Healthcare Policy and Politics in the Gulf Working Group II
2015-02-08 09:00 - 17:00 (Europe/Moscow)
On February 8, 2015, CIRS held its second working group on the Healthcare Policy and Politics in the Gulf research initiative in Doha. Participants gathered for the second time to discuss their research findings and obtain feedback from their fellow working group members. The topics discussed during the day covered a wide range of healthcare issues including the historical transformation of health services in the Gulf region to the status of mental health and substance abuse issues that have arisen as a result of changing lifestyle patterns.

The historical overview provided on the transformation of healthcare in the Gulf region showcased four distinctive phases. A common denominator in the situation of healthcare prior to the 1950s amongst the six Gulf states was the role of American and Dutch missionaries in setting up hospitals and health services. Discussants emphasized the fact that the missionaries’ efforts were not intended to be civilizing force but were an extension of the British presence in the region meant to supplement the limited health services already available. Between the 1950s and 2000s, wealth generated by the oil revenues coming from the region invigorated the study and practice of medicine within departments in universities. In the case of Saudi Arabia, several health structures existed in parallel with one another, however, the annual Hajj pilgrimage forced the state to centralize healthcare efforts and create a unified system that would deal with the health epidemics that eventually arise from such events. Currently, the health sector in the Gulf is in need of reform due to the paternalistic feelings the states hold toward the provision of healthcare. Discussants argued that a severe lack of medical educational institutions exist in the Gulf, which is reflective in the quality of physicians and medical services being provided in the region. Moreover, the role of the private sector is in need of further study as there is no explanation as to why patients are shifting from public to private healthcare institutions.

In terms of human resources in the health sector, GCC countries seem to struggle with the workforce not being home grown. The UAE is a unique case whereby data has shown that the nationalities of the doctors practicing within the country encompass 110 different countries. Aside from data records on manpower in the health sector, data collection in the Gulf remains to be sporadic and imprecise. No routine data collection for the WHO exists at the moment, whereby actual data acquired is mere estimates given by hospitals. Also, a more standardized process for recruitment of physicians is necessary because it imposes essential safeguards and helps establish doctors in the region. Revalidation processes have been put into practice recently by the Qatari government to assess the competency of physicians practicing and to identify the quality of work being provided. In the case of the non-physician workforce, the affluent lifestyle enjoyed by many locals in the Gulf is a deterrent to entering the healthcare sector when a socioeconomic need does not exist. Non-physician positions such as nursing or technical staff are often hired from abroad due to the lack of medical institutions that train individuals in these professions. However, these conditions are gradually changing as both Qatar and Oman have recently opened nursing colleges to train the local and expatriate population based on the hiring needs of the local health sector. Participants questioned whether the lack of nationals in the health sector can be attributed to structural limitations of demography and whether the establishment of medical schools can be considered an integral part of the state-building process.

Healthcare in the Gulf region remains to be a political notion. Provision of free healthcare constitutes a facet of the social contract that is provided alongside education and housing by the Gulf ruling families. The lack of non-state actors such a political or civil groups means that healthcare, as a policy, is rarely debated from a bottom to top approach.

In the case of other countries in the region, such as Lebanon, non-state actors and civil society groups provide a good reference loop and prevent policies from becoming ad hoc. In 2015, $42.9 billion was spent collectively on healthcare by the Gulf states, indicating a dire necessity for development in the healthcare structure. A further exploration into the process of policy-making in healthcare is necessary. The rapid modernization faced by many Gulf societies has created a myriad of both mental and physical diseases as a result of unhealthy and affluent lifestyles. Additionally, the high percentage of expatriates within most GCC states impact healthcare policies dramatically because data does not always differentiate between local and non-local populations. As a result, diseases such as obesity, often associated with the local population, can seem to be epidemics even though the overall percentage of people diagnosed as obese is small comparatively, when the expatriate population is accounted for in the data gathering.

Examples of chronic lifestyle diseases that have recently emerged in the region as a byproduct of affluence and rapid modernization are cardiovascular diseases, diabetes and obesity. The profile of such diseases that have emerged alongside the changing lifestyles in the Gulf showcase the lack of exercise and high-fat diet as emerging trends in chronic diseases. Participants tried to quantify the chronic disease profile of the GCC, in comparison with other high and middle-income countries, using OECD base-line data. In addition to previous studies, the data showed that major depressive disorders and road injuries were the leading causes of a disability adjusted lifestyle in comparison to worldwide standards. Nonetheless, more health awareness campaigns are necessary in the Gulf because there seems to be a high level of societal ignorance towards the impact of chronic diseases on life expectancy rates. Awareness campaigns must also extend to mental health issues, whereby the percentage of people who require mental help and actively seek it constitute only 25% of the population. Additionally, the problem with mental health care providers is that they often have to be the primary, secondary and tertiary care providers instead of mental health clinics and support groups.

In terms of substance-use disorders in the Gulf region, the changing patterns in education and family structure have all contributed to an ‘urban drift’ amongst the youth population, who often find themselves unable to belong and relate to their societies. Such sentiments in youth can be problematic because it can lead to self-medication in the form of consuming excessive amounts of alcohol or the use of recreational drugs. Opinions on substance-abuse disorders in the Gulf region often oscillate between the two polar opposite views of approaching it as an immorality or as a disease. Existing scholarship explores the relationship between availability of substances and the level of drug usage however, it was argued that there should be an evolving mechanism that liberalizes some of the less harmful substances in society to combat the prevalence of more detrimental drugs.

Noteworthy to mention is the situation of the healthcare system in the Gulf which has become multi-tiered, primarily due to the lack of proper population health need assessments, including short-term health solutions for low-skilled workers. Even though the Gulf region has attained significant social and economic achievements in a short span of time, healthcare policies are still centered more on curative health and not enough on protective and preventive measures. Discussants argued that the Gulf states spending on healthcare is below average, by WHO standards, which is reflective in the ratios of physicians to residents and number of beds per population. Moreover, in terms of policy, different health policies exist within the healthcare structure for different patients within society. For instance, GCC legislation requires employers to buy health insurance that covers their expatriate workers. However, the insurance plans often only cover basics in healthcare, in comparison to the local population which receives the high-end health services available.

See the working group agenda
Read participant biographies
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Samir Al Adawi, Sultan Qaboos University College of Medicine
Haya Al Noaimi, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Mohamad Alameddine, American University of Beirut
Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Suhaila Ghuloum, Hamad Medical Center
Cother Hajat, Emirates Cardiac Society; UAE University
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Nabil Kronfol, Lebanese Healthcare Management Association; Center for Studies on Ageing
Albert Lowenfels, New York Medical College
Ravinder Mamtani, Weill Cornell Medical College in Qatar
Dionysis Markakis, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
David Rawaf, Imperial College London; St. George’s Hospital Medical School
Salman Rawaf, Imperial College London
Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Article by Haya Al-Noaimi, Research Analyst at CIRS

Jeremy Koons CIRS Faculty Research Workshop
2015-03-08 09:00 - 17:00
The research of Jeremy Koons, associate professor of philosophy at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar (GU-Q), was featured recently in a CIRS Faculty Research Workshop about his co-authored book manuscript Unity Without Uniformity: A Synoptic Vision of the Normative and the Natural. The full day event, held March 8, 2015, included 11 participants from Europe and the greater Middle East region.

The manuscript, co-authored by Koons and Michael P. Wolf, associate professor at Washington and Jefferson College, draws on the pragmatist tradition of philosophers Wittgenstein and Sellars to defend an alternative conception of normative discourse. It also draws on other elements of the pragmatist tradition, stretching from philosophers Peirce to Brandom, to show how normative claims are constrained and how this constraint, combined with the way in which normative claims are accountable to reason and argumentation, prevents any fall into relativism.

The CIRS Faculty Research Workshop is a closed-door, one-day seminar that brings together select renowned scholars for a focused discussion on a GU-Q faculty member’s book manuscript that is in its final stages of development. All participants receive the entire manuscript in advance of the meeting and each scholar leads a focused group discussion on an assigned chapter.

This research workshop featured a talented group of esteemed philosophers who specialize in Sellarsian and pragmatist philosophy. Participants engaged in a series of structured brainstorming sessions that led to a critical and thorough discussion of the book manuscript.

Participant Niklas Möller, associate professor in philosophy at the Royal Institute of Technology (KTH) in Stockholm, Sweden, said “ever since I first read [Brandom’s book] Making It Explicit, I have felt the need for a serious attempt at addressing moral normativity from a socio-pragmatist perspective. And now you are doing exactly that (and more), which I find to be a very exciting project indeed. I think you are doing something very important and impressive, and I am happy to have been invited to engage with the text.”

Attendees included Bana Bashour and Ray Brassier, American University of Beirut; Erhan Demircioglu, Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Turkey; Anjana Jacob, GU-Q; Daniele Mezzadri, United Arab Emirates University; Niklas Moller, The Royal Institute of Technology in Sweden; Jim O’Shea, University College of Dublin; John Ryder, American University in Ras Al Khaimah, United Arab Emirates; Matthew Silverstein, New York University in Abu Dhabi, UAE; Lucas Thorpe, Boğaziçi University, Istanbul; and Jack Woods, Bilkent University, Turkey.

Koons received his Ph.D. in Philosophy from Georgetown University in 1998. He teaches a wide variety of philosophy courses on ethics (theoretical and applied), social and political philosophy, epistemology, philosophy of mind and language, metaphysics, and philosophy of religion. He publishes articles on ethics, epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of religion. His book, Pragmatic Reasons: A Defense of Morality and Epistemology, was published by Palgrave in 2009.

See the workshop agendaRead participant biographies

Unity Without Uniformity: A Synoptic Vision of the Normative and the Natural

Abstract

Our lives ineliminably involve the normative. We make moral judgments. Scientists and laymen alike make epistemic and methodological judgments (judging a theory as rational, a method as biased, and so on). We make prudential judgments. But we have to make the normative fit within our dominant, naturalist view of the world: in some sense, science offers a privileged account of what there is, and other disciplines cannot make claims incompatible with our scientific world-view. A longstanding challenge for philosophers has been to fit the normative within this naturalistic picture of the world.

Dominant naturalist approaches to this challenge try to fit normativity into our scientific world-view by showing how normative claims describe some aspect of physical reality. We argue that this approach is fundamentally misguided, and fails to do justice to the prescriptive (‘ought-to-be’ or ‘ought-to-do’) element of normative discourse.

Drawing on the pragmatist tradition of Wittgenstein and Sellars, we defend an alternative conception of normative discourse. On this conception, to make a normative claim (“You shouldn’t have done that”; “The study results were biased”; “Eating a ghost pepper is foolish”) is not to state a fact, not to make a descriptive claim, at all. Rather, such discourse serves a fundamentally action-guiding role: it prescribes behavior (or proscribes it), or recommends a course of action (or recommends against it), and so on.

Even though normative claims are not descriptive claims, such claims can be true, and indeed non-relatively true. Drawing on other elements of the pragmatist tradition, stretching from Peirce to Brandom, we show how normative claims are constrained by how the world is even though they are not in the business of describing this world. This constraint, combined with the way in which normative claims are accountable to reason and argumentation, prevents any fall into relativism.

Of course, once normative facts drop out of the picture, there is nothing left to offend against a scientific world-view. Thus, we defend not only the objectivity of norms, but also a robust version of naturalism which accords science privilege in describing how the world is and what it contains.

Finally, we show the various ways in which descriptive discourses—such as scientific and social-scientific discourses—and normative discourses mutually contribute to each other in fruitful ways. The result is a picture of normativity that is robust and truth-apt, sewn into a new take on the naturalist tradition.

Victimization or Empowerment? The Case of Saudi Literature
2015-03-10 12:30 - 13:30
Amira El-Zein, Associate Professor at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar and the 2014-2015 CIRS SFS-Q Faculty Fellow, delivered a CIRS Focused Discussion on “Victimization or Empowerment? The Case of Saudi Literature” on March 10, 2015. The lecture focused on several works authored by Saudi female novelists published outside of Saudi Arabia in places like Beirut, Casablanca, and Cairo. El-Zein examined works including Al-Firdaws Al Yabaab (The Barren Paradise) by Leila al-Juhni; Jahiliyyah (Ignorance) and Hind Wa L-Askar (Hind and the Soldiers) by Badriyyah al-Bishr; and Tawq Al Hamam (The Dove’s Collar) by Raja Alem.

In recent years, Saudi Arabia has experienced an increase in female-authored literary fiction, despite the odds. These writings are significant, El-Zein explained, in their facility to carve a space, and indeed flourish, within highly restrictive cultural settings, or, what she calls, a “fundamentalist milieu.” Regardless of the fictive nature of the writing, these works can be considered contemporary cultural documents that question the rigid patriarchal system of knowledge upon which modern Saudi Arabia is founded.

Despite women’s general experiences of powerlessness within the institutional framework of modern Saudi Arabia, discourses about women take a paradoxically central role among the most powerful religious and political entities that all compete to be ordained as “the best supervisor of the moral order in the public sphere,” El-Zein said. In order to highlight these alternative literary testaments of Saudi Arabian life, she notes: “I analyze this conservative perspective through novels, as I consider them important accounts of the Saudi individual’s predicament in both the public and the domestic spheres.”

Through the intertextual juxtaposition of past and present, authors such as Raja Alem and Leila al Juhni situate modern Saudi Arabia within a historical continuum. The significance of this literary strategy alludes to the idea that seemingly entrenched contemporary ideologies have not always held sway, and that existing social, political, and religious infrastructures can be considered unstable and fleeting. In her work, “Alem’s message is that there have been periods of time when women in the kingdom were relatively better off than today, and when segregation between sexes wasn’t enforced as it is today,” El-Zein explained. By grounding contemporary political and religious infrastructures within a historical perspective, the authors reveal them to be brief moments in the long history of the civilization. Through such an empowering writing technique, the authors manage to destabilize contemporary power relations by suggesting that change is not only possible, but inevitable. El-Zein proposes that “through intertextuality, Alem and al-Juhni reclaim history and religion rather than attack them. They look at them, not as ideologies, but rather as emblematic institutions that have been manipulated as ideologies in order to maintain the existing powers.”

In conclusion, El-Zein illustrated how these texts are intricate and complicated, and proposed paying close attention to the novels in order to detect their many defiant qualities that are not immediately apparent. “A first reading of the texts,” she said, “unveils Saudi women as helpless and subdued, and concludes that these texts are victimization texts. A second close reading, however, that is more inquisitive and probing uncovers a different image, that of empowered women.”

Amira El-Zein is author of Islam, Arabs, and the Intelligent World of the Jinn and co-editor of Culture, Creativity and Exile. She translated several French authors into Arabic such as J.M.G Le Clézio, André Malraux, and Antonin Artaud. Her translation of the Palestinian poet, Mahmud Darwish, was nominated for the Pen International Prize of translation. Her poetry was chosen to be included in the United Nations’ Book of Poetry for 2015.

During her fellowship, El-Zein is working on a project titled, “Contemporary Saudi Literature: The Grueling Adaption to Modernity.” The research argues that contemporary Saudi literature conveys the dilemma of Saudi society torn between fascination with everything Western and obligations to unbending traditions. The question of tradition in its extremely arduous adaptation to rapid changes has led to a profound malaise, loss of identity, and confusion, which are characteristic of neocolonialism. The research will interpret several novels and poems that mirror the ordeals Saudi people experience when they challenge the harsh rules of the establishment. Comparisons will be made between Saudi literature and that written by other authors in the Gulf.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

The Gulf Family: Working Group I
2015-03-14 09:00 - 2015-03-15 17:00
On March 14-15, 2015, CIRS held its first working group on “The Gulf Family” where scholars convened to discuss both historical and current issues that affect the Gulf family structure. In contrast to the literature on the family in the greater Middle East, significant gaps in scholarship still exist in relation to the dynamics of the Arab Gulf family. Five grant proposals were awarded to various scholars to conduct fieldwork and original research on topics related to the Gulf family. In conjunction to the grant awards, CIRS held a two-day working group to discuss issues such as tribalism, mixed marriages, and the effects of religious education on family dynamics amongst other topics. Alongside the five grant awardees who presented their research proposals and preliminary findings, working group participants discussed issues currently facing the region.

The Gulf family has witnessed an immense amount of change over the past sixty years. In understanding the historical importance of the Gulf family one has to structure a comprehensive narrative that includes the different tribes and ethnicities which have resided in the region. By challenging the idea that the Gulf family is contingent on consanguinity for its existence, modern discursive narratives can be further disseminated. This illustrates the various historical constructions around nationalism, modernization and class. Housing and rent were examined in an effort to understand how space related to the family in the past and how physical change impacts the structure of the family living within households.

Underlying the presence of the Gulf family lie the notions of tribalism and asabiyya (tribal solidarity). In the Gulf, tribalism is a central feature in understanding the social dynamics prevalent in the region. The functional logic of the system uses kinship to explain solidarity through practice, which can be seen in expressions of tribal unity through literary, legal, political and media outlets. Discussants questioned to what extent was tribalism prevalent in family affairs and the significance of belonging to a tribe upon an individual’s identity. At present, the modern tribal identity is rarely expressed through the nomadic lifestyle it was once associated with, instead permeating societal sentiments and intellectual thought. However, in the case of Yemen, the impact of political and economic instability of the state has pressed citizens to rely upon their respective tribes to provide necessary services such as electricity and water. Rising prices of fuel and declining subsidies offered by the Yemeni government meant that citizens’ access to education and healthcare ultimately deteriorated. The permanence of the tribal order and solidarity in Yemen, amidst the state of political chaos, has helped maintain a sense order and organization within the country. Discussants later questioned the impact of tribalism on the nuclear family and the repercussions of re-tribalizing urban areas within the cities.

Tribalism has also had deeper ramifications on societal issues such as marriage. Amongst the local population, tribal inter-marriages are generally the norm. In the absence of a class system amongst locals in the Gulf, tribal lineage determines the social hierarchy present. In an effort to understand societal forces affecting the institution of marriage in the Gulf, discussants recognized the intensive structural transformations that the Gulf region has been undergoing in the past twenty years. As a result, consanguineous marriage has been undergoing changes, whereby data on Qatar shows mixed marriages are on the rise for men but on the decline for women. Previously, the rate of divorce amongst mixed marriage couples was much higher from 1985-2000 as compared to non-mixed marriages. However, in 2010-2013 the gap between mixed marriages and non-mixed marriages began to diminish. Discussants questioned the reversal of trend in divorce amongst the two groups of marriages hypothesizing the reasons to be increasing globalization, education and transnational flows.

Given the rising statistics on divorce in the Gulf, the legal systems’ negligence towards reforming child custody law has become increasingly problematic. Family law reforms have traditionally focused on the relationship between spouses, often neglecting the parent-child relationship that determines custody and guardianship. Case studies on Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have shown that further development on the concept of “best interest of the child” is in order. More specifically, Qatar has made efforts to promote the concept of “best interest” as a tool to reform custody determination whereas Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates chose to formulate guidelines for judges to follow in cases of custody determination.

