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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20161009T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20161010T150000
DTSTAMP:20260424T224628
CREATED:20161020T080836Z
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SUMMARY:The Resource Curse in the Gulf Working Group I
DESCRIPTION:On October 9-10\, 2016\, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) held a working group under a research initiative on “The ‘Resource Curse’ in the Gulf.” During the course of two days\, assembled participants identified key gaps in the literature on rentier states of the Persian Gulf\, while leading discussions on a variety of related subtopics: rent distribution and development of institutions; political legitimacy; military establishments in the Persian Gulf; stability and instability; human rights in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states; gender equality; entrepreneurship; and education\, occupation\, and Khaleeji youth. \n\nThe working group discussions commenced with a session led by Matthew Gray on “Rentier Wealth: Curse or Cure for the Gulf.” During his session Gray provided a broad overview of existing theories of the resource curse\, and identified a number of questions relating to its application in the Persian Gulf. After presenting the main arguments on the resource curse that have been made by scholars over the past decades\, Gray provided a review of several questions that remain understudied or that have not been adequately addressed. Amongst other things\, Gray suggested that the issue of state autonomy in rentier states is not as empirically established as theory suggests it is\, and in fact remains highly debatable. It is important to provide greater empirical evidence of rentier-driven state autonomy (or a lack thereof)\, and studying this question within the GCC states would provide for an original case study. Gray also argued for a deeper understanding of Gulf state capitalism\, and particularly the role of elites and resource rents. In rentier states institutions and corporations may serve as tools for forging patrimonial networks. These social dynamics in state institutions and corporations raise a question on the extent to which patrimonial networks are steered and maintained by resource rents. Gray suggested another important research gap exists in terms of labor policies in hydrocarbon-rich states studied from an interdisciplinary context. Insofar as foreign relations and history are concerned\, Gray pointed out that there has been no comprehensive work on developing a theory of international relations in the Persian Gulf that is centered on rents and resources. Finally\, there is a need for a comprehensive history of rents and rentierism in the Persian Gulf\, from pre-oil rentierism to post-oil rentierism. \n\nDesha Girod led a discussion session on the topic of “Rent Distribution and the Development of Institution in the Gulf.” Girod has carried out a comparative research project examining the challenges that faced institutional development in very different sorts of resource-based economies. She has studied the historical evolution of institutions in two African states\, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon\, against developments in two GCC oil states\, Kuwait and Oman. Girod’s findings suggest that pre-oil discovery is important when considering the evolution of institutions in rentier states. Her examination of Equatorial Guinea and Gabon suggested that the extractive economies that were developed by colonial powers weakened state institutions and destroyed existing social pluralism. The colonial legacy led to a particular development of institutions in these two nations. Kuwait and Oman did not experience the same sort of pre-oil extractive economic conditions through colonial domination\, and colonial powers were not interested in intervening in the domestic politics of either of these two states. Based on her ongoing research\, Girod suggested that further study is important to assess how certain conditions (such as weak institutions) conventionally attributed to the resource curse may be in fact be an artifact of an earlier curse (such as the colonialism or institutions developed to assist the colonial project of exploiting natural resources) that shaped the development of certain key institutions. Further research is also needed so that we have a stronger explanation than the current one in the literature that suggests that “weak” versus “strong” institutions can determine whether the resource curse is suffered or avoided. It is also important to study how institutions in the GCC evolved over time\, through a historical study of the sorts of institutions that existed in the Gulf during the time of hydrocarbon discovery\, and how these subsequently shaped the ways in which rents were used by the modern states that came into being. Another area of research suggested by Girod is on the role of external actors in the GCC\, their impact on institution building and the use of rents. \n\nBuilding on Girod’s discussion\, Mehran Kamrava led a discussion on “Political Legitimacy and Scaling Back during an Oil Bust in the Gulf.” Kamrava claimed that there are differences among GCC states in terms of patterns of state building\, social cohesion\, rent-driven policies\, relationship between ruling families and tribes\, and bureaucracies. These differences