Center for International and Regional Studies

Kai-Henrik Barth on Nuclear Ambitions in the Gulf
2009-12-06 08:00 - 18:00 (Europe/Moscow)
Professor of Government Kai-Henrik Barth delivered the December 6, 2009 CIRS Monthly Dialogue on the topic of “Nuclear Ambitions in the Gulf.” He focused on nuclear proliferation concerns associated with ambitious goals to introduce nuclear power in the Gulf states, with an emphasis on the United Arab Emirates.

Barth’s presentation was divided in five parts. First, he emphasized the “puzzle” at the heart of the debate: why would Gulf Cooperation Council states, with their massive oil and gas reserves, seek to develop nuclear power? Second, he assessed the proliferation risks of nuclear power; third, he highlighted the Gulf’s strategic context, emphasizing GCC’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear program; fourth, he analyzed the UAE’s nuclear effort; and, finally, he concluded with some policy recommendations.

Looking at nuclear power developments throughout the world, Barth said that “there are thirty states that have nuclear power stations and, in total, there are 436 nuclear reactors in operation. In the last couple of years, more than forty other states have requested assistance from the IAEA” to develop new programs. Barth said that “in the short time period from February 2006 to January 2007, thirteen countries in the region announced plans to use nuclear power.” These are countries in the greater Middle East and include all Gulf states with the exception of Iraq.

Barth argued that “investment in nuclear energy in the Gulf appears to be motivated by security rather than economic reasons.” The timing of the 2006 GCC nuclear policy announcement is significant because it suggests that nuclear ambitions in the Gulf are a response to three developments: a growing concern about a weakening role of the United States in the region, especially after the 2003 Iraq war; the rise of Shia confidence after the Israeli-Lebanese conflict of 2006; and, in particular, concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. Barth maintained that the Gulf’s nuclear projects can be explained as “being primarily about security and driven by a concern about Iran’s nuclear program.”

In terms of the dangers of nuclear proliferation, Barth noted that regardless of the stated peaceful intentions of civilian projects, there always remains the possibility of a nuclear weapons option down the line. Uranium enrichment facilities, for example, can be used to enrich uranium for civilian purposes, but also for nuclear weapons. Equally, the chemical reprocessing of spent nuclear reactor fuel separates plutonium, which can be used for nuclear weapons. Barth argued that “the history of many nuclear weapons programs highlights the close relationship between civilian and military applications of nuclear power: military programs often benefitted from technology acquisition and expertise gained in civilian counterparts.” Although International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are put in place to prevent this from happening, the threat is always present, Barth said.

Emphasizing the strategic context of nuclear programs in the Middle East, Barth noted that the threat of Iranian nuclear ambitions dominates the region. Highlighting the current status of Iran’s nuclear capabilities, he said that “the Gulf states and the greater Middle East have enough reasons to be concerned.” In addition, “the Iranian missile program doesn’t help to alleviate concerns in the region.” Barth added that “the relationship between the UAE and Iran is in a delicate balance; it is a rivalry, they are close neighbors, they are key economic partners, there is a long-standing territorial dispute over three islands in the Gulf, and, on top of this, the UAE hosts the largest Iranian expat community. So, it is a very complicated, interwoven relationship.”

Barth emphasized the UAE’s nuclear capabilities by arguing that “the UAE has the most ambitious national nuclear program in the GCC,” with two large nuclear power plants expected to be operational by 2017. Barth posed the questions, “is energy a viable or plausible explanation in the UAE case? And is there really a shortage despite all the oil and gas wealth?”

In response to these apprehensions, the UAE government maintains that “the UAE is concerned about energy security and it needs energy diversification.” Further, because water and electricity in the UAE are subsidized, “energy consumption rates in the Emirates are exceedingly high.” The UAE calculates that energy supplies will fall short of the growing demands over the next few decades. Indeed, according to official UAE estimates, “by 2020, the UAE will need 20 gigawatts of additional electricity production capabilities.” The UAE claims that nuclear energy is one competitive option to produce electricity. According to an official UAE energy policy document, the UAE had considered and rejected coal, primarily because of CO2 emissions; equally, while the UAE is pursuing alternative energies such as wind and solar power, officials concluded that their base-load energy production capabilities are limited. Barth argued, however, that the suggested economic advantages of nuclear power in the UAE are doubtful at best: high capital costs and the uncertainty of oil and gas prices make pursuing a nuclear power option in the Gulf economically very risky. According to Barth, optimistic assumptions about cheap electricity through nuclear power in the Gulf are questionable. He argued that while the UAE has legitimate energy concerns, security concerns vis-à-vis Iran are significant drivers of the UAE’s nuclear ambitions.

In conclusion, Barth relayed some policy recommendations that “provide energy security for GCC countries without provoking a nuclear proliferation cascade.” He proposed that nuclear supplier states should not sell nuclear power reactors to any country without stringent IAEA safeguards. He favored a worldwide moratorium on enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, in the Middle East in particular. Finally, Barth argued that ultimately, “nuclear power still has major problems and its relationship with nuclear weapons has not been erased and I do not see any future where it will be erased.”

Kai-Henrik Barth is Visiting Assistant Professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Qatar. From 2002 to 2008 he was a member of the core faculty in Georgetown’s Security Studies Program (SSP) on the main campus, where he also served as Director of Studies for the last three years. Dr. Barth’s current research focuses on the causes and consequences of nuclear proliferation, with a particular emphasis on Iran. He has also begun to investigate the nuclear aspirations of the Gulf States. His publications have appeared in Physics Today and Social Studies of Science, among others, and he is the guest editor (with John Krige) of a special issue of the journal Osiris on Global Power Knowledge: Science and Technology in International Affairs (University of Chicago, 2006).

Article by Suzi Mirgani,CIRS Publications Coordinator.

Hanan Ashrawi on the Future of Palestine
2009-12-01 08:00 - 18:00
Professor and Palestinian political activist Hanan Ashrawi shared her insights on the Palestinian struggle when she lectured on “The Future of Palestine” in Doha, Qatar. The lecture was hosted by the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar. Ashrawi is the Founder and Head of the Executive Committee of the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion of Global Dialogue and Democracy-Miftah, and an elected member of the Palestinian Legislative Council for the Jerusalem District.

SFS-Qatar student Lina Abduljawad introduced Ashrawi to an audience of 400 people at the Diplomatic Club in Doha. Ashrawi noted that the title of her talk, “The Future of Palestine,” was deceptively simple but that such simplicity was not representative of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which is mired in various historical, economic, political, and ideological battles that fracture and divide the Palestinian people on a daily basis. In order to know where a nation is headed, she explained, it must come to terms with the past and must go through a “historical redemption,” which is an important part of any reconciliation process. Ashrawi explained that Palestine not only needed international political recognition, but was also in need of its history to be affirmed and recognized as legitimate and one that has been unfairly violated.

Ashrawi noted that Palestine is in a struggle for “devolution of occupation and evolution of statehood,” but that the exact opposite is occurring and is leading to what she terms “the deconstruction of Palestine.” This, she said, is the worst type of humanitarian crisis, as it is a deliberately crafted one. Ashrawi gave details of the daily economic, political, and physical restrictions and challenges that the average Palestinian must endure under Israeli occupation, including the inability for many children to attend schools, and for many adults to reach their lands or places of work. She noted that physical restrictions in the form of checkpoints and the infamous “wall,” ironically, not only restrict the lives of Palestinians, but also prohibit the Israelis form viewing their own horizon, and are, effectively, imprisoning both communities.

In conclusion, Ashrawi called on the international community, and especially Arab countries, to take responsibility for the state of Palestine. She welcomed new ideas and gave several possible solutions that, if honored by all parties involved, will lead to a peaceful existence in the Middle East.

During the question and answer session, Ashrawi gave recommendations for the future and how to begin to work towards a viable and longstanding peace. She called for unconventional approaches to solve the crisis, such as United Nations involvement as a caretaker and mediator or requesting the presence of international ground troops to protect Palestinian rights. Ashrawi argued that the most important aspect of any attempt at conflict resolution was to redress the asymmetrical power relations between the two communities.

Earlier in the day, Ashrawi was invited to speak at an informal luncheon meeting at Georgetown SFS-Qatar, She took questions from Faculty and discussed the nature of the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict and how it might be resolved. In answer to a question regarding how the new U.S. administration might impact the conflict, she noted that, in order to break away from past failures regarding the Middle East peace process, Barack Obama and his administration need to surround themselves with a new team of knowledgeable people and expert policy-makers. This was important in order to formulate a new approach and to create refreshing ideas about how to engage with the problem. It is important, she said, not to resuscitate old teams of experts who have been involved in past mediation efforts, as their energies and ideas are spent. According to Ashrawi, “this is the most important advice to give any new administration.”

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator.

Gulf Gas Development: A Rational Development Strategy
2009-11-11 08:00 - 18:00
On November 11, 2009, Justin Dargin, a Research Fellow with The Dubai Initiative at Harvard University and a Fulbright Scholar of the Middle East, was invited by CIRS to deliver a lecture on “Gulf Gas Development: A Rational Development Strategy” to Georgetown University in Qatar faculty and staff. The lecture focused on the basics of the Gulf Gas/Power Sector and how the countries of the GCC are facing the current energy challenges.

Dargin maintained that “the Gulf region is home to some of the largest natural gas reserves: 23% of global total” but because there is “only 8% of global production,” there is great future potential to tap into these reserves to facilitate increased production. Qatar, he said, is the world’s number one Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) exporter since 2006. “With the exception of Qatar,” Dargin noted, “every GCC member is facing a gas shortage.” By developing its natural gas sector, Qatar’s industrial development program rivals the traditional oil production projects of its neighbors.

Gulf Gas Development: A Rational Development Strategy from Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Over the last few decades, the Gulf states have experienced a tremendous injection of wealth to their local economies. This has had major effects on the infrastructure and population of the countries and all the related demands that these expansions entail. Currently, there is a “demographic explosion” of imported labor that far outstrips local populations and “a major push for industrialization” combined with a “need for desalination projects.” Because the GCC is growing at an unprecedented pace, various developments are needed to sustain the future of GCC infrastructure and economies. In this respect, Dargin argued that “the GCC will need to add 60 gigawatts (GW) of additional power between 2009 and 2015, which represents 80% of current capacity.”

Going through case studies for each Gulf state, Dargin pointed out how the “gas crunch” has affected these countries’ individual economies. Saudi Arabia is experiencing problems because “recent OPEC quotas prevented it from supplying additional gas to the domestic sector, thus increasing the reliance on liquid fuels,” and in Kuwait, the UAE and Oman, “there will not be enough gas to meet the demand increase,” argued Dargin.

The ramifications, Dargin noted, is that the domestic price paid for gas and electricity is too low, which “distorts investment and consumption decisions. It dampened interest for regional trading in favor of global LNG export.” He further added that “the main obstacle between the two regional suppliers, Iran and Qatar, and the regional consumers, Kuwait, UAE and Bahrain, has been pricing issues.”

Concluding the lecture with the future prospects of the energy sector in the GCC, Dargin said that there are, currently in the initiation phase, various ambitious projects being set up to exploit natural resources and to “stimulate domestic production.” Some of these initiatives include establishing domestic gas production facilities and investment in renewable and alternative energy plans such as “the GCC Nuclear plan, various solar and wind initiatives, and the Masdar Initiative.”

Dargin is a specialist in international law and energy law, and is a prolific author on energy affairs. He specializes in carbon trading, the global oil and gas market, the legal framework surrounding the Gulf energy sector, and Middle Eastern geopolitics. Dargin is the author of “The Dolphin Project: The Development of a Gulf Gas Initiative” (OIES Press January 2008), and the author of a book, entitled Desert Dreams: The Quest for Gulf Integration from the Arab Revolt to the Gulf Cooperation Council (forthcoming 2010).

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator.

John Crist on Global Trends in Protest
2009-11-10 08:00 - 18:00
John T. Crist, Assistant Dean for Academic Affairs at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar and an expert on social movements and peace and conflict studies, delivered his lecture, “From Gandhi to Twitter: Global Trends in Protest,” before a packed house of students, faculty, staff, and community members on November 10, 2009 as part of the CIRSMonthly Dialogue series.

Crist focused on the changing nature of social protest movements in the face of rapid globalization. He pointed to the shift away from activism directed at specific states towards movements and protests that transcend national boundaries.

Using the iconic anti-colonial protests led by Mahatma Gandhi on the Indian subcontinent during the early twentieth century as an example, Crist outlined the traditional state-targeted methods of social activism as a precedent for today’s increasingly borderless transnational protest movements. Contrary to popular perception, Gandhi’s emphasis on nonviolent civil disobedience delivered only partial success, according to Crist. However, nonviolent tactics were invaluable in creating broad popular support for the Indian National Congress. The group was, according to Crist, “the main vehicle that Gandhi and the Gandhians used to disseminate their ideas and their tactics of nonviolent action.” The Indian National Congress came to be recognized as the de-facto opposition government in colonized India, wielding great leverage because of its power as a social movement that mobilized millions against British rule across many constituencies.