While transitions within Gulf society have been taking place over the past decades, the impact of modernization efforts can be witnessed in the religious, linguistic, and educational aspects of family life. The formation of family life in the Gulf in itself is a religious act, encouraged by sunnah and hadith, which is often embraced by couples as a fundamental element to the marital relationship and their childrearing ways. Previous scholarship has explored the role religious education plays in women’s positioning within society. Theoretically, the rise of modern education was seen by scholars as a way to empower women into assuming roles within the public sphere. Yet, case studies have shown that the quality of education women were receiving tended to reproduce the traditional system and enforce gender segregation. Discussants also emphasized the rise of religious education within the household, whereby female Islamic preachers would conduct house visits in segregated spaces in an effort to educate women on relevant Islamic values to the home.

Islamic values within Gulf households have also hindered channels of communication between parent and child on more sensitive issues such as sexual and reproductive health education. As the median age of marriage is increasing, youth are increasingly confronted with their sexuality prior to marriage. The cultivation of shame rather than genuine guilt, especially within the family, is a byproduct of religious and tribal sentiments that dictate social relations in Gulf states. As a result, youth are expected to source their own information on sexual issues often resorting to the internet as an impartial source of education. However, the lack of sexual and reproductive health education amongst Gulf families raises youth’s vulnerabilities when confronted with issues such as rape, sexual harassment, and transmitted diseases. Parents often struggle with establishing open and honest channels of communication with their children, partially due to the linguistic barriers that bi-lingual families face and stigma attached with this sensitive topic. Discussants argued that religious teachings in fact encourage open discussion on such issues, within the scope of legally sanctioned marriage whereas, social pressure and familial inexperience constitute the biggest obstacles in the face of sexual health education.

See the working group agenda
Read the participants’ biographies
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Rogaia Abusharaf, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Nadwa Al Dawsari, Sheba Center for International Development
Sanaa Al Harahsheh, Doha International Family Institute
Haya Al Noaimi, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Barb Gillis, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Sebastian Maisel, Grand Valley State University
Dionysis Markakis, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Mohamed Mohieddin, Doha International Family Institute
Lena-Maria Möller, Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law
Sophia Pandya, California State University at Long Beach
Jihan Safar, College de France, Sciences-Po
Laura Sjoberg, University of Florida
Amira Sonbol, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Ali Kemal Tekin, Sultan Qaboos University
Valbona Zenku, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Article by Haya Al-Noaimi, Research Analyst at CIRS

The Politics of National Narratives: The Evolution of 'Revolution' in Egypt
2015-03-23 18:00 - 20:00
Laurie Brand, the Robert Grandford Wright Professor of International Relations and Middle East Studies at the University of Southern California, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue on “The Politics of National Narratives: The Evolution of ‘Revolution’ in Egypt” on March 23, 2015. The talk reflected some of the main themes presented in her recent book, Official Stories: Politics and National Narratives in Egypt and Algeria, including how ruling elites actively construct a national narrative for political purposes.

Brand described national narratives as collective stories, whether official or popular, that seek to define a country’s identity, history, and mission using particular historical events and heroes, and including purported collective cultural, linguistic, religious, or ethnic markers. As part of a broader study, Brand’s research examines the legitimizing role that national narratives play in regime maintenance, and questions how and why they may change. “I chose to look only at manifestations of an ‘official’ narrative. But even there, a narrative is multi-stranded, and can be quite complex because it includes not just the state’s version of national history, but also a range of values, aspirations, and identity elements,” she said.

In order to understand how national narratives are mobilized by state authorities, Brand explained that they are often employed as a relegitimizing force during times of contested succession or political rupture. National narratives involve “the creation of a ‘usable’ past; that is, the construction of a national history that can be mobilized, that can be channeled, and that can be used by a leadership for a demand, need, or a crisis in the present,” she argued. These narratives can be read in a variety of official and unofficial political, social, and cultural texts, whether through state proclamations, cultural texts the media, or the educational system, among many other outlets for imparting some form of collective instruction.

In particular, Brand analyzed traits of the official story of “revolution” in the case of Egypt, and noted that, since January 2011, many associate the concept of revolution with contemporary Egyptian events. However, the very concept of revolution has been integral to the Egyptian national narrative for well over a century, and, indeed, makes up the founding story of the Egyptian nation state as it emerged after July 1952. The language of revolution has been used throughout Egyptian political history as part of a legitimation strategy, especially during regime changes, whether through anti-colonial struggles, the Free Officers’ 1952 overthrow of King Faruq, or Anwar Sadat’s struggle to consolidate his rule after he succeeded Gamal Abd Al-Nasir. Even during the Mubarak era, fidelity to the 1952 revolution was regularly invoked during ceremonial speeches, but its importance began to wane as the regime moved farther and farther away from the 1952 revolution’s emphasis on economic and social justice to the implementation of neo-liberal economic policies.

In conclusion, Brand returned to the most recent invocations of the revolutionary narrative, and the struggles surrounding it. “The meaning of the term ‘revolution’ was constructed and re-constructed over time in Egypt,” and has evolved over the course of Egyptian history to take on different meanings, demonstrating that even if critical elements of such narratives are rescripted, the elements themselves remain central to the legitimation formulas of successive regimes or leaderships. With the overthrow of Mubarak and Morsi, and the coming to power of Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi, the Egyptian people have been confronted with several overlapping and conflicting narratives of revolution or political change—January 25 and/or June 30—through which they must navigate. “These issues are not simply of academic interest, but are very real battles that are very much a part of ongoing struggles today in Egypt and in other parts of the Middle East over the future of the political system,” she concluded.

Laurie A. Brand directed the University of Southern California’s Center for International Studies from 1997 to 2000, the School of International Relations from 2006 to 2009, and is currently the director of its Middle East Studies Program. Brand served as president of the Middle East Studies Association in 2004, and she has chaired its Committee on Academic Freedom since 2006. A four-time Fulbright scholar to the Middle East and North Africa, a Carnegie scholar 2008 to 2010, and a Rockefeller Bellagio writing residency fellow in fall 2012, she is the author of Palestinians in the Arab World (Columbia University Press, 1988), Jordan’s Inter-Arab Relations (Columbia University Press, 1994), Women, the State and Political Liberalization (Columbia University Press, 1998), Citizens Abroad: States and Emigration in the Middle East and North Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2006), and Official Stories: Politics and National Narratives in Egypt and Algeria (Stanford University Press, 2014).

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

The Future of Nile Cooperation
2015-03-25 12:30 - 13:30
Bart Hilhorst, a water resources specialist and former Chief Technical Advisor for the FAO project on the Nile basin, delivered a CIRS Focused Discussion on “The Future of Nile Cooperation” on March 25, 2015. The lecture centered on the complexities of water cooperation, with a focus on the Nile Basin. Hilhorst introduced the audience to these intricate issues by explaining that “water resources management is not a technical issue. Rather, quintessentially, it is a political issue. It determines who gets what and when.”

Since competition over scarce water resources is increasing at local, national, and regional levels, Hilhorst argued that “we need better tools to deal with these difficult, complex, and emotive issues of water resources management.” One of the tools he recommended was the “scenario approach,” which is a methodology that develops internally consistent and equally plausible stories that describe how the future might unfold. Hilhorst explained that “scenario thinking” is not to predict or to forecast. Rather, by examining the main driving forces in the external environment, there is a gradual understanding of what is driving the “system” and the underlying structural relations. This understanding is critical for making informed decisions. Importantly, scenario thinking takes a “big picture” approach to water resources management by encompassing the various stakeholders and their needs. Since regional water management often results in polarized perspectives, this approach helps to achieve an alignment of views between the various stakeholders, and to establish a common ground from which negotiations can emerge.

Hilhorst elaborated upon the application of scenario thinking to Nile cooperation among the eleven countries that share this valuable, yet somewhat scarce, water resource. “The Nile is a big name, and a long river, but it is a small river in terms of volume of runoff relative to the size of its basin,” he said. The countries through which the Nile flows have a number of developmental issues, including high demographic growth rates, poor infrastructure, and dependency on the Nile waters for most of their water and agricultural needs. Without effective north-south transport connections, there is little that links the eleven states as a group other than the Nile itself. Hence, direct common interests among the riparians are limited.

In order to address some of these overarching development issues, concerted efforts are ongoing to strengthen cooperation among the Nile riparians, including the “Nile Basin Initiative” that was established in 1999. At this point in time, however, the shape and dynamics of Nile cooperation are subject to a number of uncertainties. Will the international donor community continue its current level of support to the regional Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) centers? Can financing be mobilized for the large infrastructure investment projects that will increase the benefits accrued from the Nile waters? When can the NBI centers advance from transitional to permanent status? Will Egypt re-engage in the Nile discussions? It is especially within such dynamic and uncertain environments that scenario thinking thrives in its offering of possible solutions for plausible outcomes. In September of 2014, Hilhorst conducted a scenario exercise with a committee made up of key stakeholders including members of the Nile Technical Advisory Committee as well as representatives from both government and civil society groups.

Hilhorst concluded by highlighting the increasing man-made influences upon the Nile. He explained that, currently, “the Nile is transferring from a natural to a regulated river,” where various water management infrastructures and dams are being established along the length of the river in national attempts to benefit from its flow. Most of these projects are aligned to national development programs, and do not necessarily take into account the regional perspective. Yet, because many of these projects have increased the flood control, hydropower, and irrigation optionality of Nile resource management, they have created a situation wherein “the potential benefits of cooperation has increased dramatically,” for the entire Nile Basin. This, in turn, has sparked the need for increased regional cooperation, and so is a positive drive towards future integration between the nations of the Nile.

Bart Hilhorst has over twenty-five years of experience in land and water resources management, with a focus on transboundary rivers and forward thinking in natural resources development and use. He has extensive field experience in complex transboundary water projects in Africa and Asia, and served as a Chief Technical Advisor for FAO project “Information Products for Nile Basin Water Resources Management.” Hilhorst has particular knowledge of using scenario thinking to support strategy formulation for natural resources management, and to facilitate dialogue processes regarding complex water allocation challenges. He recently facilitated a comprehensive multi-stakeholder scenario process that investigated the complex water-agriculture-energy sector in the Aral Sea basin, and is currently involved in a scenario project on the ‘future of Nile cooperation’ for the Nile Basin Initiative. In February 2015 Bart Hilhorst completed a study on the status of GCC agro-investments in sub-Saharan Africa.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

The Digital Middle East:Working Group II
2015-04-11 09:00 - 2015-04-12 17:00
On April 11-12, 2015, CIRS held its second working group on “The Digital Middle East” research initiative in Doha. Participants gathered to discuss their research papers and obtain feedback from their fellow working group members. The topics discussed during the two days covered a variety of issues relating to the digital world across the region. Discussants provided critical feedback on each of the papers, and found linkages between the different subjects that are being addressed through this book project.

Scholars debated labor and productivity within the digital realm, and how increasingly social media users and content developers actually “work for free.” Observations centered on the fact that users and developers often overlap in social media. Through this “community of practice” both sets of actors are united in their skills exhibiting traits of egalitarian behavior in the digital sphere. In the context of the Middle East, developers usually have a dual role, whereby they engage in remunerated work during the day and then assume activist roles during the night, when they work for free. By doing so, developers often hope to create digital companies that are lucrative enough to sell as a whole, as opposed to selling only the product of their paid labor. In this case, the value of the developers’ labor is being captured by aggregators such as Facebook and Google. Discussants also suggested the need for further research exploring the overall economic impact of ICT in the region, and whether the internet can actually be translated into productivity outcomes. Even though the internet is fast become a universalizing process, the specifics of its relevance to the Middle East is yet to be fully studied.

Another element of discussion at the working group was how multi-modality in the digital sphere has led to changing behavior patterns in relation to the development of friendships and personal relationships in the Middle East. The nature and function of friendships have significantly changed as a result of instantaneous connections made online. Discussants observed behaviorisms such as de-individuation, or the erosion of self-awareness within a group setting, was becoming more prevalent as a result of new technologies. The advancement of technology and media has also acted as a catalyst for women’s political development, not only post-Arab Spring but also after the 1979 revolution in Iran. Even though technology has often facilitated women in advancing their rights within society, paradoxes still exist in the history of the region. For example, in Iran, women played an integral and active role in the Islamic revolution, yet afterwards were relegated to the private sphere and in their homes. Participants around the table offered alternative examples of female mobility through digital media, such as the case of the driving campaign for Saudi women and Palestinian women’s role fighting the occupation through the electronic intifada.

Issues of freedom of the internet and online censorship were raised in relation to state power. States have often greatly benefited from the digital environment as a domain to exert their power. When thinking of civic engagement and digital media, both fields and spaces suffer from being agnostic towards structure. To get past this agnosticism, one must develop an observable appreciation for infrastructure but at the same time, cultivate an understanding of the underlying technocratic issues that exist in digital media. Societal practices, norms and attitudes as communities of practice all must be utilized as tools in the promotion of digital democracy. Discussants noted the problematic nature of framing the Arab Spring as the instigator of change in the region, arguing that political internet processes predate that, as can be viewed in the case of Iran.

Additional areas of research at the working group elaborated on ethnographies showcasing lived experiences of ordinary citizens during the Egyptian revolution and their daily interactions with technology. Participants pushed for a more nuanced definition of mediation arguing that its application to media environments in the Middle East needed further justification.

Videogame development and gaming in the Middle East have played a pivotal role in the digital world acting as cultural artifacts and alternative spaces for contestation. Discoveries made by some of the authors showcased games as domains for role-play within a predefined model world. The global flows of gaming remain underexplored generally whereby game studies have traditionally focused on consumption and popularity in regions such as the US, Europe, and Japan heavily neglecting the Middle East. As a result, discussants in their written work tried to lay a theoretical framework in a broad historical and cultural context by exploring videogames as places of hybridization. It is interesting to note that many developers in the region are driven to develop videogames by personal motivations and not by economic interest.

In the case of intellectual property laws in the Middle East, and the Gulf region in particular, states often struggle with developing a legal framework that deals with issues of copyright and piracy. Discussants observed that several GCC states have attempted to “domesticate” foreign intellectual property laws in an effort to protect traditional knowledge rights. Furthermore, GCC states have started to use intellectual property laws to their advantage by placing a heavy emphasis on digital archiving and protection of traditional knowledge and heritage.

General observations were made as to how Middle Eastern governments and societies were moving towards online platforms. Current data on e-governance in the GCC was showcased in an effort to show the similarities and differences amongst the Gulf states in their progress towards online governance. Results remarkably showed that the smaller less affluent states of Bahrain and Oman had better e-governance portal sites offering a wide array of services for the general public. Data also showed that e-governance world rankings were difficult to maintain, as in the case of the UAE, without a proper all-encompassing digital structure. Additionally, citizens and recipients of e-governance services were often suspicious and untrusting of e-services arguing that cybercrime laws were not stringent enough to protect their information online. Similarly, the same was said for Gulf citizens’ experiences in e-commerce whereby many were reluctant when dealing with this new form of business dealings. Similarities and differences were drawn between the souk and e-commerce websites, however participants argued that the establishment of malls in the region should be considered as the intermediary between the two commercial examples.

See the working group agenda
Read participant biographies
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Ilhem Allagui, Northwestern University in Qatar
Haya Al Noaimi, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Jon Anderson, Catholic University of America
Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
John Downing, Northwestern University in Qatar
Muzammil M. Hussain, University of Michigan
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Joe Khalil, Northwestern University in Qatar
Gholam Khiabany, Goldsmiths University of London
Dionysis Markakis, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Vit Šisler, Charles University in Prague
Annabelle Sreberny, SOAS, University of London
Norhayati Zakaria, Universiti Utara Malaysia
Mohamed Zayani, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Valbona Zenku, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Article by Haya Al-Noaimi, Research Analyst at CIRS

China and the Middle East: Working Group Meeting I
2015-04-25 18:00 - 2015-04-26 18:00
On April 25-26, 2015, the first working group meeting of CIRS’ research initiative on “China and the Middle East” took place. A diverse, multi-disciplinary collective of scholars from China, the Middle East, the US, and elsewhere met in Washington, D.C., over the course of two days, to discuss the main features, trends, and implications of this multi-faceted relationship.

The foundations of China’s engagement with the Middle East have been economic in nature, and primarily based on the trade of energy commodities. As a result, the Middle East has assumed an important position in China’s global economic vision, which sees the region as a key part of its contemporary “Silk Road” flagship initiative, an effort to better connect China to the rest of Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. This economic relationship is evolving steadily. China is increasingly investing capital in the region, as for example in industry and infrastructure, rather than simply relying on the energy trade. Participants of the working group noted the potential of the shale gas revolution to alter the energy equation in the Middle East, with the US set to produce more gas than Saudi Arabia produces oil. China itself has its own substantial shale gas deposits. Another issue raised was China’s investment in green energy, currently the world’s leader, and the global implications of this. What will the above mean for China’s relations with the Middle East? The participants highlighted the need to fully interrogate the impact of China’s economic embedment in the region—in political, economic, and social terms.

An important consequence of this economic relationship has been the growth of a variety of socio-cultural connections between China and the Middle East. Chinese Muslims now reside across the Gulf, with some 200,000 Chinese citizens living in Dubai alone. As part of an Islamic education, a large number of Chinese Muslims study Arabic in China, but also abroad in Syria and Iran. Chinese Muslims have played a role in facilitating ties between China and the Middle East. Likewise, there is a sizeable Arab diaspora in China, who has emigrated to places such as Yiwu, a major Chinese trading hub. What is their impact as a community? Participants noted an increasing perception of China as a fertile ground for religious conversions, with anti-Shia bias taking ground as a result of the influence of Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi Islamic doctrine.

On the political level, China’s engagement of the Middle East is also undergoing significant changes. One area this is reflected is the increasing Chinese trend towards multilateral engagement. This as opposed to the bilateralism that has traditionally characterized China’s relations with Middle Eastern countries. Participants observed that China is increasingly looking to multilateral platforms to formalize cooperation with the Arab world, one example being the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), whose 2014 summit was held in Shanghai. The potential of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-BRICS relations was also referenced, with discussants noting that while there are no formal ties currently, developments in this area could eventually have a profound impact. In political terms, one of the main variables affecting China’s engagement with the region has been the legacy of the Arab Spring of 2011. China has sought to maintain good relations with both established allies, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, but also with those countries undergoing domestic upheaval, such as Egypt and Syria. Here, the role of China as a “balancing” force in the Middle East is of relevance. Participants noted China’s ability to maintain positive relations with all the important regional actors simultaneously, although they claimed that this will become increasingly difficult in the future; one example raised was China’s 2011 veto of UN sanctions on Syria, which subsequently strained relations with Saudi Arabia and Turkey. China’s inherently pragmatic approach in the region was summarized by one participant as a case of “avoiding enemies, rather than having friends.”