are stimulated by implicit understandings between ruling families and other stakeholders\, such as the merchants\, pre and post-oil discovery. Stakeholders’ corporatism and marital bonds between ruling families and stakeholders contributed to the resilience and adaptability of the social contracts between ruling families and stakeholders; and thus to the establishment of enduring ruling bargains. Kamrava also argued that Persian Gulf states have reacted differently to fluctuations in oil prices. The variance in reactions raises a question: what are the conditions that shape states’ responses to changes in oil prices? Kamrava added that in countries where the State establishes strong clientelistic relationships with the merchant class through offering contracts\, the merchant class becomes more dependent on the State\, especially during times of downturn. How did entrepreneurial classes and States react in three different oil bust cycles? What was the relationship between state and business in previous oil cycles? And what does this tell us about institutional evolution between the three oil boom and bust cycles? Kamrava also claimed that States have responded to economic downturns by promoting nationalization of the labor force\, which has decreased the efficiency of state institutions. Finally\, Kamrava argued that identity politics captures public imagination rather than issues such as transparency and accountability. This questions how governments use salient concerns\, during times of economic downturns\, to influence social cohesion in the society. \n\nMohammad Reza Farzanegan focused his discussion on “Oil Rents and the Military in the Gulf.” Farzanegan raised seven original research questions that address critical gaps in the literature on the impact of oil revenues in rentier economies on military establishments. First\, he claimed that a systematic analysis of the correlation between GCC military spending and oil prices is missing. Thus\, what is the impact of positive and negative oil price shocks on military spending? Second\, Farzanegan claimed that the effect of oil revenues on military spending depends on the level of corruption. This raises the question: how does the quality of political and economic institutions matter? Third\, he argued that increasing military spending may increase political stability at higher levels of oil rent; while at lower levels of oil revenues\, increasing military spending may require cutting social spending such as subsidies and other transfers\, leading to reduction of life satisfaction of locals and higher political instability. Thus\, it is critical to examine how do fluctuations in oil revenues matter insofar as the effect of military spending on political stability is concerned. Fourth\, since Middle Eastern countries have one of the highest levels of military spending burden around the world\, how does economic growth impact military spending? Fifth\, is there a military spending threshold pegged to oil rents and growth? Sixth\, Farzanegan discussed the youth bulge in the GCC\, and how this can be a burden on governments if oil rents decrease. He asked if there is any moderating role of oil rents and military in the stability-youth nexus. Finally\, Farzanegan highlighted the effect of oil rents on corruption\, which questions how the involvement of military establishments in politics can impact corruption insofar as military spending is concerned. \n\nJessie Moritz led a discussion session on the topic of “Resource Rents and Stability/Instability in Gulf Societies.” Moritz argued that there is a difference between “resource abundance” and “resource dependence.” She stated that resource abundance promotes regime stability\, but resource dependence promotes violent conflict or instability. In examining this issue\, Moritz raised a series of questions\, among which: what makes an individual\, or a group of people\, challenge the State? And how do states co-opt public dissatisfaction? Moritz also emphasized the importance of studying exceptions to rentier logic\, rather than just focusing on commonalities between rentier economies. She claimed that studying these exceptions lead to another series of questions\, such as: how effective has state co-optation been\, especially on the subnational level? What causes subnational groups to move away from the royal court’s side\, to the opposition’s side? Is political loyalty determined by rent distribution? What has happened to reformist groups\, especially when oil prices are at a low? How effective will broader societal movements be? Will they be able to influence state policies? And will they side with particular factions of the regime against others? \n\nZahra Babar led a session on “Hydrocarbons and Human Rights in the GCC.” Babar suggested that the “universality” of human rights remains highly contested\, with polarization between which rights are meant to be prioritized in different contexts. Within the GCC there continue to be limitations on political and civil rights for individuals\, while rentier resources may have led to the evolution of greater protections for economic and social rights of citizens. Most of the studies of the Gulf states are from the perspective of human rights in authoritarian and non-democratic contexts\, and have not applied the lens of rentierism and human rights. Babar identified a number of research gaps in relation to the evolution of human rights