Protest trends in the twenty-first century, Crist posited, have reflected the seismic influence of globalization, with interest groups from around the globe banding together to coordinate action. “The single-most important trend in social movements is the move away from the state as the principle target for protest activity,” Crist said. “This, of course, is the result of the power of globalization.”

The increased availability of funding sources, ease of travel, low cost of communication through technologies like the internet, and high-profile transnational forums such as the United Nations, have enabled issues groups to bring their protests to the international stage.

Crist noted that an unprecedented number of transnational coalitions that work to promote their coordinated initiatives and messages in multiple countries are currently being formed. A prime example of the new protest mold is the 350 Campaign, which is an environmental initiative that calls itself “a global grassroots campaign to stop the climate crisis.” According to Crist, on October 24, 2009, the group held concurrent events in 181 countries around the world, including in Qatar, to promote climate change advocacy. It seeks to provide its environmental allies in governments and organizations across the globe with leverage to prompt policy change. Global protest movements such as the 350Campaign hope that their coordinated international efforts will garner the attention of leaders in many nations while at the same time galvanizing local groups to continue their activities.

Crist also touched on the power that new technologies such as SMS-messaging and Twitter have had on grassroots activism. He pointed to the role that Twitter and texting played in orchestrating protests following the Iranian elections of June 2009. Through “tweets,” Iranians were able to send out instantaneous updates about unfolding events to help bolster their struggle, as well as to communicate with the international media outlets that have been barred by the Iranian government. The power of Twitter to influence the actions of the protestors on the ground as well as the international political structure were striking, according to Crist, who asserted that Twitter “had become, overnight, a tool for dramatic social change and a sticking point in U.S.-Iranian relations.”

Ending the lecture, Crist pointed out that not all modern grassroots protests facilitated by these new technologies are successful. Recent political protests in Moldova organized through the social networking site Facebook and through text messaging turned violent. In the absence of strong leadership with a clear message or strategy, Crist said, grassroots protests facilitated by communication technologies can easily become counterproductive or even destructive.

Dr. Crist is Assistant Dean for Academic Affairs at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar. He received his Ph.D. in Interdisciplinary Social Science from the Program on the Analysis and Resolution of Conflicts in the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University.

He taught courses in sociology, peace studies, conflict resolution, and research methods at the M.A. in Conflict Resolution Program on the Georgetown University main campus, the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Maxwell School at Syracuse University, the Peace Studies Program at Colgate University, and the Department of Sociology at the Catholic University of America. Professor Crist published journal articles and book reviews on social movements, nonviolent action, and the policing of demonstrations. He edited a special issue of the Journal of Contemporary Ethnography on ethnographic fieldwork in war zones and post-conflict settings. As a fellow of the Albert Einstein Institution, he conducted extensive archival research in England and India on the politics of nonviolent mobilization during the Gandhian anti-colonial struggle in India.

Article by Clare Malone. Clare is a Student Affairs Officer at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar.

Europe and the Gulf Region: Towards a New Horizon
2009-11-04 08:00 - 18:00
Christian-Peter Hanelt, Senior Expert on Europe and the Middle East at the Bertelsmann Stiftung, was invited by CIRS to give a lunchtime Focused Discussion entitled “Europe and the Gulf Region: Towards a New Horizon” to Georgetown University–Qatar faculty and staff on November 4, 2009.

Hanelt focused on the current relations between Europe and the Gulf region. He maintained that the GCC was an important political partner, energy supplier, and, in its efforts to diversify, a crucial investor in the European Union. “The EU and the Gulf,” he said, “are islands of stability” that are surrounded by economic and politic turbulence.

Advocating for the importance of strengthening ties within the European Union, Hanelt noted that those countries that are party to the Euro currency were significantly less affected by the recent global economic crisis than those that maintained their own currencies. The current reforms proposed by the Lisbon Treaty, Hanelt said, will undoubtedly affect the ways in which the European Union is structured, its future expansion, and its relationships with its neighbors as well as with the larger international community. Issues of European Union expansion to include Turkey are of particular significance in the years to come and will have direct consequences on its relationships with the Middle East and the Gulf.

Currently, the EU works with Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries in various state-building and soft power initiatives and Qatar’s prolific conflict resolution plans, he said, are of particular importance to its rapport with the European Union.

In terms of possible future collaborative projects between the EU and the Gulf, Hanelt predicted that the most important areas of synergy will be on issues of sustainability and the setting up of mutually beneficial agricultural, solar, and energy plans. Hanelt said that “both the GCC and the EU depend on functioning global markets and there is a need for more cooperation and dialogue on how to work together in the G20.”

In looking at the future of EU-GCC relations, Hanelt suggested that the EU and the GCC could collaborate on a variety of free trade agreements such as those that have been negotiated between the GCC and the United States. Other areas of accord could involve higher education initiatives, research, and dialogue on issues of regional security challenges.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator.

Water, Energy, and Climate Change in the Gulf
2009-11-02 08:00 - 18:00
CIRS organized a panel presentation on the issues of “Water, Energy, and Climate Change in the Gulf.” The panel, chaired by the Interim Dean of GU-Q Mehran Kamrava, was made up of Professor Tim Beach of Georgetown University, Professor Sharif Elmusa of Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, and Mari Luomi, a researcher at The Finnish Institute for International Affairs and a PhD candidate at Durham University. All three experts approached the panel topics from their unique disciplinary perspectives of geoscience, environmental politics, and political science respectively.

Click here to download an MP3 of the panel discussion

Tim Beach gave the first presentation in which he illustrated the state of the world’s biodiversity in the current ecological climate and how its degradation relates directly to issues of diminished resources and, ultimately, to issues of human rights. He argued that “the world and the Gulf are faced with solving two ends in the equation of water.” One aspect of the politics of water is to maintain ecosystems and the other is to provide adequate amounts of water for direct human needs and uses. Currently, with increases in global population numbers and temperature levels, there is a water deficit in many parts of the world. Beach maintained that “in the last hundred years or so, about half of the world’s wetlands have disappeared.”

Currently, “wetlands cover 6% of the world, but provide a disproportionate amount of the ecosystem services to humanity and form hotspots for biodiversity” as they have a high net primary productivity, Beach said. “Currently however, he noted that “wetlands face continuous threats,” and there are many areas of disappearing wetlands around the globe due to human agricultural and farming projects as well climate change effects. Beach argued that wetlands, marshes, and mangroves are some of the most important areas for ecosystem services such as fish, wildlife, and soil habitats. Critically, from an environmental economic perspective, apart from being habitats for endangered species and spawning grounds for fishing industries, Beach explained that “wetlands are natural water quality improvers” and so, in the long run, their worth per hectare is far greater than prime farmland. As such, “wetlands are natural carbon sequestration areas” that need proper maintenance for their full potential to be activated. As a final thought, Beach argued that water is a basic human right that needs to be protected through United Nations declarations and supported through development programs in the impoverished areas of the world. Human interactions with wetlands do not have to be degrading, but it is possible to learn from various tribes in South America who have a symbiotic and long-term sustainable relationship with these areas. Sharif Elmusa gave the second presentation on the subject of “debating water and oil wars” in the Middle East. He argued that water wars, although long predicted, have not come to pass, but what we have instead are wars over oil. The reason for this, he argued, is because water is of regional significance, it is not a resource sold on the world market. The primary reason there is international political interest in the dearth of water is that it could lead to the disruption of oil supplies. Countries with valuable resources – ones that can be appropriated and sold on the world market – are more likely to suffer violent conflict than countries that do not, and oil qualifies as one of these finite and highly sought-after resources. Elmusa explained that these resources do not only underlie armed conflicts, but help in the prolongation and intensification of existing ones; “you cannot understand what is happening in Iraq today, without understanding the role of oil in the civil war that is taking place,” he said. In this regard, Elmusa, quoting Gary Wills, said that the United States has had two long-standing and active interests in the Gulf area and its fossil fuels. One goal “is to guarantee the secure supply of oil to the industrialized countries, and the second is to prevent any hostile power from acquiring political or military control over those resources.” Historically, “any attempt by an outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region was regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America,” he added. This entrenched mindset was translated into the two American-led wars involving Iraq. While 9/11 may have triggered the 2003 war, as some have claimed, it would not have happened without the prior fixation on “securing” the oil supply from the region. Elmusa noted that although “water is scarce and is going to become even scarcer because of rapid population growth, urbanization, and global warming,” he speculated further on why wars were fought over oil rather than water. Water, he argued, flows across countries, but oil does not. To get oil, you must go to the source.

If however, a war was to be waged over water, it would happen among the downstream Arab states, the reason being their dependence on the geography and the distribution of power in each basin. Syria, for instance, cannot go to war with Turkey over the Euphrates River because Turkey is much stronger militarily and because taking over the origins of this watercourse would entail domination over millions of Kurds. However, Syria and Iraq could find themselves engaged in military confrontation if Turkey does not release enough water for the two states. The same could happen in the Nile basin between Egypt and Sudan, because Egypt cannot project its military away from its immediate borders to Ethiopia, the source of the bulk of the Nile’s flow. But this, he said, depends on the unknown future of Sudan itself.

In conclusion, Elmusa explained that avoiding water or oil wars in the future requires that we stop thinking of these wars as political possibilities, and begin thinking innovatively of viable alternatives.

The third and final speaker, Mari Luomi, presented a political science perspective of the pressures and potential sources of threat that climate change poses to the Gulf monarchies. She argued that “climate change itself is envisaged to have different kinds of negative consequences that could potentially be destabilizing for the countries of the Middle East.” Although this was the case, Luomi warned that discussing climate change within a strict security framework could lead to emphasizing adaptation measures over mitigation as well as shifting approaches to the problem from multilateralism to unilateralism and responsibility from the individual to the state. She argued that “the six Gulf Cooperation Council states, particularly the four OPEC member states – Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, and Qatar – perceive climate change mitigation as a threat to their economies.”

The negative consequences of climate change affect the physical, social, and economic aspects of any country or region. The physical consequences include temperature and sea-level rise, changes in precipitation, and intensity and frequency of natural disasters. Social consequences include problems with food and water security, migration, and instability and, finally, in terms of economic consequences, “the cost of delayed action to fight climate change will be higher than that of prompt action,” she said.

With regards to the Middle East, Luomi explained that there is a dearth of historic data recording past weather patterns and climate change effects, but because of the region’s water scarcity, and pockets of political instability, it is considered to be one of the most vulnerable areas in the world. However, in the international negotiations on climate change, the OPEC countries have concentrated in emphasizing the potential negative consequences that policies and actions of the industrialized countries to mitigate climate change might have on their oil revenue in the long term.

In terms of responsibility for alleviating climate change, she noted that “although it is indisputably the industrialized states that bear the responsibility for climate change, and should take the lead in fighting it, developing states will have to understand that the battle can only be won if everyone participates according to their capabilities.”

Concluding the final presentation, Luomi explained that climate change presents the Gulf countries with opportunities that could be actively exploited. She argued that “there are tangible financial benefits to be gained through decarbonizing Qatar’s energy economy by exploring energy efficiency, solar energy, and carbon trade.” To this effect, new ministries for the environment are being set up in many Gulf states that try to project new images of themselves as an energy-efficient and sustainable countries by investing in a variety of alternative energy projects and initiatives.

Finally, because there is a regional leadership vacuum in the Gulf and in the Middle East, “Qatar should, among other things, seek to develop technologies and solutions related to natural gas, which is widely seen as a transitional fuel,” Luomi said.

Panelist Biographies

Tim Beach holds the Cinco Hermanos Chair in Environment and International Affairs and is Professor of Geography and Geoscience and Director of the School of Foreign Service’s Program in Science, Technology, & International Affairs (STIA) for 2009-2010. He was the Director of Georgetown University’s Center for the Environment from 1999 to 2007. His research focuses on soils, agriculture, environment change and geoarchaeology. He also teaches courses in physical geography (climatology, hydrology, geomorphology, and environmental management) and how these relate to international management and policy in the STIA and environmental studies programs.

Sharif Elmusa is Visiting Associate Professor at Georgetown University in Qatar from the American University in Cairo, Egypt, where he is an associate professor in the Political Science Department. He teaches courses on sustainable development; global environmental politics; technology and culture and industrialization; and the everyday politics of Palestine. His research and writing covers environmental politics, including hydropolitics, resources conflict/ cooperation, culture and the natural environment.

Mari Luomi is currently a Researcher at The Finnish Institute for International Affairs and is completing her PhD on the energy security and climate change attitudes of small Gulf states at Durham University.

Article by Suzi Mirgani. Suzi is CIRS Publications Coordinator.

