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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20170312T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20170313T150000
DTSTAMP:20260404T204211
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SUMMARY:Sports\, Society\, and the State in the Middle East Working Group I
DESCRIPTION:On March 12-13\, 2017\, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) held a working group under its research initiative on “Sports\, Society\, and the State in the Middle East.” During the course of two days\, participants identified key gaps in the literature on sports in the Middle East through the lenses of their various disciplines. The participants led discussions on a number of related subtopics\, including: the historical evolution of sports in the Middle East; nationalism\, identity and sports; ethno-national conflict and sports; social inclusion\, gender\, and sports; fans\, brands\, sponsorships and the commercial development of sports; the politics of football in the Levant; physical education; the evolution of sports media; Khaleeji soft power\, branding and sports investments; and GCC mega sporting events and foreign relations. \n\nMurat Yildiz led the opening discussion on “The Historical Evolution of Sports in the Middle East.” Yildiz identified a number of questions that remain understudied in the literature on the history sports in the Middle East. He proposed that it would be worthwhile to develop a unique periodization of the Middle East through the lens of sports\, and that such a periodization might look quite different from the social and political markers that are most commonly applied when separating the region into different historical eras. Yildiz also suggested that the question of the relationship between late imperial structures and sports development in the region needs further study. It is also important to understand why Middle Eastern states had attempted to promote sports in rural areas\, and how this has contributed to our understanding of the urban history of the Middle East. Clearly there have historically been factors that have led to certain sports being more successful and popular in the region\, with others less so. Yildiz claimed that studying these factors would contribute to the existing literature.  \n\nNadim Nassif provided an overview of new research questions in relation to “Nationalism\, Identity\, and Sports in the Middle East.” Nassif argued that there is a “Gold War” and a global race among Middle Eastern states seeking to engage in sports for the purpose of branding\, image-building\, and reputational gain. The scholarship that looks at the role of sports in identity and nation-building in the Middle East is incomplete\, as it has focused primarily on the cases of Palestine\, Lebanon\, and Yemen. Nassif emphasized that the study of sports in the Middle East has not provided enough empirical evidence for how sports are playing into or trying to counter the broader sectarian divisions across the region. Nassif suggested that there are three levels of analysis which need to be applied in order to understand the role of sports in Middle Eastern politics: the relationship between regime type and sports development; the strength or weakness of the state and the role of sports in nation-building; and the different echelons of stakeholders\, and their particular motives behind their engagement in sports. Among other questions which need to be addressed\, he suggested: What are the factors that impact ethno-national rivalries in sports? How can states promote national identity through sports when in fact so many “national” sports teams rely heavily on foreign players and coaches? How do states position themselves regionally and internationally by hosting mega elite sports events? How do sports investments contribute to national identity? Is there a correlation between self-identity and involvement in sports? Do sports serve as a tool to stimulate or counter sectarianism and sub-national identities? Additional questions that are relevant examine the role of diaspora- and homeland-players in stimulating public support to national teams\, the evolution of cross-national identities and sports\, and the role of political parties in appointing heads of national sports federations. \n\nClosely related to questions raised during Nassif’s session\, Tamir Sorek led a discussion on “Ethno-national Conflict and Sports in the Middle East.” Sorek explored how sports can impact public attitudes in countries experiencing ethno-national conflicts\, and how sports can promote the exclusion of ethno-linguistic and religious communities. For example\, he raised a question: How does the performance of an Arab star in the Israeli national team impact Jews’ perceptions of Arabs? The same question could also be asked with regards to Copts in Egypt\, and other communities in the ethnically and religiously plural Middle East. Another issue Sorek raised is the display of nationalism in sports arenas. He claimed that at the time some states are antagonistic towards displays of overt nationalism in sports arenas (i.e. Israel’s response towards Palestinian identity expressed in public)\, other states remain agnostic towards such displays (i.e. Lebanon). Sorek also raised an interesting question on the value of sports sanctions as a tool for modifying the behavior of states seen to be acting outside international norms. \n\nNida Ahmad continued with a discussion on identity\, social inclusion\, and exclusion by examining the issue of gender and sports in the Middle East. Ahmad raised a number of questions in relation to women’s participation in sports in the Middle East\, including how social media has shaped female athletes’ ability to communicate at the national\, regional\, and international level with their audiences and fan-bases. She