The Arab Reform Agenda: Challenges, Promises, and Prospects
2017-10-30 12:45 - 13:45 (Europe/Moscow)
The Arab world today is experiencing “its second great fragmentation and reconfiguration of the past century,” according to respected journalist and Middle East analyst Rami G. Khouri. Acknowledging that there is not really an “Arab world,” and the Arab League only exists “on paper” anymore, he used the term “the Arab region” as a geographic description in his talk, “The Arab Reform Agenda: Challenges, Promises, and Prospects,” at the Center for International and Regional Studies at Georgetown University in Qatar on October 30, 2017.

Around World War I, the region was reconfigured by foreign powers—led primarily by Western powers—into its current state of nation-states, as countries like Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Iraq and others gradually came into being. Now, a century later, the 400 million citizens of Arab countries are experiencing another radical transformation, Khouri explained. What is different now is that local people are making many of the decisions about their fragmenting states and the reconfiguring of their society, he said. These are mostly Arab people, but also non-Arabs like Kurds, Iranians, Turks, and others, including the great powers.

Khouri shared a recent news item that captured for him the severity of the dilemma for Syria today— and for virtually all the Arab world. The Russians, Turks, and Iranians—three non-Arab powers who were engaged militarily in Syria—were meeting to agree on how to deploy their militaries inside the country. In the past, he said, “they used to meet in London and Paris or Washington to talk about what they were going to do about frontiers and sovereignties, but now they’re talking about how to behave militarily with their own troops inside Syria.” At the same time, the US and many others are also involved militarily in the country.

This example also explains in part how the Arab world got to its current situation, Khouri said. “The many different symptoms that we see: ISIS, refugees, sectarian violence, civil wars—these are all symptoms of underlying stresses, disparities, and distortions.” From about 1920-1980, he said, the lives for most Arab citizens were improving, and societies in the region were on a trajectory of relatively sustained, expanding, and equitable national development. “It wasn’t perfect, but for fifty or sixty years the region was mostly developing on the basis of nationalist developmental states in most countries,” he said.

The 1980s were the transitional period in the modern Arab world, he said. Populations grew faster than economic development; military families seized power in most of the Arab republics; and the monarchies in the region had established their own forms of governance, which were widely seen as legitimate, he said. But in the republics—Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia—the militaries essentially took over, and family rule took hold for decades on end, with some of these families still in power forty years or more later.

So the Arab region has endured decades of “autocratic, security-led, family-anchored, non-participatory, non-accountable political power, combined with the continuing negative impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its repercussions, and non-stop foreign military intervention,” which Khouri said has essentially never stopped since Napoleon arrived, with only some breaks in between foreign military action in the region. The modern period since the 1950s has witnessed almost non-stop foreign military interventions. Historically this meant the British, French, and Americans, he said, “but now we’re talking about the Russians, the Iranians, and the Turks also—actively involved militarily inside Arab countries, with their friends, allies and proxies.” And the circle of foreign military intervention continues to expand, he said, mentioning new Chinese military bases in the region, while Arab states also directly deploy their military forces in other Arab states, such as the Saudi and Emirati war in Yemen or Arab involvement in Libya.

It is no surprise that the Arab region has reached the current stage of “tumultuous conditions, chaos, warfare, some state collapse, savagery, and mass refugees in the tens of millions,” said Khouri. This did not happen suddenly, he noted, as there were many early warning signs indicating there was something seriously wrong in the region, starting in the 1970s. Surveys in recent decades revealed low trust in government institutions; people did not expect their futures would improve; poverty increased; educational results dropped across the region; corruption was perceived as being very high and permanent; there were high rates of unemployment and labor informality, especially among youth; and tens of thousands of the smartest and most dynamic young people emigrated permanently. A major early sign of stressed populations at the family level was the massive support for the Muslim Brothers in the late 1970s, he said.

Conditions worsened steadily in the 1990s and 2000s, “leading to the Arab Uprisings in 2010-2011, which was an extraordinary sign that something was seriously wrong in our societies,” he said. These and other factors led to the creation of Al Qaeda, ISIS, and other radical groups of that nature. “We have no reason to be surprised by what’s going on, but we do have reason to be shocked,” he said.

Khouri offered some very rough, personal calculations for what he called the “five distinct groups of Arabs” in the region today:

Around 10% are materially well off and have a very good life; Around 30% are basically middle-class, largely employed by the government, and live a decent life; Perhaps 50% (around 200 million) are low-income, poor, marginalized, and vulnerable; The remaining 10% comprise two groups lumped together: emigrants and refugees—people who left or were forced to leave; and the radicals and militants who took up arms and created their own militias, like the Islamic State. This last segment of the population has essentially—whether voluntarily or involuntarily—left the Arab-state system.

When taking about the Arab world economically, Khouri said there are essentially two Arab worlds. There are the oil/energy producing countries—the smaller, wealthy emirates that do not suffer the same degree of fragmentation of the other states, with the possible exception of Bahrain. The other world—across the whole region—is a population that is “showing clear signs of pauperization, marginalization, disparities, and polarization between the wealthy and the poor.” This is creating intense pressures when you throw onto it foreign military intervention, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the continued Israeli colonization of Arab lands.

With the exception of the small wealthy states, in the rest of the region, “I think we can safely say the Arab States by and large have failed the twin tests of statehood and sovereignty that were initially implanted in their lands around a hundred years ago,” Khouri said. The Balfour Declaration of 1917, which gave British support to a homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine, he argues, led to “the indirect but significant impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict continuing to this day across the Arab world, and particularly on the psyche of ordinary Arabs. It has played a major role in the coming to power and staying in power of military security regimes in countries like Syria, Iraq, Libya, and other places, and it has had a major negative impact on the self-perception of ordinary Arab men and women.”

People across the region equate the Palestinian tragedy with the wider pressures that they feel in their own societies because of foreign military intervention, Khouri said. The colonial process that took root in Palestine with the Balfour Declaration still continues today, he said, “and you see this with the Russians, the Turks, and the Iranians trying to figure out how their troops are going to coexist inside Syria, let alone people outside Syria meeting to come up with new constitution for Syria.”

Rami George Khouri is an internationally syndicated political columnist and book author, professor of journalism, and journalist-in-residence at the American University of Beirut (AUB). He was the first director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at AUB, and is now senior fellow. He also serves as a nonresident senior fellow at the Kennedy School at Harvard University and is a recipient of the Pax Christi International Peace Prize.

Article by Jackie Starbird, Publications and Projects Assistant at CIRS.

Jeremy Koons Faculty Research Workshop
2017-11-05 09:00 - 17:00
A new book manuscript by Jeremy Koons, associate professor of philosophy at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar (GU-Q), was featured recently in a CIRS Faculty Research Workshop. The manuscript The Ethics of Wilfrid Sellars was studied and discussed by specialist scholars from Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia during a full day event on November 5, 2017.

The manuscript explains that, suitably developed, Sellars’s ethical theory has the potential to develop the tools to answer pressing moral questions. These include questions on moral statements, moral reasoning, moral judgments and motivation, and how we fit morality into a scientific view of the world. Additionally, Koons shows that elements of Sellars’s theory can be enriched by contemporary philosophical work—work by later Sellarsian philosophers, by philosophers working on group intentions and cooperative rationality, and more. In resolving these tensions, and updating Sellars’s theory with more recent work in the field, what emerges from Koons’s manuscript is a strikingly original and comprehensive theory that has much to contribute to contemporary debates.

The CIRS Faculty Research Workshop is a closed-door, one-day seminar that brings together select renowned scholars for a focused discussion of a GU-Q faculty member’s book manuscript during its final stages of development. All participants receive the entire manuscript in advance of the meeting and each scholar leads a focused group discussion on assigned chapters.

This research workshop featured a talented group of internationally-recognized philosophers who specialize in Sellarsian and pragmatist philosophy. Participants engaged in a series of structured sessions on how this nearly neglected body of ethical theory has the potential to contribute to current philosophical debates on how best to answer crucial moral questions.

Participant Amir Saemi, faculty member at the School of Analytic Philosophy at the Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences, said: “It is very exciting to know there will be a book long discussion of Sellars’s ethical works. No doubt that such a book would be a huge contribution to the current moral philosophy. I congratulate Dr. Koons for undertaking such a valuable project.”

Attendees included Bana Bashour, American University of Beirut; Arudra Burra, Indian Institute of Technology Delhi; Dionysis Christias, University of Patras; Anjana Jacob, GU-Q; Bhaskarjit Neog, Jawaharlal Nehru University; Amir Saemi, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences; Lucas Thorpe, Boğaziçi University; Jack Woods, University of Leeds; and, Bill Wringe, Bilkent University.

See the workshop agendaRead biographies of participants

Jeremy Koons received his Ph.D. in Philosophy from Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. His research focus is ethics, epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of religion. Koons is author of Pragmatic Reasons: A Defense of Morality and Epistemology (Palgrave, 2009), and co-author, with Michael P. Wolf, of The Normative and the Natural (Palgrave, 2016).

US-Iranian Relations in the Age of Trump: Back to the Future?
2017-11-08 12:45 - 13:45
In an October 13, 2017 speech, US President Donald Trump rejected the 2015 Iran nuclear deal—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—the arrangement made between Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany. The agreement had lifted economic sanctions on Iran and placed strict limits on its nuclear program, and was a signature achievement of President Barack Obama. US legislation enacted in response to the agreement requires the president to certify every ninety days that Iran is in compliance with the agreement. Trump’s refusal to certify Iran’s compliance in October did not immediately pull the US out of the deal; instead it shifted the responsibility onto Congress, which now has sixty days to decide whether to reimpose sanctions on Iran, which could kill the historic deal.

Trump has frequently criticized the agreement, which he called “an embarrassment” and “the worst deal ever.” In his speech, he claimed that Iran had been on the verge of total collapse before the deal, and the country would have collapsed had it not been for the previous administration’s lifting of sanctions. Daniel Brumberg, co-director of Democracy and Governance Studies at Georgetown University, called this assertion “demonstrably crazy and false and baseless,” and said “anybody who has an understanding of how this system works knows that it is simply false.” Brumberg delivered a talk, “US-Iranian Relations in the Age of Trump: Back to the Future?” at the Center for International and Regional Studies on November 8, 2017. He described Trump in a January 2017 article as “a narcissistic personality” and said his projections in domestic and foreign policy were a reflection of that narcissism, adding, “This is dangerous.”

“I make the argument that those arguing for renegotiation know that this will not succeed. This is just a tactic to weaken support. They know that there can’t be a renegotiation of the deal and they don’t really want one at all.”

Brumberg said that Trump’s own advisors favored certification of the agreement and did not want to abandon it, but it was well known that Trump was raging about it. They had to find a way to channel his rage into a more productive approach, and they found a “compromise” by removing Trump from having to regularly certify that the Iran deal is in fact working. After he has been so publicly outspoken against it, this avoided the potentially catastrophic consequences of him outright quitting the Iran deal.

Trump’s speech would be interpreted in Tehran as the United States has decided to forgo the agreement and is getting ready to find a sanction-based or military-based solution, said Brumberg. “It revives the perception that runs deep along the hardliners in Iran that ultimately for the US, the only solution to Iran is to have regime change,” he said. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, told Iranian President Rouhani in 2015 that he was wasting his time with the nuclear deal and the US would renege on the agreement, according to Brumberg. And in the wake of Trump’s speech, the hardliners now feel vindicated, he said. “Now there’s this clampdown on the reformists and this motley coalition of forces that Rouhani has put together at a crucial time in Iranian history.” In the next few years the critical matter of who will succeed the Supreme Leader will be determined. In that sense, Brumberg said, as far as the hardliners are concerned, “the speech could not have come at a better moment. It worked beautifully—almost as if they had written the script themselves.”

Brumberg said that politically, for Iran’s own internal politics, it’s a disaster, “but it is also a disaster for US foreign policy.” He said that because there isn’t a coherent alternative to the agreement, Trump’s decision to undermine and sabotage it leaves the US without any policy at all. “When you don’t have a coherent policy, when there’s a vacuum, the chances for war increase. Now they’ve increased that much more.” It’s making everyone justifiably nervous, he said.

For many years the US-Iran policy was incoherent and was basically forged on the basis of tactics and no clear strategic view, Brumberg explained. For a long time the consensus policy had been maintaining and increasing sanctions, and applying more pressure with the hope that the regime would change, he said. But crippling sanctions never stopped Iran’s nuclear program, and they acquired more centrifuges and more capability over time.

American policymakers didn’t want to choose because the choice was difficult to make, Brumberg said. You have to go beyond tactics and have a strategic view of what you want to achieve and how you’re going to achieve it, he explained. The problem for the US has been a short menu of choices. Brumberg said he is “thoroughly dubious” about alternatives to the JCPOA, but he offered war as one possibility, which some Congress members have advocated. “There’s no such thing as a short-term war,” he said, and “there’s also no such thing as an overnight attack.” The military would say a short-term attack will provoke a long-term war, he explained. His other suggested strategies include engagement and diplomacy, with some sort of negotiated outcome; or containment and deterrence, which can go along with diplomacy and be blended in different ways.

Brumberg explained that Obama supported the agreement because of the lack of a better alternative. He had inherited a very weak hand after the G.W. Bush term, and the choice was an agreement or no agreement. “Once you decide on an agreement you’re going to negotiate. And negotiation means that each side gives in on certain kind of things,” he said. The agreement is not just a US-Iran agreement and it is supported by the international community. He believes it is still a good agreement that provides controls and intents and supervision of Iran’s program for the next 20 to 25 years, and possibly longer.

Brumberg asserted the possibility that if this agreement were to hold, and there would be an evolution in Iran’s own political system, it might actually help over time to open up the space in Iran, because from the perspective of the hardliners, “conflict with the United States is fundamental to their existence,” he said. “As soon as you don’t have that conflict their position is being undermined.” After the nuclear agreement was struck, there was a very sharp reaction backlash from the hardliners, he said, which was a measure of how seriously they took the agreement. The backlash was against Rouhani and his people, because from their perspective the deal was strengthening their domestic positions. Rouhani had been calling for international peacemaking and a world without violence, Brumberg said.

If you look at Trump’s speech and the critiques of many of the experts who know the situation, you can see that in terms of his criticisms of the agreement, they really fell short, Brumberg said. Trump either misrepresented the agreement or he distorted the facts on many issues. He said the agreement was about one thing only: nuclear weapons. Had the Iranians been asked to negotiate on the zero-enrichment of uranium policy, or terrorism, Hezbollah, or Israel, there never would have been an agreement, he argued.

Brumberg said, there’s a “nix or fix” scenario, meaning let’s fix or renegotiate, or nix it. He argued that you can’t renegotiate an existing agreement like this; you can start or propose new talks, but you don’t renegotiate, which Trump is pushing. “I make the argument that those arguing for renegotiation know that this will not succeed. They are waiting for the nix part. This is just a tactic to weaken support. They know that there can’t be a renegotiation of the deal and they don’t really want one at all,” he said. Most of the critics of the nuclear deal actually want regime change, however that’s going to happen. Blumberg’s solution is to use the elaborate mechanisms provided in the agreement for addressing concerns. “Jettisoning the agreement is no way of dealing with this challenge,” he said.

Daniel Brumberg is Co-Director of Democracy and Governance Studies at Georgetown University. He spent ten years as a Special Advisor to the United States Institute of Peace; and also served as a consultant to the US Department of State and the US Agency for International Development. He is the author of Reinventing Khomeini, The Struggle for Reform in Iran, (University of Chicago Press). He coedited Conflict, Identity, and Reform in the Muslim World: Challenges for US Engagement (USIP Press) with Dina Shehata; and Power and Political Change in Iran with Farideh Farhi (Indiana University Press).

Article by Jackie Starbird, Publications and Projects Assistant at CIRS.

Parental Discrimination over Diverse Schools: Evidence from a Randomized Online Survey in Denmark
2017-11-12 12:45 - 13:45
The education achievement gap between ethnic minorities and majority populations is persistent and even widening in the United States and Europe, according to Mongoljin Batsaikhan, Assistant Professor in Economics at Georgetown University in Qatar. At a Center for International and Regional Studies talk on November 12, 2017, Batsaikhan explained that the leading explanations for the gap include segregation, discrimination, peer dynamics, and identity, which are factors that often play out early in children’s lives.

In 2015, Batsaikhan and his colleagues conducted a research study into how the ethnic composition of daycare institutions affects parental preferences in Copenhagen, Denmark. The team wanted to understand why people discriminate, and why segregation and discrimination are very persistent over generations. Many economic studies have documented the existence of discrimination, and segregating school children is known to have detrimental effects on ethnic-minority children, he said. Additionally, the environment in which kids grow up is important in forming their attitudes around diversity.

This study looked at parents’ preferences in choosing schools because parents tend to put a great deal of thought into school choice. The research team wanted to see how parents made their choices and whether they could find discrimination in the selection process. They were motivated by these questions: Does the diversity of the environment affect the children’s preference and racial tolerance? And, looking at parental preferences in daycares, how are they shaped by the ethnic composition of the daycare institution?

“It seems we have quite a lot of evidence that the environment kids grow up in is very important in forming a preference toward diversity.”

The motivation for the project was simple, Batsaikhan said. He referenced the Civil Rights Movement in the United States and its efforts to end racial segregation and discrimination beginning around the 1950s. The landmark US Supreme Court case “Brown v. Board of Education” banned the segregation of black and white children in public schools in 1954. Yet, African Americans in the US continue to face discrimination nearly sixty years later. “A lot of areas and schools have some sort of an ethnic clustering and segregation even now,” Batsaikhan said. Pointing to the Black Lives Matter movement today, he said, “People don’t just go out to the street and randomly protest. They feel discriminated against. The existence of discrimination is real.” Due to historical reasons we have this sorting and segregation problem, he said, and it persists today. The black/white achievement gap widened in the US in the 1990s, he said. “You would expect it would shrink when you remove the segregation, but it persisted and the gap persisted,” he said. The same thing has also been happening in Europe and in Denmark. When comparing ethnic Danes with minority children, often times the gap is greater, he said.

Parents’ school choice is a form of sorting, as are issues like neighborhoods with high tax rates and expensive housing that make it prohibitive for lower-income residents to enroll children in preferred schools, Batsaikhan said. Inside the school, the composition of the student population also has an effect on kids’ performance. “It’s not just the educational performance,” he said, “It is also exposure to a diverse community that will affect their future attitudes toward diversity.” Segregation creates a very strong sense of identity and people start labeling themselves and others (e.g. white, black, Asian), Batsaikhan said. Segregation affects children’s preferences and this was the motivation for this research, he said, “because parents’ preferences toward diversity become intergenerational.”

Economics literature has found that social interaction networks play a role in the formation of discriminatory beliefs toward other people, Batsaikhan said. A key question in the study was: If you have a bit of a diverse environment, will that affect children’s preference and racial tolerance? “It seems we have quite a lot of evidence that the environment kids grow up in is very important in forming a preference toward diversity,” he said.

Batsaikhan shared a 2004 study that found discrimination in employment hiring when an African American-sounding name was used in job applications. When the name of the applicant was changed to a white-sounding name, and everything else remained the same on an identical CVs, those with white-sounding names were more likely to be called for an interview. Economists then try to answer: What kind of discrimination it is: taste-based or statistical? Batsaikhan’s team attempted to answer this question using a randomized trial, a type of method to identify causality. They also used a Muslim-sounding name for the purpose of manipulating preferences and then to change parents’ perception by introducing additional information.

The Copenhagen Daycare Survey was carried out as part of a large project on daycare assignment mechanisms. The web-based survey was distributed to parents with a child aged 7-19 months. A sample of 5,000 was drawn randomly from city administrative registers and the response rate was about 50 percent. When the surveys were returned, they were merged with data held by Statistics Denmark, which holds extensive background information on citizens, such as a parent’s education and income.

In the survey, participants were initially asked to choose between two institutions that were based on sample testimonials from parents with children enrolled in daycare. Institution A was a highly-structured daycare, which is a preferred style of daycare in many cultures. Institution B values freedom in instruction and children play outdoors for much of the day. Northern countries tend to value this free-play institution more than structured daycare.

Seven different surveys were sent randomly, and each survey had six testimonials from parents sharing examples of what that liked about their school. Testimonials included a) the names of the parent and child behind the quote; b) the names plus the profession of the parent; c) no name or profession. Treatment choices included: a) only Danish-sounding names; b) a Muslim-sounding name; c) and the names with the parent’s profession included. A control group had no names associated with the testimonial.

