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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20160918T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20160919T150000
DTSTAMP:20260407T014255
CREATED:20161004T064153Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T105420Z
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SUMMARY:Pluralism and Community in the Middle East Working Group II
DESCRIPTION:On September 18–19\, 2016\, CIRS held a second working group under its research initiative on “Pluralism and Community in the Middle East.” Over the course of two days\, working group participants presented draft papers examining pluralism and diversity within the contemporary Middle East\, addressing amongst other things: how governance and legal regimes incorporate or engage with issues of plural communities; how architecture and urbanism in the Middle East reflect changing notions of identity and inclusion; iconoclasm and heritage destruction undertaken by the Islamic State (IS); education in plural societies of Lebanon and Syria; the economic conditions of Sunni communities in Iran; the evolution of Armenian nationalism and identity in the Middle East; race\, ethnicity\, and identity in Iran; and Qatari social structure. \n \n \nThe working group commenced with a presentation of Kathleen Cavanaugh’s paper on “Governance and Legal Regimes in the Middle Eastern Plural Society.” In her paper\, Cavanaugh appraises the normative universalism of human rights principles in addressing issues of pluralism and inclusion\, examines how these principles have influenced governance in the Middle East\, and provides a robust critique of ‘secularism’ as being the prescriptive means by which to foster greater inclusion in the Middle East. Cavanaugh’s paper suggests that that there is a need to undertake a pragmatic assessment of the ways in which the language of the “universal” and the “secular” have actually suffocated voices of diversity and allowed states to suppress culture and identity. \n \n \nNezar Al Sayyad presented his paper “On the Changing Identity of Architecture and Urbanism in the Middle East during the Era of Globalization.” Al Sayyad argues that the Middle East serves as a convincing geographical space from which to argue that “universal modernism” is only or at least mainly a European phenomenon. The permanently hybrid and evolving nature of architecture and urbanism in the Middle East make it impossible to accept an inflexible or static idea of what is “universal.” Al Sayyad’s paper suggests that the history of the world demonstrates a movement towards greater cultural differentiation as opposed to homogenization\, and at an individual level this means that a person considers himself or herself to simultaneously hold multiple affiliations and identities. If hybridity is also accepted as an inherent constituent of national identity\, this means the ensuing forms of urbanism must be accepted as only a reflection of a specific transitional stage or era within any society. Since culture has become increasingly placeless\, urbanism will likely become one of the few remaining arenas where one may observe how local communities and nations mediate the tensions between the local and the global. \n \n \nJames Barry tackled another facet of the question of identity in the Middle East through his paper on “Millet Ethnicity: Christianity\, Islam\, and the Politics of Armenian Identity in the Modern Middle East.” He claims that the Armenian perception of “Armenian Muslims” as a contradiction is gradually being challenged\, although the centrality of Christianity\, nominal or otherwise\, to Armenian identity still holds fast. In the Turkish context\, the ethnic gulf that separates the Armenian-Christian from the Turkish-Muslim remains a potent legacy of the millet system\, which in the modern context has “ethicized” religious identities. He also argues that in the Armenian Diaspora\, there has been a change in attitude towards Muslim people of Armenian descent who are living in Turkey. Finally he claims that the contemplation of the potential Armenian-ness of both the Hopa Hemshin and the Islamized Armenians\, coupled with the enthusiastic engagement by the Diaspora with these two groups\, demonstrates that there is a change afoot in modern conceptions of what it is to be an Armenian\, and indeed to be a Turk. \n \n \nFollowing Barry’s discussion\, Taghreed Al-Deen discussed “Cultural Cleansing and Iconoclasm under the ‘Islamic State’: Attacks on Yezidi and Christian Humans/Heritage.” Al-Deen argues that the devastating brutality and heritage destruction carried out by the IS has included deliberate attacks against two of the most vulnerable minorities in Iraq and Syria: Yezidis and Christians. Such attacks on the human/heritage dimension of a given community ultimately rupture their identity\, dismembering their connections to each other and to their collective past. More to the point\, attacks by the IS on Christian sites such as the Armenian church in Deir ez-Zour and the villages along the Khabur River appear to be deliberately designed to conjure sharp memories of the Armenian Genocide and the Siemele massacre. Re-enacting earlier waves of genocide allows the IS to connect their contemporary brutality—ideologically\, temporally\, physically—to those moments in Yezidi and Christian history that are most sensitive and painful. These attacks also intends to erase any vestige