In terms of the regional security architecture, China does not support absolute security for any one power in the region, rather it has sought a system that balances the interests of the various states. As a result, it has sought to encourage collective security arrangements. Yet China’s strategic stance in the region is undergoing change, becoming more pro-active as it consolidates its presence. Under President Xi-Jin Ping, China has adopted a regional security role for the first time, contributing towards maritime security, for instance. Participants argued that this will form an increasingly important area, noting that China’s role in the region has now entered a new phase. This was demonstrated during the Chinese Navy’s evacuation of Chinese citizens from Yemen in 2015, which underscored the increasing need for a physical presence in the region, to protect China’s interests. This reflects a broader evolution in the Chinese military presence in the region, which went from initially supporting construction projects and offering medical support, to now deploying combat units, as part of the UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan for example, as well as during antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.

The possibilities for Chinese and US cooperation were also discussed. Participants noted that while the US and China define regional “stability” in very different terms in the context of the Middle East, great power cooperation remains integral to China’s approach in the region. While the US remains the predominant security guarantor, China’s regional involvement will only grow, although to date it has largely been content to ‘free ride’ in terms of security commitments. As such, it is important to identify the areas where Chinese and US interests align. Here the impact of US attempts to contain China were discussed, through its support of India for example. The participants questioned the extent to which China is rallying against this containment in the Middle East, in terms of its Silk Road initiative, naval expansion, and so forth.

Yet overall, the participants highlighted the lack of an overarching Chinese “grand strategy” in the Middle East. In contrast to say Africa, no “white paper” for the Middle East has been formulated. Instead, they noted China’s posture is predominantly reactive rather than pro-active. This is exacerbated by the fact that China’s knowledge of the Middle East is limited in its depth. Participants highlighted the need to explore internal Chinese discussions about China’s role in the Middle East, in terms of academic and policy institutions for instance. And furthermore to examine the primary state mechanisms guiding Chinese-Arab relations—identifying the key institutional actors within China, their respective roles, and their mutual interactions, so to ascertain a deeper understanding of China in the Middle East.

See the working group meeting agenda
Read biographies of the participants
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Mohammed Al-Sudairi, Gulf Research Centre
Jon B. Alterman, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Jacqueline Armijo, Qatar University
Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Liao Baizhi, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations
Bing Bing Wu, Peking University
Manochehr Dorraj, Texas Christian University
John Garver, Georgia Institute of Technology
Barb Gillis, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Pan Guang, Shanghai Center for International Studies
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Dionysis Markakis, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
James Reardon-Anderson, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service
Joseph Sassoon, Georgetown University
Andrew Scobell, RAND Corporation
Jean-François Seznec, Georgetown University
Yitzhak Shichor, University of Haifa, and Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Degang Sun, Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University
Casimir Yost, Georgetown University

Article by Dionysis Markakis, Research Associate at CIRS

The Changing Security Dynamics of the Gulf: Working Group II
2015-05-13 09:00 - 2015-05-14 17:00
On May 13-14, 2015, CIRS held its second Working Group on the “The Changing Security Dynamics of the Gulf” research initiative. Academics gathered for the second time to discuss their research findings and gather opinions on their papers from their fellow working group members. The topics that emerged covered a wide range of issues such as the politics of succession in Gulf monarchies, the rise of ISIS, business and politics, and the emerging energy landscape.

Scholars debated the strengths and limitations of a succession model in Gulf politics. Research findings showed that in the case of Oman, despite the absence of a son or a publicly designated heir, the political mechanism in place allowed for senior elders to choose the next heir to the throne when a death occurs. In Saudi Arabia, succession tends to be a more complicated process, as sons in line could be skipped based on senior Saudi leaders’ choices. Participants asked for a broader analytical context in order to contextualize the two case studies and further explanation on the rapid pace of change taking place in Saudi Arabia. The United Arab Emirates’ behavior as a small state was also put into question. Due to the size and capacity of the Emirati army and air force, relative to other small states in the region, small state theory could not be applied to the UAE’s foreign policy decisions that encompass both soft and hard power. Participants speculated whether the generational change in power coincided with the distinctive shifts in foreign policy and how this contributed to the UAE’s ‘activist foreign policy’ within the region.

Undoubtedly, in the wake of the Arab uprisings in 2011, the Gulf regimes in power have been facing severe policy dilemmas. During the periods of 1980-2003, the three Gulf wars altered the positioning of the GCC states vis-à-vis Iran and Iraq and accelerated their integration into the Western military and security umbrella. The emergence of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the occupation of Iraq demonstrated how non-state violence was replacing inter-state conflict as the primary threat to regional security and stability in the Gulf. During the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the six GCC states provided varying degrees of political and logistical support. Policymakers were placed in the complicated position of having to balance their security relationship with the US against high levels of domestic opposition regarding the invasion. More recently, the threat to regional security posed by the Islamic State is confronting all the Gulf states. Saudi Arabia is particularly at risk from the ideological threat that ISIS presents. ISIS impacts both the internal and external security interest of the GCC, due to the existence of a network of IS cells within the Gulf states, and also as a result of the flow of Gulf nationals who are joining IS fighting forces.

In addition to the rise of ISIS, the United States’ perceived reluctance to intervene more aggressively in the Syrian civil war has also contributed to the GCC states taking on a more active role in regional security. At the current juncture there is an unprecedented willingness by GCC states to embrace military leadership in the region. Yet there is no coherent or coordinated response by the six states. The escalating ideological tensions between different states and the lack of trust and intelligence sharing amongst them have negatively impacted the development of a collective security architecture. From 2011 onwards we have witnessed a distinctive shift in the foreign policies of Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Participants at the working group suggested that this new form of interventionism displayed by some of the GCC states brought with it severe risks that could directly impact Gulf security. For example, GCC interventionism in North Africa has come with extensive financial commitments. Meeting this commitments and managing their relationships with North Africa may increasing pose a challenge to the GCC states particularly if oil prices continue to plummet.

The production of oil and shale gas in the United States as a result of fracking and horizontal drilling has had significant strategic implications for the energy landscape in the Gulf region. Participants hypothesized whether the United States’ changed energy outlook corresponded with a reduction in its military and strategic engagement in the Middle East. India, for example, has an overwhelming dependence on oil from the Gulf, whereby oil imports from the Gulf constitute eighty percent of their annual need. Moreover, approximately $32 billion in annual remittances are sent back to India every year from the six million expatriates that live in the Gulf region. Despite these strong energy and commercial ties, India has been significantly absent in its engagement with the Gulf region, choosing instead to become increasingly closer to the United States and the European Union. Nevertheless, India is a rising, albeit reluctant power in the region.

Diversification of economies in the Gulf has been a long stated goal for the Gulf Cooperation Council, but in light of falling oil prices, the need has become even more essential. In fact, economic diversification may be difficult in the Gulf due to the protective business system in existence. In the majority of the six Gulf states the business communities have a history of political influence and often support the socio-political order in place. In recent years, Gulf ruling family members have entered the business and private sector in growing numbers. This can be attributed to the growing amount of ruling family members who are unable to assume positions in politics, thus pursuing economic ventures. As the Arab Spring has shown, the business elite continue to benefit from the political status quo. Protests and political unease in Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman were initially triggered by youth’s anger and resentment towards the unequal distribution of rent and rising unemployment. Additionally, youth in the region are not separate elements from the tribal networks in place. However, generational differences exist in terms of their perception of themselves as stakeholders in society. Inevitably, ruling elites will face conflicting priorities between the nation’s interests in promoting youth employment, social services and personal stakes they may have as businesspeople. Participants questioned the nature of the new ruling bargain in the Gulf – if ruling families continue to believe that security requirements trump democratization processes, what are the implications for Gulf societies in the future?

See the working group meeting agenda
Read biographies of the participants
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Haya Al Noaimi, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Khalid Almezaini, Qatar University
Alanoud Alsharekh, Supreme Council for Planning and Development, Kuwait
Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Gawdat Bahgat, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Study – National Defense University
Nader Entessar, University of South Alabama
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Joseph A. Kéchichian, King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies; Kéchichian
Dionysis Markakis, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Toby Matthiesen, University of Cambridge
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Marc Valeri, Center for Gulf Studies – University of Exeter
Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Nussaibah Younis, Project on Middle East Democracy

Article by Haya Al-Noaimi, Research Analyst at CIRS

Strengthening the Family in Qatar: Challenges and Required Actions
2015-05-25 18:00 - 20:00
Noor Al Malki Al Jehani, Executive Director of the Doha International Family Institute, delivered the final CIRS Monthly Dialogue of the 2014-2015 academic year with a lecture on “Strengthening the Family in Qatar: Challenges and Required Actions” on May 25, 2015. Al Malki gave an overview of the historical evolution of family policies in Qatar, resulting in “the family cohesion agenda,” in the Qatar Vision 2030 and the National Development Strategy of 2011-2016. As an introductory note, she stated that “while I think that Qatari families should be the primary targets of policymaking in Qatar, these policies should also take in consideration the wellbeing of all families in Qatar,” including expatriates who make up a majority of the population.

Al Malki pointed out that although people tend to view the notion of family through their own personal sets of beliefs and experience, the family structure continues to be the defining basic unit of most societies. This is “because healthy, functioning families play an essential role in individual, human, social, and economic development,” and the dissolution of this structure places a heavy burden on governments, she said.

Historically, the Qatari family structure has evolved differently to that of the predominant Western nuclear family. The formation of the Qatari family is governed by Islamic principles, and incorporates responsibility towards members of the extended family, including inheritance rights. The historical structuring of the Qatari family is also based on tribal affiliations, which is an organizing societal force that predates that of the state in the Gulf region and continues to this day. “The tribe might have lost some of its authority over its member families, and its economic role, but it is still a major force in family life, and is supported by the continuing practice of intermarriage and a unique system of tribe and family-based neighborhoods,” Al Malki explained.

The family as the basic unit of society became enshrined in the Qatar constitution with the establishment of the State of Qatar in the second half of the twentieth century. Various state laws have been built around the family as a social institution in order to further support and regulate it. The first official family policies were introduced in the 1960s, and revolved around the implementation of social security laws to provide monetary and housing assistance to the most vulnerable in society, including low-income families, widows, divorcees, and orphans.

In the 1980s, as the Qatari state developed and grew more prosperous, “Qatari men were growing richer, and they started to explore the Middle East and other countries,” leading to increased marriages between Qatari men and non-Qatari women, Al Malki explained. It was during this time that the government took a step to directly intervene by introducing a law to regulate marriage to non-nationals, with the exception of GCC citizens, as a response to “growing problems related to nationality claims,” she said.

In the 1990s, Her Highness Sheikha Moza Bint Nasser played a major role in the social development of Qatar as President of the Supreme Council for Family Affairs and the founder of a number of private organizations including the Family Development Center, the Family Consultation Center, and the Foundation for the Protection of Children and Women. All the organizations were tasked with a mission of community development by focusing on strengthening the wellbeing of the family, and promoting the rights of women and children in Qatar. Importantly, Al Malki said, Sheikha Moza’s influence was not limited to Qatar, and she established the Doha International Family Institute (DIFI), with a mandate to promote the family at the national, regional, and international levels to research policy and outreach.”

In order to achieve family cohesiveness in the Qatar Vision 2030, “the strategy seeks to address some of the trends affecting Qatari families, such as the rising divorce rates, high proportions of women who marry late or remain single for life, the growing levels of family violence, the dependence on domestic helpers and caring for children, family-work conflict, and the alarming rate of personal debt among Qatari families.” Al Malki noted that the strategy focuses on familial dysfunction, and fails to adopt a more comprehensive approach to strengthening the family. This is because of the lack of civil society organizations and national expertise and capacity geared towards these issues. “Family strategies are multi-sectorial in nature; they cannot be implemented by one ministry alone,” she argued. “The lack of community-based and non-governmental organizations is a major challenge.”

Al Malki concluded by making some recommendations for the future, including an increase in government and private sector funding for civil society organizations, as well as an ease of the strict laws governing the establishment of such entities. As a first step, she recommended establishing degrees in family studies to be given at educational institutions in order to build national expertise. “Achieving Qatar’s Vision of cohesive families requires a partnership between the government, civil society, the private sector, and, first and foremost, families themselves,” she concluded.

Noor Al Malki Al Jehani served as the Secretary General of the Supreme Council for Family Affairs from 2009-2011, and prior to that was the director of the Women’s Department of that same council. She is currently a member of the Board of Directors for Qatar Foundation for Social Work, and was a member of the Qatar National Human Rights Committee from 2003 until 2011. Al Malki was an expert in the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against women from 2013-14. She participated in the drafting of many national strategies and plans, including Qatar’s first national development strategy 2011-16, where she was the chair of the drafting committee of the strategy of family cohesion and women’s empowerment. She also participated in the review and drafting of several legislations pertaining to social and women’s issues.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications.

Re-Emerging West Asia Working Group II
2015-06-14 09:00 - 2015-06-15 17:00
On June 14–15, 2015, CIRS held a second working group meeting under the “Re-Emerging West Asia” research initiative. This project’s geographic focus includes the countries of the Persian Gulf, the Levant, and the three South Caucasus states. Scholars gathered around the table to receive critical feedback and commentary on draft chapters that have been written for the project. At the meeting a range of topics were covered, including a historical overview of the region’s geopolitics, pipeline politics, civil society, the power of non-state actors, and finally, the rise of oligarchs and white-collar criminal networks in the South Caucasus.

Opening the session was a discussion on the impact that history and empire has had on the structure of the region. West Asia has been defined by the rule and collapse of three great imperial powers, and more recently, the problematic rise of the transnational Islamic State. While the post-Soviet countries of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia have remained mostly internally stable after the fall of the Soviet Union, a new regional hegemon to replace the USSR has not emerged to create a new regional order. The modernization project has been difficult due to the need for an ideological and cultural hegemony that can be extended to large sections of the populations. During the course of the discussion, scholars suggested that there is a need for a more nuanced definition of nationalism in relation to the modernization project in the South Caucasus. Discussants also stressed the need to highlight the different experiences of autonomous regions in West Asia have had with the colonizing powers, and the impact this has had on territorial bids for self-determination in the post-Soviet era.

Russia’s soft power relations in the South Caucasus thrives through religious institutions, such as the orthodox churches in Georgia and Armenia, as well quasi-governmental organizations that are equivalent to the role of NGOs in civil society. Project participants suggested that Russia engages in the South Caucasus region by reaching out to close constituencies in order to gain their support. Discussants mentioned the existing contradictions between certain post-Soviet countries’ support of Russia as a state but dislike for the Putin government currently in power. These inherent contradictions highlight the differences between European value-based engagements in the region in comparison to Russia’s engagement model based on political coercion. Participants also stressed the need for further elaboration on alternative forms of soft power such as ethnic nationalism, the Russian language and the diasporas which reside within Russia today.

In the post-Soviet era, issues of ethnicity in Iran and Azerbaijan have influenced political and social relations. Working group participants suggested that in the case of Azerbaijan ethnicity has been used as a political lever in devising policy, whereas in Iran, ethnic issue have taken a back seat in terms of foreign policy relations. This can be explained by understanding the roots of state legitimacy whereby Azerbaijan finds it in its nationalism as opposed to Iran which bases it more on religious sentiment. In the case of the Kurdish question, both Iran and Turkey have struggled with providing this ethnic population with the legitimacy that it needs. More recently, the encroaching power and seizing of territory by the Islamic state in areas such as Kobane has meant that Turkish-Kurdish relations will have to be re-examined in light of these new regional security threats.

In regards to the pipeline politics of the region, the South Caucasus is an area where Turkey, Iran, and Russia have competed for centuries. The significance of this region does not only lie in its natural resources but also the multiple routes that connect the South Caucasus with the larger Caspian Sea reserves. Power leverage differs between the three countries whereby Iran has ample energy resources and is in a good geopolitical position, Turkey has no resources but has a unique location and soft power, and finally Russia has both energy reserves and hard power. In recent weeks, with the recent voting developments in Ankara, Turkey’s newest proposed pipeline project ‘Turkish Stream’ has been facing issues of third-party access to the trans-Adriatic pipeline.

Until the recent elections, the AKP party in Turkey were able to present themselves as a new political force with a distinctive foreign policy in the region. The AKP’s focus, in regards to the Middle East, was on desecuritization and the consolidation of Turkey’s regional status in relation to its neighbors. Turkey was able to brand itself by using soft power through its foreign aid programs and more recently, its acceptance of over 1.5 million Syrian refugees. Participants questioned whether AKP’s behavior could be classified as “Neo-Ottomanism” and whether neighboring countries buy into this narrative. Additionally, discussants emphasized the need for a more thorough analysis of the refugee crisis Turkey is facing and the distinctions between it and other Middle Eastern states who have instead chosen to close down their borders.

Participants also discussed issues of white-collar crime and the rise of oligarchs, noting that the emergence of the economic elite in Armenia has largely distorted reform efforts within the country. More interestingly, during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict the state relied on these oligarchs for consistency in terms of tax collection and the provision of services. Discussants argued that in addition to oligarchs’ influence in the political economy some also resorted to violent means to realize their demands. In the case of Georgia, even though their economic variables are very similar to those of Armenia a divergence has taken place when comparing the corruption levels in the two countries. According to the World Bank, corruption and white-crime levels dramatically plummeted after the 2004 Rose Revolution. Even though the occurrence of the revolution itself does not explain the plummeting of crime and corruption level, the revolution was able to temporarily break down the corrupt structure in place and allowed younger and newer people to assume positions in government.

See the working group agenda
Read participant biographies
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Hamid Ahmadi, Institute for Middle East Strategic Studies
Haya Al Noaimi, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Meliha Benli Altunışık, Middle East Technical University
Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Richard Giragosian, Regional Studies Center
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Elaheh Koolaee, University of Tehran
Alexander Kupatadze, School of International Relations at St Andrews University
Anatol Lieven, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Jeffrey Mankoff, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Dionysis Markakis, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Mahmood Monshipouri, San Francisco State University
Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Gareth Winrow, Independent Research Analyst and Consultant

Article by Haya Al-Noaimi, Research Analyst at CIRS

Art and Cultural Production in the GCC Working Group I
2015-08-30 09:00 - 2015-08-31 17:00
On August 30-31, 2015, CIRS held the first Working Group under its research initiative on “Art and Cultural Production in the GCC.” Included in the meeting were academics, art historians, museum specialists as well as a selection of curators and visual culture specialists. Over the course of two days, the participants discussed a number of relevant issues and identified existing gaps in the literature. Topics discussed during the meeting included, amongst other things, the viability of art as soft power in the GCC region, the role of the Gulf states as patrons of the arts, authenticity, cultural appropriation, and censorship in the region.

Opening the discussion, participants considered the viability of art as soft power amongst the GCC states and the role artists play within these societies. As Bourdieu argues, the value of a work of art is not set by the artist themselves, but by the field of production which produces its value. Hence, when trying to understand how art and cultural production in the Gulf can be utilized for soft power gains, one must not only recognize the direct producers of the art work but also all the agents and institutions, such as critics, curators, collectors, and patrons involved in valuing the art. In the case of the Gulf, artistic development has been taking place in Sharjah and Kuwait since the 1960s and 1970s, yet only recently has international attention formally recognized art and cultural development in the Gulf region as being financially lucrative. This has been largely stimulated by the patronage of the arts, whereby certain Gulf states such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, have began to heavily sponsor and fund such initiatives. By recognizing the different actors involved in the game of soft power, it become easier to understand the intersectionalities that exist between internal and external interests in relation to art and cultural production within the region.