The researchers first examined the role of the Muslim-sounding name in the survey to determine if there was a difference in the reactions to a minority name in the free-play institution versus the structured institution. The survey revealed that 75 percent of parents preferred free-play to structured daycare. The structured daycare was preferred by ethnic-minority parents, parents with lower education, low-income parents, families where the father earned more, and when the child being placed in daycare was a boy.

Interpretation was as follows:

Estimation 1. Comparing the responses of having an ethnic name in a free-play vs. structured institution; the latter had a negative and significant effect on the probability of preferring the structured institution.

Estimation 2. Changing the information about the ethnic background of the mother (a Muslim-sounding name) in the free-play institution had no significant effect on the probability of preferring the structured institution.

Regarding the type of discrimination, the researchers raised the question: Is there any effect on the preferences of information about the profession of the person behind the quote? The results showed that additional information about parent’s profession did not change the attitude toward the daycares with ethnic-minority names. This indicates that the discrimination is not statistical, at least the missing information is not associated with the profession or skill of the ethnic minority parents.

Finally, the researchers explored who preferred the structured daycare because that is where the discrimination exists. The initial exploration indicates that low educated mothers and ethnic minorities and low income families tend to choose the structured daycares. The team is planning to further explore this and identify who tend to discriminate more against the diverse daycares.

Mongoljin Batsaikhan is Assistant Professor of Economics at Georgetown University in Qatar. His research field is Applied Microeconomics, with a focus on social norms, discrimination, entrepreneurship, and small and medium enterprises in developing countries. His work has been published in Management Science, Economic Inquiry and Journal of Public Economics. He is a CIRS Faculty Fellow for 2017-2018.

Article by Jackie Starbird, Publications and Projects Assistant at CIRS.

Tensions in the Middle East: A Tentative Assessment
2017-11-28 12:45 - 13:45
Mehran Kamrava and Gerd Nonneman, both Professors of Government at Georgetown University in Qatar and experts on Middle East politics, gave a talk entitled “Tensions in the Middle East: A Tentative Assessment” at GUQ on November 28, 2017. They presented a broad overview of some of the major developments occurring in the region, particularly in Syria, Iran, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, and some of the implications for Qatar and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

Kamrava opened with some background on the region since the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011. He explained that a decisive factor in influencing the outcomes of the uprisings was whether militaries abandoned their civilian leadership during the uprisings. In Tunisia and Egypt when the armed forces did abandon ostensibly civilian leaders, there was a transition of power. Where the military did not abandon their civilian leadership, or where the military itself was fractured, there were different outcomes—mostly in the form of civil wars, as seen in Syria, Yemen, and for somewhat different reasons, Libya.

The fracture of the post-uprising political system in these cases resulted in civil wars, and civil wars facilitated and were also brought on by weak states—or collapsed countries. In Syria, the top command of the armed forces stayed with the civilian leadership, and Syria degenerated into a tragic and bloody civil war. “That afforded the opportunity for a number of external actors to step into Syria in the same way they had stepped into Libya and then later in Yemen, to try and expand their influence,” Kamrava said. In 2012 and 2013, Syria became a battlefield for external actors. “What we have had is a stalemate in Syria, in which now the fate of Syria is being decided by non-Syrians.”

Iran’s self-interest drove it to be involved in Syria, and those interests dictated that Iran prop up the existing Syrian regime, Kamrava said. Iran and Russia became involved on the side of the Syrians at the same time that Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and initially Turkey, were trying to foster the collapse of Syrian regime. “Iran’s intervention and proactive involvement in Syria on the part of the regime only fed into and reinforced a sectarian narrative that had previously been framed by the Bahraini government and Saudi government, and Iran really only reinforced and added fuel to the sectarian fire through it’s own activities and initiatives,” he said.

“Always on the verge of implosion,” is Lebanon, whose political system is so inherently fragile that the country is susceptible to the slightest pressure from within or from the outside. The fragility of its political system has continued since Lebanon’s long civil war ended in 1991. That weakness of the Lebanese central authority continued, and the weaknesses gave birth to the armed group, Hezbollah. Kamrava said it’s important to remember that Hezbollah is a Lebanese entity. “It is a political group that is also armed, but it is also a political group that has engaged in an awful lot of civil society activities.” Hezbollah is also a close Iranian ally, which has been a point of contention for Israel, and also lately for Saudi Arabia.

Since 2013, Saudi Arabia has adopted a radically different foreign and domestic policy—as compared to any time in its history—because of the ascendance of new political actors in the Saudi system, namely the king, Salman, and his son, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman. Kamrava said Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic and foreign policy initiatives have repeatedly hit roadblocks since 2013. “The war in Yemen was supposed to be a two-month endeavor and it still continues two years on with no end in sight. The blockade of Qatar was supposed to be a two-week endeavor and it still continues with Qatar in no mood to settle. The competition with Iran has not gotten anywhere. Saudi efforts in Syria have reached a deadlock, and Saudi Arabia is now trying to organize its own Syrian opposition and it hasn’t gotten anywhere. And the forcible resignation of the prime minister of Lebanon seems to have backfired,” he said.

Despite these setbacks in foreign policy, Kamrava argued, Mohammad bin Salman appears to have had a number of successes on the domestic front. His domestic social and cultural reforms, curtailing the powers of the religious police, his anti-corruption drive, and his attempts at dismantling the Saudi “deep state,” all seem extremely popular with most Saudis and have so far not elicited any serious challenges.

Nonneman agreed that Saudi Arabia, and Mohammad bin Salman (“MbS”) in particular, are worth focusing on because of the country’s regional superpower status, its recent record of increased assertiveness, and the striking changes in domestic and foreign policy that have been in evidence—not least in the Qatar boycott. Yet he pointed out that the role of Mohammad bin Zayed (“MbZ”), the Crown Prince but de facto ruler of Abu Dhabi, is crucial in understanding many of these developments, given his own ambitions for Abu Dhabi and the UAE, and his influence on MbS.

He noted that when it comes to the UAE’s role in the boycott or other regional issues, it is important to distinguish the role of Abu Dhabi and its leadership. In UAE foreign policy, the sheikhdoms that really count have always been Abu Dhabi and Dubai, which are ruled by separate ruling families: the Al Maktoum in Dubai and the Al Nahyan in Abu Dhabi, Nonneman explained. For many years after the UAE’s seven constituent emirates came together in 1971, the federal constitution and the first president, Abu Dhabi ruler Sheikh Zayed, had brought a balance between unity and continued diversity—including in foreign policy and defense: Dubai had retained its separate defense force until 1997. This balance was managed to the benefit of the wider federation and of Dubai and Abu Dhabi in particular, each of which had much to offer the other.

Two shifts occurred in the UAE to change this picture, Nonneman said. First, Sheikh Zayed, the charismatic founding leader of the UAE, died, leaving his son Mohammad bin Zayed as the power behind the throne of the new emir of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Khalifa. MbZ was very different: “sharp, very ambitious for Abu Dhabi’s status and role, very strongly military- and security-oriented in his world view, and not particularly good at taking on board conflicting opinions.” There was, though, still a balance with Dubai and its ruler, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid. Then came the financial crisis of 1998, where Dubai suffered grievously and might have come close to bankruptcy, had it not been for some $20 billion dollars of support from Abu Dhabi. So the power relationship has shifted, with Dubai losing much of its autonomy in matters of foreign and security policy. Hence, also, the much better relations between the Al Maktum and Qatar’s Al Thani, and Dubai’s much more pragmatic attitude towards Iran, ceased to have the effect they once had, he said.

“Mohammed bin Zayed was likely the main instigator of the level of vitriol directed at Qatar, and of the harshness of the boycott,” Nonneman suggested, “out of his concern to contain any Qatari challenge to his policy concerns regarding Iran, the role of political Islam, and his essentially autocratic vision of rule—as well as any Qatari pretenses at regional prominence.” In much of this he found a sympathetic ear in MbS. Of course there had been frictions before in the GCC, and even limited armed clashes, but “never has there been anything like this—cutting off of social and kinship relations, and buckets of vitriol being thrown at other ruling families.” The apparent and public attempts at regime change in Qatar, “that was a novelty,” he said.

Understanding this shift requires an appreciation for how leadership and decision making have shifted in both the UAE and Saudi Arabia, where Nonneman drew a parallel between leadership in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. “Decisions are made more impetuously than before, without serious consideration of alternatives, and without feedback from the sorts of voices that might have questioned lines of thinking.” One of the positives of the old Saudi system was there was always a variety of voices heard in decision-making circles, and “policy was carefully calibrated and possible consequences and pros and cons debated. That’s gone.” In MbS’s court, “there is nobody who dares question what he has decided.” The handling of the operation in Yemen, the boycott against Qatar, and the virtual kidnap of Lebanese Prime Minister Harari, are examples of this much-narrowed decision-making environment, he said.

Nonneman agreed with Kamrava that the domestic reform agenda of MbS in Saudi Arabia is popular and holds out promise. Yet he cautioned that the key to success will not just be new social freedoms: it will be jobs—one of the key pressure points for the Saudi economy. “If the jobs don’t appear within the medium term, then I fear a lot of latent resentments are going to bubble back up again,” he said.

What does this mean for Qatar and the blockade? Nonneman said that there was little left in the toolbox of the boycotting countries—as the military option is off the table and Qatar has the wherewithal to sustain the blockade indefinitely. He did have one concern, regarding the potential of Iran being drawn into wider regional conflicts. “If, for instance, the original Saudi plan had worked—of removing Hariri as the fig leaf for Hezbollah’s presence in Lebanon—it might have led to a wider military conflict.” If such dynamics brought Iran into direct conflict with Israel and the US, it “would bring Qatar into a very difficult spot,” he suggested.

Kamrava said there is usually very little cost to countries that impose sanctions on others; they have fewer incentives to settle and to resolve the conflict. Saudi Arabia has very little incentive to end the blockade against Qatar. “For the foreseeable future I don’t necessarily see a resolution,” he said, “but the rupture is there to stay for some time.”

Article by Jackie Starbird, CIRS Publications and Projects Assistant.

Supporting Social Science Research in a Turbulent Middle East Roundtable Meeting
2017-11-29 08:00 - 17:00
On November 29, 2017, CIRS convened a one-day roundtable meeting to bring together scholars of the region with extensive experience in carrying out social science research, to have an in-depth conversation on the topic of “Supporting Social Science Research in a Turbulent Middle East.” Over the course of a day experts engaged in a vibrant and open conversation on how the research community can address the multiple challenges encountered when carrying out studies on the Middle East.

Among other things, participants in the focused discussion discussed the value, replicability, and statistical significance of Middle Eastern case-studies; methodological issues relating to the merits of quantitative and qualitative research, as well as the potential usefulness of alternative methodological approaches adapted to conflict zones; data challenges due to lack of existing data or lack of access to (and confidence in) existing data; challenges of supporting and funding safe fieldwork in societies and countries that are in the midst of war or facing authoritarian clamp-downs; challenges related to censorship and academic freedom; the impact of restrictions and immigration controls that limit travel and free mobility of researchers both within the region and from the region to the West, limit research collaboration across borders, and diminish access to participation in international conferences; the role of the ever evolving sanctions regime and the constraints of funding or working with scholars in states which have sanctions imposed upon them; and finally the whole host of ethical and moral challenges related to protecting researchers, protecting informants, protecting scholars at risk, protecting sensitive data, protecting vulnerable communities, and protecting the rights of scholars trying to carrying out “sensitive research” that confront social values and norms in some parts of the Middle East. In the introduction to our meeting, we urged scholars participating in the discussion to not only highlight and reiterate the difficulties and dismal prospects for social science research in the Middle East, but to also help us understand their own experiences in navigating challenges, and identify for us what the possibilities for managing this difficult time are.

Key points that emerged out of the discussions were:

Conditions for social science research in MENA region are particularly challenging due to region-wide restrictions on academic freedom, increasing securitization and rigid control of the social sciences under authoritarian regimes, the existence of deeply divided societies, social sensitives that limit research topics, and the impact of US sanctions regime

The academic community of social science scholars in and of the MENA region is weak and not unified. There is a need for greater development of region-wide network of social scientists who can work with and support each other.

Mechanisms for integrating ethical concerns into social science research projects are not effective. Institutional Review Boards are only there to oversee initial proposal submissions, but there are serious shortcoming when it comes to maintaining ethics throughout the research process. Among other things discussed were the social science researcher’s obligations to ensure that his or her research is used responsibly, and also avoiding making false promises and raising the hopes of research subjects by promising that the study will make a real-life difference.

Complicated and oppositional ideas of the role of the social science researcher working in the Middle East. Some participants insisted that prioritizing and maintaining scientific objectivity is the most important thing that social scientists can do. Others had very different ideas and suggested social science researchers also have a mandate to “do good” and contribute towards the improvement or betterment of problematic conditions.

It is worth mentioning that CIRS will publish the findings of the roundtable meeting in the near future.

Read more about the research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Abdullah Al-Arian, Georgetown University in Qatar
Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Abdallah Badahdah, Doha International Family Institute
Laurie A. Brand, University of Southern California
Afyare Elmi, Qatar University
Michael Ewers, Qatar University
Justin Gengler, Qatar University
Suzanne Hammad, Qatar University
Islam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Islah Jad, Qatar University
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Milli Lake, London School of Economics
Beverley Milton-Edwards, Queen’s University Belfast
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Firat Oruc, Georgetown University in Qatar
Mary Schmiedel, Georgetown University
Seteney Shami, Arab Council for the Social Sciences
Shaida Sonde, Georgetown University in Qatar
Jackie Starbird, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Valbona Zenku, Georgetown University in Qatar

Article by Zahra Babar, Associate Director of Research at CIRS

Mobility, Displacement, and Forced Migration in the Middle East Working Group II
2017-12-10 09:00 - 2017-12-11 17:00
On December 10-11, 2017, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) held the second working group under its research initiative on “Mobility, Displacement, and Forced Migration in the Middle East.” Over the course of two days, scholars discussed issues around: borders and mobility of Syrian refugees in the Levant; livelihood and identity politics of Syrian refugees in Northern Lebanon and Southern Turkey; patterns of Syrian refugees in Dayr al-Ahmar region in Lebanon; the experiences of displaced Syrian refugees in Jordan from a gender perspective; the situation of Yezidi, Christian and other religious communities from Sinjar, Iraq; migration to Libya and Tunisia; African migrants in Morocco; Afghan migrants in Tehran; and Yemeni refugees in Djibouti. It is worth mentioning that five teams of researchers participating in this project were awarded grants from CIRS to conduct empirical fieldwork.

Zahra Babar started the working group discussions by presenting Natalia Ribas-Mateos’s paper on “Borders and Mobilities in the Middle East: Emerging Challenges for Syrian Refugees in the Bilad Al Sham.” In her paper, Ribas-Mateos examines the transformation of geopolitical lines and borders with the rise of globalization in the Middle East. She claims that such transformation has accompanied severe inequalities: increasing limitations placed on the mobility of refugees and migrants; fewer limitations on cross-border flow of goods, refugee encampments and settlements (formal and informal), human vulnerability and rights violations; and expanded border securitization. In examining the transformation of geopolitical lines and borders in the Middle East, Ribas-Mateos studied a number of Lebanese villages, towns and cities bordering Syria.

Building on Ribas-Mateos’s paper, Estella Carpi presented her grant-funded research on “The Borderwork of Humanitarianism during Displacement from War-Torn Syria: Livelihoods as Identity Politics in Northern Lebanon and Southern Turkey.” Carpi’s research is an ethnographic inquiry into the socio-economic practices of urban refugees, local residents, and humanitarian actors in the framework of the 2011-2015 forced migration flows from Syria into the border cities of Halba (northern Lebanon) and Gaziantep (southern Turkey). The research explores how local patterns of everyday consumption, livelihoods hunting, and labor have changed in light of the historically unprecedented humanitarian response to refugee crisis in the two border regions. The research focuses on humanitarian livelihoods programing and people’s identity work in a bid to examine the border-making effects that humanitarian practices—echoing national policies—entail. Likewise, it investigates the role of livelihoods programing in crystallizing identity categories, which crisis management typically relies on to build its outreach. The paper finally unravels an ongoing process of “identity neo-borderization” in northern Lebanon and southern Turkey.

Leïla Vignal, another grant-awardee, sharpened the discussion on Syrian refugees in neighboring Lebanon by presenting her paper, co-authored by Emma Aubin-Boltanski, on “Hosting and being Hosted in Times of Crisis: Exploring the Multi-layered Patterns of Syrian Refugees in the Dayr al-Ahmar Region, Northern Bekaa, Lebanon.” In their paper, Vignal and Aubin-Boltanski illuminate the dynamics and patterns of the Syrian refuge to Lebanon, and Syrian refugees’ relations and interactions with local host communities. Through an in-depth fieldwork in the villages of the Dayr al-Ahmar caza (sub-district) in the muhafaza (district) of Baalbek-Hermel, in the North of the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon, the authors study Syrian refugees through a local prism. Such prism allows rooting the host/guest relations into history and space. Similarly, the paper connects host-guest relations to specific contexts that are rendered difficult in Lebanon by the lack of economic development, the fragile organization of politics, and the lack of consensus with regards to the Syrian conflict and Syrian refugees.

Aitemad Muhanna-Matar, a grant-awardee, focused the discussion further on Syrian refugees through her discussion on “Gendering the Triangular Relationship between Vulnerability, Resilience and Resistance: The Experiences of Displaced Syrian Refugees in Jordan.” Based on empirical data drawn from the personal narratives of sixty Syrian refugees displaced in three Jordanian governorates: Amman, Zarqa and Mafraq, Muhanna-Matar explores the triangular relationship Syrian refugees have developed, through their experience of displacement, between gendered vulnerability, resilience, and resistance. Muhanna-Matar suggests that the three angles of the triangular relationship do not operate in a sequential manner, but in procession and mutual assistance. Through this relationship, vulnerable masculinity and femininity is negotiated, renegotiated, and contested through different modes of everyday acts of resilience and resistance, or resilient resistance. The article contextualizes the gendered vulnerability of Syrian refugees, how Syrian refugees cope with it, and how the international humanitarian community responds.

Thomas Schmidinger shifted the discussion to “The Situation of Êzîdî-, Christian- and Other Religious Minorities- IDPs and Refugees from Sinjar after the Genocide of 2014.” In his article, Schmidinger argues that the lack of security and the rivalry between different militias and armed groups in Iraq prevented Êzîdî, Christians, and other religious communities from Sinjar to return to their region after their forced displacement. Only a limited number of displaced persons returned to the north of Mount Sinjar, while the vast majority still lives as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Dohuk Governorate. In addition, Schmidinger claims that many members of the religious minorities who lived in Sinjar lost their trust in a future inside Iraq. They do not connect their problems just with the so-called “Islamic State,” but rather see the Islamic State as a continuation of “Muslim (Sunni) repression against religious minorities.” He adds that although many of the aforementioned IDPs would like to migrate to Europe or overseas, they also know about the difficulties refugees face by European states. This led many of them to feel abandoned by the international community.

Ricardo René Larémont and Mustafa Attir, grant-awardees, discussed “Clandestine Migration in Libya and Tunisia” (co-authored with Mohammed Jouili). Based on over 760 interviews with migrants in Libya and Tunisia, the authors argue that since the 2011 Arab Spring revolts, there has been a considerable increase of migrants from North Africa to Europe. Media and academia have focused their attention on trans-Mediterranean migration while ignoring the more important trend of migration to North Africa as a destination rather than as a transit point to Europe. The authors argue that Tunisia has witnessed a dramatic increase in migration from sub-Saharan countries, especially between 2015 and 2017. The primary motive for migration was economic. Most migrants see Tunisia as a final destination or they are involved in circular migration between Tunisia and their home countries, as they perceive employment opportunities in Tunisia as better than in their home countries even though the Tunisian economy has been in decline since 2011. The authors add that only a minority of migrants to Tunisia aspire to migrate to Europe.

Building on the previous discussion, Matt Buehler discussed “Integration of African Migrants in Morocco: Surveying the Attitudes of Native Citizens” (co-authored with Kyung Joon Han). The authors argue that whether intentional or not, more and more African migrants have chosen to resettle in Morocco, without entering the European Union. This contributed to a greater number of interactions and conflicts between African migrants and native Moroccan citizens, who have express tremendous variation in how much they support or oppose these new arrives in their homeland. Based on a 1500-respondent survey, the authors to explore this variation in native citizens’ attitudes.