of a cosmopolitan and diverse Middle East towards the creation of a monolithic and oppressive caliphate governed by the most perverse interpretations of Islamic law. \n \n \nAnnika Rabo presented a paper on “Educating Citizens in Lebanon and Syria.” Rabo paper draws attention to criticism that Arab educational systems have frequently received\, particularly for inadequately preparing pupils for managing contemporary challenges\, and for failing to create an educational environment that develops and nurtures open-minded and creative future citizens. Rabo argues that\, in any context all\, elements of an educational system—from public policies of education\, to classroom learning practices and teaching methods\, to curriculum development and teacher training—are an essential place to examine how a state and society are managing larger issues of inclusion and exclusion. Through an in-depth examination of two comparative case studies on the evolution of educational systems in Lebanon and Syria\, Rabo presents evidence of two very different approaches to managing pluralism and identity. In Lebanon\, a society where pluralism and a more open and liberal approach to politics co-exist with highly politicized and at times sectarian identity issues\, the educational system reflects ongoing struggles over curriculum and a lack of harmonious adoption of texts and teaching methods. As a result there exist a proliferation of schools catering to the country’s many different religious\, linguistic\, and ethnic communities\, with the end result that parochial citizens are created who are cosmopolitan and engaged with the outside and broader world\, but ill-equipped to negotiate the challenges of their own complex plural society. Syria in its pre 2011 form offered a stark contrast to Lebanon\, at least within its educational system where there was suppression of ethnic\, linguistic and religious identity\, and an ideological approach of flattening identity down to a nationalistic unified identity with no acceptance of differences. \n \n \nAfshin Shahi shifted the discussion to examine notions of inclusion and exclusion in Iran through a paper on “Economic Conditions of the Sunni Community in Modern Iran.” Shahi claimed that Sunni Iranians’ economic situation in modern time is multi-angled and influenced by various elements. Each of these elements had different level of importance in various historical periods. In their paper\, Afshin Shahi and Ehsan Abdoh Tabrizi focus on the contemporary era of Pahlavi monarchy (1925-1979) and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Although they shed light on the general economic situation of the Sunni Iranians in general\, the main focus is on ethnic Sunni Iranians\, including the Baloch\, Turkmens and Kurds\, who still comprise the majority of Iran’s Sunni population. The authors argue that the uneven modernization and imbalanced growth brought by Pahlavi policies automatically disfavored Iran’s Turkmen\, Kurdish and Baloch ethnicities\, yet these policies were not driven by sectarianism or anti Sunni sentiment. Under the Islamic Republic\, although certain economic elements of rural Iranians—including Sunni ethnic Iranians—have improved\, the State’s economic policies still disfavor Sunni Iranians\, like the Pahlavi policies\, but this time such policies are driven by sectarianism and discrimination. \n \n \nFollowing up on Shahi and Tabrizi’s paper\, Firoozeh Kashni-Sabet presented her paper on “Colorblind or Blinded by Color?: Race\, Ethnicity\, and Identity in Iran” providing a historical review of the evolution of notions of race and skin color in modern Iran. Kashani-Sabet’s analysis of archived graphics and texts suggests that conversations about race in Iran\, while rooted initially in linguistic and ethnic differences\, and while far from color-blind\, became more politicized over the course of the twentieth century. She further suggests that the production of knowledge about race\, ethnicity and identity in Iran over the twentieth century moved away from colonial actors and institutions\, and became instead the function of Iran’s state institutions\, which at times reproduced the prejudices first introduced by colonial administrators. By the 1960s\, however\, even as the state remained stunted in its understandings of culture\, ethnicity\, and race\, key Iranian intellectuals moved away from discourses of Aryanism and participated instead in the larger struggles of peoples and nations who had long been subjected to colonialism or racial discrimination. \n \n \nIslam Hassan concluded the working group’s discussions with his paper on “Qatari Social Structure and the State: Problems of Inclusion and Exclusion.” Hassan claims that the historical narrative of the composition and evolution of Qatari society is an imaginaire that contributed to the reproduction of the current social inclusion and exclusion scheme. This historical narrative emphasizes on the role of Arab tribes in the inhabitation process\, evolution of governing authority\, and creation of statehood in Qatar disregarding a major faction of the society\, particularly those of slave and Persian backgrounds. He also argues that the Qatari State has been playing a major role\, by adopting a social conservatist approach\, in maintaining and further stimulating the existing social hierarchy and inclusion and exclusion scheme. This can be viewed by examining two main issues: the State’s