Mahmood Mamdani on "Mass Violence and Reconciliation"
2009-11-01 12:00 - 13:00
On November 1, 2009, Mahmood Mamdani, Herbert Lehman Professor of Government and Professor of Anthropology at Columbia University, gave a lecture to Georgetown students, faculty, and staff. The event was sponsored by the Georgetown University-Qatar Culture and Politics (CULP) program, headed by Professor Rogaia Abusharaf, the Georgetown University-Qatar African Society student club, and the Arab Democracy Foundation. Mamdani began the lecture by explaining that much of his recent work focuses on issues of mass violence and reconciliation, such as the historical events that took place during the apartheid era in South Africa, the genocide in Rwanda, and, more recently, in Darfur. In order to contextualize these events during his research, he noted that he began by examining various human rights organizations and their writings and, he said, became increasingly skeptical about the data and the means of presenting these findings to the international community.

Over the years, Mamdani said, many of the most respected human rights organizations have developed formulaic patterns of research, the purpose of which is to identify the perpetrator, first and foremost, and then the victim. At the heart of this approach, he said, is a demand for punishment and for these atrocities to be treated as crimes. Mamdani explained that “if you look at conflict situations in the African context, what you confront is not just a set of events, but you confront a cycle of violence – an ongoing cycle of violence.” When the Rwandan genocide is placed in this context, the victim and perpetrator trade places as each side has a victim narrative, he argued. Human rights literature advocates punishment as a means of ending cycles of violence, but the core issue itself, why the violence arose in the first instance, is not fully addressed. There are two ways of approaching the core issues of any conflict situation, Mamdani said. One way is to blame the perpetrator as an explanation of the violence and to point to the psychology, identity, or culture of the perpetrator as being the reason for conflict. He argued that “the tendency to define victim and perpetrator in absolute terms has lent itself to a demonization process and, ironically, one of the worst tendencies in the human rights movement, which drives it to demonize perpetrators, undercuts it.” He argued that “the framing in terms of crime and punishment, basically says that the only solution to violence is more violence – the only difference being, theirs is bad violence and ours is good violence; ours is the violence meant to stop violence.”

Currently, the paradigm of how to deal with mass civil conflict is a result of the Nuremberg trails, which maintained that “political orders are not a sufficient excuse and that every individual and state official must take full responsibility for what they have done.” He added that “the Nuremberg model was based on two assumptions: one assumption was that the conflict has ended – there is a victor and, therefore, crimes can be de- fined, identified, and punished under the rule of the victor.” The second assumption “is that perpetrators and victims will not have to live together.” But in the case of South African apartheid, neither of these assumptions held true, “there was no victor” and “there was no Israel for the victims” as both oppressor and oppressed had to live alongside each other after the cessation of apartheid. In this instance, there was a need to “decriminalize” the oppressors and their policies, and “treat them as political adversaries.”

South African apartheid was a problem of “the definition of political society.” Indeed, “in this context,” he argued, “part of the challenge was the founding of a new political society; a foundation which would lay the basis for the rule of law.” Therefore “part of the trade-off was that there would be no criminal trials.” Mamdani said that “the focus was on political justice, not criminal justice” and that is why “the South African model is more relevant to the kind of post-colonial conflict in African situations, which is actually about the foundation of a new political order.”

Concluding with his thoughts on the situation in Darfur, Mamdani argued that through modern movements such as the Save Darfur campaign, there has been a tendency to “commoditize” the conflict through celebrity publicity, a dramatization of events, and an emotional appeal to the international community, rather than addressing the political problems and explaining the issues.

Mehran Kamrava Lectures to HEC School of Management, Paris
2009-10-25 08:00 - 18:00
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS Director and Interim Dean of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, lectured to a group of French scholars from the HEC on the Geopolitics of the Gulf. Kamrava gave a broad overview of the relationships between the Gulf states and how these associations are shaped by the geopolitics of the region.

Through a series of topographic and geopolitical maps, Kamrava looked at how the Gulf region has progressed into a series of nation states in the post-Ottoman period. Many of these countries were voluntarily under the tutelage of British protection as a means to safeguard their interests against Iran. He argued that the Gulf states gained their independence at various periods in the twentieth century, the oldest being the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which was established in the 1930s. The UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain all gained their independence in the 1970s, after Britain vacated the areas east of the Suez Canal.

View the presentation from lecture below:

Geopolitics of the Gulf from Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
As such, most of the Gulf states came into existence relatively recently, although the tribes and peoples that inhabit these areas are ancient groupings who have lived for centuries in sporadic fishing and pearling villages. In the past, there were no major urban centers but merely villages where wealthy families were later to emerge as the merchant classes and became the rulers of their regions. Kamrava maintained that “the national youth of these countries has significant consequences regarding economic development, the patterns of state-society relationships, and how political leaders assert their rule over their societies and the kinds of vision that they are able to articulate. These are recent political entities with very recent political histories.”

By the 1950s, the Gulf states become tremendously resource-wealthy, with an abundance of exploitable natural resources. Therefore, Kamrava argued, rentierism, or “the rent and the interest that they accrued from the sale of oil, become their economic mainstay.” As such, “the state-building in these countries is consistent with economic penetration of the West. If you look at the modern map of the region, particularly in places like Saudi Arabia, you see that state-building is simultaneous with massive amounts of wealth being pumped into the economy.”

In terms of existing boundaries, there are still several border disputes between many of the Gulf states. One major dispute, Kamrava noted, exists between Kuwait, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Although in recent years these border disputes have not erupted into open warfare, this was precisely the reason for Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

Turning to economic issues, Kamrava called attention to the increasing projected demand for oil in the coming decades, with the estimated 21.7 million bbl/d (barrels a day) that was being produced in the Gulf region in 2000 rising to 30.7 million bbl/d by 2010 and 42.9 million bbl/d by 2020. The Gulf’s share of world production is estimated to rise from 28 percent in 2000 to 35 percent in 2020. Not surprisingly, with very small population sizes, in recent decades, the Gulf states have registered some of the highest GNP & GDP average annual growth rates in the world.

Massive economic wealth has not made these states immune to the global economic downturn. In fact, according to Kamrava, the GCC state’s exposure to the global financial crisis has hit six areas particularly hard:

Direct banking sector exposure to toxic assets;
Sudden stop/reversal in foreign capital inflows;
Weaker non-commodity export growth;
Plunge in commodity prices, most notably crude oil; and,
Faltering demand for energy-intensive industrial and building materials.

Kamrava noted that there has been a 60 percent fall in GCC hydrocarbons revenue in 2009, to around $200 billion. This, he argued, has had five notable consequences. It has, first and foremost, led to a sharp decline in liquidity and assets that fueled the 2002-2009 business growth spurt. Second, there has been a steady growth deceleration in all economic sectors. Third, there has also been a steady decline in inflation, especially in real estate and other consumer indices, leading to a fourth consequence, namely a wave of consolidation across several sectors, particularly among small and medium-size enterprises. Fifth and last, built-in structural resilience and growth momentum will make Qatar less susceptible to downturn, followed by Abu Dhabi, and Saudi Arabia.

Summary by Suzi Mirgani. Suzi is CIRS Publications Coordinator.

Carol Lancaster on Wealth and Power in the New International Order
2009-10-12 08:00 - 18:00
Carol Lancaster, Interim Dean of the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University in Washington, DC, was invited to Doha to give a CIRS Distinguished Lecture on the topic of “Wealth and Power in the ‘New International Order.’” Lancaster was introduced by Lamia Adi, a sophomore GU-Q student and President of the DC-Qatar Forum, which fosters inter-cultural dialogue between students on the DC and the Qatar campuses.

In addition to an extensive career in government, Lancaster has been a consultant for the United Nations, the World Bank, and numerous other organizations. She serves on the board of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Vital Voices, the Society for International Development, and the advisory board for Center for Global Development.

Beginning the evening’s lecture, Lancaster said that the “basic message today is that we are living in a slow-moving and fundamental transition in wealth and power in the world, involving changes in the distribution of wealth, a redefinition of power, and challenges to world order.”

It was necessary, Lancaster argued, to answer three broad questions in order to elaborate upon the reasons for these paradigmatic shifts, including: 1) What was the nature of the “old world order”? 2) What changes have occurred that have contributed to a different world today? and 3) What are the consequences for international balances of power, wealth, and order?

The “old world order,” Lancaster noted, was largely defined as being state-centric; states were the major actors, and had the ability to use their power to effective ends. The two “super powers” of the United States and the Soviet Union that dominated the international scene for many decades of the twentieth century were prime examples. As such, Lancaster argued that one of the markers for the end of the “old world order” could be defined as the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. She added that, to a certain extent, we miss “the certainties and the clarity that made the old world order, if not bearable, at least, understandable and often predictable.” In the “new world order,” Lancaster argued, “the state has not ended and is not going to end. States are still the major actors in the world but military force, as the United States has demonstrated in the last four or five years, is not enough to control events.”

Further, in the “old world order,” wealth across the globe, Lancaster said, was concentrated and imbalanced and still is, to a certain degree, but not as sharply as it was in the past. The hemispheric divides that were characterized by a rich North and a poor South are now being blurred as there has been tremendous economic and social progress in many of the countries that were once considered “Third World” and under-developed. Lancaster argued that “not only has there been progress, but that progress has been enough in some parts of the world so that the old names of ‘the rich North’ and ‘the poor South’ are no longer relevant, and we have a much more diverse world” as a result. This, she maintained, has lead to increasing international economic inter-dependence between nations, which is mostly beneficial, but is also a key factor in the current global economic recessions.

View the presentation from lecture below:

Wealth and Power in the New World Order from Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Adumbrating the causes that have lead to these changes, Lancaster said that the most important factors were related to revolutionary advancements in technology; achievements in global education and access to knowledge along with an increase in life expectancy; developments in a country’s capacity that makes full use of its human and natural resources; and growing prosperity that can be considered both an effect and a cause of these factors. Although we think we are living in a time that is marked by various global conflicts, Lancaster said “the data show that the number of conflicts – civil conflicts in particular – have declined since the early 90s” and so the new world order can be largely characterized by relative political stability.

Another major change that will define the “new world order,” Lancaster noted, is related to demography and the changing nature of the world’s population. Current prosperous nations have largely ageing populations, whilst developing countries have youthful populations, which will necessarily shift the entire international economic and social patterns of the future. With an estimated world population of 9 billion in 2050, this will have dramatic effect on resources and climate.

Concluding the lecture, Lancaster argued that globalization in the form of international social and economic integration has been vital to the de-concentration and distribution of wealth and the redefinition and decentralization of power. As a result, we have seen the dynamic emergence and influence of non-state actors, including international organizations – both benevolent and malevolent, informal networks, and individuals connecting with one another across boundaries. There is strength and yet, at the same time, great vulnerability in such an interdependent world.

Dr. Lancaster is Interim Dean of the School of Foreign Service in Washington, DC. She is also a Professor of Politics in the School of Foreign Service with a joint appointment in the Department of Government.

She has been a Carnegie Fellow and a recipient of a fellowship from the American Council of Learned Societies. She has also been a Congressional Fellow, a Fulbright Fellow and a visiting fellow at the Institute for International Economics and (currently) the Center for Global Development.

Dr. Lancaster has also had an extensive career in government. She was the Deputy Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development from 1993 to 1996. She worked at the U.S. State Department as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 1980-81 and for the Policy Planning Staff from 1977-80. In addition, she has been a Congressional Fellow and worked for the Office of Management and Budget.

She has been a consultant for the United Nations, the World Bank and numerous other organizations. She serves on the board of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Vital Voices, the Society for International Development and the advisory board for Center for Global Development.

Article by Suzi Mirgani. Suzi is CIRS Publications Coordinator.

CIRS and GRC Al-Jisr Project
2009-10-11 08:00 - 2009-10-14 18:00
On October 11–14, 2009, the Al-Jisr working group participants were invited to Doha by CIRS and the Gulf Research Center (GRC) to conduct the project’s second meeting. Supported by the European Commission, Al-Jisr is a two-year project on “Public Diplomacy and Outreach devoted to the European Union and EU-GCC Relations.” The initiative aims to enhance public as well as professional knowledge and understanding of the European Union and its policies and institutions among GCC citizens.

Over the course of two years, the Al-Jisr working group participants are to conduct research on a multitude of issues related to the EU and GCC ranging from higher education analysis to political reform and trade relations between the two entities.

During the Doha meeting, Al-Jisr project leaders Christian Koch and Giacomo Luciani gave an overview of the meeting’s main aims and objectives, citing it to be comprehensive research and the results of which will be invaluable to EU and GCC policy toward each other.

Most of the topics under discussion were focused on outlining the economic status of GCC countries and in-depth analysis of particular economic enterprises ranging from oil and gas production and exports to exchange rate policies and joint venture formations between the EU and GCC countries. In addition, a wide range of related subjects such as economic diversification into alternative and nuclear energies, tourism, and other socio-economic initiatives were also discussed. At the project’s conclusion, all the chapters will be published as an edited volume which will be instrumental in guiding future EU-GCC policies.

