Center for International and Regional Studies

The Gulf Family Working Group Meeting II
2015-11-15 09:00 - 2015-11-16 17:00 (Europe/Moscow)
On November 15-16, 2015, the Center of International and Regional Studies (CIRS) hosted the second working group meeting under its research initiative on “the Gulf Family” at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar. Over the course of two days, ten experts—five of whom are CIRS grant-awardees who have carried out fieldwork—presented papers that covered a wide range of issues related to the family in the Arab states of the Gulf. Papers presented and discussed at the meeting touched on a variety of topics, including tribalism and the family; the marriage institution; cross-national or “mixed” marriages; social stratification and the family; Family Law and the rights of the child; sexuality and the family; the impact of war on Iraqi families; gender relations; power and politics; and bilingualism.

The family has historically been an integral unit of society, and its structure and formation are continuously adapting to evolving social, economic, and political developments. The states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have witnessed massive transformation since the discovery of oil, having emerged over the past few decades as strategically important and ostensibly modern states. This transformation across the region brought with it changes to the nature and functions of the state that were paralleled with equally rapid changes in society, culture, and economy. The Gulf family has of course been influenced by these broader social dynamics, but academic scholarship on the topic remains limited and the family in the Arabian Peninsula is still quite understudied.

CIRS’s research initiative has supported original research that explore questions related to the family institution in the Gulf, including those that focus on family structure, demographic dynamics, the role and impact of policies, tribes, kinship ties, customs, and values. CIRS awarded five competitive grants to scholars proposing original fieldwork on the topic. Building up on the first working group meeting, at the November meeting scholars presented papers and core research findings. During the meeting, participants engaged in critical discussions of each paper, providing comments and feedback on the various contributions.

The working group kicked off with Sebastian Maisel’s examination of “Tribalism and Family Affairs.” Maisel’s paper examines the tribal character of Gulf families, focusing on the influence of tribalism in the conduct of family affairs. The paper investigates whether or not current social and cultural practices of families from the region can be classified as “tribal”. Since there is debate over the notion and meaning of “tribalism” in existing literature, this study begins by introducing a framework and definition of what tribal values actually are, and how these have impacted the pre-oil and post-oil dynamics of the Gulf family. Maisel’s research effort provides a historical lens of analysis, and is based on a series of structured interviews that have been conducted in three Gulf States.

Jihan Safar, another CIRS grant recipient, has carried out research on “the Soaring Bride-Price (mahr) in a Context of Modernization: A Complex Variable that is Affecting the Formation of the Gulf Family: The Case of Oman.” Safar’s research answers some fundamental questions on how the mahr amount is determined and negotiated in Oman, and how this is impacting trends in marriages in the Sultanate. Her research unravels some of the main reasons as to why the costs of mahr in Oman continue to escalate despite trends of modernization, the education and employment of women, urbanization, and new individual aspirations. Safar identifies variables that determine the mahr amount, including geographic location, arranged and non-arranged marriages, religious affiliation, and ethnic identity. This study provides us with a more nuanced understanding of patriarchal family structures, state regulations, notions of masculinity and femininity, and how the family, as a unit, continues to influence the marriage institution in Oman.

Mohammed Mohieddin, Sanaa Alharahsheh, and Feras Al Meer of the Doha International Family Institute presented their research that focuses on “Mixed Marriages among Qataris.” The study provides an in-depth analysis of the phenomena of Qataris marrying non-Qataris, which, they argue, has been a growing and visible trend over the past few years. This research project, based on existing data sets on marriage in Qatar, explores a relatively understudied subject. Amongst other things, this research demonstrates that there is a high number of Qatari women marrying foreigners, and the authors highlight the constraints for the children of Qatari women who are denied citizenship rights if their father is not Qatari. The paper suggests that changing demographic and economic conditions have had a direct impact on marriage trends in Qatar.

Another contributor, CIRS Research Analyst Islam Hassan, has studied “Family, Marriage, and Social Stratification in the Qatari Society.” Hassan’s paper fills-in a gap in literature by examining the role of social dynamics, specifically the family and marriage institutions, in the sustenance and reproduction of the social order and stratification scheme in the Qatari society. The study tests available literature against datasets that have not yet been systematically analyzed. Hassan’s analysis shows how the family institution—through influencing marriage choices—preserves and reproduces the culture; traditions; values; customs; and social hierarchy in the Qatari society.

Lena-Maria Möller has carried our research on the subject of “Gulf Family Law and the Best Interests of the Children: The Multiple Meanings of a Vague Legal Concept.” Mölller’s paper highlights the international framework in which the recent reforms of child law in the Gulf have been situated. She also considers the influence of the introduction of the “best interests of the child standards” on the codification of family law in Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE. Finally, Möller explores the relationship between the interpretation of the concept of “best interests of the child” and the changing societal values, family structures, and present-day attitudes towards motherhood and fatherhood in the Arab states of the Gulf.

Haya Al-Noaimi, formerly with CIRS and currently a doctoral candidate at SOAS, presented a paper entitled “Hiding and Masking Your Sins: The State of Sexuality in the Gulf Family.” Al-Noaimi’s paper has three main foci. First, it highlights how the Gulf nuclear family and the larger society define sexual norms and scripts. Second, it examines the role of the state in policing sexuality through a brief analysis of sexual morality laws, and highlighting the strengths and weaknesses such legislation posits. Finally, it concludes with some of the ways in which Gulf families, in collaboration with the state, can attempt to implement realistic policies that protect youth and sexual minorities through discussion, education, and legislation.

Laura Sjoberg’s contribution centered on “War Families and the Iraq Wars.” This paper looks at Iraqi war families, families constituted by and constitutive of the Iraq wars. She reviews stories of the complexity of families living the wars, and explores changing demographic, nutritional, and health dynamics of Iraqi families over the progressive years of war and conflict in Iraq. Sjoberg concludes with a contextualization of war families, and a look forward for families in Iraq’s near future.

Sophia Pandya presented a paper entitled “The War Took Us Backwards: Yemeni Women Activists, Revolution and War.” This study analyzes gendered dimensions of the “Yemen Spring” and the subsequent 2015 war, with a focus on the role of religious groups. It examines the reasons behind the failure of Yemeni women’s extraordinary activism to produce significant change in their gendered statuses. The study also highlights the conditions in which political activities offer potential for change, in this case offering women greater lasting access to formal political power instead of “reintegration” into the way things were before the “Yemen Spring.”

Dionysis Markakis, formerly with CIRS, contributed with a paper entitled: “A Family Affair: Power in the Persian Gulf.” This paper explores the role of family in relation to the exercise of power in the Gulf states, and argues that the variable of familial kinship is crucial to understanding the exercise of power and the continuity of the Gulf ruling families. It also explores the main characteristics, features, and trends present in familial governance in the Gulf, examines the processes of succession in the Gulf, and considers the main threats to the continuity of the phenomenon of “ruling families” in the Arab states of the Gulf.

The final paper, presented by Ali Kemal Tekin, focuses on “Bilingual Children of the Gulf: The Case of Oman.” Tekin’s fieldwork explores why and how Omani parents promote bilingualism, to what extent bilingualism impact the inter-generational relations, and the effects of bilingualism on children’s everyday lives. The study concludes with offering implications and areas for further research, and recommendations for policy makers.

Zahra Babar, Associate Director for Research at the Center for International and Regional Studies, concluded the working group meeting by highlighting the participants’ contributions to scholarship through their papers, which will be published in an edited volume by CIRS in the near future.

It is worth mentioning that this working group is part of the Center of International and Regional Studies Research and Scholarship’s initiatives that aim to fill in existing research gaps, and contribute towards furthering knowledge. Each of these initiatives involves some of the most prominent scholars of the Middle East, North Africa, and the Gulf region who address prevailing issues related to the security, economic stability, and political realm of the region.

See the Meeting Agenda
Read Participants’ Biographies
Read more about this Research Initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Rogaia Abusharaf, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Sanaa Al Harahsheh, Doha International Family Institute, Qatar
Feras Almeer, Doha International Family Institute, Qatar
Haya Al-Noaimi, School of Oriental and African Studies
Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Amira El-Zein, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Islam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Sebastian Maisel, Grand Valley State University
Thomas Michel, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Mohamed Mohieddin, Doha International Family Institute, Qatar
Lena-Maria Möller, Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law
Sophia Pandya, California State University at Long Beach
Jihan Safar, Sciences-Po, France
Ayman Shabana, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Laura Sjoberg, University of Florida
Ali Kemal Tekin, Sultan Qaboos University
Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

Robert Wirsing Focused Discussion and Farewell
2015-11-18 16:30 - 18:00 (Europe/Moscow)
CIRS hosted a Focused Discussion and farewell gathering for Robert Wirsing, Professor of Government at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar. Mehran Kamrava, Director of CIRS, addressed the audience made up of faculty, students, and staff, as he recollected Wirsing’s long and illustrious career spanning over four decades. Kamrava said that Wirsing’s scholarly pursuits were defined by a thorough internationalism in which he traveled the world, embracing a variety of global adventures and endeavors. Wirsing’s career has been one devoted to learning, appreciating, and understanding diverse cultures, and engaging with people of all backgrounds—characteristics that have been equally applied to Wirsing’s classrooms. Kamrava said that “Professor Wirsing is someone who meets people on their own turf, and on their own terms. He brought us civility, and reminded us what it means to be a gentleman and a scholar.”

Wirsing, in turn, thanked the audience, saying that Georgetown University in Qatar was a unique institution built on collegiality, congeniality, and the basic humanist tenets of international relations. He concluded by saying: “If you scratch the very thin veneer of cultural difference there is a tremendous amount of commonality. Human beings are very alike despite their different nationalities.”

CIRS Hosts "Iran-GCC Dialogue"
2016-01-13 09:00 - 17:00 (Europe/Moscow)
On January 13, 2016, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS), Georgetown University in Qatar’s flagship research institution, recently hosted a roundtable on Iran-GCC Dialogue.

The day-long meeting brought together distinguished scholars and academics from Iran and neighboring countries to explore historical, religious, cultural, social, and political ties between Iran and the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

The CIRS-led Iran-GCC dialogue included as many as twenty renowned scholars from Iran, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, and a number of other Arab countries, with proceedings conducted in both Arabic and English. Presentation titles included “Common Historical Roots of Iran and the GCC,” “Iranian and Arab Cultural Relations,” “Cultural Commonalities of Iranian and Arab Women and Families,” “The Role of Religion and Culture in the Development of Relations,” and “The Role of Common Art and Literature between Iran and the GCC.”

Speaking on the role of academics in better informing regional leaders, Director of CIRS, Dr. Mehran Kamrava, said that “at a time of increasing tensions in the region, exploring areas of mutual interest and commonality between Iran and the GCC is of fundamental importance. There are numerous areas of overlap and common bonds between Iran and the states of the GCC. It is our hope that scholarly analysis and dialogue will enable policymakers to make better and more informed decisions.”

Kamrava added that “The work of CIRS “involves conducting globally recognized research on a broad range of important topics in the areas of international relations, political economy, and domestic politics of the Gulf. We routinely take the lead on identifying emerging socio-economic issues, and so we are particularly well placed to initiate and bring together the leading scholars who participated in this roundtable. Not only do we seek to create mutually beneficial links between various educational institutions, we also focus on providing further insights into current events by adding to the general body of knowledge about the region.”

A follow-up to the recent CIRS Iran-GCC dialogue is likely to be held in Tehran in a few months involving a greater number of regional academics and scholars.

In addition to sponsoring events such as the recent Iran-GCC dialogue, CIRS engages in in-depth research throughout the academic year, publishing their results in Occasional Papers, Summary Reports, and numerous books. Through its various publications, CIRS provides in-depth examination of ideas and issues of contemporary academic and political significance.

See the meeting agenda
Read participant biographies
See Media Coverage of the event:

Gulf Times
Qatar Tribune
Qatar is booming
Doha News
AMEinfo

Participants and Discussants:

Salah Al Fadhli, Information Systems Specialist
Ali Al Hail, International Fulbright Visiting Scholar and consultant to Qatar Media Corporation
Nayef Nahar Al Shamari, Faculty of Islamic Studies and Qatar University
Fatima Alsmadi, Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abdullah Baabood, Gulf Studies Program – Qatar University
Sultan Barakat, Brooking Institution’s Doha Center
Mousa Bidaj, Shiraz magazine
Youssef Choueiri, Doha Institute for Graduate Studies
Salah Eddin Elzein, Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Masoud Fekri, Razi University
Ibrahim Fraihat, Brookings Institution’s Doha Center
Islam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Mohammad Masjed Jamei, Former Iranian Ambassador to the Kingdom of Morocco
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Batoul Meshkinfam, Alzahra University
Mohamad Ali Mohtadi, Journalist and Researcher of Middle East Affairs
Mahdi Khaleghi Rad, Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Qatar
Samer Shehata, Doha Institute for Graduate Studies and the University of Oklahoma
Luciano Zaccara, Gulf Studies Program – Qatar University
Mahjoob Zweiri, Qatar University

Inside the Arab State: Re-Envisioning the Arab State Working Group I
2016-01-17 09:00 - 2016-01-18 17:00 (Europe/Moscow)
On January 17–18, 2016, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) convened the first Working Group under its new research initiative, “The New Arab State: Actors, Institutions, and Processes.” The working group brought together scholars and experts representing a variety of disciplines including political geography, sociology, history, and political science. The purpose of the meeting was to identify central research questions on the evolving role of the Arab states in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings. Over the course of two days, participants discussed a variety of topics ranging from the definition, conception, and evolution of the Arab state, the state’s functions and institutions, as well as key topics such as state sovereignty, legitimacy, capacity, state-society relations, political engagement, and civil-military relations across the Arab world.

The Working Group began with a discussion of the conception and definition of the “Arab state.” The 2011 revolts as well as the subsequent disintegration of several Arab states have reinvigorated scholarly interest in the most fundamental questions around statehood in the Middle East. Since 2011, several states in the region have experienced social and political turmoil (Egypt and Lebanon) while others have rapidly disintegrated into “failed” or “failing” states (Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Libya). During the working group, participants debated the validity of the very classification of the “Arab state,” and highlighted the need for further exploring what constitutes a state as being Arab. There is a general assumption that an Arab state is where the majority of the population identifies as being Arab and speaking Arabic.

At the same time, there is something more nuanced when theorizing the validity of the Arab state as a distinct sub-category that needs to move beyond ethno-linguistic conceptions and boundaries. The participants also discussed the issue of legitimacy within the Arab state, and suggested that determining or measuring state legitimacy is also not always clearly defined by scholars of the Middle East. There was discussion over whether it is the state itself that provided legitimacy through its domestic arena, through its society and citizenry, or was it a result of the confirmation of legitimacy provided by the international community and the international order. Participants stressed the role of foreign powers when discussing the Arab state, given the pivotal role played by external actors during processes of state formation in the Middle East in the last century, and because so many outside powers still continue to exert their influence.

At the current juncture, with increasing conflict and war, the political map of the region may potentially be redrawn in ways yet unknown. Boundaries established by the colonial powers have remained remarkably durable since the evolution of the post-colonial arrangements in the Middle East. Notwithstanding this, enthusiastic cartographers and Middle East experts have often taken to producing imaginative re-drawings of the Middle East, seeking to illustrate how the region could look if “properly” demarcated based on history, ethnicity, and linguistic affiliation. Yet these highly creative versions of the territorial construction of the Middle East may not appear so far-fetched or fantastical in the current context. With the rise of ISIS and its incursion onto the territory of two fragile Arab states, understanding the durability of borders and territory, as well as their meaning to the citizens, has once again become important. Working Group participants considered the reconfiguration of borders within the Arab world and the politics around sovereignty and space.

Additionally, the post-2011 environment has exposed the fundamental weakness of institutions within the Arab. The failure of the states to deliver essential public services and good to their citizens has been compounded by limitations on political freedom expression, inadequate economic security, and corrupt and inept state institutions. As a consequence, extremist movements like ISIS have stepped into the picture with promises of providing order, stability, peace, and security to the people. Members of the Working Group noted that most Islamic oppositional forces arrayed against regimes do not want to abolish the state system; instead, they are seeking to either control the state or present an alternative, Islamic model of political rule.

Following the 2011 uprisings, the Arab world has been plagued by a widening gulf between state and society, and rapid state deformation in countries such as in Yemen, Libya, Iraq, and Syria. The 2011 protests differed from the earlier ones: whereas the earlier protests had been a demand for the repair of the regimes, the 2011 uprisings grew out of a conviction among the middle classes that the social contract had been broken by the state. Even the states which experienced very modest levels of protests, such as Qatar, felt threatened due to the fear of the contagion effect. The Working Group examined “Arab political thought” to the topic of the Arab Spring, examining whether Arab intellectuals were organically tied to the political action on the streets or were aloof in relation to what was happening. The 2011 protests represented populous movements that sought to resist Arab authoritarianism by demanding justice, democracy, equality, and rights for all citizens. Contemporary Arab political thought addresses these issues and calls for a new social pact between state and society. However, the social movements gradually fizzled out despite their intensity, and the possibility of a reoccurrence is yet to be determined.

The participants debated over the presence or absence of a viable political “center” in the Arab region. Michael Hudson, one of the participants at the Working Group, sees the political center as something between extremist Islamic movements on the one hand and authoritarian states on the other. While some scholars believed that there has never been a political center in the Arab world, others argued that it was shrinking rapidly due to authoritarianism and the outlawing of political parties. They considered the reasons that in the immediate aftermath of 2011 uprisings, an Arab center not materialize out of something that offered more than the two extremes. Moreover, the participants explored the transformations that are taking place in the political economy of the Arab state and repeated economic shocks since the 2011 uprisings. Citizens in different kinds of Arab rentier states have responded in their own ways to cracks in prevailing ruling bargains. For example, citizens in the Gulf states have looked to the state to protect their economic interests in difficult times, whereas in weak states such as Algeria and Iran, they blame the state for their failures. However, given the currently changing nature of the rentier states, it is difficult to say whether the citizens will continue to look to the state for protection.

Historically, Arab states have had a troubled relationship with citizenship, and minority groups especially, who by and large have not been considered as equal citizens. The Arab states have therefore devised citizenship policies that give ruling states the power to decide who will be included in or excluded from the state. The Gulf states have frequently used the act of withdrawing citizenship for political purposes and have recently aligned their citizenship policies with anti-terror laws—a phenomenon leading to statelessness and not unique to this region as illustrated by the anti-terror laws in Canada and Australia. Added to this is the refugee problem in the Middle East region: a significantly large number of people have either been displaced or have become stateless due to political turmoil or the disintegration of central authority in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Since there is not much scholarship on citizenship in this region, the group agreed that the topic should be further explored as part of a broader re-envisioning the Arab state.

Another topic of discussion revolved around the evolving nature of civil-military relations in the region. Generally, armies are designed to provide national defense. Yet the purpose of the Middle Eastern armies is unclear. In the rentier states, armies are normally financed by oil revenues, with major foreign powers providing military assistance to the state. Moreover, some political systems in the Arab world have dual militaries—ideologically armed forces alongside professional security forces—that provide a visible manifestation of the powers of the state or the ruling elite. Many of these security forces had to be called in order to quell the 2011 uprisings. However, the character of the military involvement varied from state to state. In Tunisia the police was much stronger than the military, whereas in Egypt the army continued to play an important role because of its long history of intimate involvement in politics.

Participants also compared current transnational Islamist movements to the Pan-Arabist movements of the 1960s and the 1970s, both of which challenge the conception, functions, and legitimacy of the Arab states. As these states continue to face threats to their sovereignty and legitimacy, they have tried to consolidate their powers and security by forming state-based alliances with outside patrons.

While the participants in the Working Group addressed a multitude of topics ranging from the conception, functions, and institutions of the Arab state to the basic challenges to its legitimacy and sovereignty after the 2011 uprisings, they all acknowledged that there are gaps in the existing literature where more research is required. Hence, the Working Group concluded by identifying areas of research where further analysis is needed. These included the conception and terminology surrounding the very notion of the Arab state, the position and application of political boundaries, ideologies and discourses of the state, engagement between state and the citizens, and the perseverance or change of prevailing ruling bargains particularly in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings.

See the meeting agenda

Read participant biographies

Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Fateh Azzam, American University of Beirut

Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Michaelle Browers, Wake Forest University

Juan Cole, University of Michigan

Stephanie Cronin, University of Oxford

Ahmad Dallal, American University of Beirut

Alasdair Drysdalem, University of New Hampshire

Islam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Steven Heydemann, Smith College

Michael C. Hudson, Georgetown University

Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Rami G. Khouri, American University of Beirut

Beverley Milton-Edwards, Queen’s University

Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Adham Saouli, University of St. Andrews

Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Article by Umber Latafat (SFS ’16), Research Intern at CIRS

The U.S.–Saudi Arabia Relationship: ‘Special’ or Broken?
2016-01-19 18:00 - 19:00 (Europe/Moscow)
Michael C. Hudson, the Seif Ghobash Professor of International Relations and Arab Studies, Emeritus, at Georgetown University, delivered the first CIRS Monthly Dialogue of the Spring 2016 semester on “The U.S.–Saudi Arabia Relationship: ‘Special’ or Broken?” on January 19, 2016. A long-term scholar of the Middle East, Hudson argued that the Middle East region is in an extremely turbulent condition, necessitating the reexamination of traditional alliances. He paid particular attention to the state of the US-Saudi relationship, which was once described as “special” and which is now under considerable strain.