In terms of art, authenticity and cultural appropriation in the Gulf, discussants explored the relationship between authenticity and professionalism, and how that ties into issues of citizenship and nationality. If heritage sites in Abu Dhabi and Qatar were to be perceived as art installations, the issue of cultural appropriation becomes deeply problematic considering such places evoke the idea of a mono-identity by marginalizing the other. A certain level of disconnect exists between the arts and the community the art is being created in, which also extends to the relationship of museums with their surrounding communities. The philosophy behind museums is that they should be embedded within their community by providing a necessary intellectual and cultural service. For example, in Bahrain the Pearling Pathway is an artistic initiative that consists of 21 different historical sites such as mosques, schools and underwater oyster beds which depict traditional Bahraini communities’ lives before the discovery of oil. Likewise, in Oman, Qasab Castle is a newly-converted museum which is funded from top-down and managed from bottom-up, in terms of economics and local employment. Nevertheless, these two examples are often the exception, considering most museums in the Gulf often struggle with engaging non-museum entities.

Feasibility and sustainability plans, something most European museums have to go through in order to apply for national funds, are a rarity in the case of Gulf museums. Most feasibility studies are conducted internally which largely limits community engagement and venues for discussion around such subjects. Similar issues can be perceived when charting the development of contemporary Gulf cinema. Gulf cinema has been a small, but thriving affair since the 1970s, however more recently, there has been a rush of financial support and social interest for young filmmakers from the region. After a while, film festivals and film school programs were downsized dramatically or closed completely. This has partially been due to censorship issues and because correct feasibility and sustainability plans did not take place before the initiative was launched.

When it comes to understanding the role of the Gulf states as patrons of the arts, discussants problematized the type of vision each art institution and museum was shaping. For instance, at the signing of the contract for the Louvre Abu Dhabi, there was significant concern from the artistic community about the importation of western art considering most of these art collections were curated by foreign art consultants. Similarly in Dubai, art fairs and auctions were market-driven due to the narrative that Dubai was a crossroad for art acquirement in the region. In the case of museums in Sharjah and Kuwait, the vision was focused on supporting local artists through the provision of free art space and educational programs for enrichment of skills. Participants also discussed the educational aspect of the art industry in the Gulf, whereby many art programs train students adequately, but fail to create a critical academic community that is able to nourish a culture beyond state patronage. It is also necessary to examine who is teaching the new generations of artists in the region, since many of the experts are not based locally and happen to be transient.

In regards to censorship in the arts, the Gulf region has had several instance were art fairs and exhibitions were censored due to ‘cultural sensitivities’. In a region as young as the Gulf, the dynamics of the contemporary art world are always in flux. Individuals and collective actors play a crucial role in determining how the art market regulates what is permissible and what is not. For example, certain instances of censorship have targeted pieces of public art because of the level of exposure they had to the public eye. Discussants questioned the nature of public art in Gulf cities that are not pedestrian-friendly, which in turn encourages architectural pieces and buildings to often be the only existing example of art in public space.

Discussants concluded that in the absence of oil fortunes, the Gulf states of Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait, have had to rely on alternative funding opportunities unrelated to the state, pushing them to engage with various community members in order to fund artistic initiatives through cash donations or collection loans. Discussants later noted that sometimes, in the case of the Gulf region, states can benefit from a lack of wealth in regards to creativity and artistic production.

See the meeting agenda
Read participant biographies
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Haya Al Noaimi, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Ian Almond, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Asli Altinisik, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Sheyma Buali, BBC Arabic Festival
Nancy Demerdash, Princeton University
Elizabeth (Beth) Derderian, Northwestern University
Kristin Eggeling, University of Saint Andrews
Amira El-Zein, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Pamela Erskine-Loftus, Northwestern University in Qatar
Karen Exell, University College London in Qatar
Maymanah Farhat, Ayyam Gallery
Lesley Gray, University College London in Qatar
Islam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Robert Kluijver, Paris School of International Affairs
Umber Latafat, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Thomas Leisten, Qatar Museums
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Noof Mohammed, National Museum of Qatar
Nadia Mounajjed, Abu Dhabi University, UAE
Firat Oruc, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Jelena Trkulja, Qatar Museums
Sarina Wakefield, The Open University
Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Mohamed Zayani, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Article by Haya Al Noaimi, Research Analyst at CIRS

The Geopolitics of Natural Resources in the Middle East Working Group I
2015-09-27 09:00 - 2015-09-28 17:00
On September 27–28, 2015, CIRS convened the first Working Group under its research initiative on “The Geopolitics of Natural Resources in the Middle East.” The session was attended by ecologists, geologists, economists, political scientists, and other scholars with expertise on environmental issues in the Middle East. The purpose of the meeting was to present key geopolitical and environmental concerns in the Middle East, and to identify gaps in the existing scholarship on the subject. Over the course of two days, participants debated a number of topics that not only covered a general overview of geopolitics and natural resources in the region, but also included case studies on environmental conditions in specific countries.

The Working Group opened with a debate on applying the theoretical framework of “geopolitics” to the topic of natural resources in the Middle East. Straddling vast reserves of oil and natural gas, this region has been vulnerable to a host of geopolitical forces since the beginning of the twentieth century. Major powers, including European countries, the United States, and Russia, have historically attempted to remain influential in the resource-rich states of the Middle East, and these dynamics of external intervention relating to regional resources have had a substantial impact on the region’s political economy. More recently, shifts in the energy sector accompanied by a significant decrease in global oil prices may end up impacting the geopolitical arrangements in the region. Working group participants considered the possibility of waning U.S. interest in the Middle East as a result of diminishing dependency on Persian Gulf hydrocarbons due to the American surge in domestic shale oil and gas production. Asian powers, including China and India are emerging as key consumers of Middle Eastern hydrocarbons, which could also have geopolitical consequences for the region. Additionally, the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) brings attention to the role of transnational non-state actors and regional natural resources. Working Group participants discussed ISIS’s conquest of territory around the Tigris-Euphrates river system, paying particular attention to the question of whether ISIS is strategically attempting to build a “water” empire or whether it is primarily interested in controlling territory and oil. There was a general consensus amongst the group to conceive of geopolitics, in the context of this research initiative, as a general metaphor for examining the multiple transnational, regional, and domestic dynamics through which politics intersects with the management of environment and resources in the region.

Natural resources have significantly impacted state formation in the Middle East. There has been a continuing sense of instability in the region over the course of the past few years, particularly since the Arab Uprisings and the growth of ISIS. The oil-rich regimes of the Gulf, including that of Bahrain—the primary Gulf state to experience its own significant Arab uprising—were largely able to maintain political stability, and contain any attempts at anti-regime political mobilization. Working group participants as such highlighted the difference between the GCC and other Arab countries in relation to the Arab Spring, and attributed the Gulf states’ relative political stability to their exceptional status as wealthy oil and natural gas states, and the institutional path dependencies and resilience of the regional rentier bargains. In addition, natural resources have also affected economic diversification in the region, not only within the GCC but also as seen in the broader Middle East. Gulf economies are built around capital derived from an abundance of natural resources and an unlimited access to relatively cheap (migrant) labor, as a result of which the theory on economics of scarcity does not appear to apply to this context. Scholars discussed the kind of economy that could actually be built as a result of these particular conditions prevalent in the GCC. There has been an assumption that rentier states are doomed to fail in terms of achieving substantial economic diversification, as the existing political economy does not encourage innovation or high labor productivity. Over the past decade or more GCC countries have attempted to encourage economic diversification through pushing forward state projects on innovation and focusing efforts on the creation of knowledge-based economies. Many of the Gulf states also rely on portfolio diversification and Sovereign Wealth Fund investments as a means by which to move away from their dependence on hydrocarbon based revenues.

As is the case globally, the Middle East has increasingly been adversely affected by climate change. Some of the environmental concerns facing the region include critical groundwater depletion, water salinity, increasing temperatures, and pollution. Additionally, the paucity of rivers and lack of hydropower and coal deposits have proven to be persistent obstacles faced by the states in the region. For much of its history, people in the Middle East have relied upon an abundant livestock with largely sheep and goats being kept due to their ability to handle the climate. However, things have changed with the discovery of oil and natural gas reserves, and states have stepped in to manage the resources with fossil fuels becoming vital to rentier politics. There has been growing urbanization which has led to rural marginalization and degradation of traditional agricultural hubs in the Middle East. Rising income levels have also caused rapid lifestyles changes and the development of consumer culture in the GCC which has a direct impact on environmental resources, straining existing water and energy sources and leading to discussion of how to curtail waste and consumption patterns. While discussing the political ecology of renewable and non-renewable resources and how the GCC landscape has been shaped by its fossil fuel industry, participants raised the need to develop a more robust literature on environmentalism, environmental attitudes, and environment behavior in the Gulf as only a fragmentary collection of data on these topics exist. Since large numbers of foreigners reside in the Middle East, the discussants also stressed the need to learn more about the attitudes and behavior of non-nationals in Gulf in relation to conservation and environment.

In addition to a general overview of the region, the Working Group included country specific studies to highlight certain environmental problems. Mining of a less known natural resource – the sand, to meet the increasing demands of the global construction industry was examined. According to statistics, sand in Morocco is being extracted at a greater rate than it is being renewed. This has a severe impact on the environment resulting in degradation of coastline, destruction of wetlands, rising sea levels and subsequent flooding. Hence, sand mining poses a threat to the Arab World where most of the capital cities are located on the coast. The issue of aforestation and “greening projects” in the United Arab Emirates was also discussed. Dubai has a vision to establish the first Middle East rainforest for educational and cultural purposes by 2020. However, most of the species being used for that purpose are exotic ones that rely on too much water which exacerbates the already water-stressed conditions in the Emirate. During the Working Group experts discussed the need to counter current greening trends in the GCC and invest more energy in researching how indigenous species that use less water and have the ability to withstand high temperatures could be more broadly planted. Across the Middle East there is also a need to invest in genetically engineered crops that have stress-tolerant genes to withstand the frequent droughts that have been recently plaguing the region.

The discussants noted that the Middle East is a very water scarce region, expected to experience acute water shortages in the near future as a result of population pressures and climate change. Rising temperatures and a decrease in precipitation have adversely impacted the water levels. There are more heat waves, prolonged droughts and destructive floods in the region than before. For example, Yemen is facing a serious water crisis with UNICEF anticipating the country to run out of water by 2020. The majority of the population in Yemen lacks access to safe water, and water-borne diseases are widespread. There are studies which attribute the current state collapse to the severe water crisis in the country. Water scarcity is the most direct environmental issue for the Middle East, and has a major impact on food security as agricultural production depends on water availability. Water shortages are devastating for the Yemeni economy as the country is also increasingly food insecure and need to enhance domestic agricultural production. In order to address water and food security concerns, GCC countries have established institutions to increase domestic production despite the precarious nature of their water resources, and also to develop overseas farmland in order to secure their food imports. For example, Qatar, amongst other GCC states, has acquired farmland in Sudan and well as in other destinations, although to date none of these efforts has led to active agricultural production overseas.

While the participants in the Working Group addressed a multitude of topics ranging from geopolitics to environmental problems in the Middle East, they all acknowledged that there is limited scholarship and data available on the environment in the region from a multi-disciplinary perspective. Through this research initiative the hope is to fill some of the existing gaps in literature.

See the working group meeting agendaRead participant biographiesRead more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Madalla Alibeli, United Arab Emirates UniversityZahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarFarid Chaaban, American University of BeirutJill Crystal, Auburn UniversityLaura El-Katiri, Oxford Institute for Energy StudiesAli El-Keblawy, University of SharjahClement Henry, National University of SingaporeMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarMartin Keulertz, Texas A&M Nexus GroupLaurent Lambert, SESRI – Qatar UniversitySuzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarMaria Snoussi, Université Mohammed V in Rabat, MoroccoJeannie Sowers, University of New Hampshire, DurhamWessel N. Vermeulen, University of OxfordElizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarEckart Woertz, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs

Article by Umber Latafat (SFS ’16) and Zahra Babar, CIRS Associate Director for Research

Environment and Human Insecurity in the Middle East
2015-09-29 18:00 - 20:00
CIRS invited Jeannie Sowers, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of New Hampshire, to deliver the inaugural Monthly Dialogue of the 2015-2016 academic year on September 29, 2015. The lecture titled “Environment and Human Insecurity in the Middle East,” highlighted how human well-being and health are directly and indirectly affected by environmental challenges. Important challenges include the provision of urban infrastructures for water and sanitation and the impacts of man-made climate change on the Middle East and North Africa on water resources.

Sowers introduced the notion of an ecological shadow to highlight how environmental challenges often require decision-making and participation across multiple scales. An ecological shadow, she explained, is the “environmental harm from patterns of production, consumption, and disposal that is displaced elsewhere. This displacement can be to other people, it can be to other places, it can be, of course, displaced to other countries,” as well as to future generations. While environmental awareness has been steadily increasing over time, the conceptual distancing of ecological harm remains a serious and widespread problem all over the world, and is, essentially, a prerequisite of economies driven by mass production and consumption. Industrial and industrializing nations often defer negative ecological costs upon those who are most vulnerable to ecological shifts, including those weakest on the political scale, such as poor communities and other species.

Sowers argued that there are a whole host of everyday issues that are often neglected when considering environmental challenges and the causes of human insecurity. One such example is the ubiquitous plastic water bottle that is widely produced, consumed, and discarded in the countries of the Middle East. Despite the seemingly innocuous everyday use of plastic water bottles, Sowers argued that the material is a local as well as a global hazard at the level of its production and disposal. Around 8 percent of the global production of fossil fuels is used to sustain the plastics industry, as a feedstock and as energy used in manufacturing. Even if Middle Eastern countries made serious efforts to encourage or enforce the reuse and recycling of plastics, there still remains a problem with the material’s non-biodegradability. The seemingly small and everyday issue of plastic water bottles, thus becomes a wider issue of environmental politics related to the political economy of plastic, and the ecological shadow it casts.

Inadequate government policies and activities regarding the collection and disposal of solid waste, especially in the poorer countries of the Middle East and North Africa, means that the accumulation of garbage, and especially plastics, have become serious problems for the surrounding environment, including the contamination of air and water, with direct negative consequences for human health. Such solid waste problems also persist in “developed” countries. Despite some success with recycling efforts, to date, “the dominant strategy of waste management in the United States remains simply putting it somewhere else,” Sowers said.

Landfills are something that can perhaps be tolerated by countries with large, empty landmasses, but for a small and overcrowded country like Lebanon, for example, this solution is unsustainable in the long term. With the closure of the main landfill on the outskirts of Beirut, there was a build-up of solid waste on the streets if the city, and an outcry by the affected residents. “For environmental studies, this whole field of inquiry about ecological shadows has been very closely tied to research on environmental justice, which, of course, calls our attention to the unequal distribution of environmental benefits and harm for a given activity, or a given product,” she said.

Sowers offered Beirut’s “You Stink” campaign as a case study example of the convergence of political failure, the environmental effects of mass production and everyday consumption, and the resulting social activism that calls for environmental justice and government accountability. “The campaign itself,” she said “is very interesting in that it mimics many of the strategies, the tactics, and the discourse that we see not only in other environmental campaigns in the Middle East and North Africa, but also, of course, in the Arab uprisings more broadly.”

Ultimately, the ecological shadows associated with the global fossil fuel economy have a long-term effect on climate change and the disruption of weather patterns, which for the Middle East, is a concern considering the already arid nature of many countries. Climate change and increases in weather and water pattern instability has a direct effect on human health and wellbeing, with many communities becoming increasingly displaced, both internally and internationally.

In conclusion, Sowers asked a basic, but fundamental question: “what can we do to reduce the intensity of these shadows?” She gave several suggestions, including technocratic resource management; increasing resource efficiency for any given product; engaging in demand management; increasing mechanisms for environmental accounting by exposing hidden costs to consumers, producers, and governments; and environmental regulation and taxation. Ultimately, however, none of these suggestions will work successfully unless there is a unified, systemic, and inclusive approach to ecological shadows. “In order to have social engagement, you have to start dealing with patterns of economic and political exclusion,” Sowers concluded.

Jeannie Sowers focuses on the intersections between political economy and environmental issues in the Middle East, particularly in Egypt where she has conducted extensive field research. She holds a PhD from Princeton University and a BA from Harvard University. Selected publications include Environmental Politics in Egypt: Experts, Activists, and the State (Routledge, 2013), The Journey to Tahrir: Revolution, Protest, and Social Change in Egypt (co-edited with C. Toensing, Verso, 2012), and articles in Development and Change, Climatic Change, Middle East Report, and International Environmental Agreements. She is on the editorial boards of the journals Global Environmental Politics and Middle East Report.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for Publications at CIRS

China and the Middle East Working Group Meeting II
2015-10-04 09:00 - 2015-10-05 17:00
On October 4–5, 2015, CIRS held a second working group meeting under its research project on “China and the Middle East.” Contributors were assembled to receive critical feedback and commentary on the draft chapters that they had written on range of topics, including amongst other things, the nature of Chinese foreign policy interests in the region, China’s increasing security engagements in the Middle East, the applicability of the “Chinese Model” to Middle Eastern states, and China’s role in the Iranian nuclear deal negotiations. Case studies were also presented on Israel’s role in the development of Taiwan’s military and defense capabilities, on the Sino-Saudi relationship and on Sino-Turkish relations.

Chinese policy makers tend to view the world through four concentric geographic circles, and rank countries in order of importance to Chinese interests based on their proximity to China. Accordingly, China’s primary attention is devoted to ensuring the security of its domestic realm and sovereign territory, followed by prioritizing relations with those countries that press upon its immediate land and sea borders. Subsequent Chinese foreign policy engagement is more or less active depending on whether or not a state is located close or far to its immediate periphery. Within this analysis, the location of the Middle East may not make it one of the most critical regions drawing Chinese commitment and attention. Yet, for a number of reasons in spite of its somewhat geographic remoteness from the Chinese borders, the Middle East is growing in importance to China. One of the reasons for this is that, in the Chinese imagination, the Middle East is in fact an extension of the Chinese periphery, and particularly if seen through the lens of its cultural and historical connectivity to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. Central Asia and its neighborhood certainly falls into China’s direct realm of hegemony and fundamental interest. Additionally, internal discussions in China on the spillover and impact of extremism and terrorism that may threaten China’s domestic security, Chinese scholars and analysts clearly identify linkages with the Middle East. The Middle East is also increasingly central to China as a source of energy, and Chinese economic investments in the region have been growing exponentially over the past decade.

