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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20150411T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20150412T170000
DTSTAMP:20260416T010847
CREATED:20150505T091410Z
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SUMMARY:The Digital Middle East:Working Group II
DESCRIPTION:On April 11-12\, 2015\, CIRS held its second working group on “The Digital Middle East” research initiative in Doha. Participants gathered to discuss their research papers and obtain feedback from their fellow working group members. The topics discussed during the two days covered a variety of issues relating to the digital world across the region. Discussants provided critical feedback on each of the papers\, and found linkages between the different subjects that are being addressed through this book project. \n \n \nScholars debated labor and productivity within the digital realm\, and how increasingly social media users and content developers actually “work for free.” Observations centered on the fact that users and developers often overlap in social media. Through this “community of practice” both sets of actors are united in their skills exhibiting traits of egalitarian behavior in the digital sphere. In the context of the Middle East\, developers usually have a dual role\, whereby they engage in remunerated work during the day and then assume activist roles during the night\, when they work for free. By doing so\, developers often hope to create digital companies that are lucrative enough to sell as a whole\, as opposed to selling only the product of their paid labor. In this case\, the value of the developers’ labor is being captured by aggregators such as Facebook and Google. Discussants also suggested the need for further research exploring the overall economic impact of ICT in the region\, and whether the internet can actually be translated into productivity outcomes. Even though the internet is fast become a universalizing process\, the specifics of its relevance to the Middle East is yet to be fully studied. \n \n \nAnother element of discussion at the working group was how multi-modality in the digital sphere has led to changing behavior patterns in relation to the development of friendships and personal relationships in the Middle East. The nature and function of friendships have significantly changed as a result of instantaneous connections made online. Discussants observed behaviorisms such as de-individuation\, or the erosion of self-awareness within a group setting\, was becoming more prevalent as a result of new technologies. The advancement of technology and media has also acted as a catalyst for women’s political development\, not only post-Arab Spring but also after the 1979 revolution in Iran. Even though technology has often facilitated women in advancing their rights within society\, paradoxes still exist in the history of the region. For example\, in Iran\, women played an integral and active role in the Islamic revolution\, yet afterwards were relegated to the private sphere and in their homes. Participants around the table offered alternative examples of female mobility through digital media\, such as the case of the driving campaign for Saudi women and Palestinian women’s role fighting the occupation through the electronic intifada. \n \n \nIssues of freedom of the internet and online censorship were raised in relation to state power. States have often greatly benefited from the digital environment as a domain to exert their power. When thinking of civic engagement and digital media\, both fields and spaces suffer from being agnostic towards structure. To get past this agnosticism\, one must develop an observable appreciation for infrastructure but at the same time\, cultivate an understanding of the underlying technocratic issues that exist in digital media. Societal practices\, norms and attitudes as communities of practice all must be utilized as tools in the promotion of digital democracy. Discussants noted the problematic nature of framing the Arab Spring as the instigator of change in the region\, arguing that political internet processes predate that\, as can be viewed in the case of Iran. \n \n \nAdditional areas of research at the working group elaborated on ethnographies showcasing lived experiences of ordinary citizens during the Egyptian revolution and their daily interactions with technology. Participants pushed for a more nuanced definition of mediation arguing that its application to media environments in the Middle East needed further justification. \n \n \nVideogame development and gaming in the Middle East have played a pivotal role in the digital world acting as cultural artifacts and alternative spaces for contestation. Discoveries made by some of the authors showcased games as domains for role-play within a predefined model world. The global flows of gaming remain underexplored generally whereby game studies have traditionally focused on consumption and popularity in regions such as the US\, Europe\, and Japan heavily neglecting the Middle East. As a result\, discussants in their written work tried to lay a theoretical framework in a broad historical and cultural context by exploring videogames as places of hybridization. It is interesting to note that many developers in the region are driven to develop videogames by personal motivations and not by economic interest. \n \n \nIn the case of intellectual property laws in the Middle East\, and the Gulf region in particular\, states often struggle with developing a legal framework that deals with issues of copyright and piracy. Discussants observed that several GCC states have attempted to “domesticate” foreign intellectual property laws in an effort to protect traditional knowledge rights. Furthermore\, GCC states have started to use intellectual property laws to their advantage by placing a heavy emphasis on digital archiving and protection of traditional knowledge and heritage.   \n \n \nGeneral observations were made as to how Middle Eastern governments and societies were moving towards online platforms. Current data on e-governance in the GCC was showcased in an effort to show the similarities and differences amongst the Gulf states in their progress towards online governance. Results remarkably showed that the smaller less affluent states of Bahrain and Oman had better e-governance portal sites offering a wide array of services for the general public. Data also showed that e-governance world rankings were difficult to maintain\, as in the case of the UAE\, without a proper all-encompassing digital structure. Additionally\, citizens and recipients of e-governance services were often suspicious and untrusting of e-services arguing that cybercrime laws were not stringent enough to protect their information online. Similarly\, the same was said for Gulf citizens’ experiences in e-commerce whereby many were reluctant when dealing with this new form of business dealings. Similarities and differences were drawn between the souk and e-commerce websites\, however participants argued that the establishment of malls in the region should be considered as the intermediary between the two commercial examples. \n \n \n\nSee the working group agenda\nRead participant biographies\nRead more about this research initiative \n\n \n  \n \n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nIlhem Allagui\, Northwestern University in Qatar\nHaya Al Noaimi\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nJon Anderson\, Catholic University of America\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nJohn Downing\, Northwestern University in Qatar\nMuzammil M. Hussain\, University of Michigan\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nJoe Khalil\, Northwestern University in Qatar\nGholam Khiabany\, Goldsmiths University of London\nDionysis Markakis\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nVit Šisler\, Charles University in Prague\nAnnabelle Sreberny\, SOAS\, University of London\nNorhayati Zakaria\, Universiti Utara Malaysia\nMohamed Zayani\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nValbona Zenku\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\n\n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Haya Al-Noaimi\, Research Analyst at CIRS 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/digital-middle-eastworking-group-ii/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20150425T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20150426T180000
DTSTAMP:20260416T010848
CREATED:20150518T130716Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T095312Z
UID:10001053-1429984800-1430071200@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:China and the Middle East: Working Group Meeting I
DESCRIPTION:On April 25-26\, 2015\, the first working group meeting of CIRS’ research initiative on “China and the Middle East” took place. A diverse\, multi-disciplinary collective of scholars from China\, the Middle East\, the US\, and elsewhere met in Washington\, D.C.\, over the course of two days\, to discuss the main features\, trends\, and implications of this multi-faceted relationship. \n \n \nThe foundations of China’s engagement with the Middle East have been economic in nature\, and primarily based on the trade of energy commodities. As a result\, the Middle East has assumed an important position in China’s global economic vision\, which sees the region as a key part of its contemporary “Silk Road” flagship initiative\, an effort to better connect China to the rest of Asia\, Africa\, Europe\, and the Middle East. This economic relationship is evolving steadily. China is increasingly investing capital in the region\, as for example in industry and infrastructure\, rather than simply relying on the energy trade. Participants of the working group noted the potential of the shale gas revolution to alter the energy equation in the Middle East\, with the US set to produce more gas than Saudi Arabia produces oil. China itself has its own substantial shale gas deposits. Another issue raised was China’s investment in green energy\, currently the world’s leader\, and the global implications of this. What will the above mean for China’s relations with the Middle East? The participants highlighted the need to fully interrogate the impact of China’s economic embedment in the region—in political\, economic\, and social terms. \n \n \nAn important consequence of this economic relationship has been the growth of a variety of socio-cultural connections between China and the Middle East. Chinese Muslims now reside across the Gulf\, with some 200\,000 Chinese citizens living in Dubai alone. As part of an Islamic education\, a large number of Chinese Muslims study Arabic in China\, but also abroad in Syria and Iran. Chinese Muslims have played a role in facilitating ties between China and the Middle East. Likewise\, there is a sizeable Arab diaspora in China\, who has emigrated to places such as Yiwu\, a major Chinese trading hub. What is their impact as a community? Participants noted an increasing perception of China as a fertile ground for religious conversions\, with anti-Shia bias taking ground as a result of the influence of Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi Islamic doctrine.   \n \n \nOn the political level\, China’s engagement of the Middle East is also undergoing significant changes. One area this is reflected is the increasing Chinese trend towards multilateral engagement. This as opposed to the bilateralism that has traditionally characterized China’s relations with Middle Eastern countries. Participants observed that China is increasingly looking to multilateral platforms to formalize cooperation with the Arab world\, one example being the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA)\, whose 2014 summit was held in Shanghai. The potential of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-BRICS relations was also referenced\, with discussants noting that while there are no formal ties currently\, developments in this area could eventually have a profound impact. In political terms\, one of the main variables affecting China’s engagement with the region has been the legacy of the Arab Spring of 2011. China has sought to maintain good relations with both established allies\, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran\, but also with those countries undergoing domestic upheaval\, such as Egypt and Syria. Here\, the role of China as a “balancing” force in the Middle East is of relevance. Participants noted China’s ability to maintain positive relations with all the important regional actors simultaneously\, although they claimed that this will become increasingly difficult in the future; one example raised was China’s 2011 veto of UN sanctions on Syria\, which subsequently strained relations with Saudi Arabia and Turkey. China’s inherently pragmatic approach in the region was summarized by one participant as a case of “avoiding enemies\, rather than having friends.” \n \n \nIn terms of the regional security architecture\, China does not support absolute security for any one power in the region\, rather it has sought a system that balances the interests of the various states. As a result\, it has sought to encourage collective security arrangements. Yet China’s strategic stance in the region is undergoing change\, becoming more pro-active as it consolidates its presence. Under President Xi-Jin Ping\, China has adopted a regional security role for the first time\, contributing towards maritime security\, for instance. Participants argued that this will form an increasingly important area\, noting that China’s role in the region has now entered a new phase. This was demonstrated during the Chinese Navy’s evacuation of Chinese citizens from Yemen in 2015\, which underscored the increasing need for a physical presence in the region\, to protect China’s interests. This reflects a broader evolution in the Chinese military presence in the region\, which went from initially supporting construction projects and offering medical support\, to now deploying combat units\, as part of the UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan for example\, as well as during antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. \n \n \nThe possibilities for Chinese and US cooperation were also discussed. Participants noted that while the US and China define regional “stability” in very different terms in the context of the Middle East\, great power cooperation remains integral to China’s approach in the region. While the US remains the predominant security guarantor\, China’s regional involvement will only grow\, although to date it has largely been content to ‘free ride’ in terms of security commitments. As such\, it is important to identify the areas where Chinese and US interests align. Here the impact of US attempts to contain China were discussed\, through its support of India for example. The participants questioned the extent to which China is rallying against this containment in the Middle East\, in terms of its Silk Road initiative\, naval expansion\, and so forth. \n \n \nYet overall\, the participants highlighted the lack of an overarching Chinese “grand strategy” in the Middle East. In contrast to say Africa\, no “white paper” for the Middle East has been formulated. Instead\, they noted China’s posture is predominantly reactive rather than pro-active. This is exacerbated by the fact that China’s knowledge of the Middle East is limited in its depth. Participants highlighted the need to explore internal Chinese discussions about China’s role in the Middle East\, in terms of academic and policy institutions for instance. And furthermore to examine the primary state mechanisms guiding Chinese-Arab relations—identifying the key institutional actors within China\, their respective roles\, and their mutual interactions\, so to ascertain a deeper understanding of China in the Middle East. \n \n \n\nSee the working group meeting agenda\nRead biographies of the participants\nRead more about this research initiative \n\n \n  \n \n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nMohammed Al-Sudairi\, Gulf Research Centre\nJon B. Alterman\, Center for Strategic and International Studies\nJacqueline Armijo\, Qatar University\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nLiao Baizhi\, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations\nBing Bing Wu\, Peking University\nManochehr Dorraj\, Texas Christian University\nJohn Garver\, Georgia Institute of Technology\nBarb Gillis\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nPan Guang\, Shanghai Center for International Studies\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nDionysis Markakis\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nJames Reardon-Anderson\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service\nJoseph Sassoon\, Georgetown University\nAndrew Scobell\, RAND Corporation\nJean-François Seznec\, Georgetown University\nYitzhak Shichor\, University of Haifa\, and Hebrew University of Jerusalem\nDegang Sun\, Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University\nCasimir Yost\, Georgetown University\n\n \nArticle by Dionysis Markakis\, Research Associate at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/china-and-middle-east-working-group-meeting-i/
CATEGORIES:American Studies,Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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