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DTSTART:20110326T230000
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20121203T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20121203T180000
DTSTAMP:20260411T205800
CREATED:20141026T143934Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T104648Z
UID:10001018-1354521600-1354557600@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:CIRS and the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs Discuss Climate Change in the Arab World
DESCRIPTION:The Center for International and Regional Studies and the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy ‎and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut\, held a Panel discussion on “Who or What ‎Drives Climate Change Policy in the Arab World?” on December 3\, 2012. The panel featured ‎Karim Makdisi from the American University of Beirut; Roula Majdalani from the United ‎Nations’ Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia; Lama El Hatow from IndyACT-‎The League of Independent Activists; and Rabi Mohtar from the Qatar Energy and Environment ‎Research Institute (QEERI).‎ \n \n \nThe panel moderator\, Karim Makdisi\, posed the question “who or what drives climate change ‎policy in the Arab World?” to the speakers and the audience. He argued that there needs to be an ‎examination of the drivers behind a reinvigorated interest in climate change among Arab ‎governments. In answer to this question\, the first speaker\, Roula Majdalani\, advocated for the ‎state as the most important player in any climate change related issue. However\, Majdalani said ‎that it was necessary to unpack the idea of the state and question who or what it represents. This\, ‎she said\, is especially relevant in the context of the Arab uprisings and “the dismantling of the ‎security apparatus.” The dissolution of various regional regimes does not necessarily mean that ‎the state per se has disappeared\, but that there are new dynamics taking shape at the level of ‎governance\, and this reformation is something that is new to many Arab countries.‎ \n \n \nThe state\, Majdalani said\, plays a strategic role in climate change issues in its “ability for working ‎through complex governance structures\, working at an inter-ministerial level\, working with a long ‎range perspective\, and working on issues that are transboundary\, and in that sense the state really ‎is a key interlocutor in this process of negotiation.” It is also the main player in mobilizing ‎financing and ensuring the transfer of technology at the domestic and international levels.‎ \n \n \nThe state has the main responsibility of addressing issues related to extreme climactic conditions ‎such as droughts and floods. It is\, therefore\, in the state’s interest to take a leading role in driving ‎climate change policy\, especially in the countries of the Arab World where issues of water and ‎energy are paramount. The state is also responsible for safeguarding\, preserving\, and exploiting ‎natural resources without adversely affecting neighboring countries. Carbon emissions are ‎necessarily transboundary\, and so the state must negotiate with its neighbors and\, indeed\, with ‎the international community for international climate related agreements.‎ \n \n \nIn conclusion\, Majdalani argued that the increasing interest in issues of climate change among ‎Arab nations provides a unique opportunity to reinvent the idea of the state as an entity that is ‎accountable\, transparent\, and responsible. ‎Traditionally\, some Arab states have been strong in terms of forcefulness and authoritarianism\, ‎but are weak when it comes to the will and capacity to tackle such irreversible environmental issues. ‎ \n \n \nRabi Mohtar was the second speaker on the panel and he highlighted the crucial role of science\, ‎research\, and development in addressing climate change concerns. He argued that climate change ‎discourse is dominated by the key words of “adaptation” and “mitigation\,” but that there needs ‎to be more critical investigation into exactly what it is that should be adapted or mitigated. ‎Current climate change data states that\, on a global level\, “the extremes in terms of climate are ‎getting hotter\, but that doesn’t tell us where and how.” Further complicating the discourse\, the ‎scientific knowledge on climate change is still in a nascent phase and much of the data is ‎contradictory and inaccurate. Mohtar argued that there is urgent need to invest in research and ‎development. QEERI\, he said\, is taking the lead on many such research initiatives in the region ‎and “embarking on an initial study that looks into the effects of climate change on dust and dust ‎storms.”