Pooya Alaedini discussed “Afghan Migrants in Tehran: A Socioeconomic and Spatial Analysis.” Alaedini claims that the Province of Tehran is a highly significant area of residence for Afghanis in Iran. The overwhelming urban primacy of the national capital located in the province makes Tehran particularly important in the analysis of Iran’s Afghani migrants—as they are concentrated in several locations across the neighborhoods and hold a variety of occupations against the background of the economic opportunities offered by the city. Thus, their effects on the city are also copious and important. With these in mind and based on empirical field work, Alaedini analyzes the dynamics of Afghani residence in urban Tehran by examining laws and regulations of urban and regional planning in Iran, and Afghani migration to Farahzad, Harandi, and Aminabad neighborhoods; demographics; housing; economic situation, employment and business activities; social networks in neighborhoods; and cultural and social activities.

Finally, Islam Hassan presented Nathalie Peutz’s “In Dire Straits: Refugees from Yemen Displaced in Djibouti.” Puetz conducted empirical, on-ground fieldwork in the Markazi camp in Djibouti, the only camp for Yemeni refugees in the Horn of Africa region. Based on her empirical fieldwork, Puetz argue in her paper that much of the literature on migration, sovereignty, and territoriality focuses on how externally funded mobility restriction regimes in transit countries aim to keep migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers out of the destination countries. This is the politics of exclusion. However, what Puetz’s interviewees pointed to was the temporary extension of Yemeni/Saudi sovereignty into a transit country to contain Yemeni refugees: to keep them “in.” Puetz argues that whether restriction regimes and extension of sovereignties have any legitimacy, or the paranoid fears of people living in a heightened state of uncertainty do, what is real is that the Markazi refugees feel doubly incarcerated— both as occupants of a securitized camp and as persons who, despite having crossed the sea, have not in fact escaped the grasp of Yemen.

It is worth mentioning that CIRS will publish the papers of this research initiative in an edited volume by Zahra Babar in the near future.

Click here for the working group agenda
Click here for the participants’ biographies
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf, Georgetown University in Qatar
Pooya Alaedini, University of Tehran
Mustafa Attir, University of El-Fatah in Tripoli, Libya, & Center for Sustainable Development Research
Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Matt Buehler, Harvard University
Estella Carpi, University College London
Islam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Ricardo René Larémont, State University of New York
Aitemad Muhanna-Matar, London School of Economics
Natalia Ribas-Mateos, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain
Thomas Schmidinger, University of Vienna
Jackie Starbird, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Leïla Vignal, University of Rennes-2, France
Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

CIRS Screens Suzi Mirgani's Film "There Be Dragons"
2018-01-10 12:45 - 13:45
On January 10, 2018, CIRS screened There Be Dragons, a short experimental film by Suzi Mirgani, Managing Editor at CIRS. The film premiered at the Doha Film Institute’s Ajyal Youth Film Festival on November 30, 2017, one of 16 local productions showcased in the Made in Qatar program at the festival.

The three-minute film was conceived in a workshop organized by the University’s student-run Film Society, where Mirgani is one of the mentors, along with Abdullah Al-Arian. A number of Georgetown students, including CIRS interns Mohammed Al Jaberi and Waleed Zahoor, and Film Society leaders, Rawan Al-Zaini and Mehaira Mahgoub, also helped with its creation.

“There be dragons”—or, more accurately, “here be dragons” from the Latin hic sunt dracones—is a term that was once used to describe unexplored territory on a medieval map. It was designed to warn people of the unknown—an unfamiliar space that is imagined to be filled with mystery and monsters. Mirgani said “In this film, I play with the idea of the unknown in modern times, and create a kind of ‘map of modernity.’ In the age of digital technology, Google Maps, and omnipresent CCTV surveillance, is there anything left undiscovered? I argue that there is. Since most of the earth is explored, boxed, and bordered, perhaps the unknown now exists on an entirely different realm—the realm of technology. The more advanced we become, the more complex the digital devices. Does the average person know how anything works? Even though electricity and digital technologies are explained to us scientifically, there are ghosts in the machine— deus ex machina—that we will never be able to comprehend.”

In this film, flickering lights, eerie kites in flight, the random revolutions of a funhouse ride, and self-playing pianos suggest a metropolis that lives a life of its own. Advanced technologies propel cities to work in the absence of the human. Even though there are real people and a workforce catering to smooth running of urban life, this film is a reflection on the automation, and at times alienation, underlying the city. Through this film, Mirgani tries to grapple with some of these concepts to see beyond what is obvious and available. On the surface, this is a visual amble through Doha, but it is also one that uncovers an alternate side of the city that often goes unnoticed.

To show this alternative, unexplored part of the city, Mirgani combined footage she had taken of scenes around Doha over a number of years. From flickering lights to the revolutions of a funhouse ride and self-playing pianos, the films suggests that the city lives a life of its own.

“I think one of the most interesting aspects of this film is that it is both experimental and documentary,” said Mirgani. “Doha changes so quickly that it is often difficult to hold on to any specific memories of pace and place; new landscapes are brought to life, even as old landmarks are bulldozed and buried. It is both developing and super modern.”

There Be Dragons is the latest of a number a short films Mirgani has produced, edited, and directed. Her short film Caravan premiered at the Ajyal Youth Film Festival last year, and her 2013 film Doha Lullaby won the Jury Award for the Doha Film Institute’s 48-Hour Film Challenge.

The CIRS researcher, who has edited and written numerous publications on topics ranging from media and politics to food security in the Middle East, is also the director of 2014’s Hind’s Dream. That film, produced with a cast and crew of Georgetown students, won the jury award for artistic vision at the 2014 Ajyal Film Festival and has been screened at film festivals around the world.

Nation Building in Central Asia Working Group I
2018-01-21 09:00 - 2018-01-22 16:00
On January 21-22, 2018, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) convened a working group on “Nation Building in Central Asia.” The working group took place under the larger CIRS research project which aims to examine various social and political processes that have been taking place in Central Asia following the dismantling of the Soviet Union. With the establishment of the new successor states in the early 1990s, Central Asian powers undertook the enormous task of building cohesive, unified states, while still contending with the legacy of the USSR and the challenges of trying to accommodate various minority groups and dislocated populations, all while struggling to assert full sovereign control over their newly established territories. These efforts introduced or mobilized competing ethnic, nationalistic, and territorial claims, the effects of which are still emerging. During the January working group, the group of assembled experts’ primary objective was to identity original research questions in relation to Central Asian nation-building processes and provide guidance on where the focus of the project ought to be. Some of the topics that scholars addressed during the working group included: migration and transnationalism; regional integration; food culture and identity; national identity in Kazakhstan; religion and identity in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan; and language policies in Kyrgyzstan.

Ruslan Rahimov led the first of the working group discussions, focusing on “Migration, Transnationalism, and Nation Building in Central Asia.” The fall of the Soviet Union left the newly formed Central Asian states with the encumbrance of weak territorial boundaries. Population transfers and interregional mobility patterns that had taken place during the Soviet Union’s own state formation efforts have left their imprint on the region, and these effects can be felt until today. Migration and mobility continue to be challenging features of the region that have impacted nation-building efforts of Central Asian states, particularly for the smaller states of the region. One of the key questions that still needs to be fully explored is the capacity of a small state to build a coherent nation within the context of mass migration, continuous movement and mobility, as well as brain drain as skilled citizens leave. In addition, other important current areas which need further study are the consequences of internal migration; Chinese migration to Central Asia; dependency on remittance flows from Russia; and how migrants may serve as a political tool in Post-Soviet countries’ interstate relations.

Nargis Kassenova continued the discussion by examining “Regional Integration and Nation Building in Central Asia.” Focusing on a case study of Kazakhstan’s regional foreign policy, Kassenova stated that while there is an established scholarly literature on the country’s relations and policies towards global actors such as the Russia, the European Union, Eurasia and the United States, there has been far less work on how Kazakhstan engages with its immediate neighborhood. Kassenvoa highlighted six understudied areas where there is a need for further research. First with regards to regional cooperation at the sub-state level, how do national business try to work in the region? Second, how do Central Asian youth feel about their region and their place in it? Third, what does Central Asian identity mean in terms of actual mobility and attributes of collective identity? Fourth, is Central Asia limited to the former Soviet states, or its boundaries could be extended to other countries, such as Afghanistan? Fifth, what role did the withdrawal of Russia from the region play in consolidating a Central Asian identity? Finally, to what extent is Central Asian identity influenced by outside actors such as Russia, US and others?

Aida Alymbaeva shifted the discussion to “Food Culture and Identity in Central Asia.” In her discussion, Alymbaeva highlighted the politicization of food both at the state and societal levels. In her discussion, she focused on Kyrgyzstan raising questions on multiple issues, among which: the role of media in localizing dishes, the construction of cuisine in the Soviet era versus current time, and how comparing food traditions and dishes across regions can draw a different geographical map. Alymbaeva also discussed issues around hospitality, the role of modernization and globalization in influencing the local, national, and regional cuisine, the role of food in the nationalization process, how economics influence food traditions, the revival of Islam and its influence on food culture, and the takeover of fast-food chains.

Aziz Burkhanov focused the discussion with his presentation on “National Identity and Nation Building in Kazakhstan.” Burkhanov listed four main issues that deserve further study. First is multiculturalism and the policy of ethnic particularism sponsored by the Kazakhstani government. He argued that the state funds ethnic (non-Kazakh) cultural centers questioning how this relates to “civic Kazakhstani nationhood”. Second, Burkhanov raised a question on youth, born after 1991, and their perception of Kazakhstaniness/Kazakhness in light of the rural (Kazakh)-urban (non-Kazakh) divide in the societal discourse. Third, he highlighted the usage of urban public spaces (monuments, billboards, etc.) and how the state uses such pomp for its national identity propaganda. Finally, he argued that most scholarship is based on Russian-language sources and discourse, while Kazakh-language discourse tends to be somewhat overlooked. This makes the Kazakh-language discourse, for its important and interesting discussions on various visions of identity, worth exploring.

Laura Yerekesheva shifted the discussion to “Religion and Nation Building in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.” Yerekesheva argued that the deterministic approach in studying nation-building based on political, economic, and social organization doesn’t accommodate other areas of development in ideas, consciousness, memories, traditions, etc. Thus, the concept of identity and culture–as a conglomeration of symbol-based traditions—is in fact equally or more important than political and economic variables. Yerekhsheva insisted that one has to make a distinction between cultural identity and national identity. Cultural identity can be considered as more cohesive and represents the broader identity affiliations of a group, while national identity is often imposed by the state, and tends to be narrowly defined. Germane to this discussion, Yerekesheva argued that religion is a key variable in cultural identity but in Central Asian national identity development projects, religion is often not included as a result of state restriction. In Central Asia the role and influence of religion has in principle been highlighted in the historical realm of the region without an adequate attention paid to how it informs or influences contemporary modes of identify formation. Yerekesheva suggested that as a result there are multiple areas that need further study when it comes to religion in Central Asia, and among other things suggested the need to examine: the heritage and influence of Sufism in Central Asia; national cultural heritage programs and religion; the influence of religious radicalism and state efforts to address this threat; and the role of Arab countries in preparing teaching, training, and supporting Muslim scholars and Imams in Central Asia.

Mukaram Toktogulova led the final discussion of the working group and explored “Language Policies and National Identity in Kyrgyzstan.” Toktogulova argued that language policies in Kyrgyzstan are ostensibly influenced by the pervasive ideologies adopted at the realm of the state. Since language policies are closely linked to language practice, the public interprets such policies in their own way as they practice language. In the nation-building process that has started post-independence, differences in language and dialects became more important for people as a tool to differentiate between ethnic identities. This is reflected in the integration and assimilation with first Arabic and Latin, and then Cyrillic writing systems. Toktogulova argued that the use of Russian, national language, or a mix of both has naturally resulted in a mixed language, which the state then has exerted palpable efforts to “purify”. Such efforts included issuing laws on official language, and requiring passing standardized Kyrgyz language tests for state employees. Such societal and state efforts raise questions around the pushing for regional integration as replacing Russian with Kyrgyz language obliterates one common variable that peoples across the region share. The state’s replacement of Russian with the national language also raises questions about the future of migration to Russian.

Scholars have been now invited to study some of these research questions, among others, in written papers to be presented and critiqued at a second meeting to be held next the summer. CIRS aims to publish the written contributions in an edited volume in the near future.

For more information on the working group agenda, please click here.For the participants’ biographies, click hereRead more about this research initiative.

Participants and Discussants:

Aida Alymbaeva, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, GermanyZahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarAziz Burkhanov, Nazarbayev University, Republic of KazakhstanIslam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarNargis Kassenova, KIMEP University, KazakhstanSuzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarRuslan Rahimov, American University of Central Asia, KyrgyzstanMukaram Toktogulova, American University of Central Asia, KyrgyzstanElizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarLaura Yerekesheva, R. B. Suleimenov Institute of Oriental Studies

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

Science and Scientific Production in the Middle East Roundtable
2018-02-22 08:00 - 17:00
In February, 2018, CIRS convened a one-day roundtable meeting to bring together scholars, scientists, experts, and business practitioners with extensive experience on science and scientific production in the Middle East. Over the course of a day the participants engaged in a vibrant and open conversation on the opportunities and constraints of conducting scientific research in the region.

Among other things, participants in the roundtable explored the influence of culture, coherence, continuity, and consensus on the development of SDI; and transnational collaborations and networks, along with local patronage which funds such relationships, which enable world-class scientific research, even in areas that don’t promise immediate financial return. The participants also discussed the need to encourage scientific indigeneity and internationalization of Middle Eastern scientific production. Moreover, the participants highlighted the relationship between Islam and science, which has been one of the main issues in contemporary intellectual discourses in the Muslim world, particularly in the Middle East; and the impact of the Arab uprisings on science and scientific advancement. Finally, the participants concluded the roundtable discussions by focusing on the impact of sanction regimes on scientists and scientific production in the Middle East with a particular focus on Iran.

Key gaps in the literature on science and scientific production in the Middle East that emerged out of the discussions were:

Structural and bureaucratic limitations to the development of SDI in the Middle East. Self-censorship in disseminating sensitive research findings to the Middle East’s general public. The gap between society and the scientific community, and access to foreign technology, scientific discovery, research, etc. The role scientific networks and collaborations play in exchange of ideas and technological transfer between Middle Eastern countries and other parts of the world. Networks and transnational collaborations’ contribution to building local capacity, and continuity and sustainability of scientific research within an individual country.Sanction regimes a blessing or a curse? Although sanctions restrict external funding for research and equipping labs, they can contribute to scientific indigeneity. The issue of capturing transnational collaborations between local and foreign research institutions.

It is worth mentioning that CIRS will launch a research initiative that addresses some of these gaps, among others, in the near future.

For the roundtable agenda, click here.For the roundtable participants, click here.For the research initiative, click here.

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

Is the International Criminal Court a Colonial Institution?
2018-02-28 12:45 - 13:45
The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established in 1998 to ensure that war crimes and crimes against humanity do not go unpunished. Although governments usually have capable systems to enforce laws, when it comes to mass atrocities, they often lack the framework to deal with crimes of such proportions. Since its inception, the ICC has been criticized for being a colonial institution, one perpetuating the “powerful versus the powerless” paradigm. On February 28, 2018, the Center for International and Regional Studies hosted the talk, “Is the International Criminal Court a Colonial Institution?” presented by Mia Swart, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center and research director at the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) in South Africa. In addition to raising the presentation question, she also offered suggestions for reforms of the ICC.

Swart provided some background on the ICC and its relationship to the United Nations Security Council, which has played an important role in international criminal justice, such as by establishing ad hoc tribunals in the aftermath of large-scale crimes, like with the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s. These organizations were the predecessors to the ICC and led to its establishment. Unlike these tribunals, however, the ICC is based on the Rome Statute, the treaty that established the ICC’s jurisdiction and functions. States voluntarily become party to the statute by ratifying it and, as of 2017, 123 states are members.

Swart argued that, “it is uncontroversial that international law has been shaped by colonialism and imperialism,” as it is rooted in the Westphalian system that was devised by the European States. And, the idea of certain states having all the power “is inextricably bound-up with international law as a discipline.” She believes that international law cannot be conceived without its colonial roots. The paternalistic idea of the UN or Western states caring for other nations is still given a lot of importance today, she said, and “at the center of this debate is the ICC’s nearly exclusive focus on African countries until very, very recently.”

This matter of whether the ICC is colonial is of particular interest for Swart, as a South African. And the issue has been a “burning issue nationally,” as South Africans are deeply concerned over how many of the institutions within their country are deeply colonial, she said. Additionally, when Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir arrived in Johannesburg in 2015 to attend an African Union summit, it triggered an enormous debate over colonialism in South Africa. Subsequently, the South African government attempted to withdraw from the ICC, and the African Union continues to support a mass withdrawal by its members.

Al-Bashir had been charged by the ICC with crimes against humanity and genocide in Darfur in 2009, and it was the obligation of South Africa, as a member of the ICC, to have him arrested upon entering the country. That did not happen. The expectation of the ICC was that member states were obliged to arrest Al-Bashir if he stepped foot in their countries. What is notable about this situation is that Sudan is not a state party of the ICC. In fact, Al Bashir had travelled to thirteen member-countries with a fair amount of immunity and without being arrested.

Swart said immunity and impunity for sitting heads of state is an international hot topic. “My view is that the Rome Statute trumps traditional rules of immunity and if you signed that statute then you are obliged to operate and arrest.” However, she said, it was simply inconceivable that South African President Zuma would arrest Al-Bashir because of long-standing diplomatic relations between the two countries. During this incident, there was a lot of opportunistic use of the term colonialist, she said. Claims were made that Al-Bashir should not be arrested because the ICC is colonial, whereas “what was really going on was friends protecting friends.” Certain governments just refused to break diplomatic ties even if they knew that international crimes were committed, she said.

This was the context that really created a lot of the debate around whether the ICC is neocolonialist, Swart said. She clarified that using the term colonial really means neocolonial. That the word colonial does not mean literally invading and taking over other countries; rather it’s a continuation of economic and political control, and is equally damaging. Especially, she said, “China these days is a major neocolonialist on the African continent, and the United States, certainly.”

Swart believes the ICC is capable of evolving and becoming more understanding of global diversity, and she noted that international law can also be counter-imperialistic. International law both reinforces the idea of colonialism and it also talks about liberation, which is “the unstable nature of the international law,” she said. However, she said it should not be ignored that some entities like Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) are deeply critical of international law, as it views the system as continuing the exploitation of the Third World by the West. And there are plenty of critics from the West who would agree that the system is internally flawed, she said.

The ICC is fundamentally colonial in two ways: in its design and in its funding, Swart argued. Its relationship to the Security Council allows it a measure of decision-making power, and this influence can be obstructive, as in the cases of Syria and the Al Bashir debacle, she said. In terms of funding, whereas the ad hoc committees are funded by UN, the ICC is funded by a variety of states. The top funders are all from Europe (and Japan), giving them considerable ability to “pull strings in all kinds of ways.” This is an under-acknowledged way in which Western states plays a role in influencing the situations, Swart said. Additionally, the ICC prosecutor is acutely aware of the interests of these states, she said, “so she will never threaten the interests of United States and Japan, for example.”

Selectivity is another critical factor, Swart said. “In a world full of international crimes where a lot of international crimes are being committed, the ICC is fairly arbitrary.” The ICC does not choose a country, it chooses a situation, she explained. For example, they will not choose Sudan or Congo, but will select a particular situation within a country. All of the issues that the ICC focuses on make a statement about how it views its role in the world, so how it chooses these situations is extremely meaningful. “Selectivity is the Achilles’ heel of international criminal justice; the aspect that gives it a dubious legitimacy,” she said.

This gives rise to the question: Why did African nations chose to become a part of the ICC if they had initial reservations? One theory is that some African states were pressurized to sign the agreement because the UN refused to provide them aid if they did not do so. An alternative explanation is that the African nations believed in the ICC’s ability to make a difference. In its early years, the organization did not seem to be characterized by the traditional dialectic of North and South. The opinion about South Africa’s position on the ICC today is divided. “There is no question that the African nations are hostile toward the ICC,” Swart said. The African Union is now in the process of creating their own instrument for international justice.

Swart argued that the effect of the ICC on African states has not only been negative; it has had some positive effects in that it has given African states something to mobilize around. For example, Kenyans have strongly mobilized against ICC and they are not afraid to assert themselves in the Assembly of State Parties (capitals), she said. A pivotal question that this leads to is: How can the ICC be reformed? Swart offered the following strategies. Structurally, it can be amended, as their statute allows for it. The assembly of state parties can also play a much more important role in advocating for change, and the ICC can be much stronger in its own rhetoric. “Perceptions matter,” she said, so the way the ICC communicates with the public is of key importance. The gravity threshold of the ICC prosecutor remains very unclear, and they can have a more inclusive focus. And, finally, she argued that it is important to note that the constant focus of the ICC on Africa and their condescending attitude threatens the very existence of the court. There is a real chance that African states might actually withdraw, which would mean over thirty states leaving the ICC, greatly affecting its influence and legitimacy.