Highlighting some key moments in the history of the US-Saudi relationship, Hudson noted that it was established after World War I, when companies backed by the US government began formalizing business ties and facilitating the establishment of the Saudi oil industry during the 1930s. Subsequently, “a modus vivendi was established that allowed this engine of modernization to function without really interfacing with, or let alone disturbing, the traditional political culture of the Kingdom,” he argued. In order for this businesses relationship to continue flourishing, the Americans remained uncharacteristically uncritical of the domestic politics of Saudi Arabia. This arrangement suited both parties, as each could get along with its business interests despite having many antithetical notions regarding each other’s cultures, religions, and politics. In this regard, Hudson argued that “the relationship, although special, was not deeply rooted in American politics, in the American mind, or within the American public. The relationship depended upon a rather narrow spectrum of interests, expertise, and influence,” and was established on a strategic basis between political and business elites.

In order to further secure these shared US-Saudi economic interests, the alliance was eventually expanded to other related political engagements and foreign policy alignments over the decades. During the Cold War, Saudi Arabia proved to be a strategic ally in securing US interests, and guarding against communist advances into the region. The importance of Saudi Arabia was further amplified after the Iranian revolution of 1979, and the collapse of the US’s alliance with the Shah.

In light of current turbulent political developments in the Middle East, the accepted historical basis of the US-Saudi relationship has come under questioning, and is in an increasing state of flux. Regional security concerns regarding the rise of sectarian tensions, the machinations of the Islamic State, and the easing of sanctions on Iran, have all worked towards straining the US-Saudi relationship, and are further magnified by domestic Saudi woes in the form of falling oil prices, a weakening economy, rising unemployment, a young population riddled with unrest, and a new royal regime taking an increasingly combative stance in the region.

Hudson mused on how these issues are likely to affect the future of US policy in the Middle East. Since the dangers posed by the Islamic State have become so central to regional and international political discourse, Hudson noted that it is unlikely that the US security umbrella in the Middle East will see any drastic change, and that the United States will continue to see Saudi Arabia as a key ally in its attempts at regional influence. While the solid historical and material interests, business connections, and security contracts between the United States and Saudi Arabia remain largely intact, “there is a rising chorus of hostile analysis and hostile criticism of Saudi Arabia in important political circles in the United States,” that argue in favor of taking a more lenient stand towards Iran, and reversing the balance of regional power. Today, “much of that debate is focused on foreign policy in the Middle East despite President Obama’s wish that he could pivot away from the Middle East and work on Asia instead.” However, Hudson concluded, current policies regarding the special US-Saudi relationship may indeed be altered depending on the results of the upcoming US presidential elections.

Michael C. Hudson is a former Director of Georgetown University’s Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS), and from 2010 to 2014 he was the first Director of the Middle East Institute and Professor of Political Science at the National University of Singapore. He was the Kuwait Foundation Visiting Scholar at the Harvard Belfer Center’s Middle East Initiative in spring 2015. Hudson has held Guggenheim, Ford, and Fulbright fellowships and is a past president of the Middle East Studies Association. His publications include The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon; The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators; Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy; The Palestinians: New Directions; and Middle East Dilemma: The Politics and Economics of Arab Integration (editor and contributor). His most recent books are: Gulf Politics and Economics in a Changing World and The Arab Uprisings: Catalysts, Dynamics, and Trajectories.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

The Negotiating Process and Recent Developments in Cyprus
2016-02-02 18:00 - 20:00 (Europe/Moscow)
H.E. Emine Çolak, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Northern Cyprus, delivered a CIRS Focused Discussion on February 2, 2016, titled “The Negotiating Process and Recent Developments in Cyprus.” The talk shed light on the promising political developments in Cyprus between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot people.

After decades of prolonged negotiations, H.E. Çolak said, the impasse on the island was expected to be relieved in 2004 with the United Nations (UN) Comprehensive Settlement Plan. However, it received 65 percent approval from the Turkish Cypriot people and was rejected by 76 percent of the Greek Cypriot people. Since then, there has been some progress, resulting in a Joint Declaration on February 11, 2014, which would enable the two sides to endorse their objectives for the formation of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation based on political equality, and headed by a single sovereignty stemming equally from the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots.

The negotiations resumed more auspiciously following the election of His Excellency Mr. Mustafa Akıncı as the new Turkish Cypriot President. With the presence of the UN Special Adviser, Espen Barth Eid, on May 15, 2015, the two leaders, Akıncı and Anastasiades, expressed their interest and strong commitment to proceed towards a comprehensive settlement in a constructive fashion. Included in these agreements is the desire by the two parties to work on confidence building measures to ameliorate the living standards of the two communities. Discussing the outcome of this new process, H.E. Çolak summarized the five confidence building measures pursued by the two sides as “the opening of more crossing points between the two sides; interconnecting electricity grids; mobile telephone interoperability; prevention of radio frequency interferences; and establishing a committee on gender equality.” After substantive negotiations revealed that convergences on legislative and judicial affairs are consistent with the political equality of the two peoples, negotiations after November 2015 entered a more intensified stage with property at the center of the discussions. Agreeing on the categories of property, the parties decided to pursue the issues of territory, security, and guarantees at the end of the process.

Maintaining its commitment to the result-oriented principles of the 2014 Joint Declaration, the Turkish Cypriot side is optimistic about the prospects of reaching an agreement within months, not years. In the context of achieving that goal, H.E. Çolak also stressed the role of the EU, Greece, and the international community in supporting and defending the negotiations in order to ensure productive engagement from both sides of the island. She also added that it was necessary for the Turkish Cypriot side to be heard on all international platforms to further facilitate the process.

The reality of the situation, however, reveals the subjection of the Turkish Cypriot people to restrictions that have denied them basic human rights. From representation in international mediums to trade and tourism, the constraints imposed on Northern Cyprus for over five decades have proved to be a hindrance to the country’s cultural, academic, and sporting relations with the rest of the world. On this note, H.E. Çolak referenced UN Security Council reports in which both the then Secretary-General Mr. Kofi Annan, and the Secretary-General Mr. Ban Ki-moon, urged the international community to collaborate bilaterally to eradicate the restraints that isolate and obstruct the progress of the Turkish Cypriots. In addition to the support expressed by the UN, she reflected on the declaration of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) “to fully cooperate with and put an end to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot people by calling upon the Member States to strengthen effective solidarity with the Muslim Turkish people of Cyprus and to help the Turkish Cypriots to overcome the inhuman isolations imposed upon them by increasing and expanding relations in all fields.”

In conclusion, H.E. Çolak condemned the unwarranted state of isolation that continues to preclude the Turkish Cypriot people from exercising their basic human rights as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This, she said, is a blatant violation of the UN Charter and had no justification. She concluded her speech by reiterating the resolutions and declarations of the UN and OIC and acknowledging the positive impact that the lifting of the isolation would have on settlement efforts.

The Pedagogic State: Translation and the Cultural Revolution in the Early Republican Turkey
2016-02-03 12:30 - 13:30 (Europe/Moscow)
Firat Oruc, Assistant Professor of English and Humanities at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar and the 2015-2016 CIRS-SFSQ Faculty Fellow, delivered a CIRS Focused Discussion on “The Pedagogic State: Translation and the Cultural Revolution in the Early Republican Turkey” on February 3, 2016. The lecture drew on central themes from Oruc’s current book project examining the cultural and ideological transformations forged during the early decades of the Turkish Republic, with particular emphasis on importation and translation of classics in world literature.

With the forming of the new Turkish Republic, a new Turkish identity was crafted on the principles of nationalism, modernity, and secularism. “In order to create a new society and country out of the now gone Ottoman Empire, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his comrades envisioned ‘a total revolution’ in all aspects possible,” and especially in language reform, replacing Arabic script with Latin script. For the reformers, “translation from European languages would enable Turkish to ‘free’ itself from the historical ‘yoke’ of Arabic and Persian words, idioms and expressions.”

In answer to questions such as: “Why would a state need world literature?” and “What was this ‘foreign element’ doing in the midst of the Turkish cultural revolution?” Oruc explained that the Kemalist state saw reading as means of cultivating “civilized” citizens with a crusade against “ignorance” based on reason and knowledge. The European humanist canon was taken as the philosophical basis for the republican reforms that would lead to a “Turkish renaissance.” This “cultural engineering” and the creation of a new national canon relied on a campaign of translation in which the state was the central actor. “Thus, an organized, and government administered operation of translation contributed to the state regulation of the language,” Oruc argued. However, this celebration of a cultural revolution was not supported by a corresponding implementation of a social revolution, and many in Turkish society remained illiterate and impoverished, and incapable of partaking in the grand visions presented by the elite.

In conclusion, Oruc pondered the question of the complex tensions and contradictions involved in the formation of world literature in non-western societies such as Turkey. He argued that, even though the study of world literature purports to be a global humanist project, the grand narratives of the discipline have been largely shaped by specific European histories and ideologies. In order to problematize the power relations enacted through the world literature discourse, Oruc proposed engaging with the perspective of other nodes in the global network. “The state has so far never been discussed as an actor in the field of world literature. Whereas, in the Turkish case, the state is right at the center,” where world literature was coopted as an ideological apparatus.

Firat Oruc received his Ph.D. in Literature from Duke University in 2010. His teaching specialties include contemporary global literature, 20th century Anglophone writing, literatures of the Middle East, and world cinema. Before joining SFS-Q, he taught in the Comparative Literary Studies program at Northwestern University (2011-2013) and the departments of English and Comparative Literature at the University of California, Los Angeles (2010-2011). His scholarly interests center on the intersections of cultural globalization and transnationalism, postcolonial studies, world literature theory, and translation studies. His recent work has appeared in literary criticism journals such as English Language Notes, Criticism and Postcolonial Text. His current book project is a comparative study of world literature and institutions of translation in Turkey, Egypt, and Iran.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

Art and Cultural Production in the GCC Working Group II
2016-02-07 09:00 - 15:00 (Europe/Moscow)
On February 7, 2016, the Center for International and Regional Studies held its second working group meeting on “Art and Cultural Production in the GCC.” Project participants, as well as other scholars, engaged in critical group discussions, and provided feedback to the authors on draft chapters. The chapters written under this project address a variety of subjects, including amongst other topics: utopian ideals and art museums in the Arabian Peninsula; public art in Gulf cities; aesthetics, artistic production, and censorship in the GCC; art as modernity and “soft power”; and art and discourses of culture and “authenticity” in the UAE.

Over the course of three decades, economies of the Arab states of the Gulf have been experiencing immense growth. This has influenced the political significance of these states on the international and regional levels, and the social fabric of these states, due to the influx of expats from all around the world, on the domestic level. The pace of changes in the social fabric of these states has influenced the development of artistic and cultural institutions. The limited existing scholarship tends to focus on the rapidly growing museum culture and the acquisition of foreign art as indicative of several Gulf states’ use of oil revenue. This project builds on available literature by contributing towards furthering knowledge on the prevailing issues around art and cultural production in the Gulf. The contributed chapters explore the process of art acquisition and certain GCC governments’ investment in museums and artworks, and investigate the effects of art importation and assimilation on citizens’ perceptions of identity and self.

The working group commenced with Karen Exell’s chapter on “Utopian Ideals, Unknowable Futures, and the Art Museum in the Arabian Peninsula.” In her chapter, Exell explores the idea of the utopian in relation to art museums and the contemporary moment in the Arabian Peninsula. The transference of global art museums—constructed according to dominant western art historical principles and museological practices—to the Arabian Peninsula has brought with it the rhetoric of post-Enlightenment humanist idealism. The ability of these museums to instrumentalize international peace and understanding, as well as offering solace on an individual level through solitary communion with works of art, results in a transcendental experience. This experience is desirable in a secular society, but perhaps unnecessary and even problematic in an Islamic one. The chapter addresses the differing ideologies at play, and concludes by evaluating some of the futures posited for global art museums in the Arabian Peninsula.

The second chapter was presented by Nadia Mounajjed on “Public Art in Gulf Cities.” Mounajjed claims that although “public art” refers to artworks, either permanent or temporary, commissioned for sites with open public access, in the Gulf it is only discussed in the context of architectural production and urban design. This steers her investigation on the nature of the public and the public realm in the Arab cities of the Gulf. She explores the specific “parameters of publicity” and the potential of public art to act as a force for social discussion, place making and collective memory. In her chapter, Mounajjed raises a series of questions around: what counts as public art, and what does not? What does “public” mean? Who is public art intended for? Who funds public art? And how is public art tied to notions of place, identity, and social diversity?

In the third presented chapter titled: “Of ‘Gray Lists’ and Whitewash: The Aesthetics and Artistic Strategies of Complicity and Circumvention in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries,” Nancy Demerdash examines the GCC’s “areas of gray” in artistic censorship. She claims that the processes by which works receive endorsement and acceptance, or scrutiny and rejection, by a combination of private sponsors, patrons, or the public, presents a complex fabric of actors beyond the state apparatus, extending to institutions and organizations. In addition, Demerdash examines suppression and artists’ complicity or subversion, and analyzes the outlets through which aesthetic alternatives arise. She also illuminates a more nuanced perspective of artistic freedom and aesthetic choices with respect to the cultural spaces, institutions, and biennials of the GCC. Throughout her chapter, Demerdash raises a series of questions: in what ways do we define artistic freedom generally within the GCC? How do artists of the Gulf engage with customs of religion and everyday politics of the region? In what ways do such artists wittingly self-censor, effectively depoliticizing their practice? How does the intended viewership of an artist inform his or her production? If art of the Arab world, in recent years following the so-called Arab Spring, has become increasingly situated or defined as “activist,” “political,” or “revolutionary,” where is the place of these types of art forms in the Arab states of the Gulf? What shape does this engagement with unstable or transgressive content take? And what are the aesthetics of art forms that cannot be openly dissident or subversive?

Lesley Gray presented the fourth chapter on “Contemporary Art as Modernity: Art and Global Identity in Azerbaijan and the Gulf.” Using textual and media discourse analysis for both academic and popular media, Gray examines the factors that were instrumental in the rise of contemporary art as part of a strategy of international engagement, and contextualizes this information with the opinions of those who work in the art scene in Baku. Moreover, within the context of other similar geographies in the Arabian Peninsula who share Azerbaijan’s energy wealth, Azerbaijani modernity is one that has incorporated elements of Western-style economic progress propelled by oil wealth without the accompanying personal, social, and political freedoms and rights. Specifically, this chapter asks how can we define Azerbaijani modernity, and under what conditions has it arisen? How has the media shaped the image of Azerbaijan to an international audience? How has contemporary art developed in the post-Soviet era and how does it express Azerbaijan’s modern identity to the international art community? What does the contemporary art scene look like from the ground up and who is their public? And how does Azerbaijan, and specifically Baku, compare to other similar cities like Abu Dhabi, Doha, and Dubai?

In the final chapter on “Authentic Culture in the UAE,” Elizabeth Derderian argues that the “museum boom” in the Gulf region raises questions of authenticity and cultural appropriation. Focusing largely on the United Arab Emirates (UAE), this chapter explores the concept of authenticity and how its deployment affects exclusion in particular ways. Derderian examines the ways in which authenticity claims create the need for experts and serve as forms of knowledge production that rely on and reproduce different structures and dynamics of power. In addition, Derderian parses cultural exchange from cultural appropriation, focusing on hierarchies of power and exclusion.

Mehran Kamrava, the Director of the Center for International and Regional Studies, concluded the working group meeting by highlighting the participants’ contributions to scholarship through their papers, which will be published in a forthcoming special issue of an academic journal.

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Participants and Discussants:

Haya Al Noaimi, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Nancy Demerdash, DePaul University
Elizabeth (Beth) Derderian, Northwestern University
Karen Exell, University College London in Qatar
Lesley Gray, University College London in Qatar
Islam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Nadia Mounajjed, Abu Dhabi University
Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

Museums and Modernity in the Arabian Peninsula
2016-02-23 18:00 - 19:00 (Europe/Moscow)
Karen Exell, Honorary Senior Research Associate at UCL Qatar, and a consultant at Qatar Museums, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue lecture, titled “Museums and Modernity in the Arabian Peninsula,” on Tuesday February 23, 2016. Highlighting some key arguments from her forthcoming book Modernity and the Museum in the Arabian Peninsula (Routledge, 2016), Exell recounted that when she first arrived to Qatar with the task of setting up an institution to cultivate professional museological practices, the general consensus was that no such practices existed in the local context, and that Qatar was a “tabula rasa” in need of such imported knowledge and services. However, after spending time in the country and researching the local museological landscape, she argued that a very different picture emerged.

Exell explained that there are two simultaneous and oppositional discourses of cultural production currently being articulated in the region. These are presented as oppositional in terms of both style and content: modern art is seen as a product of Western art history, while traditional cultural practices draw on the oral histories and traditional practices of the region. These binary cultural productions are also presented as providing contrasted cultural experiences: one evokes an internationally-recognized art world, while the other invites a dialogic and immersive interaction with traditional regional productions. In order to examine how these discourses have been put into practice, Exell compared the Museum of Islamic Art in Qatar with the Saif Marzooq Al-Shamlan and Bait Al Outhman museums in Kuwait.

“The Museum of Islamic Art draws extensively on the Western paradigm of museological expertise,” she said, and is a prestige project that attempts to create a new global cultural center within Qatar. Such “engagement with Western-style museums was and is a strategic choice by the ruling families and elite actors,” and has been geared towards realizing a multitude of agendas over the years. Following independence, museological practices aided in nation-building, creation of consistent historical narratives, and legitimizing the status of the region’s ruling families. In the contemporary period, they are “a means of branding nations and gaining symbolic global power through accessing cultural capital,” she noted.

The Saif Marzooq Al-Shamlan and Bait Al Outhman museums in Kuwait, meanwhile, represent centers for the protection of local histories and traditional knowledge. Since these cultural forms are “rich in the kind of heritage that orthodox Western heritage models struggle to accommodate: intangible, performative, and embodied,” they are hard to promote or export. Simply put, they do not fit within the Western museological paradigm. However, Exell argued, while these local museological practices are deemed of little international value, they are of extreme importance in supporting and creating national identities and narratives.

It is by examining the rhetoric surrounding these supposedly contrasting cultural spheres that one can begin to understand how the two discourses actually play towards specific and strategic regional agendas, she said. As the Gulf states attempt to exploit the immense wealth created through hydrocarbon industries, these nations must also answer to how they are protecting against the encroachment of rapid regional transformations. Even as certain elements of modernity are being celebrated, there is a simultaneous call to strengthen local heritage as defense against what is perceived to be an onslaught and effacement of local histories anc cultures. This balancing act between the old and the new is exemplified in the two types of cultural engagements practiced in the region.

Ultimately, Exell argued, “the rhetoric of fusing the traditional and the modern represents the region’s approach to modernity…an agenda of retaining cultural identity in balance with aspects of a more secular modernity, while the rhetoric of engagement with global art and ideas of the universal is a method of discursively bridging cultures—bridging the East and the West and bringing people together—is repeatedly emphasized by actors investing in and producing the global art projects.”

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Karen Exell directed the MA in Museum and Gallery Practice at UCL Qatar from 2011-2015, after teaching museums studies and holding curatorial positions in university museums in the UK for several years. She is currently involved in two QNRF-funded research projects, as a PI on project researching museum pedagogy in Qatar and the region, and as LPI on project exploring the concept of national identity in relation to the planned new National Museum of Qatar. Her recent publications include the co-edited volumes, Cultural Heritage in the Arabian Peninsula: Debates, Discourses and Practices (Ashgate, 2014), and Museums in Arabia: Transnational Practices and Regional Processes (Ashgate, 2016).

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Managing Editor for CIRS Publications.

What the U.S. Presidential Election Means for the Middle East
2016-02-24 12:30 - 13:30 (Europe/Moscow)
On February 24, 2016, John Hudak, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director at the Center for Effective Public Management Governance Studies–Brookings Institution, delivered a CIRS Focused Discussion titled “What the U.S. Presidential Election Means for the Middle East.” Hudak, an expert on U.S. elections and campaigns, stated that it is difficult to gauge the positions and policies of the U.S. presidential candidates on the Middle East region since they are often vague and variable, especially during the primaries. Compared to previous election cycles, however, the 2016 elections are unique due to the rise of foreign policy as a critical issue for both parties’ candidates. Hudak also discussed the foreign policy credentials of the Republicans and the Democrats, and explored which party has generally seen itself as the bastion of U.S. foreign policy goals.