effort to narrow down the definition of the Qatari national identity; and articles of the constitution and legal system\, symbols\, and official history of Qatar that have been perpetuating the social inclusion and exclusion scheme through resisting marriages that could challenge the existing social order. \n \n \nMehran Kamrava\, Director of the Center for International and Regional Studies\, concluded the working group meeting by highlighting the participants’ contributions to scholarship through their papers\, which will be published in an edited volume by CIRS in the near future. \n \n \n  \n \n \n\nSee the working group meeting agenda\nRead participants’ biographies\nRead more about this research initiative \n\n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nTaghreed Jamal Al-deen\, Deakin University\, Melbourne\nNezar Al Sayyad\, University of California\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar\nJames Barry\, Deakin University\, Melbourne\nIslam Hassan\, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar\nFiroozeh Kashani-Sabet\, University of Pennsylvania\nSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar\nFirat Oruc\, Georgetown University in Qatar\nAnnika Rabo\, Stockholm University\nAfshin Shahi\, University of Bradford\nElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar\n\n \nArticle by Islam Hassan\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/pluralism-and-community-middle-east-working-group-ii/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20160925T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20160925T170000
DTSTAMP:20260407T014255
CREATED:20161005T073334Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T094219Z
UID:10001303-1474790400-1474822800@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Strategic Forum on Gulf Security
DESCRIPTION:On September 25\, 2016\, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) at Georgetown University in Qatar in collaboration with the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA) at the National Defense University hosted a one-day workshop under the title “Strategic Forum on Gulf Security.” A number of distinguished scholars\, experts\, and policy-makers were convened to discuss current threats and concerns\, and potential opportunities in some of the Persian Gulf’s countries\, including: the United Arab Emirates (UAE)\, Qatar\, and Iran. Participants also discussed the United States’ (US) positions on a number of these security concerns and opportunities. \n\nThe Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states have been keen to protect their monarchies\, and maintain the status quo in the Middle East by following more assertive foreign policies\, and utilizing their financial capabilities to influence the political dynamics in the region. Five main perceived security concerns have been driving the active role of GCC states in the Middle East: the instability in Syria\, Iraq\, and Yemen; the uncertainty about the American priorities in the region; the rise of non-state actors such as the Islamic State; the profound fluctuations in the oil market; and the domestic social and economic challenges. \n\nRegardless of internal disagreements\, security remains a top priority for the GCC leaders\, as do regional and domestic stability. Despite significant steps toward integration since its formation some thirty-five years ago\, the GCC is still far from providing a model of security integration. GCC member states have different perceptions of their security threats\, especially when it comes to Iran. Some perceive of Iran as having hegemonic aspirations in the region; and thus\, pursue policies designed to undermine Iranian influence\, especially in Yemen\, Syria and Lebanon. Many GCC states are also developing advanced security systems in order to minimize possible cyber attacks on their oil facilities and other infrastructures. \n\nAnother priority of the GCC states has been maintaining rapid economic growth\, which is central to regime legitimacy\, and\, by implication\, security. Although largely immune from it\, the GCC states are also concerned about the threat of domestic terrorism. These different perceptions among GCC states have undermined attempts at security integration\, and especially collective efforts to develop a common missile security system directed at threats from Iran. \n\nConsidering these perceived threats\, the participants argued that each of the GCC states would continue to think in national rather than collective terms. They will also invest heavily in their own security through arms purchases and weapons acquisition. There has been an increasing perception that the US is an unreliable ally\, and\, as a result\, there is greater need for self-reliance. \n\nFocusing on the UAE\, the country’s security mood could be described as one of confidence as well as concern. The UAE is living through one of its most confident eras. At the same time\, the country remains very concerned about the region and the pervasiveness of tension\, extremism\, violence\, and sectarianism\, which may spillover into its own territories. There are five main perceived security threats facing the UAE. The first threat is Iran as both an instant and a continuous threat. With the election of the Rouhani administration\, Iran is perceived as more problematic\, threatening\, destabilizing than ever before. This perception of Iran is shared by some of