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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20130907T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20130908T180000
DTSTAMP:20260416T101804
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SUMMARY:Arab Migrant Communities in the GCC Working Group I
DESCRIPTION:On September 7–8\, 2013\, CIRS held a two-day working group to discuss\, amongst other things\, the economic and political push and pull factors of Arab migration to the region\, the historical migration trajectory\, the current conditions and varied experiences of Arab expatriates residing and working in the Gulf\, as well as future trends in regional migration. Along with the five teams of research grant awardees\, who updated the group on their ongoing research and preliminary findings\, the working group participants consisted of a cohort of experts and scholars. In contrast to the burgeoning literature on Asian immigrants in the Gulf\, Arab migration to the region has been a neglected area of study. In order to fill this gap\, in early 2013 CIRS launched a grant-based research initiative on “Arab Migrant Communities in the GCC.” Five grant proposals were awarded to scholars to conduct fieldwork and original research on various topics related to Arab migration in the region. \n \n \nThe advent of the Gulf oil economy in the 1950s brought with it an influx of migrants\, initially predominantly from the Arab world. As the literature documents\, the stocks and flows of regional migration have altered throughout the years\, with the first Gulf War demonstrating a break in the inflow of Arabs and a dramatic increase in the import of an Asian work force. Viewed as more politicized in comparison to their Asian and Western counterparts\, Arab migrants in the GCC have historically been impacted by the geo-political atmosphere. In light of the recent uprisings throughout the region\, and more specifically in recognition of the political consciousness of Arab youth\, the participants discussed the significance of assessing perceptions of the Arab Uprisings amongst non-local students in the GCC. The attitudes of foreign students towards political and social change taking place in the region has significant implications for future policies related to labor and migration. While perceptions embedded in historical events or narratives impact the governance of migration\, they too influence the relations between the locals and the expatriate Arab. Mapping the historical-political consequences of the first Gulf War and more recently the Arab Uprisings provides a lens to assess how certain Gulf States have negotiated their tenuous relationship with their migrant Arab communities. Based on the historical context\, different generations of Palestinians in the UAE for example\, have exhibited varying experiences of cross-nationality interaction\, different degrees of willingness to engage on political issues\, and most substantially\, diverse levels of success in their ability to obtain Gulf citizenship. \n \n \nUnderlying the politics of migration\, the notion of impermanence and temporariness in relation to the “transient foreigner” was repeatedly discussed throughout the two-day working group. As participants pointed out\, the “temporariness of migration” in the Gulf states\, particularly as it relates to Arab migrants\, is an indication more so of their political and social status rather than the duration of their stay in the region. Several nationalities of Arab origin have resided within the GCC for decades\, resulting in a significant proportion of second and third generation GCC-born Arab expatriates. While limited pathways to citizenship have policy makers categorizing migrants as “temporary\,” numerous long-standing migrant communities of various Arab origins have carved out a more permanent presence within the GCC. \n \n \nAs the dominant Arab nationality throughout the GCC\, Egyptians have permeated a range of economic sectors and are generally considered to be the most diverse Arab expatriate community within the Gulf states. The diversity of the Egyptian community in certain states such as Kuwait is manifested in the demographically based socio-spatial and geographic distribution of Egyptians throughout the city. The diverse experiences and socio-economic statuses of Egyptians provide a valuable foundation for the analysis of “bonding capital” within the Egyptian community as well as “bridging capital” with the host community. Moreover\, as Egyptians in Kuwait constitute the second largest source of remittances to Egypt\, their impact on homeland development is substantial. While most studies focus on the micro-level impact of remittances at the household level\, experts discussed the need to assess its impact on macro-level development and particularly how it affects the home country’s investment climate. \n \n \nWhile most Arab migrants have traditionally migrated