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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140603T080000
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SUMMARY:The State and Innovation in the Gulf Working Group II
DESCRIPTION:On June 3-4\, 2014\, CIRS held the second working group under the State and Innovation in the Gulf research initiative. Participants reconvened in Doha to discuss their paper submissions that collectively analyze efforts of GCC states to diversify their oil-based economies into knowledge-based economies (KBEs)\, the manifestation of these efforts on the ground\, and the structural realities that facilitate or hinder this transition. \n \n \nSignificant dependence on the oil and gas industry has led to the development of national visions and strategies that actively seek to diversify GCC economies. These diversification efforts are not merely related to the diffusion of risk by decreasing dependence on the volatile oil and gas sector\, but are rather increasingly intertwined with elements associated with KBEs—namely job creation and the development of sectors with high knowledge content. Global rankings such as the World Bank’s Knowledge Assessment Methodology database provide a comparative indication of the status of knowledge economies around the world. While GCC countries rank below European and North American countries in the World Bank’s KAM database\, they also score significantly higher than other states in the MENA region. Despite this relative indication of GCC rankings\, participants questioned the applicability of these assessments to the region due to the Gulf’s peculiar economic transition throughout the decades. Developed countries around the world—those that tend to score higher on these global rankings—have gone through a developmental evolution from agrarian to industrial economies\, then transitioned to information societies\, which led to the present knowledge economies. Gulf states however\, are attempting to leapfrog from pearling and trading economies to robust KBEs. The core cause of this rapid transition in the region—in comparison to other resource-based economies such as Norway—is attributable to the concurrent discovery of oil and establishment of nationhood\, leading Gulf rulers to focus on strengthening their rule by building physical infrastructure\, providing basic services\, and essentially suspending the diversification process. Production oriented structures and practices were thus sidelined by robust oil earnings\, leading participants to question: can countries which have not been through the industrial revolution enter the knowledge economy phase of development? \n \n \nOne of the ways in which Gulf states are attempting to build the foundations of their respective KBEs is by heavily investing in human capital and intangible assets through the establishment of vast educational and research facilities. By replicating and adopting models of education from abroad\, this form of investment enables Gulf states to “leapfrog the lengthy and costly process of indigenous growth and maturity”—indicating a strong motivation to catch-up with the developed world and compete in the global race for innovation. While borrowing and replicating models may have its advantages in reducing the time and cost of establishing native educational systems\, the process of borrowing\, adoption and implementation is a complex and costly one itself.  Cultural transmission is one of the core components of education\, and as such\, having a standard model that is imported from abroad omits the required cultural and contextual fit for education systems to be locally effective. Second\, excessive reliance on foreign models and external providers retards the growth of local capacity building in the Gulf—essentially hindering the ability to foster knowledge and expertise produced locally.  Despite this tendency to replicate and borrow\, Gulf states have exhibited forms of innovation in developing their education systems. Education City—the flagship of Qatar Foundation in Qatar—is a model of clustered international branch campuses (IBCS)\, where a number of foreign universities operate under the umbrella of Education City. This clustered model of IBCs creates opportunities for integrating the educational experiences of the different universities\, allowing students to cross-register for classes and providing a platform for joint-degree programs and research collaborations to take place. Due to the benefits of this model of clustered IBCs – or the Education City model – other regions of the globe are attempting to adopt it. While the benefits are clear\, it is a costly endeavor and its global level of diffusion will largely be dictated by the ability of states with fewer resources than Qatar to effectively replicate the model. \n \n \nLarge investments in higher education are tailored towards developing the skills of the national workforce and producing the “knowledge worker” that is required by KBEs. Despite this investment in human capital however\, Gulf nationals are continuously drawn to employment in the public sector—where they