Participants and Discussants include:

Christian Koch, GRCF, GenevaGiacomo Luciani, GRC Al-Jisr ProjectZahra Babar, CIRS, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarSelen Guerin, The Centre for European Policy Studies, BrusselsJohn Sasuya, GRCJoerg Beutel, Konstanz University of Applied SciencesAli Aissaoui, APICORPHans-Georg Müller, GTZ, DamascusMehran Kamrava, CIRS, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar Carol Lancaser, Georgetown UniversityEckart Wörtz, GRC, Dubai Attiya Ahmad, Duke Islamic Studies CenterJocelyn Mitchell, Georgetown UniversityNate Hodson, Princeton UniversityRachida Amsaghrou, GRCF, GenevaAna Echagüe, FRIDE, MadridRaja Alkami, Asian Studies CenterShannon McNulty, Texas A&M University at QatarKenneth Wilson, National Research Foundation, UAESteffen Hertog, Sciences Po, ParisKhalid Almezaini, University of ExeterEdward Burke, FRIDE, MadridAbdelkader Latrèche, Government of Planning, QatarNatalia Alshakhanbeh, World Trade Organization, GenevaSuzi Mirgani, CIRS, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarAbdullah Baabood, GRC Cambridge Radhika Kanchana, Sciences Po, Paris

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator

Robert Wirsing on the Af-Pak Misadventure
2009-10-05 08:00 - 18:00
Robert Wirsing, Visiting Professor of International Relations at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, delivered the October CIRS Monthly Dialogue on the topic of “The Af-Pak Misadventure: Where is America’s ‘Long War’ Heading?…And Why?”

Introducing the issues, Wirsing noted that he did not necessarily approve of the designation “Af-Pak” but drew attention to its formal use by the United States government as part of its wider international relations terminology.

The lecture was premised on four main questions related to the current situations in Afghanistan and Pakistan: 1) What is the war in Afghanistan all about? 2) What are the five obstacles confronting the Obama administration in the “Af-Pak” war? 3) What are Obama’s fundamental options in this war? and; 4) What should the Obama administration do to bring this war to a conclusion?

View the presentation from lecture below:

The Af-Pak Misadventure: Where is America’s ‘Long War’ Heading?…And Why? from Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
In order to introduce a general background of the current military operations taking place in the region, Wirsing gave some figures related to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, which is made-up of United States, NATO, and other allies. “The U.S. currently has approximately 68,000 troops either deployed or on route to Afghanistan” and “NATO has about 38,000 troops” so “there is a total of 106,000 troops of the ISAF forces in Afghanistan.” He noted that it was more difficult to record the exact number of Taliban insurgents, but “back in 2007, the New York Times estimate was 10,000 fighters, but only 3,000 full-time, which is not very much in a country the size of Afghanistan. The government in Kabul more recently, in February 2009, gave a figure of 10-15,000.” Nonetheless, Wirsing noted that “no estimate suggests that this is a vast insurgency.”

Wirsing also stated the costs of fighting the war in Afghanistan by saying that “the United States and NATO together, essentially the Bush administration, from November 2001 to December 2008, had spent overtly 281 billion dollars on the war in Afghanistan. Covert expenditures would enlarge that substantially.”

In order to answer the question “What is the war in Afghanistan all about?” Wirsing noted that he had to clarify what was driving the insurgency as well as U.S. policy in the region. “A very common explanation is Islamic extremism” and Islamic madrassa indoctrinated fanaticism. But Wirsing argued that “religious extremism is not the sole or even most important driver” of the war and would go so far as “to dismiss religion and religious extremism almost entirely.” He argued that “the madrassa issue is a red herring and always has been a distraction from what is really going on in this region.” Other reasons for the war that have been proposed are factional tribal identities, the rise of mercenary insurgents fighting the war for a wage, revenge and hatred of America, and a traditional aversion to occupying forces.

Insofar as the main drivers of American policy are concerned, Wirsing argued that “America has a much broader agenda in Central Asia than chasing Al Qaeda; its agenda has a lot to do with geography.” As such, he introduced into the discussion “the enormous importance of energy security, energy resources, oil, and gas.” These issues, he said, were the primary reasons for American presence in Afghanistan. Wirsing argued that Afghanistan’s strategic position, bordering a number of energy producing countries, means that it is a potentially important conduit between South and Central Asia. These resources could be exploited and transported rather than being contained, as they currently are, between the two giants of China and Russia. Wirsing quoted from U.S. legislation regarding the region, entitled the Silk Road Strategy Act, which details United States significant long-term interests in the region from security to energy and economic development. This Act outlines American policy regarding development of infrastructure in Central Asia, such as pipelines, transportation routes, and export opportunities for otherwise landlocked nations. Wirsing argued that “it is odd that much of the debate that goes on in North America generally, so often omits mention of energy, oil, and gas, which I regard as hugely important.” He pointed out the many tactics in place for “ensuring American and Western access to these tremendous resources, the potential of which could be vast,” possibly up to $15 trillion in petroleum and natural gas resources in the Caspian region alone. Wirsing emphasized that “Afghanistan’s strategic importance goes way beyond containment of a terrorist threat and it also implies a prolonged Western presence.”

In describing the “the five obstacles confronting the Obama administration in the Af-Pak war,” Wirsing listed them as a) Waning public, congressional, and Democratic Party support in America b) Disenchantment with the Afghan government in Kabul magnified by election fraud and its undermined legitimacy c) Pakistan’s less than perfect fit as America’s ally in the “war on terrorism” d) The impracticality of Obama’s promise of greater regional collaboration and finally, e) The need for Obama to avoid the appearance of weakness and indecisiveness. “If Obama chooses to do nothing or chooses to exit or reduce American forces, it might appear as a failure of political will in America’s Af-Pak policy.”

Wirsing outlined the options open to the Obama administration, including the most viable in his opinion which is to escalate by adding more troops. He argued that the only option he believes to be viable is to back a troop surge in Afghanistan and put an end to an already lengthy war.

According to Wirsing, the short-term solutions open to the Obama administration include an immediate troop surge; a shift from offensive to defensive counter-insurgency by withdrawing troops from exposed areas to selected urban centers to provide security for as much of Afghan population as possible; prioritizing a major reduction in civilian casualties by suspending unmanned drone attacks; fully implementing the Congressionally endorsed increase in aid to Pakistan; and, finally, encouraging Pakistani cooperation in Afghanistan.

The long-term initiatives that the Obama administration could implement range from pursuing opportunities for talks with the Taliban elements over power-sharing to endorsing the Iran, Pakistan, India (IPI) gas pipeline, and urging consideration of a civilian nuclear agreement with Pakistan akin to that reached with India.

Dr. Wirsing is Visiting Professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service at Qatar. A specialist on South Asian politics and international relations, he has made over forty research trips to the South Asian region since 1965. His publications include:Pakistan’s Security Under Zia, 1977-1988 (St. Martin’s Press, 1991); India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute (St. Martin’s Press, 1994); Kashmir in the Shadow of War (M. E. Sharpe, 2002); Religious Radicalism & Security in South Asia, co-editor (Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004); Ethnic Diasporas & Great Power Strategies in Asia, co-editor (India Research Press, 2007); and Baloch Nationalism and the Geopolitics of Energy Resources: The Changing Context of Separatism in Pakistan (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April 2008). His recent research focuses primarily on the politics and diplomacy of natural resources (water and energy) in South Asia.

Article by Suzi Mirgani. Suzi is CIRS Publications Coordinator.

Alexis Antoniades on the Future Global Economy
2009-09-08 08:00 - 18:00
Resuming its annual Public Affairs Programming series after the summer break, CIRS kicked off the 2009-2010 academic year with a Monthly Dialogue lecture by Alexis Antoniades, professor of economics at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar. The Monthly Dialogue, entitled “The Future of the Global Economy,” took place on September 8, 2009 and was attended by ambassadors and embassy representatives, Georgetown University and Education City faculty, as well as interested members of the public.

Dr. Antoniades spoke on three distinct areas: he took the audience through a general overview of the current economic recession and its relationship to past events, he then relayed the consequences of the crises and its international impact, and, finally, he outlined several short-term and long-term recovery strategies for overcoming the current crisis. Noting that in order to predict what the future of the global economy might look like, Antoniades said that it was necessary to first analyze the factors that have produced the current situation. The global economic crisis that began in 2008, he noted, was unlike any of the past international recessions, and did not fall into any certified pattern.

Summarizing the consequences of the global recession on the United States, he noted that “we have extremely high unemployment now and it will probably not come down anytime soon. We have lower trade, lower output, lower consumption spending, and a higher savings rate. This is not typical of past recessions.” Antoniades showed comparisons between different economic recessions at different historical and geographical points, including the great 1920s depression in the United States and the recession in Japan in the 1990s.

The primary trigger for the current economic decline was located in the housing market in the United States. The sub-prime crisis, Antoniades said, was caused by a number of factors, starting with the Clinton administration in the United States and its active push for a home-ownership scheme. Banks acted accordingly, giving out loans to applicants regardless of their high-risk status and their inability to honor the pay-back schemes. Banks, investment firms, and other related finance institutions, by selling off their loans and increasing their leverage, engaged in a number of financial innovations and manipulations rather than monitoring the activities played out in the housing market. The simultaneous increase in interest rates, house prices, and loans meant that this real-estate bubble had to burst.

A major consequence of the current financial crisis is the increasing rate of unemployment. It is important to note, Antoniades said, that it is not just the magnitude of unemployment that is of concern, but the speed at which it has escalated. Currently, in the Unites States, “unemployment is at 9.7%, and is expected to go up.” This figure, he said, actually understates the rate of unemployment because it does not take into account the percentage of discouraged workers: people “who decide to exit the labor force, to take early retirement or who decide to go back to school.” If these were added to the count, “the number would actually be 11%.” By looking at the last two recessions in the United States, “we notice that unemployment doesn’t actually go down after the end of the recession; it keeps going up, so things do not look good.” Another interesting measure, Antoniades noted, is “capacity utilization,” which measures how much of a country’s economy is being utilized. He noted that “at this point, the U.S. economy is working at 67-68% of its capacity, the lowest it has been since 1962.”

[Graph showing unemployment levels in the US] American consumers are known for being resilient and for being big spenders, but the recession has curbed this attitude. Antoniades argued that “Consumers will become savers. This is something new for the U.S. economy.” He noted that “This is the first time that we have a positive savings rate; it went up to 7% in May, where it used to be 0% before.”

To have sustainable growth and a sustainable recovery, there needs to be consumer confidence: people need to spend so that money circulates and creates growth in the economy. Firms and businesses also need to invest in new endeavors to raise output and facilitate growth. But this cycle is broken because, for growth to happen, consumers and businesses need to acquire loans from banks, which is something that is unlikely to occur in the current frugal climate.

Many analysts and economists determine recoveries, Antoniades said, as either V shaped, meaning that the economy declines, but there is a speedy recovery; U-shaped, meaning the economy declines, remains down for a while, and then recovers; or L-shaped, meaning that the economy declines and then flat-lines, making the recovery a long and arduous process. He argued that in his opinion, an L-shape recovery would be closest to what the current global economy is currently experiencing in its recovery phase.

According to Antoniades, as a consequence of the current global economic recession, there will be major restructuring and rebalancing of the U.S. economy, but it will not go back to its former state, and “this,” he noted, “is not a bad thing.” Although high unemployment is undesirable, high savings rates and low debts are a positive. For these reasons, it is impossible for the U.S. economic recovery to result from domestic spending in the short-run. Antoniades argued that “the recovery will come from abroad, especially Asian countries and countries with big economies – Brazil, Russia, India, and China.” China, in particular, will stimulate the global recovery, as it will outperform all other countries in the coming years leading to enormous growth. As China grows, consumers will start spending more and saving less. This change in consumption behavior by the Chinese will increase the demand for consumption goods, especially for goods imported from advanced economies like the United States. Consequently, advanced economies will be able to exit the prolonged recession through this export-led recovery.

Although the U.S. has long been the world leader in innovation, education, and technology, in the long-run, these other developing countries will catch-up in record time. The rapid growth of these developing economies, however, will put enormous stress on the environment and on resources, which will cause long-term degradation and pollution. Antoniades concluded on a positive note for the United States by arguing that “there is an opportunity here for advanced economies,” because they still have superior technological ability in comparison to the rest of the world. The U.S. can thus “invest in clean and green technology and then export their expertise and products to China and the other Asian countries,” thereby facilitating innovation and maintaining its pole position in the world economy.

[Pie Charts comparing the growth in US and Developing Economies] Alexis Antoniades is Visiting Assistant Professor at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Services in Qatar. He received a B.A. in Mathematics and in Economics from the University of Wisconsin at Madison in 2001 as a Fulbright Scholar, and a Ph.D. in economics from Columbia University in 2008. In 2001-2002, Antoniades worked as assistant economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York where he co-authored two papers on forecasting inflation and on developing an index for activity in the technology sector. The Bank now publishes this tech index monthly. His current research focuses on inflation issues, and on the effects of monetary unions and exchange rates. He is awarded a three-year Qatar National Research Fund grant to undertake the first microstrudy on the economies of the Gulf countries. He advices the Qatar Statistics Authority on harmonizing inflation measures across the Gulf countries and collaborates with the Qatar Central Bank on monetary policy issues. At GU-Q, professor Antoniades teaches courses on international finance, international trade, and money and banking.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator.