to North America and Europe\, they are increasingly choosing the GCC as a destination despite limited pathways to integration and citizenship. For instance\, the number of high-skilled Lebanese immigrants in Kuwait has exponentially increased in recent years. While assessing the push factors of Lebanese emigration to Kuwait\, participants identified the limited size and prospects of the Lebanese labor market\, along with issues of clientalism and corruption as major drivers of emigration. In addition to economic and political push factors of Arab migration\, a deteriorating “quality of life” in some home countries have led migrants to seek employment in Gulf cities\, which are characterized by high growth\, sound infrastructure\, and the accessibility of public goods. An increase in Jordanian female immigration to the Gulf suggests that the rising age of marriage\, the geographic proximity of the GCC\, the availability of job opportunities\, and the “comfortable lifestyle” offered have made this region the ideal destination for Arab female migrants. Moreover\, within certain sectors of the GCC labor market\, there appears to be a level of dependency on Arab workers\, most notably due to the shared Arabic language with the host country. Arab teachers\, for instance\, are a unique part of the labor force in the Gulf\, in that they cannot easily be replaced by Asians or Westerners. While the pull-factors to the GCC may outweigh the status of impermanence its migrants face\, Arab workers nonetheless accommodate their temporariness into their risk and decision-making process. Impermanent contracts affect the behavior of workers as manifested in their tendency to invest in the present rather any future-related endeavors. \n \n \nInvestigating intergroup-relations and particularly the relationship between Arab workers and GCC employers within the workplace was also discussed as a point of interest. In certain sectors\, there is a “privileging” of Arab workers and assessing opportunities or barriers to promotion and professional development in the Gulf is of importance. In addition to standard workplace relations\, the relationship between Hadrami migrants and their Kuwaiti employers is unique in comparison to other Arab expatriate experiences. Since the start of their migration to Kuwait in the early 1950s\, Hadramis were quickly absorbed into the domestic services sector. Throughout the decades\, a culture of dependency developed between Hadramis and their mo’azib (Kuwaiti sponsor and employer) where immigrants and their sons work for the same household for decades. What is exemplary in this relationship in comparison to other workplace relations is the inherent hierarchy and enduring commitment to the mo’azib that eliminates any possibility of competition with the locals. In comparison with other Arab immigrants that characteristically tend to be economically valued\, Hadramis are symbolically valued in the Kuwaiti community. These differences in the experiences of Arab migrants based on historical context and nationality offer a nuanced understanding on the evolving conditions of expatriates and the dynamics of migration in the Gulf. \n \n \n\nFor the working group agenda\, click here\nFor the participants’ biographies\, click here\nRead more about this research initiative\n\n \n  \n \n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nAbdullah M. Alajmi\, Arab Open University\nMohammed Al-Waqfi\, United Arab Emirates University\nHeba Arafa\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nNerida Child Dimasi\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nFrançoise De Bel-Air\, Institut français du Proche-Orient (IFPO)\nIsmail H. Genc\, American University of Sharjah\nBarb Gillis\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nManal A. Jamal\, James Madison University\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nSulayman Khalaf\, Abu Dhabi Tourism and Culture Authority\nGarret Maher\, Gulf University for Science and Technology\nSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nHeba Nassar\, American University in Cairo\nGeorge Naufal\, American University of Sharjah\nMichael Newson\, International Organization for Migration\nGwenn Okruhlik\, Middle East Institute – National University of Singapore\nDwaa Osman\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nNatasha Ridge\, Sheikh Saud bin Saqr Al Qasimi Foundation for Policy Research\nGanesh Seshan\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nNasra Shah\, Kuwait University\nNada Soudy\, Carnegie Mellon University in Qatar\nPaul Tacon\, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia\nAbbie Taylor\, ISIM – Georgetown University\nLuciano Zaccara\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\n\n \n​ \n \n \nArticle by Dwaa Osman\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/arab-migrant-communities-gcc-working-group-i/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20130909T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20130909T180000