also suggested that there are new forms of physical activity which are gaining popularity among women in the MENA region\, particularly “action” sports. Ahmad observed that there is increasing agency of for women in terms of creating a new narrative around sports. Female athletes and sports participants are influencing the regulatory environment\, changing local and regional norms\, and perhaps making sports more accessible to Muslim women at a global level. There has been a gradual easing of regulations that had previously prohibited the wearing of hijab in international sports competitions. International sportswear brands’ have also made a strategic shift towards producing sportswear designed for Muslim women athletes\, such as the Nike “Pro Hijab” advertising campaign demonstrates. Ahmad also suggested that some Middle Eastern states have promoted women in sports as a means to counter radicalization in their societies. Additional worthwhile contributions to the literature could be examining underground females’ sports competitions\, the emergence of senior female sports officials and their role in sports organizations and federation\, and girls’ inclusion in athletic programs through the educational system. \n\nSimon Chadwick led a session on the commercialization of sports in the Middle East. Chadwick stated that there is a sizable sports economy in the Middle East which is valued at about sixteen billion US dollars\, and yet it remains significantly understudied. Chadwick proposed five approaches to studying the sports economy in the Middle East: fans\, brands\, sponsors\, commerce\, and the future. Expanding on this\, Chadwick raised a number of questions: on what basis do fans engage with sports? How is this manifested in their choices\, thinking\, and behavior? How are sports brands built? And what contribution can this make to the business of sport in the Middle East? What forms can sponsorship in the Middle East take? And how should sponsorship deals be managed to ensure maximum effectiveness? What is the economic and commercial role of sport in the Middle East? And how should the challenges faced by the industry be addressed? And finally\, what role will new sports and new sports formats play in the Middle East? \n\nDag Tuastad shifted the discussion to “The Politics of Football in the Levant.” Tuastad claimed that football remains at the center of politics in the Levant. It reflects cultural and social processes in the region; in addition to being a space for political struggle between the social units of state. Therefore\, given that remembering takes place in individual minds through membership\, Tuastad argued that football should be studied as a critical constituent of the social memory of peoples of the Levant. This would explain the active remaking of the past through social groups’ attachment to the past. Tuastad gave a number of examples that justify his argument\, among which: Palestinians and their invented symbols that represent their identity in Jordanian stadiums; primary solidarity groups\, “tribal football”; how Hamas took control over football clubs and resumed the league once it came to power; and the Palestinian football league of Beirut. \n\nFollowing Tuastad’s discussion\, Ferman Konukman explored “Physical Education and Sports Development in the Middle East.” Konukman traced physical education through the imperial history of and in the Middle East. This raised questions on how colonial experiences impacted the physical education system in the GCC? And what is the role of foreign physical educators in the development of sports in the wider region? He also highlighted how\, later on during state building processes\, physical education served as a bonding and nation-building strategy\, particularly in Turkey\, Egypt\, Iran\, and the GCC states. Konukman then focused the discussion on physical education curriculum in the Middle East\, and asked: How has physical education in the Middle East accommodated students with special needs? What is the perception of female students towards physical education in the Middle East? How do co-ed classes impact physical education in the Middle East? These questions led the discussion to issues around policymaking\, graduate and executive sports management programs\, and elite sports academies in the Middle East. \n\nMahfoud Amara discussed another aspect of sports: “The Evolution of Sports Media in the Middle East.” Amara started by highlighting the various types of sports media that range from state television’s sports channels; sports magazines that turned into television channels; private-owned channels; cable-channels; football clubs television channels; and YouTube channels. The wide variety of sports media channels and popular sports programs provoked questions around the international legislation of broadcasting\, and migration of sports journalists. Amara highlighted BeIN Sports as an understudied case-study. He raised questions\, among which: Is BeIN Sports commercially viable\, or underwritten by the government similar to Al Jazeera news? Why did Aljazeera Sports transform into BeIN Sports? In the competitive structure of media rights\, does Qatar have the capacity to compete in the broadcasting market? Is BeIN Sports an example of economic diversification? What role does social media play in competing with BeIN Sports? What intellectual property rights exist in broadcasting mega sports competitions? And how are they enforced? \n\nNnamdi Madichie led a discussion on “Khaleeji Soft Power\, Branding\, and International Sports Investments.” Madichie focused his session on the role of states in the development of sports for branding\, and claiming regional leadership purposes. He highlighted how such endeavors by states are not only to claim international and regional recognition\, but also to consolidate legitimacy domestically. In analyzing states’ sports endeavors\, Madichie investigated issues around sports tourism; investments in elite sports; sports diplomacy; sports foreign investments; and promoting Khaleeji products in European stadia. \n\nFinally\, Danyel Reiche discussed “GCC Mega Events and Foreign Relations: Reputational Gain or Loss?” Reiche started his discussion by defining mega-sporting events\, which he claimed are events that have global or continental appeal. There are two dimensions of mega sports events: hosting\, and participation. Insofar as hosting mega-sporting events in concerned\, he raised questions around: What drives hosting mega sports events in the GCC?Why do some GCC states still behind in terms of hosting mega sports events?  