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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20120515T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20120516T180000
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SUMMARY:Sectarian Politics in the Gulf - Working Group II
DESCRIPTION:On May 15–16\, 2012\, CIRS held a second working group meeting to conclude its research initiative on “Sectarian Politics in the Gulf.” Scholars and experts on the topic were invited to return to Doha for a second time to share their chapter submissions and to solicit feedback from members of the working group. CIRS will gather the complete chapters into a monograph under the title\, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf. The first working group meeting took place on October 9–10\, 2011. \n \n \nThe working group members began the meeting by discussing their different disciplinary definitions of what the terms “sectarian” and “sectarianism” might mean. In the literature on the topic\, it has been notoriously difficult to come to agreement on a single workable definition of the terms involved. The CIRS project does not aim to reduce the term “sectarian” to a single definition\, but to reveal the diversity at the heart of the subject and to open the debate up to its complexities. Although the term “sectarian” has strong—often negative—religious connotations\, it is not based simply on religious difference\, but implies a multifaceted mix of communal identifiers ranging from ethnic and tribal distinctions to political and philosophical beliefs and orientations. Regardless of the many theoretical and epistemological assumptions making up the discourse\, the participants agreed that the heterogeneity of the subject was one that merited further nuanced study\, especially in the context of the Arab uprisings. The participants emphasized the conditional nature of sectarian issues and examined why ethnic and religious differences come to the fore in some Gulf societies and not in others. \n \n \nTopics discussed during the meeting include explorations of Baluch communities in the various Gulf states; Sunni-Shi’a communities in Iraq\, Bahrain\, Saudi Arabia\, and Iran; identity and politics as they relate to language\, religion\, ethnicity\, national-minority status\, and tribal affiliation; the historically cosmopolitan mix of ethnicities in Oman; among other studies into the history of sectarian communities in the Gulf states. \n \n \nMost countries in the Middle East are heterogeneous societies that were created as a result of the design of colonial empires and their subsequent dissolution. Littoral settlements on the Gulf were born of maritime cultures based on pearling\, fishing\, and trade\, allowing tribes to travel freely across waterways\, intermingle with other cultures\, and defy the limited and arbitrary borders of modern nation-states. As a result of independence\, newly formed Gulf nations had to contend with the breakdown of the political order of the past\, and many different ethnic\, tribal\, and religious groups clamored for political control\, thereby unleashing sectarian struggles that may have been dormant\, suppressed\, or non-existent in the past. The dominant group that rose to power had to engage in the formation of a new identity for the nation—often one that was based on glorifying the regime’s own particular sectarian or tribal history at the expense of others. These new articulations of a largely unrecorded past had to be cultivated in these new Middle Eastern states in order to create a new sense of nationalism as well as to bolster political legitimacy for the ruling elite. Ruling groups created an official narrative of the state’s formation\, which did not always reflect the reality of diversity and heterogeneity on the ground. \n \n \nThe participants agreed that the historical reference to cultural and tribal purity is a symptom of modernity\, as nations attempt to rebuild cultural identities after years of colonial struggle. In these states\, newly formed citizens were the first generation to grow up with a national\, rather than a regional identity—a process that was not without friction to notions of identity. In this sense\, many national heritage and renovation projects are state-sponsored and are in service to the idea of the patriotic\, rather than loyalty to a certain communal sect. Today\, the media plays simultaneous key roles in both upholding national unity and enhancing sectarian divisions. The Al Jazeera network in particular has given voice to the fragmented regional discourse with many taboo topics on sectarian issues being openly discussed. \n \n \nThe more contentious issues surrounding sectarian politics in the Gulf states\, the participants agreed\, are primarily shaped by shares in the rentier economy and the resulting political status of privileged groups over others. Mass protests in Bahrain\, for example\, were largely a product of socio-economic frustrations that ran along sectarian lines. The participants argued that it was important to examine how ruling regimes choose to either engage these sectarian elements or subdue them depending on how much extra wealth and benefits that the state is willing to share. \n \n \nIn the new political order of Iraq\, the ascendance of Iraq’s Shi‘i has worried many Sunni governments who question the loyalty of the Shi’a communities in their states. This has been especially prominent in Bahrain\, with Saudi Arabia having to intervene in order to militarily control the uprisings. The participants argued that these recent events have shown how sectarian struggles in one Gulf state has direct implications in another. A sectarian issue\, therefore\, cannot be thought of as indigenous to any one Gulf state\, but as something that affects all of these countries and their identity formations. \n \n \nIn the wake of the Arab Spring\, analyzing the varied sectarian communities in the Gulf is especially relevant to understand long silent and marginalized groups who have found a space to voice their discontents as a result of successful public uprisings elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa. The CIRS initiative is designed to not only study the different social groups who feel marginalized\, but to also highlight those that have existed peacefully and who perceive themselves to be an inherent part of the social fabric of Gulf states. \n \n \n  \n \n \n\nClick here for the working group’s agenda\nRead more about this research initiative \n\n \nParticipants