DTSTAMP:20260416T101804
CREATED:20140915T062852Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T104210Z
UID:10000790-1378713600-1378749600@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:George Naufal on the Economics of GCC Migration
DESCRIPTION:George Naufal\, Assistant Professor of Economics at the American University of Sharjah and a ‎research fellow at the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)\, delivered a CIRS Monthly ‎Dialogue lecture titled\, “The Economics of Migration in the Gulf Cooperation Council ‎Countries” on September 9\, 2013. The lecture mapped the history of non-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Arab workers ‎migrating to GCC states\, and explained how and why there were ‎such dramatic changes to these migration patterns since the 1970s. \n \n \nNaufal elaborated upon the history of labor migration to the GCC states in order to explain why ‎these countries became a uniquely attractive destination for large numbers of foreign laborers. The ‎chief factor turning the region into a hub of temporary economic migration was the discovery of ‎large oil and natural gas reserves in the early twentieth century. Decades after the discovery of ‎hydrocarbon reserves\, during the time of the oil embargo of the 1970s\, Naufal explained that ‎‎“the GCC countries—Saudi Arabia first—received the largest transfer of wealth in human ‎history.” Because the local populations were small in number and inexperienced\, there was a dire ‎need to import foreign labor in order to fully exploit the nascent industry. Naufal recounted that ‎‎“in 1981\, when the GCC was formed\, the population was around 15 million” people living on a ‎relatively vast amount of land. As the growth of the hydrocarbon industry accelerated\, this in ‎turn led to increased economic growth and related development projects\, which required even ‎more labor power. “The ultimate goal was to develop and develop fast\, and the best way to do so ‎is to bring labor\,” he added. ‎ \n \n \nOwing to geographical proximity as well as shared language\, culture\, and religion\, “it was the ‎non-GCC Arabs who came first in the ‘70s and the ‘80s” as migrant workers to the GCC states. ‎However\, this influx was gradually capped in the mid-1980s when GCC governments realized that ‎the Arab migrant workers posed a disruptive threat by introducing their own domestic religious ‎and political ideologies\, which were not always welcome in the region. Naufal cited the first Gulf war as ‎‎“a structural break in the nationality\, or the source of workers\,” to the GCC. During this time\, ‎citizens of Middle East countries that supported Iraq were deported en mass from GCC states. ‎ \n \n \nThe large numbers of non-GCC Arab migrant laborers were replaced with Asian and South Asian ‎workers. Naufal argued that “the estimates put the non-GCC Arabs in the ‘70s to be around 70 ‎percent of the labor force and the Asians less than 20 percent.” These figures were almost exactly ‎reversed in 2005. GCC policymakers found that the Asian workers were economically beneficial ‎as they would work more for less pay\, and there was also less chance that they would be ‎politically\, religiously\, or ideologically influential. ‎ \n \n \nThe determinants of migration to the Gulf are the results of push and pull factors that are ‎international and domestic according to the needs of both the sending and receiving countries. ‎On their part\, South Asian and South East Asian laborers traveled to the GCC to escape ‎unemployment and poor standards of living in their home countries. “In comparison\, in 2010\, the ‎standard of living in Qatar\, measured by income per capita\, was 23 times that of Sri Lanka\, 35 ‎times that of Yemen\, 50 times that of Sudan\, and 70 times that of Bangladesh.” Naufal noted ‎that these macro-economic measurements translate on a micro personal level: “if you were an ‎Egyptian farmer in the ‘70s\, and you came to Saudi Arabia\, you made 30 times your salary. In ‎the 80s\, if you were a school teacher in Egypt\, you made 20 times your salary. In the 90s\, if you ‎were a Jordanian engineer\, you tripled your income by moving to Kuwait.” ‎ \n \n \nNaufal also explored the remittances phenomenon from the Gulf\, which “are much less volatile ‎and much more stable than foreign direct investment and foreign aid.” During the global ‎economic crisis\, remittances from the GCC remained strong\, “basically\, one fourth or one fifth of ‎remittances in the world comes from the GCC\,” he added. Pointing out the direct correlation ‎between GCC labor policies and the growth and development of labor sending countries that ‎receive direct remitted capital\, Naufal commented that Middle East countries have thus missed ‎out on potential investments and wealth that has been redirected to Asian countries. ‎ \n \n \nSimilarly\, he noted the