Presidential Elections in Iran by Mehrzad Boroujerdi
2009-06-14 08:00 - 18:00
CIRS hosted a discussion on the Iranian presidential elections on June 14, 2009, featuring Dr. Mehrzad Boroujerdi, an Associate Professor of Political Science at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University. Professor Boroujerdi is engaged in a broad, empirical study of the Iranian political elites. Guests included a number of ambassadors and diplomats resident in Qatar, educational experts from Qatar University, as well as Georgetown University faculty.

Boroujerdi began by framing the current elections and their results within a historical perspective, before proceeding through an analysis of what happened in Iran on June 12th 2009, the subsequent public reaction to the results, and what impact this might have on the future shape of the Iranian political system.

Through graphs and other statistical evidence Boroujerdi highlighted particular trends from previous Iranian presidential elections, the novel features of this particular election, as well as statistical data necessary for determining the legitimacy of the current election results.

Boroujerdi pointed out that despite the role of the president being limited in Iran’s political structure, the ten elections held for the position since the revolution have been actively contested. In the early days of the revolution, the requirements for being eligible to run for the office were low, but in more recent years the ruling elites, and in particular the Supreme Leader, have strictly limited the number of eligible candidates to the cream of the crop.

Boroujerdi felt that there was little chance that President Ahmedinejad was the genuine winner of the elections with the announced margin of victory.

In order to address the question of why so many people are suspicious of the election results, Boroujerdi presented a series of graphs of the figures just released by the Iranian Election Commission. According to the data given out by the Commission, this last presidential election has been the most popular election since the revolution, with over 82 percent of all eligible voters casting their ballots. This is a significant jump from the previous percentage of four years ago, and is even greater than the elections of 1997, which up until then had been the most popular election. Voter participation in the presidential election in Iran to the tune of around 60 percent is considered the norm, so experts on Iranian politics determine that the given numbers for this year are abnormally high.

Furthermore, elections where one of the candidates is a sitting president have historically been less popular with Iranian voters, due to the public’s perception that the incumbent has the strong advantage of retaining his seat. Three times in Iran’s recent history, on the occasions where Presidents Khamana’i, Rafsanjani, and Khatami were running for a second term there was a significant drop in voter turn-out. If the numbers are to be trusted for the current election, they not only indicate that the voter percentage is the highest in the history of post-revolutionary elections, but also that there has been a substantial increase in voter turn-out since the elections of four years ago.

Causing further skepticism regarding the authenticity of the 2009 election results is the fact that in all the previous elections candidates were able to usually win at least a single province, and most likely the one that they originate from. In the current election that did not happen. Several of the running candidates did not win the majority of the votes from their provinces.

Important issues in these elections were the economy and the staggeringly high unemployment and inflation rates. Corruption in the government, as well as the international isolation of the country were also hotly contested issues which each of the candidates spoke to. Despite the economic woes of the country, the other candidates in this election were unable to form any clear and coherent economic platforms to counter President Ahmadinejad’s.

Boroujerdi noted that the 2009 Iranian presidential elections demonstrated some novel features previously unseen in Iranian post-revolutionary politics. Amongst other things, these included the active role of the media, especially alternate and internet media; the positions adopted by the various clerical parties; and the phenomena of placing a candidate’s wife under public scrutiny. It was also the first time in Iranian presidential elections that a previous president who had completed two terms in office attempted to run for a third before pulling out of the campaign.

Boroujerdi noted that the active participation, involvement and energy seen in the Iranian public throughout this election and following it, is unprecedented in post-revolutionary Iran. It is a clear indication that the will for a more participatory political system is extremely strong and alive in the Iranian state.

Migrant Labor in the Gulf Working Group I
2009-05-16 08:00 - 2009-05-17 18:00
On May 16–17, 2009, CIRS convened the first of its working group meetings with its research grant program dedicated to the study of migrant labor issues in the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The working group was comprised of twenty international and local participants from a variety of disciplines, including anthropology, political science, sociology, and public policy. Participants also included policy specialists and migrant labor rights activists. The four research grant awardees that CIRS selected as part of its research grant program also took part in shaping the direction of the initiative.

Beginning in 2008, CIRS launched a major research initiative on migrant labor issues and concerns in the Gulf region. The initiative has two distinct but interrelated streams.

One stream consists of awarding Research Grants to scholars interested in conducting primary research and fieldwork on migrant labor issues in one of the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

The second stream, which runs simultaneously alongside the Research Grants program and also includes some of the Grant recipients, consists of a Migrant Labor Working Group of experts in the field. The Working Group consists of academics, experts, labor organizations, and representatives from various governmental and non-governmental organizations. The recipients of the Research Grants are active in the Working Group.

The Migrant Labor in the Gulf research initiative is especially significant in the current global financial climate, and also given its size and significance in relation to the GCC economies. CIRS has undertaken this research initiative in order to fill the vacuum in the scholarship on the conditions, composition, and overall significance of migrant labor throughout the Gulf region. To this effect, the CIRS research grants program is designed to sponsor the research of four long-term and in-depth projects on different aspects of migrant labor in the GCC. This is the first fully-funded, academically-sponsored research of its kind to take place in the region.

The working group meeting was divided into four different research agendas. The first day of the meeting was dedicated to debating the issue from anthropological and sociological perspectives, and the second day concentrated on the practical aspects of labor migration and issues related to public policy. Participants were invited to identify those principal areas of research related to migrant labor in the Gulf were additional research could be generated and future research inquiries should be directed.

Five central themes and areas of scholarly attention were identified as a result of the two-day study. They include: the difficulty of data-collection and analysis and the added problem of data validity and accuracy; the need to problematize and critically assess the casual use of particular terminologies; the need to address issues of belonging and fitting into the cultural paradigms of the host country; the need to place migrant labor in the Gulf within broader international scholarship and comparative trends; the need to examine the state as an instrument of power and its relationship with ensuing laws.

Further issues that needed to be addressed included the paucity of research concerning gender within migrant labor studies, as well as an examination of the various economic categories of what is termed “migrant labor.” Studying the issue of migrant labor has far-reaching implications, both on the level of the individual and on the level of local and global economies.

The CIRS research initiative on migrant labor is designed to last for approximately two years, at the end of which CIRS will publish its findings in a comprehensive study of the subject in an edited volume titled, Migrant Labour in the Gulf (Columbia University Press/Hurst, 2012).

Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants include:

Attiya Ahmad, Duke UniversitySadoun Alhayali, Qatar Foundation for Combating trafficking in HumansSabika Al Najjar, Bahrain Human Rights SocietyAmna Al Sulaity, Qatar National Human Rights CommitteeZahra Babar, CIRS, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarMary Breeding, ISIM/Georgetown UniversitySuleman Din, American University of CairoBridget Ganguly, Al Amana Center, OmanAndrew Gardner, Qatar UniversityDirgha Ghimire, University of MichiganHend Abdalrahman Mohamed Jolo, Qatar UniversityMehran Kamrava, CIRS, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarHabibul Khondker, Zayed UniversityNoora Lori, Johns Hopkins UniversityDavid Mednicoff, University of Massachusetts/ AmherstSuzi Mirgani, CIRS, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarSharon Nagy, DePaul UniversityFilippo Osella, University of SussexMizanur Rahman, National University of SingaporeNasra Shah, Kuwait UniversityHélène Thiollet, CERI/Independent ResearcherAntoinette Vlieger, University of Amsterdam

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator

James Onley on Britain's Local Representatives in the Gulf
2009-05-04 08:00 - 18:00
James Onley, the 2008–2009 CIRS Senior Fellow and Director of the Gulf Studies program at the University of Exeter, delivered the May Monthly Dialogue lecture entitled “Agents of Empire: Britain’s Local Representatives in the Gulf, 1750s–1950s” on May 4, 2009. Onley began by explaining that the lecture was part of a larger study he conducted towards a book he authored entitled The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj: Merchant, Rulers, and the British in the Nineteenth-Century Gulf, published by Oxford University Press in 2007. The book was based on a year’s fieldwork in Bahrain, where he made extensive use of local merchant family records. His work also drew heavily on historical records housed in the British Library in London.

Although based on Bahrain, Onley’s book has implications for the Gulf region in general. The Gulf, he noted, was “a frontier of Britain’s Indian Empire up until 1947.” He explained how the Gulf shaikhdoms formed part of Britain’s Indian Empire, comprised of colonies (the provinces of British India) and protectorates and protected-states (the Gulf shaikhdoms, Princely India, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bhutan, the Aden Protectorate, and the British Somaliland Protectorate). The protectorates and protected-states of the Indian Empire, such as the Gulf shaikhdoms, had their foreign affairs and defense managed by the East India Company and, later, the British Government of India, until Indian independence in 1947.

“British India,” Onley explained, “controlled its protectorates and protected-states by grouping them into diplomatic districts known as ‘political residencies’, each presided over by a ‘political resident’. ‘Political resident’ was the title the East India Company and the Government of India used for its chief political representatives (ambassadors or consul-generals), whose job it was to manage Britain’s relations with these states.” Each residency had a network of subordinate political agencies, run by political agents, in the key protectorates or protected states within the residency. Onley noted how “the local British agent was the de facto Foreign Minister and Defense Minister of these protectorates and protected states, although they still had their own heads of state: maharajas, nizams, shaikhs, amirs, sultans, and so on.”

Onley’s study focuses on British India’s Political Residency in the Gulf (1822–1947) during the nineteenth century. He explained how virtually all historical accounts of the Gulf Residency explain British involvement in the nineteenth century Gulf in terms of the interactions between the handful of British political officers, the local rulers and governors, and the small number of gunboats in Britain’s Gulf Squadron. Such top-down, one-sided explanations still dominate much of the thinking about how imperialism worked on the ground. Onley’s book is the first historical account to examine the infrastructure of the Gulf Residency that enabled the Gulf Resident, with so few resources, to maintain the Pax Britannica on the waters of the Gulf; to protect British interests throughout the region; and to manage political relations with the dozens of rulers, chiefs, and governors in Arabia and Persia as well as he did.

“The secret to the Gulf Residency’s effectiveness,” Onley argued, “was the Resident’s strategy of working within the indigenous political systems of the Gulf. Arab rulers in need of protection collaborated with the Resident to maintain the Pax Britannica, while influential men from affluent Indian, Arab, and Persian merchant families served as the Resident’s “native agents” (compradors) in over half of the political posts within the Gulf Residency. The result was a collaborative power triangle between the Resident, his native agents, and the rulers that sustained Britain’s informal empire in the Gulf.”

Onley’s book tells the story of Britain’s native agents in the Gulf. These locally-recruited agents not only had an extensive knowledge of local cultures, languages, and politics, which anyone recruited from outside the Gulf could not possibly possess, but also could obtain (through their family, social, and business networks) the intelligence the British needed to operate their informal empire in the Gulf. As wealthy merchants, these agents also enjoyed considerable influence with local rulers and governors. The contacts and influence of the agents enabled the Gulf Resident to tap into local political systems to an extent that would have been otherwise impossible, while at the same time the British connection allowed the agents to increase their wealth and political influence.

Onley explained how, today, native agents are known as honorary consuls. For hundreds of years, they played an important role as local mediators in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa, yet they are barely accounted for in the history of Western involvement in these regions. Native agents represented the East India Company at the courts of hundreds of foreign states in South Asia until the early nineteenth century, when the Company began to replace them with British political officers. However, native agents continued to represent the Company and, later, the Government of India along the distant frontiers of Britain’s Indian Empire (where life was too arduous for British political officers) as well as in some of the less important Indian states. In the Gulf, native agents were typically Indian up to the early nineteenth century and Arab or Persian thereafter; in India, they were generally Indian and occasionally Persian.

The Gulf Residency supervised up to a dozen political agencies and consulates in Arabia and Persia in the nineteenth century, the majority of which were run by native agents. While concerned with the Residency as a whole, Onley’s book focuses on one political agency in particular: Britain’s Native Agency in Bahrain (c.1816–1900)—a case study within a case study. He introduced the audience to the most important native agents who served in Bahrain, men like Agha Muhammad Rahim Safar (Native Agent in Bahrain 1893–1900), pictured here in the middle with his agency staff in 1898. He explained that, while there were often conflicts of interest between trade and politics, the British tolerated this so long as British interests were advanced, the ends justifying the means.

Onley concluded by explaining how, in the first decade of the twentieth century, the British Government of India replaced these local agents with Britons, not because local agents were ineffective, “but because of the increasing international rivalry in the region – Russia, France, and Germany were becoming increasingly involved in the Gulf region,” necessitating the native agents’ replacement by British officers who were “a more visible sign of Britain’s presence in the region.” While the native agents may have been replaced, the same men or at least the same merchant families, continued their association with the Gulf Residency, serving as assistant agents, or munshis (political assistants) in all of the political agencies in the Gulf, as well as the Gulf Residency headquarters itself. Onley estimates that about 95% of those employed by the East India Company and the Government of India in the Gulf Residency, from native agents to laborers, were locally-recruited men like Agha Muhammad Rahim Safar (see photo below). The Residency could not have operated without them.