Mia Swart is a visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center and research director at the HSRC in South Africa. Her research focus is on transitional justice, international criminal law and comparative constitutional law. She is currently a Visiting Professor at the University of the Witwatersrand and was Professor of International Law at the University of Johannesburg and Associate Professor at the University of the Witwatersrand before joining Brookings. Her work has been cited by South African courts as well as by the International Criminal Court. Her co-edited book, The Limits of Transition: The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 20 Years After, was published in 2017.

Article by Khansa Maria, CIRS Student Assistant

Informal Politics in the Middle East Working Group I
2018-03-10 09:00 - 17:00
On March 10, 2018, the Center for International and Regional Studies held its first working group under its research initiative on “Informal Politics in the Middle East.” During the working group, a number of scholars were convened to discuss various questions on a number of related topics: tribes and the Yemeni state, women and non-governmental organization (NGOs) in Iran, the role of the Diwaniyya in Kuwait, the informal politics around access to natural resources, and spaces for activism and inclusion in the Middle East.

Charles Schmitz started the working group discussions with his session on “Social Organization or Political Actor: Tribe and State in Yemen.” Schmitz argued that there has been no agreement in the literature on what “tribe” constitutes given the ostensible differences in the structures of and roles played by tribes. For instance in Yemen, there are major differences between tribes based on where they are geographically located. In his discussion, Schmitz focused on the northern tribes who play a major role in relation to the state. He argued that Yemeni tribes are unique as they have always been settled unlike tribes elsewhere in the Arabian Peninsula. This contributed to the establishment of tribes in Yemen as small sovereignties. Such sovereignties are usually strong when the state is weak, and are weak when the state is strong. However, although the tribe was originally merely a social order for which the Sheikh had collective responsibility and mediated and arbitrated between its members after the Republican Revolution sheikhs became influential in the political realm of the state. Since then, the state used tribes as administrative circles and often distributed “tribal subsidies” to the Sheikhs to take care of their communities’ needs.

Shahla Haeri shifted the discussion to “Women and NGO Participation in Iran”. In her session, Haeri discussed the issue of citizenship and women in Iran, the history of NGOs, and women who established NGOs in Iran. Finally, Haeri listed a number of understudied topics related to her discussion. With regards to the issue of citizenship, she claimed that the relationship between state and society, and particularly women, in Iran has been inconstant. In the wake of the Islamic Revolution, the state supported women education. This contributed to women’s perception of their autonomy. Hence, the state tried to control and restrict their agency fearing challenges to the principles the Islamic Republic was founded on. Such principles, which are embedded in Iranian legal structures, place women somewhere between a subject and a full citizen. That is to say that while both men and women have the capacity to execution, women’s capacity to obligations always remains restricted. With regards to NGOs, Haeri drew a distinction between NGOs and GNGOs (NGOs that are sponsored by the government). It was only when Khatami came to power that the state in Iran approved the bylaws of the Charter of NGOs. Yet, there seems to be significant mistrust between the state and NGOs that results in the state supporting and funding GNGOs while neglecting real NGOs. Haeri listed a number of cases of women who started NGOs in Iran, such as Touran Mirhadi, and initiatives by women such as schools for Afghan immigrants in Tehran, and the Thursday Bazaar for women, on which the film Braving the Wave was made. Finally, Haeri suggested conducting research on issues around informal women organizations, known as dorehs, and women as entrepreneurs who create jobs and help women thrive in these NGOs.

Clemens Chay shifted the discussion to Kuwait in his session on “Social and Political Influence of the Diwaniyya”. Chay argued that most of the literature discusses the role of the diwaniyya during elections in Kuwait disregarding the social and diplomatic aspects of the diwaniyya. Historically, the diwaniyyas were located on the shore of the Persian Gulf, and were used by big merchant families in Kuwait to observe the sea state. However, the social role of tribal diwaniyyas has significantly changed. Now, the diwaniyya has extended inland. Almost every house has an attached diwaniyya. The purpose of the diwaniyya has also metamorphosed as it has become a space for collective belonging, sharing ideas, and expressing issues and concerns. Recently, there has been a proliferation of “youth diwaniyyas” that are ostensibly distinctive from traditional diwaniyyas. These new youth diwaniyyas are less strict on diwaniyya etiquette, and serve as a space for young Kuwaitis and their invitees to spend their spare time. However, tribal diwaniyyas remain central to Kuwaitis lives. This is for the role they play in bringing members of the tribe together, discussing political issues, hosting diplomats and ambassadors, and serving as a medium of communication between the state and the tribe. Towards the end of his discussion, Chay raised a number of questions, among which: Is Kuwaiti exceptionalism related to the establishment of the parliament, or is it a social space that is continuously evolving? What role does the diwaniyya play for the opposition when the parliament is dissolved? And to what extent is social media replacing the diwaniyya?

Nejm Bennessaiah focused his session on “Informal Politics and Access to Natural Resources in the Middle East”. In his presentation, Bennessaiah focused on three main issues related to the access to natural resources in the Middle East: voluntary association, infrastructures, and local customary regulations. With regards to voluntary association, he claimed that rural population makes up about 41 percent of the Middle East’s population, and in countries such as Egypt and Syria these numbers can go up to 50 percent. Such high percentages add pressure on access to resources and markets. At the same time, the Middle East has been witnessing a significant constriction insofar as participation in natural resources decision-making processes is concerned. However as maintaining such constraints have become difficult for states in the Middle East given their limited institutional capacities, voluntary associations were allowed in many countries across the region. In Morocco, for example, associations were allowed in 1998 after the food riots as long as they do not have political agendas. However, some associations, such as the Farmers Association, have succeeded in putting pressure on elected officials to meet their demands. This increase in associations’ strength and influence led to their thriving. In Morocco, the number of associations has mushroomed from around 73,000 associations in 2008 to about 93,000 associations in 2018. With regards to infrastructure, Bennessaiah claimed that a new field in anthropology has been building on political ecology. In light of this, there seems to be limited research on the impact of desalination, particularly in the UAE, on the development of knowledge, and how new infrastructure projects serve as sites for political engagement by local communities. Moreover, to what extent does informal politics play a role in influencing policy-makers in determining which areas receive better maintenance and higher pressure insofar as water distribution is concerned? Finally, Bennessaiah highlighted the role of local customary regulations that are based on local consultation and verbal agreements on land uses. He argued that local sanctions and customary law remain understudied in the Middle East.

Deen Sharp concluded the working group discussions with his session on “Informality and the City: Spaces for Activism and Inclusion in the Middle East”. During the Arab uprisings of 2011, public squares have shown to be vital sites of mass political activism. However as much as the urban landscape of many of the region’s old cities facilitated political action, relatively newly developed cities seemed to be designed in ways that foreclose certain types of politics. In light of this, Sharp discussed the role of multinational and international construction corporations in the political life in the Middle East. Despite the fact that that the corporation is not in any of the constitutions in the Middle East or viewed as a formal political actor, Sharp argued that the corporation could be considered to be one of the most powerful political entities in the region. The joint-stock corporation is increasingly becoming a key institution in the Middle East and integral to shaping contemporary urban life in the region. Since the 1990s, there has been a significant expansion in corporate power particularly within the urban context in the Middle East. Today, if you look at the skyline of downtowns throughout the region, in particular in the Gulf cities like Dubai and Doha, but also in Cairo and Casablanca, the joint-stock corporation has transformed the urban landscape. The joint-stock corporate city makes itself present by the proliferation of its urban mega-projects, including skyscrapers, downtown developments and gated communities; retail malls and artificial islands; airports and ports; and highways. Such projects are not only being executed in urban cities, but have expanded to urbanize rural areas that have acted also as sites for protests during the Arab uprisings. Corporations, such as Emaar and Damac, are now household names. Stock markets have also recently opened in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, and significantly expanded in Egypt and Iraq. In sum, Sharp argued that the corporation is more than a mere business and is a key component of contemporary political life in the Middle East.

To read the working group agenda click here.To read the participants’ biographies click here.Read more about this research initiative.

Participants and Discussants:

Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarNejm Benessaiah, Georgetown UniversityClemens Chay, Durham University, UKKristin Smith Diwan, Arab Gulf States Institute, Washington, DCShahla Haeri, Boston UniversityIslam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarDavid Ottaway, Wilson Center, Washington, DCMarina Ottaway, Wilson Center, Washington, DCCharles Schmitz, Towson University, BaltimoreDeen Sharp, Terreform, Center for Advanced Urban Research & CUNY Graduate CenterElizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

Refusing the Uniform: Immigrant and Ethnic Minority Women's Activism in Denmark, 1967–1997
2018-03-19 12:45 - 13:45
The Center for International and Regional Studies invited GU-Q student Emma Mogensen (class of 2018) to present her senior thesis, “Refusing the Uniform: Immigrant and Ethnic Minority Women’s Activism in Denmark, 1967–1997,” at a public talk on March 19, 2018, in which Mogensen shed light on an often-overlooked period of activism in Danish history. This event formally inaugurated the CIRS Undergraduate Research Advancement (CURA) initiative.

In the thirty-year period from 1967 to 1997, there was a dramatic increase in immigrant and ethnic minority women’s activism in Denmark. Frustrated with their social standing and economic situations, immigrant women from various minority ethnic backgrounds began to rally together to oppose the discrimination they experienced. Mogensen’s study on immigrant and ethnic minority women’s activism in Denmark analyzed content from publications by immigrant women’s organizations from the late 1960s to the 2000s. Mogensen began her talk with a news story from 1975, which depicted two Pakistani women in Denmark who were denied unemployment benefits because they had refused job offers. The women argued that these were not actual refusals, however, because the Danish hotels had offered them positions that had mandatory uniform rules requiring women to wear short skirts, which went against the womens’ particular social norms.

The Female Workers’ Union (FWU) might have been expected to support these women in their case because they were members of the organization. But the union failed to address the “inherently gendered discriminatory policies of hotels that required women to wear revealing uniforms,” and instead chastised the women for their refusal of the jobs and the uniforms. In an article in The Foreign Workers’ Magazine, the union hinted at larger tensions between the union and immigrant women. A union spokeswoman generalized the women’s refusal as “allegedly emblematic of problematic attitudes of immigrant women,” further nothing that “if we accept the foreigners’ excuses we discriminate against the Danes. We wish to treat everyone the same.” These comments were remarkable because the Danish women’s movement and the FWU had been actively advocating for wage equality and universal access to childcare for decades prior to this case.

“Immigrant and ethnic minority women have challenged Danish feminist organizations, trade unions, and politicians between 1967 and 1997 through their commitment to combating intersecting forms of discrimination.”

“The Female Workers’ Union’s criticism implied its inability to see the Pakistani women as facing similar systemic challenges as Danish women,” Mogensen said, adding that its criticism conveyed a “maternalist” attitude. This revealed the FWU’s exclusionary treatment of immigrant women, despite their commitment to strengthening women’s solidarity. This position was further supported by the Pakistani community’s accusation that the union had intentionally set up the women to have their benefits revoked since they had arranged the jobs. Although the resolution of the event is unknown, Mogensen said this case was representative of tensions between both immigrants and Danish unions, and immigrant women and Danish women’s organizations.

Mogensen’s central argument was that “immigrant and ethnic minority women have challenged Danish feminist organizations, trade unions, and politicians between 1967 and 1997 through their commitment to combating intersecting forms of discrimination.” They pushed for more complex understandings of how various forms of discrimination functioned simultaneously in Danish society based on gender, race, class, etc. Immigrant women activists forged international networks with immigrant women and feminist organizations, understanding how oppressive systems like sexism were not territorially limited.

Mogensen explained that immigrant women experienced double discrimination on the basis of both race and ethnicity. She shared a quote from a 1989 Danish-immigrant women’s magazine: “We are doubly oppressed—as women and as black.” Today, the term “intersectionality” is used to describe this phenomenon—a term that was practically unheard of in Denmark in the 1980s, especially when it came to questions of race and ethnicity.

Denmark had received immigrants for centuries, but the late 1960s marked a turning point in Danish immigration history through the Guest Worker Program. Like many other Western European nations, Denmark experienced an economic upturn following WWII, leading employers to bring in foreign workers to meet growing labor needs. In 1973, the Danish economy entered a severe recession with increasing unemployment due to the global oil crisis. This pushed the Danish parliament to restrict the flow of migrants, and later that year they enacted a law ending all labor immigration.

Fearing that migrant workers would leave Denmark to return to their families, employers lobbied to open up legal avenues for workers to bring their spouses and children to Denmark. Their efforts succeeded in 1974 when the parliament passed a new family reunification law. Through this new law and Denmark’s subsequent acceptance of refugees, many female immigrant activists arrived in Denmark. The early period of immigrant women’s mobilization efforts was marked by discrimination at the hands of Danish trade unions and women’s organizations. These women’s activism was generally spontaneous and ad hoc, and centered on individual ethnic or linguistic groups. Through their opposition to such discrimination, these early activists exposed contradictory and hypocritical policies theoretically dedicated to supporting female immigrant workers, as seen with the FWU.

In the late 1980s, immigrant women in Denmark expanded their efforts to create more permanent multi-ethnic organizations. Rather than operating on an ad hoc basis, they developed institutional roots, which allowed them to more comprehensively address immigrant women’s issues, according to Morgensen. While earlier activists had discussed the multidimensional sources of discrimination, starting in the late 1980s, immigrant women explicitly placed intersectionality at the center of their mission. Through these organizations, immigrant feminists also forged links with existing international feminist movements.

The first such organization in Denmark was Soldue, which was founded in 1988 by a diverse group of immigrant women, and the focus was on shared experiences rather than nationalities. Soldue focused on intersectionality and criticized the discrimination immigrant women faced at the hands of Danish authorities and Danish women’s organizations. Many women used the organization’s magazine to discuss gender discrimination in their own communities. From the beginning, they recognized that racism and sexism were intertwined. From 1993, their efforts began to impact Danish legislation, and started leveraging influence by collaborating with Danish women’s groups and the government on policy issues.

One of the main objects of Soldue’s advocacy was the Three-Year Rule, introduced in the 1983 Aliens Law. Soldue was highly critical of how the law tied foreign women’s legal status in Denmark to their spouses. It argued that the law rendered immigrant women especially vulnerable to domestic abuse, since leaving an abusive partner before the end of three years could result in their deportation. According to Soldue, domestic abuse was common everywhere, and thus the law needed to protect immigrant women as it did Danish women. In 1993, Soldue was appointed to a special commission on immigrant women’s legal status in Denmark set up by the Ministry of Interior. The parliament eventually incorporated the commission’s recommendations into law by amending the Aliens Law in 1996. Not satisfied with parliament’s limited concessions, Soldue activists continued to argue against the Three-Year Rule even after the amendment, Mogensen found.

Soldue simultaneously increased their local and global influence, increasing their outreach and international networks. A new generation of Danish-born children of immigrants was becoming politically active. They had never immigrated, but they had experienced various forms of discrimination. Although they built on the efforts of their predecessors, they developed their own strategies based on their position as Danish-born minorities. “Their increasing political activity was especially marked by debates over citizenship,” Mogensen said.

Immigrant and ethnic minority women actively confronted the multilayered forms of discrimination they experienced in Danish society. Through their activism, they argued for the need to understand how various forms of discrimination intersected. They engaged with international feminist and activist movements and paved the way for a new generation of ethnic minority women’s activism. The activists who took a principled stand in 1975 for their right to reject a mandatory revealing uniform, “paved the way for a new generation of ethnic minority women’s activism in Denmark from the 1990s onwards,” Mogensen said.

Article by Khansa Maria, CIRS Student Assistant

Emma Mogensen is a fourth-year undergraduate student majoring in International History at Georgetown University in Qatar. Originally from Denmark, she has lived in Qatar since 2009. She works as a Research Assistant at the Center for International and Regional Studies at GU-Q, where she has conducted research on labor migration and citizenship in GCC countries, among other topics concerning international migration. Her research interests revolve around migration and transnational activist networks, as well as global understandings of citizenship and feminism.

CIRS Book Launch: Contemporary Politics in the Middle East
2018-03-21 18:00 - 20:00
“There is always a sense of timeliness about the politics of the Middle East,” and a pressing sense of the issues, according to Beverley Milton-Edwards, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center. “It doesn’t matter what day of the week it is, what time of year it is—the Middle East is always in the headlines.” Milton-Edwards is a professor of politics at Queen’s University in Belfast, and a security theme leader at the Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice. She has lived in the Middle East for thirty years as a researcher, and was at CIRS on March 21, 2018, to launch the fourth edition of her book, Contemporary Politics in the Middle East.

Milton-Edwards focuses her research on security sector governance in the Middle East and the challenges of political Islam. The author said she found the need to publish a fourth edition of her book because the Middle East is such a dynamic region, internally and externally. The book covers issues ranging from colonialism, political economy, conflict and lack of peace, nationalism, women, ethnicity, and minorities. She said her ambition in writing the book was modest and that it is meant to provide understandings for people new to the study of the region.

Milton-Edwards discussed the entirety of the volume, as well as what the book meant to her personally, noting: “I have been in the region for some of the most pivotal political moments in recent times, being caught up in events where leaders have been assassinated, where regimes have crumbled, populations have revolted, and peace on occasion may have looked possible. And because of these field experiences, I was also afforded the opportunity to be able to make small contributions on the ground, in particular, to management of conflict and the achievement of peace, because I do believe that the Middle East deserves peace.”

The author’s research for the book is based on extensive on-the-ground fieldwork “whether in overcrowded refugee camps, presidential compounds, or in the shadowy, complex lairs of rebel leaders or urban battle zones,” she said. Milton-Edwards argued that it is impossible to study the region only from textbooks or media sources; that one must learn from various experiences that are diverse in nature. She wrote the book through interacting with different cross-sections of society—state and non-state actors alike—to understand the essence of their myriad perspectives.

“I am not attempting to change the world one student at a time, but I feel that the book is a resource that can open up the opportunities for looking at a region in other ways.”

Milton-Edwards said that her work as a researcher gave her unique insight into political and social interactions in various situations, such as corruption, foreign policy, the interaction of states in Middle East with Western policymakers and politicians, and, most importantly, security dimensions. Over decades, her research has charted the rise and collapse of state nationalist projects, the fixation on what she calls “strong man politics and the tragic consequences of states waging wars against their own populations or against other states in the region in order to distract from the problems at home.”

What struck her when speaking with ordinary people was issues such as “regional wealth, inequality, labor mobility and unemployment, Islamism, the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, and the US in the Middle East.” These everyday concerns are the themes and contents of the book, and her way of “making sense of the politics of this vast ethnically, politically, religiously, and socioeconomically diverse region.” One of the main points she makes in the book is that “the politics of the contemporary Middle East is not as exceptional as many in the West would have us believe.” She said the curious thing is why the world sees itself as different from the Middle East. The region reflects the lasting effects of “colonialism, power relations, lack of political participation or apathy, poor economic growth, increasing urbanization, and a return to faith and faith-based discourses,” she argued. The contemporary politics of the Middle East is driven by the same broad dynamics of change over the last century as elsewhere across the globe.

Milton-Edwards also argued that, for the foreseeable future, the “politics of the region—within the region and between the people and the state, as well as by the region and other parts of the globe—will stay animated in one way or another to one degree or another by these same issues.” She pointed to youth as one such issue. In the UK in 2017, youth were central to the emergence of new forms of political mobilization in the general elections, and, in the US, youth are challenging the powerful gun lobby. “Youth in the region represent a powerful intersectionality of class, gender, nationality, and faith,” as evidenced by the role they played in the Arab uprisings. “The same grievances are levied, the same challenge to authority, and dismissal of obsolete and out of touch political structures—the same intergenerational struggles,” she said.

“I am not attempting to change the world one student at a time,” Milton-Edwards said, “but I feel that the book is a resource that can open up the opportunities for looking at a region in other ways.” This is because, as each chapter, theme, and case study illustrates, the context does actually matter and shapes the issue under scrutiny, she said, and local context and history matter. For this reason, the book goes back in history and explores the profound impact of colonialism. For so many political constituencies in the Middle East, “the past is still very much present,” affecting people’s lives in what she called “everyday insecurities.” She also cited the example of violence, arguing that it is a “reaction to the politics of authoritarianism, ethnic domination, rights denied, and freedoms reneged on,” which explains the phenomenon of terrorism and violence in the Middle East.