accrue large benefits from the state—as opposed to seeking employment in the private sector. While foreigners comprise the bulk of GCC populations and as such dominate the private sector\, they have a temporary presence in the labor market due migration policies that limit their duration of stay. This has adverse effects on developing KBEs due to hindering local knowledge retention and transfer of imported foreign knowledge. In developed countries\, the private sector is traditionally conceived of as the bearer and fosterer of innovation; however\, with minimal presence of nationals in the private sector and the temporally limited presence of expatriates\, there exists a large disjuncture between investment in human capital and labor market outcomes that reap the benefits of these investments. In an attempt to fill this gap\, GCC states are promoting entrepreneurship by developing institutions that support local entrepreneurs and SMEs\, with the aims of building a robust private sector that is promotive of innovation. In the recent years\, the SME ecosystem has witnessed a mushrooming of institutions and organizations mandated to cater their services towards the support of private business. While the strategies and infrastructure for SME promotion may be set in place\, the pervasive rentier arrangement in the Gulf provides a thick security blanket of social benefits that continues to deter nationals from fostering an entrepreneurial spirit—a spirit that is largely based on uncertainty and risk-taking. \n \n \nIncreasingly so\, it is apparent that what is lacking in the GCC is not necessarily the infrastructure or the investment in pillars of a knowledge based economy—but in creating an environment and a national system that is conducive to knowledge creation and innovation. When it comes to university-industry-government collaborations\, it appears that the role of the government in incentivizing both universities and industries to collaborate in knowledge exchange and management is weak in some GCC states such as Qatar.  As such\, industries continue to operate in silos\, curtailing the diffusion of knowledge throughout the economy. Moreover\, it becomes evident that while state rhetoric is supportive of creating KBEs that foster innovation\, the structural realities of Gulf states—namely the rentier arrangements and the demographic imbalance—actively mitigate against the translation of these national visions and strategies into concrete realities\, hindering the realization of KBEs and keeping innovation at shallow levels. \n \n \n\nSee the participant bios\nSee the Working Group agenda \nRead more about this research initiative\n\n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nHaytham Abduljawad\, Qatar Petroleum\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nJohn Crist\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nCrystal A. Ennis\, Balsillie School of International Affairs\nMartin Hvidt\, Zayed University\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nDaniel Kirk\, Emirates College for Advanced Education\nSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nDwaa Osman\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\n\n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Dwaa Osman\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/state-and-innovation-gulf-working-group-ii/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140608T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140608T180000
DTSTAMP:20260611T135956
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SUMMARY:World Regions: The Middle Eastern Pivot Working Group I
DESCRIPTION:On June 8\, 2014\, CIRS and the Stony Brook Institute for Global Studies (SBIGS) held the first working group under the collaborative research initiative World Regions: The Middle Eastern Pivot. Scholars from various disciplinary backgrounds gathered for the meeting in Doha to discuss topics related to the concept of “regions\,” the construction of regional identities\, and world regions and civilizations. \n \n \nParticipants began the working group meeting with a discussion of “a Pangaean approach to world regions.” The new-old approach to world regions categorized regions using physical and meta-geographical distinctions. Physically\, the distinction is the seven continents that resulted as a fragmentation of the old super-continent Pangea. Other meta-geographical distinctions are: nation-states\, which arise out of political categories; North-South and core\, periphery\, and semi-periphery economic categorizations; and cultural distinctions such as the occident and the orient. However\, this traditional way of studying regions lacks the incorporation of the human impact on the geo-body\, which is largely affected by techno-scientific means.  