced that imported from Saudi Arabia after the severing of ties. Qatar’s main water issue\, unlike the other aforementioned cases\, lies in its lack of resources not mismanagement. There remains a critical dilemma with regards to how Qatar should deal with water scarcity. Given that Qatar’s limited groundwater is significantly depleted\, investing in innovation and technology with regards to desalination\, Qatar’s only option\, is always on the table. However\, the inefficiency of desalination plants and their limited capability to produce potable water remains a lasting problem. \n\nFor the working group agenda click hereFor the participants’ biographies click hereRead more about this research initiative\n\nParticipants and Discussants: \n\nFarah Al Qawasmi\, Qatar UniversityHussein A. Amery\, Colorado School of MinesZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarNadim Farajalla\, American University of BeirutMark Giordano\, Georgetown UniversityIslam Hassan\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarBart Hilhorst\, Water Resources SpecialistMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMarcus DuBois King\, George Washington UniversityHelen Lackner\, University of LondonSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarSabika Shaban\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarTobias von Lossow\, Freie Universität BerlinPaul A. Williams\, Bilkent University\, Turkey\n\nArticle by Islam Hassan\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/water-and-conflict-middle-east-working-group-i/
CATEGORIES:Environmental Studies,Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20171030T124500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20171030T134500
DTSTAMP:20260406T215746
CREATED:20171101T135144Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T094712Z
UID:10001349-1509367500-1509371100@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:The Arab Reform Agenda: Challenges\, Promises\, and Prospects
DESCRIPTION:The Arab world today is experiencing “its second great fragmentation and reconfiguration of the past century\,” according to respected journalist and Middle East analyst Rami G. Khouri. Acknowledging that there is not really an “Arab world\,” and the Arab League only exists “on paper” anymore\, he used the term “the Arab region” as a geographic description in his talk\, “The Arab Reform Agenda: Challenges\, Promises\, and Prospects\,” at the Center for International and Regional Studies at Georgetown University in Qatar on October 30\, 2017. \n\nAround World War I\, the region was reconfigured by foreign powers—led primarily by Western powers—into its current state of nation-states\, as countries like Syria\, Egypt\, Jordan\, Kuwait\, Iraq and others gradually came into being. Now\, a century later\, the 400 million citizens of Arab countries are experiencing another radical transformation\, Khouri explained. What is different now is that local people are making many of the decisions about their fragmenting states and the reconfiguring of their society\, he said. These are mostly Arab people\, but also non-Arabs like Kurds\, Iranians\, Turks\, and others\, including the great powers. \n\nKhouri shared a recent news item that captured for him the severity of the dilemma for Syria today— and for virtually all the Arab world. The Russians\, Turks\, and Iranians—three non-Arab powers who were engaged militarily in Syria—were meeting to agree on how to deploy their militaries inside the country. In the past\, he said\, “they used to meet in London and Paris or Washington to talk about what they were going to do about frontiers and sovereignties\, but now they’re talking about how to behave militarily with their own troops inside Syria.” At the same time\, the US and many others are also involved militarily in the country. \n\nThis example also explains in part how the Arab world got to its current situation\, Khouri said. “The many different symptoms that we see: ISIS\, refugees\, sectarian violence\, civil wars—these are all symptoms of underlying stresses\, disparities\, and distortions.” From about 1920-1980\, he said\, the lives for most Arab citizens were improving\, and societies in the region were on a trajectory of relatively sustained\, expanding\, and equitable national development. “It wasn’t perfect\, but for fifty or sixty years the region was mostly developing on the basis of nationalist developmental states in most countries\,” he said. \n\nThe 1980s were the transitional period in the modern Arab world\, he said. Populations grew faster than economic development; military families seized power in most of the Arab republics; and the monarchies in the region had established their own forms of governance\, which were widely seen as legitimate\, he said. But in the republics—Yemen\, Iraq\, Syria\, Libya\, Egypt\, Sudan\, Tunisia—the militaries essentially took over\, and family rule took hold for decades on end\, with some of these families still in power forty years or more later. \n\nSo the Arab region has endured decades of “autocratic\, security-led\, family-anchored\, non-participatory\, non-accountable political power\, combined with the continuing negative impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its repercussions\, and non-stop foreign military intervention\,” which Khouri said has essentially never stopped since Napoleon arrived\, with only some breaks in between foreign military action in the region. The modern