The first part of Hudak’s talk focused on describing the convoluted nature of the U.S. presidential elections. Before running for the general election, presidential candidates have to participate in a competitive primary campaign to become the party’s standard-bearer. During the primaries, candidates compete with each other for delegates who represent the constituents of the states. As the results of different states emerge, starting with Iowa and New Hampshire, it becomes a little clearer to see who is better positioned to become the party’s representative. However, the 2016 race has still not been decided since some candidates can surge while others sink. “If we take a step back one year and look at what our expectations were about this race, they are entirely turned on their head,” said Hudak, “the realities of the election this year are very different than what expectations were in February of 2015.” By the end of July 2016, the winning candidates will be announced at the parties’ national conventions and will begin the rapid race for the general election.

After familiarizing the audience with the intricacies of the election process, Hudak shifted the discussion to the factors behind the increased prominence of U.S. foreign policy in the 2016 elections. Hudak attributed this shift to two main points: the topical interest in the Middle East’s crises—particularly the conflict in Syria and the rise of Islamic States—and the fact that both parties view foreign policy as the winning issue in this general election. “There are a lot of serious conflicts in the world where either the U.S. is involved, or there is an expectation for American leadership,” said Hudak, “either to help ameliorate the challenges, or to fix the problem.” The level of interest in foreign policy usually increases when such situations arise; the most recent example was the 2004 election when John Kerry and the incumbent president, George W. Bush, fought a contested election that hinged on the decision to intervene in Iraq and Afghanistan. In contrast, the elections of 2008 and 2012 focused on domestic policy and the economy, particularly after the 2008 recession.

In most election years, “the Republicans, in terms of polling, are typically much more trusted in terms of dealing with policy issues than Democrats are,” said Hudak. Democrats, on the other hand, focus more on the “bread and butter” issues that concern domestic affairs, such as the economy, jobs, and issues of social justice and equality. In 2016, however, both parties approach foreign policy as their winning issue, and both parties have candidates with strong stances. Hillary Clinton believes she is well versed and experienced with the major foreign policy issues from her time as Secretary of State, and this makes her unique among Democrats. She also sees it as a benefit for her candidacy because she is a woman, and foreign policy is commonly seen as the purview of men. “In that sense,” Hudak reasons, “she sees it as a transformational thing, both for herself, gender, and her party […] that is the thinking within the campaign.” While Clinton has not focused as much on foreign policy as she would have liked, she will likely prop up her foreign policy credentials again in the general election. In contrast, the Republicans pride themselves on their traditional focus on foreign policy, and their campaigns have especially focused on pointing out the disastrous aftereffects of Clinton’s time as Secretary of State.

Finally, Hudak concluded by discussing potential areas of foreign policy interest for the next president such as Syria, Israel, and Iran. After taking the presidential oath on January 20, 2017, Syria will be priority for whoever is elected. Hudak stated that either the new president will dramatically change course from Obama’s policies or mildly alter them, depending on whether a Republican or a Democrat emerges victorious. Regardless, Americans can be sure that there will be a change in policy, and foreign policy will remain one of the most vital issues in the first 100-200 days in office. Other important foreign policy issues on the president’s mind will be alleviating the U.S.’s strained relationship with Israel—one area both Democrats and Republicans agree on—and working out the next steps for the nuclear deal with Iran.

John Hudak is Senior Fellow and Deputy Director at the Center for Effective Public Management Governance Studies, Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. His research examines questions of presidential power in the contexts of administration, personnel, and public policy. Additionally, he focuses on campaigns and elections, bureaucratic process and legislative-executive interaction. You can access his complete bio, click here.

Article by Salman Ahad Khan, Senior Publications Intern at CIRS

Pluralism and Community in the Middle East Working Group Meeting I
2016-03-06 09:00 - 2016-03-07 15:00 (Europe/Moscow)
On March 6–7, 2016, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) held a working group on “Pluralism and Community in the Middle East.” Over the course of two days, a number of distinguished scholars discussed issues related to ethno-linguistic and religious pluralism in the Middle East, identified gaps in the existing literature, and pointed to potential areas of original research. Amongst the various topics discussed, Working Group participants examined pluralism and diversity as represented through governance and legal regimes; social inclusion/exclusion and policymaking; the role and symbolism of iconoclasm in the Middle East; architecture, the urban space, and identity; digital culture, political communication and regional notions of “multiculturalism;” language; and literature and cultural representation. Two specific case studies, the Amazighs and Armenian Christians, were also discussed.

The Middle East’s pluralistic social and political fabric has gone through several historical changes, and ethnicity, religion, language, and political ideologies play pivotal roles in contemporary identity affiliations across the region.

National and regional conflicts often intensify subnational identities, and this has especially been the case in the Middle East over the last several years. Working Group participants identified a series of original areas of research regarding the on-going intensification of identities in the Middle East, including the relationship between the conceptions of the state and inclusion of some identity groups and the exclusion of others; the impact of globalization and transnational communities; the historical legacy of the Ottoman millet system; sectarianism in the post-Arab Spring era; the role of intellectuals and social media in identity formation; and the underlying causes and consequences of increasing religiosity.

Governance and state policies impact the social, economic, and political inclusion or exclusion of communities in the Middle East. Working Group participants discussed the multiple linkages between statehood and identity-formation in the Middle East. They questioned the relationship between communities and sites of power; and challenges international law’s values and principles pose on states’ traditional governance. The participants also discussed topics related to the parallel development of local human rights traditions along with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a sort of self-determination in the decision-making processes, and the role of state institutions in enforcing social harmonization and cohesiveness.

State policies dealing with education, families, kinship and law, mobility of labor and capital can directly impact social inclusion and exclusion. In recent years, state policies have greatly impacted foreign, national and private educational institutions. Although this is not unique to the Middle East, there is limited literature on the notions of inclusion and exclusion in Middle Eastern educational curriculums. The relationship between policymaking and ways in which families are being constructed also has direct bearing on education. The participants claimed that the nature of communities’ relations both with each other and the state could be seen as a result of exclusionary and inclusionary policies. In addition, the participants discussed issues related to mobility of people and ideas, social representation in the education system, globalization, and war on terror and school curriculum in the Middle East.

Modern nation-building processes began roughly in the middle of the twentieth century in several states of the Middle East, such as Egypt and Iraq. Driven by ideology, politics and religious beliefs, states, and recently non-state actors like ISIS, have used iconoclasm as a tool to limit the multiple identities within the nation state, and reinforce a monolithic identity. The practice of iconoclasm has impacted the material culture and visual heritage of the different religious and ethno-linguistic communities that comprise the region’s demography. Archeological negligence, and inconsiderate urban planning have also contributed to this erasure of visual pluralism. In addition, participants also discussed the role of social media, media and film in encouraging and countering iconoclasm in the Middle East.

Urban spaces in the Middle East have been going through swift progression in some countries, and massive urban decay in others. Master planning of urban spaces is very politicized in the Middle East, with various socio-economic drivers and consequences. The planning of gated and smart cities, and new capitals segregates communities by nationality, class, ethnicity, and religion. The participants posed questions related to the definition of public good, social representation in master planning, public contestation, access to public information, democratic decentralization, communities’ quarters, gentrification of communities, security, citizenship, and urban equality and inequality.

Media is a tool of communication greatly influenced by states in the Middle East. It propagates certain convictions insofar as religious and ethno-linguistic communities in the Middle East are concerned. The participants identified four main topics that are insufficiently researched: labor and digital media; citizenship; border; and knowledge production. Within these four main topics, questions around the usage of media by migrant workers and expatriates in the Gulf, redesigning of borders, under-representation in political and media institutions, capitalism and cognitive knowledge, memory preservation, and production of knowledge were identified as important areas of original research.

Language and linguistics are germane to the discussion on pluralism in the Middle East. Members of ethno-linguistic communities have been attempting to maintain their languages and dialects despite attempts by states to undermine their languages and reinforce the official language of the state. The participants suggested research questions that examine the influence of local groups and authority over language, communities’ resistance to states’ language policies, unification and fragmentation among different ethno-linguistic communities, Shiite-Sunni dialect differences, preservation of dialects, linguistic class processing, media and film, and different usages of colloquial and classic languages.

“Minor literature” is literature produced by the colonized in the colonizer’s language that resists colonization. Post colonization, minor literatures have emerged as a form of resistance and denationalization produced by religious and ethno-linguistic communities in contestation to their marginalization by their respective states. Minor literatures in Turkey often refer to Greek, Jewish, Armenian, and Yazidi literature. The body of literature was always studied in relation to the past. The place and role of minor literature in the imagined futuristic social and political conditions of post nationalist Turkey remains understudied. Ethnographic studies on the readership of minor literature in Turkey also remain under-studied. Thus, the participants suggested original research questions that addressed the engagement with minor literature in Turkey, diasporic migrant experience and minor literature writers, representation of communities in mainstream literature, engagement of Turkish minor literature with the international literary community, engagement among different communities in Turkish minor literature, and targeted audience of Turkish minor literature.

Insofar as the Armenian Christian community in the Middle East is concerned, the participants discussed four original areas for research. These areas looked at the issue of Muslim Armenians, and whether Islam is not compatible with Armenian identity. They also discussed the question of Armenian citizenship and if practicing Christianity is a pre-requisite. The participants identified also other gaps in literature that included: the role of Armenian media, communal publications and propagation of Armenian political agenda, the tension between Eastern and Western Armenians, perception of Armenians in diaspora on the Armenian state, usage of national language, objectives of Armenian publications, Armenian urban space in the Middle East, Armenian scouts, Armenian transnational networks, media and film, Armenian progressive national movements, and the relationship between Armenians and Hezbollah.

Finally, the participants discussed the Amazigh community in North Africa. The participants claimed that the main gaps in research have less to do with how the Amazigh community has changed, but more with how to change the methodological lens through which the community and its struggles can be viewed and analyzed. Regional and transnational analysis can contribute to the study of the Amazigh community in North Africa as it addresses larger political questions, and recognizes the unintended consequences of pluralism. Four gaps in literature were identified: regionalism, transnationalism, localism, and language policy. Under these four main thematic topics, the participants posed questions that touched on topics that included: the relationship between foreign policy and identity formation, Amazigh activism, differences between first and second generation Amazigh immigrants, urban versus rural elitism, institutionalization and politicization of Amazigh as an ethno-linguistic minority, and concepts of inclusion and exclusion.

See the meeting agenda
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Participants and Discussants:

Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
James Barry, Deakin University
Kathleen Cavanaugh, National University of Ireland
Paolo D’Urbano, Doha Institute for Graduate Studies
Amanda Garrett, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Shak Hanish, National University, California
Islam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Umber Latafat, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Catherine Miller, Aix-Marseille University
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Firat Oruc, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Annika Rabo, Stockholm University
Diane Singerman, American University, Washington
Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Antonio Zarandona, Deakin University

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

Is Black Money Really Black? The International and National Fight Against Money Laundering
2016-03-23 18:00 - 19:00 (Europe/Moscow)
Reem Al-Ansari, a professor at Qatar University’s College of Law and the 2015-2016 CIRS Qatar University Fellow at Georgetown University in Qatar, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue on March 23, 2016, on “Is Black Money Really Black? The International and National Fight Against Money Laundering.” The talk focused on the billions of dollars criminals launder through the global financial system, the staggering social, economic, and political fallout they cause, and what countries like Qatar are doing in response.

Beginning her lecture by defining the term “money laundering,” Al-Ansari said that: “In its simplest form, money laundering refers to an amount of money leaving from destination A, and using techniques to make it seem like the funds were obtained from destination B, a legal source.” Once the money has moved through several banks in different countries, it can then be returned to its owner, ready to be used as legitimate funds.

Al-Ansari, who is also the Director of the Legal Research and Studies division at Role of Law and Anti-Corruption Center (ROLACC) in Doha, listed the various countries targeted for money laundering, as well as the nations that serve as destinations for newly cleaned money. Adding that Qatar is also a target of this criminal activity, she said that Qatari authorities have taken steps to respond to the threat of money laundering by introducing a specific law to mitigate against it. This comprehensive law was enacted following the unsatisfactory conclusion of an IMF-led evaluation report of Qatar’s banking system. “Qatar is awakening to the threat, and it led to the new law,” she said.

The newly established regulations are particularly important as a result of the criminal opportunities posed by the upcoming World Cup in 2022, she said. Further strengthening Qatar’s anti-corruption commitment, she added that, “Qatar now adheres to the series of recommendations that FATF has developed and that set the international standard for combating of money laundering,” referring to the nation’s membership to the Financial Action Task Force, an intergovernmental policy-making body, established in 1989 to promote effective implementation of measures for combating threats to the integrity of the international financial system.

The consequences of unchecked money laundering, she concluded, are severe, including increased criminal activity and currency inflation in developing economies, which bear the consequences of economic collapse when critical funds simply disappear as they continue through the multi-step money cleaning process.

Reem Al-Ansari received her LLM from the University of Michigan Law School–Ann Arbor, and earned her Doctorate degree from Georgetown University’s Law Center in Washington D.C., marking her as the youngest Qatari lawyer and doctorate degree holder in the state. In addition to lecturing, Al-Ansari is the Director of the Legal Research and Studies division at Role of Law and Anti-Corruption Center (ROLACC) in Doha, Qatar. Previously, she worked at the World Bank headquarters in the Governance and Anti-corruption (GAC) unit, and is the recipient of two EED awards for education excellence. She is currently working on a book tackling the issue of money laundering and corruption, and tweets under @ReemaAlAnsari.

Shantayanan Devarajan on "How the Arab World Can Benefit from Low Oil Prices"
2016-03-24 12:30 - 13:30 (Europe/Moscow)
Shantayanan Devarajan, Chief Economist of the World Bank’s Middle East and North Africa Region, delivered a CIRS Focused Discussion on “How the Arab World Can Benefit from Low Oil Prices” on March 24, 2016, in which he proposed that the widespread concern about plummeting oil prices, particularly among rentier states, is not a predicament to be solved, but an opportunity to be harnessed.

Devarajan highlighted four key problems facing the Arab world today. The first of these is that the region has the highest unemployment rates in the developing world, a figure that reflects the systematic exclusion of women and young people from the labor market. The second problem is the lack of economic diversification, and especially in the case of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, concentration on the exports of a single commodity, whether oil or gas. Made more visible by the events of the Arab uprisings, the third problem includes the poor quality of public services, such as the widespread lack of sustained electricity and sanitation in many Arab countries. The final problem concerns the high volatility of already declining average growth rates for countries such as Egypt.

All of these issues, he argued, are intimately connected with the prevalent policies decision-makers have implemented across the Arab world in recent times. Devarajan identified and discussed three key adverse policies. The first concerns a variety of policies that have led to the non-optimal use of public resources, whether deliberately or inadvertently. The second adverse policy involves the high proportion of civil servants in the labor force, making the ratio of public to private sector workers in the MENA region the highest in the world. In Kuwait, for instance, 95 percent of the male labor force works in the public sector. Exemplifying the high levels of volatility in the region, the third policy underscores the pro-cyclical strategies that allow countries to enter into an expansionary mode when oil prices are up, often with the risk of debt, and contraction when prices drop.

Devarajan emphasized the connection between poor policymaking initiatives and the four major problems facing the Arab world. As an example, he examined the impact of fuel subsidies on energy-intensive industries, arguing that the persistent subsidizing of these large, old, and capital intensive firms hinders these small firms from growing, ultimately affecting the labor market and precluding employment growth. Young and small firms, on the other hand, which do create jobs through growth and expansion, are associated with non-energy-intensive firms. Thus, unemployment in many Arab countries can be partially, but not exclusively, attributed to energy subsidies. Similarly, the policy of Arab countries maintaining a large civil service has the effect of crowding out the private sector. The relatively more stable working conditions for those employed in the public sector, in both oil importing and exporting countries, discourages nationals from working in the private sector, thus limiting overall economic growth.

These examples, Devarajan noted, constitute the “bad news.” However, the “good news” has been steadily taking shape since the price of oil fell in 2014-15 when the region began witnessing remarkable systematic investments in energy subsidy reforms by oil importers and exporters alike. “The UAE, basically, has eliminated its fuel subsidies,” Kuwait, Morocco, Jordan, and Egypt have followed suit, and “Lebanon has addressed its water subsidies,” leading to a positive environment of policy reform. In the civil service sector of many Arab countries, partial reforms are being undertaken, where governments are cutting back on civil service wages, benefits, and wasteful expenditures. Underpublicized are also efforts by some of these countries to improve energy efficiency, including investing in renewables. Owing to recent subsidy reforms, and by association, the drop in oil prices, oil-dependent countries are unexpectedly moving towards renewables, even faster than some European countries, thus making a larger contribution to the mitigation of global climate change. In contrast to times of stability, therefore, low oil prices allow for the formation of political coalitions necessary to pursue a variety of political and economic reforms. The reason for these changes, Devarajan explained, is budgetary pressure. “It is actually the right thing to do even if there were no budgetary pressures. This is something that should have been done a long time ago if you wanted to solve these problems of unemployment and poor quality services.”

Even though Devarajan acknowledged many of the major advancements made, he said there remains much work to be done. He suggested further improvements that can be implemented, including a variety of public service reforms to overcome the “credibility trap” where mistrust of the government’s ability to improve public services paralyzes public contributions to financing those services. Further, the persistence of reactionary decisions and policies towards changes in oil prices underscores the necessity of adopting standardized fiscal rules to overcome obstacles to economic growth. Lastly, the civil service in oil-exporting countries, particularly those with small citizen populations such as Kuwait and the UAE, function as a system for redistributing oil revenues. “There is no reason to have 95 percent of the labor force in the civil service. There are not that many jobs. There is not that much work to be done in the public sector to have so many people employed,” he argued. Devarajan concluded by sharing his optimism for further positive change in a low oil-price Arab world due to already demonstrated possibilities for reform.

Shantayanan Devarajan is the Chief Economist of the World Bank’s Middle East and North Africa Region. Since joining the World Bank in 1991, he has been a Principal Economist and Research Manager for Public Economics in the Development Research Group, and the Chief Economist of the Human Development Network, South Asia, and Africa Region. He was the director of the World Development Report 2004, Making Services Work for Poor People. Before 1991, he was on the faculty of Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. The author or co-author of over 100 publications, Devarajan’s research covers public economics, trade policy, natural resources and the environment, and general equilibrium modeling of developing countries. Born in Sri Lanka, Devarajan received his B.A. in mathematics from Princeton University and his Ph.D. in economics from the University of California, Berkeley.

Article by Hazim Ali, Center for International and Regional Studies

Uday Chandra Faculty Research Workshop
2016-03-28 09:00 - 17:00 (Europe/Moscow)
On March 28, 2016, CIRS hosted a Faculty Research Workshop on Uday Chandra’s book manuscript Negotiating Leviathan: State and Tribe in Modern India. The manuscript explores how and why certain people and places came to be seen as “tribal” in modern India, and in turn, how “tribal” subjects remade their customs and communities in the course of negotiations with colonial and postcolonial states. Dr. Chandra argues, briefly, that the state and tribes make and remake each other recursively in the margins of modern India, historical processes of modern statemaking shaping and being shaped by myriad forms of resistance by tribal subjects. Implicit here is a critique of theories of “subaltern” resistance that treat tribes and peasants as vestiges of a pre-modern past and at odds with the workings of modern states. Comparatively speaking, the manuscript carries much relevance beyond South Asia, especially in the Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America, where “tribes” continue to be politically salient yet widely misunderstood as pre-modern vestiges.

Research for this book, which comes out of Dr. Chandra’s doctoral project, was conducted over the past decade. Archival research in London, Delhi, Kolkata, Patna, Pune, Bangalore, and Ranchi permitted Chandra to piece together a history of the modern Indian state in its “tribal” margins over the past two centuries. These archives, far from being mere repositories of the state’s own perceptions of tribal communities, presented a polyphonous chorus of voices, ranging from paternalistic British and Indian officials and Christian missionaries seeking converts to tribal subjects from diverse backgrounds speaking in different tongues. In-depth ethnographic research over three years in the forests of Jharkhand in eastern India complemented work in the archives by offering a close-to-the-ground understanding of the everyday lifeworlds of tribal communities residing in this region. As the author lived and worked among the Mundas of central Jharkhand, he listened to their songs, stories, and histories, and observed the ways in which their ways of life were enmeshed with those of the state. Indeed, even the Maoist movement, which was spreading across the region, coexisted curiously with the state, and ordinary men and women lived under circumstances of dual sovereignty.

The participants at the CIRS research workshop came from universities in India, the Gulf, and Europe. These historians, political scientists, anthropologists, and sociologists specialize in the study of modern India. The book manuscript as a whole presented them an opportunity to grapple with the totality of his project rather than just smaller article-length chunks of it. The workshop participants approached the manuscript from their diverse disciplinary positions, though they appreciated that the author wished to speak across conventional disciplinary divides in clear, jargon-free prose. Each participant had been assigned specific chapters, on which they offered detailed comments and criticisms in each session. Other participants raised their own questions for the author, who took copious notes and responded to calls for clarification as well as queries on the specific goals each book chapter sought to accomplish.