James Onley is the 2008–2009 CIRS Senior Fellow and Director of the Gulf Studies program and Senior Lecturer in Middle Eastern History at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter, England. He specializes in the history, society, and culture of the Gulf Arab states and holds a DPhil from the University of Oxford, where he studied at St. Antony’s College.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator

Comparative Ethics of War
2009-05-03 08:00 - 2009-05-04 18:00
on May 3–4, 2009, the “Comparative Ethics of War” working group meeting was co-sponsored by the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). The meeting, which took place in Doha, is part of a larger research initiative undertaken by PRIO. The research group met twice previously, in Stresa, Italy in August 2007 and in Oslo, Norway in August 2008. The project is funded by a grant from the Research Council of Norway.

The working group was made up of eleven scholars who debated the “Comparative Ethics of War” from unique religious, theoretical, and ethical perspectives. Each scholar represented a different theoretical and religious tradition and discussed the question of ethics during times of war from Islamic, Christian, Sikh, and Buddhist perspectives as well as from feminist, post-modernist, historical, and socialist standpoints.

During the working group meeting, the participants debated the genesis of the question of ethics and just war, and examined their intersections with religious texts and the surrounding social infrastructure during particular historical moments. The ethical impetus of many social structures, they argued, is drawn from religious teachings and behavioral norms promoted by scripture. The political undercurrents regarding the question of human rights, social justice, bettering the means of living, and promoting particular social contracts were also analyzed and compared within each religious tradition. The working group members agreed that to understand the ethics of war, the underlying social structure at particular historical periods must also be examined, thus paying homage to the inextricable links between religion and social models.

There is a strong element in each religious tradition that condones the fight for social justice, and implicitly supports warfare for what is believed to be defending justice and for change. It is supported through the primary sources of many religions that there have been religiously-backed movements for ‘change.’ Historians usually focus on the major changes that have occurred within each religious context but not on the smaller movements. Most collections of scripture have been studied by theologians whose interest has been to study law and practice, but seldom have the sources been scrutinized for their social and historical implications.

The “Comparative Ethics of War” research initiative will result in an edited volume to be published by Cambridge University Press. The book will assemble the most representative primary sources and editorial commentary from the world’s leading religious traditions, on norms of war. Within the context of the book, the working group aimed to clarify the meaning of terms such as Jihad in order to point out their current use by the media and within the popular vernacular. The scholars recommended carrying out a close scrutiny of the verses which mention a particular religious term and how the usage of language in the text may have a different meaning. The working group members also discussed the actual intellectual process of the project and their handling of issues such as the difficulty of obtaining relevant sources and gaining access to materials. In addition to this edited volume, the project participants are also writing scholarly articles and monographs on selected topics in comparative ethics of war. Some of these publications were presented at the workshop.

CIRS will publish a Summary Report of the meeting, which will include paper synopses and biographies of the working group members. The working group was made up of:

Christine Amadou, University of Oslo
Torkel Brekke, University of Oslo
Mahinda Deegalle, Bath Spa University
Mohammad Faghfoory, George Washington University
Ivan Koniar, Catholic University in Ruzomberok, Slovakia, and Visiting Scholar,International Peace Research Institute, Oslo
Greg Reichberg, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo
Kaushik Roy, Presidency College, Kolkata
Hanne Røislien, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, and International Peace Research Institute, Oslo
Amira Sonbol, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Yuri Stoyanov, University of London
Henrik Syse, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator

Nabil Fahmy on US Arab Relations in a Changing World
2009-04-29 08:00 - 18:00
Former Egyptian Ambassador to the United States Nabil Fahmy gave his analysis and insight into the foreign policy challenges facing the United States and the Arab world in a speech at the Diplomatic Club in Doha on April 29, 2009.

Fahmy stressed the inter-connectedness of the challenges facing the region and suggested that developments on both the American and Arab political landscapes have presented new opportunities to tackle them.

He hailed the election of Barack Obama in particular as an indicator that the “United States is going through a transformational period” in terms of the way it sees its place in the world. Under the Clinton administration, he said, the United States struggled with the new roles and responsibilities it assumed as it transitioned from a Cold War superpower to a global power. Meanwhile, George W. Bush “sold his foreign policy to Americans as a function of fears” and withdrew American participation in international treaties and cooperation with the United Nations.

In contrast, President Obama has told Americans that they need to change and has elevated the role of diplomacy in America’s toolkit for international engagement. Obama “was not selling fear,” Fahmy said, and instead arguing that America can “engage in the world.”

While the Arab world has a large stake in America’s actions – the global financial crisis, for example, Fahmy said, has led to a $10 billion reduction in foreign investment in the region – it is also experiencing a transformation of its own, spurred by a new openness in the media and an ever-more knowledgeable and globally exposed youth demographic. Fahmy sees, in the future, a continued importance for states that have traditionally played a leading role in the region, such as Egypt, as well as an increased importance for countries in the Gulf which have an opportunity to diversify their investments and gain a sense of economic power that is not wholly dependent on outside brokers.

However, Fahmy said, the Arab world suffers from a lack of unity created by conflicts in national priorities and petty rivalries. Thus, he advised, Arabs need to look to the model of the European Union and “find a way to talk in one voice even if we do not have identical positions.” In addition, the Arab foreign policy agenda should be more proactive and clearly stated, rather than merely reacting to agendas set out by other international players.

On a whole host of issues, from Iraq and Iran to Arab-Israeli peace and terrorism, the United States and the Arab world have a different ordering of priorities, according to Fahmy. The encouraging news, however, is that developments on one front often have positive repercussions for others, and President Obama “wants to deal with all these issues together.”

On Israeli-Palestinian peace, Ambassador Fahmy stressed that there is no solution but a two-state solution. He added that he was worried by the formation of a new Israeli government led by Binyamin Netanyahu and the Israeli right. If, however, Arab states make it clear that they will pursue their foreign policy objectives regardless of outside pressure, the United States will respond and offer cooperation on realizing peace, which is also in its national interest, as it did during the 1970s with Anwar Sadat.

Fahmy acknowledged that terrorism is a major challenge facing the Arab world, but he called for some historical perspective on the matter, arguing that Egypt was the target of terrorism and religious extremism before America. He also stated that terrorism is hardly a phenomenon limited to the Middle East. Europe experienced waves of terrorism in the 1960s and 1970s, and the West “cannot put blame on others, because they have been there before.”

On Iraq, Fahmy said it was in the interest of the Arab world that Iraq remain a unified country, and efforts must be made to promote national identity above the myriad sectarian identities that have emerged.

Responding to a question from the audience regarding political reform and the absence of democracy in the region, Fahmy said, “Having better institutions in the Arab world serves the Arab world before it serves America.” He stressed, however, that reform is a longer-term project that requires fostering implementation, rather than appealing to immediate and careless strategies.

A seasoned diplomat, Ambassador Fahmy was Egypt’s chief representative to the United States for nine years beginning in 1999. He has participated in Arab-Israeli peace talks and filled several advisory positions in the course of his tenure at the Foreign Ministry. Ambassador Fahmy is an expert on international security and disarmament and served as chairman of the UN Secretary General’s Advisory Board of Disarmament Matters in 2001.

Summary by Alex Schank.

Mark Farha Lectures on Lebanon as the Mirror of Arab Politics
2009-04-07 08:00 - 18:00
On April 7, 2009, Mark Farha, Visiting Assistant Professor at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, was invited by CIRS to give the April Monthly Dialogue on the subject of “Lebanon as the Mirror of Arab Politics.”

Farha began by noting that the “sheer number of civil society organizations, the amount of political activism, and the dynamism of social activism that the city of Beirut has witnessed over the centuries is unparalleled.” He further emphasized Lebanon’s unique strength, which, he said, comes from the strategic geographical position that Lebanon occupies as a gateway to the Arab world and the Mediterranean Sea, helping to make it “one of the most vibrant terrains on earth” and “a meeting point for civilizations.” Farha explained that the “melting pot” effect created in Lebanon was as a result of the diversity of its cultures, religions and ethnicities that, for centuries, unleashed creative synergies through their interaction despite periodic backlashes of civil strife.

Historically, Lebanon was a cross-road for a variety of cultures that congregated in this particular location to partake in commercial and intellectual exchanges. One example from ancient history was that segments of the Justinian code were formulated in Beirut. Ancient Beyrutus was hailed as a center for law, and prospective jurists flocked to Lebanon from all over the world to study at its famous school of law until the 6th century.

“Lebanon,” Farha said, “is the oldest democracy in the Middle East, continuously operating since 1926,” and “despite all the trouble that one may associate with Lebanon, it should be borne in mind that what you have here is a political system, which, despite all its failings, has endured for very long periods.” Regarding the milestones of Lebanese political history, Farha pointed out that Lebanon has had no military coups d’état – in contradistinction to most Arab countries. The country has the highest density per capita of universities and secondary schools in the Arab world, which is partly a legacy of the establishment of Catholic and Protestant missionary schools, and, to this day, many “Lebanese are multi-lingual and quite well-educated.” Farha continued by recording that Lebanon was the first Arab country to grant women’s suffrage in 1953, which, he noted, occurred some twenty years prior to Switzerland’s granting of these rights.

“Lebanon has seen its share of confessional conflict throughout the ages” Farha recounted, but he argued that, due to Lebanon’s history and diverse mix of cultures, “the liberalism of Lebanon is a function of its pluralism. If you want to get along, if you have a country which is so divided, ethnically and religiously, there are a few options, and one of them is to find a modus vivendi, which de facto means recognizing each group and giving each its due…to maintain the peace long-term.” To this effect, Farha counted no less that eighteen officially recognized spiritual leaders in Lebanon, each representing a different confessional identity and each empowered by the constitution to voice their community’s concerns at the government level.

Despite all these various factions, Farha argued that Lebanon’s problems cannot all be blamed on the friction of confessional identities or external meddling. Juxtaposing the demographic make-up and class divisions of the country, Farha claimed that tensions will continue to loom if socio-economic disparities are not adequately tackled by an enfeebled state. As such, skewed forms of globalization and commercialism have shown a propensity to upset any balance that the country may have achieved.

Farha argued that each of the surrounding Arab countries experiences similar socio-economic and communal predicaments, but that their salience is accentuated by Lebanon’s unique diversity. Just as the hidden potential of Arab thought and culture can unfold in Lebanon’s open marketplace of ideas, so too the negative symptoms of the Arab world are writ large upon the face of Lebanese politics and society.

Farha concluded by outlining three possible future courses open to Lebanon: A pernicious emulation of the Israeli model of exclusive ethno-religious discrimination and confessional segregation; the confessional democracy Lebanon narrowly succeeded to preserve thanks to the 2008 Doha Accords mediated by Qatar; or, finally, the avenue leading towards true national integration in which each citizen is granted full and equal rights in all spheres irrespective of his or her personal religious identity. While Lebanon stands out as the only country in the region neither predicated on a religion of state nor a single sectarian hegemony, Farha underscored that the regional escalation of competing communalisms has rendered the reaffirmation of a trans-sectarian, inclusive Arab-Lebanese identity at once all the more difficult and indispensable.

Professor Mark Farha is currently teaching the core class “Comparative Political Systems” as well as an elective on “Globalization and Geopolitics of the Middle East.”

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator.

Edward Djerejian on U.S. Policy Toward the Arab & Muslim World
2009-03-17 08:00 - 18:00
Drawing on his career of experience as a diplomat, former U.S. ambassador to Syria and Israel, Edward Djerejian, offered his insights and analysis of current foreign policy challenges facing the United States in the Middle East and South Asia to a full house at the Diplomatic Club in Doha on March 17, 2009.

Ambassador Djerejian, a graduate of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, is currently the Director of the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University. He has served in eight U.S. administrations from John Kennedy to Bill Clinton and has filled such posts as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs and ambassador to Syria and Israel. In 2008, Djererjian published a book entitled Danger and Opportunity: An American Ambassador’s Journey through the Middle East, detailing his experiences in the region.

In his lecture, Ambassador Djerejian noted that “the challenges that the Obama administration faces in its foreign policy toward the Arab and Muslim world are comparably great.” He addressed U.S. policy challenges in Israel-Palestine, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, stressing that the politics of the region are often interconnected and what happens in one state can have a significant impact on another. Specifically, he pointed to the centrality of Israel-Palestine conflict, saying that the so-called neo-conservatives erred when they claimed that the road to peace in the region ran through Baghdad rather than Jerusalem. While he hailed some positive developments in Israeli-Arab relations, including the Madrid conference of 1991, in which Arabs and Israelis negotiated face-to-face for the first time, Djerejian said that it was essential that U.S. policy be aimed at a resolution of the conflict. He added that the term “peace process,” was not useful as it implies that there is no end in sight, and he therefore preferred to concentrate on a more results-oriented vision.

