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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20151004T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20151005T170000
DTSTAMP:20260406T034451
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LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T095052Z
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SUMMARY:China and the Middle East Working Group Meeting II
DESCRIPTION:On October 4–5\, 2015\, CIRS held a second working group meeting under its research project on “China and the Middle East.” Contributors were assembled to receive critical feedback and commentary on the draft chapters that they had written on range of topics\, including amongst other things\, the nature of Chinese foreign policy interests in the region\, China’s increasing security engagements in the Middle East\, the applicability of the “Chinese Model” to Middle Eastern states\, and China’s role in the Iranian nuclear deal negotiations. Case studies were also presented on Israel’s role in the development of Taiwan’s military and defense capabilities\, on the Sino-Saudi relationship and on Sino-Turkish relations. \n \n \nChinese policy makers tend to view the world through four concentric geographic circles\, and rank countries in order of importance to Chinese interests based on their proximity to China. Accordingly\, China’s primary attention is devoted to ensuring the security of its domestic realm and sovereign territory\, followed by prioritizing relations with those countries that press upon its immediate land and sea borders. Subsequent Chinese foreign policy engagement is more or less active depending on whether or not a state is located close or far to its immediate periphery. Within this analysis\, the location of the Middle East may not make it one of the most critical regions drawing Chinese commitment and attention. Yet\, for a number of reasons in spite of its somewhat geographic remoteness from the Chinese borders\, the Middle East is growing in importance to China. One of the reasons for this is that\, in the Chinese imagination\, the Middle East is in fact an extension of the Chinese periphery\, and particularly if seen through the lens of its cultural and historical connectivity to Pakistan\, Afghanistan\, and Central Asia. Central Asia and its neighborhood certainly falls into China’s direct realm of hegemony and fundamental interest. Additionally\, internal discussions in China on the spillover and impact of extremism and terrorism that may threaten China’s domestic security\, Chinese scholars and analysts clearly identify linkages with the Middle East. The Middle East is also increasingly central to China as a source of energy\, and Chinese economic investments in the region have been growing exponentially over the past decade. \n \n \nDespite the growing importance of the Middle East\, China continues to demonstrate a reluctance to step outside the parameters of its traditional role in the region\, or to change its standard policy line of offending no one\, maintaining or attempting to maintain cordial relations with everyone\, and avoiding direct conflict or confrontation with any of the states in the region. Working Group participants discussed the obvious mismatch between Chinese interests in the region and China’s efforts to protect those interests\, and suggested that in the Middle East China punches below its weight. However\, despite the fact that we see no obvious signs of China taking on a stronger military presence in the Middle East\, there are indications that Chinese security-related activities are expanding. Amongst other things\, Chinese peacekeeping forces have been deployed in the Middle East\, combat fleets have been active in the Gulf of Aden\, and China has also taken part in joint military exercises. In addition\, with the growing presence of Chinese economic investments and infrastructural projects the security of Chinese citizens has become of paramount concern and there are now several Chinese private security contractors operating across several Middle Eastern states. \n \n \nChina also appears to be seeking to develop more robust partnerships within the Middle East and has expanded its diplomatic efforts in the region. A case in point is the initiative shown by Beijing in terms of playing a key role in mediating Iran’s nuclear settlement with the West. China has a long standing history with Iran\, and has carefully cultivated this relationship as it sees Iran as one of the pivotal countries in the Persian Gulf sure to play a leading role in the years ahead. At the same time\, Chinese engagements in the Middle East are clearly informed by the necessity of avoiding antagonizing the United States or of being perceived as adopting a position contrary to American interests in the region. Up until 2013 in relation to the nuclear issue China adopted a policy of trying to keep both the United States and Iran happy\, however post 2013 Beijing adopted a much more proactive role in bringing about some resolution to the ongoing hostility between Iran and the West. Amongst other factors propelling this change in direction were China’s strategic calculations in maintaining stability of Persian Gulf energy supplies\, an increasing wariness in China around the possibility of a full scale militarized conflict between the United States and Iran\, as well as the ascension of Xi Jinping to the Chinese Presidency and the impact this has had on China’s global engagements. \n \n \nDuring the Working Group scholars also discussed the applicability of the “China Model” of political and economic governance to the context of the Middle East. It was suggested that despite the similar authoritarian and state-centric modes of governance visible in China and most of the Middle East\, the Chinese Model cannot be easily replicated in the region primarily because of