Despite the growing importance of the Middle East, China continues to demonstrate a reluctance to step outside the parameters of its traditional role in the region, or to change its standard policy line of offending no one, maintaining or attempting to maintain cordial relations with everyone, and avoiding direct conflict or confrontation with any of the states in the region. Working Group participants discussed the obvious mismatch between Chinese interests in the region and China’s efforts to protect those interests, and suggested that in the Middle East China punches below its weight. However, despite the fact that we see no obvious signs of China taking on a stronger military presence in the Middle East, there are indications that Chinese security-related activities are expanding. Amongst other things, Chinese peacekeeping forces have been deployed in the Middle East, combat fleets have been active in the Gulf of Aden, and China has also taken part in joint military exercises. In addition, with the growing presence of Chinese economic investments and infrastructural projects the security of Chinese citizens has become of paramount concern and there are now several Chinese private security contractors operating across several Middle Eastern states.

China also appears to be seeking to develop more robust partnerships within the Middle East and has expanded its diplomatic efforts in the region. A case in point is the initiative shown by Beijing in terms of playing a key role in mediating Iran’s nuclear settlement with the West. China has a long standing history with Iran, and has carefully cultivated this relationship as it sees Iran as one of the pivotal countries in the Persian Gulf sure to play a leading role in the years ahead. At the same time, Chinese engagements in the Middle East are clearly informed by the necessity of avoiding antagonizing the United States or of being perceived as adopting a position contrary to American interests in the region. Up until 2013 in relation to the nuclear issue China adopted a policy of trying to keep both the United States and Iran happy, however post 2013 Beijing adopted a much more proactive role in bringing about some resolution to the ongoing hostility between Iran and the West. Amongst other factors propelling this change in direction were China’s strategic calculations in maintaining stability of Persian Gulf energy supplies, an increasing wariness in China around the possibility of a full scale militarized conflict between the United States and Iran, as well as the ascension of Xi Jinping to the Chinese Presidency and the impact this has had on China’s global engagements.

During the Working Group scholars also discussed the applicability of the “China Model” of political and economic governance to the context of the Middle East. It was suggested that despite the similar authoritarian and state-centric modes of governance visible in China and most of the Middle East, the Chinese Model cannot be easily replicated in the region primarily because of the lack of state capacity, weak institutional structures, and also the very different economic preconditions existing in Middle Eastern states as compared to China. While the China Model of developmentalism may remain appealing to Middle Eastern elites as an ideal type, the necessary requirements for establishing it are lacking in the Middle East.

Working Group participants also presented select case studies on the historical evolution of Taiwanese-Israeli military cooperation, how Islam has informed the Sino-Saudi relationship, and the changing dimensions of Turkey’s relations with China. While Israel has publicly prioritized its relationship with the PRC, it has also actively engaged in working with Taiwan over the decades on developing Taiwanese defense systems, often through private or backdoor engagements. Although Israel has been a provider of both arms and technology to Taiwan, its key contribution has perhaps been in the provision of “software” in the shape of the expertise and knowledge of Israeli scientists who worked actively to develop Taiwanese military capacity.

While the Sino-Turkish relationship has not always been an easy one, at the current juncture both countries consider the other to be a strategic partner with whom they must work. Both states have serious economic incentives which propel them to cooperate, despite the fact that politically they have very different views of the Middle East. Turkey has long been a close ally to the United States and NATO member states, and also has a self-perception as a “civilizational” power in the Middle East and Asia. Turkey considers itself to be a normative regional model for the Middle East, and adopts an agenda for supporting reform across the region. For China it is current quite critical that it inoculate itself from international criticism on how it is managing the Uighur issue, and in this context the relationship with Turkey becomes quite critical. China and Turkey are placing considerable effort in developing their bilateral relationship, albeit primarily fixed in economic cooperation, and showing considerable restraint in terms of avoiding any confrontation on the political or foreign policy front.

Saudi Arabia continues to be one of China’s most important relationships in the Middle East. Existing academic scholarship on the Sino-Saudi relationship tends to focus on the economic and strategic underpinnings of this relationship, quite naturally so given that the Kingdom is a pivotal energy provider to China. Invariably some of these works also address the role that Islam has played in China’s engagements with Saudi Arabia, particularly from the perspective of the state. The Working Group concluded with a broader discussion examining “Islamic connectivities” that have historically existed and have informed the Sino-Saudi relationship. Group discussion touched upon the role of various non-state actors and groups, including Islamic missionaries in Chine and the ways in which Islamic symbols are employed and utilized by the two states.

See the working group meeting agenda
Read participant biographies
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Mohammed Al-Sudairi, Hong Kong University
Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
John Garver, Georgia Institute of Technology
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Tugrul Keskin, Maltepe University
Michael McCall, Leiden University
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
James Reardon-Anderson, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service
Andrew Scobell, RAND Corporation
Yitzhak Shichor, University of Haifa
Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Article by Zahra Babar, CIRS Associate Director for Research

Managing the Saudi-Iranian Regional Rivalry
2015-10-27 18:00 - 20:00
Ibrahim Fraihat, Senior Fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution’s Doha Center and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University in Qatar, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue lecture on “Managing the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry” on October 27, 2015. With a background in conflict resolution, Fraihat offered an analysis of how to reduce tensions in the Middle East region using two different approaches.

The first approach offered by Fraihat isolates individual conflicts as an exclusive case requiring specific solutions targeted at particular nations. The second approach takes a more regional stance, and perceives of Middle East conflicts as somewhat interrelated. This approach posits that many of the current conflicts, including those in Yemen and Syria, are the result of proxy wars, and are linked, in one way or another, to larger regional rivalries. Fraihat argued that the second approach was more useful in its holistic view of regional conflicts being the result of spillover tensions generated elsewhere.

He explained that “most, if not all, of the conflicts in the region are linked in one way or another to Tehran and Riyadh, or to the Saudi-Iranian relationship…If you are able to reduce the tension, or achieve some rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, then by the time you bring them to the table to sit and talk and have some understanding, then probably 50 percent of the conflicts will disappear.”

Fraihat gave a complex characterization and background to the history of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, arguing that there have been peaks of hostility related to specific regional incidences over the years. Leaving aside the legacy of a centuries-old Arab-Persian enmity, more recent regional concerns were stoked with the onset of Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution and the rise of a rival political and Islamic power prepared to challenge Saudi regional hegemony. Concerns about Iranian dominance led Saudi Arabia to support Iraq in its war against Iran in the 1980s. A further escalation of antagonisms began in the aftermath of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, which, effectively, changed the regional order, and led to a power vacuum in which Saudi Arabia and Iran vied for geopolitical influence. There was a new and sour turning point in the Saudi-Iranian relationship during the events of the 2011 Arab uprisings that fueled the conflict in Syria, further increasing regional tensions.

A central question about the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, and especially one asked from the perspective of the Western media, is whether or not the conflict is sectarian in nature. While sectarianism has been used to fan the flames of the rivalry, and to advance certain agendas, this is an over-simplification that only serves to reduce a longstanding antagonism into a simple sectarian binary. Importantly, the fraught Saudi-Iranian relationship has evolved over the years for a number of different reasons, including those related to national interests, economic development, and gains in geopolitical power, but not all can be properly identified or agreed upon by scholars, analysts, and policymakers. There is a variation of views and opinions on both sides, making the rivalry difficult to manage. “Even within the parties themselves, there is no clear understanding about what the conflict is really about,” Fraihat argued.

The two regional giants tend to take two distinct positions on regional issues, as seen in the cases of Yemen and Syria. However, despite the many instances of opposition, Fraihat argued, there is a surprising amount of overlap between Iran and Saudi Arabia’s mutual needs, especially as they relate to security interests and environmental concerns. “Don’t be led, or misled actually, by the obvious positions of the two countries,” he said.

Fraihat gave several strategies for addressing the finer points of the rivalry, including mediation, dialogue, confidence-building measures, credible peace plans, zones of peace, developing areas of interdependence, and restoring the balance of power. “At the end of the day,” he said, “there is no alternative to the parties talking,” and this is the key first step to mediating any rivalry. Switzerland, Norway, and Qatar have a history of mediation, and they could act as effective hosts for any potential negotiations. This would mean, however, that Saudi Arabia and Iran must be willing to engage with each other in a serious manner.

Another opportunity for mediation is the intervention of a powerful third party. Turkey, the United States, and Pakistan all play a role in the region in one way or another. In addition, Fraihat said, “Iraq here has a huge role to play in minimizing and reducing the tension and contributing to better management of the conflict.” This can only occur if the implicated powers agree to build a free, independent, and democratic Iraq.

In conclusion, Fraihat argued that, when it comes to solving regional tensions, analysts tend to talk about official “track 1” solutions between governments, but the potential of building peace between the two countries can also be advanced with “track 2” diplomacy—unofficial dialogue between influential societal figures like academics and religious leaders to build relationships and encourage new thinking that can inform policymakers. Finally, a conducive “track 3” approach is to encourage citizens of Saudi Arabia and Iran to engage with each other at the grassroots and communal level, which is another approach that could lead to a sustainable peace between the two countries.

Ibrahim Fraihat (also known as Ibrahim Sharqieh) previously taught international conflict resolution at George Washington University and George Mason University. His research focuses on conflict resolution in the Arab world, with a particular emphasis on conflict management and mediation, transitions, national reconciliation, national dialogue, institutional reform, and post-conflict reconstruction. He has published extensively on Middle East politics, with articles appearing in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Financial Times, Al-Hayat, and the Christian Science Monitor, on the CNN and Al Jazeera websites, and elsewhere. He is the author of the book Unfinished Revolutions: Yemen, Libya, and Tunisia after the Arab Spring (Yale University Press), and the co-author of Libya’s Displacement Crisis: Uprooted by Revolution and Civil War (Georgetown University Press). Professor Fraihat received a PhD in conflict analysis and resolution from George Mason University in 2006. He is the recipient of George Mason University’s Distinguished Alumni Award (2014) for his achievements in the field of conflict resolution. Fraihat can be reached at fraihat.writer@gmail.com. Follow Ibrahim on Twitter @i_fraihat and on Facebook: Ibrahim Fraihat.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

Youth in the Middle East Working Group Meeting II
2015-11-08 09:00 - 2015-11-09 12:00
On November 8–9, 2015, the Center of International and Regional Studies (CIRS), in collaboration with Silatech, hosted the second working group meeting as part of their research project on “Youth in the Middle East.” Eight distinguished scholars were invited to provide critical feedback and remarks on the draft papers, submitted as part of this project, which covered a wide range of issues faced by youth in the Middle East both domestically and in diaspora. This included themes such as employment, education, religion, political views, gender, fatherhood, economic inclusion, and social cohesion.

For decades, most of the scholarship on youth has been concerned with issues such as human capital, problems and challenges faced by youth, and their contribution to the growth of their respective countries. These concerns have spiked, insofar as the Middle East is concerned, after the wave of uprisings that hit the region in 2011. Numerous social scientists have been addressing youth issues in the transition period post Arab Uprisings; yet, there are still areas that need further in-depth analysis and critical examination. In collaboration with Silatech, CIRS launched the “Youth in the Middle East” project in 2014.

The second working group meeting focused on dynamics and challenges faced by youth in the Middle East. Its aim was to identify gaps in the available literature, suggest areas for further scholarly investigations, and recommend policies to decision-making circles.

The first paper, presented by Samar Farah, examines “The State of Education in the MENA Region and its Implications for Youth.” This paper sheds light on the education system in the Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa by exploring data presented in international assessments in recent years. Farah focuses on three levels of analysis—school, teacher, and student levels—in order to better understand the challenges facing the education systems, and their implications on youth living in the region.

Michael Robbins’s paper examines “Youth, Religion, and Democracy after the Arab Uprisings.” Robbins compares the experiences of youth in Egypt and Tunisia—two countries that experienced dramatic changes after the Arab uprisings—by investigating public opinion data gathered by the Arab Barometer Research Project. Robbins addresses the process of political learning among youths, specifically in the cases of Egypt and Tunisia.

Jennifer Olmsted’s paper focuses on “Gender Priorities and the Arab Uprisings.” Olmsted examines gender equality in the transition period after the Arab Uprisings, explores the various transitions that both males and females generally experience, and focuses on various health outcomes as well as questions about political voice. In doing so, Olmsted examines a number of social and economic indicators in order to address broader questions about control of assets and access to services, equal access to schooling, trends of marriage and household formation, and gendered patterns emerging in labor markets.

Natasha Ridge, Soohyun Jeon, Soha Shami, and Ann-Christine Niepelt, presented a paper on “Conceptualizing the Role and Impact of Fathers in the Arab World.” Using data from a pilot study on Arab fathers collected in the United Arab Emirates, the authors explore the role and impact of Arab fathers retrospectively, as reported by adult children, on involvement and self-esteem. They also examine gender, socioeconomic status, and nationality in order to study the influence of father involvement on the experiences of males and females in the Arab world.

Edward Sayre presented paper titled “Youth Economic Inclusion in the Wake of the Arab Uprisings.” This paper examines the influence of the educational levels of individuals and their parents on their ability to secure employment after leaving school. Using both non-parametric (Kaplan Meier) and parametric approaches, this paper assesses the different roles family background plays in the case of women compared to men. It also addresses the issue of inequality of opportunity and its impact on educational achievement and attainment, as well as labor market outcomes. Sayre relies on the 2013 “School to Work Transition Survey” by the International Labor Organization to estimate the determinants of the length of time to find work after leaving school for young Palestinians, specifically those aged between 15 and 29 years old.

Another paper was presented by Samer Kherfi titled “National Employment Policies in the Gulf: Achievements and Challenges.” This paper links the salient features of the GCC labor market to various governmental efforts aimed at nationalizing employment, particularly in the private sector. It also provides an assessment to decades-old policies to boost employment via the direct imposition of minimum quotas for nationals at the firm, industry, and occupation levels. In addition, the paper examines the recent price-based nationalization measures as well as other active labor market interventions.

The Working Group’s last paper was presented by Sherine El-Taraboulsi and is titled “Navigating British-ness: British-Libyan youth, the Arab unrest and debates on immigration in the United Kingdom”. This paper investigates the discourse on immigration in the United Kingdom, and its implications on the sense of belonging of British-Libyan youth, especially at a time of social and political upheaval in the Arab world. In exploring this issue, El-Taraboulsi unpacks topics related to faith, ethnicity and citizenship of Libyan youth in diaspora.

The second working group meeting was concluded by Mehran Kamrava, the Director of the Center of International and Regional Studies, and Paul Dyre, Senior Consultant at Silatech. As part of a collaborative effort between the two institutions and through facilitating original contributions to the topic by experts, the Working Group moved the study of youth in the contemporary Middle East further along. CIRS and Silatech expect to publish the products of this research initiative in the near future.

It is worth mentioning that this working group is part of the Center of International and Regional Studies Research and Scholarship’s initiatives that aim to fill in existing research gaps, and contribute towards furthering knowledge. Each of these initiatives involves some of the most prominent scholars of the Middle East, North Africa, and the Gulf region who address prevailing issues related to the security, economic stability, and political realm of the region.

Click here to view Meeting Agenda
Click here to view Participants Biographies
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Tom Chidiac, Silatech
Brian Chung, Al Qasimi Foundation
Paul Dyer, Silatech
Sherine El Taraboulsi, Overseas Development Institute in London
Samar Farah, Columbia University
Islam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Soohyun Jeon, Al Qasimi Foundation
Nader Kabbani, Silatech
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Samer Kherfi, American University of Sharjah
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Edward Sayre, University of Southern Mississippi
Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

Afghanistan: War Without End?
2015-11-09 18:00 - 20:00
Anatol Lieven, Professor at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue titled, “Afghanistan: War Without End?” on November 9, 2015. Lieven recounted his experiences as a journalist reporting from Afghanistan in the 1980s, and visiting the country for research in recent years, and offered comparisons between the effects of Soviet military withdrawal in 1989 and the withdrawal of most US troops today. The main difference between the two time periods in Afghan history is that the local government created by the United States is arguably weaker than the one the Soviets left behind, and this is exemplified by the fact that Afghanistan continued as a communist state even after the fall of the USSR. A similarity between the two time periods is continued “overwhelming dependence of the Afghan state on outside help…Around 90 percent of the Afghan state budget and 100 percent of the security budget depends on outside financial aid,” Lieven said.

President Obama pledged the complete withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan by the end of his time in office, but there are three major reasons for why this still has not been accomplished. The first obstacle is the rise of the Islamic State in Afghanistan. The establishment of a local branch made up of Afghan and foreign fighters spells further drastic consequences for the US if it ever evacuated the country. The second is the revolt of the Islamic State in Iraq following the US military withdrawal from there, and the near collapse of the Iraqi state. Lieven argued that “the US cannot afford another collapse of a client regime, or an Islamist militant force taking over another large area in the Muslim World.” The third reason for why the US cannot withdraw from the country comes in the form of the Taliban’s resurgent strength and its temporary seizure of Kunduz in September 2015, highlighting the group’s tenacity, and their willingness to fill the impending power vacuum should the US withdraw its military support.

Also disastrous for the future of Afghanistan would be withdrawal of European and US economic aid. Lieven explained that much, if not most, of the international aid money directed towards Afghanistan has been pilfered or squandered, leading Western governments and media to decry the high levels of corruption within Afghanistan, and to call for a halt in future funding. However, Lieven proposed an alternative reading of the situation. He argued that much of the money “redirected” within Afghanistan and by the Afghan government, can be considered a crucial form of state patronage. While this redistribution is illegal—insofar as legality has any meaning in Afghanistan today—it works towards the concentration of wealth and power in Kabul as opposed to its decentralization into the hands of regional warlords, and can be viewed as a better option than depending on profits generated through the enduring heroin industry. The heroin trade is profitable for individual actors, and results in the decentralization of power across groups of actors, including members of the government operating in a non-official capacity, and, of course, the Taliban. In this sense, where the West perceives corrupt practices regarding international aid, the Afghan government perceives a consolidation of the central government’s position, and thereby, a strengthening of the state.

Adding further complexity to the state of Afghan affairs, Lieven pointed out that much of the current aid money bestowed upon Afghanistan has, in fact, been pilfered and redistributed, albeit “legally,” by the very Western organizations hired to help in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Highlighting a further hypocrisy, he said that the strategy of buying the support of local warlords was the very one devised by the US government upon invading Afghanistan in 2001.

In conclusion, Lieven gave some insights into the future of Afghanistan, positing that neither the Afghan regime, nor the Taliban opposition are united any longer. Indeed there is a sort of competition between them as to which disintegrates faster.

The Taliban used to be a formidably united force under the charismatic leadership of Mullah Omar, but since the belated acknowledgment of his death this summer, the movement has split, with large sections refusing to accept the legitimacy of his official successor, Mullah Akhtar Mohammed Mansur, leader of the Taliban Political Committee based in Pakistan. The fact that this dissident faction includes some leading Taliban field commanders makes it a dangerous opponent to Mansur. Meanwhile, other Taliban radicals have left the movement altogether to join the Islamic State (IS), which has set up a branch in eastern Afghanistan. IS has attracted supporters from members of the Pakistani Taliban and international militants from the former USSR, who have been driven across the border into Afghanistan by the successful offensives of the Pakistani army earlier this year.