issues in rentier-based political economies of the region. Among other things\, Babar raised the need to study the question of the impact of falling or rising oil prices and how they increase or limit political freedoms and human rights in the GCC. A second research gap raised by Babar was on the role of international actors and external patrons\, and the advancement of human rights in Gulf oil monarchies. Human rights regimes have found greater means of imposing disciplinary mechanisms (such as sanctions or isolation) on “pariah states” that somehow are presented as being outside the norms of international relations. How do human rights actors interact with more complex cases such as the GCC states that have been considered to be “security partners” or “economic partners” and critical to the global energy economy? A third set of research questions center on the narrative of citizenship and its sets of rights across a spectrum of GCC distributive states which vary in the degrees of capacity to distribute. Post 2011 increasingly the GCC states have been conflating their goal of “protecting economic rights” of citizens with increasing measures to securitize citizenship – how is this impacting the regional human rights narrative? Finally Babar raised a number of areas of research in relation to the Gulf oil sector and human rights. Clashes and confrontations between the global oil industry and international and transnational networks of human rights have been increasingly commonplace from Sudan to Ecuador\, how come we have not seen the GCC as a locus of this exchange? \n\nFollowing Babar’s discussion\, Gail Buttorff led a session on “Hydrocarbon Wealth and Gender Equality in the Gulf.” Buttorff started off her session by highlighting the major differences between GCC states in terms of level of rentierism\, political economy\, and social cohesion. She then listed three original research topics. First\, she discussed the various nationalization policies that have been employed across the GCC\, and how their impact on female participation in the labor forces remains understudied. Buttorff also claimed that the impact of fluctuations in oil prices on government efforts to boost female labor force participation is also understudied. Finally\, Buttorff discussed the link between female labor force participation and political empowerment. She raised a question: does female participation in higher levels of government reflect improvements in women suffrage in the GCC? \n\nHanadi Al Mubaraki shifted the working group discussions to examine “Oil Wealth and Entrepreneurship in the Gulf.” Hanadi started her discussion with highlighting GCC governments’ efforts to encourage and support entrepreneurship and innovation. Yet\, she claimed that there has not been any literature on the success or failure of projects supported by GCC governments. Al Mubaraki highlighted the importance of studying entrepreneurship policies in the GCC in comparison to policies employed in other developed regions. Al Mubaraki also raised attention to the challenges and opportunities in establishing Technology Commercialization programs in GCC universities\, which have impacted the evolution and internationalization of GCC based entrepreneurship. Finally\, Al Mubaraki questioned the outcomes of business development programs—such as business incubation programs\, innovation programs\, accelerator programs\, and small and medium-size enterprises—on entrepreneurship in the GCC. \n\nCrystal Ennis concluded the working group discussions with a session on “Education\, Occupation\, and Khaleeji Youth Success.” Ennis claimed that there is a mismatch between Khaleeji youth’s education and job market demands. Yet\, this is not the only challenge Khaleeji youth face. She claimed that class\, rural divide\, gender\, and family status factor in education and job options among youth in the GCC; this is a topic that deserves further study. Another issue is the limited production base in the GCC that impacts the analysis of Khaleeji youth labor\, and our understanding of youth contribution to global production. Ennis also argued that there is a critical need to investigate the impact of neo-liberal ideologies on the social construction of youth in the hyper-modernity of the GCC\, and the factors that shape economic citizenship among youth in the GCC\, especially when it comes to the private sector. Ennis also discussed the impact of expats’ expertise on the learning development of Khaleeji youth in the private sector. The impacts of neo-liberal ideologies and expats’ expertise raise a question on Khaleeji youth’s perception of their belonging to the labor market. \n\nMehran Kamrava\, Director of CIRS\, concluded the working group with emphasis on the contribution of the working group discussions to literature on the resource curse in the Persian Gulf\, which will be published in a special issue by CIRS in the near future. \n\nSee the working group agenda hereRead the participants’ biographies hereRead more about this research initiative\n\nParticipants and Discussants: \n\nHanadi Mubarak Al-Mubaraki\, Kuwait UniversityZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarGail Buttorff\, University of KansasCrystal Ennis\, Leiden UniversityMohammad Reza Farzanegan\, Philipps-Universität MarburgDesha Girod\, Georgetown UniversityMatthew Gray\, Waseda University\, JapanIslam Hassan\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarJessie Moritz\, Australian National UniversityMoamer Qazafi\, Georgetown University in QatarElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar\n\nArticle by Islam Hassan\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/resource-curse-gulf-working-group-i/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20161018T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20161018T200000