the other GCC states\, especially by Saudi Arabia. The threat from Iran has also escalated from being merely security oriented\, to an ideological threat\, with Wahhabism versus Khomeinism. \n\nThe second threat is the prolonged war in Yemen that needs to stop as soon as possible. This directly relates to a third threat\, namely “the weak links between GCC member states.” Bahrain\, Kuwait\, and post-Qaboos Oman\, and possibly even Saudi Arabia\, are all weak links that challenge a strong and unified GCC. The last threat is the “post-US Persian Gulf.” President Obama’s foreign policy has encouraged GCC states to seek a path of less dependence on the US\, and compensate for that by establishing relations and alliances with other global and regional powers. \n\nThe key challenge facing the UAE’s leadership is how to navigate between these concerns and opportunities. The UAE has invested in the most advanced security systems in order to shield itself from as many security challenges as possible\, and has become more assertive and preemptive in confronting security threats. It has also been playing an active role at the regional level. On the international level\, the UAE\, through the GCC\, has been establishing stronger ties with the European Union (EU)\, and is in talks to sign bilateral trade agreements with Britain. This regional and international activism is designed to prepare the country for the post-US Persian Gulf. \n\nInsofar as Qatar is concerned\, there are three levels of analysis from which to examine the Qatari leadership’s behavior: domestic politics\, foreign policy\, and security politics. In terms of domestic politics\, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa tried to transform Qatar into the Singapore of the Persian Gulf. Articulating such a vision\, and at the same time diving away from the shadows of Saudi Arabia\, was facilitated by three main factors: social cohesion in Qatari society; absence of sectarian divides; and the absence of a parliament that resists the Emir’s agendas. \n\nFor Qatar\, threat perceptions in the 1990s revolved around possible machinations by Saudi Arabia to reinstall in power the deposed emir\, Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad. As the country became more stable under Sheikh Hamad’s rule\, Qatar’s efforts at protecting its security turned into power projection. This projection of power often occurred through the country’s use of hedging as a foreign policy option. Accordingly\, Qatar placed its security bet with the US\, but also maintained ostensibly warm relations with states and non-state actors such as Iran\, Hamas\, and the Taliban. Qatar also sought to position itself as an honest broker for peace and negotiations. During and after the Arab Uprisings\, Qatar saw the instability in the region as an opportunity rather than a threat\, and capitalized on what it perceived as emerging opportunities. \n\nHowever\, Qatar’s overambitious assertions in regional foreign policy\, particularly in Egypt and Libya\, had some undesired consequences. A strong reaction from Saudi Arabia and other GCC actors\, culminating in the withdrawal of the Saudi\, Emirati\, and Bahraini ambassadors from Doha\, led to a change in a chastened Qatari foreign policy direction. Currently in Syria\, for example\, Qatar is no longer competing with Saudi Arabia for influence. Qatar’s relationship with the US has traditionally been close at multiple levels\, and there are visible signs of this in terms of diplomacy\, economy\, culture\, and security. Due to the robustness of its cooperation with the US\, Qatar appears to be less concerned than other GCC states about US foreign policy in the region. Additionally\, Qatar continues to develop its security partnerships with other Western states\, as the recent arms deal with France demonstrates\, and is also developing a strategic relationship with Turkey. \n\nIran’s perception of its security interests and threats have been going through a transitional phase following the signing of the nuclear deal. The Iranian leadership had assumed that the deal would help the country reprioritize its security threats and open up new opportunities for international engagement\, but to date little of substance has changed. While the Iranians feel that they have fulfilled their side of the bargain\, US and European leaders remain skeptical. As a result\, the US has been discouraging Western companies and international banks from working with Iran. Currently Iranian foreign policy aims are to enhance the country’s relations with the EU\, while also cooperating closely with Russia and China. When it comes to Iran’s foreign policy towards the Arab world\, although there are still tensions with a number of Iran’s traditional regional rivals\, the country has been keen to develop relations with a number of Arab states and non-state actors in the region. \n\nUS foreign policy towards the Persian Gulf region is seen as also being in a period of transition\, with the view from the GCC being that the Americans are shifting their priorities to the eastern shore of the Persian Gulf\, namely Iran. The Obama administration is considered to be unwilling to challenge Iran and uphold the interests of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. This uncertainty around US foreign policy towards the Persian Gulf region is driving GCC states to embark on reengineering their countries’ agendas in preparation for the