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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20170207T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20170207T200000
DTSTAMP:20260407T195900
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SUMMARY:The Regional Humanitarian Crisis
DESCRIPTION:Reach Out To Asia is a Qatar-based non-profit organization that works to ensure that people affected by crisis across Asia and the Middle East have continuous access to relevant and high-quality primary and secondary education. Since its inception in 2005\, ROTA has had a vision of providing education for children and youth to discover their potential to become full\, responsible citizens building their communities and their futures. Today ROTA has education and development projects in thirteen countries and it has a major strategic initiative to build local capacity and community service in Qatar.  \n \n \nEssa Al-Mannai\, the executive director of ROTA\, delivered the talk\, “The Regional Humanitarian Crisis: How ROTA is Mobilizing Resources to Tackle the Refugee Crisis through Education\,” at the Center for International and Regional Studies on February 7\, 2017. He shared these grim figures about the status of refugees today: \n \n \n\nCurrently there are twenty-one million refugees in the world.\nAbout fifty percent of the world’s refugee population is children.\nOn average\, a refugee will live away from home for seventeen years.\n\n \n \n\n\n\n\n\n \n \n \nThere are sixty-five million forcibly-displaced people worldwide. This number is comprised primarily of internally-displaced people who do not have any country or state that would acknowledge their citizenship\, and the aforementioned twenty-one million refugees. Tragically\, against these disheartening numbers\, Al-Mannai reported that only 107\,000 refugees were resettled in 2015. He cautioned of the danger of just looking at the magnitude of these problems in terms of the numbers\, however. “When we talk about refugees\, we are talking about humans with ambitions. People who have hopes and the right to fulfill life dreams\,” he said.  \n \n \nROTA upholds education as the top priority in humanitarian crises because children are the most marginalized and most vulnerable. Providing access to education in safe\, nurturing environments can enable children to develop critical lifelong skills. Al-Mannai explained that it is essential for children in emergency situations to have a sense of normalcy\, to make friendships\, build self-confidence\, acquire knowledge\, and have a chance to become something in the future. Furthermore\, he said\, “The simple fact is that illiteracy is isolation\, and isolation can lead to destructive tendencies towards the self and towards others.”  \n \n \nWhat benefits does the world get by educating refugees? “It’s our moral obligation as humans to identify and respect the human mind through fulfilling its desire to learn\, to acquire knowledge\, to ask questions\, to debate\, and ultimately to create something\,” said Al-Mannai. It is a human need for everyone\, regardless of status or where you are from\, and he said\, “without education this right is denied.” \n \n \nAnother benefit of educating refugees is the huge return on investment for a country that has experienced a crisis\, such as the civil war in Syria. Eventually there will need to be resettlement and rebuilding. “Do you want to rebuild a country with engineers and doctors or people who are illiterate?” Al-Mannai asked. “The benefits of education are self-evident.” He reported that\, according to the World Bank in 2016\, education is an investment where\, overall\, each year of schooling will raise individual earnings by ten percent; bringing better results than almost any other form of investment. However\, of all the international aid that goes for emergencies\, only 1.4 percent goes to education. \n \n \nThe Syrian refugee crisis rose from 3.7 million in 2015 to 4.8 million in 2016. Schools were severely in need\, with a broken-down infrastructure and limited teacher capacity and access to materials. ROTA’s basic approach to this dire situation was to increase teacher capacity and offer non-formal education\, because schools simply could not meet the great needs of the refugee populations. “Education goes beyond the book\, the teacher and homework\,” Al-Mannai said. Non-formal education can provide a support system to children and youth and offer a positive environment with psychosocial support\, and other assistance. ROTA does not just build schools\, they take a holistic approach because\, he explained\, “education is a multi-party process that engages the community\, the government\, ministries of education\, the school directorate\, the parents\, and even the teachers and the school administration.” \n \n \nAl-Mannai said a shift is occurring in the global agenda for international humanitarian work and development. In the year 2000\, leaders from 189 countries gathered at the United Nations and approved eight Millennium Development Goals by 2015. Progress was achieved