Concerning where we are today and where we go from here, Milton-Edwards pointed to the last chapter of the book titled, “The Arab Spring and the New Era of Uncertainty.” She read a segment from the chapter: “The future of the region is almost impossible to predict. Many of the issues outlined in this book, such as political economy, political Islam, and the state and its rulers will probably continue to determine the political systems which will develop over the next decade. Not least of which will be the unfolding legacy of the Arab Spring, and the resilience of authoritarian regimes. They will continue to be tested and challenged by the region’s citizens.”

Article by Khansa Maria, CIRS Student Assistant

Beverley Milton-Edwards is a visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center. She is professor of politics at Queen’s University Belfast and security theme leader at the Senator George J. Mitchell Institute for Global Peace, Security and Justice. She is known for having pioneered both scholarship and practice in the field of conflict management, including ceasefires. She was the principal investigator to the European Union’s Civil Police Mission to the Palestinian Territories Program in 2006–2010. Her recent books include: The Muslim Brotherhood, the Arab Spring, and its Future Face (2016); Islamic Fundamentalism since 1945 (2013); Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy (2012); The Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, A People’s War (2011); and Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement (2010).

Karl Widerquist CIRS Book Workshop
2018-03-26 09:00 - 17:00
The Center for International and Regional Studies hosted a workshop on Universal Basic Income (UBI) experiments. This was part of the CIRS-Faculty Book Series, which provides an opportunity for faculty members to present book manuscripts to scholars and receive critical feedback in advance of publication. The workshop was held on March 26, 2018, and included four sessions, in which eleven scholars from around the world critically assessed and provided suggestions on the manuscript, The Devil’s in the Caveats: A Critical Analysis of Basic Income Experiments for Researchers, Policymakers, and Citizens, by Karl Widerquist, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University in Qatar.

Widerquist’s book discusses an important new topic in social science, large-scale experiments devoted to testing UBI—a policy that would assure every citizen a steady income regardless of whether they work or not. Several similar experiments were conducted in the United States and Canada in the 1970s, and recent interest in UBI experiments has returned with more than a half dozen experiments underway or under consideration in countries around the world.

The book discusses the difficulty of conducting UBI experiments and communicating their results to nonspecialists in ways that successfully raise the levels of debate. This is because of the inherent limits of experimental techniques, the complexity of the public discussion of UBI, and the many barriers that make it difficult for specialists and nonspecialists to understand each other. The book suggests that researchers stay focused on the public’s bottom line: an evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of a permanent, national UBI policy. Even if experiments can examine only a few questions relevant to that overall evaluation, they need to draw the connection between what they can do and what citizens evaluating a policy option really need to know.

In response to the growing debate over Unconditional Basic Income, several governments and NGOs around the world have begun or are seriously considering conducting UBI experiments. This book argues that a large gap in understanding exists between the researchers who conduct UBI experiments and the citizens and policymakers who hope to make use of experimental findings. The usual solution—a simple list of caveats—is not sufficient to bridge that gap. The problem is not simply that nonspecialists have difficulty understanding experiments, but also that researchers conducting experiments have difficulty understanding the role of experiments in that debate. These gaps create risks of misunderstanding, misreporting, oversimplification, spin, and what researchers call “the streetlight effect”—examining the most easily answered questions instead of the questions in most need of answers. This book is an effort to help bridge those gaps in understanding to avoid potential problems. It examines the many ways in which experiments can go wrong or be misunderstood, in an effort to help researchers conduct better experiments and communicate their results in ways more likely to raise the level of debate.

“The devil’s in the details” is a common saying in policy proposals, and the author suggests that perhaps we need a similar expression for policy research, something like “the devil’s in the caveats.” This is both because nonspecialists (the citizens and policymakers who are ultimately responsible for evaluating policy in any democracy) have great difficulty understanding what research implies about policy, and because specialists often have difficulty understanding what citizens and policymakers most hope to learn from policy research.

This problem creates great difficulty for UBI experiments that are now getting underway in several countries. These experiments can add a small part to the existing body of evidence people need to fully evaluate UBI as a policy proposal. Specialists can provide caveats about the limits of what research implies, but nonspecialists are often unable to translate caveats into a firm explanation of what that research does and does not imply about the policy at issue. Therefore, even the best scientific policy research can leave nonspecialists with an oversimplified, or simply wrong, impression of its implications for policy.

Karl Widerquist is Associate Professor at SFS-Qatar, Georgetown University. He specializes in political philosophy and his research is mostly in the area of distributive justice—the ethics of who has what. He holds two doctorates: Political Theory from Oxford University (2006), and Economics from the City University of New York (1996). He coauthored Prehistoric Myths in Modern Political Philosophy (Edinburgh University Press 2017) and authored Independence, Propertylessness, and Basic Income: A Theory of Freedom as the Power to Say No (Palgrave Macmillan 2013). He coedited Basic Income: An Anthology of Contemporary Research (Wiley-Blackwell 2013); Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend: Examining its Suitability as a Model (Palgrave Macmillan 2012); Exporting the Alaska Model: Adapting the Permanent Fund Dividend for Reform around the World (Palgrave Macmillan 2012); and The Ethics and Economics of the Basic Income Guarantee (Ashgate 2005). He was founding editor of the journal Basic Income Studies, and he has published numerous scholarly articles and book chapters. His articles have appeared in journals such as Analyse & Kritik; Eastern Economic Journal; Ethnoarchaeology; Political Studies; Politics and Society; Politics, Philosophy, and Economics; Journal of Socio-Economics; and Utilitas. He has been co-chair of Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN) for several years and was a founder of the US Basic Income Guarantee (USBIG) Network and its coordinator from 2000-10. He was NewsFlash editor for USBIG from 2010-15. He was also a founder of BIEN’s news website, Basic Income News, and its principle editor for its first four years.

A Conversation with George Osborne
2018-03-28 12:45 - 13:45
On March 28, 2018, George Osborne, former British Conservative Party politician and current editor of the London Evening Standard, was invited by CIRS to deliver a Focused Discussion in which he spoke to Georgetown University-Qatar faculty, staff, and students about the increasingly challenging state of international politics. He began the conversation by noting that “there is quite a profound pessimism about the direction that the world is heading in.”

There are several reasons for this general distrust in international politics, including “an erratic president” in the United States, an aggressively expansionist Russia reaching into Ukraine and Georgia, the uncertainties associated with Brexit, and a progressively fragmenting Europe in which the far right is coming to power in many countries. “The EU, NATO, the IMF—all of these institutions created in the aftermath of Second World War seem like they are struggling and like they are failing,” he said. In the Middle East, the problems continue, with the Syrian conflict looming large, and fears of an escalation in hostilities between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

“All this makes the world look very gloomy,” Osborne said, but, despite the ongoing negativity, he offered “three reasons to be cheerful” regarding the current political climate. The first is that, despite his inflammatory rhetoric, President Trump has not made substantial policy changes, and has taken a surprisingly orthodox stance when it comes to the Middle East, even more so that of Bush and Obama before him. The US president has spoken of “fairly alarming policies, but these did not turn out to be that big of a threat,” Osborne argued.

“All this makes the world look very gloomy.”

Even though Osborne noted that “I did everything in my power to stop Brexit,” he argued that a second reason for optimism is that despite Britain’s exit from the European Union, it will continue to be intimately involved with the EU, and will not be completely isolated.

The third and final reason to be cheerful, according to Osborne, is the steady but measured rise of China. Although the country’s ascendance has caused some governments to be wary, he noted that “China is keen on asserting its rights, but it is also keen on doing so through international channels.” China may have firm nationalistic aims, but not at the cost of peace. “One thing that I learned from China in many years is that, above all, they are interested in stability,” Osborne said.

Osborne ended with some statistics to support his optimistic conclusions. Despite the current state of world affairs, in 2017, he said, fewer people in the world died of hunger, disease, or violence as compared to any previous year in human history. Even with the many problems, conflicts, and challenges we face today, “something is working,” he concluded.

Article by Khansa Maria, CIRS Student Assistant

George Osborne was Member of Parliament (MP) for Tatton from 2001 to 2017. He served as Chancellor of the Exchequer under Prime Minister David Cameron from 2010 to 2016, during which time he also served on the National Security Council. From 2015 to 2016, he served as Britain’s First Secretary of State. He is Chair of the Northern Powerhouse Partnership, a not-for-profit organization he created to promote economic development in the North of England.

The UAE in the Red Sea and East Africa
2018-04-11 18:00 - 20:00
The Center for International and Regional Studies invited, Islam Hassan, CIRS Research Analyst, to present his study, co-conducted with Nael Shama, at a Dialogue event on April 11, 2018. Hassan noted that, for the past decade, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has had foreign policy objectives in the Red Sea and East Africa in its pursuit of security and influence in the Middle East. The country has been heavily engaged in establishing military bases and acquiring operational and management rights over ports and economic zones in and around the Red Sea. This foray into one of the most important global shipping lanes is coupled with a significant naval presence in the Gulf of Aden and the Bab al Mandab Strait. Additionally, the presence of private Emirati security companies in the region has expanded for the purposes of conducting anti-piracy operations and providing protection for UAE ships.

During the long years of Sheikh Zayed Al-Nahyan’s rule (1971–2004), the UAE’s foreign policy was more idealistic than realistic and more reactive than proactive, according to Hassan. It was “pan-Arabist at the zenith of pan-Arabism in the 1970s; turned slightly pan-Islamist in the heyday of pan-Islamism in the 1980s; and then became increasingly pragmatic in the decades that saw the decline of ideologies, the 1990s and after,” he argued. And in the precarious early years of the UAE federation, founded in 1971, Zayed had to contend with the ordinary challenges of state formation. Iran’s occupation of three Emirati islands in the same year meant that the UAE “was put on test from the first day of its formation,” Hassan said.

After the death of Sheikh Zayed, the UAE witnessed five major developments on the domestic and regional levels: the massive wealth the country has generated in recent years; the 2011 Arab uprisings; the country’s intense rivalry with Qatar; the tension between the US and the UAE during the late years of the Obama administration; and the new leadership’s outlook.

The UAE’s economy enjoyed significant growth in the last decade. Since 2004, the country’s GDP has more than doubled, placing the country at third-highest in the Arab world for GDP per capita. This economic robustness has encouraged the new leadership to search for increased political influence and foreign investment opportunities, especially in the Red Sea countries whose economies have been rising in recent years, and are expected to grow in the future, according to Hassan.

Since 2011, the Arab landscape changed dramatically, especially following the uprisings. “A pan-Arab awakening that crossed borders with ease and unleashed deep forces of change; the Arab Spring sent shock waves throughout the ruling establishments in the Gulf monarchies,” said Hassan. The UAE was not immune to the uprisings, which struck the shores of Bahrain and neighboring Oman, and echoed inside the UAE itself. Fear of potential spillover effects rose, he said. With urgent appeals for reform and equality, “particularly worrying to the Emirati leadership” was the potential for the local Al-Islah Islamist movement to become more active and influential. These regional developments were coupled by “deep cracks that have swept the GCC,” and, consequently, the competition that has taken root with other Gulf states, including Qatar, he said.

“A pan-Arab awakening that crossed borders with ease and unleashed deep forces of change; the Arab Spring sent shock waves throughout the ruling establishments in the Gulf monarchies.”

Hassan explained there were also three nearly simultaneous developments that “poisoned the strategic UAE-US alliance:” the gradual US shift from the Gulf region to the Asia-Pacific region; the US administration’s tacit embrace of the Arab Spring; and the landmark nuclear deal in 2015 with Iran. These developments cast doubt on the US commitment to maintaining its long-standing security umbrella over the Gulf region. Additionally, fallout with Washington contributed to the strategic reformulation in the foreign policy of the UAE, whose contours began to emerge more clearly after 2011. This included a disposition towards using military means, he said.

The aforementioned domestic and regional developments were interpreted through the prism of “the overly ambitious new leadership” (Khalifa bin Zayed as the President of the UAE, and Mohamed bin Zayed as Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi) that rose to power in 2004. The new leadership has a regional and international outlook that is conspicuously different from that of their reserved father, according to Hassan. They tend to be more pragmatic, realistic, and confrontational in dealing with regional challenges. So rather than merely focusing on diplomacy, mediation, dialogue, and foreign aid—tools used by Sheikh Zayed—the new leadership has sought influence through military engagement, massive foreign direct investments internationally, and military and naval presence beyond the country’s vicinity, particularly in the Red Sea, East Africa, Yemen, and Libya, he said.

This foreign policy change, which the UAE witnessed during the past decade or so, involved not only a change in means (from soft to hard power), but also in goals (seeking security and pursuing increased regional influence), Hassan said. “These two objectives—security and influence—have been the driving motivations behind the UAE’s intervention [through economic investments and military presence] in the Red Sea and East Africa.” The UAE’s economic aid to East African countries has increased twentyfold between 2011 and 2013, Hassan reported. The country’s “heavy investment with cash and guns” in the Red Sea region has included supplying economic aid, building ports, providing maritime services, and establishing military and naval bases.

The regional competition over the Red Sea, and its islands, ports and straits, has intensified in recent years with Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, and is likely to continue in the foreseeable future, according to Hassan. “The transformation that has taken place in the foreign policy of the UAE over the past few years has been huge. It has not only involved a change in foreign policy means, but also in the identification of new foreign policy problems and goals,” he said. Whether the UAE can sustain such distant foothold in the Red Sea and East Africa despite competition with regional and international powers, and maintain its alliance with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which allows the country to be active in areas always considered strategic depths of the two regional powers, are things for time to unfold, he said.

Article by Khansa Maria, CIRS Student Assistant.

Islam Hassan is the Research Analyst at the CIRS, Georgetown University in Qatar. His current research interests include state-building in the Gulf States and comparative politics and international relations of West Asia and North Africa. He coedited “The State of Middle Eastern Youth,” a special issue of the journal The Muslim World (2017). His publications also include “The GCC’s 2014 Crisis: Causes, Issues and Solutions” (in Arabic and English, with Al Jazeera Research Center, 2015); and “Jordan on the Brink,” International Journal of Culture and History (2016).

CURA Seminar: Water and Conflict in the Middle East
2018-04-12 10:00 - 12:00
On April 12, 2018, CIRS convened its first CURA Discussion Seminar under the center’s new initiative: CIRS Undergraduate Research Advancement. The seminar was introduced to support the research needs of undergraduate students at Georgetown University in Qatar, and to provide them with opportunities to hone their research skills. As part of the seminar, CURA fellows discussed and critiqued two papers from the CIRS research initiative on “Water and Conflict in the Middle East.”

Mohammed Al-Jaberi (class of 2019) started the conversation with a brief summary of Marcus DuBois King’s article, “A Watershed Moment: Hydropolitical Trends and the Future of Iraqi Kurdistan.” This paper addressed the increasingly contentious issue of water stress on the region, due to Iraqi Kurdistan’s emerging socio-political trends, as well as environmental changes such as demographic pressures; dam building by Iran and Turkey; declining water quality; recurring drought; climate change; and earthquakes. The author concluded that if the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) did not at least recognize the latter trends’ increasing threat to security, they would further compromise the regions’ water security. King theorized that in order to avoid the adverse impact on Iraqi Kurdistan, the KRG must place water stress as a priority and develop a comprehensive strategy to address the issue.

Rawan Al-Khulaidi (class of 2018) presented Nael Shama and Islam Hassan’s article “In Pursuit of Security and Influence: The UAE in the Red Sea and East Africa.” The article explored the ways through which the United Arab Emirates has attempted to assert its authority over the Red Sea and its ports, showing the importance of the Red Sea and East Africa in the new Emirati leadership’s strategic interests. The article demonstrated how the UAE’s actions and policy arrangements in relation to the Red Sea and its ports reflect a larger change in its foreign policy, which has been evolving for over a decade. This change in Emirati foreign policy is driven by the UAE’s economic wealth; the “rise of Islamism in the region;” the UAE’s military agendas in the border states of the Red Sea – especially those of Djibouti and Yemen; the political environment of the UAE post-Zayed; the shock of the Arab Spring politically and socio-economically; and, finally, UAE-US relations.

Following the presentation of each paper, the CURA fellows engaged in an insightful discussion on the structure and organization of the paper, the employed theoretical and conceptual frameworks, and the clarity of the argument. By focusing on the topic of water and conflict in the Middle East, the students were able to employ the tools and skills of their respective majors—namely international politics, culture and politics, international economics, and international history—to assess, critique, and provide feedback on the papers. Following the discussions, Mohammed Al Jaberi and Waleed Zahoor (class of 2018) presented the fellows’ comments and feedback at the CIRS Working Group, “Water and Conflict in the Middle East.”

For the participants’ biographies, please click here.

Article by Amie Hewka, CURA Fellow at CIRS

Water and Conflict in the Middle East Working Group II
2018-04-15 09:00 - 2018-04-16 16:00
On April 15–16, 2018, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) hosted the second working group meeting of its research initiative on “Water and Conflict in the Middle East.” Over the course of two days, scholars came together to present their research papers on a variety of topics including, water mismanagement in the Middle East, the “weaponization” of water by the Islamic State, Hydropolitical trends in Kurdistan, community-based water practices in Yemen, Emirati activities in the Red Sea and East Africa, Turkish hydro-hegemony, and groundwater use in the Middle East and North Africa.

Hussein Amery commenced the working group by presenting his draft article on “Water Mismanagement and Conflict in the Middle East.” In his article, Amery highlights how competition for water supplies between riparian states has become more intense due to the significant increase in water demand. This increase in demand has been a result of a number of factors such as rapid population growth, the improved quality of life, climate change, and geophysical conditions. Amery suggests that distrust between different water stakeholders within a country, unilateral development along international water basins, and gross mismanagement of water resources accentuate the problems facing several Middle Eastern states and raise the specter of water conflict. Amery’s paper is focused on two case studies: the Egyptian-Ethiopian conflict over the Grand Renaissance Dam over the Nile river, and the completion between different riparian states along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. While filling a huge reservoir, as part of a new large dam project, is the principal trigger of conflict in the aforementioned cases, historical distrust between governments, water mismanagement, as well as political instability remain the structural triggers for these conflicts.

Tobias von Lossow presented his paper on the “Weaponization of Water in the Middle East: ‘Lessons Learned’ from IS.” In this article, von Lossow examines how actors engaged in armed conflict use water resources as instruments of power and war. The Islamic State weaponized water both as a tactic of war, and also used water as a political and social tool for garnering people’s support and for state-building purposes. While von Lossow agrees that historically there have been numerous instances of water being deployed as a strategic weapon during conflict, he suggests that the way in which IS weaponized water was different from what had previously been seen.

Marcus DuBois King’s article on Iraq examines hydro-political trends within Iraqi Kurdistan. Although Iraqi Kurdistan enjoys abundant water resources, water stress has been increasing over the last few years. Water stress is being driven by changing demographics, an increase of dam construction in neighboring countries, and an overall declining quality of water. King argues that as water stress increases in the region conflict over water resources will inevitably increase. He concludes that water stress is likely to have an adverse impact on the security of Iraqi Kurdistan unless the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) recognizes addressing water stress as a priority and subsequently develops a comprehensive strategy to achieve that goal.

Helen Lackner shifted the discussion to “Revitalization of Community-based Water Practices in Yemen.” Lackner claims that in recent decades, there have been calls for public participation in addressing most development issues, whether rural or urban. Insofar as water management in Yemen is concerned, for many years the rules of customary water management were the officially recognized mechanisms by the state. However, these rules were transformed through political, social, and economic changes. Such transformation was driven by both domestic dynamics and external funding agencies. Lackner claimed that these developments had a significant impact on state institutions. The domestic- and external-led development interventions limited the control of water resources to state-bureaucrats and pro-state private beneficiaries. Finally, Lackner argues that these developments coupled the rhetoric of ‘community empowerment’, which has not empowered the community as much as it prioritized the concerns and interests of a minority at the helm of the state.

Islam Hassan presented his co-authored article with Nael Shama on “In Pursuit of Security and Influence: The UAE in the Red Sea and East Africa.” The article highlights how in order to safeguard its stability and security at home, thwart the threat of the burgeoning den of militant Islamists in Somalia, Yemen, and other East African states, secure its trade relations and oil transportation routes, and extend its regional influence, the UAE decided to retain a strong foothold in East Africa. The control of ports and islands, and the establishment and administration of military bases, training centers, and economic zones in the Red Sea, the Arabia Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Mandeb Strait has offered the UAE the chance to achieve these objectives. As illustrated by this case study, the authors argue that UAE’s foray into the Red Sea and East Africa is a manifestation of a significant transformation in the foreign policy of the UAE over the past few years. This transformation has not only involved a change in foreign policy means, but also in the identification of new foreign policy problems and goals.

