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DTSTART:20141025T220000
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20141013T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20141013T200000
DTSTAMP:20260611T113142
CREATED:20141014T121103Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T123845Z
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SUMMARY:Justin Gengler Monthly Dialogue
DESCRIPTION:Justin Gengler\, Senior Researcher at the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI) of Qatar University\, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue on “Studying Public Opinion in Qatar” on October 13\, 2014. SESRI conducts nationally-representative\, scientific household surveys of the different social groups residing in Qatar\, including the local national population\, professional expatriates\, and labor migrants. Giving some background to the state of survey research in Qatar\, Gengler noted that the in-depth\, nation-wide study of public opinion in the Gulf region is still in its infancy. In this context\, it is important to think about “what we mean by public opinion or studying public opinion in the Gulf region—especially in a place where people don’t always associate mass attitudes as being part of the decision-making process\,” he explained. \n \n \nGiving specific examples of how responses can change according to context and over time\, Gengler argued that there are three general levels of dealing with collected data. A primary level of data analysis is “descriptive” in reporting basic distributions of survey responses to a particular question. A secondary level of data analysis offers a basis for temporal or cross-societal comparison and so offers enhanced analytical value. A tertiary level of data analysis delves more deeply into survey results not only by situating the data in context\, but by moving beyond the question of “what” to explain the “why” of survey responses. \n \n \nIn order to demonstrate how and why responses can vary\, Gengler displayed results to the survey question “Which country poses the greatest challenge to Qatar?” In the summer of 2010\, approximately 19 percent of Qatari national respondents identified Israel as the greatest challenge. This result in and of itself carries little meaning unless it is compared to those from other years as well as to events occurring during the relevant time periods. “After the events of 2011 and the ramping up of sectarian rhetoric and sectarian feeling in the Gulf\, you see that threat perceptions change in a very predictable or a very systematic way\, which is that Iran emerges as a much greater threat in the public imagination.” As such\, Qatari responses to the same question in 2011 were very different\, with the proportion of nationals identifying Iran as the greatest challenge more than doubling over the previous year. In relation to “data situated within temporal or societal context\, the thing of interest is not responses to a specific question\, but relationships between responses and other variables\,” he said. \n \n \nA final level of analysis when examining data is to look at the interaction between the interviewer and the respondent. This is especially important for the data gathered in Qatar and elsewhere in the Gulf region\, because “for social and economic reasons\, there are very few nationals employed as field interviewers. We might think this is a problem because we are asking citizens about their opinions on sometimes sensitive topics\, so it is a question whether or not the answers we receive are reliable\,” he argued. In order to assess the reliability of responses and the impact of Qatari nationality on survey results\, Gengler divided two teams of Qatari and non-Qatari students to conduct a field experiment surveying 1\,200 Qatari nationals. Contrary to expectations\, there were no great variations in answers given to Qatari interviewers versus answers given to non-Qatari interviewers regarding sensitive political questions. Rather\, the differences lay in “social questions that touch on the issue of the expatriate-national divides … as well as the relaxation of naturalization laws\,” he noted. \n \n \nConcluding the talk\, Gengler’s gave a positive outlook for the future of survey research in the Gulf. He argued that “there is a newfound appreciation in the Gulf region in particular—including at the elite level—for survey research\, because it is objective rather than partisan or coming from a simply ideological standpoint; it is based on empirics; and also because states see the value in staying ahead of public opinion.” \n \n \nJustin J. Gengler completed the first-ever mass survey of political attitudes in Bahrain in 2009 as part of his doctoral dissertation for the University of Michigan\, titled “Ethnic Conflict and Political Mobilization in Bahrain and the Arab Gulf.” This project forms the basis of a forthcoming monograph on group conflict in the rentier state\, to be published in early 2015 in the Indiana University Press Series in Arab and Islamic Studies. He is a contributor to the volume Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf\, published by Hurst/Oxford University Press. His work has also appeared recently in Middle East Policy (2012)\, Journal of Arabian Studies (2013)\, and Middle East Law and Governance (2013)\, in addition to numerous policy-oriented publications.  \n \n \nArticle by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/justin-gengler-monthly-dialogue/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Distingushed Lectures,Regional Studies