‎ \n \n \nIt is befitting that Qatar hosted the COP 18 conference\, Mohtar said\, since it is the Middle East ‎and the Arab World that are most affected by issues of increased population growth and the ‎concomitant stresses on food\, water\, and energy. The Middle East “is where the highest per ‎capita consumption of water and energy are taking place” and where food security is becoming ‎an increasing concern. “There is no single country in the whole region that is self-sufficient\,” in ‎terms of food\, and so “the food-water nexus is an extreme driver for climate change research that ‎we should be focusing on.” This includes investigating efforts to reintroduce dry land agriculture ‎that had been traditionally used in the countries of the Middle East since ancient times. Mohtar ‎conclude by saying that there is a significant need for a climate change model that is locally ‎developed for the region – one that is specifically designed for arid and semi-arid regions. ‎ \n \n \nThe final speaker on the panel was Lama El Hatow who rallied for the importance of civil society ‎in climate change issues. She argued for “the role that civil society can also play by affecting and ‎influencing climate change policy in this part of the world.” El Hatow explained that civil society ‎in many countries of Arab World has been either dormant or non-existent. This was largely due ‎to “the oppressive nature of many Arab governments and the way that many social structures ‎function” in some Arab states. Since the regional uprisings\, however\, this scene has changed ‎dramatically and a space has been opened for civil society organizations to operate openly and ‎effectively. These new formations are increasingly made up of youth groups who are advocating ‎for a variety of issues and\, more importantly\, people are speaking out on all issues related to ‎human rights.‎ \n \n \nSince climate change issues are transboundary and of global concern\, Arab civil society ‎organizations are teaming up with their international counterparts and pressing their governments ‎on unified issues. Although many of these groups have limited capacity\, their passion for the ‎issues has made a significant difference. As a final thought\, El Hatow said that although many ‎regional and international governments have made great strides in addressing issues of climate ‎change\, civil society organizations are still needed as they act as a monitoring force and a constant ‎voice that prompts governments into further action. ‎   \n \n \nArticle by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications \n \n \nSpeaker Biographies:‎ \n \n \nKarim Makdisi is an Associate Professor of International Politics and International ‎Environmental Policy in the Department of Political Studies and Public Administration at the ‎American University of Beirut (AUB). He is also the Associate Director of AUB’s Issam Fares ‎Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs\, and coordinates the Environmental Policy ‎component of AUB’s Interfaculty Graduate Environmental Science Program.‎ \n \n \nRoula Majdalani holds a master’s degree in Urban and Regional Planning from Syracuse ‎University. She worked with Dar Al-Handasah Consultants (London)\, from 1985 to 1988 as an ‎Urban Planner preparing surveys\, sectoral studies and research activities for urban development ‎projects in Saudi Arabia\, Kuwait\, Bahrain\, Jordan and Morocco.‎ \n \n \nRabi Mohtar founded the Global Engineering Program at Purdue University where he was a ‎Professor of Environmental and Natural Resources Engineering since 1996. His professional ‎activities addressed the important issues of Water – Energy Food nexus and its inter-linkages; ‎more specifically in developing and maintaining the environmental aspects of sustainable ‎development.‎
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/cirs-and-issam-fares-institute-public-policy-and-international-affairs-discuss/
CATEGORIES:American Studies,Panels,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20121204T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20121204T180000
DTSTAMP:20260411T205800
CREATED:20141023T091908Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T104609Z
UID:10000819-1354608000-1354644000@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Sheikha Aisha bint Faleh Al Thani on Qatarization and Gender Quotas
DESCRIPTION:Sheikha Aisha bint Faleh Al-Thani delivered a Monthly Dialogue lecture on the subject of ‎‎“Women in Qatar: Quotas\, Qualifications\, and Qatarization” on December 4\, 2012. Sheikha Al ‎Thani is the chairperson and founder of Al Faleh Group\, an organization that provides ‎educational products and services\, and she also serves on the Board of Directors for the Supreme ‎Education Council\, Reach Out to Asia\, and Zaytuna Institute and College. ‎ \n \n \nSheikha Al Thani began the lecture by noting that “despite great strides in education and ‎employment\, a large gender gap remains in position of status in Qatar for women.” There is still ‎much work that needs to be done to close the gender gap in the labor market\, especially in ‎relation to the integration of Qatari women on a level playing field in the workforce in Qatar\, the ‎Sheikha argued.