in a number of those goals\, but the new target is Sustainable Development Goals. The big lesson learned from the international community\, according to Al-Mannai\, is that “Giving is not enough. We have to give\, but we also have to build local capacity.” \n \n \nGlobal development goals are moving from quantity measures towards quality. According to Al-Mannai\, the focus in the past was on the most needy\, poorest countries; now there is recognition that everyone must be included to achieve targets. The previous approach was top-down\, donor to beneficiary; now it is bottom-up\, and developing capacity is the new goal. Al-Mannai said the new understanding is that top-down will never work\, because the needy will continue to come back and ask for more. Teaching people to build their capacities\, systems\, and governance are the new global directions. The current draft of the Sustainable Development Goals has seventeen goals\, and include peace\, stability and human rights. \n \n \nROTA is building local capacity in Qatar through youth engagement\, community service\, and global citizenship. ROTA has created various platforms for youth to become active locally and internationally\, and to serve as representatives of Qatar in the region. To date\, over one-thousand youth have been trained by ROTA. There are currently eighteen Qatari-based youth clubs\, each with its own unique vision and mission. Some international platforms that Qatari youth have participated in include the UN General Assembly and the UN World Humanitarian Summit\, and ROTA hosted the Global Youth Consultation in 2015\, which shapes youth engagement in humanitarian work. \n \n \nROTA is a partnership-led initiative\, working with organizations in other countries\, because Al-Mannai said\, “One solution will not fit all\, and no one organization has all the solutions.” There are many humanitarian and aid organizations\, each with their competitive edge and good capacities. ROTA is mobilizing resources and is building the capacity of the community as a whole\, and is partnering with other local non-governmental organizations to increase its impact. \n \n \nNot since World War II has the world witnessed the number of refugees that we are witnessing today\, according to Al-Mannai. The world is developing\, but there is a huge percentage of the world that is lagging behind\, and he says\, we are at risk of these two worlds growing apart from each other. ROTA’s deep commitment to partnership\, sustainability\, and building local capacity could go far in reversing this alarming trend. \n \n \nEssa Al-Mannai was appointed as ROTA’s Executive Director in 2010. Under his leadership\, the organization has led initiatives in thirteen countries and local programs in Qatar. Additionally\, ROTA has led adult literacy trainings\, youth leadership programs\, and programs designed to benefit students and teachers. He has served on the steering committees of various international and local groups in the fields of development and social responsibility. Recently\, Al-Mannai represented the Qatar NGO sector at the high-level event on Refugees’ Education in Emergency Situations hosted by the Permanent United Nations Missions of Portugal\, Qatar and Turkey. \n \n \nArticle by Jackie Starbird\, Publications and Projects Assistant at CIRS. \n \n \n  \n \n \n 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/regional-humanitarian-crisis/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20170212T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20170213T170000
DTSTAMP:20260407T195900
CREATED:20170320T070725Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T093758Z
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SUMMARY:Leading the Faithful: The Role of Religious Authorities in the Middle East Working Group II
DESCRIPTION:On February 12-13\, 2017\, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) held its second working group under the research initiative on “Leading the Faithful: The Role of Religious Authorities in the Middle East.” Over the course of two days\, working group participants presented a number of draft papers investigating the dynamics\, the position of\, and the role played by religious leaders of assorted religious communities present in the Middle East. While some of the papers provide nuanced historical depth when tracing the role of religious leaders\, others cast their attention to the role of religious leadership during more recent times\, particularly in the wake of increasing confessional and sectarian civil conflict seen in the wars in Iraq and Syria. The draft papers focused on a number of specific themes and case studies\, and together provide an examination on the following areas: the role of Sunni authority from a historical perspective; the evolution of the marja’ and Shi’i religious leadership in the Middle East; the role of Sufi religious leaders and orders in the Middle East today; the evolution of leadership and authority over the Hajj; the conditions of the Alawite community and the role of the Alawi Sheikhs in Syria in the current