While the new-old approach fragments the earth based on a predominantly socio-cultural perspective\, the new-new approach—or the Pangea II project—seeks to integrate the techno-scientific lens with the cultural studies lens. Our socio-natural impact gives rise to a global techno-scientific culture requiring new imagery and a re-mapping of the world—as Pangea II. Participants also discussed the importance of language when constructing and re-mapping regions. The notion of “world” regions emphasizes the diversity and divisions between various regions\, whereas the concept of “global” regions may focus more on the interconnections and overlaps\, accounting for the ongoing change that is occurring to earth as a whole and providing a binocular view that incorporates socio-cultural and socio-natural constituents. \n \n \n“The Islamicate civilization and the Persianate world” was the second topic of discussion amongst participants. The growth of Orientalism by the end of the eighteenth century led to a shift from a unitary to a plural notion of civilization. The Orientalist approach to civilization used language as the decisive marker\, and as such\, based on the generation and influence of the Persian language\, the Persianate world is considered to be a civilizational zone. Max Weber’s approach to civilization replaces language with religion as the main marker. In this conception\, the Islamicate civilization is constituted as a world region. These conceptions of world regions are not mutually exclusive and as such identities can be intersecting and overlapping allowing one to be simultaneously Muslim\, Persianate and Middle Eastern. In considering world regions as a unit of analysis\, geographic\, cultural or political\, and structural coherence are considered to be the basic criterion. Geographic coherence was evident in ancient and medical empires that were territorially contiguous. Political coherence is produced as a result of polity formation. A framework for considering political coherence is “Sheldon Pollock’s idea of the vernacular millennium where the ecumenical languages—Sanskrit\, Latin and Arabic—recede to make possible the growth of vernacular languages and cultures as a result of polity formation with the rise of local monarchies.” While Arabic was the lingua franca of the Islamic Civilization\, Persian became a complimentary lingua franca to Islam where the Samanids in the tenth century played a particularly major role in spreading Islam as a world religion. A core component of the third criterion – structural or institutional coherence—is the legal order and juridification of norms and organizing logics. Islamic law—or Sharia—is predominantly private law and developed under the Islamicate civilization. Public or constitutional law however did not develop under this civilization and the idea of an “Islamicate monarchy” as a “political ethic” was largely derived from the Persian idea of kingship—signifying another area of great overlap between the two worlds. \n \n \nIn exploring the topic of the “Islamicate Ecumene in MENA and South Asia before Colonial Empires and Nation-States”\, participants discussed the monopolization of literature by two dominant framings on geographic entities: that of the ecumene (ethno/cultural/religious civilizational aspects) and that of the empire (political aspects). Nestled between these geo-entities framings is one that is more socio-cultural and socio-economic—one that focuses on activities centered on exchange and one that includes people who were not part of the elite—such as students\, teachers\, pilgrims\, traders etc. The neglect of the latter geo-entity accounts for the relative absence of the Middle East and South Asia in comparison to other parts of the world in the scholarship of global histories. Addressing this third geo-entity fills a huge gap in the scholarship and facilitates the reconstruction of salient spheres of social communication that took place prior to the nineteenth century.  By embracing philology\, and drawing on social-scientific techniques that create cardinal visualization\, scholars can facilitate the study of conceptual history and the reconstruction of spheres of spatial communication in past contexts. \n \n \nWhile addressing the Arab World and the Middle East as overlapping world regions\, the “Middle East” as a defined region was problematized by the working group members. Characterized as “one of the most relative terms\,” scholars have long debated what geographical\, cultural\, political and historical patterns give coherence to this label. Despite these disputes in the nomenclature of the Middle East\, participants nonetheless engaged with the region. Paralleling an earlier discussion of shifts in regional centers and the reversal of center and periphery\, participants questioned whether there is a shift in the regional centers of gravity in the Middle East—moving away from the previous centers of power and economic activity of Baghdad\, Cairo and Damascus\, to that of the Persian Gulf states. In order to understand whether the center of gravity is shifting\, scholars of the region need to have a better read of the intellectual landscape of the Middle East. Much of what we know about the production of knowledge in the region is related to that of political activists\, but not much is known about political thinkers in Middle Eastern society. Whether or not places such as Dubai for instance\, signify authentic cultural centers of knowledge