The workshop participants suggested vital changes to the manuscript in order to avoid certain pitfalls and to appeal broadly to its intended audiences. Firstly, they recommended rewriting the introductory chapter entirely for a general audience unfamiliar with the subject matter of the book. The introduction, they explained, should reflect the core strengths of the book, namely, the author’s interdisciplinary approach and deep familiarity with his fieldsites and their inhabitants. Secondly, some participants suggested laying out clearly at the outset how the data were collected, especially during ethnographic fieldwork, and rendering the author more visible in the book’s narrative. Doing so, they claimed, would permit readers to appreciate the uniqueness of the research and the author’s close relationships with informants, both of which are implicit rather than explicit at present. Thirdly, other participants argued for a closer braiding together of the historical and ethnographic parts of the manuscript. Each chapter could, of course, make its own arguments, but to the extent that the author argues that the past matters for the present, they need to be brought into close conversation with each other across chapters. Lastly, a number of workshop participants advised the author to clearly define key terms such as the “state,” “resistance,” and “negotiation” so that readers are certain of how they are being deployed in the book. The author thanked the workshop participants for these suggestions, which, he said, will greatly improve the overall quality of the manuscript.

Dr. Chandra is currently in discussions with Stanford University Press regarding the publication of his book. Two other leading university presses have expressed an interest in publishing the book. Since the subject matter of the book should appeal to multiple audiences across regional and disciplinary boundaries, the author has written it in a way that makes sense to even undergraduates unfamiliar with the region of study. The manuscript should be ready for submission this summer, and may be expected to be in print sometime during the 2017-18 academic year. By that time, Dr. Chandra will have commenced work on a second book, tentatively titled Democracy and Fascism in Modern India, which traces the historical entanglements of democratization in the public sphere and fascist tendencies therein that have favored the rise and growth of Hindu majoritarianism over the past century or so. CIRS will be supporting that book project too.

See the Workshop AgendaRead Participant Biographies

Uday Chandra is an Assistant Professor of Government. He received his B.A. in economics from Grinnell College and his PhD in political science from Yale University in 2013. He received the 2013 Sardar Patel Award for writing the best dissertation in a US university on any aspect of modern South Asia. Before coming to Doha, he held a prestigious research fellowship at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity in Goettingen, Germany. Uday’s research lies at the intersection between critical agrarian studies, political anthropology, postcolonial theory, and South Asian studies He is interested in state-society relations, power and resistance, political violence, agrarian change, rural-urban migration, popular religion, and the philosophy of the social sciences. Uday’s work has been published in the Law & Society Review, Social Movement Studies, New Political Science, The Journal of Contemporary Asia, Contemporary South Asia, and the Indian Economic & Social History Review. He has coedited volumes and journal special issues on the ethics of self-making in modern South Asia, subaltern politics and the state in contemporary India, caste relations in colonial and postcolonial eastern India, and social movements in rural India today.

Geopolitics of Natural Resources in the Middle East Working Group Meeting II
2016-04-03 09:00 - 2016-04-04 15:00 (Europe/Moscow)
On April 3-4, 2016, CIRS held a second working group under its research initiative on “Geopolitics of Natural Resources in the Middle East.” On the course of two days, working group participants presented draft papers on a number of related topics including, amongst other things, on the politics of natural resources in the Middle East; scarcity and economic development; environmental and social mobilization; the securitization of natural resources in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states; “greening” policies in the Arab states of the Persian Gulf; Tunisian phosphate mining; coastal sand mining in Morocco; piracy and illegal fishing in Somali territorial waters; and illegal charcoal trafficking from Africa to the GCC states.

Georgetown University’s Harry Verhoeven initiated the group discussion by suggesting that there are three principal paradigms that can serve as a guiding analytical framework through which we can study the politics of natural resources within the Middle East. The first is a fundamentally positivist approach, which conceives of the natural world as a separate realm that is disconnected from the actions of human beings. Within this framework, politics is withdrawn from the equation, and development and environment can be reconciled, particularly through technological intervention and innovation. A second paradigm is resoundingly negativist and Malthusian, conceiving of human behavior as ultimately destructive in relation to the environment. A third paradigm suggests that human society and the environment are inexorably entwined; and thus, any conversation concerning the environment is fundamentally political.

Following Verhoeven’s largely theoretical discussion, Wessel Vermuelen presented a paper titled “Scarcity Derives Economic Development: The Effect of Energy Subsidies on Export Diversification in the Middle East.” Vermuelen tests the effect of energy subsidies on export diversification, particularly focusing on varieties of exports, and the number of export destinations. His research points out that energy subsidy reform remains a critical challenge in many developing countries, and particularly within the Middle East and North Africa. Subsidy reform is considered difficult to implement due to resistance from both the general population and the private sector. However, over the longer term, reductions in energy subsidies remain inevitable if the Middle Eastern states are economically integrated with the rest of the world and advanced economies in particular.

Building on Vermuelen’s paper, Jeannie Sowers offered an examination of “The Evolution of Environmental and Social Mobilization in the Middle East.” Through her research Sowers explores the changes and continuities in patterns of environmental mobilization as seen across the region. Sowers situates Middle Eastern environmental mobilization within broader studies of activism, social mobilization, and state-society relations. Her analysis draws attention to existing structural economic and ecological challenges across the region, and discusses which of these have proved more salient to environmental activism. Sowers also identifies the dominant forms of environmental mobilization seen in the Middle East, from the popular campaign (hamla), to the state-donor project (mashru’), as well as the mobilization driven by NGOs. In her paper, Sowers draws on the popular environmental campaigns that occurred in Egypt and Lebanon.

Jill Crystal shifted the group’s focus to the Arabian Peninsula, presenting a paper on “Securitization of Natural Resources in the Gulf.” Crystal examines the political construction of a broad security framework in the GCC states insofar as natural resources are concerned. She argues that when the GCC’s critical energy infrastructure was threatened by terrorism, governments created a language of anti-terrorism and developed a discourse of securitization to frame energy resources. After the Arab uprisings, new modes of authoritarian behavior have been observed across the region, and the securitization discourse has infiltrated a number of domains. Amongst other things, in her paper Crystal argues that the historical trade-off between political quiescence and economic satisfaction has been replaced by political quiescence in exchange for security.

Ali Al-Keblawy sharpened the focus on the Arab states of the Persian Gulf further through his paper “The Greening of the Gulf,” in which he claims that the landscape and vegetation of deserts in the Arab states of the Persian Gulf have been significantly altered during the last fifty years by a variety of factors. These factors include: livestock grazing, off-road vehicle use, urbanization and its attendants, oil exploration and production activities, and introduction of exotic species. Several other factors have slowed natural recovery of the desert vegetation after disturbance, some of the most notable of which include unpredictability and scarcity of rainfall, repeated drought, extreme high temperatures, intense sun light, high wind storms, and the low fertility of desert soils. However, many of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf paid too much attention to the recovery and greening of the deteriorated landscapes. Al-Keblawy argued that working with, not against, the harsh conditions of the environment would help in creating a sustainable green landscape. He suggests a number of alternatives that include, among others, plantation of native trees, genetic modification of crops, sea watering, and usage of halophytes.

Another paper, by Abbas Maleki, focused on “The Politics of Natural Resources in the Caspian Sea.” Maleki claims that the Caspian region today is a zone of interest to the United States, Russia, European Union, China, Turkey, Japan, Iran and India, largely because of its promising oil and gas resources. These resources exceed those of the North Sea. Under the bottom of this trans-boundary body of water, which is the largest lake in the world, there is four percent of the world gas and oil reserves. Given the amount of oil and gas reserves, Maleki argues that the geo-economic power has not fully surpassed more traditional, military control of territory in this context, which continues to be complex on several geopolitical scale. In his paper, he studies the geopolitics, ecosystem, energy politics and economics, and legal debates insofar as the natural resources in the Caspian Sea are concerned.

Francis Ghiles and Eckart Woertz’s contribution focused on “Tunisian Phosphates and the Politics of the Periphery.” In their paper, the authors presented a historic overview of Tunisian phosphate mining and its role in regional development. They also analyzed the politics of Tunisia’s periphery, Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail’s role within it, and the emergence of new social actors. They presented a detailed examination of how such conflicts played out during the strikes in the phosphate mines in 2008 and after 2011, concluding with some thoughts on possible future developments.

Maria Snoussi provided a critical review on coastal sand mining in Morocco through her paper on “The State, Business, and Morocco’s Environmental Strains: The Case of Coastal Sand Mining.” Snoussi investigates the main causes that have impeded the authorities to effectively manage sand mining. She argues that these causes lie in the lack of comprehensive and integrated policies governing coastal sand resources, and the weakness and lack of enforcement of legal frameworks. This is compounded by a shortsighted vision on the potential value of the coast as a natural capital. Finally, Snoussi argues that only a decisive policy shift toward resource conservation, integrated coastal zone management, and legal reforms regarding sand mining could lead to a different outcome.

Afyare Abdi Elmi led a discussion on his research on “Piracy and Illegal Fishing from Somalia to the Middle East.” Elmi argues that Somalia’s territorial waters are of critical importance and that seventy percent of the Middle East’s transit goes through the Gulf of Aden. Elmi points out that the piracy that has been dominating Somali waters is rooted in a previous history of illegal fishing from vessels originating from Yemen, Iran, and other Middle East countries. Elmi provides a deep analysis of the political and economic explanations and consequences of the causes of piracy, the links to illegal fishing, as well as how this particular political economy is connected to the Middle East. His research suggests five principal causes: statelessness or weak statehood; profit; business opportunities; illegal overfishing; and toxic waste material dumping.

Finally, Illyaa Gridneff shared the findings on “Illegal Charcoal Trafficking in the Middle East.” Gridneff has investigated the economic and environmental consequences of the illegal charcoal trade in Somalia that have led to political tensions on the local, regional and international levels. His work suggests that illegal charcoal trade links Somalia to the Middle East and particularly Arab states of the Persian Gulf. In southern Somalia, acacia tress have been cut and burned to create charcoal and subsequently exported to the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. The demand for Somali charcoal, which is one of the world’s finest, and the income that comes with it, has led to competition over influence in Somalia between African Union forces and neighboring countries on the one hand, and aboriginal forces in Somalia, Al Shabab, on the other. The Somali charcoal trade, a source of income to Al Shabab, constitutes an environmental as well as a political and security threat to both Somalia as well as to the broader Middle East and Africa regions.

See the meeting agendaRead participant biographiesRead more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarJill Crystal, Auburn UniversityAli El-Keblawy, University of SharjahAfyare A. Elmi, Qatar UniversityFrancis Ghilès, Barcelona Center for International Affairs (Cidob)Ilya Gridneff, Sahan ResearchIslam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarUmber Latafat, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarAbbas Maleki, Sharif University of Technology in TehranSuzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarMaria Snoussi, Université Mohammed V, MoroccoJeannie Sowers, University of New HampshireHarry Verhoeven, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarWessel N. Vermeulen, University of OxfordElizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

The Impossibility of Palestine: History, Geography and the Road Ahead
2016-04-05 18:00 - 19:00 (Europe/Moscow)
Mehran Kamrava, Professor and Director of the Center for International and Regional Studies at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue lecture to discuss the findings of his most recent book, The Impossibility of Palestine: History, Geography and the Road Ahead (Yale University Press, 2016), on April 5, 2016. Explaining why he felt the need to write this book, Kamrava said that what he had learnt about Palestine as a student and professor of the Middle East bore little resemblance to the reality of what he experienced when he began conducting fieldwork in Palestine. He recalled this disconnect by noting, “I was immediately struck, while I was on the ground, by the inconsistency between my own assumptions—what I had studied and what I had thought about over the years—and the reality on the ground.” Kamrava argued that the Oslo Accords, an exciting development in the stalemate of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, offered little to alleviate the struggle of Palestinians and lead to further entrenchment of the continued struggle raging on the ground.

Introducing the thesis of his book, Kamrava explained: “If you think about Palestinian history, Palestinian society, and Palestinian politics, a Palestinian state is impossible. The realities on the ground as they have unfolded have made a Palestinian state impossible and improbable.” However, he continued by saying “a Palestinian nation, or, more specifically, a Palestinian national identity will continue to live on and will be extremely vibrant. In fact, the vibrancy of Palestinian identity—of what it is to be Palestinian lies largely because of the impossibility of the Palestinian state.”

In order to examine this thesis more closely, Kamrava adumbrated three complicated reasons that have made a Palestinian state impossible. The first of these is a result of the complex political forces that have shaped Palestinian history and continue to dictate its current predicament and future direction. Within this category, Kamrava examined four subsets of these political dynamics, including Israel’s military and territorial conquest and defeat of an ill-equipped Palestine in 1948; the subsequent decades of Israel’s ethnic cleansing of Palestinians through outright violence as well as through “legal” administrative policies resulting in the stealthy “silent transfer” of Palestinian communities from their historical homelands; the systematic defeat of Palestinian armed struggle taken up since the 1970s; and, finally, the international community’s betrayal of the Palestinian leadership in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords.

The second reason for the impossibility of Palestine, Kamrava explained, is due to the debilitating geographic segregations introduced after the Oslo Accords. Palestinian mobility became increasingly restricted with the division of the West Bank into three separate territories: Area A, under Palestinian control; Area B, under Israeli military control and Palestinian civil and administrative control; and Area C, under complete Israeli control. “This,” he said, “is result of the Oslo Accords. This is the Palestine that the Palestinian leadership agreed to.” These political dynamics conspired to divide Palestinian territories into a series of dysfunctional and ungovernable entities, thus disempowering Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation and undermining any notion of a future Palestinian state.

The third, and most consequential, reason for the impossibility of a Palestinian state is the critical changes that have been taking place in Palestinian society, and the multiple factions therein. Kamrava stated that, despite their eagerness to offer assistance, a multitude of civil society and non-governmental organizations have, in many ways, hampered the constitution of a Palestinian state. While these organizations have often been supportive, they are, ultimately, beholden to their foreign funders, who then dictate where support can be given and where it should be withheld. Many of these decisions have been politically motivated, seriously curtailing the areas in which civil society organizations are allowed to operate. Over the years, the proliferation of such organizations has meant that non-governmental support has developed its own type of bureaucratic bankruptcy. Kamrava explained that “with unintended consequences, Palestinian society, today, in the West Bank and to a lesser extent in Gaza, has become paralyzed because of the work of these civil society organizations.”

Kamrava concluded with what the road ahead might look like for Palestine, and offered three possible scenarios for the future of Palestine. The first of these is the model of a national rebirth in the wake of almost total annihilation, similar to Poland in the post-WWII period; the second is a model in which a nation is overtaken almost entirely by another civilization, similar to modern-day Tibet; and, finally, the third is a model in which a community of people are deliberately segregated into islands of deprivation, similar to the dispossession of native populations in America and Australia.

Mehran Kamrava is Professor and Director of the Center for International and Regional Studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Qatar. He is the author of a number of journal articles and books, including, most recently, The Impossibility of Palestine: History, Geography, and the Road Ahead (2016); Qatar: Small State, Big Politics (2015); The Modern Middle East: A Political History since the First World War, 3rd ed. (2013); and Iran’s Intellectual Revolution (2008). His edited books include Fragile Politics: Weak States in the Greater Middle East (2016); Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East (2015); The Political Economy of the Persian Gulf (2012); The Nuclear Question in the Middle East (2012); and The International Politics of the Persian Gulf (2011).

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

CIRS Hosts Reception for Dean Nonneman
2016-04-18 18:00 - 20:00 (Europe/Moscow)
CIRS hosted a reception for Gerd Nonneman, dean of Georgetown University in Qatar, on April 18, 2016. The reception was attended by Georgetown University in Qatar faculty, students, and staff, as well as members of the Qatar community, including diplomats, community leaders, and invited members of the general public. Gerd Nonneman served as dean of Georgetown University in Qatar for five years, a period in which he oversaw a series of institutional developments leading to an expansion of the Qatar campus, an increase in specialized faculty, establishment of the Arabic heritage program, and sustained community engagement. Although Nonneman is stepping down as dean of the university, he will return to Georgetown University in Qatar as a professor and researcher in the coming academic year.

Dr. Gerd Nonneman, Professor of International Relations & Gulf Studies, holds an M.A. in Middle East Politics (1985) and Ph.D. in Politics (1993) from the University of Exeter. He also holds Licentiates in Oriental Philology (Arabic) (1980) and Development Studies (1981) from the University of Ghent, Belgium. Prior to his appointment as dean, he served as Professor of International Relations & Middle East Politics, and Al-Qasimi Professor of Gulf Studies at the University of Exeter, where he has also directed the Institute of Arab & Islamic Studies and the Center for Gulf Studies. A former Executive Director of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies (BRISMES), he is also a Council member of the World Congress for Middle Eastern Studies (WOCMES). Aside from his academic work, he has worked in the private sector in the Gulf region, and acted as a consultant to a range of companies, NGOs, governments and international institutions. Dean Nonneman is Associate Editor of the Journal of Arabian Studies (Routledge). Among his recent publications are: Al-Mamlaka Al-‘arabiyya al-sa’udiyya fi-l-mizan [Saudi Arabia in the Balance] (updated Arabic edition: Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies, 2012); ‘Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States: Elite Politics, Street Protests and Regional Diplomacy’ (Chatham House, 2011); ‘Europe, the US, and the Gulf after the Cold War’, in V. Mauer & D. Möckli (eds.), European-American Relations and the Middle East: From Suez to Iraq (Routledge, 2010); ‘Terrorism and Political Violence in the Middle East and North Africa: Drivers and Limitations’, in A. Siniver (ed.), International Terrorism post 9/11 (Routledge, 2010); ‘Political Reform in the Gulf Monarchies: From Liberalisation to Democratisation? A Comparative Perspective’, in A. Ehteshami & S. Wright (eds.), Reform in the Middle East Oil Monarchies (Reading: Ithaca Press, 2008); Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs (New York University Press, 2006); ‘EU-GCC Relations’, (Gulf Research Center, 2006); and Analyzing Middle East Foreign Policies (Routledge, 2005).

Highly Skilled Migration to the Gulf in Comparative Perspective Working Group I
2016-06-01 08:30 - 2016-06-02 14:00 (Europe/Moscow)
On June 1-2, 2016, The Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) hosted a working group on “Highly Skilled Migrants: The Gulf and Global Perspectives.” This working group is an outcome of a joint research project on Highly Skilled Migrants in Qatar that Zahra Babar, CIRS Associate Director, and two co-collaborators, Nabil Khattab of the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, and Michael Ewers of Qatar University’s Social and Economic Survey Research Institute recently began working on. The working group provided Babar, Khattab, and Ewers with the opportunity to share their preliminary research results and receive feedback. A number of other scholars with regional and global experience on the topic of skilled migration were invited to present on their own research during the working group. The gathering allowed the group to revisit some of the fundamental assumptions about the nature, patterns, and processes of labor migration to the Gulf region, through the lens of highly skilled migration.

Zahra Babar, Michael Ewers and Nabil Khattab started the discussion by introducing their pilot project on “Highly Skilled Migrants in Qatar.” They shared the results of a survey of 300 highly skilled migrants that was carried out in Qatar in January 2016 and also some of the preliminary findings of a few in-depth interviews that they have carried out in the past month. The survey and qualitative interviews address a number of areas, including among other things: highly skilled migrants’ careers and professional lives in Qatar, motivations and drivers for coming to the country and reasons for staying, human capital development— both the tacit skills and know-how that they contribute to their work, organizations and the country— and their values and aspirations relating to their mobility, as well as life strategies and future aims and life strategies.

Building on the first session and allowing for a very interesting comparative geographic perspective, Micheline van Riemsdijk led a discussion on the “Integration of Highly Skilled Migrants in the Workplace: A Multi-Scalar Model” which is focused on highly skilled migrants in Scandinavia. Dr. van Riemsdijk’s research examines the integration of foreign-born skilled migrants within Norway’s petroleum industry. Just as in Qatar and in other hydrocarbon producers, Norway draws on an international workforce to populate its petroleum industry. Through her study of foreign-born engineers and other highly skilled migrants in Norway’s petroleum industry, Dr. Van Riemsdijk argues that integration and retention of skilled migrants is essential to the success of the sector, as these foreign workers contribute to knowledge creation and innovation in their host countries. Van Riemsdijk has developed a multi-scalar model to assist her in studying the socio-cultural integration of skilled migrants in the workplace. This model includes several interdependent variables that influence the integration of skilled migrants in the workplace, including societal values, industry characteristics, companies, managers, and the agency of migrants. This model can be useful to the broader literature on immigrant integration and international skilled migration.