context; and case studies on the religious leadership of the Mandaean\, the Yezidi\, and the Shabak religious communities. \n\nThe opening session of the meeting was devoted to discussing Professor Tamara Sonn’s paper on the topic of “Who Speaks for the Umma? Sunni Authority and Religious Leadership in the Contemporary Middle East.” In her paper\, Sonn suggested that there is no single source of Sunni religious leadership in the contemporary Middle East. Due to political and demographic changes over the past century\, Sunni religious leadership is in a state of transition. Traditional nodes of religious authority have been called into question\, and are themselves evolving. As well\, non-traditional sources of authority are emerging and\, in some cases\, have become sufficiently institutionalized to supplant traditional authorities. Sonn briefly described traditional sources of religious authority in Sunni Islam. She also provided an overview of political and demographic developments that called traditional authorities into question. In addition\, Sonn surveyed representative examples of both reformed traditional authorities and emerging non-traditional religious leaders in the Sunni Middle East. Finally\, she concluded with some observations about long-term trends in Sunni authority and religious leadership in general. \n\nFollowing on from the discussion on the role of authority and religious leadership for the Sunni community\, Sajjad Rizvi presented his paper on Shi’i leadership and the making of a marja’\, focusing on the role of Sīstānī and Shi’i Religious authority in the Twitter Age. In his paper\, Rizvi considers the question of how one becomes a marja’\, particularly in reference to the authority of that marja’. Rizvi focused his discussion on an examination of Sīstānī\, and the shift and development of the marja’ in the form of the “Sīstānī model” in the age of social media. Rizvi argues that globalization has both increased the power and reach of the marājiʿ; but yet\, ironically\, made their significance more local. The increasing consensus of the political role of the marājiʿ is clear in Qum\, Najaf and beyond. Rizvi also claims that the recent developments in Iraq have shown that the theory of the authority of the jurist (wilāyat al-faqīh) is no longer just Iranian\, nor does the support for it signal a disloyal support for the Iranian state and its jurisdiction. What is properly Iranian and Iraqi in the contemporary world cannot be so easily compartmentalized; this further complicates the question of the role of “Iran” in Iraq. A study of the marāji’ demonstrates that there is more than one conception ofmarja’iyya and of the ḥawza\, as well as multiple claimants and potential centers of power for the marāji’. In other words\, Rizvi argues that the marja’iyya is traditional and local as well as dynamic and transnational\, quietest and conservative as well as politically engaged and reforming. Finally\, Rizvi unpacks whether the marja’iyya will survive. \n\nMark Sedgwick led a working group discussion on his paper that examines Sufi religious leaders and orders in the Middle East today. Sedgwick’s paper studies the basis and nature of the primarily esoteric\, person-centered authority of the Sufi shaykh in the context of the ṭarīqa (Sufi Order)\, and Sufi doctrine. Sedgewick in his paper raises the interesting point about the inverse relationship between the power of the shaykh and the size of the ṭarīqa. The smaller the order over which he asserts leadership\, the more direct and over-riding is the authority of the shaykh. The larger the order\, the more diffuse and limited is the authority of the shaykh. In addition\, Sedgewick also examines the foundation and nature of the primarily exoteric\, scripture–centered authority of the Sufi shaykh beyond the ṭarīqa\, which includes the social influences of the person-centered authority. Sedgewick argues that this sort of authority diminished during the twentieth century. Sedgwick’s paper concludes with an exploration of more recent developments\, particularly the political promotion of Sufism by some states\, such as Morocco\, as an alternative to other forms of “radical” Islam. \n\nIn his presentation\, Robert Bianchi focused the discussion on “Religious Authorities and Reimagining the Hajj.” Bianchi argued that the Saudi data leave little doubt that the quality of care for Hajjis varies enormously depending on several key factors which policy makers and religious leaders must address with greater honesty and determination. Year in and year out\, the most vulnerable pilgrim populations are poor people\, women\, and children from across Africa and Asia as well as foreign workers\, refugees\, and illegal migrants living in Saudi Arabia. Most of the current proposals for Hajj reform ignore these high-risk groups. Saudi planners focus on promoting year-round pilgrimage to boost tourism revenues and high-end infrastructure. In most other countries\, government-run Hajj agencies are busy cutting market-sharing deals with private business cartels and their political patrons. The combined effect of these policies is to weaken what remains of already inadequate regulations that are vital to the protection of all Hajjis.  