Paul Williams discussed his article on “Turkish Hydro-hegemony and the Impact of Dams”. By focusing on the last three main dams of the Southeast Anatolian Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi or GAP), Williams highlights how Turkey has exhibited positive and negative types of basin-centric hegemony. He argues that the legitimacy of Turkey’s hydro-hegemony and GAP depends not only on Turkey’s measurable progress towards meeting infrastructure targets, but also on the perception of GAP’s by both Turkey’s basin neighbors and intended beneficiaries living in Southeast Anatolia, including large numbers of ethnic Kurds. He concludes that Turkey’s past threats to halt flow or its actual stoppages and its intended use of dammed water to flood guerrilla transit routes could alienate both the downstream states (relatively silent during the Syrian civil war) and Kurdish nationalists. Such broadcasting of dams as military objects, Williams argues, could make them targets and trigger conflict between the different stakeholders.

Elizabeth Wanucha concluded the working group discussions by presenting an article on “Supply, Use, and Implications of Groundwater Use in the Mideast/North Africa: A Review” co-authored by Mark Giordano, Katalyn Voss, and Signe Stroming. Giordani et al. argue that groundwater in the Middle East/North Africa has emerged as a critical resource to support the drinking water supply for booming population centers as well as agriculture expansion to promote food security. While we know groundwater resources are overused in most of this region, as elsewhere, an overall, quantitative understanding of the available groundwater supply and use is missing as is an understanding of the social and political mechanisms that could help ensure equitable and sustainable management. In their paper, Giordano et al. investigate the interplay between the technical understanding of groundwater resources in the Middle East/North Africa and the political, economic, and social dimensions driving use. They summarize the existing data on groundwater supply and demand, discuss emerging points of tension among groundwater scarcity, food security, and global markets, and highlight the challenge of transboundary water management as it relates to shared groundwater aquifers as well as the interplay between international rivers and their respective groundwater basins. The authors conclude with a commentary on the need to leverage emerging technologies and data to better understand trends in groundwater supply and use across the region, but more importantly, suggest approaches for dealing with the short and long term political consequences likely to emerge as groundwater resources continue to diminish, competition for water resources increases, and food availability declines.

For the working group agenda, click hereFor the participants’ biographies, click hereRead more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Hussein A. Amery, Colorado School of MinesMohammed Al-Jaberi, Georgetown University in QatarZahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarIslam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMarcus DuBois King, George Washington UniversityHelen Lackner, University of LondonAnatol Lieven, Georgetown University in QatarSuzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarJackie Starbird, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarTobias von Lossow, Freie Universität BerlinElizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarPaul A. Williams, Bilkent University, TurkeyWaleed Zahoor, Georgetown University in Qatar

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

Migrant Workers and Health in Qatar: Research Roundtable I
2018-04-26 09:00 - 17:00
The Center for International and Regional Studies collaborated with Qatar-based partners to study the health of migrant workers in Qatar with a roundtable meeting on April 26, 2018. The project considers the state of healthcare provision to this segment of the population with a goal of contributing to the formulation of policy guidelines with suggestions for improvements to the state of migrants’ health. Currently, there is limited scholarship on health and temporary labor migration in the context of the Gulf region, most of which is anecdotal and journalistic. These accounts highlight the poor conditions of migrant workers’ health, particularly in relation to their vulnerable position in Gulf society.

The research roundtable served as a preliminary brainstorming session with discussants from a variety of academic, policy, legal, and healthcare backgrounds who addressed some of the broader issues on the overall state of migrants’ health in Qatar. The discussion was divided into broad themes regarding the social and political contexts of labor migrant conditions and healthcare in Qatar and the legal and regulatory framework. The participants highlighted areas in need of improvement and pointed out shortcomings that need to be addressed. The experts presented their research to provide a better understanding of migrant workers’ health conditions and healthcare delivery within Qatar. The primary research questions that emerged from this session will inform the agenda of a second research meeting, to be hosted by in the near future.

Citizenship, Class, and Inequality in the Middle East Working Group I
2018-05-06 09:00 - 2018-05-07 16:00
On May 6-7, 2018, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) hosted a working group on “Citizenship, Class, and Inequality in the Middle East.” During the course of two days, scholars were convened to discuss and critique their draft papers that covered a wide array of topics, including: passive and active citizenship in the Middle East; securitization of citizenship and sectarianism in the Gulf; political participation in the post-2011 constitutions; race, ethnicity, and citizenship in Sudan and South Sudan; the Iranian Diaspora and dual citizenship; Palestinian citizenship and non-citizenship; citizenship and the Sinai Bedouins; and national identity creation and Qatar Museum’s merchandise.

Roel Meijer commenced the working group discussion with his article on “Passive and Active Citizenship in the Middle East and North Africa in Modern History.” In his paper, Meijer analyzes the factors in Middle Eastern history that have determined the active and passive character of citizenship. The article focuses on the role of the state, and how the modern state has emerged and influenced the nature of citizenship in the Middle East. Meijer argues that the state has led to the emergence of passive citizenship as the citizen has been perceived by the state as an analytical tool, a category of control, and an object of policies. In other words, the citizen is created to pay taxes, serve in the army, spread universal education, and demonstrate loyalty to the state. The article concludes that since modernity demands greater interaction between subjects and the state, the larger the impact of the state on the people in the form of obligations, the greater the chances are that the citizens will also demand rights.

James N. Sater shifted the working group discussion to “The Securitization of Citizenship and Sectarianism in the GCC.” In his paper, Sater develops a link between sectarianism and the quest for citizenship in the Gulf through focusing on four countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The author clarifies how and when sect-based graded citizenship has become a dominant feature of state-society relations in some of these countries, yet not in others. The paper builds on the concepts of extent, content, and depth of citizenship, and analyzes the case of non-citizen residents and their impact on citizenship evolution. Sater also examines the process of securitization of citizenship, through which sect-based citizenship demands have become polarized and through which the category of the non-citizen has become constructed and solidified. Sater asserts that the process of securitization is intimately linked to the strength of the regimes, which either allows them to securitize and avoid any demands for liberalization or brings them into an equilibrium with opposition movements that allows for liberalizing their citizenship regimes to become more inclusive.

Elizabeth Wanucha presented Gianluca Parolin’s article on “The Jinsiyya (citizenship) Obsession and the Muwatana (nationality) Veil: Political Participation in post-2011 Constitutions.” Parolin frames the increase in jinsiyya and muwatana provisions in the post-2011 West Asia and North Africa’s constitutional texts in light of the enforcement that these provisions have seen in recent years. He argues that the provisions on jinsiyya regulations and those involving single-jinsiyya requirements to hold public office seem to be in line with the liberal trend seen globally. However, the aforementioned provisions are contradicted by executive practices and by the very governance design, while the provisions emphasizing muwatana as the mode of the political system have been heavily profited from. In light of this, Parolin argues that the post-2011 constitutions have been devised to work “against” revolutions. He examines this phenomenon by analyzing the constitution-making process in Egypt, Bahrain, Morocco, and Tunisia, and how these processes were captured in the various contexts by certain political elites.

Amir Idris sharpened the discussion by presenting his article on “Race, Ethnicity, and Citizenship in Sudan and South Sudan.” In his paper, Idris argues that Sudan and South Sudan’s crises of citizenship are tied to the historical and political processes that led to the creation of ideas and narratives about racial and ethnic identities prior to the partition of South Sudan from Sudan. Idris problematizes sub-national racial and ethnic identities by examining the historical processes involved in their making. Idris argues that race and ethnicity were central to the colonial, nationalist, and postcolonial projects of inventing the “North” and the “South” as self-contained entities, and that the politicization of race and ethnicity after independence is largely a product of “Orientalizing” cultural differences through colonial administrative rules and postcolonial policies.

Amy Malek presented her article on “Hyphenated Citizens: Constraints of Dual Nationality in the Iranian Diaspora.” In her article, Malek offers three key areas in which, despite growing global trends towards non-exclusive forms of citizenship, the limits of multiple citizenships are felt by Iranian dual nationals in the diaspora, namely: renunciation, securitization, and patrilineal jus sanguinis. She argues that the case of Iranian dual nationals points to the ways in which individuals with multiple citizenships have not been able to access full rights equal to their compatriots. It also highlights how these individuals have also been targeted in their countries of citizenship and beyond in ways that reveal the constraints of geopolitics and power of states to limit flexible, strategic, and compensatory forms of citizenship.

Fateh Azzam shifted the discussion to “Overview of Palestinian (Non)Citizenship.” Azzam argues that Palestinians’ understanding of their own nationality is geographically and historically linked to Mandate-era Palestine, and has been largely inclusive and non-sectarian despite the creation of Israel and attempts by the Ottomans and the British to sub-divide the population into religious communities. However, Palestinians were never able to decide on, establish, and enjoy their own citizenship. Varieties of legal status have historically been imposed upon them by the Ottoman Empire, the international community, the egregious British Mandate, the Nakba and dispossession of 1948, the Israeli and Jordanian caveat, and the decisions of other Arab countries. Five overlapping legal statuses, with concomitant levels of rights, define Palestinians’ lives depending on where they live: stateless persons, refugees, citizens, permanent residents, and minorities. He concludes by suggesting that the recent recognition of the State of Palestine by the United Nations and a majority of states has opened new possibilities that have, as of yet, not been utilized for a variety of political and legal reasons.

Islam Hassan presented Mohannad Sabry’s article on “Informal Economy and Informal Citizenship in the Borderlands: The Case of the Sinai Bedouin.” Sabry argues that since the declaration of the Arab Republic of Egypt by the Free Officers in 1952, the indigenous population of the Sinai Peninsula gradually transformed from the proud Bedouins into the marginalized Bedoons of Egypt. He claims that despite the significant role the Sinai bedouins played during the 1967 war and the Israeli occupation of Sinai, the military has portrayed the Sinai bedouins as traitors to justify the unjustifiable military defeat of the Six Days War. He also asserts that the establishment of police stations, courts, and government departments in the Sinai Peninsula in 1982 failed to incorporate the local communities and the existing informal institutions, which contributed to the bitter relations between the Sinai bedouins and the state. Another chapter of the rather grim Sinai bedouins’ story, Sabry claims, is the 2013 anti-terrorism campaign in Sinai that displaced thousands of Sinai’s bedouins. Sabry concludes that as long as the state approaches the case of Sinai bedouins with the “tank and AK47” mentality, the issue of the Sinai bedouins will never be resolved.

Suzi Mirgani concluded the working group discussions with her article on “Enter through the Gift Shop: Signifying a Modern National Identity through Qatar Museums’ Merchandise.” In her article, Mirgani shows that something significant is taking place in Qatar Museums’ (QM) gift shops—a reformulation of the signifiers of national identity through contemporary commodities. She argues that while traditional gifts and handmade crafts remain prized and promoted, the introduction of modern museum merchandise is a sign that Qatar has entered into a new stage of national identity formation. She asks: if a souvenir attempts to offer a distillation of a nation’s culture, then how do modern museum merchandise—mobile phone covers, accessories, t-shirts—fit into Qatar’s new national narrative? Do these commercial artifacts problematize Qatar’s traditional historical narrative, or do they extend Qatari national identity into new directions—ones that oscillate around shared consumption practices that are no longer beholden to the past?

These research articles will be published in an edited collection by CIRS in the near future.

For the working group agenda, please click here.For the participants’ biographies, please click here.Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Fateh Azzam, American University in BeirutZahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarIslam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarAmir Idris, Fordham UniversityMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarAmy Malek, College of Charleston, South CarolinaRoel Meijer, Radboud University, NetherlandsSuzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMohannad Sabry, Independent Researcher & JournalistJames N. Sater, American University of SharjahElizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

Nation Building in Central Asia Working Group II
2018-08-12 09:00 - 2018-08-13 16:00
On August 12–13, 2018, the Center for International and Regional studies (CIRS) held the second working group under its research initiative on “Nation-Building in Central Asia.” Over the course of two days, scholars were convened to present and critique a number of papers that tackled issues relevant to nation-building, such as: multiculturalism, civic identity, migration, perceptions of national identity, food and culinary identity, Islam, socio-cultural integration, and nomadism.

Aziz Burkhanov initiated the working group discussions with his article on “Multiculturalism, Civic Identity, and Nation Building in Kazakhstan.” In his paper, Burkhanov examines issues of multiculturalism and civic identity in Kazakhstan. He argues that since the fall of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan, like many other post-Soviet states, has faced a challenge of creating a new sense of national identity. Burkhanov analyzes three main aspects of the recent trends in Kazakhstan’s ethnic diversity policies. He complements that by incorporating perceptions of the civic ‘Kazakhstani’ national identity in the discourses of Kazakh- and Russian-language media, highlighting the divergent views on civic nationhood in these two linguistic realms. Finally, Burkhanov triangulates his results with data from surveys conducted in Kazakhstan in 2005 and 2016 to explore any substantial dynamics in the respondents’ perception vis-à-vis the ethnic-civic national identity issues. By incorporating these different approaches, this study illustrates the complexity of the Kazakhstani supranational identity project, and how this project is reflected in state policies, media discourse, and popular perceptions.

Ruslan Rahimov shifted the working group discussions to “State, Migration, and the Nation Building Process in Central Asia: Resources, Perception, and Practices.” Rahimov’s paper demonstrates the various ways in which states dealt with migration and nation-building processes in Central Asia, with a particular emphasis on emergent trends in Kyrgyzstan. Premised on the assumption that nation-building involves the construction of ideational and expressive processes emphasizing the uniqueness of a nation, Rahimov asserts that the ways in which Central Asian countries have dealt with transnational migration have influenced broader nation-building policies.

Dina Sharipova builds on Burkhanov’s paper in her discussion on “Perceptions of National Identity in Kazakhstan: Evidence from a Nation-wide Survey.” Sharipova argues that although much research has been done on nation building in Central Asia, little has been written on people’s perceptions of their national identity. Hence, she analyzes in her paper the results of an original nation-wide survey (N= 1,600) conducted in January 2016 in Kazakhstan. Based on her analysis, Sharipova argues that national identity in Kazakhstan is multilayered and context specific. Kazakhs use citizenship, patriotism, knowledge of history, respect of laws, and political institutions as well as the knowledge of Kazakh language as identity markers. Sharipova goes in depth to analyze the variant perceptions of civic and ethnic identities, usage of the Kazakh language, and religion as elements of Kazakh’s identities. She concludes that despite the growing significance of religion in Kazakhs’ daily lives, it does not overshadow ethnic and civic identities that continue to be the dominant identity markers in Kazakhstan.

Aida Alymbaeva focused her discussion on “Nations of Plov and Beshbarmak: Central Asian Food and National Identity on the Internet.” In her paper, Alymbaeva surveys the ways how Central Asian food and nation have been imagined and interpreted in the Internet space. She argues that in the Internet, Central Asian food and cuisine have been directly connected to ideas of nation. In other words, food and dishes have contributed ostensibly to the imagination of Central Asian nations. Ideas of belonging and materiality have been interactively and constantly produced, re-produced, narrated, and contested by various actors–individuals and institutions—in the Internet space. Alymbaeva claims that within the virtual phatic communions of known dishes people now associate or dissociate themselves from nations beyond necessity of contact: imagination became not only visually much available, but has also become simultaneously shareable with the globe because of the Internet.

Mukaram Toktogulva discussed “Islam in the Context of Nation Building in Kyrgyzstan: Reproduced Practices and Contested Discourses.” In her paper, Toktogulva examines local practices of Islam, and diverse, sometimes conflicting, understandings of those practices in Talas, Osh, and Naryn regions of Kyrgyzstan. She focuses on Muslims’ reproduction and recreation of local practices of Islam in ways that are meaningful for them. In addition to illustrations of local practices, Toktogulva explores discourses about the meaning and role of Islam in present socio-cultural context. The analysis of diverse understanding of Islam highlights, on the one hand, how state officials redefine the role and meaning of “proper” Islam through strict regulation of religious sphere, and how different groups of the society respond to those official regulations. On the other hand, this analysis also shows how alternative meanings of Islam are emerged in local practices, and how ordinary people interpret these practices’ significance.

Building on Toktogulva’s discussion, Laura G. Yerekesheva presented her paper on “Religion and Socio-Cultural Integration: Functions of Religion and Dynamics of Nation Building in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.” In her paper, Yerekesheva explores the interlinks between nation building and religion as part of social integration. The author looks beyond the strict institutionalized approaches of social integration by studying: the interactions between the inclusive cultural system and its religious subsystem; and functions of religion on institutional, relational, and cognitive planes. Through these lenses, Yerekesheva studies the nation-building process taking place in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan throughout the last two and half decades.

Finally, Elizabeth Wanucha presented Diana T. Kudaibergenova’s paper on “Bringing the Nomads Back In!: Horses, Warriors, Nation-Building and “Nomadism” Discourses in Central Asia.” Kudaibergenova argues that discourses of “nomadism”, which embody lost heritage of the Eurasian steppe and the core of the authentic Kazakh identity, became the most ubiquitous artistic and literary representations expressed by Kazakhstani Soviet intellectuals and artists since the 1960s. This concept of nomadic heritage also constituted an important part of both the official nation building and independent cultural production. Kudaibergenova also claims that Kazakh writers meticulous researched and constructed the basis and genealogy of nomadic heritage in the post-Stalinist period. This wave of romanticized nomadism was developed further with the formation of the contemporary Kazakh art in the late 1980s and the beginning of 1990s. Post-1991 the political elites incorporated these discourses of nomadic heritage into the official nation-building policy envisioned by the president Nursultan A. Nazarbayev. In modern Kazakhstan multiple nomadism discourses are blended in official iconography, heritage management, souvenirization as well as artistic critique. The author concludes that different discourses of nomadism represent a field for contestations and re-contextualization of intellectuals’ own identity in the Soviet period, state’s reconceptualization of national ideology, and a constructed idea of national authenticity.

It is worth mentioning that the aforementioned papers will be published as a special issue of a journal by CIRS in the near future.

For the working group agenda, click hereFor the participants’ biographies, click hereRead more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Aida Alymbaeva, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, GermanyZahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarAziz Burkhanov, Nazarbayev University, Republic of KazakhstanIslam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarDiana Kudaibergenova, University of Cambridge, UKSuzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarAbdul Rehmaan Qayyum, Georgetown University in QatarRuslan Rahimov, American University of Central Asia, Kyrgyz RepublicDina Sharipova, KIMEP University, KazakhstanJackie Starbird, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMukaram Toktogulova, American University of Central Asia, Kyrgyz RepublicElizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarLaura Yerekesheva, Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

CIRS Launches CURA Program
2018-09-10 12:00 - 15:00
On September 10, 2018, CIRS formally launched the CIRS Undergraduate Research Advancement program (CURA) by hosting a reception that was attended by GU-Q students, staff, and faculty members. CURA aims to support GU-Q students in the development of their passion for research, by assisting them in developing new skills and providing opportunities for students to present on and publish their research findings.

During the launch, Professor Mehran Kamrava, Director of CIRS pointed out that CIRS has had a robust program of supporting student development since the earliest days of its establishment. He suggested that: “The CURA program gives coherence and direction to this effort by imparting on our students the skills to engage in in-depth research, to present the results of this research in an academic forum, and to publish it for wider audiences,” he said. “We are excited to be working with our CURA Fellows and with the broader student community to ensure CURA’s continued growth and success in the coming years.”

One aim of CURA is to help enrich the undergraduate experience by encouraging students to cultivate research skills beneficial to their studies and careers. To this end, CIRS will hold a research skills workshop each semester on the essential components of the research process and writing of scholarly papers. CURA workshops are open to all GU-Q students and are designed to offer hands-on experience, combining a presentation of techniques with hands-on application of the skills in peer-led group exercises. The first workshop, Designing a Research Question, takes place in October of this year, featuring a presentation by Professor Kamrava and facilitated by Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS Project Manager, and Islam Hassan, CIRS Research Analyst.

“The CURA program gives coherence and direction to this effort by imparting on our students the skills to engage in in-depth research, to present the results of this research in an academic forum, and to publish it for wider audiences.”

Ayesha Iqbal (class of 2022) said by attending the workshop, she was able to narrow the scope of her research, and discern and access the relevant literature in the field. “CURA’s exercises, like mind-mapping, colleague critique, brainstorming sessions and, most importantly, Professor Kamrava’s guidance and expertise, have helped me construct my research question and formulate a sustainable research plan.” She added, “Research is at the heart of Georgetown and I am extremely excited to begin this journey with CURA.” The next workshop will be offered in early February, 2019. You can read more about the CURA Workshops here.