Mathias Czaika led a group discussion on “High-Skilled Migration Policies and Practices in Emerging Economies.” Dr. Czaika’s research focuses on emerging economics, in particular the “BRICS plus” of Brazil, Russia, India, China, Turkey and Indonesia, as “new hubs” of global migration that are drawing highly skilled workers. Dr. Czaika’s work on recent developments in migration policy-making reveals that in highly developed (mostly OECD) states, policies to attract the highly skilled are implemented, as are carefully crafted migration policies that allow for selectively allowing the highly skilled to immigrate. The newly emerging migration hubs of the BRICS plus are at a different stage of development, and as a result they are experiencing a “migration policy transition”. Dr. Czaika concluded by suggesting that the “global race for talent” is not so much a race for the new migration hubs as it is for the old.

Martin Hividt’s presentation was on the role and impact of highly skilled migrants in developing economies of the GCC. Dr. Hvidt’s research demonstrates that the contribution of highly skilled migrants to the GCC is vital, particularly given the focus on creating a knowledge economy. While highly skilled migrants are certainly an important component of the skilled labor force, in larger and more mature industrialized societies, in the GCC the countries could not transform into knowledge-based economies without the international skilled workforce.

Payal Banerjee shifted the regional focus once again, by sharing her research on Indian IT workers in the United States technology sector. Dr. Banerjee’s research helps us to unpick and think through some of the binaries that exist that suggest that migrants who are “skilled and highly skilled” face less exploitation or obstacles in their lives than migrants who are considered “low skilled.” Dr. Banerjee’s work suggests that there is in fact a fluidity to migration categories and visa classes. Her works demonstrates how the development of capitalism and neo-liberal economic globalization have impacted the creation of immigrant categories and work visas in the United Sates, such as the H-1B, L-1, and B-1. According the Dr. Banerjee these visa programs allow for the differential construction of immigrant statuses in terms of producing different entitlements, pay-scales, rights, and protections under law. Banerjee argues that there is a troubling disjuncture between the neoliberal rhetoric of “free market” policies and the daily practices of subordination and control witnessed in the methods of subcontracting-based immigrant recruitment.

Building up on the differences between migrants in terms of governing and rights, Binod Khadria discussed “The Gulf Divide: Indian Highly Skilled vs. Labor Migrants.” He examined whether the so-called “Asian Century” has sowed the seeds of a paradigm shift in the GCC states, ushering in a change of trend in the ratio of “knowledge workers” to “service workers.” More Indians are migrating as generic workers and students with varying endowments of knowledge, experience, and training. These migration trends turned high-skill migration to the GCC states from “occupation-tied” to “occupation-wide.”

The last session was led by Neha Vora on “Western ‘Experts’ in an Age of Knowledge Economy.” Dr. Vora explored the experiences of highly-skilled migrant workers who have been hired for their expertise to develop GCC’s knowledge economies. These highly-skilled migrants, who are predominantly Westerners, include: consultants, administrators, and educators in all areas of research, development, and education sectors, and primarily those who participate in projects of liberal education. Vora examined the role of “whiteness” and self-segregation in Western migrant experiences, whether they rehearse earlier colonial and civilizational attitudes to projects of development and modernity, and their articulations of their place within highly stratified ethno-racial and class regimes of migration and labor.

​

See the meeting agenda
Read participant biographies
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Payal Banerjee, Smith College
Mathias Czaika, University of Oxford
Michael Ewers, The Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI) at Qatar University
Islam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Binod Khadria, Jawaharlal Nehru University
Nabil Khattab, Doha Institute for Graduate Studies
Martin Hvidt, Zayed University
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Micheline van Riemsdijk, University of Tennessee
Neha Vora, Lafayette College
Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

Leading the Faithful: The Role of Religious Authorities in the Middle East Working Group I
2016-08-22 09:00 - 2016-08-23 15:00 (Europe/Moscow)
On August 22-23, 2016, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) held the first working group meeting under its research initiative on the topic of “Leading the Faithful: The Role of Religious Authorities in the Middle East.” During the course of the two days, scholars identified a number of key gaps in the literature on the position and role of religious leaders of different communities present in the Middle East, as well as broader themes relating to the issue of religious authority across the region as a whole.

The Working Group commenced with a discussion led by Dr. Reem Meshal on “The Crisis of Religious Authority in Egypt and the Arab Spring.” In particular, Meshal raised three current crises relating to the issue of religious authority in the Middle East that need further scrutiny: the crisis over who demonstrates legitimate religious authority in Sunni Islam, the crisis of revitalized sectarianism, and the crisis in the academy produced by limiting our understanding of religious orthodoxy via the secular critique. Meshal suggested that in Egypt it is challenging to identify a religious leader who hold a monopoly over authority over Sunni Islam. Many contending and oppositional sources, like Al Azhar and the Muslim Brotherhood, claim to speak for Sunni Islam, but none can serve as sole authority over it. Recently, spreading sectarianism is another crisis that has produced most visible results in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, and to an extent in Egypt and also points to a crisis in religious authority. Additionally, Meshal raised a question of whether we might be in the midst of a “third reformation period” of Islamic history where state actors and technocrats presume to speak for religion. Meshal stressed the need to question orthodoxy in a more nuanced and complex manner than what is provided by the secular critique, and to address it as a process that is constructed, rather than given.

Dr. Sajjad Rizvi moved the discussion forward by raising areas of inquiry related to “The Changing Marjaiyyat and Shiite Religious Authority in the Middle East.” Rizvi started his discussion with the impact of certain moments in the history of the Middle East on Shiite religious authority. He discussed the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and how it further established the idea that clerics possess authority; and the Iraq war of 2003, and how it raised the question of who is going to take over religious authority. Rizvi also discussed the structures of Islam in Shiite theology, and how they are more resilient than those of Sunni Islam. Rizvi followed this discussion by a series of questions that, he believes, are understudied. Amongst other interesting and original research questions Rizvi identified the following: how is a Marja produced now days? What are the impacts of social media, new media, new forms of communication on the role and relationship of the Marjayyat and believers? How are the financial flows and networks of the Marjas managed? And how has the militarization and militia-making changed the role of the Marjayyat? Additionally, Rizvi raised some very interesting points relating to the relationship amongst different Shiite clerics, as well as on the difference between traditional mode of religious authority, networks arranged around piety of particular figures and their philanthropic work, and contemporary figures that take on different and broader roles. Rizvi also questioned what impact class, ethnicity, and race play producing Shiite religious leadership, and whether a Marja could be produced outside of Najaf and Qom.

Robert Bianchi led a discussion on the topic of “Religious Authorities and the Politics of Hajj in the Middle East.” Bianchi raised four main themes that could benefit from extended study, and would add to the existing scholarship. First of all, Bianchi suggested that it is important to consider the implications of the changing demographic composition of Hajj pilgrims, who are no longer primarily for Arab states, but rather from Asia and elsewhere. This demographic change has had implications for power relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and other Muslim majority states. Secondly, Bianchi suggested that over the past few decades the management of Hajj has become increasingly internationalized with a number of other states and private sector actors involved in management and organization of the Hajj, and this also needs to be more closely examined. As a third area of research, Bianchi suggested studying Hajj as part of the global pilgrimage system, and from a comparative and complementary perspective. The Hajj has seldom been in comparison to other religious pilgrimage global as performed by devotees of other faiths, and it would be interesting to provide this new and comparative framing of Hajj. And finally Bianchi offered the suggestion of discussion to what extent there are possibilities for reinventing, reforming or re-imagining the Hajj, to make it both more practical as well as more inclusive.

Stephane Dudoignon led a session on Iran, focusing on the role of “Sunni Religious Leaders and Inter-Confessional Relations in Iran.” Dudoignon argued that the re-activation of historical memory of religious minority identity versus majority identity had cemented the complex interaction of interests between the Shiite and Sunni religious binary in Iran. Iran also provides an interesting case-study for examining what role local religious authorities play in a context where tribal identity and transnational affiliations also exist. Amongst other understudied areas of research on Iran, Dudoignon suggested the need to carry out a study of the Sunni ulama as a distinct power group within Iran, to deepen our understanding of the complex interaction between the Sunni and Shiite “universes,” to examine how Iranian religious authorities articulate or engage with ethnic, tribal, religious, and linguistic identity in Iran, and finally the role of Sunni clerics in secularizing Iran.

Zachary Wright and Usama Alony discussed “Personalized Religious Charisma in Jihadi Islamist Circles.” Wright started with a broad discussion on long-standing theological debates around leadership and authority amongst religious scholars of different Islamic schools of thought. Wright highlighted the importance of examining the development of doctrine in Salafi Jihadi circles. Following this, Alony spoke about variations in core ideologues of different Salafi religious authorities associated with different transnational movements. Based on qualitative research conducted in Syria in 2013 with interviews of a number of military leaders of various Jihadi movements in Syria, Alony provided details on who these Jihadi leaders are, where they come from, what their ideology is, and how they see themselves and their lives post-civil war Syria. Alony stated that based on his field research he would suggest that while religious leadership continues to be important, it is not the sole motivator for Jihadi militant groups in Syria. Wright and Alony suggested that it is important to address gaps in the scholarship on the religious authority and legitimacy of Daesh, and on the subject of charismatic leadership and different sources of religious authority in Salafi groups more broadly.

Leon Goldsmith, Albert de Jong, and Michael Leezenberg all provided focused case-studies on different, smaller religious communities in the Middle East. Leon Goldsmith provided a lot of insight on the topic of “Alawite Religious Leadership, the State, and Politics in the Levant.” In his discussion, Goldsmith suggested that it currently it is not clear whether religious leadership continues to be of real importance for Syrian Alawites and whether Alawite religious figures remain influential. It could be argued that decades of Ba’athism successfully coopted, dismantled, or significantly limited the authority of Alawite religious figures and limited their ability to influence decision-making for and by the community. In terms of broader gaps in our understanding, Goldsmith suggested that there was limited work on actually defining Alawite identity and whether Alawite religious leaders attempt to influence the formation and development of Alawite identity. Goldsmith also discussed the publication of the Alawite Declaration in April of this year, which could be considered an historic turning point as it attempted to dismiss previously existing notions of Alawite identity. Among other gaps in the literature Goldsmith stated that this project should attempt to provide further study on the following suggested topics: Alawite Religious Leadership in the Levant (who, where, what etc), the Importance and Influence of Alawite religious leadership on the Community, Alawite Religious Authority and State Co-optation in Syria and Turkey, and Fragmentation or Unity in Crisis: Current Status of Alawite Religious Leadership.

Albert de Jong led a discussion on a very understudied community in the Middle East about whom little is known, the Mandaeans. De Jong commenced his session on “Mandaean Tarmida, Mandaean Identity, and Religious Authorities in Iraq and Iran” by stating that there is very limited scholarship on Mandaeans in contemporary times, and what work does exist tends to be historical. As such there are multiple gaps and questions that need to be addressed. Among other areas to study de Jong identified two in particular worth exploring within this topic: the dissolution of religious diversity in the Middle East, and the death of a religion, or how does a religion die? Does it really die out or transform into something else? In both these topics multiple communities facing similar dilemmas could be incorporated into the discussion, the Mandaeans, Zorastrians, and Yezidis. Michael Leezenberg concluded the working group with a discussion on “Shabak and Yezidi Religious Leaders and the Iraqi State.” Leezenberg started his discussion with questioning if Iraq is currently a full functioning “state.” During his presentation Leezenberg highlighted some interesting areas of original research that ought to be undertaken on Shabak and Yezidi religious leaders. Among other things he suggested that it was necessary to study how the recent spate of violent upheaval across the Middle East is affecting these communities, and in particular how the growing instability has shaped the leadership of these groups. Are there in fact even distinct religious leadership bodies for these groups that engage with state and non-state actors in Iraq?

The discussions reflected the significance of the role religious leaders play in the Middle East through their interactions with both sates and publics. They also revealed the extent to which this significant role is understudied in scholarship, especially in light of the developments that swept the region post the 2011 Arab uprisings. Through the aforediscussed topics, this research initiative addresses an increasingly important but largely understudied topic in Middle Eastern studies.

See the working group meeting agenda
Read participants’ biographies
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Usama Alony, Northwestern University in Qatar
Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Robert Bianchi, Shanghai International Studies University
Albert de Jong, Leiden University
Stéphane Dudoignon, French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRF)
Nazarbayev University of Astana, Kazakhstan
John Fahy, Georgetown University in Qatar
Leon Goldsmith, Massey University and University of Otago, New Zealand
Islam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Michiel Leezenberg, University of Amsterdam
Reem Meshal, Qatar University
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Sajjad Rizvi, University of Exeter
Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Zachary Wright, Northwestern University in Qatar

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

Pluralism and Community in the Middle East Working Group II
2016-09-18 09:00 - 2016-09-19 15:00 (Europe/Moscow)
On September 18–19, 2016, CIRS held a second working group under its research initiative on “Pluralism and Community in the Middle East.” Over the course of two days, working group participants presented draft papers examining pluralism and diversity within the contemporary Middle East, addressing amongst other things: how governance and legal regimes incorporate or engage with issues of plural communities; how architecture and urbanism in the Middle East reflect changing notions of identity and inclusion; iconoclasm and heritage destruction undertaken by the Islamic State (IS); education in plural societies of Lebanon and Syria; the economic conditions of Sunni communities in Iran; the evolution of Armenian nationalism and identity in the Middle East; race, ethnicity, and identity in Iran; and Qatari social structure.

The working group commenced with a presentation of Kathleen Cavanaugh’s paper on “Governance and Legal Regimes in the Middle Eastern Plural Society.” In her paper, Cavanaugh appraises the normative universalism of human rights principles in addressing issues of pluralism and inclusion, examines how these principles have influenced governance in the Middle East, and provides a robust critique of ‘secularism’ as being the prescriptive means by which to foster greater inclusion in the Middle East. Cavanaugh’s paper suggests that that there is a need to undertake a pragmatic assessment of the ways in which the language of the “universal” and the “secular” have actually suffocated voices of diversity and allowed states to suppress culture and identity.

Nezar Al Sayyad presented his paper “On the Changing Identity of Architecture and Urbanism in the Middle East during the Era of Globalization.” Al Sayyad argues that the Middle East serves as a convincing geographical space from which to argue that “universal modernism” is only or at least mainly a European phenomenon. The permanently hybrid and evolving nature of architecture and urbanism in the Middle East make it impossible to accept an inflexible or static idea of what is “universal.” Al Sayyad’s paper suggests that the history of the world demonstrates a movement towards greater cultural differentiation as opposed to homogenization, and at an individual level this means that a person considers himself or herself to simultaneously hold multiple affiliations and identities. If hybridity is also accepted as an inherent constituent of national identity, this means the ensuing forms of urbanism must be accepted as only a reflection of a specific transitional stage or era within any society. Since culture has become increasingly placeless, urbanism will likely become one of the few remaining arenas where one may observe how local communities and nations mediate the tensions between the local and the global.

James Barry tackled another facet of the question of identity in the Middle East through his paper on “Millet Ethnicity: Christianity, Islam, and the Politics of Armenian Identity in the Modern Middle East.” He claims that the Armenian perception of “Armenian Muslims” as a contradiction is gradually being challenged, although the centrality of Christianity, nominal or otherwise, to Armenian identity still holds fast. In the Turkish context, the ethnic gulf that separates the Armenian-Christian from the Turkish-Muslim remains a potent legacy of the millet system, which in the modern context has “ethicized” religious identities. He also argues that in the Armenian Diaspora, there has been a change in attitude towards Muslim people of Armenian descent who are living in Turkey. Finally he claims that the contemplation of the potential Armenian-ness of both the Hopa Hemshin and the Islamized Armenians, coupled with the enthusiastic engagement by the Diaspora with these two groups, demonstrates that there is a change afoot in modern conceptions of what it is to be an Armenian, and indeed to be a Turk.

Following Barry’s discussion, Taghreed Al-Deen discussed “Cultural Cleansing and Iconoclasm under the ‘Islamic State’: Attacks on Yezidi and Christian Humans/Heritage.” Al-Deen argues that the devastating brutality and heritage destruction carried out by the IS has included deliberate attacks against two of the most vulnerable minorities in Iraq and Syria: Yezidis and Christians. Such attacks on the human/heritage dimension of a given community ultimately rupture their identity, dismembering their connections to each other and to their collective past. More to the point, attacks by the IS on Christian sites such as the Armenian church in Deir ez-Zour and the villages along the Khabur River appear to be deliberately designed to conjure sharp memories of the Armenian Genocide and the Siemele massacre. Re-enacting earlier waves of genocide allows the IS to connect their contemporary brutality—ideologically, temporally, physically—to those moments in Yezidi and Christian history that are most sensitive and painful. These attacks also intends to erase any vestige of a cosmopolitan and diverse Middle East towards the creation of a monolithic and oppressive caliphate governed by the most perverse interpretations of Islamic law.

Annika Rabo presented a paper on “Educating Citizens in Lebanon and Syria.” Rabo paper draws attention to criticism that Arab educational systems have frequently received, particularly for inadequately preparing pupils for managing contemporary challenges, and for failing to create an educational environment that develops and nurtures open-minded and creative future citizens. Rabo argues that, in any context all, elements of an educational system—from public policies of education, to classroom learning practices and teaching methods, to curriculum development and teacher training—are an essential place to examine how a state and society are managing larger issues of inclusion and exclusion. Through an in-depth examination of two comparative case studies on the evolution of educational systems in Lebanon and Syria, Rabo presents evidence of two very different approaches to managing pluralism and identity. In Lebanon, a society where pluralism and a more open and liberal approach to politics co-exist with highly politicized and at times sectarian identity issues, the educational system reflects ongoing struggles over curriculum and a lack of harmonious adoption of texts and teaching methods. As a result there exist a proliferation of schools catering to the country’s many different religious, linguistic, and ethnic communities, with the end result that parochial citizens are created who are cosmopolitan and engaged with the outside and broader world, but ill-equipped to negotiate the challenges of their own complex plural society. Syria in its pre 2011 form offered a stark contrast to Lebanon, at least within its educational system where there was suppression of ethnic, linguistic and religious identity, and an ideological approach of flattening identity down to a nationalistic unified identity with no acceptance of differences.

Afshin Shahi shifted the discussion to examine notions of inclusion and exclusion in Iran through a paper on “Economic Conditions of the Sunni Community in Modern Iran.” Shahi claimed that Sunni Iranians’ economic situation in modern time is multi-angled and influenced by various elements. Each of these elements had different level of importance in various historical periods. In their paper, Afshin Shahi and Ehsan Abdoh Tabrizi focus on the contemporary era of Pahlavi monarchy (1925-1979) and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Although they shed light on the general economic situation of the Sunni Iranians in general, the main focus is on ethnic Sunni Iranians, including the Baloch, Turkmens and Kurds, who still comprise the majority of Iran’s Sunni population. The authors argue that the uneven modernization and imbalanced growth brought by Pahlavi policies automatically disfavored Iran’s Turkmen, Kurdish and Baloch ethnicities, yet these policies were not driven by sectarianism or anti Sunni sentiment. Under the Islamic Republic, although certain economic elements of rural Iranians—including Sunni ethnic Iranians—have improved, the State’s economic policies still disfavor Sunni Iranians, like the Pahlavi policies, but this time such policies are driven by sectarianism and discrimination.

Following up on Shahi and Tabrizi’s paper, Firoozeh Kashni-Sabet presented her paper on “Colorblind or Blinded by Color?: Race, Ethnicity, and Identity in Iran” providing a historical review of the evolution of notions of race and skin color in modern Iran. Kashani-Sabet’s analysis of archived graphics and texts suggests that conversations about race in Iran, while rooted initially in linguistic and ethnic differences, and while far from color-blind, became more politicized over the course of the twentieth century. She further suggests that the production of knowledge about race, ethnicity and identity in Iran over the twentieth century moved away from colonial actors and institutions, and became instead the function of Iran’s state institutions, which at times reproduced the prejudices first introduced by colonial administrators. By the 1960s, however, even as the state remained stunted in its understandings of culture, ethnicity, and race, key Iranian intellectuals moved away from discourses of Aryanism and participated instead in the larger struggles of peoples and nations who had long been subjected to colonialism or racial discrimination.

Islam Hassan concluded the working group’s discussions with his paper on “Qatari Social Structure and the State: Problems of Inclusion and Exclusion.” Hassan claims that the historical narrative of the composition and evolution of Qatari society is an imaginaire that contributed to the reproduction of the current social inclusion and exclusion scheme. This historical narrative emphasizes on the role of Arab tribes in the inhabitation process, evolution of governing authority, and creation of statehood in Qatar disregarding a major faction of the society, particularly those of slave and Persian backgrounds. He also argues that the Qatari State has been playing a major role, by adopting a social conservatist approach, in maintaining and further stimulating the existing social hierarchy and inclusion and exclusion scheme. This can be viewed by examining two main issues: the State’s effort to narrow down the definition of the Qatari national identity; and articles of the constitution and legal system, symbols, and official history of Qatar that have been perpetuating the social inclusion and exclusion scheme through resisting marriages that could challenge the existing social order.