Meanwhile\, support is also growing for more sweeping proposals to reimagine and reinvent the Hajj instead of fine-tuning the status quo. Some of these reforms are particularly likely to test the ingenuity and influence of religious leaders from all backgrounds because they challenge longstanding custom. \n\nLeon Goldsmith presented his paper on “The ‘Alawī Sheikhs of Religion: A Brief Introduction.” He argues that the ‘Alawī religious leadership has always lacked structure or explicit roles\, but nonetheless\, filled an important function in the social milieu at local levels. The ‘Alawī mashayikh would cooperate to mediate among individuals and with other groups at times of danger or tension such as in 1936\, 1973 and possibly in 2016 as indicated by the unverified Declaration of an Identity Reform. He also claimed that pressures were exerted on the sect to conform to mainstream religious identities\, whether Sunni or Shi’i\, throughout the twentieth century from both inside Syria and at the regional level. Moreover\, Goldsmith claimed that the Ba’th/al-Asad regime has coopted ‘Alawī religious leadership as an instrument of regime maintenance since 1982. The effect of this has been to further divide religious leadership between the traditional and regime-appointed mashayikh. The appointment of regime loyalists as religious sheikhs has seen the standard of sheikhs deteriorate and they have lost respect and independent status in their communities. Finally\, the growing corruption and opportunism creeping into the ‘Alawī religious class at the expense of the traditional sheikhs bode poorly for the future of religious leadership as a positive agent for political transformation and stability in Syria. \n\nAlbert de Jong shifted the discussion to pseudo-Islamic sects in his presentation on “Kings on Earth\, Angels Beyond: Spiritual Elite Communities in the Contemporary Middle East.” de Jong argues that within the mosaic of religious communities of the pre-modern and modern Middle East\, there is a wide range of religious communities that predated the rise of Islam alongside a cluster of communities that decidedly came into being after the Islamic conquests\, in various distinct geographical\, religious\, and social contexts. de Jong questions how wholly distinct religious communities have not only survived\, but also almost continually increased in the Middle East. He credits their survival and expansion to the organizations of these religious groups\, and the role of their leaders. de Jong suggested two fundamental patterns of the social and religious organization that have contributed to the survival and growth of these religious groups: endogamy; and the characteristic division of the community into a small section of specialists in whom knowledge of the tradition is vested\, and a large majority who do not (need to) know much about their religion. \n\nMichael Leezenberg presented the last paper of the working group that examines the transformations in the leadership of minority religious communities in Northern Iraq: the Yezidis\, Shabak\, and Assyrians in Northern Iraq. In his paper\, Leezenberg discusses these three religious communities that in some ways have shared the same fate\, that of to some degree being at the mercy of their geography\, a geography that has left them ensnared by ongoing conflict which has only accelerated over the past three decades. While these communities were certainly vulnerable even during the Baathist years\, in post-Saddam Iraq their conditions have grown much more precarious status. Most recently they have suffered by becoming a target for violence directed at them by ISIS. In his paper Leezenberg traces the at times converging and at other times diverging trajectories of these groups\, focusing particularly on the role of their religious leaders and how they have dealt with crises and conflict at different points in the bloody history of the region.  \n\n  \n\nSee the working group agenda hereRead the participants’ biographies hereRead more about this research initiative \n\nParticipants and Discussants: \n\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarRobert Bianchi\, Shanghai International Studies UniversityAlbert de Jong\, Leiden UniversityLeon Goldsmith\, University of Otago\, New ZealandIslam Hassan\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMichiel Leezenberg\, University of AmsterdamSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarSajjad Rizvi\, University of ExeterMark Sedgwick\, Aarhus University\, DenmarkTamara Sonn\, Georgetown UniversityJackie Starbird\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar\n\nArticle by Islam Hassan\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/leading-faithful-role-religious-authorities-middle-east-working-group-ii/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20170219T123000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20170219T133000
DTSTAMP:20260407T195900