In his discussion of U.S. foreign policy toward Iraq, Djerejian stressed that the Bush administration made a serious error in ignoring a key recommendation of the Iraq Study Group to engage diplomatically its adversaries, Iran and Syria. The United States has many common interests with Iran in particular, among them cooperation on Iraq, Afghanistan, and energy. Djerejian suggested that all issues be on the table in talks with Iran, except for the threat of regime change. Military action against Iran would be a huge failure, he said.

On Afghanistan and Pakistan, the former ambassador suggested that U.S. policy suffers from a lack of coherence in approach, in part, due to the distraction of the war in Iraq. He proposed that the Obama administration lower its military goals and expectations in Afghanistan, partly out of recognition that, historically, the country is not easily controlled by foreign powers. Additionally, the United States should recommit to building roads and infrastructure and providing basic services and security to the Afghan people, given that the Taliban thrives in places where these essentials are missing.

Addressing the region as a whole, Ambassador Djerejian argued that it “is fraught with critical issues – unresolved – that need the attention of the people of the region in the first instance, but also, the hopefully constructive involvement of the outside world.” He argued that “overarching all of these specific issues, in my view, is the struggle of ideas within the Muslim world and by that I mean the struggle between the forces of moderation and the forces of extremism and in the middle, those – especially the younger generations – who haven’t made up their mind which way to go. This is a struggle of ideas that will determine the future of the Arab world.”

Djerejian concluded by noting that the problem for U.S. democracy promotion efforts is the possibility that radical Islamist parties will use elections to assume power then overthrow the democratic system. The United States should therefore take a careful approach to promote a culture of democracy rather than trying to impose an American-modeled democratic system on foreign cultures. He stressed education as an important building-block in such a promotion of democracy, highlighting the role education played in Arab high society over the centuries and citing Qatar’s Education City as an example of rising new models of education in the region.

Summary by Alex Schank. Alex graduated from Georgetown University in 2008 with a major in English and minors in Arabic and government. As an undergraduate, he studied abroad in Cairo, Egypt and completed an internship with the U.S. Department of State in Doha, Qatar. Alex is currently studying Arabic at Qatar University.

Mehran Kamrava on International Power Realignment in the Gulf
2009-03-10 08:00 - 18:00
On March 10, 2009, a Monthly Dialogue entitled “International Power Realignment in the Gulf” was given by Mehran Kamrava, Director of the Center for International and Regional Studies and an expert on Iran and the Persian Gulf. The Dialogue was attended by Georgetown faculty, students, staff, and invited guests.

Kamrava’s Monthly Dialogue informed the audience about “how changing dynamics in the Gulf are resulting in the emergence of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates as major players in the region and beyond.” Kamrava argued that we are witnessing a shift in power alignments in the Gulf region as small states, such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, are exhibiting powerful performances in the region as well as within the international arena. In tandem with this trend, the position of the region’s traditional “big powers,” such as Iran and Iraq, are being gradually and strategically declining.

This power realignment is important in two respects. Firstly, Kamrava’s thesis regarding the Gulf region is that Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are unusual in that they are “small states” and yet are powerful players changing the international relations of the region. “These small states of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, in many ways, do not fit the defined model. In fact, they are often times going against the model of how small states are supposed to behave in the international arena” according to the various international relations theories. They exhibit an extraordinary set of characteristics and engage in behaviors that are fundamentally atypical.

These countries, Kamrava noted, rely on the support and protection of global superpowers and Qatar is home to one of the largest United States airbases. These states also spend huge amounts of resources on forging a number of alliances with large states. Traditionally, small states limit themselves to dealing with their immediate geographic surroundings, but Qatar has shown a penchant for helping to negotiate in other countries’ regional and civil strife. These small states show a growing self-confidence and clout and have become “norm makers” as they influence others with their particular style of international relations and, essentially, “change the rules of the game.”

These small states’ power, Kamrava pointed out, is evident in three distinct areas:

Neither Qatar nor the United Arab Emirates blindly tow Riyadh’s line as they have done historically, particularly concerning trade relations and policies.
Both these states demonstrate some fearlessness in relation to Iran, with particular emphasis on their struggle over the issue of the three islands. These countries have also reclaimed their symbolic sovereignty by re-naming the area the “Arabian” Gulf rather than conforming to what has been known historically as the “Persian” Gulf.
With the decline of Iraq’s regional influence, these states have emerged as major regional power players.

One of the most important issues regarding these particular small states, Kamrava argued, is that not only do these states change the power dynamics in the region, but they are instrumental in changing our very conception of what constitutes power in the first instance. Traditional scholarship argues that there are two types of power: hard power and soft power. “Hard power” is a country’s ability to gain influence and submission from others through military or forceful means and “soft power” is how a country gains influence by having a strong appeal and by attracting others to its particular values systems and norms.

Kamrava concluded by noting that Qatar and the United Arab Emirates exhibit neither of these powers and yet, they are highly influential and successful states. Kamrava argued that what these small states do have is what he terms “civilian power,” which is a combination of personal and state-owned wealth and stability along with strategic and clever use of these assets. These countries have vast sovereign wealth funds that have allowed Qatar and the United Arab Emirates to be partially shielded from the damage that the global economic crisis has had on the rest of the world and has given these small states “big power.”

Dr. Mehran Kamrava is Director of the Center for International and Regional Studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Qatar. He received his PhD in Social and Political Sciences from the University of Cambridge. His specialties include political development, comparative politics, and Middle Eastern Studies.

In addition to a number of journal articles, he is the author of Revolution in Iran: The Roots of Turmoil (1990), The Political History of Modern Iran: From Tribalism to Theocracy(1992), Revolutionary Politics (1992), Politics and Society in the Third World (1993),Understanding Comparative Politics: A Framework for Analysis (1996), Democracy in the Balance: Culture and Society in the Middle East (1998), Cultural Politics in the Third World(1999), Politics and Society in the Developing World, 2nd ed. (2000), The Modern Middle East: A Political History since the First World War(2005), and Iran’s Intellectual Revolution(2008). He has also edited The New Voices of Islam: Rethinking Politics and Modernity(2006) and is the co-editor of the two-volume work Iran Today: Life in the Islamic Republic.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator.

Ibrahim Oweiss on the Global Depression and the Gulf Economies
2009-02-10 08:00 - 18:00
Ibrahim M. Oweiss, Professor of Economics at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, gave the February CIRS Monthly Dialogue lecture on the subject of “Current Economic Global Depression: Causes and Effects With Reference to the Gulf Economies.”

Oweiss began the talk by noting that he refers to the current economic crisis as a “depression” rather than the more commonly used term “recession,” because, he said, the fall-out from unemployment will be one of the most devastating features of the years to come. He gave various examples to demonstrate the negative effects of deregulation and emphasized that no country is immune from the global effects of the depression.

“There are many causes for the financial crisis,” Oweiss argued, “and one of them is the war in Iraq” that is a constant drain on financial resources and is costing the U.S. taxpayer dearly. Giving some recent figures, Oweiss calculated that “it costs 371,000 dollars every minute.” The war has created an unfathomable amount of debt and budget deficit to the U.S. economy. This crisis was a result of “the unwise fiscal policy during the Bush administration. Usually at a time of war, a country increases taxes, and not decreases them. George W. Bush inherited a surplus in the budget” and yet awarded tax cuts and with a mounting war, this “had a dual negative effect on the U.S. budget and on the National Debt.”

View the presentation from lecture below:

The Global Depression and Gulf Economies from Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

The other obvious cause for the financial crisis, Oweiss pointed out, is the lack of government regulation in private equity and corporate affairs. This has had a devastating effect and has allowed people to act with impudence because, he said, “Americans have been used to buying with money they do not own,” and there will always be a problem when people overextend themselves and cannot pay back debts. Oweiss warned that “the crack in the U.S. economy is too wide and too deep to be filled by any amount of money, whether it had been approved under the Bush administration or now under the Obama administration.”

With reference to the Gulf economies, Oweiss stated that no economy is safe from the global economic crisis and the Gulf countries “are being affected to varying degrees.” According to the Oweiss Demand Curve theory, “petro-dollars are declining because the world’s industrial machinery is slowing down” hence the demand for oil and the prices of oil are also in decline. He argued that the effects for the GCC were also psychological and that Arab investors are used to following the pattern of global stock markets and will undoubtedly become discouraged by the negative outlook. “The GCC labor market” in particular, he added, “is bound to be reduced.” A variety of real-estate projects have been delayed or cancelled in the UAE in particular, costing 260 billion dollars, and losses to sovereign wealth funds in the region may reach 450 billion dollars. This, Oweiss explained “is equal to all petro-dollar revenues for the year 2008. Such losses are only on paper but can materialize if those invested assets are to be liquidated.” However, Qatar, due to years of immense expenditures and investments in natural gas and other important business ventures, will have a reasonable rate of growth in 2009 that will be of help to its economy.

A question Oweiss asked at the beginning of the lecture was “Is this the end of capitalism?”, and he answered it by saying that, contrary to French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s affirmative answer, it most definitely was not. If one defines capitalism, in its most basic philosophy, as being “an economic system allowing private citizens to own capital and to benefit from it,” then there will always be some form of capitalism. There are many shades, he said, between “unbridled individualism” and “regulated capitalism” and these need to be properly defined and applied.

On a positive note, Oweiss concluded that there have been many depressions in U.S. and world history, and that people have always managed, over time, to extract themselves from dire situations through overseeing a consistent program of proper regulation. Hope, he concluded, coupled with human ingenuity, unlike all other resources, is not finite.

Oweiss joined the faculty of the Department of Economics at Georgetown University in 1967 after having served on the faculty of the University of Minnesota and Western Maryland College. He was also a Visiting Professor of Economics at Harvard University and taught at Johns Hopkins University.

As an international economic advisor, he worked for several governments and multinational corporations in the USA and abroad. Dr. Oweiss was one of the founding members of Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies as well as the College of Commerce and Economics at Sultan Qaboos University in Oman. Dr. Oweiss has authored over fifty scholarly publications including, Arab Civilization, and The Political Economy of Contemporary Egypt.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator.

Nur Yalman Lectures on Turkey's Transformation
2009-02-08 08:00 - 18:00
Nur Yalman, Professor Emeritus of Social Anthropology and Middle Eastern Studies at the Department of Anthropology, Harvard University, gave a CIRS Focused Discussion on February 8, 2010 on the topic of “Turkey’s Transformation: Regional Implications.” Yalman was invited to Doha by GU-Qatar Professor Mark Farha on whose PhD thesis Yalman served as an advisor. The lecture was attended by Georgetown University students, faculty, and staff.

Yalman discussed several features of Turkey that have increased its prominence as an international player in recent years. He explained that Turkey has a large and growing population of over 76 million people. This is a relatively young population, which bodes well for a productive future economy. Currently, Turkey is rapidly industrializing, and has become a manufacturing base for various international and local products. Remote parts of the country that had no electricity thirty years ago, Yalman said, have been connected to electricity grids and fully equipped with modern convenience goods.

Yalman recounted how the modern Turkish Republic was formed after the Ottomans allied with Germany in order not to lose parts of the Empire – its Balkan and Caucus territories – to its large and growing Russian neighbor to the north. The Ottoman Empire was defeated, but Mustafa Kemal Atatürk succeeded in rallying against occupying forces by instigating a nationalist movement to found modern Turkey. “Atatürk became a great hero, not only for the Turks, but for the non-western world. The fact that Turkey kept out of WWII meant that it has had a period of relative peace in its development from 1923 to today.”

The context of Turkey’s steady development and zealous economic drive stems from the philosophy behind Turkey’s “cultural revolution,” instigated by Atatürk. This “cultural revolution,” however, had devastating effects on the local population who were obliged to become forcibly “westernized,” at least in outward appearances, in order for the country to contend with European nations. Traditional modes of dress, language, writing styles, and perceptions were all effectively outlawed and replaced with more “scientific,” modern, and progressive ones.

However, Yalman argued, notions about progress and the gradual emancipation of human beings from religion were nineteenth century ideas that did not take into account the strong traditional communal formations that were deeply rooted in Turkish society. A strong underlying negative public reaction to Atatürk reforms emerged in the form of the very popular Justice and Progress (or AK) party that is now in power in Turkey and has strong Islamic roots. The AK party, which has forcefully expressed its profound interest in the Arab world in general and the Palestinians in particular, also maintains a strong connection with the secular Ataturk legacy.

In conclusion, Yalman said that there are two very powerful yet competing discourses in Turkey: an Islamist resurgence and the secularist drive for modernity. This division has caused tremendous tensions that will likely continue into the future.

Yalman is Senior Fellow, Harvard Society of Fellows. His fields of concentration include South Asia (Sri Lanka and India), the Middle East, and Japan. Dr. Yalman’s research interests include contemporary social theory and theorists; anthropology of religion, and social and political conditions in South Asia and the Middle East. He has published widely, including “Religion and Civilization” in Dialogue of Civilizations: a New Peace Agenda for a New Millenium, eds. M. Tehranian & D.W.Chappell (2002).