transition to the post-US Persian Gulf. \n\nAt the end of the forum\, Mehran Kamrava\, Director of CIRS\, and Richard L. Russell Professor of National Security Affairs at NESA gave their concluding remarks. They stressed on this forum’s contribution to a greater understanding of the current realities and high stakes of the security environment in the Persian Gulf region. \n\n  \n\n\nRead participants’ biographies\n\n\n  \n\nPresenters:  \n\n\nAbdulkhaleq Abdulla\, Qatar University\n\n\n\nGawdat Bahgat\, NESA\, National Defense University\n\n\n\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar\n\n\n\nMohammad Marandi\, University of Tehran\n\n\n\nRory Miller\, Georgetown University in Qatar\n\n\n\nRichard Russell\, NESA\, National Defense University\n\n\n\nHouchang Hassan Yari\, Royal Military College of Canada\n\n\nParticipants: \n\n\nLTC Sadiam Al Dhulaimi\, Representative for Yemen\, US Central Command\n\n\n\nH.E. Bashir Al-Shirawi\, Former Ambassador of Qatar to South Africa\n\n\n\nLTC Mustafa Abdel Haleem Mohammad Alhyari\, Jordan Armed Forces\n\n\n\nAbdullah Baabood\, Qatar University\n\n\n\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar\n\n\n\nDaniel Baltrusaitis\, National Defense College of the UAE\, and NESA\, National Defense University\n\n\n\nKai-Henrik Barth\, Georgetown University in Qatar\n\n\n\nAbdelwahab El-Affendi\, Doha Institute of Graduate Studies\n\n\n\nAfyare Elmi\, Qatar University\n\n\n\nGlnar Eskandar\, US Embassy\n\n\n\nIbrahim Fraihat\, Brookings Doha Center\n\n\n\nLauren Granger\, Georgetown University in Qatar\n\n\n\nIslam Hassan\, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar\n\n\n\nHussein Heydari\, Embassy of Iran\n\n\n\nLudovic Hood\, US Embassy\n\n\n\nH.E. Willy Kempel\, Ambassador of Austria to Qatar\n\n\n\nKentaro Niimi\, Embassy of Japan\n\n\n\nCSM Cynthia Pritchett\, (retired) US Central Command\n\n\n\nJames Reardon-Anderson\, Georgetown University in Qatar\n\n\n\nJean-Marc Rickli\, King’s College London\n\n\n\nMarta Saldana\, Georgetown University in Qatar\n\n\n\nYoussef Shatilla\, Masdar Institute of Science and Technology\n\n\n\nRana Shayya\, US Embassy\n\n\n\nDouw GJ Vermaak\, Embassy of South Africa\n\n\n\nSteven Wright\, Qatar University\n\n\n\nLuciano Zaccara\, Qatar University\n\n\n  \n\nArticle by Islam Hassan\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/strategic-forum-on-gulf-security/
LOCATION:Education City\, Al Luqta St\, Ar-Rayyan\, Doha\, Qatar
CATEGORIES:American Studies,Dialogue Series,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20160926T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20160926T200000
DTSTAMP:20260407T014256
CREATED:20160918T092643Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T094213Z
UID:10001295-1474912800-1474920000@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Transitions in Qatar’s Architectural Identity
DESCRIPTION:Ibrahim Mohamed Jaidah\, renowned Qatari Architect and Group CEO & Chief Architect of the Arab Engineering Bureau\, was invited to deliver the inaugural CIRS Monthly Dialogue of the 2016-2017 academic year with a lecture on “Transitions in Qatar’s Architectural Identity” on September 26\, 2016. The talk focused on the definitions of Qatari architecture; its history\, influences\, aesthetics\, and the future of its development. \n\nJaidah explained that the history of the Gulf region in general\, and Qatar in particular\, has always been one of global influences through trade routes and contact with neighboring countries and cultures including Basra\, Najd\, Zanzibar\, India\, and Iran\, among many others. Qatari culture\, he said\, has always been a blend of borrowings “from the way we dress\, to our dialogue\, to our cuisine\, to our music\,” and to the diversity of the local architecture. These are all products of historical learning. \n\nDefining the history of Qatari architecture\, Jaidah noted that it falls into broad time periods that can be categorized according to pre- and post-oil styles of development. He explained that\, in a few decades\, Qatar achieved what other nations strived to accomplish over centuries\, and this incredibly rapid growth has had massive effects on the nation and its architectural growth and design. The transition from one period into another occurred relatively rapidly\, where Qatari architecture that was once defined by haphazard mud houses in the pre-oil period\, was quickly transformed with oil wealth in the immediate post-oil period to encompass a growing town defined by cement and bricks\, and\, in the contemporary period\, a global city brandishing steel and glass towers. \n\n\n\n \n\nThe invention of cultured pearls in Japan in the 1930s brought about the decimation of the pearling industry in Qatar—its primary source of wealth—plunging the nation into poverty and affecting its architectural development. “In the pre-oil period\,” he recalled\, “the architecture was quite straightforward; simple houses\, courtyard houses\, that expanded as the families required.” The architecture of this time period was defined by respect to the environment\, sourcing local materials and building according to optimum orientations to make best use of the natural weather conditions. Jaidah noted that “all natural materials were used\, and that is why it was responsive to the environment and it was pleasant to live in.” In fact\, “the only thing that was brought from abroad was the wood—because we didn’t have enough