CREATED:20170306T063520Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T093750Z
UID:10001318-1487507400-1487511000@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Higher Education Policies and the Emerging Over-education Crisis in the Middle East
DESCRIPTION:Student enrollment in higher education institutions has rapidly increased in most Middle Eastern countries in recent years. Governments have shown a strong commitment to higher education\, and there has been broad support from politicians and citizens for establishing more universities and increasing access to higher education. However\, in recent years\, the supply of university graduates in many fields of education has exceeded the labor market demand and the unemployment rate among university graduates has increased. Unfortunately\, so far this high unemployment rate has not led to a reduction in student enrollment. Instead\, some Middle Eastern countries have fallen into an “over-education trap\,” according to Nader Habibi\, Professor of Economics and Middle East Studies at Brandeis University. \n \n \nThe over-education trap\, as defined by Habibi\, includes the following process: university graduates who cannot find employment in their university majors will eventually accept low-skill and semi-skilled jobs that do not require a university degree. In doing so they reduce the employment opportunities for high school graduates\, who would have been employed for these jobs traditionally. Consequently\, high-school graduates face higher unemployment rates (crowded out by university graduates)\, and many will conclude that their only option for avoiding unemployment is a “university education.” \n \n \nHabibi presented his talk\, Higher Education Policies and the Emerging Over-education Crisis in the Middle East\, at the Center for International and Regional Studies on February 19\, 2017. He argued that there must be a balance between quality and quantity of education in the region. “Getting a degree in physics and then getting a job in chemistry or another job that requires a university degree is not big a waste of resources; you’re still a university graduate working in some other field\,” Habibi said. “But if you are a university graduate and you are working in a field that does not really need the skills of a university education then you have to think about the resources you (and the government) have devoted to your education.” \n \n \nHabibi began his research on conditions of higher education in Egypt\, Iran\, and Turkey about four years ago. Along with local research partners in these countries\, he has conducted research on the earnings of university graduates\, examined the motivations behind why individuals choose to get degrees\, interviewed policymakers\, and studied higher-education planning patterns. \n \n \nThere is strong cultural demand for higher education everywhere\, but this was not the case forty or fifty years ago\, he explained. “In 1976\, it was unheard of for university graduates to be unemployed in Iran\, but in 2011 the unemployment rate for university graduates was nineteen percent.” Habibi reported that in many MENA countries today\, the unemployment rate for people with university degrees is higher than high school graduates. \n \n \nIn the past two decades\, because of the political acceptance of privatization of higher education\, policymakers have been able to expand higher education without expanding the government expenditure by the same proportion. Therefore\, in a way\, the fiscal burden of expansion has been reduced through privatization. “In these countries\, enrollment has increased\, but the burden of education on government has not increased\,” Habibi said. Politicians did not foresee that increasing enrollment would become a massive burden. “The cost of education is to a large extent a burden on the entire society\,” he said\, “so we should justify the return to education not just for the individual but for the entire society\, by taking into account the massive government investment in tertiary education.” \n \n \nA common feature among Middle Eastern countries is that governments take a very active role in educational planning\, Habibi said. This is not the case in Europe and the United States\, where a large number of universities are private\, and governments do not really have much control over admission and enrollment policies. He said there are two primary justifications for governments expanding educational opportunities in higher education\, economic justification (labor market demand for university skills) and social demand. \n \n \nLabor market justification arises from manpower planning. Based on long-term forecasts for economic growth and industrial development\, the government estimates the amount of skilled labor that is needed in each specific field. Social demand for higher education\, on the other hand\, is based on the desire of students and their families for higher education\, according to Habibi. Social demand is generally larger than the labor market demand because citizens observe that university