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2014/10/events_20481_13381_1414050254-1-scaled.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20141025T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20141026T170000
DTSTAMP:20260611T113142
CREATED:20141130T104024Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T103648Z
UID:10001029-1414227600-1414342800@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:The Changing Security Dynamics of the Gulf
DESCRIPTION:On October 25-26\, 2014\, CIRS held its first Working Group under “The Changing Security Dynamics of the Gulf” research initiative. Academics from various disciplines gathered for their first meeting to discuss evolving national and regional security dynamics\, and to identify research gaps that need to be addressed. The group drew attention to different\, prevailing definitions of security\, including military\, regime\, and human security.  Amongst other themes\, participants debated existing security arrangements in the Gulf and how regional relations may pose security threats to individual Gulf states’ national interests. \n \n \nOpening the discussion\, participants focused on the concept of securitization theory. Classical approaches to security focus on the measurable characteristics of a threat\, such as balance of power and military capabilities. Securitization theory examines how certain issues are transformed into security concerns by the state or by political actors and other stakeholders. \n \n \nState security usually hinges upon military\, regime\, and resource stability. As a result\, state surveillance mechanisms are effective safeguards in ensuring the legitimacy and stability of the regimes in power. In places such as Bahrain\, there are sectarian angles associated with regime security. Other forms of threat perception identify political\, human and environmental concerns\, all factors that can contribute to a populations’ feelings of “relative deprivation”.  More recently\, in the Gulf\, human insecurity has been exacerbated by the interventions of non-state actors such as ISIS. \n \n \nDuring the Working Group the “personality element” of regional rulers was also discussed. Often in Gulf states there is no differentiation between the type of threats that are perceived as impacting the personal security of regime leaders and those that affect the security of the state as a whole. Questions were raised as to the relevance of critical security perspectives to the Gulf context\, particularly when there is a proliferation of fragile institutions. Oftentimes\, the severe demographic imbalances in the Gulf lead to a general consensus amongst the indigenous population to accept the regime’s definitions of what constitutes a security threat \n \n \nParticipants also discussed the weaknesses of collective security arrangements in the GCC. During Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait\, GCC member states were immobile for several weeks and unable to provide a unified\, robust response. This inaction resulted in the Kuwaiti royal family having to escape to Saudi Arabia until the monarchy was restored. Commonalities in security concerns amongst the ruling Gulf regimes reinforce the shared security interests dominant in this region and the institutional importance of the Gulf Cooperation Council in highlighting these concerns. The Council also contemplated extending membership invitations to both Jordan and Morocco\, at a time when the GCC felt that it had barely survived the first upsurge of revolts threatening its stability. The invitations were an act of commitment on part of the Gulf states towards monarchic regimes in the region. However\, working group participants questioned the purpose of this collective security arrangement\, considering the Council’s history of cooperation during times of crisis and its tendency to prioritize national interest once external threats dissipate.  \n \n \nIn addition to broad thematic areas the discussions also mentioned a number of specific cases\, including the UAE\, Saudi Arabia\, Bahrain and Iran. In the UAE’s case\, having gone through significant foreign policy changes since the death of Sheikh Zayed Al Nahyan\, the United Arab Emirates identified the danger of militant Islamism as the biggest threat to the security of the regime and state. In March 2013\, a group of activists and members of the Emirati community signed a petition urging the regime to shift to a more democratic society\, calling for election of all members in the National Federal Council and the bestowing of legislative and regulatory powers upon this body. Approximately\, 64 out of 94 activists on trial were found guilty and accused of having ideological sympathy with the Muslim Brotherhood. Today\, the UAE has made an extensive effort towards involving itself in North Africa’s politics\, partly encouraged by Egypt’s support. Both Qatar and the UAE have exerted substantial effort in North Africa\, in an effort to develop their geostrategic roles in the region. From a security perspective\, North Africa is of utmost relevance to the Gulf\, as it acts as a gateway to Europe\, heightening inter-Gulf state competition over regional relevance. \n \n \nIn Bahrain\, the lack of political institutions makes it difficult to gain insight into the political views of the Bahraini population and how they perceive threats to security. GCC states have been very deliberate in structuring political conflict and defining what constitutes a threat to the state\, and have often used sectarian sentiments for this purpose. During the February 14th demonstrations state-sponsored Sunni counter-mobilization efforts were a reaction to the rebellion organized by the Shiite majority in Bahrain. One month later\, over five thousand troops were dispatched by neighboring Gulf states in an effort to contain and localize the uprisings. Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province was also inspired by the uprisings taking place in Bahrain\, whereby the province of Qatif\, with a population of 95 percent Shiites\, demonstrated in solidarity with Bahrain when Saudi troops arrived. \n \n \nWorking Group members also discussed how some Gulf states\, such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain\, have been showing greater vulnerabilities in their rentier bargain with their citizenry. Since 2011\, the majority of Gulf states have reinvigorated their rentierism\, by increasing salaries and providing jobs in the labor market\, in an effort to discourage people from contesting the regimes’ legitimacy. Scholars suggested that not all the Gulf states are alike\, and in some of the Gulf states maintaining rentier disbursements are proving challenging\, as state capacity to deliver is stretched. Certain Gulf states with larger indigenous populations and less financial transparency such as Saudi Arabia\, have been facing serious cracks in the rentier bargain\, whereby 70 percent of Saudi nationals live in rented accommodation due to the inability of the state in providing national housing for its local population. The growing demographic imbalances in Gulf states have only added to the complexity of the local population relationship with the labor market\, often intensifying underlying tensions between locals and expatriates. This proves to be problematic for the regimes in power considering that the rentier bargain is the foundation of Gulf regimes’ legitimacies. \n \n \nThe most common explanation for the success of Gulf State’s domestic security and the continuity of the ruling elites has been the presence of hydrocarbon energy\, which guarantees geostrategic value to the West and protection for the Gulf states. The management of domestic security has generally been conducted through the strategy of combined cooption and repression of the masses. Such tactics can be witnessed in Bahrain during the 2011 uprisings where sixty people were killed and numerous political activists were jailed and detained for indeterminate lengths of time. In the case of Saudi Arabia\, cooption lead to the creation of hundreds of jobs for people in an effort to remedy the economic situation within the country. Working Group members also discussed linkages between religion\, tradition\, and oil\, arguing that Gulf states often cultivate national identities that are corresponding to their domestic security interests. \n \n \nWhen Gulf states were granted their independence in 1971\, it was apparent that a Gulf “national” identity was not based on principles of self-determination or collective history. This was due to the fact that the trucial states were only under a British economic and political protectorate\, having not experienced or been inherently changed by a colonial process. At the time\, most coastal states in the Gulf were comprised of either nomadic or seafaring tribes. Amongst these tribes were substantial populations of Iranians and Indians who were part of the mercantile classes. In more recent times and with the creation of city states\, there has been an active rejection of external and non-indigenous identities. Gulf regimes have also made a conscious effort to create a national identity that is based on tribal and religious heritage in order to enforce their domestic legitimacy. The question of whether the creation of national identities can lead to “imagined communities” was problematized by the discussants. Namely\, the idea that Gulf states revalorize national and tribal ties as a way to construct a narrative based on national and sectarian sentiments.  \n \n \n\nSee the working group agenda\nRead participant biographies\nRead more about this research initiative\n\n \n  \n \n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nRogaia Abusharaf\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nHaya Al Noaimi\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nAlanoud Al Sharekh\, Secretariat of the Supreme Council for Planning and Development in Kuwait\nKhalid Almezaini\, Qatar University\nAbdullah Baabood\, Qatar University\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nGawdat Bahgat\, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Study\, National Defense University\nPatricia Duran\, Independent Researcher\nNader Entessar\, University of South Alabama\nJustin J. Gengler\, Qatar University\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nJoseph A. Kéchichian\, King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies\nAnatol Lieven\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nDionysis Markakis\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nToby Matthiesen\, University of Cambridge\nSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nJean-Marc Rickli\, Kings College London\nDavid Roberts\, Kings College London\nMarc Valeri\, Center for Gulf Studies\, University of Exeter\nElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nOle Wæver\, Center for Resolution of International Conflicts\,University of Copenhagen\nLuciano Zaccara\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\n\n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Haya Al-Noaimi\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/changing-security-dynamics-gulf/