production in the region could help us understand whether such regional shifts are in fact occurring. Some participants\, however\, questioned whether there remain any centers of gravity\, or perhaps just a series of networks that interlace throughout the region. \n \n \nBridging regional studies and social science disciplines\, participants delved into the topic of “The Middle East and International Relations Theory.” Each of the four schools of IR thought (i.e. the power\, interdependence\, Marxist\, and constructivist schools) has particular relevance to the region. For instance\, the power school emphasizes realism and attributes the shape of the region to the actions of great powers—this is fitting to the Middle East because the shape—and definition—of the region is in fact a product of great powers. When interpreting the modern world\, however\, another type of realism emerges—realism of power that is defined by the ability to produce and develop techno-scientific knowledge\, emphasizing the modern need for civilizations to be progressive as compared to traditional civilizations that did not emphasize the growth process. Though the power school remains salient\, it does not account for the power of regional actors nor take into consideration non-state actors. The school of constructivism on the other hand—which is a late comer in IR theory—brings forth the importance of ideas\, thereby bringing IR theory closer to social thinking and allowing for deeper analysis and engagement with the internal dynamics of the region. Neo-constructivism—perhaps the most effective of all—integrates the material dimensions of the latter three IR theories (power\, economy\, class) and that of ideas. \n \n \nLast on the agenda\, working group members tackled the topic of “Central Eurasia as a World Region.” Central Eurasia encompasses multiple ethnic groups and languages making it difficult to define this region as a region. Although linguistic similarities between Uzbeks and Kazaks for instance indicate a level of cultural similarity; natives of these countries do not perceive it to be the case largely due to the linguistic and geographic borders that were reified through the soviet institutions of the twentieth century. From an internal perspective\, national legacies of the region make it hard to identify central Asia as a region as its inhabitants have historically emphasized maintaining separateness. Additionally\, from the perspective of outsiders such as international aid donors\, the divergent developmental trajectories of the countries within also undermines regional coherence (for instance\, while Kazakhstan is undergoing rapid economic progression\, countries like Tajikistan and Afghanistan are seen as failing states by the international community). The various aspects of language\, culture\, geography\, diasporas and the ways in which international organizations engage with the region\, reveal multiple layers of regional identity that may be mobilized by people. Thus\, while the region may be a construct of western academic discourse\, there are moments when people evoke regional unity for certain purposes. Ascertaining when these moments occur and for what purposes contributes to the understanding of the ways in which people themselves evoke regional coherence.  \n \n \n\nSee the participant bios\nSee the Working Group agenda \nRead more about this research initiative \n\n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nLaura Adams\, Harvard University\nSaïd Arjomand\, Stony Brook University\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nNerida Child Dimasi\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nBarb Gillis\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nBahgat Korany\, The American University in Cairo\nDwaa Osman\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nWolf Schäfer\, Stony Brook University\nGagan Sood\, London School of Economics\nElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\n\n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Dwaa Osman\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/world-regions-middle-eastern-pivot-working-group-i/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140622T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140623T180000
DTSTAMP:20260611T135956
CREATED:20140914T144110Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T103727Z
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SUMMARY:Social Currents in the Maghreb Working Group II