DTSTAMP:20260424T224628
CREATED:20161004T094912Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T094108Z
UID:10001301-1476813600-1476820800@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:The 2016 U.S. Presidential Election
DESCRIPTION:On October 18\, 2016\, CIRS hosted a Panel discussion on “The 2016 US Presidential Elections\,” featuring Joshua Mitchell and Clyde Wilcox\, professors in the Government Department at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service\, and world renowned authorities in their respective areas of expertise. Mitchell specializes in political theory and\, among other topics\, has written on religion and freedom in the United States. Wilcox has written extensively on interest groups\, public opinion\, electoral behavior\, and campaign finance. The discussion was moderated by Mehran Kamrava\, Director of the Center for International and Regional Studies. \n \n \nMitchell opened the debate by framing his speech around a central question: “Why did Trump so easily take the nomination?” He clarified that: “my task here…is not so much to defend Trump\, but rather to explain him through the lens of the history of political thought.” Giving some background to the current political climate\, Mitchell painted a picture of the United States as a nation sharply divided\, stating that “there are two different Americas right now.” One America is reflected in the power and wealth of Washington\, and other key urban centers\, where property prices and incomes are soaring\, while “the other America is an America of despair\, drug addiction\, suicide\, low-paying jobs\, and never-ending condescension toward ‘flyover’ country.” \n \n \n \n\n\n\n\n\n \n \n \nBecause of such sharp divisions between wealth and poverty\, and indeed the growing rifts within US politics\, a “populist uprising” in the form of an outlier candidate like Trump has been a long time coming. Examining key political moments to explain Trump’s success\, he argued that during the Cold War\, factions of “the Republican Party hung together not by virtue of internal coherence\, but by virtue of what they were opposed to—namely\, progressivism within\, and the Cold War without.” After the end of the Cold War\, Mitchell noted\, there really was no reason for the party to be held together since their common interest was defeated\, thus\, “it was just a question of time before that party fell apart; if it wasn’t Trump\, it was going be somebody else\, sooner or later.” \n \n \nIn the aftermath of the Cold War\, a new type of political thought was cultivated in young people who began defining their lives around issues of “globalization” and “identity\,” which have become the central features of contemporary political engagement. These terms differ greatly to how politics was conceptualized in the past\, revolving around notions of the sovereign state and the rational citizen\, as outlined in the treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and Hobbes’ Leviathan in 1651. Today\, sovereignty is no longer located in the state\, but is located “above the state\,” in global norms\, international trade and laws\, and transnational organizations\, and “below the state\,” in identity politics. “You have this tremendous paradox: the disembodied citizen who imagines his or her identity in relation to others\, and politics as activism—not citizenship\,” Mitchell explained. \n \n \nCurrently\, the battle being waged in the US—as well as in Europe as seen in the Brexit vote—is whether the future of politics will continue along the lines of the post-1989 organizing principle of globalization and identity politics\, or\, whether someone with Trump’s ideals will dismantle the current political arrangement. Trump has enthralled his electorate by turning the tide on a world obsessed with globalization by offering fervent claims that borders matter\, immigration policy matters\, national rather than universal interests matter\, entrepreneurship matters\, decentralization matters\, and\, finally\, that politically correct speech—an essential component of identity politics—does not matter. “When Trump says crass things\,” for example\, “the way he thinks through this problem is in terms\, not of sin but\, of error\,” Mitchell argued. The counter reaction to Trump’s rogue behavior\, with Hillary Clinton’s campaign being a chief proponent\, is to utilize the old American religious tropes of “purity” and “stain.” Mitchell noted that this revival of a religious language is a deeply troubling development in which Trump and his supporters are tarnished as deplorable and irredeemable\, further diving the country along political and racial lines. Especially because Hillary Clinton is white\, he argued\, her democratic campaign is even more driven to chastise the faults of white America\, and its seeming penchant for racism. \n \n \nThese two sides of the divide fall along the historic conservative and left set up of US politics\, which is anathema to\, and leaves little sustenance for\, the third alternative\, which