CATEGORIES:American Studies,Dialogue Series,Regional Studies
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2014/11/2t5a3196_-1.jpg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20141027T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20141027T190000
DTSTAMP:20260611T113142
CREATED:20141120T103139Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T103639Z
UID:10001026-1414432800-1414436400@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Ole Wæver on Security in a Post-Western World
DESCRIPTION:Ole Wæver\, Professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science\, University of Copenhagen\, and Director of the Center for Resolution of International Conflicts\, delivered a CIRS Focused Discussion on October 27\, 2014 on the topic “Global Security in a Post-Western World.” Introducing the lecture\, Wæver noted that when world events change so quickly and so radically\, it is always important to understand the basics of international relations theories\, no matter how old-fashioned an idea that may seem. In international relations\, it is tradition to want to comprehend the “big picture\,” in terms of how one country relates to another and under what kinds of power relations within the international system. \n \n \nGiving some historical background to the topic\, Wæver explained that the idea of the singular “superpower” is one that has its roots in Eurocentric history\, and goes back to a time where Europe was central to world events\, especially during the colonial period and up to the Cold War. However\, since the end of the Cold War\, the question of what kind of international political system has replaced the older\, more traditional bipolar global engagement of superpowers is still being debated in the discipline. There have been a great many shifts in global engagement. Nations have since attempted to adapt to the new transition and to the decline of powerful global ideologies as they reconstruct their security allegiances within power vacuums. Wæver argued that we are currently in a radically different system to that of the past bipolar world where giant powers faced off against each other. So\, how did we get to this stage of finding ourselves in a post-Cold War period and\, what he called\, a post-West period? The answer is in what comes after bipolarity: is it unipolarity or is it multipolarity? Or\, is it neither? \n \n \nThe post-Cold War period saw the rise of an ideologically-victorious United States\, with power and influence all over the world. However\, Wæver argued\, it is evident from events of the recent past that the United States can no longer claim power based solely on market or military might. Around 2005\, there was a turning point where the centric approach began showing signs of weakness. The Iraq and Afghanistan wars proved to be a poor strategy\, and one in which the United States failed to dominate. Further\, the 2008 global financial crisis completely damaged US legitimacy as a global market leader. “The US is really not dominant enough to be able to impose order\,” he said. \n \n \nPerhaps then the idea of multipolarilty could be considered a more appropriate definition in its acknowledgement of fluid and shifting alliances\, but\, Wæver argued\, it is still a concept that is unsatisfactory to describe current international system structures. The idea of multipolarity is problematic since within any group of nations\, some are more powerful than others. Thus\, these concepts are unstable\, and we need a new definition of what is taking place in the global balance of power. \n \n \nCurrently\, the world is increasingly made up of many great powers with fewer superpowers in neither a unipolar nor a multipolar world. “No one is really thinking of themselves as global players\, they are all anchored and rooted in regions\, mostly interested in their own regions\, somewhat interested in neighboring regions\, and occasionally concerned about global questions\,” he explained. Thus\, if there is no longer an ongoing struggle for the prime position within the global order\, we need a different type of definition\, and a different type of understanding for this new global configuration. \n \n \nIn conclusion\, Wæver said that\, ultimately\, many of these issues come down to basic assumptions and ways of thinking. In this sense\, the current configuration of world politics is post-Western in three very distinct ways: in power politics that is no longer Western-centric; in the value order that is no longer based on a singular framework of interpretation; and\, finally\, in the understanding of international relations theory and concepts of polarity and global security\, where we now see a greater role for theories that emanate out of different geographic and cultural contexts—ones that are not dominated by Western modes of thinking. \n \n \nOle Wæver is most known for coining the concept of “securitization” and developing what is commonly referred to as the Copenhagen School in security studies. His research interests include international relations and security theory\, sociology of science\, religion in international relations\, climate change\, conflict analysis\, and the role of national identity in foreign policy. He has published and broadcast extensively in the field of international relations and securitization theory. His most recent publications include the contribution of a chapter to Capturing Security Expertise: Practice\, Power\, and Responsibility (Routledge\, forthcoming 2015). His most recent peer-reviewed journal article\, “The Theory Act: Responsibility