GU-Q students have the opportunity to conduct independent research and submit their work for consideration to the CURA Paper Series. The process of selecting papers is rigorous and competitive. This is an unparalleled opportunity for students to have their work professionally reviewed and published by a reputable source. The CURA Lunch Talk series is another initiative that will give students a platform to present their independent research in a public forum.

Nine GU-Q students joined CIRS as CURA Fellows for the 2018-19 school year; CURA Fellows work for the Center and are also mentored by CIRS staff in a range of areas. CURA Fellows provide research assistance, and also engage in tasks related to publication, administration, and project management. Fellows participate in peer mentorship programs designed to facilitate student to student learning, and also hone their analytical skills by convening one seminar each semester on a current CIRS research project. Fellows are invited to discuss papers written by experts in their respective fields, and share their conclusions with the authors of the papers in the CIRS Working Group organized around that research project.

Mehaira Mahgoub (class of 2019), a CIRS research fellow said, “As a senior preparing to enter the real world, I found the chance to develop my academic research skills with CIRS to be exciting and incredibly useful.” After joining the CIRS team, she said, “I was able to gain valuable insight on Middle Eastern and international politics from topics like the patterns of migration in the Middle East to Russian foreign policy.”

Khansa Maria, CIRS Project Assistant and CURA Fellow

Troubled Waters: Insecurity in the Gulf
2018-09-12 18:00 - 20:00
Amidst international disputes and conflicts, the Gulf region stands out as a political hot zone. Seeking to find out why the region is so chronically unstable, Mehran Kamrava, Professor and Director of the Center for International and Regional Studies at Georgetown University in Qatar, set out to explore this phenomenon in depth. He performed extensive field research, interviewing government ministers and experts from Abu Dhabi, Riyadh, Muscat, and Tehran, among others, over several years. His research led to the book, Troubled Waters: Insecurity in the Persian Gulf (Cornell University Press, 2018) and he presented his findings at a CIRS book talk on September 12, 2018.

Kamrava began by sharing three particularly memorable conversations. In every interview he posed the question: “What is the biggest security threat that your country faces?” Often, he said, he received predictable answers. In Riyadh, he was told the threat was “Tehran;” in Tehran, it was “obviously the Americans.” However, the foreign minister in Muscat surprised Kamrava with the answer, “unemployment.” The official had explained that if young people were not employed they had the potential to get into trouble. “That really showed me an awful lot about the maturity of Omani foreign policy,” Kamrava said, especially given that Oman has a reputation for negotiating “very subtle, very complex diplomacy in a very mature, reasoned way.” In another interview, he had asked a senior cabinet minister why his country had suddenly introduced conscription. The minister explained that if the youth were bored and idle they can get into trouble, and also “ISIS recruits on the internet.” That also, was not the clichéd answer that one might hear when interviewing a cabinet minister, Kamrava said.

Kamrava happened to be in Riyadh in 2014, at a time when Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain had withdrawn their ambassadors from Qatar, an impasse that lasted eight months. During an interview with a senior prince in the foreign ministry, the official realized that Kamrava was from Georgetown University in Qatar—not Georgetown in Washington, DC. The prince’s reaction was, “Qatar! We can close our airspace to them. We can impose a blockade on them. We can suffocate them. We will not let Qatar Airways fly.” Kamrava told the audience that at the time he did not understand why the prince had become so agitated. Three years later, in 2017—when Saudi Arabia led the current blockade against Qatar—it dawned to him that if a simple professor had heard these comments, officials in Doha certainly knew and were making contingency plans, and the Saudis were in motion to further sever relations with Qatar.

Kamrava said he was struck by an insight he gained from meeting with foreign ministers and other officials in Iran. He said that everyone had told him that the experience of the Iran–Iraq war guides their country’s foreign policy making today. He was told, “We never forget that the Arab countries of the region lined up one after another to beat up on us. And Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and a number of others gave billions of dollars to Iraq from 1980 to 1988. And we will not forget that the Americans gave satellite information to the Iraqis to more effectively put chemical weapons on Iranian troops, and told them about Iranian troop movements.” As a scholar of Iran, Kamrava said he had not fully grasped that the memory of the war was “such a living memory.”

As a result of his many interviews and conversations, Kamrava said the causes and dynamics that have made the Gulf region so chronically insecure can be clustered into four broad categories. The first, he said, is how the region’s security architecture is structured, and has been structured for a long time. “Nobody has thought about a win-win scenario; everybody has thought about a win-lose scenario,” he said, explaining that the regions’ security is viewed terms of a zero-sum game—that is, the only way to protect one’s interests is at the expense of someone else’s interests.

The second reason for the region’s insecurity is the “pervasiveness of identity politics.” He broadly outlined the region’s political history. The Middle East from the 1950s on, could be considered “the era of secular nationalism.” From the late 1970s onward, the dominant narrative was one of political Islam. In that period, he said, “the salvation of the region lay not so much in nationalism, which was underlined by secular, non-religious assumptions, but in embrace of political interpretations of religion.” After 2011, he said, “what became important—what became one’s core source of identity—wasn’t just religion in broad terms, but specific sectarian identities within religion.” Kamrava described sectarianism’s deep, colonial roots in the Middle East, citing the divide-and-rule tactics of the British and French in agitating sectarian sensibilities.

“What we’re seeing today, it isn’t so much sectarianism, but a process of re-sectarianization of the Middle East.”

The third reason, Kamrava said, is that many regional actors are belligerent. “Agency matters. It’s not only institutions that matter, people matter. Political science—politics—is ultimately the art of exercise of power, or the science of exercise of power.” He continued, “What we see in our region, particularly since 2013-2014, is the coming to the fore of entirely new generations of leaders who are not playing by the old rules of the game, they are making their own rules,” and are unwilling to be bound by traditional diplomatic experiences, he said.

The final reason he offered for the breakdown of security in the region is what he called the “security dilemma.” That is, when a country increases its own security, it inadvertently makes other countries feel more insecure. “If you buy a new weapon system then your adversary next door feels a new threat, so they have to do the same thing,” thus creating a vicious cycle. How to get out of this cycle? Kamrava said, “You talk to each other. You build trust. You take the first step. And, of course, nobody is willing to talk to each other. We do not have any forum for dialogue.”

Looking to the future, Kamrava offered four questions for consideration. First, what role is the United States going to play in the region? Are the Americans going to step in and say that the Saudis and the Iranians must learn to share the region? Second, what will happen in Iran? Iran is in the cusp of change, he explained, with the impending departure of the aging Supreme Leader Khamenei, the Iranian political landscape will certainly undergo fundamental changes. This will in turn effect President Rouhani’s consensus politics, and the role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

“What we see in our region, particularly since 2013-2014, is the coming to the fore of entirely new generations of leaders who are not playing by the old rules of the game, they are making their own rules.”

The third question concerns the future of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Kamrava described the GCC has “being on life support,” since the start of the blockade on Qatar. “Nobody wants to be the party responsible for pulling the plug” on the GCC, Kamrava said. He projected a continuation of life-support status with technical cooperation, but as far as “having a common defense force, having meaningful political and economic integration—that, I believe, is thing of the past.”

The last and “probably most vexing” question is the long term outlook for energy. The region would not have had its strategic significance if it didn’t produce oil and natural gas, he said. If current trends continue—increasing energy independence in relation to the Gulf region, Kamrava said, “This region will, quite unfortunately, remain insecure for some time to come.”

Article by Khansa Maria (class of 2021), CURA Administrative Fellow

Mehran Kamrava is Professor and Director of the Center for International and Regional Studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Qatar. He is the author of a number of journal articles and books, including, most recently, Troubled Waters: Insecurity in the Persian Gulf (Cornell University Press, 2018); Inside the Arab State (Oxford University Press, 2018); The Impossibility of Palestine: History, Geography, and the Road Ahead (Yale University Press, 2016); Qatar: Small State, Big Politics (Cornell University Press, 2015); The Modern Middle East: A Political History since the First World War, 3rd. ed. (University of California Press, 2013); and Iran’s Intellectual Revolution (Cambridge University Press, 2008). His edited books include The Great Game in West Asia: Iran, Turkey, and the Southern Caucasus (2017); Fragile Politics: Weak States in the Greater Middle East (2016); Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East (2015); The Political Economy of the Persian Gulf (2012); The Nuclear Question in the Middle East (2012); and The International Politics of the Persian Gulf (2011).

Science and Scientific Production in the Middle East Working Group I
2018-09-16 09:00 - 2018-09-17 16:00
On September 16–17, 2018, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) hosted the first working group under its research initiative on “Science and Scientific Production in the Middle East.” Over the course of two days, scholars discussed issues around: the social impact of scientific research; Islamic ethics and legitimacy of scientific innovation; women and science in the Middle East; social inequality, economic policies and scientific innovation; sanction regimes; and the military-industrial complex.

Sari Hanafi began the working group discussions with his presentation on “The Social Impact of Scientific Research in the Middle East.” During his presentation, Hanafi discussed four main issues: the relevance of research and internationalization; profiles of Middle Eastern academics; transnational scientific networks; and production versus usage of knowledge in the region. Hanafi stated that based on his study, research publications in Arabic appear to be less influential, and scholarship as well as scholars located outside the region hold more influence. As far as citations are concerned, Arabic publications when compared to research that is published in English are less cited. Research produced in Arabic tends to have less visibility to academics and scholars, as there are no proper databases that capture all Arabic language publications. Much of the research produced in the region, instead of being carried out at within a university setting by academics, is carried out for policy purposes by professional researchers and tends to be funded by international organizations for short, limited periods of time. This is primarily because there is not enough funding being devoted to academic research, and professional researchers are dependent on policy institutes and foreign donors for accessing funds. This has a significant impact on the sustainability and long-term production of scientific research and knowledge, as well as its consumption. There are an absence of intermediary institutions in the Arab world that connect universities to industry and society. Hanafi concluded his presentation with by identifying a few of the core challenges for attaining social impact through scientific research in the Arab world: there is lack of trust in science in the region; research and science are not considered as value neutral; societal debate is part and parcel of research in the region; authoritarian states are not committed to developing evidence-based policies; conducting critical research impacts academics and they can find themselves marginalized and their careers negatively impacted; knowledge production needs to become more socially distributed; and Arab universities have little control over or involvement in scientific production.

Ayman Shabana focused his discussions on “Islamic Ethics and Legitimacy of Scientific Innovation.” Shabana opened his remarks by raising the questions of why Islamic ethics are important for legitimation of scientific innovation, and even what Islamic ethics mean. There have been few deep studies examining the relationship between Islamic ethics and science or scientific innovation in the Muslim world, particularly in the Middle East. It is important to also examine who the key stakeholder and actors involved in the domain of Islamic ethics and science are. Emerging social concerns pertaining to legal, theological, and moral domains have challenged the Islamic normative tradition and its authority. From theories of evolution and astronomical calculations in the 1900s to modern biomedical technology, Islam has been invoked either to justify or condemn scientific advancement. In grappling with the issue of Islam and scientific production, Shabana identified four gaps in the literature that deserve in-depth study: the role of muftis/Muslim adjudicators and judicial scholars and the relationship between Islam and science; Islamic ethics and warfare in the Middle East; Islamic bioethics and human enhancement; and Islamic ethics and artificial intelligence.

Rana Dajani’s remarks at the working group discussion focused on the topic of “Women and Science in the Arab World.” Dajani posited that there is a general assumption that there are low numbers of females engaged in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) in many parts of the world, but statistics show that in the Arab world and East and South East Asia this is not necessarily the case. In fact in the Arab world there are higher numbers of woman in STEM fields than in the United States, and this needs to be further explored. If gender equality is better in Nordic countries than in the Arab world, what are the reasons for such high female representation in STEM fields in the Arab world as opposed to northern Europe? Dajani argued that despite social conditions that are considered to limit girls’ educational choices and perceived traditional norms challenging women’s empowerment women, the number of females in the STEM fields continues to grow. However, women’s professional participation in STEM fields remains disproportionate to the number of female students pursuing STEM education—there are more young women studying in these areas that are not reflected later on in the labor market. Dajani suggested a few gaps in the literature which need further studying. Among other things she suggested that research was needed to examine the long-term impact of the segregated educational system on female educational choices, and specifically whether girls who study in single-sex environment have a greater tendency to pursue STEM-based higher education. Dajani also suggested that there is a need to further understand how Arab women are impacting the scientific workplace, and women’s influence on scientific laboratories and innovation hubs. Other sub-areas that need to be studied are mentoring schemes in sciences for women and the impact of female scientists as role models for young women and men.

Building on Dajani’s discussion, Abelkader Djeflat discussed “Science and Social Inequality in the Middle East.” Djeflat argued that the pervasive social inequality in the Middle East has been obstructive to the advancement of sciences and scientific production in the Middle East. Social disparity has not only manifested in the high unemployment rates across the region, but also in youth’s access to knowledge. Elites have more access to foreign technology, scientific discovery, and research than lower classes. This incongruent access to knowledge is passed down through generations cementing inequality, and ultimately frustration, between social classes. Djeflat argued that there is a need to study the social system in the Middle East, and identify the dysfunctional social institutions that create such disparity in the access to knowledge between social classes.

Mehran Kamrava presented Parviz Tarikhi’s comments on “Sanctions and Scientific Production in Iran.” Tarikhi suggests that science and scientific production in Iran remain dependent on the state politically, ideologically, and financially. The state’s control over science and scientific production in Iran led to three structural problems. First, given that the state is the biggest funder of scientific research, there has been an ostensible disparity in allocation of public funds to scientific research. Instead of funding research that contributes to scientific production and knowledge, the state has funded pretentious projects that boost national pride domestically, and project an image of a powerful, advanced Iran internationally. Second, state’s control of scientific production has circumcised the parameters of constructive scientific criticism. Finally, many scientific endeavors funded by the state have been considered sensitive to national security; hence, impacting the circulation of scientific information. In addition to the aforementioned structural problems, Tarikhi highlighted the role of sanctions in further hampering scientific production in Iran. He claimed that because of sanctions, the trend towards brain-drain has picked up dramatically, and more Iranian scholars and scientists have been leaving the country than ever before. In addition, Iranian scholars face limited access to scientific production outside Iran both for education and contribution purposes, as some journals do not accept papers from Iranian scholars. However, the sanctions contributed to the growth of cosmopolitanism among Iranian scientists in diaspora and those in Iran. Tarikhi highlighted a number of areas that deserve further studying, among which: the inverse relationship between sanctions and science; sanctions impact on the criticism of scientific production; Iranian scientists’ ability to conduct independent scientific research; immigration and scientific cosmopolitanism in Iran; and the internal quality of dissent, and how it impacts scientific production in Iran.

Tariq Da’na concluded the working group discussions with his presentation on “The Military-Industrial Complex and Technological Advancement in Israel.” Da’na provided an overview of Israel’s business-political-military relations. He argued that the military-industrial complex in Israel could be traced back to pre-statehood. Israel Military Industries, currently known as IMI Systems, was established in the 1933. This company, and the Israeli military-industrial complex at large, played a significant role in the Israel’s state building process in the 1950s and 1960s. Da’na claimed that given the central role the Israeli army plays in politics, the Israeli military-industrial complex remains worth studying. Da’na identified key gaps in the literature on the Israeli military-industrial complex, among which: the connection between Israeli academia and military apparatus, the indigeneity of Israeli scientific production the privatization of security in Israel; privatization of Israeli checkpoint and prisons; and comparisons between the Israeli and Egyptian military-industrial complexes in 1960 to the 1980s.

For the working group agenda please click hereFor the participants biographies please click hereRead more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarRana Dajani, Hashemite University, JordanTariq Dana, Doha Institute of Graduate Studies, QatarAbdelkader Djeflat, University of Lille, FranceMohammed Ghaly, Hamad Bin Khalifa University, QatarSari Hanafi, American University of Beirut, LebanonIslam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarSuzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarAyman Shabana, Georgetown University in QatarElizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

CURA Workshop: Designing a Research Question
2018-10-04 12:00 - 16:00
On October 4, 2018, CIRS hosted its first CURA workshop for students. “Designing a Research Question” was intended to outline the research process and offer strategies for developing a research question. This was accomplished through the process of finding and narrowing a research topic, identifying a research problem, and devising a research question to address that problem.

CIRS Director, Professor Mehran Kamrava, led an interactive session with the participants about his preferred research methods and techniques. He shared the steps he expects of his students when writing their research papers; from choosing a research question and conducting the research process, to organizing the research findings and writing the paper. Kamrava emphasized the need to begin research with a broad area of interest and not a specific question, in order to avoid personal bias and to fully evaluate existing data and resources before identifying a topic. He addressed the importance of planning and organization to academic writing and explained his method of structuring papers. He further shared his expectations of students enrolled in his courses.

The workshop was facilitated by Islam Hassan, CIRS Research Analyst, and Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS Project Manager. Participants were all GU-Q students, and the following CURA fellows provided direction during the workshop: Mohammed Al-Jaberi, Chaïmaa Benkermi, Aiza Khan, Mehaira Maghoub, Riham Mansour, Khansa Maria, and Fatemeh Salari. The facilitators and fellows led exercises encouraging participants to apply and practice the workshop skills on their own research questions.

The exercises helped students to arrive at a succinct research question from their broad areas of academic interest. Personal interests ranged from “Artificial Intelligence in India” to “Islamophobia in China.” Students worked in small groups and discussed their topics in-depth with their peers and mentors. In the first exercise, students were provided with a set of questions to ask themselves and their peers to guide a conversation to a focused area of interest for further deliberation. Next, participants were asked to identify what needed further research and how they would tackle it. Students discussed their different approaches. For the last exercise, students volunteered their research questions for everyone to critique.

The workshop was attended by twenty-five students from every class year, from freshmen working on their first college papers to seniors preparing for their final theses. Everyone engaged in peer learning, with third- and fourth-year students sharing their learned experiences, and first- and second-year students sharing their own perspectives and approaches. Students who successfully completed the workshop were awarded electronic badges that could be shared on their LinkedIn profiles.

This was the first research workshop that CIRS has planned for the purpose of enhancing students’ research abilities. GU-Q students will have another opportunity to participate in a CURA workshop in the spring semester.

“As a freshman starting her career at an institution as research intensive as Georgetown, this workshop proved to be a great kick start for my journey as a researcher,” commented Aimen Khan, a participant in the workshop. Another participant, Jasmin Afifi described the workshop as “enjoyable, informative and enlightening.”

Article by Aiza Khan (class of 2020), CURA Research Fellow

Access Denied: Banning Qatari Ships from Blockading States
2018-10-17 12:45 - 13:45
On June 5, 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt cut diplomatic ties with Qatar, imposed a blockade, and immediately moved to close off access to Qatar, with an embargo on air, sea, and land traffic to and from the country. These punitive measures were based on allegations that Qatar was supporting terrorism, which Qatar denied, and were used to pressure Qatar to comply with a list of demands in order to end the blockade, which Qatar rejected.

Muna Al-Marzouqi, Assistant Professor of Maritime and Commercial Law at Qatar University’s College of Law, was invited to share her research on this subject at CIRS on October 17, 2018. Her presentation concerned “access denied” to Qatari ships by the blockading states, and specifically the legality of the ban. Al-Marzouqi studies this unique aspect of the Gulf crisis through maritime laws, and she has probed the question of whether the blockade is in conformity with principles of international laws and conventions.

There are several laws that govern maritime trade. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is a body of laws, customs, and agreements that applies to all nations, and governs how nations interact in maritime matters. Maritime law considers activities and events related to the seas that, for example, would apply to shipping companies, their clients, and their employees.

The blockade has prevented all vessels owned by the Qatari government or a Qatari citizen from being accepted at the ports of the blockading countries. In fact, in the first weeks of the conflict, vessels owned by other countries that were bound for or arriving from Qatar were also denied access the blockade countries’ ports. However, Al-Marzouqi said, Qatar’s minister of transportation and telecommunication filed a complaint with the International Maritime Organization seeking permission for foreign and Qatari vessels to enter these ports and, as a result, foreign vessels were allowed access to Saudi, UAE, and Bahraini ports, but Qatari vessels remained banned.

While analyzing the impact of the blockade, Al-Marzouqi pointed out that Qatar regularly imported goods from the blockading countries—such as food, pharmaceutical products, and other daily essentials—but no longer has access to these. Vessels do not only dock at these ports for fuel and repairs, she explained, but also for humanitarian reasons like medical assistance or ship maintenance. So there are many aspects of trade that are affected by the shipping ban.