This ought to give the Afghan government a major opportunity to push the Taliban back, but unfortunately it seems as if the Taliban on the ground—like the Mujahidin of the 1980s before them—are still capable of uniting to fight the Afghan National Army. However, it does not seem likely that they can ever conquer most of the non-Pashtun areas of the country, since even if the USA does withdraw completely, India, Russia, and Iran will support their allies within Afghanistan.

Moreover, the government is itself deeply split and indeed almost paralyzed between the competing authorities of the president, Ashraf Ghani, and the “chief executive,” Abdullah Abdullah. Analysts warned at the time against the power-sharing deal cobbled together by the USA to end last year’s political crisis over the disputed presidential election results. They said that it could not possibly work—and it hasn’t. So bad has the political situation become that there is strong support for the idea of calling a new national assembly and bringing back former President Hamid Karzai—something that would be disastrous for Western public support.

Amongst other things, the split in Kabul makes it extremely difficult, or even impossible, for the government to make a peace offer to the Taliban that would appeal to the pragmatists who support Mullah Mansur, and might draw them into an alliance against the Islamic State.

As a final word, Lieven noted that the nature of the Afghan state, as created by the United States, can only function as an extension of US hegemony. The current Afghanistan cannot exist autonomously, and will certainly collapse if the US security scaffolding is removed. “As things stand,” he said, “the most likely future seems to be one of long-term messy warfare between multiple actors,” controlling different parts of the country.

Anatol Lieven is a professor in Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service based in Doha, Qatar. He is a visiting professor in the War Studies Department of King’s College London and a senior fellow of the New America Foundation in Washington DC. His latest book, Pakistan: A Hard Country was published in 2011. From 1986 to 1998, Lieven worked as a British journalist in South Asia and the former Soviet Union, and is author of several books on Russia and its neighbors. From 2000 to 2007 he worked at think tanks in Washington DC. A new edition of his book America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism was published in 2012. Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

The Gulf Family Working Group Meeting II
2015-11-15 09:00 - 2015-11-16 17:00
On November 15-16, 2015, the Center of International and Regional Studies (CIRS) hosted the second working group meeting under its research initiative on “the Gulf Family” at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar. Over the course of two days, ten experts—five of whom are CIRS grant-awardees who have carried out fieldwork—presented papers that covered a wide range of issues related to the family in the Arab states of the Gulf. Papers presented and discussed at the meeting touched on a variety of topics, including tribalism and the family; the marriage institution; cross-national or “mixed” marriages; social stratification and the family; Family Law and the rights of the child; sexuality and the family; the impact of war on Iraqi families; gender relations; power and politics; and bilingualism.

The family has historically been an integral unit of society, and its structure and formation are continuously adapting to evolving social, economic, and political developments. The states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have witnessed massive transformation since the discovery of oil, having emerged over the past few decades as strategically important and ostensibly modern states. This transformation across the region brought with it changes to the nature and functions of the state that were paralleled with equally rapid changes in society, culture, and economy. The Gulf family has of course been influenced by these broader social dynamics, but academic scholarship on the topic remains limited and the family in the Arabian Peninsula is still quite understudied.

CIRS’s research initiative has supported original research that explore questions related to the family institution in the Gulf, including those that focus on family structure, demographic dynamics, the role and impact of policies, tribes, kinship ties, customs, and values. CIRS awarded five competitive grants to scholars proposing original fieldwork on the topic. Building up on the first working group meeting, at the November meeting scholars presented papers and core research findings. During the meeting, participants engaged in critical discussions of each paper, providing comments and feedback on the various contributions.

The working group kicked off with Sebastian Maisel’s examination of “Tribalism and Family Affairs.” Maisel’s paper examines the tribal character of Gulf families, focusing on the influence of tribalism in the conduct of family affairs. The paper investigates whether or not current social and cultural practices of families from the region can be classified as “tribal”. Since there is debate over the notion and meaning of “tribalism” in existing literature, this study begins by introducing a framework and definition of what tribal values actually are, and how these have impacted the pre-oil and post-oil dynamics of the Gulf family. Maisel’s research effort provides a historical lens of analysis, and is based on a series of structured interviews that have been conducted in three Gulf States.

Jihan Safar, another CIRS grant recipient, has carried out research on “the Soaring Bride-Price (mahr) in a Context of Modernization: A Complex Variable that is Affecting the Formation of the Gulf Family: The Case of Oman.” Safar’s research answers some fundamental questions on how the mahr amount is determined and negotiated in Oman, and how this is impacting trends in marriages in the Sultanate. Her research unravels some of the main reasons as to why the costs of mahr in Oman continue to escalate despite trends of modernization, the education and employment of women, urbanization, and new individual aspirations. Safar identifies variables that determine the mahr amount, including geographic location, arranged and non-arranged marriages, religious affiliation, and ethnic identity. This study provides us with a more nuanced understanding of patriarchal family structures, state regulations, notions of masculinity and femininity, and how the family, as a unit, continues to influence the marriage institution in Oman.

Mohammed Mohieddin, Sanaa Alharahsheh, and Feras Al Meer of the Doha International Family Institute presented their research that focuses on “Mixed Marriages among Qataris.” The study provides an in-depth analysis of the phenomena of Qataris marrying non-Qataris, which, they argue, has been a growing and visible trend over the past few years. This research project, based on existing data sets on marriage in Qatar, explores a relatively understudied subject. Amongst other things, this research demonstrates that there is a high number of Qatari women marrying foreigners, and the authors highlight the constraints for the children of Qatari women who are denied citizenship rights if their father is not Qatari. The paper suggests that changing demographic and economic conditions have had a direct impact on marriage trends in Qatar.

Another contributor, CIRS Research Analyst Islam Hassan, has studied “Family, Marriage, and Social Stratification in the Qatari Society.” Hassan’s paper fills-in a gap in literature by examining the role of social dynamics, specifically the family and marriage institutions, in the sustenance and reproduction of the social order and stratification scheme in the Qatari society. The study tests available literature against datasets that have not yet been systematically analyzed. Hassan’s analysis shows how the family institution—through influencing marriage choices—preserves and reproduces the culture; traditions; values; customs; and social hierarchy in the Qatari society.

Lena-Maria Möller has carried our research on the subject of “Gulf Family Law and the Best Interests of the Children: The Multiple Meanings of a Vague Legal Concept.” Mölller’s paper highlights the international framework in which the recent reforms of child law in the Gulf have been situated. She also considers the influence of the introduction of the “best interests of the child standards” on the codification of family law in Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE. Finally, Möller explores the relationship between the interpretation of the concept of “best interests of the child” and the changing societal values, family structures, and present-day attitudes towards motherhood and fatherhood in the Arab states of the Gulf.

Haya Al-Noaimi, formerly with CIRS and currently a doctoral candidate at SOAS, presented a paper entitled “Hiding and Masking Your Sins: The State of Sexuality in the Gulf Family.” Al-Noaimi’s paper has three main foci. First, it highlights how the Gulf nuclear family and the larger society define sexual norms and scripts. Second, it examines the role of the state in policing sexuality through a brief analysis of sexual morality laws, and highlighting the strengths and weaknesses such legislation posits. Finally, it concludes with some of the ways in which Gulf families, in collaboration with the state, can attempt to implement realistic policies that protect youth and sexual minorities through discussion, education, and legislation.

Laura Sjoberg’s contribution centered on “War Families and the Iraq Wars.” This paper looks at Iraqi war families, families constituted by and constitutive of the Iraq wars. She reviews stories of the complexity of families living the wars, and explores changing demographic, nutritional, and health dynamics of Iraqi families over the progressive years of war and conflict in Iraq. Sjoberg concludes with a contextualization of war families, and a look forward for families in Iraq’s near future.

Sophia Pandya presented a paper entitled “The War Took Us Backwards: Yemeni Women Activists, Revolution and War.” This study analyzes gendered dimensions of the “Yemen Spring” and the subsequent 2015 war, with a focus on the role of religious groups. It examines the reasons behind the failure of Yemeni women’s extraordinary activism to produce significant change in their gendered statuses. The study also highlights the conditions in which political activities offer potential for change, in this case offering women greater lasting access to formal political power instead of “reintegration” into the way things were before the “Yemen Spring.”

Dionysis Markakis, formerly with CIRS, contributed with a paper entitled: “A Family Affair: Power in the Persian Gulf.” This paper explores the role of family in relation to the exercise of power in the Gulf states, and argues that the variable of familial kinship is crucial to understanding the exercise of power and the continuity of the Gulf ruling families. It also explores the main characteristics, features, and trends present in familial governance in the Gulf, examines the processes of succession in the Gulf, and considers the main threats to the continuity of the phenomenon of “ruling families” in the Arab states of the Gulf.

The final paper, presented by Ali Kemal Tekin, focuses on “Bilingual Children of the Gulf: The Case of Oman.” Tekin’s fieldwork explores why and how Omani parents promote bilingualism, to what extent bilingualism impact the inter-generational relations, and the effects of bilingualism on children’s everyday lives. The study concludes with offering implications and areas for further research, and recommendations for policy makers.

Zahra Babar, Associate Director for Research at the Center for International and Regional Studies, concluded the working group meeting by highlighting the participants’ contributions to scholarship through their papers, which will be published in an edited volume by CIRS in the near future.

It is worth mentioning that this working group is part of the Center of International and Regional Studies Research and Scholarship’s initiatives that aim to fill in existing research gaps, and contribute towards furthering knowledge. Each of these initiatives involves some of the most prominent scholars of the Middle East, North Africa, and the Gulf region who address prevailing issues related to the security, economic stability, and political realm of the region.

See the Meeting Agenda
Read Participants’ Biographies
Read more about this Research Initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Rogaia Abusharaf, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Sanaa Al Harahsheh, Doha International Family Institute, Qatar
Feras Almeer, Doha International Family Institute, Qatar
Haya Al-Noaimi, School of Oriental and African Studies
Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Amira El-Zein, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Islam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Sebastian Maisel, Grand Valley State University
Thomas Michel, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Mohamed Mohieddin, Doha International Family Institute, Qatar
Lena-Maria Möller, Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law
Sophia Pandya, California State University at Long Beach
Jihan Safar, Sciences-Po, France
Ayman Shabana, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Laura Sjoberg, University of Florida
Ali Kemal Tekin, Sultan Qaboos University
Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

Robert Wirsing Focused Discussion and Farewell
2015-11-18 16:30 - 18:00
CIRS hosted a Focused Discussion and farewell gathering for Robert Wirsing, Professor of Government at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar. Mehran Kamrava, Director of CIRS, addressed the audience made up of faculty, students, and staff, as he recollected Wirsing’s long and illustrious career spanning over four decades. Kamrava said that Wirsing’s scholarly pursuits were defined by a thorough internationalism in which he traveled the world, embracing a variety of global adventures and endeavors. Wirsing’s career has been one devoted to learning, appreciating, and understanding diverse cultures, and engaging with people of all backgrounds—characteristics that have been equally applied to Wirsing’s classrooms. Kamrava said that “Professor Wirsing is someone who meets people on their own turf, and on their own terms. He brought us civility, and reminded us what it means to be a gentleman and a scholar.”

Wirsing, in turn, thanked the audience, saying that Georgetown University in Qatar was a unique institution built on collegiality, congeniality, and the basic humanist tenets of international relations. He concluded by saying: “If you scratch the very thin veneer of cultural difference there is a tremendous amount of commonality. Human beings are very alike despite their different nationalities.”

CIRS Hosts "Iran-GCC Dialogue"
2016-01-13 09:00 - 17:00
On January 13, 2016, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS), Georgetown University in Qatar’s flagship research institution, recently hosted a roundtable on Iran-GCC Dialogue.

The day-long meeting brought together distinguished scholars and academics from Iran and neighboring countries to explore historical, religious, cultural, social, and political ties between Iran and the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

The CIRS-led Iran-GCC dialogue included as many as twenty renowned scholars from Iran, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, and a number of other Arab countries, with proceedings conducted in both Arabic and English. Presentation titles included “Common Historical Roots of Iran and the GCC,” “Iranian and Arab Cultural Relations,” “Cultural Commonalities of Iranian and Arab Women and Families,” “The Role of Religion and Culture in the Development of Relations,” and “The Role of Common Art and Literature between Iran and the GCC.”

Speaking on the role of academics in better informing regional leaders, Director of CIRS, Dr. Mehran Kamrava, said that “at a time of increasing tensions in the region, exploring areas of mutual interest and commonality between Iran and the GCC is of fundamental importance. There are numerous areas of overlap and common bonds between Iran and the states of the GCC. It is our hope that scholarly analysis and dialogue will enable policymakers to make better and more informed decisions.”

Kamrava added that “The work of CIRS “involves conducting globally recognized research on a broad range of important topics in the areas of international relations, political economy, and domestic politics of the Gulf. We routinely take the lead on identifying emerging socio-economic issues, and so we are particularly well placed to initiate and bring together the leading scholars who participated in this roundtable. Not only do we seek to create mutually beneficial links between various educational institutions, we also focus on providing further insights into current events by adding to the general body of knowledge about the region.”

A follow-up to the recent CIRS Iran-GCC dialogue is likely to be held in Tehran in a few months involving a greater number of regional academics and scholars.

In addition to sponsoring events such as the recent Iran-GCC dialogue, CIRS engages in in-depth research throughout the academic year, publishing their results in Occasional Papers, Summary Reports, and numerous books. Through its various publications, CIRS provides in-depth examination of ideas and issues of contemporary academic and political significance.

See the meeting agenda
Read participant biographies
See Media Coverage of the event:

Gulf Times
Qatar Tribune
Qatar is booming
Doha News
AMEinfo

Participants and Discussants:

Salah Al Fadhli, Information Systems Specialist
Ali Al Hail, International Fulbright Visiting Scholar and consultant to Qatar Media Corporation
Nayef Nahar Al Shamari, Faculty of Islamic Studies and Qatar University
Fatima Alsmadi, Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abdullah Baabood, Gulf Studies Program – Qatar University
Sultan Barakat, Brooking Institution’s Doha Center
Mousa Bidaj, Shiraz magazine
Youssef Choueiri, Doha Institute for Graduate Studies
Salah Eddin Elzein, Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Masoud Fekri, Razi University
Ibrahim Fraihat, Brookings Institution’s Doha Center
Islam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Mohammad Masjed Jamei, Former Iranian Ambassador to the Kingdom of Morocco
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Batoul Meshkinfam, Alzahra University
Mohamad Ali Mohtadi, Journalist and Researcher of Middle East Affairs
Mahdi Khaleghi Rad, Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Qatar
Samer Shehata, Doha Institute for Graduate Studies and the University of Oklahoma
Luciano Zaccara, Gulf Studies Program – Qatar University
Mahjoob Zweiri, Qatar University

Inside the Arab State: Re-Envisioning the Arab State Working Group I
2016-01-17 09:00 - 2016-01-18 17:00
On January 17–18, 2016, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) convened the first Working Group under its new research initiative, “The New Arab State: Actors, Institutions, and Processes.” The working group brought together scholars and experts representing a variety of disciplines including political geography, sociology, history, and political science. The purpose of the meeting was to identify central research questions on the evolving role of the Arab states in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings. Over the course of two days, participants discussed a variety of topics ranging from the definition, conception, and evolution of the Arab state, the state’s functions and institutions, as well as key topics such as state sovereignty, legitimacy, capacity, state-society relations, political engagement, and civil-military relations across the Arab world.

The Working Group began with a discussion of the conception and definition of the “Arab state.” The 2011 revolts as well as the subsequent disintegration of several Arab states have reinvigorated scholarly interest in the most fundamental questions around statehood in the Middle East. Since 2011, several states in the region have experienced social and political turmoil (Egypt and Lebanon) while others have rapidly disintegrated into “failed” or “failing” states (Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Libya). During the working group, participants debated the validity of the very classification of the “Arab state,” and highlighted the need for further exploring what constitutes a state as being Arab. There is a general assumption that an Arab state is where the majority of the population identifies as being Arab and speaking Arabic.

At the same time, there is something more nuanced when theorizing the validity of the Arab state as a distinct sub-category that needs to move beyond ethno-linguistic conceptions and boundaries. The participants also discussed the issue of legitimacy within the Arab state, and suggested that determining or measuring state legitimacy is also not always clearly defined by scholars of the Middle East. There was discussion over whether it is the state itself that provided legitimacy through its domestic arena, through its society and citizenry, or was it a result of the confirmation of legitimacy provided by the international community and the international order. Participants stressed the role of foreign powers when discussing the Arab state, given the pivotal role played by external actors during processes of state formation in the Middle East in the last century, and because so many outside powers still continue to exert their influence.

At the current juncture, with increasing conflict and war, the political map of the region may potentially be redrawn in ways yet unknown. Boundaries established by the colonial powers have remained remarkably durable since the evolution of the post-colonial arrangements in the Middle East. Notwithstanding this, enthusiastic cartographers and Middle East experts have often taken to producing imaginative re-drawings of the Middle East, seeking to illustrate how the region could look if “properly” demarcated based on history, ethnicity, and linguistic affiliation. Yet these highly creative versions of the territorial construction of the Middle East may not appear so far-fetched or fantastical in the current context. With the rise of ISIS and its incursion onto the territory of two fragile Arab states, understanding the durability of borders and territory, as well as their meaning to the citizens, has once again become important. Working Group participants considered the reconfiguration of borders within the Arab world and the politics around sovereignty and space.

Additionally, the post-2011 environment has exposed the fundamental weakness of institutions within the Arab. The failure of the states to deliver essential public services and good to their citizens has been compounded by limitations on political freedom expression, inadequate economic security, and corrupt and inept state institutions. As a consequence, extremist movements like ISIS have stepped into the picture with promises of providing order, stability, peace, and security to the people. Members of the Working Group noted that most Islamic oppositional forces arrayed against regimes do not want to abolish the state system; instead, they are seeking to either control the state or present an alternative, Islamic model of political rule.

Following the 2011 uprisings, the Arab world has been plagued by a widening gulf between state and society, and rapid state deformation in countries such as in Yemen, Libya, Iraq, and Syria. The 2011 protests differed from the earlier ones: whereas the earlier protests had been a demand for the repair of the regimes, the 2011 uprisings grew out of a conviction among the middle classes that the social contract had been broken by the state. Even the states which experienced very modest levels of protests, such as Qatar, felt threatened due to the fear of the contagion effect. The Working Group examined “Arab political thought” to the topic of the Arab Spring, examining whether Arab intellectuals were organically tied to the political action on the streets or were aloof in relation to what was happening. The 2011 protests represented populous movements that sought to resist Arab authoritarianism by demanding justice, democracy, equality, and rights for all citizens. Contemporary Arab political thought addresses these issues and calls for a new social pact between state and society. However, the social movements gradually fizzled out despite their intensity, and the possibility of a reoccurrence is yet to be determined.