and Exactitude as seen from Securitization” appears in International Relations (2014). \n \n \nOle Wæver\, Professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science\, University of Copenhagen\, and Director of the Center for Resolution of International Conflicts\, delivered a CIRS Focused Discussion on October 27\, 2014 on the topic “Global Security in a Post-Western World.” Introducing the lecture\, Wæver noted that when world events change so quickly and so radically\, it is always important to understand the basics of international relations theories\, no matter how old-fashioned an idea that may seem. In international relations\, it is tradition to want to comprehend the “big picture\,” in terms of how one country relates to another and under what kinds of power relations within the international system. \n \n \nGiving some historical background to the topic\, Wæver explained that the idea of the singular “superpower” is one that has its roots in Eurocentric history\, and goes back to a time where Europe was central to world events\, especially during the colonial period and up to the Cold War. However\, since the end of the Cold War\, the question of what kind of international political system has replaced the older\, more traditional bipolar global engagement of superpowers is still being debated in the discipline. There have been a great many shifts in global engagement. Nations have since attempted to adapt to the new transition and to the decline of powerful global ideologies as they reconstruct their security allegiances within power vacuums. Wæver argued that we are currently in a radically different system to that of the past bipolar world where giant powers faced off against each other. So\, how did we get to this stage of finding ourselves in a post-Cold War period and\, what he called\, a post-West period? The answer is in what comes after bipolarity: is it unipolarity or is it multipolarity? Or\, is it neither? \n \n \nThe post-Cold War period saw the rise of an ideologically-victorious United States\, with power and influence all over the world. However\, Wæver argued\, it is evident from events of the recent past that the United States can no longer claim power based solely on market or military might. Around 2005\, there was a turning point where the centric approach began showing signs of weakness. The Iraq and Afghanistan wars proved to be a poor strategy\, and one in which the United States failed to dominate. Further\, the 2008 global financial crisis completely damaged US legitimacy as a global market leader. “The US is really not dominant enough to be able to impose order\,” he said. \n \n \nPerhaps then the idea of multipolarilty could be considered a more appropriate definition in its acknowledgement of fluid and shifting alliances\, but\, Wæver argued\, it is still a concept that is unsatisfactory to describe current international system structures. The idea of multipolarity is problematic since within any group of nations\, some are more powerful than others. Thus\, these concepts are unstable\, and we need a new definition of what is taking place in the global balance of power. \n \n \nCurrently\, the world is increasingly made up of many great powers with fewer superpowers in neither a unipolar nor a multipolar world. “No one is really thinking of themselves as global players\, they are all anchored and rooted in regions\, mostly interested in their own regions\, somewhat interested in neighboring regions\, and occasionally concerned about global questions\,” he explained. Thus\, if there is no longer an ongoing struggle for the prime position within the global order\, we need a different type of definition\, and a different type of understanding for this new global configuration. \n \n \nIn conclusion\, Wæver said that\, ultimately\, many of these issues come down to basic assumptions and ways of thinking. In this sense\, the current configuration of world politics is post-Western in three very distinct ways: in power politics that is no longer Western-centric; in the value order that is no longer based on a singular framework of interpretation; and\, finally\, in the understanding of international relations theory and concepts of polarity and global security\, where we now see a greater role for theories that emanate out of different geographic and cultural contexts—ones that are not dominated by Western modes of thinking. \n \n \nOle Wæver is most known for coining the concept of “securitization” and developing what is commonly referred to as the Copenhagen School in security studies. His research interests include international relations and security theory\, sociology of science\, religion in international relations\, climate change\, conflict analysis\, and the role of national identity in foreign policy. He has published and broadcast extensively in the field of international relations and securitization theory. His most recent publications include the contribution of a chapter to Capturing Security Expertise: Practice\, Power\, and Responsibility (Routledge\, forthcoming 2015). His most recent peer-reviewed journal article\, “The Theory Act: Responsibility and Exactitude as seen from Securitization” appears in International Relations (2014). \n \n \nArticle by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/ole-w%c3%a6ver-security-post-western-world/
CATEGORIES:American Studies,Dialogue Series,Distingushed Lectures,Race & Society,Regional Studies
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2014/11/olewaever-1.jpg
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