Al-Marzouqi has researched the applicable international rules to determine which apply to the blockade. “There are rules from maritime conventions, trade conventions, and also from the principles of international law that may be applicable,” she said. The Law of the Sea regulates the right of coastal states to take some measures against foreign vessels. One of the rights of foreign-flagged vessels is to have “innocent passage” into the territorial waters of foreign states. She explained that any vessel, whatever the nationality, has the right to enter the waters of another foreign state. In the current case of Qatar, however, no Qatari vessel is currently allowed to enter the waters of the blockading states—let alone be granted safe passage. She explained that the term “innocent passage” means that ships can pass through the waters without breaching any laws or doing harm, “and Qatari vessels are now deprived of this right.”

“The actions taken against the state of Qatar are actually unjustified, unreasonable, arbitrary, and outrageous.”

Another applicable treaty in this situation is the Convention on International Régime of Maritime Ports of 1923, which remains in force today. This convention obligates states party to the convention open their ports to other states; however, none of the blockading states are signatories to this convention—including Qatar. Thus, this convention only has a “persuasive effect” on states, but it is a part of the customary international law. Al-Marzouqi said that all states are obligated to apply the rules articulated in the convention, and therefore “states should not deny access to ports.”

One of the most important international conventions is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1994. GATT regulates trade between states and its principles encourage states to adopt free-trade policies and eliminate barriers to trade. By suspending maritime navigation to and from Qatar and hampering trade with the state, the blockading nations are going against the principles of free trade. Al-Marzouqi pointed out one exception to these rules: in a situation where states need to protect their national security interests, they are allowed to resort to these measures. This gives rise to the question of whether Qatar is enough of a national security threat to merit a response like the blockade.

Al-Marzouqi said, based on her research, these claims of threats to national security “do not have any basis, and thus the blockade is a not a legal response,” because the blockading countries have failed to provide any substantial proof to strengthen their claims of Qatar’s security or terrorism threat. In response, Qatar has filed cases with international organizations like the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Al-Marzouqi argued that the case against Qatar does not meet the security exception to the applicable rules, and therefore, “the actions taken against the state of Qatar are actually unjustified, unreasonable, arbitrary, and outrageous.”

Principles of international law urge states to work together to find solutions to crises like this. Al-Marzouqi pointed out that the blockade against Qatar is “a political problem that leads to legal consequences.” There is no international body with the authority to impose binding decisions on states to stop actions that are not in conformity with international law, she said, except for the ICJ. However, “the blockading states don’t want to solve the problem by amicable means or by judicial means,” she said. There is a presumption in law that applies to the blockade, Al-Marzouqi said, where the refusal of all mediation and negotiation attempts by the blockading nations indicates “that they have no evidence to show that Qatar is a terrorist country.”

Article by Khansa Maria, CURA Administrative Fellow

Muna Al-Marzouqi is Assistant Professor of Maritime and Commercial Law at Qatar University College of Law. She received her LL.B from Qatar University College of Law and a Masters degree in law from the University of California, Berkeley. She obtained her doctorate in the field of Maritime Law from Tulane University.

CURA Seminar: Informal Politics in the Middle East
2018-10-25 14:00 - 16:00
In October 2018, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) held a CURA Seminar under its CURA (CIRS Undergraduate Research Advancement) initiative. Each semester, CURA Fellows come together for an active discussion of research papers that were submitted to a current CIRS research project. The papers are shared in advance of the seminar, and CURA fellows attend prepared to critique the papers that they have read. At a later stage, selected CURA fellows attend a CIRS scholarly research working group to share fellows’ feedback with the paper authors. CURA was introduced to support the research needs of undergraduate students at Georgetown University in Qatar, and to provide them with opportunities to enhance their research skills by discussing and critiquing papers from CIRS research initiatives. This CURA seminar was under CIRS’ research initiative on “Informal Politics in the Middle East,” where the CURA fellows discussed two papers addressing the blurred line between formal and informal politics and how it shapes government and society within Yemen and Turkey.

Abdul Rehmaan Qayyum (class of 2021) kicked off the CURA Seminar discussion by presenting Charles Schmitz’spaper titled “Weighing the Tribal Factor in Yemeni Politics.” The paper discusses the role of tribes in Yemeni politics. In the North, the Houthi tribe exploits tribalism in pursuit of legitimacy and power, while the South rejects the tribal system, perceiving it as an uncivilized system. Schmitz addresses the role of tribalism while juxtaposing it with the role of Saudi Arabia, the different political parties (such as the Islah party), militias, and the Hadi government. Schmitz claims that tribes function across state institutions. Tribal sheikhs participate in the government and parliament, control areas out of the weak Yemeni state’s reach, and collect taxes on behalf of the state. However, tribes are not the sole actors in Yemeni local politics. External actors, such as Saudi Arabia; local political parties; and the conflicts within the government all factor into shaping Yemeni politics, even more so than tribalism.

Khansa Maria (class of 2021) presented Michelangelo Guida’spaper titled “Çay Politics: Informal politics in Turkey and the Example of Vote Mobilization in Istanbul and Şanlıurfa.” The paper conveys the power of informal politics in Turkey, focusing on the cities of Istanbul and Şanlıurfa. In the aforementioned two cities, political parties’ campaigns and manifestos are less effective in swaying voters toward a specific candidate during elections. Community leaders and voters’ communal affiliations play a much more effective role in influencing public votes. Guida mentions how in a survey conducted in 2005 by the Reuters Institute Digital News Report in the district of Üsküdar Kadıköy and Küçükçekmece portrayed the impact of media on voters, highlighting that 33 percent of people mistrusted TV, and over 50 percent mistrusted the media and preferred to listen to their community leaders and which candidate they support for reference. As a result of the public mistrust in media and the role of community in Turkish politics, several political parties, particularly the AK Parti, use informal space to win votes. Instead of organizing big media campaigns and rallies, these political parties interact with voters face-to-face, and organize community events as unconventional ways of campaigning.

Subsequent to each paper presentation, the CURA fellows engaged in an insightful discussion on the structure and organization of the paper, the employed theoretical and conceptual frameworks, the sources used, and the clarity and strength of the argument. While focusing on the concept of informal politics and its relationship with formal politics in the Middle East, the CURA fellows employed the theories and research tools and skills of their respective majors—namely international politics, culture and politics, international economics, and international history—to assess, critique, and provide feedback on the discussed papers.

Following the CURA Seminar, Chaïmaa Benkermi (class of 2021) and Riham Mansour (class of 2019) presented the CURA fellows’ comments and feedback at CIRS’s second working group on “Informal Politics in the Middle East.”

For the participants’ biographies, please click here

Article by Hala Eid, CURA Publications Fellow at CIRS

Informal Politics in the Middle East Working Group II
2018-10-28 09:30 - 2018-10-29 17:00
On October 28–29, 2018, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) held the second working group under its research initiative on “Informal Politics in the Middle East.” Over the course of two days, a number of scholars were convened to discuss issues including: the tribe in Yemen, the Dīwãniyya in Kuwait, ‘ashwa’iy cities in the Middle East, social activism in Egypt, vote mobilization in Turkey, women in Iran, and agricultural associations in Saharan Algeria.

Charles Schmitz initiated the working group discussions by presenting his article on “Weighing the Tribal Factor in Yemeni Politics”. Schmitz argues than many consider the tribe to lie at the heart of Yemeni politics and society, and that existing scholarship tends to overemphasize the tribe while not giving enough attention to other institutions or dynamics which are core to understanding Yemen. Schmitz suggests that political parties, the military, various other state institutions, and civil society are all key actors that need to be studied alongside the tribe and tribal dynamics. Entirely ignoring the role of the tribe in Yemen is of course not possible, but what needs to be closely examined is how important or influential tribes are in the contemporary Yemeni political landscape. Assessing the tribal factor is a challenge because of two main realities: the diverse conceptual approaches to understanding Yemeni tribes, and the transformation of Yemeni society and tribes. Schmitz argues that not only is there a great deal of debate about the nature of a tribe, but the last half century also produced new hybrid forms of politics such as the rise of tribal shaykhs in Yemen’s national political institutions, state officials’ use of tribal custom to resolve disputes, and the use of clan identity to secure loyalty in the national security apparatus of Yemen.

Clemens Chay shifted the discussion to “Dissecting the Spatial Relevance of the Dīwãniyya in Kuwait: An Inquiry into its ‘Publicness.’” In his article, Chay argues that as an integral component of Kuwaiti culture, dīwāniyyas have also become spaces where informal politics and formal political negotiations are enacted. In its most basic form, the dīwāniyya has historically served as a social space where people gather. Surviving the transition from its traditional relevance in pre-oil Kuwaiti society towards current forms of urbanized society, the dīwāniyya continues to be relevant as a space for social exchange. This article explains how the dīwāniyya’s spatial relevance is attributed to its “publicness,” and its quality of enabling face-to-face communication that technology has failed to provide. Departing from an understanding of public space, this article shows how the dīwāniyyastraddles the public-private divide. The space’s malleability has ensured its persistence; its capacity for socialization has led to its use by different societal groups, including foreign diplomats. Crucially, this article shows how an informal and indigenous mode of grassroots diplomacy provides an expression of public sentiment.

Building on the Chay’s discussion, Deen Sharp discussed another form of informal spaces in his article: “In the Age of ‘ashwa’iy Cities.” Sharp argues that urban studies, since the start of the new millennium, has stressed the importance of studying the urban fringes and moving away from the rather myopic study of metropolitan cores that have traditionally dominated urban theory, and assumed to stand in for broader urban processes. However, there has been a significant rise of urban perspectives from the global south, in the context of the continued urbanization that has accelerated in more recent years. The contemporary processes of urbanization in the Middle East and the debate on formal and informal urbanism in the region have contributed significantly to the rise of such perspectives. Hence, Sharp argues that the way we study and think about urbanization in the Middle East, and its political importance, is undergoing a rapid change. Finally, he suggests that we are not living in an urban age of “global” or “ordinary” cities, but rather ‘ashwa’iy (haphazard) cities.

Islam Hassan presented Amr Hamzawi’s article on “Egypt’s Resilient Social Activism.” Hamzawi argues that in light of Egypt’s ruling generals’ crack down on civil society, secular opposition parties, and Islamist movements since 2013, four forms of anti-authoritarian platforms have shaped social activism in Egypt: single-cause initiatives that are opposing human rights abuses and advocating for the rights and freedoms of the victims; professional associations that are defending freedoms of expression and association; student groups that are challenging the systematic interference of the security services in their affairs and the permanent presence of security forces on campuses; and the labor movement that is galvanized by deteriorating economic and social conditions and by the government’s repression of labor activists. In addition, spontaneous eruptions of popular anger in response to human rights abuses have become politically significant.

Michelangelo Guida shifted the discussion to Turkey with his paper on “Çay Politics: Informal Politics in Turkey and the Example of Vote Mobilization in Istanbul and Şanlıurfa.” Guida argues interpersonal relations, face-to-face, and person-to-person relationships dominate Turkish public life. Or example in Istanbul, besides conventional political meeting, parties prefer door-to-door political campaigning, visiting families, businesses, and associations of immigrants for a sohbet, intimate conversation, over a glass of tea. AK Party has succeeded in using this form of informal politics as a tool to mobilize votes. Guida also argues that Turks prefer to use existing tribal, family, hemşehri, or community networks to have access to public life. This article examines the interactions between formal and informal political structures, particularly during elections, in modern day Turkey.

Shahla Haeri discussed “Perilous Adventures: Women and Civil Society Participation in Iran.” In her article, Haeri argues that from the early days of the establishment of Islamic Republic, educated urban Iranian women have been actively engaged with the state and civil society in all spheres and domains, despite the many legal and political hurdles thrown on their paths by the state’s medieval gender policies. Their activism, however, was not initiated by the drastic structure sociopolitical changes. Women engaged with the civil society well before the establishment of the Islamic Republic, though perhaps not in such wide scale. Haeri examines women’s success in demanding and partially achieving political authority and representation in governmental and non-governmental organizations, and the evolution of the relationship between women and the Islamic Republic since 1979.

Finally, Jackie Starbird presented Nejm Benessaiah’s article on “Micro-movements and the Politics of Change in Saharan Algeria.” Benessaiah argues that rather than a linear progression from traditional, hierarchical forms of governance to modern, democratic ones, the present governance composition in Saharan Algeria reveals the continued existence of several, mixed forms of political behavior. Among these forms of political behavior: authoritarian (still to some degree the family, the ashīra, the cazzāba and the state); liberal market-driven, competitive behavior (the labor market, mercantile selling of goods, consumption of goods and services); and consensus-based egalitarian decision-making (associations). The existence of these mixed modes of governance could be seen as evidence for a society in transition, as newer forms gradually replace the old. Instead of the eclipse of the “traditional” by a monolithic modernity, Benessaiah argues that this hybrid composition of governance in Saharan Algeria in fact constitutes a locally negotiated form of modernity itself. The Mozabite associations are able to challenge the hierarchy of the local elites, not by violence or even direct conflict, but by simply doing things differently, by organizing in inclusive, voluntary ways, and actually achieving results.

For the working group agenda, click here
For the participants’ biographies, click here
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Chaïmaa Benkermi, Georgetown University in Qatar
Misba Bhatti, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Clemens Chay, Durham University, UK
Paulino Rafael Robles-Gil Cozzi, Qatar University
Michelangelo Guida, Istanbul 29 Mayis University, Turkey
Shahla Haeri, Boston University
Islam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Riham Mansour, Georgetown University in Qatar
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Charles Schmitz, Towson University, Baltimore
Deen Sharp, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Jackie Starbird, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

Book Launch: Environmental Politics in the Middle East
2018-11-11 18:00 - 20:00
On November 11, 2018, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) launched its recent book on Environmental Politics of the Middle East (Oxford University Press/Hurst, 2018), edited by Harry Verhoeven, Associate Professor of International Relations and African Politics at Georgetown University in Qatar, who presented the research findings at a CIRS Dialogue. In Verhoeven’s words, the book tries “to unmask, to contest, to deconstruct some of the leading environmental narratives that have emerged throughout this macroregion.” He said that these storylines are not just the products of the Middle East, but of interactions between other parts of the world and the states, societies, and markets of the Middle East.

Verhoeven argued that the idea in which nature itself shapes political, economic, and social outcomes, has long been intuitive: “perhaps there is no better illustration of this than the old saying that ‘Egypt is a gift of the Nile.’ As if the mere fact that water flows down from the Ethiopian highlands—and from Lake Victoria in Central Africa, all the way to Egypt—in and of itself would explain all the political and social processes that have been happening in Egypt.”

Environment is often assumed to be, he said, “an exogenous and independent variable shaping the dependent variable”—that is, political, social, and economic outcomes. This notion has a very long history that can be traced back to many illustrious intellectuals. Verhoeven explained that the concept of “environmental determinism”—that environmental outcomes fundamentally shape political and economic thinking—was propagated by Aristotle, who held the idea that in certain types of topography, specific political civilizations would emerge.

Such thinking also underpinned the writing of Ibn Khaldun, who was, Verhoeven argued, perhaps the greatest thinker of the fourteenth century. Khaldun divided the world into seven different types of climatic zones, each of which had a specific outcome in the form of social organization, culture, and political systems associated with it. “The idea here, fundamentally, is that climate, the environment as an exogenous variable, shapes human outcomes,” Verhoeven said.

“Khaldun’s ideas were also used—or, more pertinently, abused—by European colonialism in this part of the world,” Verhoeven said. The classic British and French explanations for why the West was richer and more powerful than parts of North Africa and the Middle East, was in part environmental. Reading the historical chronicles, particularly of the French colonization in Algeria starting in 1830, he said, “one is struck by the repetition of how the French essentially blamed the local population for mismanaging natural resources and therefore justified seizing the land and expropriating its people.” Colonists defended their exploits on the basis that they had far greater knowledge of scarce resources, he explained, and rationalized their efforts as “making a contribution to humanity, and to civilization as a whole.”

“The very way we think about the environment, the way we represent it, the way we try to intervene upon it is not an apolitical exercise. It is an exercise that is essentially concerned with questions of distribution. Who gets what? Who is accountable for what? Whose narrative is told, and whose narrative is not told? Who has the authority to decide on whether to call an environmental problem, a development problem, or a security problem?”

Verhoeven said environmental determinism is still very present in the dominant patterns of thought about the links between the environment, economic development, and politics today. “Technocratic environmentalism” declares itself to be resolutely apolitical and carried forward by the planet’s most erudite minds. One of the world’s most influential economists, Jeffrey Sachs, proposes “a profession of rigor, insight, and practicality” using positivist methods. Technocratic environmentalists believe that science can be and should be a value-free endeavor. Politics in this reading is a corrupting variable, which should not be factored into explaining processes of environmental change, and that interventions should be left solely to experts. However, as Verhoeven explained, this opens the door for highly authoritarian decision-making, in which ordinary people are treated as ignorant and not worthy of participation.

A second, influential way of thinking about the environment, politics, and development, comes out of a more pessimistic tradition, Verhoeven said, which goes back to the Reverend Thomas Malthus, who warned that human capacity to shape nature was limited. This perspective holds that a point will come where population growth outstrips agricultural growth. Such a scenario would lead to a rebalancing of population levels through the combination of famine, war, and disease, or so Malthus prophesized, Verhoeven explained. Today’s discourse of so-called water wars or climate wars—the idea that when societies or entire regions run out of water and food they irredeemably are on a path to war—echoes Malthus’s dystopian visions, he said.

The intuition underpinning “water wars” is the well-known “tragedy of the commons,” a parable about resource use inspired by the famously pessimistic Thomas Hobbes, Verhoeven said. This is the idea that when finite resources have to be shared, in the absence of an external authority which regulates the consumption of individual parties, communities will inevitably deplete the resource as it is in the interest of every individual to consume as much as one can. When these resources are essential for life, like water, people are willing to fight to the death over them, or so the parable goes. “People who believe in water wars are essentially telling you that they need some kind of ‘Leviathan,’ some kind of external central authority, that limits our consumption of resources and that protects us against ourselves,” he said. The empirical evidence, however, Verhoeven argued, suggests otherwise.

An alternative conceptualizing of how environmental factors, development, and politics are linked was illustrated by the thesis of one chapter of Environmental Politics in the Middle East, which Verhoeven presented. Every year, huge amounts of forests are destroyed in southern and central Somalia to bring charcoal to Middle Eastern markets for shisha smoking and grilling of meat. The Gulf appetite for the high-quality charcoal harvested from Somalia’s acacia trees directly contributes to environmental degradation, economic underdevelopment, and violent conflict. It illustrates how resource degradation in one part of the world is intimately linked to process of consumption and accumulation elsewhere. Not only is tree cover in southern Somalia reduced, deforestation driven by charcoal exploitation makes the land increasingly prone to erosion, flash-flooding, and chronic drought. Moreover, the taxation of charcoal by both jihadist groups like Al-Shabab and foreign interveners like the Kenyan Defence Forces contributes directly to the decades-long conflict that has been raging in Somalia.

Verhoeven concluded by restating the book’s central message: “The very way we think about the environment, the way we represent it, the way we try to intervene upon it is not an apolitical exercise. It is an exercise that is essentially concerned with questions of distribution. Who gets what? Who is accountable for what? Whose narrative is told, and whose narrative is not told? Who has the authority to decide on whether to call an environmental problem, a development problem, or a security problem?” The key point is thus that environmental and political issues cannot be analytically seen as separate, in this region or elsewhere. The issues at stake are fundamentally issues of power. The CIRS book is about the ways in which certain groups of people are branded as enemies of the state, are criminalized, and are shut-out of media access—ostensibly because of their activism around the environment, but really because of the way they challenge powerholders across the Middle East and North Africa. Environmental Politics in the Middle East is about “who has a right to say what, on which authority, and who is systematically—over time and over space—being excluded.”

Article by Khansa Maria, CURA Administrative Fellow

Harry Verhoeven is Associate Professor of International Relations and African Politics in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University in Qatar. He is the author of Water, Civilisation and Power in Sudan: The Political Economy of Military-Islamist State Building (2015), and Why Comrades Go to War: Liberation Politics and the Outbreak of Africa’s Deadliest Conflict (2016). He acquired his doctorate from the University of Oxford and was a visiting scholar at the University of Cambridge in 2016-17. He is Convener of the Oxford University China-Africa Network and is coeditor of the new Cambridge University Press book series on Intelligence and National Security in Africa and the Middle East.