Mehran Kamrava, Director of the Center for International and Regional Studies, concluded the working group meeting by highlighting the participants’ contributions to scholarship through their papers, which will be published in an edited volume by CIRS in the near future.

See the working group meeting agenda
Read participants’ biographies
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Taghreed Jamal Al-deen, Deakin University, Melbourne
Nezar Al Sayyad, University of California
Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
James Barry, Deakin University, Melbourne
Islam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, University of Pennsylvania
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Firat Oruc, Georgetown University in Qatar
Annika Rabo, Stockholm University
Afshin Shahi, University of Bradford
Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

Strategic Forum on Gulf Security
2016-09-25 08:00 - 17:00 (Europe/Moscow) | Education City, Al Luqta St, Ar-Rayyan, Doha, Qatar
On September 25, 2016, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) at Georgetown University in Qatar in collaboration with the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA) at the National Defense University hosted a one-day workshop under the title “Strategic Forum on Gulf Security.” A number of distinguished scholars, experts, and policy-makers were convened to discuss current threats and concerns, and potential opportunities in some of the Persian Gulf’s countries, including: the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Iran. Participants also discussed the United States’ (US) positions on a number of these security concerns and opportunities.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states have been keen to protect their monarchies, and maintain the status quo in the Middle East by following more assertive foreign policies, and utilizing their financial capabilities to influence the political dynamics in the region. Five main perceived security concerns have been driving the active role of GCC states in the Middle East: the instability in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen; the uncertainty about the American priorities in the region; the rise of non-state actors such as the Islamic State; the profound fluctuations in the oil market; and the domestic social and economic challenges.

Regardless of internal disagreements, security remains a top priority for the GCC leaders, as do regional and domestic stability. Despite significant steps toward integration since its formation some thirty-five years ago, the GCC is still far from providing a model of security integration. GCC member states have different perceptions of their security threats, especially when it comes to Iran. Some perceive of Iran as having hegemonic aspirations in the region; and thus, pursue policies designed to undermine Iranian influence, especially in Yemen, Syria and Lebanon. Many GCC states are also developing advanced security systems in order to minimize possible cyber attacks on their oil facilities and other infrastructures.

Another priority of the GCC states has been maintaining rapid economic growth, which is central to regime legitimacy, and, by implication, security. Although largely immune from it, the GCC states are also concerned about the threat of domestic terrorism. These different perceptions among GCC states have undermined attempts at security integration, and especially collective efforts to develop a common missile security system directed at threats from Iran.

Considering these perceived threats, the participants argued that each of the GCC states would continue to think in national rather than collective terms. They will also invest heavily in their own security through arms purchases and weapons acquisition. There has been an increasing perception that the US is an unreliable ally, and, as a result, there is greater need for self-reliance.

Focusing on the UAE, the country’s security mood could be described as one of confidence as well as concern. The UAE is living through one of its most confident eras. At the same time, the country remains very concerned about the region and the pervasiveness of tension, extremism, violence, and sectarianism, which may spillover into its own territories. There are five main perceived security threats facing the UAE. The first threat is Iran as both an instant and a continuous threat. With the election of the Rouhani administration, Iran is perceived as more problematic, threatening, destabilizing than ever before. This perception of Iran is shared by some of the other GCC states, especially by Saudi Arabia. The threat from Iran has also escalated from being merely security oriented, to an ideological threat, with Wahhabism versus Khomeinism.

The second threat is the prolonged war in Yemen that needs to stop as soon as possible. This directly relates to a third threat, namely “the weak links between GCC member states.” Bahrain, Kuwait, and post-Qaboos Oman, and possibly even Saudi Arabia, are all weak links that challenge a strong and unified GCC. The last threat is the “post-US Persian Gulf.” President Obama’s foreign policy has encouraged GCC states to seek a path of less dependence on the US, and compensate for that by establishing relations and alliances with other global and regional powers.

The key challenge facing the UAE’s leadership is how to navigate between these concerns and opportunities. The UAE has invested in the most advanced security systems in order to shield itself from as many security challenges as possible, and has become more assertive and preemptive in confronting security threats. It has also been playing an active role at the regional level. On the international level, the UAE, through the GCC, has been establishing stronger ties with the European Union (EU), and is in talks to sign bilateral trade agreements with Britain. This regional and international activism is designed to prepare the country for the post-US Persian Gulf.

Insofar as Qatar is concerned, there are three levels of analysis from which to examine the Qatari leadership’s behavior: domestic politics, foreign policy, and security politics. In terms of domestic politics, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa tried to transform Qatar into the Singapore of the Persian Gulf. Articulating such a vision, and at the same time diving away from the shadows of Saudi Arabia, was facilitated by three main factors: social cohesion in Qatari society; absence of sectarian divides; and the absence of a parliament that resists the Emir’s agendas.

For Qatar, threat perceptions in the 1990s revolved around possible machinations by Saudi Arabia to reinstall in power the deposed emir, Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad. As the country became more stable under Sheikh Hamad’s rule, Qatar’s efforts at protecting its security turned into power projection. This projection of power often occurred through the country’s use of hedging as a foreign policy option. Accordingly, Qatar placed its security bet with the US, but also maintained ostensibly warm relations with states and non-state actors such as Iran, Hamas, and the Taliban. Qatar also sought to position itself as an honest broker for peace and negotiations. During and after the Arab Uprisings, Qatar saw the instability in the region as an opportunity rather than a threat, and capitalized on what it perceived as emerging opportunities.

However, Qatar’s overambitious assertions in regional foreign policy, particularly in Egypt and Libya, had some undesired consequences. A strong reaction from Saudi Arabia and other GCC actors, culminating in the withdrawal of the Saudi, Emirati, and Bahraini ambassadors from Doha, led to a change in a chastened Qatari foreign policy direction. Currently in Syria, for example, Qatar is no longer competing with Saudi Arabia for influence. Qatar’s relationship with the US has traditionally been close at multiple levels, and there are visible signs of this in terms of diplomacy, economy, culture, and security. Due to the robustness of its cooperation with the US, Qatar appears to be less concerned than other GCC states about US foreign policy in the region. Additionally, Qatar continues to develop its security partnerships with other Western states, as the recent arms deal with France demonstrates, and is also developing a strategic relationship with Turkey.

Iran’s perception of its security interests and threats have been going through a transitional phase following the signing of the nuclear deal. The Iranian leadership had assumed that the deal would help the country reprioritize its security threats and open up new opportunities for international engagement, but to date little of substance has changed. While the Iranians feel that they have fulfilled their side of the bargain, US and European leaders remain skeptical. As a result, the US has been discouraging Western companies and international banks from working with Iran. Currently Iranian foreign policy aims are to enhance the country’s relations with the EU, while also cooperating closely with Russia and China. When it comes to Iran’s foreign policy towards the Arab world, although there are still tensions with a number of Iran’s traditional regional rivals, the country has been keen to develop relations with a number of Arab states and non-state actors in the region.

US foreign policy towards the Persian Gulf region is seen as also being in a period of transition, with the view from the GCC being that the Americans are shifting their priorities to the eastern shore of the Persian Gulf, namely Iran. The Obama administration is considered to be unwilling to challenge Iran and uphold the interests of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. This uncertainty around US foreign policy towards the Persian Gulf region is driving GCC states to embark on reengineering their countries’ agendas in preparation for the transition to the post-US Persian Gulf.

At the end of the forum, Mehran Kamrava, Director of CIRS, and Richard L. Russell Professor of National Security Affairs at NESA gave their concluding remarks. They stressed on this forum’s contribution to a greater understanding of the current realities and high stakes of the security environment in the Persian Gulf region.

Read participants’ biographies

Presenters:

Abdulkhaleq Abdulla, Qatar University

Gawdat Bahgat, NESA, National Defense University

Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar

Mohammad Marandi, University of Tehran

Rory Miller, Georgetown University in Qatar

Richard Russell, NESA, National Defense University

Houchang Hassan Yari, Royal Military College of Canada

Participants:

LTC Sadiam Al Dhulaimi, Representative for Yemen, US Central Command

H.E. Bashir Al-Shirawi, Former Ambassador of Qatar to South Africa

LTC Mustafa Abdel Haleem Mohammad Alhyari, Jordan Armed Forces

Abdullah Baabood, Qatar University

Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar

Daniel Baltrusaitis, National Defense College of the UAE, and NESA, National Defense University

Kai-Henrik Barth, Georgetown University in Qatar

Abdelwahab El-Affendi, Doha Institute of Graduate Studies

Afyare Elmi, Qatar University

Glnar Eskandar, US Embassy

Ibrahim Fraihat, Brookings Doha Center

Lauren Granger, Georgetown University in Qatar

Islam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar

Hussein Heydari, Embassy of Iran

Ludovic Hood, US Embassy

H.E. Willy Kempel, Ambassador of Austria to Qatar

Kentaro Niimi, Embassy of Japan

CSM Cynthia Pritchett, (retired) US Central Command

James Reardon-Anderson, Georgetown University in Qatar

Jean-Marc Rickli, King’s College London

Marta Saldana, Georgetown University in Qatar

Youssef Shatilla, Masdar Institute of Science and Technology

Rana Shayya, US Embassy

Douw GJ Vermaak, Embassy of South Africa

Steven Wright, Qatar University

Luciano Zaccara, Qatar University

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

Transitions in Qatar’s Architectural Identity
2016-09-26 18:00 - 20:00 (Europe/Moscow)
Ibrahim Mohamed Jaidah, renowned Qatari Architect and Group CEO & Chief Architect of the Arab Engineering Bureau, was invited to deliver the inaugural CIRS Monthly Dialogue of the 2016-2017 academic year with a lecture on “Transitions in Qatar’s Architectural Identity” on September 26, 2016. The talk focused on the definitions of Qatari architecture; its history, influences, aesthetics, and the future of its development.

Jaidah explained that the history of the Gulf region in general, and Qatar in particular, has always been one of global influences through trade routes and contact with neighboring countries and cultures including Basra, Najd, Zanzibar, India, and Iran, among many others. Qatari culture, he said, has always been a blend of borrowings “from the way we dress, to our dialogue, to our cuisine, to our music,” and to the diversity of the local architecture. These are all products of historical learning.

Defining the history of Qatari architecture, Jaidah noted that it falls into broad time periods that can be categorized according to pre- and post-oil styles of development. He explained that, in a few decades, Qatar achieved what other nations strived to accomplish over centuries, and this incredibly rapid growth has had massive effects on the nation and its architectural growth and design. The transition from one period into another occurred relatively rapidly, where Qatari architecture that was once defined by haphazard mud houses in the pre-oil period, was quickly transformed with oil wealth in the immediate post-oil period to encompass a growing town defined by cement and bricks, and, in the contemporary period, a global city brandishing steel and glass towers.

The invention of cultured pearls in Japan in the 1930s brought about the decimation of the pearling industry in Qatar—its primary source of wealth—plunging the nation into poverty and affecting its architectural development. “In the pre-oil period,” he recalled, “the architecture was quite straightforward; simple houses, courtyard houses, that expanded as the families required.” The architecture of this time period was defined by respect to the environment, sourcing local materials and building according to optimum orientations to make best use of the natural weather conditions. Jaidah noted that “all natural materials were used, and that is why it was responsive to the environment and it was pleasant to live in.” In fact, “the only thing that was brought from abroad was the wood—because we didn’t have enough trees—which we call the danshal was brought from either Zanzibar, from Iran—usually recycled from other buildings—and from India,” he said.

The discovery of oil a few years later, set Qatar onto the path of industrial wealth and with it immediate effects on the growth of the urban environment. Although the styles of the buildings and the arcades remained largely the same, natural materials were gradually being replaced by cement and bricks and architectural lines became more even and straight. In central Doha, “the clock tower, I think, is one of the most important buildings, because it was the start of the new construction,” made of concrete and other manmade materials. The old Ottoman fort that was the center of administrative rule, was replaced with the first diwan amiri. “As soon as the Ottomans left, the first thing the ruler did was to build the diwan amiri there in different stages because it had the most prime and historical control of the whole bay,” Jaidah explained. This transitional period was defined by a blending of natural and manmade materials that were combined within the same buildings.

This immediate post-oil period was defined by increasing incoming wealth, which was being transformed into the design of the local landscape. Prosperous residents were able to commission, for the first time, architects from India, Pakistan, and Lebanon to build unique, art deco designs, full of motifs and symbolic flourishes, or what Jaidah calls, “Arabian deco.” During this period, there was a whole era in the 50s that, unfortunately until today, is not considered as part of Qatar’s history, and so buildings have been systematically demolished to make way for the new high-rises and urban developments. Jaidah noted that he had an opportunity to preserve some of these buildings, and to document others, before they were demolished. Today, the renovation of the Fire Station building and its re-purposing to accommodate art initiatives and galleries is an example of preserving the early modern history of Qatar. He noted that these buildings are crucial to the story of Doha; “it doesn’t have to be a mud house to become history. Our modern history is what is forming the new generation.”

In what Jaidah describes as the contemporary “post-oil period,” there was a boom of construction and urban developments in the 1990s and 2000s, especially with massive land reclamation projects and the development of West Bay, Lusail, and the Pearl island. With the government’s announcement that it would rent buildings and offices in West Bay, a construction race took place to take advantage of the new policy, leading to massive growth in the construction and infrastructure sectors. However, Jaidah said, “there was a sort of scary moment because architecture became a commodity,” and towers were being constructed within a few short months. In this period, architecture became more about unique, innovative, fashionable, and flagship designs that completed with each other, and with other countries, rather than serving a function or harmoniously fitting within the exiting cityscape. Jaidah admits that during this period, not many of these construction were environmentally sustainable and “mistakes happened” in the rush to compete.

However, he argued in conclusion, “there was a wakeup call,” and new regulations were put in place to guarantee a more sustainable style of urban development, which is important for the future of the landscape and the environment. In the contemporary period, the architectural development of Qatar is taking a more measured and mature stance and is involving leading international architects. Today, there is “the beauty of getting people from all over the world to participate and to…redefine what is culture,” and to preserve our history, not only in architecture but in other areas of cultural development. Today, there is a kind of “cultural revolution” reconnecting Qatar to its history and heritage by taking the local, vernacular architecture into the future. Today, Jaidah concluded, “there is a language that is being created, sensitive to the environment and to the culture”—one that is as respectful of the past as it is open to the future.

Ibrahim Mohamed Jaidah is a researcher and author of The History of Qatari Architecture and 99 Domes who grew up in the old neighbourhood Al Jasra in the heart of Doha. He ranks as a pioneer of a new architectural movement, which combines the far reaching influences of traditional Qatari architecture with modern style, creating memorable landmark structures that are helping to shape the developing State of Qatar. Jaidah is a highly recognized architect who has won numerous awards such as the Islamic Cities Award, the Arab Town Organization Awards, and has been nominated for the Agha Khan Awards. In 2005, Jaidah was honored with the medal of the State of Qatar Encouragement Award. His projects reflect the cultural, historical, and environmental contexts in which they exist. Ibrahim is a dedicated advocate for sustainability and is a co-founding member of the Qatar Green Building Council.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications.

The Resource Curse in the Gulf Working Group I
2016-10-09 09:00 - 2016-10-10 15:00 (Europe/Moscow)
On October 9-10, 2016, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) held a working group under a research initiative on “The ‘Resource Curse’ in the Gulf.” During the course of two days, assembled participants identified key gaps in the literature on rentier states of the Persian Gulf, while leading discussions on a variety of related subtopics: rent distribution and development of institutions; political legitimacy; military establishments in the Persian Gulf; stability and instability; human rights in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states; gender equality; entrepreneurship; and education, occupation, and Khaleeji youth.

The working group discussions commenced with a session led by Matthew Gray on “Rentier Wealth: Curse or Cure for the Gulf.” During his session Gray provided a broad overview of existing theories of the resource curse, and identified a number of questions relating to its application in the Persian Gulf. After presenting the main arguments on the resource curse that have been made by scholars over the past decades, Gray provided a review of several questions that remain understudied or that have not been adequately addressed. Amongst other things, Gray suggested that the issue of state autonomy in rentier states is not as empirically established as theory suggests it is, and in fact remains highly debatable. It is important to provide greater empirical evidence of rentier-driven state autonomy (or a lack thereof), and studying this question within the GCC states would provide for an original case study. Gray also argued for a deeper understanding of Gulf state capitalism, and particularly the role of elites and resource rents. In rentier states institutions and corporations may serve as tools for forging patrimonial networks. These social dynamics in state institutions and corporations raise a question on the extent to which patrimonial networks are steered and maintained by resource rents. Gray suggested another important research gap exists in terms of labor policies in hydrocarbon-rich states studied from an interdisciplinary context. Insofar as foreign relations and history are concerned, Gray pointed out that there has been no comprehensive work on developing a theory of international relations in the Persian Gulf that is centered on rents and resources. Finally, there is a need for a comprehensive history of rents and rentierism in the Persian Gulf, from pre-oil rentierism to post-oil rentierism.

Desha Girod led a discussion session on the topic of “Rent Distribution and the Development of Institution in the Gulf.” Girod has carried out a comparative research project examining the challenges that faced institutional development in very different sorts of resource-based economies. She has studied the historical evolution of institutions in two African states, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon, against developments in two GCC oil states, Kuwait and Oman. Girod’s findings suggest that pre-oil discovery is important when considering the evolution of institutions in rentier states. Her examination of Equatorial Guinea and Gabon suggested that the extractive economies that were developed by colonial powers weakened state institutions and destroyed existing social pluralism. The colonial legacy led to a particular development of institutions in these two nations. Kuwait and Oman did not experience the same sort of pre-oil extractive economic conditions through colonial domination, and colonial powers were not interested in intervening in the domestic politics of either of these two states. Based on her ongoing research, Girod suggested that further study is important to assess how certain conditions (such as weak institutions) conventionally attributed to the resource curse may be in fact be an artifact of an earlier curse (such as the colonialism or institutions developed to assist the colonial project of exploiting natural resources) that shaped the development of certain key institutions. Further research is also needed so that we have a stronger explanation than the current one in the literature that suggests that “weak” versus “strong” institutions can determine whether the resource curse is suffered or avoided. It is also important to study how institutions in the GCC evolved over time, through a historical study of the sorts of institutions that existed in the Gulf during the time of hydrocarbon discovery, and how these subsequently shaped the ways in which rents were used by the modern states that came into being. Another area of research suggested by Girod is on the role of external actors in the GCC, their impact on institution building and the use of rents.

Building on Girod’s discussion, Mehran Kamrava led a discussion on “Political Legitimacy and Scaling Back during an Oil Bust in the Gulf.” Kamrava claimed that there are differences among GCC states in terms of patterns of state building, social cohesion, rent-driven policies, relationship between ruling families and tribes, and bureaucracies. These differences are stimulated by implicit understandings between ruling families and other stakeholders, such as the merchants, pre and post-oil discovery. Stakeholders’ corporatism and marital bonds between ruling families and stakeholders contributed to the resilience and adaptability of the social contracts between ruling families and stakeholders; and thus to the establishment of enduring ruling bargains. Kamrava also argued that Persian Gulf states have reacted differently to fluctuations in oil prices. The variance in reactions raises a question: what are the conditions that shape states’ responses to changes in oil prices? Kamrava added that in countries where the State establishes strong clientelistic relationships with the merchant class through offering contracts, the merchant class becomes more dependent on the State, especially during times of downturn. How did entrepreneurial classes and States react in three different oil bust cycles? What was the relationship between state and business in previous oil cycles? And what does this tell us about institutional evolution between the three oil boom and bust cycles? Kamrava also claimed that States have responded to economic downturns by promoting nationalization of the labor force, which has decreased the efficiency of state institutions. Finally, Kamrava argued that identity politics captures public imagination rather than issues such as transparency and accountability. This questions how governments use salient concerns, during times of economic downturns, to influence social cohesion in the society.

Mohammad Reza Farzanegan focused his discussion on “Oil Rents and the Military in the Gulf.” Farzanegan raised seven original research questions that address critical gaps in the literature on the impact of oil revenues in rentier economies on military establishments. First, he claimed that a systematic analysis of the correlation between GCC military spending and oil prices is missing. Thus, what is the impact of positive and negative oil price shocks on military spending? Second, Farzanegan claimed that the effect of oil revenues on military spending depends on the level of corruption. This raises the question: how does the quality of political and economic institutions matter? Third, he argued that increasing military spending may increase political stability at higher levels of oil rent; while at lower levels of oil revenues, increasing military spending may require cutting social spending such as subsidies and other transfers, leading to reduction of life satisfaction of locals and higher political instability. Thus, it is critical to examine how do fluctuations in oil revenues matter insofar as the effect of military spending on political stability is concerned. Fourth, since Middle Eastern countries have one of the highest levels of military spending burden around the world, how does economic growth impact military spending? Fifth, is there a military spending threshold pegged to oil rents and growth? Sixth, Farzanegan discussed the youth bulge in the GCC, and how this can be a burden on governments if oil rents decrease. He asked if there is any moderating role of oil rents and military in the stability-youth nexus. Finally, Farzanegan highlighted the effect of oil rents on corruption, which questions how the involvement of military establishments in politics can impact corruption insofar as military spending is concerned.