is a Liberal regime that has no interest in either of these types of divisive party politics. In conclusion\, Mitchell argued that “the battle for the future is not over identity politics or the state. I think identity politics and globalization have lost. The question now before us is whether we are going to have a liberal state or an illiberal state.” As a final thought\, Mitchell noted that\, along with the current political impasse\, there is yet another tremendous danger being instigated by the media who refuse to accept Trump—the officially nominated Republican Party candidate—as legitimate\, thus fueling a growing crisis of authority. \n \n \nClyde Wilcox offered a different narrative to Mitchell’s historical political analysis by focusing on the current electoral contest and the likely outcome. Despite Trump’s many political liabilities\, he remains close in many polls. The key question that needs to be answered\, therefore\, is “how can it be that a man who is catastrophically unprepared\, and who is not trying\, is still somewhat close” in the polls? Wilcox argued that the narrow gap in the poles is worrisome\, because “Donald Trump is\, let’s be honest\, catastrophically unprepared to be president. He lacks the knowledge to be president\, he lacks the curiosity to attain the knowledge…he is making no effort to appeal to the voters he would need to win\, which include women and minorities.” \n \n \nWilcox noted that current polling and survey data are all indicating that Hillary Clinton will win the election. However\, survey data have been wrong in the past\, and there are reasons for why Trump might actually win. Elections have been traditionally predicted by consulting a series of abstract models that include a number of variables related to economic indicators\, employment figures\, and GDP rates. In this particular election\, however\, there is another key factor that is determined by what Wilcox termed “the 8 year itch\,” where voters become disenchanted with the incumbent party and elect the alternative option in order to receive a fresh start. By this token\, he argued\, Republicans would normally be expected to win a close election\, if the Democrats and Republicans nominated equally attractive candidates. \n \n \nA key rallying cry for the Republicans has been that this is an election about the forgotten white people in impoverished small towns\, “but when we look at survey data\, we something slightly different: the people who support Trump are not the ones who have lost the jobs\, those people are actually Hillary Clinton people. Trump’s people are actually slightly above average in income\, not a whole lot\, but slightly above average. The single best indicator of who supports Donald Trump right now is racial resentment\,” with increasing numbers of confederate flags being raised as a symbol of this growing antagonism. \n \n \nAnother reason for the narrow gap in the polls is because Hillary Clinton has a number of obstacles stacked against her\, including the very fact that she is one of the Clintons—a name synonymous with the political status quo for almost three decades—along with a number of scandals arising from some of her questionable acts. Despite “being the most admired woman in America when she was Secretary of State\,” Clinton must also overcome the disadvantages of running as a female candidate\, and the many sexist characterizations of her temperament\, her decision-making skills\, and her political will. “The Republicans have been bashing her consistently for the last six years\,” Wilcox said. “She has the highest negatives of any presidential candidate in our history\, except for one: Donald Trump.” \n \n \nAlthough he admitted that Hillary Clinton is a much weaker candidate than the Democrats would normally have offered\, Wilcox did not believe that these weaknesses necessarily translate into her being a bad president. He argued that the US is a polarized nation of partisans\, with many people traditionally voting for the same party at every election. In this case\, however\, Trump has become such an unpredictable political liability that many staunch Republicans have publicly voiced their disappointment with the candidate\, with many opting to vote for Hillary Clinton\, thus further destabilizing the Republican Party. \n \n \nIn conclusion\, Wilcox argued\, while many of Trump’s supporters are outspoken and proud to vote for him\, it is possible that many others who plan to vote for Trump are\, in fact\, too ashamed to say so publicly\, thereby skewing the polling data. Donald Trump\, meanwhile\, has already predicted that the election is fraudulent if Clinton wins\, and has encouraged his supporters to challenge Clinton supporters in the event that he loses the election. If Hillary Clinton does indeed win\, Wilcox argued\, it is very likely that the Republications will be holding hearings on impeachment within the year.  Either way\, he concluded\, “I come away with a rather pessimistic view of the future of American politics; it has been the ugliest election in my lifetime\, and I hope that on their deathbeds my children will be able to say it was the ugliest in theirs.”  \n \n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications.
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/the-2016-u-s-presidential-election/
CATEGORIES:American Studies,Dialogue Series,Panels
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