period since the 1950s has witnessed almost non-stop foreign military interventions. Historically this meant the British\, French\, and Americans\, he said\, “but now we’re talking about the Russians\, the Iranians\, and the Turks also—actively involved militarily inside Arab countries\, with their friends\, allies and proxies.” And the circle of foreign military intervention continues to expand\, he said\, mentioning new Chinese military bases in the region\, while Arab states also directly deploy their military forces in other Arab states\, such as the Saudi and Emirati war in Yemen or Arab involvement in Libya. \n\nIt is no surprise that the Arab region has reached the current stage of “tumultuous conditions\, chaos\, warfare\, some state collapse\, savagery\, and mass refugees in the tens of millions\,” said Khouri. This did not happen suddenly\, he noted\, as there were many early warning signs indicating there was something seriously wrong in the region\, starting in the 1970s. Surveys in recent decades revealed low trust in government institutions; people did not expect their futures would improve; poverty increased; educational results dropped across the region; corruption was perceived as being very high and permanent; there were high rates of unemployment and labor informality\, especially among youth; and tens of thousands of the smartest and most dynamic young people emigrated permanently. A major early sign of stressed populations at the family level was the massive support for the Muslim Brothers in the late 1970s\, he said. \n\nConditions worsened steadily in the 1990s and 2000s\, “leading to the Arab Uprisings in 2010-2011\, which was an extraordinary sign that something was seriously wrong in our societies\,” he said. These and other factors led to the creation of Al Qaeda\, ISIS\, and other radical groups of that nature. “We have no reason to be surprised by what’s going on\, but we do have reason to be shocked\,” he said. \n\nKhouri offered some very rough\, personal calculations for what he called the “five distinct groups of Arabs” in the region today: \n\nAround 10% are materially well off and have a very good life; Around 30% are basically middle-class\, largely employed by the government\, and live a decent life; Perhaps 50% (around 200 million) are low-income\, poor\, marginalized\, and vulnerable; The remaining 10% comprise two groups lumped together: emigrants and refugees—people who left or were forced to leave; and the radicals and militants who took up arms and created their own militias\, like the Islamic State. This last segment of the population has essentially—whether voluntarily or involuntarily—left the Arab-state system.\n\nWhen taking about the Arab world economically\, Khouri said there are essentially two Arab worlds. There are the oil/energy producing countries—the smaller\, wealthy emirates that do not suffer the same degree of fragmentation of the other states\, with the possible exception of Bahrain. The other world—across the whole region—is a population that is “showing clear signs of pauperization\, marginalization\, disparities\, and polarization between the wealthy and the poor.” This is creating intense pressures when you throw onto it foreign military intervention\, the Arab-Israeli conflict\, and the continued Israeli colonization of Arab lands. \n\nWith the exception of the small wealthy states\, in the rest of the region\, “I think we can safely say the Arab States by and large have failed the twin tests of statehood and sovereignty that were initially implanted in their lands around a hundred years ago\,” Khouri said. The Balfour Declaration of 1917\, which gave British support to a homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine\, he argues\, led to “the indirect but significant impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict continuing to this day across the Arab world\, and particularly on the psyche of ordinary Arabs. It has played a major role in the coming to power and staying in power of military security regimes in countries like Syria\, Iraq\, Libya\, and other places\, and it has had a major negative impact on the self-perception of ordinary Arab men and women.”  \n\nPeople across the region equate the Palestinian tragedy with the wider pressures that they feel in their own societies because of foreign military intervention\, Khouri said. The colonial process that took root in Palestine with the Balfour Declaration still continues today\, he said\, “and you see this with the Russians\, the Turks\, and the Iranians trying to figure out how their troops are going to coexist inside Syria\, let alone people outside Syria meeting to come up with new constitution for Syria.” \n\nRami George Khouri is an internationally syndicated political columnist and book author\, professor of journalism\, and journalist-in-residence at the American University of Beirut (AUB). He was the first director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at AUB\, and is now senior fellow. He also serves as a nonresident senior fellow at the Kennedy School at Harvard University and is a recipient of the Pax Christi International Peace Prize. \n\nArticle by Jackie Starbird\, Publications and Projects Assistant at CIRS.
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/arab-reform-agenda-challenges-promises-and-prospects/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Regional Studies
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