‎ \n \n \nEducation is one of the key pillars of His Highness Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani’sVision ‎‎2030 for Qatar\, and one of the greatest agents of change for the role of women. “Qatar has ‎become a regional leader in education\,” and has invested heavily in reforming the K-12 ‎educational system led by the Supreme Education Council. In addition\, some of the world’s ‎leading universities and educational institutions have been invited to impart quality education ‎and transfer knowledge and skills. Through these institutions and through the emphasis on ‎reforming educational policies\, Qatari women are emerging as professionals who contribute ‎equally to the country’s sustainable growth in a knowledge-based economy. “There is a strong ‎positive correlation between employability and the quality of education a woman receives\,” and ‎so women in Qatar have been increasingly and actively participating in the economy\, the labor ‎market\, and society. Thus\, Qatari women are shattering old paradigms\, the Sheikha said. ‎ \n \n \nIn comparison to the neighboring Gulf Cooperation Coucil (GCC) states\, Qatar has the highest ‎percentage of local women employed in the national labor market. Despite this positive statistic\, ‎Qatar has the region’s lowest percentage of women in senior leadership roles\, and trails far ‎behind the European average. “United Nations data showed that only 7% of people in senior and ‎managerial positions were women\, which was the lowest in the region.” This means that “women ‎are still underrepresented in decision-making positions in many fields\,” but\, Al Thani argued\, this ‎is gradually changing in Qatar as more educated women are continually changing the face of the ‎labor market.‎ \n \n \nAlthough education is one of the most powerful tools for the empowerment of women in society\, ‎it is only one area of social\, economic\, and political participation. Qatar has positively introduced ‎gender quotas in national employment\, but\, the Sheikha argued\, there is a risk that these are not ‎properly introduced. There still needs to be more done to tackle the careful implementation of ‎‎“Qatarization” and gender quota policies for the inclusion of women in the labor market. ‎‎“Because this lack of participation is holding the region back from further economic growth\, ‎some governments have stiffened their resolve to ensure that unrealistic quotas are met\,” she ‎argued. “Not surprisingly\, many public and private sector managers are reluctant to hire and ‎retain nationals\, especially women\, whom they feel lack the skills needed for the job.” ‎ \n \n \nThus\, Qatarization and gender quota policies must be introduced in a careful and constructive ‎manner so that all stakeholders gain from women’s participation in the labor market. The Sheikha ‎gave the example of Qatar Petroleum (QP) as a company that has addressed Qatarization in a ‎strategic and systematic manner. “It has adopted a process for attracting qualified talent from all ‎available sources. This includes hiring entry level candidates directly from the ranks of recent ‎graduates from women’s colleges and vocational institutes\,” she said. ‎ \n \n \nSuch job placement programs and public-private partnerships providing a direct link between ‎educational institutions and the labor market is a must for future of Qatar. The connection ‎between education and the labor market cannot be stressed enough\, the Sheikha said\, as one ‎necessarily eases the burden on the other. Highly educated graduates will need less training from ‎their employers and this will lead to a smooth and symbiotic relationship between the two ‎spheres. ‎ \n \n \nIn conclusion\, the Sheikha offered some recommendations for the effective application of ‎Qatarization policies to address the gender imbalance in the Qatari labor market. “Introducing a ‎quota system for women will not be easy\, and there is a risk of moving too fast\, even for those ‎companies that are most aggressively tackling Qatarization.” Further\, Qatar should implement an ‎education policy that takes into account practical skills such as professional development ‎programs and entrepreneurship programs to help women become innovators and entrepreneurs. ‎The transfer of knowledge and acquiring job skills are long and arduous processes that need time ‎to take shape. Educational reform has occurred relatively recently and so not enough time has ‎passed to be able to assess the success of these campaigns. “For reforms to be effective\, ‎evaluation of policies must become an essential component of the process of monitoring so that ‎initiates can be revised and improved based on measured outcomes\,” she explained. ‎ \n \n \nAlthough women in Qatar play a huge role in community and social development\, raising ‎awareness about the possibilities of contributing to the country’s economy is important. Sheikha ‎Moza bin Nasser and her daughter Sheikha Al Mayassa are great role models for Qatar\, the ‎region\, and the world. ‎ \n \n \nSheikha Aisha bint Faleh Al-Thani is the chairperson and founder of Al Faleh Group\, a land mark ‎in Qatar providing educational products and services of the highest quality. Three schools\, ‎including Doha Academy\, fall under the group’s umbrella. After graduating from Qatar ‎University with a Bachelor’s in Education and a Bachelor’s in English Literature\, Sheikha Aisha ‎went on to get a Master’s in Business Administration from the University of Hull in the United ‎Kingdom\, followed by a Ph.D. in corporate governance from Cass Business School\, at City ‎University\, London. ‎  \n \n \nArticle by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/sheikha-aisha-bint-faleh-al-thani-qatarization-and-gender-quotas/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Distingushed Lectures,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20121208T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20121209T210000