The participants debated over the presence or absence of a viable political “center” in the Arab region. Michael Hudson, one of the participants at the Working Group, sees the political center as something between extremist Islamic movements on the one hand and authoritarian states on the other. While some scholars believed that there has never been a political center in the Arab world, others argued that it was shrinking rapidly due to authoritarianism and the outlawing of political parties. They considered the reasons that in the immediate aftermath of 2011 uprisings, an Arab center not materialize out of something that offered more than the two extremes. Moreover, the participants explored the transformations that are taking place in the political economy of the Arab state and repeated economic shocks since the 2011 uprisings. Citizens in different kinds of Arab rentier states have responded in their own ways to cracks in prevailing ruling bargains. For example, citizens in the Gulf states have looked to the state to protect their economic interests in difficult times, whereas in weak states such as Algeria and Iran, they blame the state for their failures. However, given the currently changing nature of the rentier states, it is difficult to say whether the citizens will continue to look to the state for protection.

Historically, Arab states have had a troubled relationship with citizenship, and minority groups especially, who by and large have not been considered as equal citizens. The Arab states have therefore devised citizenship policies that give ruling states the power to decide who will be included in or excluded from the state. The Gulf states have frequently used the act of withdrawing citizenship for political purposes and have recently aligned their citizenship policies with anti-terror laws—a phenomenon leading to statelessness and not unique to this region as illustrated by the anti-terror laws in Canada and Australia. Added to this is the refugee problem in the Middle East region: a significantly large number of people have either been displaced or have become stateless due to political turmoil or the disintegration of central authority in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Since there is not much scholarship on citizenship in this region, the group agreed that the topic should be further explored as part of a broader re-envisioning the Arab state.

Another topic of discussion revolved around the evolving nature of civil-military relations in the region. Generally, armies are designed to provide national defense. Yet the purpose of the Middle Eastern armies is unclear. In the rentier states, armies are normally financed by oil revenues, with major foreign powers providing military assistance to the state. Moreover, some political systems in the Arab world have dual militaries—ideologically armed forces alongside professional security forces—that provide a visible manifestation of the powers of the state or the ruling elite. Many of these security forces had to be called in order to quell the 2011 uprisings. However, the character of the military involvement varied from state to state. In Tunisia the police was much stronger than the military, whereas in Egypt the army continued to play an important role because of its long history of intimate involvement in politics.

Participants also compared current transnational Islamist movements to the Pan-Arabist movements of the 1960s and the 1970s, both of which challenge the conception, functions, and legitimacy of the Arab states. As these states continue to face threats to their sovereignty and legitimacy, they have tried to consolidate their powers and security by forming state-based alliances with outside patrons.

While the participants in the Working Group addressed a multitude of topics ranging from the conception, functions, and institutions of the Arab state to the basic challenges to its legitimacy and sovereignty after the 2011 uprisings, they all acknowledged that there are gaps in the existing literature where more research is required. Hence, the Working Group concluded by identifying areas of research where further analysis is needed. These included the conception and terminology surrounding the very notion of the Arab state, the position and application of political boundaries, ideologies and discourses of the state, engagement between state and the citizens, and the perseverance or change of prevailing ruling bargains particularly in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings.

See the meeting agenda

Read participant biographies

Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Fateh Azzam, American University of Beirut

Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Michaelle Browers, Wake Forest University

Juan Cole, University of Michigan

Stephanie Cronin, University of Oxford

Ahmad Dallal, American University of Beirut

Alasdair Drysdalem, University of New Hampshire

Islam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Steven Heydemann, Smith College

Michael C. Hudson, Georgetown University

Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Rami G. Khouri, American University of Beirut

Beverley Milton-Edwards, Queen’s University

Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Adham Saouli, University of St. Andrews

Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Article by Umber Latafat (SFS ’16), Research Intern at CIRS

The U.S.–Saudi Arabia Relationship: ‘Special’ or Broken?
2016-01-19 18:00 - 19:00
Michael C. Hudson, the Seif Ghobash Professor of International Relations and Arab Studies, Emeritus, at Georgetown University, delivered the first CIRS Monthly Dialogue of the Spring 2016 semester on “The U.S.–Saudi Arabia Relationship: ‘Special’ or Broken?” on January 19, 2016. A long-term scholar of the Middle East, Hudson argued that the Middle East region is in an extremely turbulent condition, necessitating the reexamination of traditional alliances. He paid particular attention to the state of the US-Saudi relationship, which was once described as “special” and which is now under considerable strain.

Highlighting some key moments in the history of the US-Saudi relationship, Hudson noted that it was established after World War I, when companies backed by the US government began formalizing business ties and facilitating the establishment of the Saudi oil industry during the 1930s. Subsequently, “a modus vivendi was established that allowed this engine of modernization to function without really interfacing with, or let alone disturbing, the traditional political culture of the Kingdom,” he argued. In order for this businesses relationship to continue flourishing, the Americans remained uncharacteristically uncritical of the domestic politics of Saudi Arabia. This arrangement suited both parties, as each could get along with its business interests despite having many antithetical notions regarding each other’s cultures, religions, and politics. In this regard, Hudson argued that “the relationship, although special, was not deeply rooted in American politics, in the American mind, or within the American public. The relationship depended upon a rather narrow spectrum of interests, expertise, and influence,” and was established on a strategic basis between political and business elites.

In order to further secure these shared US-Saudi economic interests, the alliance was eventually expanded to other related political engagements and foreign policy alignments over the decades. During the Cold War, Saudi Arabia proved to be a strategic ally in securing US interests, and guarding against communist advances into the region. The importance of Saudi Arabia was further amplified after the Iranian revolution of 1979, and the collapse of the US’s alliance with the Shah.

In light of current turbulent political developments in the Middle East, the accepted historical basis of the US-Saudi relationship has come under questioning, and is in an increasing state of flux. Regional security concerns regarding the rise of sectarian tensions, the machinations of the Islamic State, and the easing of sanctions on Iran, have all worked towards straining the US-Saudi relationship, and are further magnified by domestic Saudi woes in the form of falling oil prices, a weakening economy, rising unemployment, a young population riddled with unrest, and a new royal regime taking an increasingly combative stance in the region.

Hudson mused on how these issues are likely to affect the future of US policy in the Middle East. Since the dangers posed by the Islamic State have become so central to regional and international political discourse, Hudson noted that it is unlikely that the US security umbrella in the Middle East will see any drastic change, and that the United States will continue to see Saudi Arabia as a key ally in its attempts at regional influence. While the solid historical and material interests, business connections, and security contracts between the United States and Saudi Arabia remain largely intact, “there is a rising chorus of hostile analysis and hostile criticism of Saudi Arabia in important political circles in the United States,” that argue in favor of taking a more lenient stand towards Iran, and reversing the balance of regional power. Today, “much of that debate is focused on foreign policy in the Middle East despite President Obama’s wish that he could pivot away from the Middle East and work on Asia instead.” However, Hudson concluded, current policies regarding the special US-Saudi relationship may indeed be altered depending on the results of the upcoming US presidential elections.

Michael C. Hudson is a former Director of Georgetown University’s Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS), and from 2010 to 2014 he was the first Director of the Middle East Institute and Professor of Political Science at the National University of Singapore. He was the Kuwait Foundation Visiting Scholar at the Harvard Belfer Center’s Middle East Initiative in spring 2015. Hudson has held Guggenheim, Ford, and Fulbright fellowships and is a past president of the Middle East Studies Association. His publications include The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon; The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators; Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy; The Palestinians: New Directions; and Middle East Dilemma: The Politics and Economics of Arab Integration (editor and contributor). His most recent books are: Gulf Politics and Economics in a Changing World and The Arab Uprisings: Catalysts, Dynamics, and Trajectories.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

The Negotiating Process and Recent Developments in Cyprus
2016-02-02 18:00 - 20:00
H.E. Emine Çolak, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Northern Cyprus, delivered a CIRS Focused Discussion on February 2, 2016, titled “The Negotiating Process and Recent Developments in Cyprus.” The talk shed light on the promising political developments in Cyprus between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot people.

After decades of prolonged negotiations, H.E. Çolak said, the impasse on the island was expected to be relieved in 2004 with the United Nations (UN) Comprehensive Settlement Plan. However, it received 65 percent approval from the Turkish Cypriot people and was rejected by 76 percent of the Greek Cypriot people. Since then, there has been some progress, resulting in a Joint Declaration on February 11, 2014, which would enable the two sides to endorse their objectives for the formation of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation based on political equality, and headed by a single sovereignty stemming equally from the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots.

The negotiations resumed more auspiciously following the election of His Excellency Mr. Mustafa Akıncı as the new Turkish Cypriot President. With the presence of the UN Special Adviser, Espen Barth Eid, on May 15, 2015, the two leaders, Akıncı and Anastasiades, expressed their interest and strong commitment to proceed towards a comprehensive settlement in a constructive fashion. Included in these agreements is the desire by the two parties to work on confidence building measures to ameliorate the living standards of the two communities. Discussing the outcome of this new process, H.E. Çolak summarized the five confidence building measures pursued by the two sides as “the opening of more crossing points between the two sides; interconnecting electricity grids; mobile telephone interoperability; prevention of radio frequency interferences; and establishing a committee on gender equality.” After substantive negotiations revealed that convergences on legislative and judicial affairs are consistent with the political equality of the two peoples, negotiations after November 2015 entered a more intensified stage with property at the center of the discussions. Agreeing on the categories of property, the parties decided to pursue the issues of territory, security, and guarantees at the end of the process.

Maintaining its commitment to the result-oriented principles of the 2014 Joint Declaration, the Turkish Cypriot side is optimistic about the prospects of reaching an agreement within months, not years. In the context of achieving that goal, H.E. Çolak also stressed the role of the EU, Greece, and the international community in supporting and defending the negotiations in order to ensure productive engagement from both sides of the island. She also added that it was necessary for the Turkish Cypriot side to be heard on all international platforms to further facilitate the process.

The reality of the situation, however, reveals the subjection of the Turkish Cypriot people to restrictions that have denied them basic human rights. From representation in international mediums to trade and tourism, the constraints imposed on Northern Cyprus for over five decades have proved to be a hindrance to the country’s cultural, academic, and sporting relations with the rest of the world. On this note, H.E. Çolak referenced UN Security Council reports in which both the then Secretary-General Mr. Kofi Annan, and the Secretary-General Mr. Ban Ki-moon, urged the international community to collaborate bilaterally to eradicate the restraints that isolate and obstruct the progress of the Turkish Cypriots. In addition to the support expressed by the UN, she reflected on the declaration of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) “to fully cooperate with and put an end to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot people by calling upon the Member States to strengthen effective solidarity with the Muslim Turkish people of Cyprus and to help the Turkish Cypriots to overcome the inhuman isolations imposed upon them by increasing and expanding relations in all fields.”

In conclusion, H.E. Çolak condemned the unwarranted state of isolation that continues to preclude the Turkish Cypriot people from exercising their basic human rights as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This, she said, is a blatant violation of the UN Charter and had no justification. She concluded her speech by reiterating the resolutions and declarations of the UN and OIC and acknowledging the positive impact that the lifting of the isolation would have on settlement efforts.

The Pedagogic State: Translation and the Cultural Revolution in the Early Republican Turkey
2016-02-03 12:30 - 13:30
Firat Oruc, Assistant Professor of English and Humanities at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar and the 2015-2016 CIRS-SFSQ Faculty Fellow, delivered a CIRS Focused Discussion on “The Pedagogic State: Translation and the Cultural Revolution in the Early Republican Turkey” on February 3, 2016. The lecture drew on central themes from Oruc’s current book project examining the cultural and ideological transformations forged during the early decades of the Turkish Republic, with particular emphasis on importation and translation of classics in world literature.

With the forming of the new Turkish Republic, a new Turkish identity was crafted on the principles of nationalism, modernity, and secularism. “In order to create a new society and country out of the now gone Ottoman Empire, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and his comrades envisioned ‘a total revolution’ in all aspects possible,” and especially in language reform, replacing Arabic script with Latin script. For the reformers, “translation from European languages would enable Turkish to ‘free’ itself from the historical ‘yoke’ of Arabic and Persian words, idioms and expressions.”

In answer to questions such as: “Why would a state need world literature?” and “What was this ‘foreign element’ doing in the midst of the Turkish cultural revolution?” Oruc explained that the Kemalist state saw reading as means of cultivating “civilized” citizens with a crusade against “ignorance” based on reason and knowledge. The European humanist canon was taken as the philosophical basis for the republican reforms that would lead to a “Turkish renaissance.” This “cultural engineering” and the creation of a new national canon relied on a campaign of translation in which the state was the central actor. “Thus, an organized, and government administered operation of translation contributed to the state regulation of the language,” Oruc argued. However, this celebration of a cultural revolution was not supported by a corresponding implementation of a social revolution, and many in Turkish society remained illiterate and impoverished, and incapable of partaking in the grand visions presented by the elite.

In conclusion, Oruc pondered the question of the complex tensions and contradictions involved in the formation of world literature in non-western societies such as Turkey. He argued that, even though the study of world literature purports to be a global humanist project, the grand narratives of the discipline have been largely shaped by specific European histories and ideologies. In order to problematize the power relations enacted through the world literature discourse, Oruc proposed engaging with the perspective of other nodes in the global network. “The state has so far never been discussed as an actor in the field of world literature. Whereas, in the Turkish case, the state is right at the center,” where world literature was coopted as an ideological apparatus.

Firat Oruc received his Ph.D. in Literature from Duke University in 2010. His teaching specialties include contemporary global literature, 20th century Anglophone writing, literatures of the Middle East, and world cinema. Before joining SFS-Q, he taught in the Comparative Literary Studies program at Northwestern University (2011-2013) and the departments of English and Comparative Literature at the University of California, Los Angeles (2010-2011). His scholarly interests center on the intersections of cultural globalization and transnationalism, postcolonial studies, world literature theory, and translation studies. His recent work has appeared in literary criticism journals such as English Language Notes, Criticism and Postcolonial Text. His current book project is a comparative study of world literature and institutions of translation in Turkey, Egypt, and Iran.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

Art and Cultural Production in the GCC Working Group II
2016-02-07 09:00 - 15:00
On February 7, 2016, the Center for International and Regional Studies held its second working group meeting on “Art and Cultural Production in the GCC.” Project participants, as well as other scholars, engaged in critical group discussions, and provided feedback to the authors on draft chapters. The chapters written under this project address a variety of subjects, including amongst other topics: utopian ideals and art museums in the Arabian Peninsula; public art in Gulf cities; aesthetics, artistic production, and censorship in the GCC; art as modernity and “soft power”; and art and discourses of culture and “authenticity” in the UAE.

Over the course of three decades, economies of the Arab states of the Gulf have been experiencing immense growth. This has influenced the political significance of these states on the international and regional levels, and the social fabric of these states, due to the influx of expats from all around the world, on the domestic level. The pace of changes in the social fabric of these states has influenced the development of artistic and cultural institutions. The limited existing scholarship tends to focus on the rapidly growing museum culture and the acquisition of foreign art as indicative of several Gulf states’ use of oil revenue. This project builds on available literature by contributing towards furthering knowledge on the prevailing issues around art and cultural production in the Gulf. The contributed chapters explore the process of art acquisition and certain GCC governments’ investment in museums and artworks, and investigate the effects of art importation and assimilation on citizens’ perceptions of identity and self.

The working group commenced with Karen Exell’s chapter on “Utopian Ideals, Unknowable Futures, and the Art Museum in the Arabian Peninsula.” In her chapter, Exell explores the idea of the utopian in relation to art museums and the contemporary moment in the Arabian Peninsula. The transference of global art museums—constructed according to dominant western art historical principles and museological practices—to the Arabian Peninsula has brought with it the rhetoric of post-Enlightenment humanist idealism. The ability of these museums to instrumentalize international peace and understanding, as well as offering solace on an individual level through solitary communion with works of art, results in a transcendental experience. This experience is desirable in a secular society, but perhaps unnecessary and even problematic in an Islamic one. The chapter addresses the differing ideologies at play, and concludes by evaluating some of the futures posited for global art museums in the Arabian Peninsula.

The second chapter was presented by Nadia Mounajjed on “Public Art in Gulf Cities.” Mounajjed claims that although “public art” refers to artworks, either permanent or temporary, commissioned for sites with open public access, in the Gulf it is only discussed in the context of architectural production and urban design. This steers her investigation on the nature of the public and the public realm in the Arab cities of the Gulf. She explores the specific “parameters of publicity” and the potential of public art to act as a force for social discussion, place making and collective memory. In her chapter, Mounajjed raises a series of questions around: what counts as public art, and what does not? What does “public” mean? Who is public art intended for? Who funds public art? And how is public art tied to notions of place, identity, and social diversity?

In the third presented chapter titled: “Of ‘Gray Lists’ and Whitewash: The Aesthetics and Artistic Strategies of Complicity and Circumvention in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Countries,” Nancy Demerdash examines the GCC’s “areas of gray” in artistic censorship. She claims that the processes by which works receive endorsement and acceptance, or scrutiny and rejection, by a combination of private sponsors, patrons, or the public, presents a complex fabric of actors beyond the state apparatus, extending to institutions and organizations. In addition, Demerdash examines suppression and artists’ complicity or subversion, and analyzes the outlets through which aesthetic alternatives arise. She also illuminates a more nuanced perspective of artistic freedom and aesthetic choices with respect to the cultural spaces, institutions, and biennials of the GCC. Throughout her chapter, Demerdash raises a series of questions: in what ways do we define artistic freedom generally within the GCC? How do artists of the Gulf engage with customs of religion and everyday politics of the region? In what ways do such artists wittingly self-censor, effectively depoliticizing their practice? How does the intended viewership of an artist inform his or her production? If art of the Arab world, in recent years following the so-called Arab Spring, has become increasingly situated or defined as “activist,” “political,” or “revolutionary,” where is the place of these types of art forms in the Arab states of the Gulf? What shape does this engagement with unstable or transgressive content take? And what are the aesthetics of art forms that cannot be openly dissident or subversive?

Lesley Gray presented the fourth chapter on “Contemporary Art as Modernity: Art and Global Identity in Azerbaijan and the Gulf.” Using textual and media discourse analysis for both academic and popular media, Gray examines the factors that were instrumental in the rise of contemporary art as part of a strategy of international engagement, and contextualizes this information with the opinions of those who work in the art scene in Baku. Moreover, within the context of other similar geographies in the Arabian Peninsula who share Azerbaijan’s energy wealth, Azerbaijani modernity is one that has incorporated elements of Western-style economic progress propelled by oil wealth without the accompanying personal, social, and political freedoms and rights. Specifically, this chapter asks how can we define Azerbaijani modernity, and under what conditions has it arisen? How has the media shaped the image of Azerbaijan to an international audience? How has contemporary art developed in the post-Soviet era and how does it express Azerbaijan’s modern identity to the international art community? What does the contemporary art scene look like from the ground up and who is their public? And how does Azerbaijan, and specifically Baku, compare to other similar cities like Abu Dhabi, Doha, and Dubai?

In the final chapter on “Authentic Culture in the UAE,” Elizabeth Derderian argues that the “museum boom” in the Gulf region raises questions of authenticity and cultural appropriation. Focusing largely on the United Arab Emirates (UAE), this chapter explores the concept of authenticity and how its deployment affects exclusion in particular ways. Derderian examines the ways in which authenticity claims create the need for experts and serve as forms of knowledge production that rely on and reproduce different structures and dynamics of power. In addition, Derderian parses cultural exchange from cultural appropriation, focusing on hierarchies of power and exclusion.