Jessie Moritz led a discussion session on the topic of “Resource Rents and Stability/Instability in Gulf Societies.” Moritz argued that there is a difference between “resource abundance” and “resource dependence.” She stated that resource abundance promotes regime stability, but resource dependence promotes violent conflict or instability. In examining this issue, Moritz raised a series of questions, among which: what makes an individual, or a group of people, challenge the State? And how do states co-opt public dissatisfaction? Moritz also emphasized the importance of studying exceptions to rentier logic, rather than just focusing on commonalities between rentier economies. She claimed that studying these exceptions lead to another series of questions, such as: how effective has state co-optation been, especially on the subnational level? What causes subnational groups to move away from the royal court’s side, to the opposition’s side? Is political loyalty determined by rent distribution? What has happened to reformist groups, especially when oil prices are at a low? How effective will broader societal movements be? Will they be able to influence state policies? And will they side with particular factions of the regime against others?

Zahra Babar led a session on “Hydrocarbons and Human Rights in the GCC.” Babar suggested that the “universality” of human rights remains highly contested, with polarization between which rights are meant to be prioritized in different contexts. Within the GCC there continue to be limitations on political and civil rights for individuals, while rentier resources may have led to the evolution of greater protections for economic and social rights of citizens. Most of the studies of the Gulf states are from the perspective of human rights in authoritarian and non-democratic contexts, and have not applied the lens of rentierism and human rights. Babar identified a number of research gaps in relation to the evolution of human rights issues in rentier-based political economies of the region. Among other things, Babar raised the need to study the question of the impact of falling or rising oil prices and how they increase or limit political freedoms and human rights in the GCC. A second research gap raised by Babar was on the role of international actors and external patrons, and the advancement of human rights in Gulf oil monarchies. Human rights regimes have found greater means of imposing disciplinary mechanisms (such as sanctions or isolation) on “pariah states” that somehow are presented as being outside the norms of international relations. How do human rights actors interact with more complex cases such as the GCC states that have been considered to be “security partners” or “economic partners” and critical to the global energy economy? A third set of research questions center on the narrative of citizenship and its sets of rights across a spectrum of GCC distributive states which vary in the degrees of capacity to distribute. Post 2011 increasingly the GCC states have been conflating their goal of “protecting economic rights” of citizens with increasing measures to securitize citizenship – how is this impacting the regional human rights narrative? Finally Babar raised a number of areas of research in relation to the Gulf oil sector and human rights. Clashes and confrontations between the global oil industry and international and transnational networks of human rights have been increasingly commonplace from Sudan to Ecuador, how come we have not seen the GCC as a locus of this exchange?

Following Babar’s discussion, Gail Buttorff led a session on “Hydrocarbon Wealth and Gender Equality in the Gulf.” Buttorff started off her session by highlighting the major differences between GCC states in terms of level of rentierism, political economy, and social cohesion. She then listed three original research topics. First, she discussed the various nationalization policies that have been employed across the GCC, and how their impact on female participation in the labor forces remains understudied. Buttorff also claimed that the impact of fluctuations in oil prices on government efforts to boost female labor force participation is also understudied. Finally, Buttorff discussed the link between female labor force participation and political empowerment. She raised a question: does female participation in higher levels of government reflect improvements in women suffrage in the GCC?

Hanadi Al Mubaraki shifted the working group discussions to examine “Oil Wealth and Entrepreneurship in the Gulf.” Hanadi started her discussion with highlighting GCC governments’ efforts to encourage and support entrepreneurship and innovation. Yet, she claimed that there has not been any literature on the success or failure of projects supported by GCC governments. Al Mubaraki highlighted the importance of studying entrepreneurship policies in the GCC in comparison to policies employed in other developed regions. Al Mubaraki also raised attention to the challenges and opportunities in establishing Technology Commercialization programs in GCC universities, which have impacted the evolution and internationalization of GCC based entrepreneurship. Finally, Al Mubaraki questioned the outcomes of business development programs—such as business incubation programs, innovation programs, accelerator programs, and small and medium-size enterprises—on entrepreneurship in the GCC.

Crystal Ennis concluded the working group discussions with a session on “Education, Occupation, and Khaleeji Youth Success.” Ennis claimed that there is a mismatch between Khaleeji youth’s education and job market demands. Yet, this is not the only challenge Khaleeji youth face. She claimed that class, rural divide, gender, and family status factor in education and job options among youth in the GCC; this is a topic that deserves further study. Another issue is the limited production base in the GCC that impacts the analysis of Khaleeji youth labor, and our understanding of youth contribution to global production. Ennis also argued that there is a critical need to investigate the impact of neo-liberal ideologies on the social construction of youth in the hyper-modernity of the GCC, and the factors that shape economic citizenship among youth in the GCC, especially when it comes to the private sector. Ennis also discussed the impact of expats’ expertise on the learning development of Khaleeji youth in the private sector. The impacts of neo-liberal ideologies and expats’ expertise raise a question on Khaleeji youth’s perception of their belonging to the labor market.

Mehran Kamrava, Director of CIRS, concluded the working group with emphasis on the contribution of the working group discussions to literature on the resource curse in the Persian Gulf, which will be published in a special issue by CIRS in the near future.

See the working group agenda hereRead the participants’ biographies hereRead more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Hanadi Mubarak Al-Mubaraki, Kuwait UniversityZahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarGail Buttorff, University of KansasCrystal Ennis, Leiden UniversityMohammad Reza Farzanegan, Philipps-Universität MarburgDesha Girod, Georgetown UniversityMatthew Gray, Waseda University, JapanIslam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarSuzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarJessie Moritz, Australian National UniversityMoamer Qazafi, Georgetown University in QatarElizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

The 2016 U.S. Presidential Election
2016-10-18 18:00 - 20:00 (Europe/Moscow)
On October 18, 2016, CIRS hosted a Panel discussion on “The 2016 US Presidential Elections,” featuring Joshua Mitchell and Clyde Wilcox, professors in the Government Department at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, and world renowned authorities in their respective areas of expertise. Mitchell specializes in political theory and, among other topics, has written on religion and freedom in the United States. Wilcox has written extensively on interest groups, public opinion, electoral behavior, and campaign finance. The discussion was moderated by Mehran Kamrava, Director of the Center for International and Regional Studies.

Mitchell opened the debate by framing his speech around a central question: “Why did Trump so easily take the nomination?” He clarified that: “my task here…is not so much to defend Trump, but rather to explain him through the lens of the history of political thought.” Giving some background to the current political climate, Mitchell painted a picture of the United States as a nation sharply divided, stating that “there are two different Americas right now.” One America is reflected in the power and wealth of Washington, and other key urban centers, where property prices and incomes are soaring, while “the other America is an America of despair, drug addiction, suicide, low-paying jobs, and never-ending condescension toward ‘flyover’ country.”

Because of such sharp divisions between wealth and poverty, and indeed the growing rifts within US politics, a “populist uprising” in the form of an outlier candidate like Trump has been a long time coming. Examining key political moments to explain Trump’s success, he argued that during the Cold War, factions of “the Republican Party hung together not by virtue of internal coherence, but by virtue of what they were opposed to—namely, progressivism within, and the Cold War without.” After the end of the Cold War, Mitchell noted, there really was no reason for the party to be held together since their common interest was defeated, thus, “it was just a question of time before that party fell apart; if it wasn’t Trump, it was going be somebody else, sooner or later.”

In the aftermath of the Cold War, a new type of political thought was cultivated in young people who began defining their lives around issues of “globalization” and “identity,” which have become the central features of contemporary political engagement. These terms differ greatly to how politics was conceptualized in the past, revolving around notions of the sovereign state and the rational citizen, as outlined in the treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and Hobbes’ Leviathan in 1651. Today, sovereignty is no longer located in the state, but is located “above the state,” in global norms, international trade and laws, and transnational organizations, and “below the state,” in identity politics. “You have this tremendous paradox: the disembodied citizen who imagines his or her identity in relation to others, and politics as activism—not citizenship,” Mitchell explained.

Currently, the battle being waged in the US—as well as in Europe as seen in the Brexit vote—is whether the future of politics will continue along the lines of the post-1989 organizing principle of globalization and identity politics, or, whether someone with Trump’s ideals will dismantle the current political arrangement. Trump has enthralled his electorate by turning the tide on a world obsessed with globalization by offering fervent claims that borders matter, immigration policy matters, national rather than universal interests matter, entrepreneurship matters, decentralization matters, and, finally, that politically correct speech—an essential component of identity politics—does not matter. “When Trump says crass things,” for example, “the way he thinks through this problem is in terms, not of sin but, of error,” Mitchell argued. The counter reaction to Trump’s rogue behavior, with Hillary Clinton’s campaign being a chief proponent, is to utilize the old American religious tropes of “purity” and “stain.” Mitchell noted that this revival of a religious language is a deeply troubling development in which Trump and his supporters are tarnished as deplorable and irredeemable, further diving the country along political and racial lines. Especially because Hillary Clinton is white, he argued, her democratic campaign is even more driven to chastise the faults of white America, and its seeming penchant for racism.

These two sides of the divide fall along the historic conservative and left set up of US politics, which is anathema to, and leaves little sustenance for, the third alternative, which is a Liberal regime that has no interest in either of these types of divisive party politics. In conclusion, Mitchell argued that “the battle for the future is not over identity politics or the state. I think identity politics and globalization have lost. The question now before us is whether we are going to have a liberal state or an illiberal state.” As a final thought, Mitchell noted that, along with the current political impasse, there is yet another tremendous danger being instigated by the media who refuse to accept Trump—the officially nominated Republican Party candidate—as legitimate, thus fueling a growing crisis of authority.

Clyde Wilcox offered a different narrative to Mitchell’s historical political analysis by focusing on the current electoral contest and the likely outcome. Despite Trump’s many political liabilities, he remains close in many polls. The key question that needs to be answered, therefore, is “how can it be that a man who is catastrophically unprepared, and who is not trying, is still somewhat close” in the polls? Wilcox argued that the narrow gap in the poles is worrisome, because “Donald Trump is, let’s be honest, catastrophically unprepared to be president. He lacks the knowledge to be president, he lacks the curiosity to attain the knowledge…he is making no effort to appeal to the voters he would need to win, which include women and minorities.”

Wilcox noted that current polling and survey data are all indicating that Hillary Clinton will win the election. However, survey data have been wrong in the past, and there are reasons for why Trump might actually win. Elections have been traditionally predicted by consulting a series of abstract models that include a number of variables related to economic indicators, employment figures, and GDP rates. In this particular election, however, there is another key factor that is determined by what Wilcox termed “the 8 year itch,” where voters become disenchanted with the incumbent party and elect the alternative option in order to receive a fresh start. By this token, he argued, Republicans would normally be expected to win a close election, if the Democrats and Republicans nominated equally attractive candidates.

A key rallying cry for the Republicans has been that this is an election about the forgotten white people in impoverished small towns, “but when we look at survey data, we something slightly different: the people who support Trump are not the ones who have lost the jobs, those people are actually Hillary Clinton people. Trump’s people are actually slightly above average in income, not a whole lot, but slightly above average. The single best indicator of who supports Donald Trump right now is racial resentment,” with increasing numbers of confederate flags being raised as a symbol of this growing antagonism.

Another reason for the narrow gap in the polls is because Hillary Clinton has a number of obstacles stacked against her, including the very fact that she is one of the Clintons—a name synonymous with the political status quo for almost three decades—along with a number of scandals arising from some of her questionable acts. Despite “being the most admired woman in America when she was Secretary of State,” Clinton must also overcome the disadvantages of running as a female candidate, and the many sexist characterizations of her temperament, her decision-making skills, and her political will. “The Republicans have been bashing her consistently for the last six years,” Wilcox said. “She has the highest negatives of any presidential candidate in our history, except for one: Donald Trump.”

Although he admitted that Hillary Clinton is a much weaker candidate than the Democrats would normally have offered, Wilcox did not believe that these weaknesses necessarily translate into her being a bad president. He argued that the US is a polarized nation of partisans, with many people traditionally voting for the same party at every election. In this case, however, Trump has become such an unpredictable political liability that many staunch Republicans have publicly voiced their disappointment with the candidate, with many opting to vote for Hillary Clinton, thus further destabilizing the Republican Party.

In conclusion, Wilcox argued, while many of Trump’s supporters are outspoken and proud to vote for him, it is possible that many others who plan to vote for Trump are, in fact, too ashamed to say so publicly, thereby skewing the polling data. Donald Trump, meanwhile, has already predicted that the election is fraudulent if Clinton wins, and has encouraged his supporters to challenge Clinton supporters in the event that he loses the election. If Hillary Clinton does indeed win, Wilcox argued, it is very likely that the Republications will be holding hearings on impeachment within the year. Either way, he concluded, “I come away with a rather pessimistic view of the future of American politics; it has been the ugliest election in my lifetime, and I hope that on their deathbeds my children will be able to say it was the ugliest in theirs.”

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications.

Trump’s Election and the Need for a Mass Movement for Constitutional Reform
2016-11-23 12:30 - 13:30 (Europe/Moscow)
In his November 23, 2016 talk, “Trump’s Election and the Need for a Mass Movement for Constitutional Reform,” Anatol Lieven, Professor of International Politics at Georgetown University in Qatar, spoke about the recent US elections in the broad context of the United States Constitution. Today, many Americans consider the Constitution “sacred,” and would reject even the smallest changes to it, even though it has undergone twenty-seven successful amendments over its history. This passionate attachment comes from the Constitution’s central importance to American civic nationalism and national identity, and its success in framing the United States as it grew to become the most powerful country on earth.

This is not really a problem if a system delivers good government and basic, consensual civic peace, however, Lieven said: “I fear that the US Constitution is, as it presently exists, less and less able to do this.” As things stand today, “the Constitution is beginning to work massively in favor of one section of the American population and American politics, namely white conservatives, who are not anxious to give up the advantages that this system gives them,” he said.

Other western democracies have made changes to their constitutions over the years, but systems that have been as successful as that of the USA over a long period will find it more difficult to change. But however successful it may have been in the past, “A system which is not capable of even limited and pragmatic change may be in serious trouble,” Lieven cautioned. Because of the way that US presidential elections work, and because of the institution of the US Electoral College, Hillary Clinton won the popular vote in this election, but Donald Trump won because he secured the Electoral College votes. The same thing happened with Al Gore and George Bush in 2000. “As far as I know, the United States is the only presidential democracy in the world that operates in this this way,” he said.

The US presidential election campaign has essentially been reduced to fifteen states, those needed to win the Electoral College, according to Lieven, and the other thirty-five states are ignored to a considerable degree. This has created a somewhat odd image of American democracy in the world. Lieven asked, “Is the United States, in fact, a democracy? Well, the obvious answer is no, of course it isn’t, because it wasn’t intended to be.” The founders were notoriously suspicious of democracy, which they associated with the threat of anarchy and mob rule leading to tyranny, according to Lieven. They put barriers against democracy into the Constitution, and it was almost forty years later that the US actually became a more or less democratic country in the (then) sense of a country where all adult white males had the vote.

The founders’ intention was to create a system that would prevent tyranny while providing reasonably good, though very limited government. “It was, above all, to create a system that would last, that would create institutions that could mediate and reconcile different interests,” among thirteen very different states, Lieven said. This balanced state powers against those of the central government. The battles of states’ rights remain critically important to this day, especially when it comes to racial and cultural issues, Lieven said. This is what led to the secession of the South before the Civil War and the battles over states’ rights in the 1940s–60s, as the white South fought to retain racial segregation and discrimination.

While some of the workings of the Constitution have been transformed, formal institutions such as the Electoral College remain in place. The founders saw it as a kind of temporary parliament, a national assembly of elected, independent legislators who had made promises to their electors, but were also free to choose the president as they saw fit. In this context, direct democratic election was secondary, according to Lieven. “Today we have a situation where the Electoral College remains in certain respects highly undemocratic, but is democratically nailed to the candidate to whom they have promised their vote in advance,” he said.

When the Constitution was formulated, the smallest state had roughly one-twelfth of the population of the largest state, and most states had roughly similar populations. In 2010, there were seven states with more than 10 million people each, and they had fourteen US senators. These are the big, urban states, multi-racial and largely Democratic in their leanings, and they account for approximately 45 percent of the US population. There were seven states with fewer than one million people in 2010, accounting for about 2 percent of the total US population. These are overwhelmingly Republican leaning states with white conservative populations, and they also have fourteen US senators. Basically, this means that California has roughly 40 times less representation than a state like South Dakota.

The problem of democracy in the House of Representatives is a different one. Currently in the House of Representatives, due to the rights held by the states under the Constitution, forty-three out of fifty states have their constituency boundaries for the House determined by state legislatures and state executives, and they are politically manipulated. This despite the fact that the House was always conceived as a national popular legislature, popularly elected. The drawing of constituency boundaries to produce solid, unchangeable majorities for one party or another is favored not just by Republicans but also by black Democrats, who see this as a way to guarantee black representation in Congress (and their own seats).

As a result of this effectively rigged system, in this year’s election, Republicans won the national popular vote, but by a margin vastly smaller than the number of seats won in the House. In 2012, Republicans lost the popular vote by a wide margin but gained a majority of seats. “This raises not just questions about democracy, but it creates additional problems in America, especially a polarized America,” said Lieven. Only around seven per cent of House seats were really contested in the last four elections. The result of this is to push the real political contest for the House from the area envisaged by the Constitution (elections) and into party primaries, in a way that inevitably favors extremists and increases polarization—since there is no longer any need for candidates to try to win candidates from the middle ground or the opposing party. “Battles in party primaries always, always—in every country—tend to favor active activists and extremists,” said Lieven.

The courts have challenged individual cases of drawing district maps, but Lieven said, “It seems obvious that this should be done the way it is done just about everywhere else in democracies, which is to have an impartial national—not politically chosen—electoral commission that will distribute the seats, and be subject always to judicial review,” Lieven said. “The Supreme Court has to judge according to the Constitution, and it is very difficult to challenge the system as a whole constitutionally, given the power of states’ rights. Additionally, there is the pretty strange provision under the Constitution that the Supreme Court has far greater powers than those of any other Supreme Court that I know of in the world. Powers that are, in effect, legislative—not just judicial,” said Lieven. “And the Supreme Court has repeatedly made laws—not interpreted them—made new laws that have radically changed aspects of American life,” he said. When to this are added the Constitutional provisions that Supreme Court judges are chosen by the President, and for life, there is a very real possibility that (with a number of Democrat judges nearing the end of their life), President Trump could ensure a Republican grip on the Supreme Court for a generation to come, putting the Republicans in a position constitutionally to block large parts of a future democratic president’s legislative agenda—completely irrespective of the popular vote.

Lieven predicted that as America changes demographically and whites sink from a majority to a plurality of the population, the effective disenfranchisement of millions of urban Americans and the demand for constitutional reform are going to become a much bigger issue in the future. However, he said it is highly unlikely that the Democrats under their existing leadership will raise this issue effectively.

Due to the Senate distribution, the way the House is arranged, and the certainty the Supreme Court would do nothing about it such a demand for change would have to be pushed for by a mass popular movement—as in the struggle against slavery and for civil rights. The Democratic leadership that produced Hillary Clinton is far too cautious and intertwined with the US economic elites to consider such a radical step. Fortunately, Bernie Sanders has shown the deep desire among much of the rank and file of the Democratic Party for a more radical path.

However, Lieven cautioned against a movement for Constitutional reform couched in terms of democratic rights for racial minorities, as this would be sure to drive many moderate working class whites into the ranks of the reactionary opposition. Instead, he summoned up the examples of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Martin Luther King when in his last years he campaigned for social and economic justice for all Americans. Lieven called for “A movement for democratic reform, linked to economic justice, appealing to the disadvantaged and disenfranchised urban poor of all races, and couched in terms of the need to renew American democracy in the name of American nationalism and America’s national image in the world.”

Anatol Lieven teaches International Politics at Georgetown University in Qatar. He received a BA in History (double first) and a PhD in Political Science from the University of Cambridge. Before joining academia, he spent most of his career as a foreign correspondent for British newspapers, and later as a member of think tanks in Washington DC. Between 2007 and 2014 he worked in the War Studies Department of King’s College London, where he remains a visiting professor. His main project at present is a book on the history of the Pashtun ethnicity in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the context of the wider history and theoretical analysis of modern nationalism (commissioned by Yale University Press). His taught courses at Georgetown in Qatar include international security issues; US foreign policy; war and diplomacy in Afghanistan and South Asia; comparative political systems and the history, theory and comparative study of nationalism. He is author of numerous books, including Pakistan: A Hard Country (2012); America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism (second edition 2012); and Ukraine and Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry (1999).