trees—which we call the danshal was brought from either Zanzibar\, from Iran—usually recycled from other buildings—and from India\,” he said. \n\nThe discovery of oil a few years later\, set Qatar onto the path of industrial wealth and with it immediate effects on the growth of the urban environment. Although the styles of the buildings and the arcades remained largely the same\, natural materials were gradually being replaced by cement and bricks and architectural lines became more even and straight. In central Doha\, “the clock tower\, I think\, is one of the most important buildings\, because it was the start of the new construction\,” made of concrete and other manmade materials. The old Ottoman fort that was the center of administrative rule\, was replaced with the first diwan amiri. “As soon as the Ottomans left\, the first thing the ruler did was to build the diwan amiri there in different stages because it had the most prime and historical control of the whole bay\,” Jaidah explained. This transitional period was defined by a blending of natural and manmade materials that were combined within the same buildings. \n\nThis immediate post-oil period was defined by increasing incoming wealth\, which was being transformed into the design of the local landscape. Prosperous residents were able to commission\, for the first time\, architects from India\, Pakistan\, and Lebanon to build unique\, art deco designs\, full of motifs and symbolic flourishes\, or what Jaidah calls\, “Arabian deco.” During this period\, there was a whole era in the 50s that\, unfortunately until today\, is not considered as part of Qatar’s history\, and so buildings have been systematically demolished to make way for the new high-rises and urban developments. Jaidah noted that he had an opportunity to preserve some of these buildings\, and to document others\, before they were demolished. Today\, the renovation of the Fire Station building and its re-purposing to accommodate art initiatives and galleries is an example of preserving the early modern history of Qatar. He noted that these buildings are crucial to the story of Doha; “it doesn’t have to be a mud house to become history. Our modern history is what is forming the new generation.” \n\nIn what Jaidah describes as the contemporary “post-oil period\,” there was a boom of construction and urban developments in the 1990s and 2000s\, especially with massive land reclamation projects and the development of West Bay\, Lusail\, and the Pearl island. With the government’s announcement that it would rent buildings and offices in West Bay\, a construction race took place to take advantage of the new policy\, leading to massive growth in the construction and infrastructure sectors. However\, Jaidah said\, “there was a sort of scary moment because architecture became a commodity\,” and towers were being constructed within a few short months. In this period\, architecture became more about unique\, innovative\, fashionable\, and flagship designs that completed with each other\, and with other countries\, rather than serving a function or harmoniously fitting within the exiting cityscape. Jaidah admits that during this period\, not many of these construction were environmentally sustainable and “mistakes happened” in the rush to compete. \n\nHowever\, he argued in conclusion\, “there was a wakeup call\,” and new regulations were put in place to guarantee a more sustainable style of urban development\, which is important for the future of the landscape and the environment. In the contemporary period\, the architectural development of Qatar is taking a more measured and mature stance and is involving leading international architects. Today\, there is “the beauty of getting people from all over the world to participate and to…redefine what is culture\,” and to preserve our history\, not only in architecture but in other areas of cultural development. Today\, there is a kind of “cultural revolution” reconnecting Qatar to its history and heritage by taking the local\, vernacular architecture into the future. Today\, Jaidah concluded\, “there is a language that is being created\, sensitive to the environment and to the culture”—one that is as respectful of the past as it is open to the future. \n\nIbrahim Mohamed Jaidah is a researcher and author of The History of Qatari Architecture and 99 Domes who grew up in the old neighbourhood Al Jasra in the heart of Doha. He ranks as a pioneer of a new architectural movement\, which combines the far reaching influences of traditional Qatari architecture with modern style\, creating memorable landmark structures that are helping to shape the developing State of Qatar. Jaidah is a highly recognized architect who has won numerous awards such as the Islamic Cities Award\, the Arab Town Organization Awards\, and has been nominated for the Agha Khan Awards. In 2005\, Jaidah was honored with the medal of the State of Qatar Encouragement Award. His projects reflect the cultural\, historical\, and environmental contexts in which they exist. Ibrahim is a dedicated advocate for sustainability and is a co-founding member of the Qatar Green Building Council. \n\n  \n\nArticle by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications.
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/transitions-in-qatars-architectural-identity/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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