DESCRIPTION:On June 22-23\, 2014\, CIRS held the concluding Social Currents in the Maghreb research initiative working group in Washington D.C. Participants gathered for the second time to discuss their research findings and solicit feedback from a multi-disciplinary cohort of working group members. The topics and themes discussed ranged from the mobilization of social movements in the Maghreb to language as politics and dissent in cultural production. \n \n \nFollowing the Arab uprisings\, the rise of Islamist parties has led to renewed interest in Islamist politics and a proliferation of debates surrounding the role of Islamist parties and movements in North African politics and society. Despite increased scholarly attention to Islamist politics\, the literature remains predominantly narrow in its scope\, neglecting ideological and political innovations within Islamist parties\, and the diversity and divisions that exist within the Islamist sphere as a whole. One of the ways in which Islamist parties in North Africa have exhibited ideological innovation is by adopting new ideological references that are based on a national framework\, rather than the commonly adopted “eastern” interpretations on the relationship between Islam and politics. By primarily referencing Algerian Malek Bennabi’s work\, and Ghannouchi’s earlier writings\, al-Nahda is “nationalizing an essentially internationalist project”. This is indicative of a change in the flow of ideas in the Maghreb and the shaping of Islamism based on local experiences. While ideological innovation is taking place in the formal political sphere\, younger generations of Maghrebis are increasingly distancing themselves from institutional politics and finding alternative ways of performing “every-day Islamism” through associations that are more focused on the betterment of society\, rather than the hierarchical mechanisms of institutional politics. Decreased trust in the formal political sphere as an agent of change has led to this diffusion of what it means to be “Islamist” and a growing perception of the distance from “politicking” as a source of success for these associations. \n \n \nOn the other hand\, for young people who believe that religion should play a more central role in politics\, Salafism has become a significant outlet to achieve political objectives. Participants discussed Salafism in relation to its three broad categories of scriptural\, Jihadi\, and political Salafism. Of particular salience is the adoption of Jihadi Salafism by young Islamists who are unsatisfied with the Islamist parties in power and the absence of radical change. The rise of Jihadi Salafism in the Maghreb– even before the Arab Uprisings – has led to the co-optation of Sufism by the state to counterweigh the rising threat of Jihadi Salafism; this has led to what some participants claimed was a “revival” of Sufism in the political sphere. Despite seeming state co-optation\, participants problematized “Sufism” as a term and discussed that it entails much more than mere reflective esoteric practices but rather\, has institutional politics embedded within – complicating what is generally perceived as a “quietist” movement.  \n \n \nWorking group members also discussed the Polisario movement and the question of the Western Sahara. While the Polisario is predominantly thought of as an “Algeria-backed movement”\, it has increasingly diversified its support base since the 1990s\, to include non-state actors such as activist NGOs\, the Sahrawi diaspora and international aid agencies. This flexibility and adaptability has contributed to the movement’s resilience and accordingly this transformation has largely blurred the movement’s boundaries between being an armed and un-armed movement. \n \n \nIn questioning dominant narrow conceptions of North Africa\, participants further problematized terms such as the “Arab” uprisings\, which fail to recognize the linguistic and cultural heterogeneity of the region. Decades of Amazigh activism throughout the Maghreb has challenged the Arab nationalist ideologies of Maghrebi states. By utilizing a discourse of democracy\, pluralism\, and diversity throughout the decades and particularly in the “Berber Spring” of the 1980s\, their movement largely dovetails with demonstrations of the “Arab Spring” that call for social justice and rule of law. Similarly in Mauritania\, the Haratin have played a dominant role in shaping the way human rights issues are debated in Mauritanian society and in the political quest for democracy. \n \n \nDifferent states of the Maghreb\, such as Algeria and Morocco\, have appropriated cultural diversity and co-opted various Amazigh activists\, bringing forth the fragmentation and internal divides that exist within the Amazigh movement itself\, particularly with regards to generation and class. In addition to the heterogeneity that exists within the Amazigh movement and the Maghrebi states\, the Amazigh movement is a transnational one that expands the cultural-geographic space of Barbary\, essentially raising questions about the boundaries of those nation states and how territorial boundedness relates to the lived experience. In the Mauritanian context\, while the Haratin are characterized as those of “slave descent”\, they do not constitute a homogenous group\, but rather identify as Arabs\, Berbers\, Africans and Mauritanian. Participants noted that in shifting social and political landscapes the politics of self-racialization come in to play\, where in different moments the Haratins are racialized as “black Africans”. \n \n \nWith the neo-liberalization of culture\, “Berberness” does not merely represent an object of struggle\, but is also an “aestheticized iconography of the visual urban field”. Paralleling the commodification of Berber heritage is Jewish heritage tourism and cultural conservation in Morocco. While Moroccan Jewish history is a valued economic asset that has become central to national tourism revenues\, local support and discourses continue to be overshadowed by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict\, largely overlying Moroccan Jewish history.  