Why do not GCC states cooperate in hosting mega sports events? What is happening with the infrastructure states invest in after the sporting event? Reiche also raised issues around perceptions of hosting mega sports in GCC by nationals and expats\, and the impact of hosting such event on the local society. With regards to participation\, Reiche discussed specialization in specific sports\, and institutional promotion of participation. \n\nIn conclusion\, Mehran Kamrava\, Director of CIRS\, thanked the participants for identifying key gaps in the literature on sports in the Middle East. It is worth noting that the participants will contribute empirically-grounded articles addressing these questions\, among others\, to be published in an edited special issue under the auspices of CIRS. \n\nClick here for the working group’s agendaClick here for the participants’ biographyRead more about this research initiative\n\nParticipants and Discussants: \n\nNida Ahmad\, University of Waikato\, New ZealandMahfoud Amara\, Qatar UniversityZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarSimon Chadwick\, Salford University\, ManchesterIslam Hassan\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMonèm Jemni\, Qatar UniversityMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarFerman Konukman\, Qatar UniversityCraig LaMay\, Northwestern University in QatarNnamdi Madichie\, London School of Business and ManagementSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarNadim Nassif\, Notre Dame University\, LebanonDanyel Reiche\, American University of BeirutTamir Sorek\, University of FloridaJackie Starbird\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarBetsi Stephen\, Georgetown UniversityDag Tuastad\, University of OsloElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMurat Yildiz\, Skidmore College\n\nArticle by Islam Hassan\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/sports-society-and-state-middle-east-working-group-i/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20170319T123000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20170319T133000
DTSTAMP:20260404T204212
CREATED:20170329T105559Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T093737Z
UID:10001321-1489926600-1489930200@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Migrant Recruitment Fees and the GCC Construction Sector
DESCRIPTION:While human rights issues faced by low-wage migrant workers in the Gulf region have been widely reported on\, the related issue of “recruitment fees” paid by these workers in their countries of origin – central to the experience of so many migrants – hasn’t received as much attention.   \n \n \nThere are legitimate costs associated with recruitment and migration\, according to David Segall\, a policy associate with New York University’s Stern Center for Business and Human Rights\, who researches construction industry migrant labor in the Gulf. “The point is that recruitment is not free; it costs money to find workers\, to skills-test them\, to process visas\, to interview them\, and to make sure they’re qualified for the job that you’re hiring them for\,” Segall said. \n \n \nBut according to Segall\, in the current predominant recruitment model in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states\, clients throughout the supply chain do not pay their suppliers for services rendered. As a result\, instead of project clients and construction companies bearing these costs\, the most vulnerable migrant workers usually pay for their own recruitment—and then some—in violation of GCC and international law. \n \n \n“Every single player in the chain seems to have leverage over their supplier\, and that leads to downward pressure on wages and upward pressure on costs of migration” ultimately borne by migrants\, Segall noted in his talk\, “Migrant Recruitment Fees and the GCC Construction Sector\,” at the Center for International and Regional Studies talk on March 19\, 2017. Fatima Al-Dosari\, a research consultant at Stern\, Qatari citizen\, and graduate of Georgetown University in Washington\, D.C.\, joined Segall and shared her insights on migrant workers in Qatar. \n \n \nWhat Segall called an “inverted payment chain” has clients (such as a government\, a government-sponsored development project\, or a private company) at the top of the supply chain and low-wage workers at the bottom. In between\, there are layers of employers/sponsors\, registered recruiters in South Asian sending-countries\, and unregistered local “subagents.” According to Segall\, “Clients are not actually paying their suppliers for the services that are rendered . . . or they are getting paid. So it flips the entire chain\, such that at the end of the line it is the migrant worker who essentially foots the bill for all of the costs of migration\, plus some.” \n \n \nSegall and his colleagues are trying to understand why this is occurring and what makes it so ubiquitous in the GCC for low-wage construction workers\, who mostly come from India\, Bangladesh\, Nepal\, Pakistan\, and Sri Lanka. Segall and Sarah Labowitz\, co-director of the NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights\, have