graduates tend to earn more income\, hold a higher social status\, and have improved social interactions and opportunities. While there are many obvious social and cultural benefits to having a more educated population\, he said\, “You also have to look at the employment and labor market conditions for university graduates.” \n \n \nHabibi shared some statistics about recent spikes in university enrollment. Between 1995 and 2015\, Iran and Turkey each saw enrollment increase by almost five hundred percent. With a population of ninety million\, Egypt has 2.5 million university students enrolled at present; Turkey’s population of eighty million has five million university students. Egyptian citizens aged 25-29 who hold a university degree increased by an astounding eighty percent in this timeframe. \n \n \nUniversities in Iran expanded very rapidly\, especially since 2005\, “because of political reasons and because of populist pressure\,” Habibi reported. If you are a graduate in computer science or law\, he said\, you should have good opportunity for employment. However\, “we see surprisingly high unemployment rates in these and some other university majors like architecture and civil engineering.” He reported that in Iran in 2016\, the unemployment rate for male university graduates was thirteen percent\, and 65.5 percent for females. \n \n \nHabibi and his colleagues observed that in every country policymakers received some practical recommendations for addressing the issue of over-education through workforce planning\, (for example\, estimating the labor market need for university programs\, and admitting students according to set requirements). But in every proposed case\, he said\, “solutions were rejected by policymakers because social demand for higher education was so strong that they could not say no to families that wanted to send their children to university. . . . Rather than focusing on labor market demand\, politicians focused on satisfying the social demand for higher education\, which has now resulted in unemployment and underemployment.” \n \n \nHabibi cited two countries that have been able to contain the problem of over-education\, Germany and Singapore. Germany uses vocational training programs in high schools that are popular and effective\, and many students choose the vocational education for manufacturing jobs because they find good-paying jobs after graduation. This system has worked because there is cooperation between the private sector corporations and the vocational training schools\, Habibi said. Singapore has been successful in resisting populist demand and puts strict limits on university admissions. The government achieved this by reducing the role of the ministry of higher education in determining the enrollment quotas for universities\, and it has empowered the ministry of manpower to play a more important role in higher-education planning. As a result\, enrollment limits are closely linked to labor market demand projections for each university major. \n \n \n“There are some steps that can be taken to prevent over-education\, but they will require political will\,” Habibi said. He cited the need for economic planning and a “cap and trade” concept\, where a cap is placed on the number of students admitted into each major (for example civil engineering)\, and universities then compete for enrollment permits. He said the over-education crisis reminds him of the issue of inflation\, and how countries manage to fight it. Using this analogy he said\, “As long as the parliament is in charge of monetary policy it is hard to fight inflation because members of parliament would like to satisfy their constituency by increasing government expenditures and they will force the central government to finance the budget deficit by printing more money. However\, when the central bank of a country is independent the politicians cannot force it to print money and cause inflation.” Transferring the higher education enrollment decisions to an independent body away from political and social pressures\, can have a similar effect in preventing over-education. \n \n \nNader Habibi is the Henry J. Leir Professor of the Economics of the Middle East at Brandeis University’s Crown Center for Middle East Studies. Before joining Brandeis University in June 2007\, he served as managing director of economic forecasting and risk analysis for Middle East and North Africa with Global Insight Ltd. Habibi has more than twenty-eight years of experience in teaching\, research and management positions; including vice-president for research in Iran Banking Institute (Tehran)\, assistant professor of economics in Bilkent University (Ankara)\, research fellow and lecturer on the political economy of the Middle East at Yale University. \n \n \nArticle by Jackie Starbird\, Publications and Projects Assistant at CIRS.
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/higher-education-policies-and-emerging-over-education-crisis-middle-east/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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