and Discussants:\n \nZahra Babar\, CIRS\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarLois Beck\, Washington University in St. LouisKristin Smith Diwan\, American UniversityMichael Driessen\, CIRS\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarRenaud Fabbri\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarMark Farha\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarJustin Gengler\, Qatar UniversityFanar Haddad\, University of LondonMehran Kamrava\, CIRS\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarJackie Kerr\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarMari Luomi\, CIRS\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarJohn Peterson\, University of ArizonaLawrence Potter\, Columbia UniversityNadia Talpur\, CIRS\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarMarc Valeri\, University of Exeter \n \n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/sectarian-politics-gulf-working-group-ii/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20120516T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20120516T180000
DTSTAMP:20260523T112005
CREATED:20141023T093227Z
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SUMMARY:Lawrence Potter on the Rise and Fall of Port Cities in the Gulf
DESCRIPTION:Lawrence G. Potter\, a 2011-2012 CIRS Visiting Scholar and Adjunct Associate Professor of International Affairs at Columbia University\, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue lecture on “The Rise and Fall of Port Cities in the Gulf” on May 16\, 2012. Potter’s lecture was designed to explain the economic\, political\, and ecological reasons why port cities in the Gulf came to prominence or declined over the centuries. As a conceptual introduction to the lecture\, he argued that a distinction should be made between a port and a harbor. “A harbor\,” Potter said\, “is a physical concept\, a shelter for ships;” whereas “a port is an economic concept\, a center of exchange.” \n \n \nLittoral settlements on the Gulf were born of maritime cultures based on pearling\, fishing\, and trade\, allowing tribes to travel freely across waterways in search of ideal locations to pursue their livelihoods. The strength of these commercial and familial connections along the coast meant that “some tribes had settlements on both sides of the Gulf\, most famously the Qawasim based in Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah who temporarily governed Bandar Langeh\,” Potter said. \n \n \nThe migratory and transitory nature of sea-faring cultures meant that “the Gulf was oriented outward\, toward the Indian Ocean\, rather than inward toward the Middle East\, and was part of a cosmopolitan world of mixed race\, religion\, and ethnicity\,” as well as language\, Potter said. Because of these maritime ties\, port cities have always maintained a degree of economic and cultural independence from their inland counterparts. Importantly\, these cultures defied the limited borders of nation-states where “settlements along the Persian coast often had closer relations with those on the Arab side than those in the interior\, due to ease of communication\,” he explained. Multicultural connections\, whether based on family ties or trading relationships\, often shielded port communities from the sectarian strife that afflicted many other parts of the Middle East. This cosmopolitan history of Gulf ports is starkly different from that of the more settled inland cities of Isfahan\, Shiraz\, Tabriz\, and Herat on the Iranian plateau. Historically\, these were populated urban areas that had an established culture and that cultivated centuries of art and literature particular to a single geographical area. \n \n \n“One striking fact about port cities in the Gulf is that many have had only a temporary period of fluorescence\,” Potter said. In medieval times\, the most important ports were to be found on the northern Persian shore of the Gulf\, but in the 19th and 20th centuries\, the ports on the southern Arab shore rose to prominence. Since ports are principally economic areas\, their primary purpose is to facilitate regional and economic trade. If an environmental or political factor was to obstruct these trade routes in any way\, “theKhalijis could easily move if dissatisfied. In a region where boats and not land constituted capital\, it was easy to sail away and reestablish themselves elsewhere\,” he argued. \n \n \nThe often harsh environment in the Gulf and lack of water and wood played key roles in the migration of populations from one port to establish another. Other reasons for abandoning a port include its physical destruction due to the harbor silting up. “In medieval times this happened to old Hormuz. In the 20th century\, this happened to Sharjah\, severely damaging its trade and giving the advantage to Dubai.” In order to overcome these environmental challenges and the lack of water and wood\, some settlements imported fresh water and wood from nearby areas. Even though littoral settlements were maritime societies\, the wood to build ships and dhows had to be imported from India and East Africa. Potter explained how such ecological challenges can have profound effects on the forming of a nation’s security apparatus by arguing that “the lack of wood was undoubtedly one reason why Iran did not have a navy until the twentieth century.” \n \n \nIn conclusion\, Potter highlighted the continued trajectory regarding the importance of port cities in the Gulf. “Today\, the Khalijis have overcome the challenges of climate and lack of water\, and continue to excel as the businessmen that they always were. The port cities are multinational\, as they always were. The modern shopping malls of Doha and Dubai are just a modern version of what the great emporiums of Hormuz and Muscat must have looked like\,” he said. \n \n \nLawrence G. Potter has taught at Columbia University since 1996. A graduate of Tufts College\, he received an M.A. in Middle Eastern Studies from the School of Oriental and African Studies\, University of London\, and a Ph.D. in History from Columbia. He taught in Iran for four years before the revolution. From 1984 to 1992 he was Senior Editor at the Foreign Policy Association. He specializes in the history of Iran and the Gulf and U.S. policy toward the Middle East.  \n \n \nArticle by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/lawrence-potter-rise-and-fall-port-cities-gulf/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Regional Studies
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