Article by Jackie Starbird, Publications and Projects Assistant at CIRS.

Did Democracy Lose this Round? And Why?
2016-11-28 08:00 - 17:00 (Asia/Qatar) | Education City, Al Luqta St, Ar-Rayyan, Doha, Qatar
Azmi Bishara, General Director of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue lecture on the topic “Did Democracy Lose this round? And Why?” on November 28, 2016. While these questions were posed in regard to the state of democracy in the Arab world in the wake of the recent uprisings, he noted that some of these concerns could be equally applied to the failure of liberalism in the West, and the rise of increasingly right-wing tendencies.

Bishara gave four broad explanations for why this round of democratic transition has failed in the Arab world, with a background of the brutality of old regimes and the oppression of civil protests. The first of these was that Arab political elites of both the opposition and the ruling factions could not come to any compromises or agree on shared settlements in the wake of the Arab uprisings. This, he said, was because “the Arab political elite, had no democratic culture”. He rejected the tendency to blame popular culture. Democratic cultures take time to flourish in society in general, and are learned over many years through various aspects of a nation’s foundational systems, including its educational system, the institution of which is the responsibility of political elites in the transitionary phase.

To this effect, Bishara argued that there is no such thing as a “democratic revolution,” since “democracy happens afterwards through reform, not through revolutions. This includes the French Revolution. It did not lead to democracy at the beginning; it needed a long process of reform to reach democracy at the end.” It is a historical norm that after mass societal and political changes, opposing political elites enter into rounds of negotiation regarding the future direction of the country. This did not happen in the post Arab uprisings. He argued that “the young people who went out to the streets, protesting torture, humiliation, and physical abuse of human beings, thought that…they actually achieved or finished the job when Mr. Mubarak and Mr. Zine El-Abidine resigned or abdicated.” In earnest, the protestors delivered their hard won changes to the political elites in order to transform the new raw political environment into actionable, viable reforms, but no such restructuring took place.

The second reason for why democracy did not take root in the region is because of the failure to find a balance between democracy and liberalism—something that was achieved only relatively recently in Western nations in the post-World War II period. Today, we understand that “democracy in itself is not only majority rule; it is not only a question of the ballots; and it is not only a question of free elections,” Bishara argued. “Now when we speak of principles of democracy that should be respected by the majority, we actually mean liberal rights,” he said. These are the meta-constitutional principles that have not been taken to heart by Arab political movements. Even as traditionally conservative parties finally began to accept democracy in the shape of ballots and elections, they did not respect or believe in the related liberal principles. While it is understood that the more radical Islamic movements, like the Islamic State, openly reject democracy in general, in the post-Arab uprisings, “even the mainstream Islamic movements who accept democracy as majority rule underestimated how important civil liberties are for the co-called new Arab middle class, without which you cannot build anything,” and without which the urban centers will be lost—as was witnessed in Egypt when the Muslim Brotherhood took control.

Bishara’s third reason for the failure of democracy is due to the ways in which modern Arab regimes are engaging in the divisive and dangerous politicization—and polarization—of the multiethnic, multicultural, and sectarian social structures of their societies, especially in the countries of the Levant. Recently, there have been concerted attempts “to mobilize political loyalties to nondemocratic ruling regimes by using subnational affiliations repoliticized sects, identities, ethnicities, tribes,” which was not the case in the past, he said. This policy of so-called secular regimes elicited feelings of sectarian discrimination and confessional reaction among the people. In fact, “political sectarianism, which is exploiting these lines of identity in the struggle to control the state, is a new phenomenon.” Bishara noted that it would be impossible to build a sustainable democracy within these polarized and factionalized societies.

A fourth reason for why democracy has failed in the Arab world is due to the military’s historical stranglehold on political systems in some of these countries. When imperial powers withdrew from Arab lands, new national armies were created from the remnants of colonial military structures, and these emerged as the most organized and powerful entities from the chaos of newly forming postcolonial nations. Bishara said that “we still live the issue of politicization of the military in the Arab world,” and these armies have become increasingly politically motivated. Powerful figures within Arab militaries have strong political ambitions and think of themselves as both powerholders and as watchdogs in the balance of power. For example, in “Egypt, the army achieved a kind of autonomy before 2011,” but when the government collapsed during the Egyptian protests, “the army thought that there was an opportunity, reinforced by the inability of the elites to reach a bargain,” he explained. He drew a comparison between Sisi’s military coup in Egypt and that of Pinochet in Chile in the 1970s.

Although these many political impasses facing the Arab world might seem insurmountable, Bishara concluded on a positive note by arguing that “these hard times are suitable for rethinking,” and for encouraging a new generation of political elites who can accept disagreements and who can debate and bargain to reach compromises with each other for the sake of a future that respects democratic principles.

Azmi Bishara is the General Director of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies and the Chair of the Board of Trustees of the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies. A prominent researcher and writer, Bishara has published numerous books and academic papers in political thought, social theory, and philosophy, in addition to several literary works.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications.

Mishal Husain on "News and Views in a Post-Truth World"
2016-11-30 18:00 - 20:00 (Europe/Moscow)
Mishal Husain, one of the BBC’s best-known presenters, delivered a CIRS Focused Discussion on “News and Views in a Post-Truth World” on November 30, 2016. Her talk gave insights into how journalists navigate through, and respond to, ever-changing news environments, particularly during seismic world events such as the Arab uprisings and the recent spectacle of the US presidential election. Relaying her journalism experience, spanning over two decades in the field, she said: “I am aware, and feel the privilege of the job I do, not just the places I go to, but the moments in time and, certainly, the access to both the powerful and the powerless.”

Husain reflected on how the UK’s recent EU referendum was reported, highlighting the duty of the BBC and other broadcasters to ensure due impartiality in political coverage, the controversy about “fake news” in the wake of Donald Trump’s election victory, and her concerns about hearing “mainstream media” employed as a term of abuse.

Many people have become progressively dismissive of traditional, established news channels that reach a mass audience, and there is a growing environment in which people are seeking to reinforce their own views, rather than opening up to a culture of informed debate. “The debate about fake news is very compelling at the moment, but the influence of stories that are misleading at best will also require careful scrutiny.” Ultimately, she noted, all this is leading to the increasing circulation of misinformation, the dismissal of facts, and the erosion of truth.

In conclusion, she argued that there is a personal responsibility for people to examine the facts and to weigh the evidence. “I am deeply concerned today about the echo chamber, but also what I see as the lack of a critical thinking mindset, which is now even being identified as a bulwark against radicalization.” Husain stated. She talked about the importance of a wide range of news sources, particularly for minority communities, and an openness to explore other opinions and perspectives. “Our capacity for citizenship will not improve unless these personal skills are developed.”

Mishal Husain appears on the influential Today programme on BBC Radio 4 and presenting the main Sunday evening news on BBC1. She also presents on location from around the world, including Pakistan after the killing of Osama Bin Laden and the Peshawar school massacre, and the Middle East through the Arab uprisings and the Syrian refugee crisis. For many years she was one of the main presenters on the international channel BBC World News, and while based in Washington between 2003 and 2004, her nightly news broadcasts developed a keen following among American viewers on PBS. She was also based in the BBC’s Singapore bureau for a time, presenting business news programmes, and her sustained focus on Asia took her to the Beijing Olympics in 2008 and the Shanghai Expo in 2010. Mishal has presented four critically acclaimed BBC documentaries: Malala—Shot for Going to School, and How Facebook Changed the World on social media and the Arab uprisings, and a three-part series on the life of Mahatma Gandhi. In 2016, her hour-long film Britain & Europe: The Immigration Question was screened days before Britain’s landmark EU referendum vote. In January 2016, she was named by the Sunday Times as one of the 500 most influential people in Britain, and in 2015 she won the London Press Club’s Broadcaster of the Year award and was the Women in Film and TV Awards Presenter of the Year. In 2013, she was one of the Financial Times’ Women of the Year and in 2009 the Times named her as one of the top five most influential Muslim women in Britain.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications.

Climate Vulnerability in South Asia's Coastal Cities
2017-01-10 09:00 - 2017-01-11 17:00 (Europe/Moscow)
On January 10-11, 2017, urbanists, governance experts, and climate change specialists gathered in Doha for a two-day workshop co-hosted by the Strauss Center for International Security and Law at the University of Texas at Austin and the Center for International and Regional Studies at Georgetown University in Qatar to consider climate change vulnerability and governance in coastal cities of South Asia.

Topics debated in the workshop include the nature and definition of various understandings of climate vulnerability, the role that coastal geographies and ecologies play in exacerbating climate vulnerability, the impacts of climate change on urban settlement and migration, and the governance challenges faced by cities as they attempt (or in some cases do not attempt) to address their climate change vulnerabilities. The conversation was specifically designed to generate comparative discussion across coastal cities in the region with particular attention paid to coastal mega-cities of the region including Chennai, Dhaka, Karachi, Kolkata, and Mumbai.

Key policy-relevant questions considered by the workshop participants include:

How should we understand climate-related vulnerability in South Asia’s changing urban context?How should we think about governance vulnerabilities as we contemplate climate hazards?In which ways will climate change transform the ways that coastal cities encounter their physical and governance environments?How will the anticipated phenomenon of mass displacement and migration challenge our accepted understandings of sovereignty and the protection missions of the state, the city, and the community?How does and should our understanding of the science of climate change affect the ways policy is developed across borders and governance systems?

The workshop was the latest in an ongoing series of conversations on this topic organized by Dr. Paula Newberg as part of the Strauss Center’s research initiative on Complex Emergencies and Political Stability in Asia (CEPSA). The research program explores the diverse forces that contribute to climate-related disaster vulnerability and complex emergencies in Asia, the implications of such events for local and regional security, and how investments in preparedness can minimize these impacts and build resilience. CEPSA is a multi-year initiative funded by the U.S. Department of Defense’s Minerva Initiative, a university based, social science research program focused on areas of strategic importance to national security policy.

Please click here to view Agenda

Participants and Discussants:

Kamran Asdar Ali, University of TexasNausheen Anwar, Institute of Business Administration, KarachiZahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMisba Bhatti, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarSheryl Beach, University of TexasTimothy Beach, University of TexasSolomon Benjamin, Indian Institute of Technology MadrasJason Cons, University of TexasVinita Damodaran, University of SussexRupali Gupte, Collective Research Initiatives Trust, MumbaiArif Hasan, Architect, Planner, and Social Researcher, KarachiIslam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarIftekhar Iqbal, Universiti Brunei Darussalam, BangladeshGarima Jain, India Institute for Human Settlements, BengaluruMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarM. Hafijul Islam Khan, International Centre for Climate Change and Development, BangladeshMathangi Krishnamoorthy, Indian Institute of Technology MadrasAnatol Lieven, Georgetown University in QatarSohail Malik, Innovative Development Strategies, IslamabadPaula Newberg, University of TexasMahesh Rajasekar, Taru Leading Edge and Taru Research Information Network, IndiaAsad Sayeed, Collective for Social Science Research, KarachiAli T. Sheikh, Leadership for Environment and Development (LEAD), PakistanSam Tabory, Chicago Council on Global AffairsClare Wait, Georgetown University in QatarAdeel Zafar, Simon Fraser University, British Columbia

Middle Power Politics in the Middle East Working Group I
2017-01-15 09:00 - 2017-01-16 15:00 (Europe/Moscow)
On January 15-16, 2017, the Center for International and Regional Studies held a working group under its research initiative on “Middle Power Politics in the Middle East.” Over the course of two days, participants identified key gaps in the literature on the international relations of the Middle East through the lens of middle power theory. The participants led discussions on a number of related subtopics, including: Middle Eastern middle powers and the international system, middle powers and the 2011 Arab uprisings, domestic politics, middle powers’ cooperation and competition, humanitarian diplomacy, norm entrepreneurship, and conflict resolution and mediation.

The 2011 Arab uprisings have been an evolving moment of significance in the Middle East. While increasing domestic instability in some of the traditionally strong states led to a retraction in their capacity in international and regional affairs, smaller states were suddenly given an opening for more prominent engagement. It remains to be seen whether these smaller states’ regional and international status-seeking endeavors are of a durable, sustainable nature. During the working group, scholars examined the post-2011 dynamics of the international relations in the Middle East through the lens of middle powers.

There is ambiguity in the scholarly literature in terms of providing an exact definition for middle power states, and little work has been done on which states might qualify for middle power status within the context of the Middle East. The first topic discussed during the CIRS meeting revolved around the characteristics for determining whether, or not, a state is able to claim middle power status. These characteristics include, among others, states’ relative hard-power capabilities, their capacity to exert influence over regional events, their financial resources, their institutional strength and bureaucratic capabilities, and their relative autonomy. Participants also discussed common foreign policy features among Middle Eastern middle powers. These states tend to impact their immediate sphere, are regional balancers, have the capacity to bargain with super powers and great powers, establish alliances with lesser powers, and generally do not engage in warfare. Another issue in studying middle power politics in the Middle East is the limitations in middle power theory as to how it only focuses on the international hierarchal structure of power, and disregards the multiple hierarchal substructures within the international order. In other words, there are middle powers that pursue this role on the international level, and others who pursue it only within their respective regions. This raises a number of questions: Should the Middle East be defined based on exceptionalism, and thus needs a new definition of middle power? Can a middle power be a nondemocratic government, and not a good global citizen, such as in the Egyptian and Saudi cases? And do middle powers have to share similar pillars of foreign policy agendas? In other words, is the concept of middle power theoretically so diverse as one, for example, cannot compare Iran to Australia as middle powers?

Since status is a self-proclamation met with international recognition, the interactions of Middle Eastern middle powers with extra-regional powers, the expectations of global powers from middle powers in the region, and Middle Eastern middle powers expectations from other global middle powers are all issues worth in-depth examination. Moreover, the perceptions of middle powers in the Middle East with regard to international options, especially with the rise of China, Russia being a potential partner, and the South-South relations, remain profoundly understudied.

When discussing how the Arab uprisings reconfigured the power relations of the Middle East, it is evident that domestic dynamics impact foreign policy agendas. The post-2011 dynamics force us to reconsider traditionally understood conceptions of power, state, and sovereignty. The transnational impact of the Arab uprisings on middle powers in the region, in terms of political ideologies and migration patterns, have led to realignments of alliances. For example, under the current Egyptian leadership, President Abdel Fatah Al Sisi tried to pursue a balanced foreign policy by strengthening the Egyptian relations with Russia. In other incidents, it revived rivalries, such as the Saudi-Iranian case. The realignments and revival of animosities were results of discrepancies in regional actors’ rhetoric on the Arab uprisings. The discrepancies in rhetoric manifest the impact of agency on the identity of states, especially in totalitarian regimes of the Middle East. The transitions in leadership in many countries of the region, despite their various natures, have re-shaped the foreign policy agendas not only of these states, but also across the Middle East. United Arab Emirates is an example, as the transition in leadership from Sheikh Zayed Al Nahyan to Sheikh Khalifa Al Nahyan was coupled with a transformation of Emirati foreign policy, which became more assertive.

Agency, size, and material capacity of middle powers matter in assessing their influence, particularly as they are expected to take part in directly shaping the regional order, and indirectly influencing the international order. Thus, based on material capacity, countries like Egypt, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the pre-2003 Iraq could be considered destined middle powers. Israel and Algeria may be considered middle powers; while countries like Qatar and UAE are influential regional actors. Some participants questioned the concept of “destined middle powers,” suggesting that states should have an interest in seeking a middle power status in order to be one. This interest should not be only expressed by the political leadership, but also supported by cohesive centers of power within the state, and commended by the public. A mismatch between interests of the leadership and its constituencies impacts the country’s ability to claim a specific status in the regional or international order. If the leadership fabricates a state identity that does not fit with the public narrative, tensions in the foreign policy of the state are inevitable. Therefore, material capacity and interest in seeking a middle power status are both indispensible.

Furthermore, colonial legacies have impacted states interests and public narratives. For example, Algerian foreign policy is an extension of its nationalist movement that, for years, fought for independence. These colonial experiences encourage states to avoid conceding sovereignty to regional alliances that may hinder their status and influence. The UAE, as an example, sought an independent foreign policy agenda to escape the Saudi hegemony over the Gulf Cooperation Council. At the same time, Middle Eastern middle powers tolerate alliances that may support their regional activism and competitions. Delving deeper in the Saudi hegemony over the GCC, one can see that Middle Eastern middle powers act differently through regional organizations than other middle powers as they aim to dominate rather than collaborate. However, economic interdependence among Middle Eastern middle powers has been the key to cooperation.

Norm entrepreneurship activities of Middle Eastern middle powers are critical in studying middle power politics in the Middle East. Humanitarian diplomacy has been a prominent form of norm entrepreneurship exercised by middle powers across the world. When it comes to the Middle East, there has been Western scrutiny and skepticism on Middle Eastern charity organizations’ activities, especially after the September 11 attacks. This has impacted not only humanitarian diplomacy of individual countries, but also regional organizations, such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference, as member states scaled back their charity activities to avoid accusations of supporting terrorism. This has impacted Middle Eastern states that seek a middle power status by using philanthropy as a way to project themselves as global good citizens.

Middle Eastern middle powers have also pursued other forms of norm entrepreneurship, such as conflict resolution and mediation. Since being involved in mediation is a key component of the behavioral definition of middle powers, Middle Eastern middle powers (and aspiring middle powers) have acted as active mediators and honest brokers. However, the Middle East is not an ideal setting for studying norm-driven mediation for three main reasons. First, there is a scarcity of comprehensive agreements and a tendency to only perpetuate ceasefires. Second, oil-rich countries of the Middle East seeking middle power status have relied only on incentive-diplomacy, which is not viable in ongoing diplomatic crises. Third, there is an ostensible weakness of multilateral settings and institutions in the Middle East.

Finally, why do countries seek a middle power status? There are not necessarily common motivations among states to pursue a middle power status. Each state has its own domestic, regional, and international dynamics at play driving its pursuit for a middle power status. Some states pursue status-seeking endeavors as a legitimization strategy. Claiming a higher status in the international or regional order induces the public and helps in preempting the spillover of instability to the country, as in the case of the UAE. It also drives attention away from domestic challenges affecting the public such as low GDP, youth population bulges, and budget deficit, such as the case in Saudi Arabia.

At the end of the working group, Mehran Kamrava, Director of CIRS, concluded the session with emphasis on the contribution of the working group discussions to the literature on middle power politics, to be published in an edited volume in the near future.

Please click here to view the AgendaRead more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarJonathan Benthall, University College LondonSuleyman Elik, Istanbul Medeniyet UniversityIslam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarSimon Mabon, Lancaster UniversityImad Mansour, Qatar UniversityRobert Mason, American University in CairoSuzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMarco Pinfari, American University in CairoAmin Saikal, Australian National UniversityAdham Saouli, University of St. AndrewsNael Shama, University of St. AndrewsJackie Starbird, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarElizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarYahia Zoubir, KEDGE Business School, France

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

CIRS Screens Suzi Mirgani's Short Film Caravan
2017-01-19 12:30 - 13:30 (Europe/Moscow)
Award-winning filmmaker Suzi Mirgani recently hosted a screening of her latest work, titled Caravan, to an audience of students, staff, faculty, and guests at Georgetown University in Qatar (GU-Q). The short film, which premiered at the Doha Film Institute’s Ajyal Youth Film Festival late last year, tells the story of members of a cross-section of Qatari society stuck in a traffic jam.

Mirgani, who is the manager and editor for publications at GU-Q’s Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS), also used the screening as opportunity to share more about the production and themes in the work. The five-minute long short film, which was shot on location at The Pearl Qatar, took a day to film and more than two months to prepare for. It depicts a type of lyrical relay, as the camera zooms in and out of the stationary cars. The voices and thoughts of drivers and passengers stuck in the traffic jam play out in a stream of consciousness style.

In the film, the actors are located on a literal bridge to nowhere, as the end of the road disappears into the sand. Mirgani explained that this can be seen to symbolize a path from prosperity to nothing, as construction is still underway on the man-made island. The mix of built and unbuilt can also be viewed as a metaphor for the rapidly developing country, and its often transient residents. “If you give in to the traffic jam, it can be a space of reflection,” said Mirgani.

Featuring vehicles filled with taxi drivers, tourists, and families (speaking languages ranging from Arabic to Tagalog and Urdu), the film represented the range of nationalities, interests, and languages present in Qatar. “This film was a reflection of what I see on a daily basis,” said Mirgani.

The CIRS researcher, who has edited and written numerous books on topics ranging from food security in the Middle East to media and politics, is also the director of 2014’s Hind’s Dream. That film won the jury award for artistic vision at the 2014 Ajyal Film Festival, and has screened at film festivals around the world.

Article by Lauren Granger, Georgetown University in Qatar Media Writer