conducted more than a year of research in this pursuit\, primarily focusing on workers from India and Bangladesh. They will publish their findings in a report in early April. \n \n \nSegall and Labowitz found that an imbalance of power between multiple economic players leads to an inversion of the normal fee-for-service payment business model. Supply chain pressure begins with intense competition in the construction industry in the Gulf\, where companies often submit bids at less than normal market value just to break into the region. In order to keep these bids competitive in such a hot market\, construction firms generally do not include the cost of recruitment in their bids to clients\, and they do not pay the recruiters that service them. Smaller subcontractors and GCC-based “manpower firms”—which import\, employ\, and lease out labor for short-term projects—also avoid paying their recruiters. \n \n \nWhy would a recruiter in South Asia take on work if they are not getting paid by the employer? Segall explained that recruitment is also a very crowded market\, and the current expectation is that construction clients will not pay for low-wage workers. “Recruiters also have to make a living\, and if we acknowledge this is a legitimate service they are providing\, it would be legitimate for them to take a service fee [from the employing company] and earn a small profit\,” he said. But Segall said that with few exceptions\, recruitment firms will agree to take a contract without payment: “We hear time and time again from recruiters\, ‘if we’re not fulfilling it\, someone else will.’” \n \n \nIn order to keep their doors open and earn a profit\, then\, recruiters must take money from prospective migrants themselves. “If they are not being paid by the client\, they have to get paid by somebody. They have very little leverage to push back if they are not receiving payment from the employer.” Additionally\, he said\, corruption among recruitment agencies is a major problem. Among the few recruiters who are paid by construction company clients\, reports indicate that some charge workers anyway\, essentially “double-dipping.” \n \n \nRecruitment agencies (and therefore employers and their clients) themselves rely on unlicensed sub-agents to access remote populations of inexpensive labor\, because they don’t have access to or requisite social networks in certain common regions of migrant origin. The subagents\, who are not paid by the registered agents that commission them\, in turn charge additional fees to prospective workers. Segall argued that sub-agents should be registered\, legalized\, regulated\, and priced into bids as a legitimate cost to borne by the employer and client.   \n \n \nSegall said the actual cost of recruitment may be in the range of US$400-700\, excluding flight costs. However\, Indian migrants end up paying between $1\,000 and $3\,000\, and Bangladeshis can pay from $1\,700 to $5\,200. The discrepancy is due both to layers of recruiters and subagents throughout the process—each of whom takes a cut of profit—and to markups to the cost due to kickbacks. For example\, recruiters are willing to pay significant amounts to representatives of the employer merely for the right to a visa\, Segall said—sometimes up to $1\,300\, a cost ultimately paid for by the worker. Migrants also end up paying for other illegitimate costs and markups\, such as kickbacks by recruiters to visiting employer representatives and markups to flight ticket charges. \n \n \nFinally\, migrant workers agree to pay recruiters because of the imbalance between supply and demand for workers and jobs. If a worker doesn’t pay a recruitment fee\, many others in line behind him will. Segall argued that opportunities to enter the GCC are actually quite limited. While there are twenty-five million migrants currently in the GCC\, and in any given year hundreds of thousands of new workers will arrive\, “there are still tens of millions more who would come if they could\,” said Segall. \n \n \nAnd although there is corruption in most migrant-sending countries—and among recruiters—according to Segall\, if an employing company is not paying its recruiters\, there must be corruption. “You’re essentially creating a model where there is no option but to charge the workers\,” he said. “If ever there is to be a comprehensive solution to this issue\, construction companies and their clients will need to adopt a ‘pay and investigate the recruiter’ model.”   \n \n \nFatima Al-Dosari works on migrant workers’ welfare\, which has taken her to labor camps in Qatar\, where she has met with laborers and heard their concerns. She said that attitudes of Qataris toward migrant workers are changing and the Qatar government is increasing efforts toward sustainable change\, but many challenges—particularly with regard to social attitudes toward migrants—remain. “Both Qataris and non-Qataris have an obligation and responsibility to create change\,” she said\, adding that it “won’t happen without collaboration.”  \n \n \nDavid Segall is a research scholar and policy associate with the NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights. The Center conducts research and advocacy on issues at the intersection of these two realms\, pushing for sector-specific\, standards-based approaches to the most serious rights challenges in global supply chains. Previously\, Segall directed the Human Rights in Iran Unit at The City University of New York\, and he served as an Associate in the Middle East and North Africa Division of Human Rights Watch. \n \n \nArticle by Jackie Starbird\, Publications and Projects Assistant
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/migrant-recruitment-fees-and-gcc-construction-sector/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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