Mehran Kamrava, the Director of the Center for International and Regional Studies, concluded the working group meeting by highlighting the participants’ contributions to scholarship through their papers, which will be published in a forthcoming special issue of an academic journal.

See the meeting agenda
Read participant biographies
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Haya Al Noaimi, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Nancy Demerdash, DePaul University
Elizabeth (Beth) Derderian, Northwestern University
Karen Exell, University College London in Qatar
Lesley Gray, University College London in Qatar
Islam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Nadia Mounajjed, Abu Dhabi University
Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

Museums and Modernity in the Arabian Peninsula
2016-02-23 18:00 - 19:00
Karen Exell, Honorary Senior Research Associate at UCL Qatar, and a consultant at Qatar Museums, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue lecture, titled “Museums and Modernity in the Arabian Peninsula,” on Tuesday February 23, 2016. Highlighting some key arguments from her forthcoming book Modernity and the Museum in the Arabian Peninsula (Routledge, 2016), Exell recounted that when she first arrived to Qatar with the task of setting up an institution to cultivate professional museological practices, the general consensus was that no such practices existed in the local context, and that Qatar was a “tabula rasa” in need of such imported knowledge and services. However, after spending time in the country and researching the local museological landscape, she argued that a very different picture emerged.

Exell explained that there are two simultaneous and oppositional discourses of cultural production currently being articulated in the region. These are presented as oppositional in terms of both style and content: modern art is seen as a product of Western art history, while traditional cultural practices draw on the oral histories and traditional practices of the region. These binary cultural productions are also presented as providing contrasted cultural experiences: one evokes an internationally-recognized art world, while the other invites a dialogic and immersive interaction with traditional regional productions. In order to examine how these discourses have been put into practice, Exell compared the Museum of Islamic Art in Qatar with the Saif Marzooq Al-Shamlan and Bait Al Outhman museums in Kuwait.

“The Museum of Islamic Art draws extensively on the Western paradigm of museological expertise,” she said, and is a prestige project that attempts to create a new global cultural center within Qatar. Such “engagement with Western-style museums was and is a strategic choice by the ruling families and elite actors,” and has been geared towards realizing a multitude of agendas over the years. Following independence, museological practices aided in nation-building, creation of consistent historical narratives, and legitimizing the status of the region’s ruling families. In the contemporary period, they are “a means of branding nations and gaining symbolic global power through accessing cultural capital,” she noted.

The Saif Marzooq Al-Shamlan and Bait Al Outhman museums in Kuwait, meanwhile, represent centers for the protection of local histories and traditional knowledge. Since these cultural forms are “rich in the kind of heritage that orthodox Western heritage models struggle to accommodate: intangible, performative, and embodied,” they are hard to promote or export. Simply put, they do not fit within the Western museological paradigm. However, Exell argued, while these local museological practices are deemed of little international value, they are of extreme importance in supporting and creating national identities and narratives.

It is by examining the rhetoric surrounding these supposedly contrasting cultural spheres that one can begin to understand how the two discourses actually play towards specific and strategic regional agendas, she said. As the Gulf states attempt to exploit the immense wealth created through hydrocarbon industries, these nations must also answer to how they are protecting against the encroachment of rapid regional transformations. Even as certain elements of modernity are being celebrated, there is a simultaneous call to strengthen local heritage as defense against what is perceived to be an onslaught and effacement of local histories anc cultures. This balancing act between the old and the new is exemplified in the two types of cultural engagements practiced in the region.

Ultimately, Exell argued, “the rhetoric of fusing the traditional and the modern represents the region’s approach to modernity…an agenda of retaining cultural identity in balance with aspects of a more secular modernity, while the rhetoric of engagement with global art and ideas of the universal is a method of discursively bridging cultures—bridging the East and the West and bringing people together—is repeatedly emphasized by actors investing in and producing the global art projects.”

v:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);}o:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);}w:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);}.shape {behavior:url(#default#VML);} 0 0 1 211 1209 10 2 1418 14.0 Normal 0 false false false false EN-US JA X-NONE /* Style Definitions */table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:”Table Normal”; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-parent:””; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; text-align:center; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:12.0pt; mso-bidi-font-size:11.0pt; font-family:Georgia; mso-ansi-language:EN-US;}

Karen Exell directed the MA in Museum and Gallery Practice at UCL Qatar from 2011-2015, after teaching museums studies and holding curatorial positions in university museums in the UK for several years. She is currently involved in two QNRF-funded research projects, as a PI on project researching museum pedagogy in Qatar and the region, and as LPI on project exploring the concept of national identity in relation to the planned new National Museum of Qatar. Her recent publications include the co-edited volumes, Cultural Heritage in the Arabian Peninsula: Debates, Discourses and Practices (Ashgate, 2014), and Museums in Arabia: Transnational Practices and Regional Processes (Ashgate, 2016).

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Managing Editor for CIRS Publications.

What the U.S. Presidential Election Means for the Middle East
2016-02-24 12:30 - 13:30
On February 24, 2016, John Hudak, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director at the Center for Effective Public Management Governance Studies–Brookings Institution, delivered a CIRS Focused Discussion titled “What the U.S. Presidential Election Means for the Middle East.” Hudak, an expert on U.S. elections and campaigns, stated that it is difficult to gauge the positions and policies of the U.S. presidential candidates on the Middle East region since they are often vague and variable, especially during the primaries. Compared to previous election cycles, however, the 2016 elections are unique due to the rise of foreign policy as a critical issue for both parties’ candidates. Hudak also discussed the foreign policy credentials of the Republicans and the Democrats, and explored which party has generally seen itself as the bastion of U.S. foreign policy goals.

The first part of Hudak’s talk focused on describing the convoluted nature of the U.S. presidential elections. Before running for the general election, presidential candidates have to participate in a competitive primary campaign to become the party’s standard-bearer. During the primaries, candidates compete with each other for delegates who represent the constituents of the states. As the results of different states emerge, starting with Iowa and New Hampshire, it becomes a little clearer to see who is better positioned to become the party’s representative. However, the 2016 race has still not been decided since some candidates can surge while others sink. “If we take a step back one year and look at what our expectations were about this race, they are entirely turned on their head,” said Hudak, “the realities of the election this year are very different than what expectations were in February of 2015.” By the end of July 2016, the winning candidates will be announced at the parties’ national conventions and will begin the rapid race for the general election.

After familiarizing the audience with the intricacies of the election process, Hudak shifted the discussion to the factors behind the increased prominence of U.S. foreign policy in the 2016 elections. Hudak attributed this shift to two main points: the topical interest in the Middle East’s crises—particularly the conflict in Syria and the rise of Islamic States—and the fact that both parties view foreign policy as the winning issue in this general election. “There are a lot of serious conflicts in the world where either the U.S. is involved, or there is an expectation for American leadership,” said Hudak, “either to help ameliorate the challenges, or to fix the problem.” The level of interest in foreign policy usually increases when such situations arise; the most recent example was the 2004 election when John Kerry and the incumbent president, George W. Bush, fought a contested election that hinged on the decision to intervene in Iraq and Afghanistan. In contrast, the elections of 2008 and 2012 focused on domestic policy and the economy, particularly after the 2008 recession.

In most election years, “the Republicans, in terms of polling, are typically much more trusted in terms of dealing with policy issues than Democrats are,” said Hudak. Democrats, on the other hand, focus more on the “bread and butter” issues that concern domestic affairs, such as the economy, jobs, and issues of social justice and equality. In 2016, however, both parties approach foreign policy as their winning issue, and both parties have candidates with strong stances. Hillary Clinton believes she is well versed and experienced with the major foreign policy issues from her time as Secretary of State, and this makes her unique among Democrats. She also sees it as a benefit for her candidacy because she is a woman, and foreign policy is commonly seen as the purview of men. “In that sense,” Hudak reasons, “she sees it as a transformational thing, both for herself, gender, and her party […] that is the thinking within the campaign.” While Clinton has not focused as much on foreign policy as she would have liked, she will likely prop up her foreign policy credentials again in the general election. In contrast, the Republicans pride themselves on their traditional focus on foreign policy, and their campaigns have especially focused on pointing out the disastrous aftereffects of Clinton’s time as Secretary of State.

Finally, Hudak concluded by discussing potential areas of foreign policy interest for the next president such as Syria, Israel, and Iran. After taking the presidential oath on January 20, 2017, Syria will be priority for whoever is elected. Hudak stated that either the new president will dramatically change course from Obama’s policies or mildly alter them, depending on whether a Republican or a Democrat emerges victorious. Regardless, Americans can be sure that there will be a change in policy, and foreign policy will remain one of the most vital issues in the first 100-200 days in office. Other important foreign policy issues on the president’s mind will be alleviating the U.S.’s strained relationship with Israel—one area both Democrats and Republicans agree on—and working out the next steps for the nuclear deal with Iran.

John Hudak is Senior Fellow and Deputy Director at the Center for Effective Public Management Governance Studies, Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. His research examines questions of presidential power in the contexts of administration, personnel, and public policy. Additionally, he focuses on campaigns and elections, bureaucratic process and legislative-executive interaction. You can access his complete bio, click here.

Article by Salman Ahad Khan, Senior Publications Intern at CIRS

Pluralism and Community in the Middle East Working Group Meeting I
2016-03-06 09:00 - 2016-03-07 15:00
On March 6–7, 2016, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) held a working group on “Pluralism and Community in the Middle East.” Over the course of two days, a number of distinguished scholars discussed issues related to ethno-linguistic and religious pluralism in the Middle East, identified gaps in the existing literature, and pointed to potential areas of original research. Amongst the various topics discussed, Working Group participants examined pluralism and diversity as represented through governance and legal regimes; social inclusion/exclusion and policymaking; the role and symbolism of iconoclasm in the Middle East; architecture, the urban space, and identity; digital culture, political communication and regional notions of “multiculturalism;” language; and literature and cultural representation. Two specific case studies, the Amazighs and Armenian Christians, were also discussed.

The Middle East’s pluralistic social and political fabric has gone through several historical changes, and ethnicity, religion, language, and political ideologies play pivotal roles in contemporary identity affiliations across the region.

National and regional conflicts often intensify subnational identities, and this has especially been the case in the Middle East over the last several years. Working Group participants identified a series of original areas of research regarding the on-going intensification of identities in the Middle East, including the relationship between the conceptions of the state and inclusion of some identity groups and the exclusion of others; the impact of globalization and transnational communities; the historical legacy of the Ottoman millet system; sectarianism in the post-Arab Spring era; the role of intellectuals and social media in identity formation; and the underlying causes and consequences of increasing religiosity.

Governance and state policies impact the social, economic, and political inclusion or exclusion of communities in the Middle East. Working Group participants discussed the multiple linkages between statehood and identity-formation in the Middle East. They questioned the relationship between communities and sites of power; and challenges international law’s values and principles pose on states’ traditional governance. The participants also discussed topics related to the parallel development of local human rights traditions along with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a sort of self-determination in the decision-making processes, and the role of state institutions in enforcing social harmonization and cohesiveness.

State policies dealing with education, families, kinship and law, mobility of labor and capital can directly impact social inclusion and exclusion. In recent years, state policies have greatly impacted foreign, national and private educational institutions. Although this is not unique to the Middle East, there is limited literature on the notions of inclusion and exclusion in Middle Eastern educational curriculums. The relationship between policymaking and ways in which families are being constructed also has direct bearing on education. The participants claimed that the nature of communities’ relations both with each other and the state could be seen as a result of exclusionary and inclusionary policies. In addition, the participants discussed issues related to mobility of people and ideas, social representation in the education system, globalization, and war on terror and school curriculum in the Middle East.

Modern nation-building processes began roughly in the middle of the twentieth century in several states of the Middle East, such as Egypt and Iraq. Driven by ideology, politics and religious beliefs, states, and recently non-state actors like ISIS, have used iconoclasm as a tool to limit the multiple identities within the nation state, and reinforce a monolithic identity. The practice of iconoclasm has impacted the material culture and visual heritage of the different religious and ethno-linguistic communities that comprise the region’s demography. Archeological negligence, and inconsiderate urban planning have also contributed to this erasure of visual pluralism. In addition, participants also discussed the role of social media, media and film in encouraging and countering iconoclasm in the Middle East.

Urban spaces in the Middle East have been going through swift progression in some countries, and massive urban decay in others. Master planning of urban spaces is very politicized in the Middle East, with various socio-economic drivers and consequences. The planning of gated and smart cities, and new capitals segregates communities by nationality, class, ethnicity, and religion. The participants posed questions related to the definition of public good, social representation in master planning, public contestation, access to public information, democratic decentralization, communities’ quarters, gentrification of communities, security, citizenship, and urban equality and inequality.

Media is a tool of communication greatly influenced by states in the Middle East. It propagates certain convictions insofar as religious and ethno-linguistic communities in the Middle East are concerned. The participants identified four main topics that are insufficiently researched: labor and digital media; citizenship; border; and knowledge production. Within these four main topics, questions around the usage of media by migrant workers and expatriates in the Gulf, redesigning of borders, under-representation in political and media institutions, capitalism and cognitive knowledge, memory preservation, and production of knowledge were identified as important areas of original research.

Language and linguistics are germane to the discussion on pluralism in the Middle East. Members of ethno-linguistic communities have been attempting to maintain their languages and dialects despite attempts by states to undermine their languages and reinforce the official language of the state. The participants suggested research questions that examine the influence of local groups and authority over language, communities’ resistance to states’ language policies, unification and fragmentation among different ethno-linguistic communities, Shiite-Sunni dialect differences, preservation of dialects, linguistic class processing, media and film, and different usages of colloquial and classic languages.

“Minor literature” is literature produced by the colonized in the colonizer’s language that resists colonization. Post colonization, minor literatures have emerged as a form of resistance and denationalization produced by religious and ethno-linguistic communities in contestation to their marginalization by their respective states. Minor literatures in Turkey often refer to Greek, Jewish, Armenian, and Yazidi literature. The body of literature was always studied in relation to the past. The place and role of minor literature in the imagined futuristic social and political conditions of post nationalist Turkey remains understudied. Ethnographic studies on the readership of minor literature in Turkey also remain under-studied. Thus, the participants suggested original research questions that addressed the engagement with minor literature in Turkey, diasporic migrant experience and minor literature writers, representation of communities in mainstream literature, engagement of Turkish minor literature with the international literary community, engagement among different communities in Turkish minor literature, and targeted audience of Turkish minor literature.

Insofar as the Armenian Christian community in the Middle East is concerned, the participants discussed four original areas for research. These areas looked at the issue of Muslim Armenians, and whether Islam is not compatible with Armenian identity. They also discussed the question of Armenian citizenship and if practicing Christianity is a pre-requisite. The participants identified also other gaps in literature that included: the role of Armenian media, communal publications and propagation of Armenian political agenda, the tension between Eastern and Western Armenians, perception of Armenians in diaspora on the Armenian state, usage of national language, objectives of Armenian publications, Armenian urban space in the Middle East, Armenian scouts, Armenian transnational networks, media and film, Armenian progressive national movements, and the relationship between Armenians and Hezbollah.

Finally, the participants discussed the Amazigh community in North Africa. The participants claimed that the main gaps in research have less to do with how the Amazigh community has changed, but more with how to change the methodological lens through which the community and its struggles can be viewed and analyzed. Regional and transnational analysis can contribute to the study of the Amazigh community in North Africa as it addresses larger political questions, and recognizes the unintended consequences of pluralism. Four gaps in literature were identified: regionalism, transnationalism, localism, and language policy. Under these four main thematic topics, the participants posed questions that touched on topics that included: the relationship between foreign policy and identity formation, Amazigh activism, differences between first and second generation Amazigh immigrants, urban versus rural elitism, institutionalization and politicization of Amazigh as an ethno-linguistic minority, and concepts of inclusion and exclusion.

See the meeting agenda
Read participant biographies
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
James Barry, Deakin University
Kathleen Cavanaugh, National University of Ireland
Paolo D’Urbano, Doha Institute for Graduate Studies
Amanda Garrett, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Shak Hanish, National University, California
Islam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Umber Latafat, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Catherine Miller, Aix-Marseille University
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Firat Oruc, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Annika Rabo, Stockholm University
Diane Singerman, American University, Washington
Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Antonio Zarandona, Deakin University

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

Is Black Money Really Black? The International and National Fight Against Money Laundering
2016-03-23 18:00 - 19:00
Reem Al-Ansari, a professor at Qatar University’s College of Law and the 2015-2016 CIRS Qatar University Fellow at Georgetown University in Qatar, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue on March 23, 2016, on “Is Black Money Really Black? The International and National Fight Against Money Laundering.” The talk focused on the billions of dollars criminals launder through the global financial system, the staggering social, economic, and political fallout they cause, and what countries like Qatar are doing in response.

Beginning her lecture by defining the term “money laundering,” Al-Ansari said that: “In its simplest form, money laundering refers to an amount of money leaving from destination A, and using techniques to make it seem like the funds were obtained from destination B, a legal source.” Once the money has moved through several banks in different countries, it can then be returned to its owner, ready to be used as legitimate funds.

Al-Ansari, who is also the Director of the Legal Research and Studies division at Role of Law and Anti-Corruption Center (ROLACC) in Doha, listed the various countries targeted for money laundering, as well as the nations that serve as destinations for newly cleaned money. Adding that Qatar is also a target of this criminal activity, she said that Qatari authorities have taken steps to respond to the threat of money laundering by introducing a specific law to mitigate against it. This comprehensive law was enacted following the unsatisfactory conclusion of an IMF-led evaluation report of Qatar’s banking system. “Qatar is awakening to the threat, and it led to the new law,” she said.

The newly established regulations are particularly important as a result of the criminal opportunities posed by the upcoming World Cup in 2022, she said. Further strengthening Qatar’s anti-corruption commitment, she added that, “Qatar now adheres to the series of recommendations that FATF has developed and that set the international standard for combating of money laundering,” referring to the nation’s membership to the Financial Action Task Force, an intergovernmental policy-making body, established in 1989 to promote effective implementation of measures for combating threats to the integrity of the international financial system.

The consequences of unchecked money laundering, she concluded, are severe, including increased criminal activity and currency inflation in developing economies, which bear the consequences of economic collapse when critical funds simply disappear as they continue through the multi-step money cleaning process.

Reem Al-Ansari received her LLM from the University of Michigan Law School–Ann Arbor, and earned her Doctorate degree from Georgetown University’s Law Center in Washington D.C., marking her as the youngest Qatari lawyer and doctorate degree holder in the state. In addition to lecturing, Al-Ansari is the Director of the Legal Research and Studies division at Role of Law and Anti-Corruption Center (ROLACC) in Doha, Qatar. Previously, she worked at the World Bank headquarters in the Governance and Anti-corruption (GAC) unit, and is the recipient of two EED awards for education excellence. She is currently working on a book tackling the issue of money laundering and corruption, and tweets under @ReemaAlAnsari.
