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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20150513T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20150514T170000
DTSTAMP:20260417T150722
CREATED:20150519T084542Z
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SUMMARY:The Changing Security Dynamics of the Gulf: Working Group II
DESCRIPTION:On May 13-14\, 2015\, CIRS held its second Working Group on the “The Changing Security Dynamics of the Gulf” research initiative. Academics gathered for the second time to discuss their research findings and gather opinions on their papers from their fellow working group members. The topics that emerged covered a wide range of issues such as the politics of succession in Gulf monarchies\, the rise of ISIS\, business and politics\, and the emerging energy landscape. \n \n \nScholars debated the strengths and limitations of a succession model in Gulf politics. Research findings showed that in the case of Oman\, despite the absence of a son or a publicly designated heir\, the political mechanism in place allowed for senior elders to choose the next heir to the throne when a death occurs. In Saudi Arabia\, succession tends to be a more complicated process\, as sons in line could be skipped based on senior Saudi leaders’ choices. Participants asked for a broader analytical context in order to contextualize the two case studies and further explanation on the rapid pace of change taking place in Saudi Arabia. The United Arab Emirates’ behavior as a small state was also put into question. Due to the size and capacity of the Emirati army and air force\, relative to other small states in the region\, small state theory could not be applied to the UAE’s foreign policy decisions that encompass both soft and hard power. Participants speculated whether the generational change in power coincided with the distinctive shifts in foreign policy and how this contributed to the UAE’s ‘activist foreign policy’ within the region. \n \n \nUndoubtedly\, in the wake of the Arab uprisings in 2011\, the Gulf regimes in power have been facing severe policy dilemmas.  During the periods of 1980-2003\, the three Gulf wars altered the positioning of the GCC states vis-à-vis Iran and Iraq and accelerated their integration into the Western military and security umbrella. The emergence of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the occupation of Iraq demonstrated how non-state violence was replacing inter-state conflict as the primary threat to regional security and stability in the Gulf. During the US invasion of Iraq in 2003\, the six GCC states provided varying degrees of political and logistical support. Policymakers were placed in the complicated position of having to balance their security relationship with the US against high levels of domestic opposition regarding the invasion. More recently\, the threat to regional security posed by the Islamic State is confronting all the Gulf states. Saudi Arabia is particularly at risk from the ideological threat that ISIS presents. ISIS impacts both the internal and external security interest of the GCC\, due to the existence of a network of IS cells within the Gulf states\, and also as a result of the flow of Gulf nationals who are joining IS fighting forces. \n \n \nIn addition to the rise of ISIS\, the United States’ perceived reluctance to intervene more aggressively in the Syrian civil war has also contributed to the GCC states taking on a more active role in regional security. At the current juncture there is an unprecedented willingness by GCC states to embrace military leadership in the region. Yet there is no coherent or coordinated response by the six states. The escalating ideological tensions between different states and the lack of trust and intelligence sharing amongst them have negatively impacted the development of a collective security architecture. From 2011 onwards we have witnessed a distinctive shift in the foreign policies of Kuwait\, Qatar\, Saudi Arabia\, and the United Arab Emirates. Participants at the working group suggested that this new form of interventionism displayed by some of the GCC states brought with it severe risks that could directly impact Gulf security. For example\, GCC interventionism in North Africa has come with extensive financial commitments. Meeting this commitments and managing their relationships with North Africa may increasing pose a challenge to the GCC states particularly if oil prices continue to plummet. \n \n \nThe production of oil and shale gas in the United States as a result of fracking and horizontal drilling has had significant strategic implications for the energy landscape in the Gulf region. Participants hypothesized whether the United States’ changed energy outlook corresponded with a reduction in its military and strategic engagement in the Middle East. India\, for example\, has an overwhelming dependence on oil from the Gulf\, whereby oil imports from the Gulf constitute eighty percent of their annual need. Moreover\, approximately $32 billion in annual remittances are sent back to India every year from the six million expatriates that live in the Gulf region. Despite these strong energy and commercial ties\, India has been significantly absent in its engagement with the Gulf region\, choosing instead to become increasingly closer to the United States and the European Union. Nevertheless\, India is a rising\, albeit reluctant power in the region. \n \n \nDiversification of economies in the Gulf has been a long stated goal for the Gulf Cooperation Council\, but in light of falling oil prices\, the need has become even more essential. In fact\, economic diversification may be difficult in the Gulf due to the protective business system in existence. In the majority of the six Gulf states the business communities have a history of political influence and often support the socio-political order in place. In recent years\, Gulf ruling family members have entered the business and private sector in growing numbers. This can be attributed to the growing amount of ruling family members who are unable to assume positions in politics\, thus pursuing economic ventures. As the Arab Spring has shown\, the business elite continue to benefit from the political status quo. Protests and political unease in Kuwait\, Bahrain and Oman were initially triggered by youth’s anger and resentment towards the unequal distribution of rent and rising unemployment. Additionally\, youth in the region are not separate elements from the tribal networks in place. However\, generational differences exist in terms of their perception of themselves as stakeholders in society. Inevitably\, ruling elites will face conflicting priorities between the nation’s interests in promoting youth employment\, social services and personal stakes they may have as businesspeople. Participants questioned the nature of the new ruling bargain in the Gulf – if ruling families continue to believe that security requirements trump democratization processes\, what are the implications for Gulf societies in the future? \n \n \n\nSee the working group meeting agenda\nRead biographies of the participants\nRead more about this research initiative\n\n \n  \n \n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nHaya Al Noaimi\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nKhalid Almezaini\, Qatar University\nAlanoud Alsharekh\, Supreme Council for Planning and Development\, Kuwait\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nGawdat Bahgat\, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Study – National Defense University\nNader Entessar\, University of South Alabama\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nJoseph A. Kéchichian\, King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies; Kéchichian\nDionysis Markakis\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nToby Matthiesen\, University of Cambridge\nSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nMarc Valeri\, Center for Gulf Studies – University of Exeter\nElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nNussaibah Younis\, Project on Middle East Democracy\n\n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Haya Al-Noaimi\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/changing-security-dynamics-gulf-working-group-ii/