DTSTAMP:20260411T205800
CREATED:20140924T152141Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T104553Z
UID:10000797-1354964400-1355086800@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Weak States in the Greater Middle East Working Group I
DESCRIPTION:On December 8–9\, 2012\, CIRS convened its first Working Group meeting under the research initiative “Weak States in the Greater Middle East.” Participants employed a multi-disciplinary approach to critically analyze the terminology of weak and failing states\, and the political implications associated with states being characterized as such. In addition to exploring cross-cutting themes on the global weak states discourse\, individual case studies of Middle Eastern countries were discussed to highlight the range of domestic\, regional\, and global causes and consequences of state fragility. \n \n \nThe Working Group began with a discussion on the notions and terminology of state failure and weakness. Through the lens of standardized classifications of states and their capacity\, weak states are defined as those that are considered to lack certain distinct qualities and the ability to provide adequate social\, economic\, and political goods to their citizenry. Indexes crafted by different organizations label strong\, weak\, and failed states based on indicators that measure state institutional capacity\, political goods provided by the state\, and security and stability within the state. These rankings are utilized by policy makers to assess the status of a state and to accordingly develop policies that promote economic development\, provide humanitarian assistance\, and support political stability. During the working group\, the various methodologies used to construct indexes\, and the ability to meaningfully interpret the rankings were questioned. The aggregation of a diverse set of states\, based on indicators that highlight certain symptoms without taking into account the causes and dynamisms of certain conditions on the ground\, offers a monolithic conception of states’ success and failure. \n \n \nThis classification of states has directed the focus of donor countries and multilateral organizations to those states that are ranked at the bottom end of the state strength continuum. When assessing the effectiveness of aid allocation in weak states\, the participants debated the various routes of aid delivery\, the strategic interests of donor states\, and the different types of aid provided. In some cases aid allocation fulfills the mere purpose of paying off elites for the strategic interest of the donor countries\, while in other cases development institutions are created outside of the recipient state in order to achieve short term results\, consequently undermining the state and exacerbating the original problem of capacity weakness. \n \n \nThe politicization of aid converges with the securitization of the weak state discourse. It is assumed that state weakness creates a permissive environment for non-state actors to thrive\, thereby posing a non-traditional threat to global security. Policymakers believe that there is a positive quadratic relationship between non-traditional threat production and state failure or collapse. However\, more recent scholarly work suggests that a collapsed state does not have adequate financial and logistical resources that criminal or terrorist networks need to function\, while weak states do. It was suggested by some Working Group participants that the monolithic designation of weak states does not enable policy makers to understand the particular threat posed or to tailor an effective solution. \n \n \nThe Arab Spring has unmasked the fragility of states ruled by strongmen. The Working Group provided illumination on several states in the Middle East post Arab Spring\, both in terms of their domestic functioning and their regional interaction. Libya’s Qaddafi was characterized by his personalistic and idiosyncratic rule of a state that lacked institutions. In the aftermath of Qaddafi’s fall\, some have argued that this lack of institutions is a blessing in disguise\, since the Libyan state is not weighed down by the previous regime’s judiciary and military-industry complex. Participants also discussed the security status of the post-revolutionary Libyan state with regards