direct correlation between geopolitical events and GCC labor policies. ‎Because of the volatility of many Middle East countries\, the GCC states are especially attractive ‎as a migration destination to the populations of neighboring Arab countries. Naufal argued that ‎‎“since World War II\, before the Arab Spring\, up until 2010\, the Middle East has had 28 serious ‎conflicts.” Conflicts result in high unemployment rates and a lack of job opportunities\, which for ‎a large youthful population spell serious future challenges. To this end\, he proposed that GCC ‎labor policies could have partially alleviated some of the employment stresses that resulted in the ‎Arab uprisings. ‎ \n \n \nIn conclusion\, Naufal noted the future challenges to the GCC labor market. “The GCC countries ‎were able to create\, in the last ten years\, 7 million jobs—that’s almost one million jobs a year\,” he ‎said. However\, job creation matters less than ensuring that the local population enters fully into ‎the labor market. Currently\, unemployment rates are extremely high for local GCC populations ‎who either refuse unattractive jobs\, or cannot compete with more experienced foreign workers. ‎‎“Countries in the Gulf have to think about what will happen to the price of oil and if at some ‎point they will be able to balance their budget\,” Naufal commented. In order to offset these ‎worries\, some GCC governments have begun diversifying their economies and investing heavily ‎in education to give the local populations a competitive advantage in any future labor market. ‎ \n \n \nGeorge Naufal has a Ph.D. in Economics from Texas A&M University. His primary research ‎includes migration and its consequences\, mainly the impact of remittances on the remitting ‎countries. Naufal’s research has focused mostly on the Middle East and North Africa region with ‎an emphasis on the Gulf countries. He is the co-author of Expats and the Labor Force: The Story ‎of the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries (Palgrave Macmillan\, 2012). His work has been cited ‎by regional and international media outlets including The National\, Gulf News\, and the New York ‎Times. Professor Naufal has served as a consultant on issues related to the Middle East. \n \n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications.
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/george-naufal-economics-gcc-migration/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Distingushed Lectures,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20130913T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20130913T180000
DTSTAMP:20260416T101804
CREATED:20140915T050727Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T104205Z
UID:10000874-1379059200-1379095200@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:AUB-CIRS Host Panel on Knowledge Translation
DESCRIPTION:The Consortium of Arab Policy Research Institutes (CAPRI) at the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs (IFI) and the Center on Knowledge-to-Policy for Health at AUB collaborated with CIRS to host a workshop on September 12\, 2013\, entitled “Knowledge Translation: Bridging the Gap between Research and Policy II”. This one-day event brought together academics\, representatives from research institutes\, policy analysts\, and advocates from around the region to understand the linkage between knowledge production and policy making in the Arab world. \n \n \nMultiple research centers and particularly policy research institutes (PRIs) have emerged throughout the Middle East in the recent years. In addition to independent institutions\, several universities have become more research oriented in acknowledgement of the value of knowledge production and its vital contribution to innovation and evidence-based advocacy. Moreover\, experts at the Center on Knowledge-to-Policy for Health at AUB noted that the incentive system of research in the region is evolving\, so that research centers and universities are increasingly engaging in areas of inquiry that are policy relevant. Since the majority of policy research institutes in the region are still in their nascent stages\, they face some significant challenges. For one\, the receptivity of policy makers to researchers remains limited as they rarely create spaces for utilizing research evidence in their policy making process. Secondly\, local research in Arab countries is perceived to have limited credibility\, and regional government officials continue to heavily rely on international consultants. Recommendations to alleviate those challenges were provided by experts at IFI\, suggesting that first\, research centers should develop credibility in a certain area over a number of years\, and second\, researchers should interact with state officials and policymakers in order to better understand their needs and keep them informed on their own research output. \n \n \nWith the presence of over 240 PRIs in the