the lack of state capacity\, weak institutional structures\, and also the very different economic preconditions existing in Middle Eastern states as compared to China. While the China Model of developmentalism may remain appealing to Middle Eastern elites as an ideal type\, the necessary requirements for establishing it are lacking in the Middle East. \n \n \nWorking Group participants also presented select case studies on the historical evolution of Taiwanese-Israeli military cooperation\, how Islam has informed the Sino-Saudi relationship\, and the changing dimensions of Turkey’s relations with China. While Israel has publicly prioritized its relationship with the PRC\, it has also actively engaged in working with Taiwan over the decades on developing Taiwanese defense systems\, often through private or backdoor engagements. Although Israel has been a provider of both arms and technology to Taiwan\, its key contribution has perhaps been in the provision of “software” in the shape of the expertise and knowledge of Israeli scientists  who worked actively to develop Taiwanese military capacity. \n \n \nWhile the Sino-Turkish relationship has not always been an easy one\, at the current juncture both countries consider the other to be a strategic partner with whom they must work. Both states have serious economic incentives which propel them to cooperate\, despite the fact that politically they have very different views of the Middle East. Turkey has long been a close ally to the United States and NATO member states\, and also has a self-perception as a “civilizational” power in the Middle East and Asia. Turkey considers itself to be a normative regional model for  the Middle East\, and adopts an agenda for supporting reform across the region. For China it is current quite critical that it inoculate itself from international criticism on how it is managing the Uighur issue\, and in this context the relationship with Turkey becomes quite critical. China and Turkey are placing considerable effort in developing their bilateral relationship\, albeit primarily fixed in economic cooperation\, and showing considerable restraint in terms of avoiding any confrontation on the political or foreign policy front. \n \n \nSaudi Arabia continues to be one of China’s most important relationships in the Middle East. Existing academic scholarship on the Sino-Saudi relationship tends to focus on the economic and strategic underpinnings of this relationship\, quite naturally so given that the Kingdom is a pivotal energy provider to China. Invariably some of these works also address the role that Islam has played in China’s engagements with Saudi Arabia\, particularly from the perspective of the state. The Working Group concluded with a broader discussion examining “Islamic connectivities” that have historically existed and have informed the Sino-Saudi relationship. Group discussion touched upon the role of various non-state actors and groups\, including Islamic missionaries in Chine and the ways in which Islamic symbols are employed and utilized by the two states.  \n \n \n\nSee the working group meeting agenda\nRead participant biographies\nRead more about this research initiative \n\n \n  \n \n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nMohammed Al-Sudairi\, Hong Kong University\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nJohn Garver\, Georgia Institute of Technology\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nTugrul Keskin\, Maltepe University\nMichael McCall\, Leiden University\nSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nJames Reardon-Anderson\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service\nAndrew Scobell\, RAND Corporation\nYitzhak Shichor\, University of Haifa\nElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\n\n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Zahra Babar\, CIRS Associate Director for Research
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/china-and-middle-east-working-group-meeting-ii/
CATEGORIES:American Studies,Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20151027T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20151027T200000
DTSTAMP:20260406T034451
CREATED:20151020T085958Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T115308Z
UID:10001284-1445968800-1445976000@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Managing the Saudi-Iranian Regional Rivalry
DESCRIPTION:Ibrahim Fraihat\, Senior Fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution’s Doha Center and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University in Qatar\, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue lecture on “Managing the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry” on October 27\, 2015. With a background in conflict resolution\, Fraihat offered an analysis of how to reduce tensions in the Middle East region using two different approaches.  \n \n \nThe first approach offered by Fraihat isolates individual conflicts as an exclusive case requiring specific solutions targeted at particular nations. The second approach takes a more regional stance\, and perceives of Middle East conflicts as somewhat interrelated. This approach posits that many of the current conflicts\, including those in Yemen and Syria\, are the result of proxy wars\, and are linked\, in one way or another\, to larger regional rivalries. Fraihat argued that the second approach was more useful in its holistic view of regional conflicts being the result of spillover tensions generated elsewhere.  \n \n \nHe explained that “most\, if not all\, of the conflicts in the region are linked in one way or another to Tehran and Riyadh\, or to the Saudi-Iranian relationship…If you are able to reduce the tension\, or achieve some rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran\, then by the time you bring them to the table to sit and talk and have some understanding\, then probably 50 percent of the conflicts will disappear.” \n \n \n\n\n\n\n\n \n \nFraihat gave a complex characterization and background to the history of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry\, arguing that there have been peaks of hostility related to specific regional incidences over the years. Leaving aside the legacy of a centuries-old Arab-Persian enmity\, more recent regional concerns were stoked with the onset of Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution and the rise of a rival political and Islamic power prepared to challenge Saudi regional hegemony. Concerns about Iranian dominance led Saudi Arabia to support Iraq in its war against Iran in the 1980s. A further escalation of antagonisms began in the aftermath of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq\, which\, effectively\, changed the regional order\, and led to a power vacuum in which Saudi Arabia and Iran vied for geopolitical influence. There was a new and sour turning point in the Saudi-Iranian relationship during the events of the 2011 Arab uprisings that fueled the conflict in Syria\, further increasing regional tensions. \n \n \nA central question about the Saudi-Iranian rivalry\, and especially one asked from the perspective of the Western media\, is whether or not the conflict is sectarian in nature. While sectarianism has been used to fan the flames of the rivalry\, and to advance certain agendas\, this is an over-simplification that only serves to reduce a longstanding antagonism into a simple sectarian binary. Importantly\, the fraught Saudi-Iranian relationship has evolved over the years for a number of different reasons\, including those related to national interests\, economic development\, and gains in geopolitical power\, but not all can be properly identified or agreed upon by scholars\, analysts\, and policymakers. There is a variation of views and opinions on both sides\, making the rivalry difficult to manage. “Even within the parties themselves\, there is no clear understanding about what the conflict is really about\,” Fraihat argued. \n \n \nThe two regional giants tend to take two distinct positions on regional issues\, as seen in the cases of Yemen and Syria. However\, despite the many instances of opposition\, Fraihat argued\, there is a surprising amount of overlap between Iran and Saudi Arabia’s mutual needs\, especially as they relate to security interests and environmental concerns. “Don’t be led\, or misled actually\, by the obvious positions of the two countries\,” he said. \n \n \nFraihat gave several strategies for addressing the finer points of the rivalry\, including mediation\, dialogue\, confidence-building measures\, credible peace plans\, zones of peace\, developing areas of interdependence\, and restoring the balance of power. “At the end of the day\,” he said\, “there is no alternative to the parties talking\,” and this is the key first step to mediating any rivalry. Switzerland\, Norway\, and Qatar have a history of mediation\, and they could act as effective hosts for any potential negotiations. This would mean\, however\, that Saudi Arabia and Iran must be willing to engage with each other in a serious manner. \n \n \nAnother opportunity for mediation is the intervention of a powerful third party. Turkey\, the United States\, and Pakistan all play a role in the region in one way or another. In addition\, Fraihat said\, “Iraq here has a huge role to play in minimizing and reducing the tension and contributing to better management of the conflict.” This can only occur if the implicated powers agree to build a free\, independent\, and democratic Iraq. \n \n \nIn conclusion\, Fraihat argued that\, when it comes to solving regional tensions\, analysts tend to talk about official “track 1” solutions between governments\, but the potential of building peace between the two countries can also be advanced with “track 2” diplomacy—unofficial dialogue between influential societal figures like academics and religious leaders to build relationships and encourage new thinking that can inform policymakers. Finally\, a conducive “track 3” approach is to encourage citizens of Saudi Arabia and Iran to engage with each other at the grassroots and communal level\, which is another approach that could lead to a sustainable peace between the two countries. \n \n \nIbrahim Fraihat (also known as Ibrahim Sharqieh) previously taught international conflict resolution at George Washington University and George Mason University. His research focuses on conflict resolution in the Arab world\, with a particular emphasis on conflict management and mediation\, transitions\, national reconciliation\, national dialogue\, institutional reform\, and post-conflict reconstruction. He has published extensively on Middle East politics\, with articles appearing in Foreign Affairs\, Foreign Policy\, the New York Times\, the Los Angeles Times\, the Financial Times\, Al-Hayat\, and the Christian Science Monitor\, on the CNN and Al Jazeera websites\, and elsewhere. He is the author of the book Unfinished Revolutions: Yemen\, Libya\, and Tunisia after the Arab Spring (Yale University Press)\, and the co-author of Libya’s Displacement Crisis: Uprooted by Revolution and Civil War (Georgetown University Press). Professor Fraihat received a PhD in conflict analysis and resolution from George Mason University in 2006. He is the recipient of George Mason University’s Distinguished Alumni Award (2014) for his achievements in the field of conflict resolution. Fraihat can be reached at fraihat.writer@gmail.com. Follow Ibrahim on Twitter @i_fraihat and on Facebook: Ibrahim Fraihat. \n \n \nArticle by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/managing-saudi-iranian-regional-rivalry/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Regional Studies
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