to militias\, and the consequent spillover effect of arms going into neighboring countries. In the context of external intervention and its impact on state weakness\, the case of Iraq was examined. Urban politics and post-war reconstruction in Iraq demonstrated that cities function as both the main loci of armed conflict and the main sites of state-building. \n \n \nIndexes that quantify the state’s policies and institutional performance and grade them against weakness and strength\, do not offer us a tool to understand the nuances of regime adaptability in the state. A monolithic conception of states\, fails to understand countries such as Sudan where there are dynamic actors who bargain in a political marketplace. Over the last decade Sudanese political life has degenerated from one with an institutionalized core\, to a regionalized political market place driven by an auction of allegiance. Characterized as an oligarchy\, the ruling elite have been able to contend with competing local and regional centers of patronage in order to maintain central power and keep the periphery of the state from seriously threatening the regime. An increased focus on specific relationships\, namely the disconnect between state and society is necessary in examining the question of center and margin in weak states. \n \n \nWorking Group participants debated whether states that are in the process of formation rather than political consolidation should be considered weak states. The Yemeni state\, which is consistently labeled as weak or collapsing\, is still in a state-building process where political negotiation continues to unfold. Characterized as a state with diffuse systems of localized authority\, legal pluralism\, and rife with weaponry\, the Yemeni state falls short of the Weberian ideal of statehood. On the issue of weaponry\, it was discussed that in Yemen\, violence is a symbolic resource and not one that is utilized in ruthless fashion. Moreover\, some argue that it is an innate cultural preference of Yemenis to refuse central authority\, thereby negotiating a different model of statehood that does not necessarily converge with the Western model. Yemen’s constant state of semi-instability was attributed to the significant role of external actors. The neighboring Saudi Arabia for instance\, is keen on preventing Yemen from having a strong centralized stable state. In order to prevent the state from imploding and for the sake of regional stability however\, it is also keen on having the Yemeni state maintain certain institutional functions. By funding both the state and actors that challenge the central state\, Saudi Arabia is able to maintain the constant semi-stability of its neighbor. \n \n \nThe participants also discussed the particular dynamics that shape institution building in Palestine. Palestine as a rentier and extractive state has built its institutions in the context of colonial domination where major institutions are developed to serve both the interests of the Palestinian state and the Israeli state. Moreover\, Palestine is dictated by the “politics of antithesis” where outside leadership focuses on consolidating its own power by opposing the politics of the intifada elite at the expense of institution building. \n \n \nThroughout the discussion on the weak states in the greater Middle East\, the participants probed into the political economy that underlies the state classification system. More recently there have been country-led initiatives that monitor and report on issues facing troubled states\, as seen by the G7+ initiative which creates a paradigm for countries to do their own fragility assessment. As new conceptions of statehood arise\, the articulation of the development and security interests of global hierarchies of power may alter. \n \n \n  \n \n \n\nClick here for the working group’s agenda\nClick here for the participants’ biographies\nRead more about this research initiative \n\n \n  \n \n \nParticipants and Discussants:\n \nRogaia M. Abusharaf\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarBridget L. Coggins\, Dartmouth CollegeJohn T. Crist\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarAlex de Waal\, Tufts UniversityDaniel Esser\, American UniversityManata Hashemi\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarMark McGillivray\, Deakin UniversitySuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarDwaa Osman\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarSarah Phillips\, University of SydneyGlenn E. Robinson\, Naval Postgraduate SchoolRobert I. Rotberg\, Carleton UniversityCharles Schmitz\, Towson UniversityNadia Talpur\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarFrederic Wehrey\, Carnegie Endowment for International PeaceMahjoob Zweiri\, Qatar University  \n \n \nArticle by Dwaa Osman\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/weak-states-greater-middle-east-working-group-i/
CATEGORIES:American Studies,Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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