region\, institutes such as CAPRI are identifying ways of strengthening the outreach and communication strategies of research centers in order to enhance their efficacy in impacting policy. Workshop participants presented both their experiences in linking research with advocacy to influence policy change. In the case of theTobacco Free Initiative in Lebanon\, for example\, civil society organizations worked with researchers at AUB to achieve two goals. First\, they mobilized the public by transmitting information on the dangers of public smoking and second they augmented their advocacy to policy makers by informing them of the level of support within their voting constituency for policy change. During this process\, it was highlighted that research needs to be repackaged and transformed into something that is easily communicated in order to increase its receptivity. The media was identified as a vital intermediary between activists and their target audience\, both in mobilizing support from citizens and in influencing policy makers to achieve change. \n \n \nAlthough the Tobacco Free Initiative in Lebanon presents a success story\, it was recognized by the workshop participants that in other political settings different tactics need to be utilized. In more autocratic Arab countries where votes cannot be used as leverage\, policy advocates face the challenge of identifying means by which they can influence policy makers. Moreover\, while the media is a vital force in fostering change in some societies\, its utilization by activists in other countries may backfire. It was noted that in some states\, policymakers and members of the ruling regime may view this public form of policy advocacy negatively\, and take it as an attempt to destabilize the state. Thus\, in more autocratic settings\, policy makers fear setting the precedent whereby the media can drive policy\, and have accordingly resisted publicly communicated policy changes. Another point of departure from the Lebanese case study is the limited presence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or civil society organizations (CSOs) in other countries around the Middle East. As discussed during the workshop\, this has two major implications on linking knowledge production to policymaking. First\, policy advocacy transforms into a top-down process\, whereby activists introduce the initiatives to those in power rather than attempting to mobilize people behind their cause. Secondly\, with the limited presence of CSOs\, researchers are left with the task of producing research\, disseminating knowledge\, formulating evidence-based policy\, and engaging in policy advocacy. The latter directly falls in line with the new evolving role of researchers and universities that are increasingly reaching out to decision makers and affecting policy. Participants in the workshop concluded that while building the capacity of researchers to repackage knowledge for the policy world is a technical process\, developing a culture that is conducive to research-based policy requires social and political buy-in. \n \n \n\nSee the workshop schedule \nRead participant biographies\n\n \nArticle by Dwaa Osman\, Research Analyst at CIRS​
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/aub-cirs-host-panel-knowledge-translation/
CATEGORIES:Panels,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20130930T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20130930T180000
DTSTAMP:20260416T101804
CREATED:20140915T052641Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230806T071332Z
UID:10000880-1380528000-1380564000@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Luciano Zaccara on the Iranian Elections
DESCRIPTION:Luciano Zaccara\, Visiting Assistant Professor at Georgetown University SFS-Qatar\, delivered a CIRS Focused Discussion on the topic\, “Do Elections Matter? Reflections on the 2013 Iranian Presidential Polls” on September 30\, 2013. Answering this question in the affirmative at the start of the lecture\, he went on to explain why elections are so important to the Iranian political system. Having conducted extensive fieldwork in Iran\, Zaccara observed in-situ the last six electoral processes in Iran\, including the Presidential Elections of 2005\, 2009 and 2013; the Legislatives Elections of 2008 and 2012; and the Municipals and Assembly of Experts elections of 2006. He explained that “electoral life in Iran is very active; in the last 34 years of the Republic’s history there were 32 electoral processes in Iran\,” which reveals how significant elections are for the regime to legitimize its political processes and institutions.  \n \n \nGiving some historical background\, Zaccara noted that there have been a total of eleven presidential elections since the creation of the Islamic Republic. He added that only two presidents did not complete their terms; one was President Bani-Sadr who was impeached in 1980\, and the other was President Rajai who was assassinated in 1981. The third\, fourth\, fifth\, and sixth presidents\, Khamenei\, Rafsanjani\, Khatami\, and Ahmadinejad\, were elected for two terms\, which is the maximum allowable time in office. Of these\, Rafsanjani and Khamenei obtained the highest proportion of votes with 95 percent each. Although Ahmadinejad officially attracted more participation in the electoral process\, with figures reaching up to 83 percent\, he was the most contested candidate in the history of Iranian elections. \n \n \nElections in Iran are vital for the survival of the political system despite the various governmental constraints. He explained that “electoral processes have very important functions in Iran\, even within the authoritarian limits set by the constitutional and electoral frameworks\, which are very particular in the Iranian case.” Despite the uproar regarding the 2009 results\, electoral processes in Iran have important functions. “First\, they draw much light over the intra-elite dispute. Second\, they serve the government to check periodically on the people’s orientation. Third\, but no less important\, they bring candidates into office\, sometimes with unexpected results. And fourth\, they determine the government’s composition\,” Zaccara argued.  \n \n \nDescribing the electoral process itself\, Zaccara said that the voting system implemented in Iran in unique: there is no official registration of number of voters; the percentage of voters is calculated on a population census; and citizens can cast their vote in any polling station in the country. All these factors make it difficult for researchers and officials who study voting patterns to determine the exact proportion and geographic location of voters. Because of these unusual factors\, many international observers believed that the results of the 2009 elections were fabricated. However\, he said\, keeping in mind the way in which the electoral framework is implemented in Iran\, the history of result publication proves that these kinds of numbers are indeed possible. Zaccara added that a further difficulty for researchers is to compare election results over the years as the official information provided is not always consistent. \n \n \nDuring the 2013 elections\, 675 candidates were officially registered\, but only eight made it through the strict criteria to enter the final stages of the elections. Of these\, Rohani won the most votes and inaugurated his term as president on August 3\, 2013. The week before the elections\, Rohani had less than 10 percent of voting intention. However\, the day after a key debate where he emphasized the importance of foreign policy\, his popularity increased sharply indicating public interest in moving away from the isolationist policies of his predecessor. As a further indicator of the public’s desire for a new type of leadership\, he received only 39 percent of votes obtained in Qom\, which is considered the center of Shi’a religious clergy\, while in peripheral provinces such as Sistan-Baluchistan Rohani obtained more than 73 percent of the vote. In Tehran\, the most important and populated district he obtained 48 percent. \n \n \nIn conclusion\, Zaccara argued that\, on the domestic side\, the most recent elections in Iran provided a re-legitimation of the political system and a recuperation of the population’s trust after the events of 2009. “My hypothesis around the results is that the popular support towards a particular candidate is not ideological\, but highly circumstantial\,” he said. On the international front\, the elections have helped in the slow recovery of trust and opening up dialogue between Iran and the rest of the world. \n \n \nLuciano Zaccara is the director of the OPEMAM-Observatory on Politics and Elections in the Muslim and Arab World\, and an Honorary Research Fellow at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies\, University of Exeter. His previous positions include a postdoctoral fellowship at Institute of International Studies\, Autónoma University of Barcelona\, and several research fellowships at the Department of Arab and Islamic Studies\, Autónoma University of Madrid. He holds a Ph.D. in Arab and Islamic Studies from Autónoma University of Madrid and a BA in Political Science from the National University of Rosario in Argentina. His publications include the monograph El Enigma de Irán (2006)\, and the co-edited book Elecciones sin Elección. Procesos Electorales en Medio Oriente y Magreb (2009)\, as well as many articles on Middle East domestic and international politics\, and mainly on Iranian politics and elections.  \n \n \nArticle by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications. 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/luciano-zaccara-on-the-iranian-elections/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Distingushed Lectures,Regional Studies
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