CATEGORIES:American Studies,Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20150525T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20150525T200000
DTSTAMP:20260417T150722
CREATED:20150517T115235Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T095212Z
UID:10001052-1432576800-1432584000@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Strengthening the Family in Qatar: Challenges and Required Actions
DESCRIPTION:Noor Al Malki Al Jehani\, Executive Director of the Doha International Family Institute\, delivered the final CIRS Monthly Dialogue of the 2014-2015 academic year with a lecture on “Strengthening the Family in Qatar: Challenges and Required Actions” on May 25\, 2015. Al Malki gave an overview of the historical evolution of family policies in Qatar\, resulting in “the family cohesion agenda\,” in the Qatar Vision 2030 and the National Development Strategy of 2011-2016. As an introductory note\, she stated that “while I think that Qatari families should be the primary targets of policymaking in Qatar\, these policies should also take in consideration the wellbeing of all families in Qatar\,” including expatriates who make up a majority of the population. \n \n \nAl Malki pointed out that although people tend to view the notion of family through their own personal sets of beliefs and experience\, the family structure continues to be the defining basic unit of most societies. This is “because healthy\, functioning families play an essential role in individual\, human\, social\, and economic development\,” and the dissolution of this structure places a heavy burden on governments\, she said. \n \n \n \n\n\n\n\n\n \n \n \nHistorically\, the Qatari family structure has evolved differently to that of the predominant Western nuclear family. The formation of the Qatari family is governed by Islamic principles\, and incorporates responsibility towards members of the extended family\, including inheritance rights. The historical structuring of the Qatari family is also based on tribal affiliations\, which is an organizing societal force that predates that of the state in the Gulf region and continues to this day. “The tribe might have lost some of its authority over its member families\, and its economic role\, but it is still a major force in family life\, and is supported by the continuing practice of intermarriage and a unique system of tribe and family-based neighborhoods\,” Al Malki explained. \n \n \nThe family as the basic unit of society became enshrined in the Qatar constitution with the establishment of the State of Qatar in the second half of the twentieth century. Various state laws have been built around the family as a social institution in order to further support and regulate it. The first official family policies were introduced in the 1960s\, and revolved around the implementation of social security laws to provide monetary and housing assistance to the most vulnerable in society\, including low-income families\, widows\, divorcees\, and orphans. \n \n \nIn the 1980s\, as the Qatari state developed and grew more prosperous\, “Qatari men were growing richer\, and they started to explore the Middle East and other countries\,” leading to increased marriages between Qatari men and non-Qatari women\, Al Malki explained. It was during this time that the government took a step to directly intervene by introducing a law to regulate marriage to non-nationals\, with the exception of GCC citizens\, as a response to “growing problems related to nationality claims\,” she said. \n \n \nIn the 1990s\, Her Highness Sheikha Moza Bint Nasser played a major role in the social development of Qatar as President of the Supreme Council for Family Affairs and the founder of a number of private organizations including the Family Development Center\, the Family Consultation Center\, and the Foundation for the Protection of Children and Women. All the organizations were tasked with a mission of community development by focusing on strengthening the wellbeing of the family\, and promoting the rights of women and children in Qatar. Importantly\, Al Malki said\, Sheikha Moza’s influence was not limited to Qatar\, and she established the Doha International Family Institute (DIFI)\, with a mandate to promote the family at the national\, regional\, and international levels to research policy and outreach.” \n \n \nIn order to achieve family cohesiveness in the Qatar Vision 2030\, “the strategy seeks to address some of the trends affecting Qatari families\, such as the rising divorce rates\, high proportions of women who marry late or remain single for life\, the growing levels of family violence\, the dependence on domestic helpers and caring for children\, family-work conflict\, and the alarming rate of personal debt among Qatari families.” Al Malki noted that the strategy focuses on familial dysfunction\, and fails to adopt a more comprehensive approach to strengthening the family. This is because of the lack of civil society organizations and national expertise and capacity geared towards these issues. “Family strategies are multi-sectorial in nature; they cannot be implemented by one ministry alone\,” she argued. “The lack of community-based and non-governmental organizations is a major challenge.” \n \n \nAl Malki concluded by making some recommendations for the future\, including an increase in government and private sector funding  for  civil society organizations\, as well as an ease of the strict laws governing the establishment of such entities. As a first step\, she recommended establishing degrees in family studies to be given at educational institutions in order to build national expertise. “Achieving Qatar’s Vision of cohesive families requires a partnership between the government\, civil society\, the private sector\, and\, first and foremost\, families themselves\,” she concluded. \n \n \n  \n \n \nNoor Al Malki Al Jehani served as the Secretary General of the Supreme Council for Family Affairs from 2009-2011\, and prior to that was the director of the Women’s Department of that same council. She is currently a member of the Board of Directors for Qatar Foundation for Social Work\, and was a member of the Qatar National Human Rights Committee from 2003 until 2011. Al Malki was an expert in the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against women from 2013-14. She participated in the drafting of many national strategies and plans\, including Qatar’s first national development strategy 2011-16\, where she was the chair of the drafting committee of the strategy of family cohesion and women’s empowerment. She also participated in the review and drafting of several legislations pertaining to social and women’s issues. \n \n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications.
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/strengthening-family-qatar-challenges-and-required-actions/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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