Due to this low level of national multicultural consciousness\, there are a number of Moroccan Amazigh and Muslim activists that focus their activities on incorporating the local history of Jews in school and university curricula in order to broaden and deepen the understanding of Jews within Morocco’s historical cultural diversity. \n \n \nWhile official promotion of multiculturalism has largely led to celebratory interpretations that presume it as a precursor to social justice and democratization\, its intersection with elements of neo-liberalism masks deeper negative socio-economic repercussions. In Morocco for instance\, official rhetoric that promotes multilingualism has further stratified society by placing a heavy burden on students and young Moroccons to manage multiple languages. Due to language requirements in the education system\, structural inequalities and limitations exist that discriminate against those who cannot afford private schooling\, essentially excluding them from national and international economic arenas. While the poorer populations of the Maghreb continue to be excluded from global mobility due to these structural limitations\, other populations – particularly those of the sport elite – have widened their scope of migration destinations. In the context of sport migrant communities\, participants discussed the states of the GCC as increasingly becoming part of the Maghrebi social imaginary\, and in some ways replacing Europe as the prime target for migration. \n \n \nPreceding and during the Arab uprisings\, labor movements have mobilized to address socio-economic woes in the Maghreb. In Morocco\, labor unions pressed for material demands and partially achieved them through a series of strikes\, sit-ins and protests during the uprisings of 2011. What is important to highlight is that labor was always able to mobilize and connect with the struggle of other groups. Perhaps in recognition of such\, the Moroccan government has become particularly capable and effective in its ‘divide and conquer’ tactics to avert the creation of a broad alliance that seeks to connect actors in the political sphere. As such\, participants highlighted the importance of not only investigating the negotiations that take place between labor movements and the government\, but between labor and the myriad of social movements that exist in the Maghreb\, as it may affect the labor movement’s strategies in broadening their concrete demands beyond the economic sphere. \n \n \nThe case-study of labor movements highlights that socio-economic woes have always been present in Maghrebi society\, and more importantly so\, that groups mobilized to address their demands prior to the Arab uprisings. Beyond formal mobilization\, cultural production in the Maghreb also indicates that other forms of dissent were also prevalent within society. In looking at post-colonial film and dissent in Tunisia\, participants discussed the works of Moufida Ttali\, Nouri Bouzid\, Ferid Boughedir\, Mahamd Zran\, and Moncef Dhouib. These films challenge the sociocultural status quo by contesting taboos\, expanding social boundaries and forming “the critical basis for challenging the governmental and political state apparatus itself”. How these films are received by the Tunisian public and whether or not they inspired political action is much more obscure; what is evident however is that dissent was prevalent in the consciousness and works of many Maghrebi artists. \n \n \n  \n \n \n\nRead participant bios\nSee the working group schedule\nRead more about this research initiative\n\n \n  \n \n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nOsama Abi-Mershed\, CCAS – Georgetown University\nJean R. AbiNader\, Moroccan American Trade and Investment Center (MATIC)\nMahfoud Amara\, Loughborough University\nAlice Bullard\, IRA-USA\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nAomar Boum\, University of Arizona\nCharis Boutieri\, King’s College London\nMatt Buehler\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nFrancesco Cavatorta\, Université Laval\nNouri Gana\, University of California\, Los Angeles\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nRicardo René Larémont\, Binghamton University\nDwaa Osman\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nZekeria Ould Ahmed Salem\, University of Nouakchott\nPaul Silverstein\, Reed College\nElizabeth F. Thompson\, University of Virginia\nElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nAlice Wilson\, University of Cambridge\n\n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Dwaa Osman\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/social-currents-maghreb-working-group-ii/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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