Article by Suzi Mirgani. Suzi is CIRS Publications Coordinator.

Seyyed Hossein Nasr on Islam and the Preservation of the Natural Environment
2009-01-26 08:00 - 18:00
On January 26, 2009, CIRS began its Spring semester FacultyDistinguished Lecture Series with a talk by Seyyed Hossein Nasr, one of the foremost scholars of Islamic, Religious and Comparative Studies in the world. He was introduced to the audience by Mohammed Al Sudairi, SFS-Qatar sophomore and President of the Blue and Gray theater club.

Nasr’s lecture, held at the Al Sharq hotel in Doha, outlined daily environmental struggles within an elaborate frame of spiritual Islam. This subject, Nasr emphasized, “is of gravest importance” because people have resorted to covering up the problem without actually finding a solution. Environmental destruction however, “will not be solved by cosmetics,” but “requires a change in our way of life.”

Nasr noted the irony of human mastery over nature by warning that “to dominate nature is to destroy ourselves” in the process. He also said that there is no issue that should be higher on the world’s agenda, as other peripheral economic and political problems pale in comparison to the environmental crisis. Should the problem of degradation continue at its current rate, no other problem would even exist.

The main problem, Nasr stated, is that Muslims, although passionate about performing their religious duties, do not translate this into a greater awareness of their surrounding environments. This results in what he describes as a “disconnect” between the strength of Muslim faith and the way people’s daily actions and activates do not live up to Islamic principles. This, he argued, is because of the prominence of scientism as the singular most important principle of the modern world.

Initially, scientism became popular in the Muslim world as a means of combating colonialism and saving Islam from the onslaught of the West. This was done by mastering Western schools of thought and combining it with the principles of Islam. During this period, the Muslim world followed the basic assumptions of positivism; “the humanities were cast aside as insignificant” and “there was no intellectual resistance” to the West.

The Muslim world has become enslaved to the technological aspirations of the West and one common denominator, he noted, is that Muslims worship modern technology and science, which is falsely considered to be encouraged by Islam. Not only that, he said, but these modernized Muslims believe that the West will also take care of any problems that arise from technological developments.

The solution, according to Nasr, is to keep in mind that ultimately, God is nature and the environment. The question of Islam is integral to the environment as it is the connection humans have to the divine. Religious teaching, Nasr said, is paramount for human survival as it informs people about how to be respectful of their natural environments and how to honor every living creature, of which we are just one species. “Every creature has its rights, independent of humans” and he emphasized that we cannot overlook them. To reverse the current crisis, he said, it is imperative that we consider nature sacred.

Nasr concluded on the note that the populations of the Gulf region have an especially important task of conserving the endangered underwater coral reefs in the area. Coral reefs are one of the most fragile ecological life-forms in the world and, yet, are also one of the most instrumental in sustaining the environment.

Earlier in the day, Nasr was invited to visit the SFS-Qatar campus and to have an informal lunch- time discussion with SFS-Qatar Faculty and staff.

Summary by CIRS Intern Assma Al-Adawi and CIRS Publications Coordinator Suzi Mirgani.

Seyyed Hossein Nasr, currently University Professor of Islamic Studies at the George Washington University, Washington D.C., is one of the most important and foremost scholars of Islamic, Religious and Comparative Studies in the world today. Author of over fifty books and five hundred articles which have been translated into several major Islamic, European and Asian languages, Professor Nasr is a well known and highly respected intellectual figure both in the West and the Islamic world.

Female Suicide Bombers in Iraq by Mona Eltahawy
2009-01-19 08:00 - 18:00
Journalist and opinion-writer Mona Eltahawy was invited by CIRS to give a lunchtime lecture at the SFS-Qatar campus on the subject of “Female Suicide Bombers in Iraq.” Eltahawy is an award-winning syndicated columnist and an international public speaker on Arab and Muslim issues. Her opinion pieces have been published frequently in the International Herald Tribune,The Washington Post, the pan-Arab Asharq al-Awsat newspaper and Qatar’s Al-Arab.

Eltahawy began the lecture by noting her shift from being a journalist concerned with balance and objectivism to being compelled to speak out as an opinion-writer rather than as an impartial academic on a variety of issues that affect Muslims. This, she said, was as a result of the change in political climates all over the world after the attacks of September 11, 2001. According to Eltahawy, much of her work is driven by her subject-position as a feminist Muslim, which is an identity that is not always given the forum to voice an opinion. As a female Muslim residing in the United States, Eltahawy felt that her views were not being represented, and this forms the context in which her writing and public speaking are situated. The subject of female suicide bombers, she said, was simultaneously “a deeply fascinating and disturbing subject.”

To dispel the myth that female suicide bombers are a new ideological formation particular to Islamic extremism and to the Middle East, Eltahawy points toward the research conducted in a 1992 book by Eileen McDonald, Shoot the Women First. The title comes from the West German security-force directive to shoot the women first upon entering a Red Army stronghold, as the female fighters tended to pose the most aggressive response. The book documents the varied instances of women’s involvement in acts of extremism and violence in organizations such as the Basque separatist movement, the Kurdish PKK separatists in Turkey, the Tamil Tigers, the Baader-Meinhof gang, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, all of which existed long before the instrumentalist use of suicides by certain groups of Islamic extremists. But, “what distinguishes what is happening in Iraq from these examples”, Eltahawy notes, “is that these groups were secular, militant and terrorist groups” whereas the groups in Iraq are centered on religious extremism.

The question Eltahawy poses is: “What is the motivation for women to join a violent group or to become a terrorist?” She argues that “inherent in that question is the idea that a woman is different from a man in choosing to join these groups.” But scholars on the subject have found that the ideological and political motivations that drive radicalization are largely the same for both men and women.

Eltahawy takes Iraq as her case study and presents a number of statistics regarding female suicide bombers. She reports that, “according to U.S. military statistics, since the invasion in March 2003 until the end of last year, Iraq has seen 57 female suicide bombers – including one who surrendered – and they killed a total of 370 people and injured 650.” What is alarming is the rate at which the attacks have tripled in 2008. The reason there is a sharp increase in female bombers has to do with increased security measures all over Iraq since the U.S. military surge. Today, women can get to places that men cannot.

Also alarming, Eltahawy notes, is the varying nature of the females carrying out this extremist violence in Iraq. One bomber was a 13 year old girl, another was a woman dressed as a man, and yet another was a married mother of two. These are unusual characteristics for what constitutes a radical and do not fit within the common profile. Usually, such acts are carried out by single, divorced or widowed women who have lost family members during a particular period and so have also lost their primary sources of income.

Extremist violence, such as suicide bombings, has been articulated as an act of desperation and a weapon of political and ideological struggle and “resistance against occupying forces” and powerful oppressors. Suicide bombings in Iraq were initially seen as political and ideological resistance to occupying forces, but these extremist acts have become increasingly religious and sectarian in nature. Ironically, Eltahawy concludes, in Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt, such religiously and ideologically-backed martyrdom has seen more Muslims killing Muslims than supposed enemies, occupiers, or infidels. What is more, most of the victims of suicide bombings are religious Shi’ia pilgrims and not legitimate military targets.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator.

Katja Niethammer on Political Reform and Confessional Identities in Bahrain
2009-01-18 08:00 - 18:00
On January 18, 2009, CIRS began the 2008-2009 spring semester with a Monthly Dialogue lecture entitled “Democrats and Autocrats, Shi’ites and Sunnis: Political Reform and Confessional Identities in Bahrain” given by its Postdoctoral Fellow Katja Niethammer.

Niethammer’s lecture is part of a larger study undertaken in her PhD research and analyzes the differences in goals, strategies and behavior between Shi’ite and Sunni Islamist political organizations in Bahrain. As such, she “shed light on the relationship between Islamist actors and political reform.” Niethammer conducted extensive fieldwork in Bahrain, during which time she conducted interviews with political and religious activists from both Shi’ite and Sunni communities and also spent time within the Bahraini parliament. During these visits, she witnessed parliamentarians “engage in serious confessionalist agitation and occasionally scuffles between MPs erupted sparked by discussions on events in Iraq.”

The study of Islamist groups in general is extremely important in the current political climate of the Gulf states as “Islamist groups are currently – and not only in Bahrain – the most important actors besides the ruling elites.” This is because “they have a wide social base and have extensive religious networks at their disposal.” Niethammer noted that the groups portrayed in her research are legal organizations and promote their goals through non-violent means.

During her lecture, Niethammer proceeded to debunk the two major assumptions currently holding sway over Islamic studies scholarship. The first assumption is that Islamist parties form a natural partnership with ideas of reform and justice and the second revolves around the hypothesis that Islamist parties will lose any extremist edge and become more democratic if involved in serious parliamentary participation.

These assumptions have been proven valid in some Middle Eastern countries, but Niethammer proposed that the situation in Bahrain was far more complex. Because those parties that rejected electoral participation – the Shi’ite Islamist parties – called out for more democratic reform, and those that fully contributed to parliamentary elections – the Sunni Islamist parties – were more concerned about supporting authoritarian rule, other factors must be useful in explaining moderation and reform-mindedness.

Niethammer proposes that one reason why Bahrain does not fit comfortably within the frame-work of these hypotheses is Bahrain’s prevalent sectarian and ethnic fragmentation, which has created dominant and marginalized groups. Hence, the social and economic positions of the Islamists vis-à-vis the ruling elite determine their political goals and strategies to a larger extent than their ideological orientation. She suggests that this might also be the case in other fragmented societies in the Middle East.

In conclusion, Niethammer argued that such experiences from Bahrain suggest that “when Islamists represent a dominant confessional group, they reject meaningful reforms that enhance political representation and participation. When Islamists represent politically marginalized groups, they endorse such reforms.” In other words, Niethammer maintained that Islamist political actors do not exhibit any behavior that is different from their secular counterparts.

Niethammer joined CIRS for the 2008-2009 academic year. During her Fellowship spent within the framework of CIRS’ research and scholarship initiatives, she has been involved in three major projects.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator

International Relations of the Gulf Working Group II
2009-01-08 08:00 - 2009-01-09 18:00
On January 8-9, 2009, CIRS convened the second International Relations of the Gulf working group session. This meeting was part of a year-long research initiative that began with the first working group meeting in June 2008 and which focused on analyzing several key aspects of the International Relations of the Gulf from different angles. CIRS invited a core group of distinguished Gulf studies scholars to Doha to attend the working group meetings and to contribute individual chapters towards a book entitled The International Politics of the Persian Gulf (Syracuse University Press, 2011). The book covers topics such as the history of Gulf Shaikhdoms, Gulf security strategies, and political reform in the region. Concomitantly, CIRS also invited several other experts in the field to act as discussants and to give critical consultation and enrich the topics under examination.

This book breaks new ground and will contribute greatly to the literature on the international relations of the Middle East in general and the Gulf in particular. It will be of great interest to academics and scholars specializing in the Gulf and the Middle East, as well as practitioners and policy-makers, students, and interested readers.

Participants in the International Relations of the Gulf Working Group:

Mohammed Ayoob, Michigan State University
Daniel Byman, Georgetown University
Gregory Gause, University of Vermont
N. Janardhan, Political Analyst, Gulf-Asia Affairs, UAE
Mehran Kamrava, Georgetown University in Qatar
Rami Khouri, American University of Beirut
Joseph Kostiner, Tel Aviv University
Fred Lawson, Mills College
Katja Niethammer, Georgetown University in Qatar
Gerd Nonneman, University of Exeter
James Onley, University of Exeter
J. E. Peterson, University of Arizona
Lawrence Potter, Columbia University
Paul Salem, Carnegie Middle East Center
Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, London School of Economics and Political Science
Robert Wirsing, Georgetown University in Qatar
Steven Wright, Qatar University
Obaid Younossi, RAND-Qatar Policy Institute

Summary by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator

Jo Ann Moran Cruz & Haifaa Khalafallah on Religion and Legitimization of Political Rule
2008-12-03 08:00 - 18:00
Georgetown University professors Jo Ann Moran Cruz and Haifaa Khalafallah gave the December 3, 2008, Monthly Dialogue lecture entitled “Religion and Legitimization of Political Rule in the Islamic and Christian Worlds: Preliminary Findings.” The presentation was part of a larger study entitled Religion and the State in the Christian and Islamic Worlds, in which both professors conducted research into coinciding Islamic and Christian historical experiences by juxtaposing a variety of primary sources.

Moran Cruz began the lecture by debating the prevailing current discourse on the “Clash of Civilizations.” She noted that the task of their study was to get beyond modern and ahistorical ideas, an example of which is “secular humanism,” which, she said, “is a problem in western scholarship. It is a term that does not stand up to scrutiny.” Moran also suggested that prevailing ideas on the role that religious hegemony has played in the West understate its influence on representative institutions. Khalafallah, in turn, argued that the bulk of historical evidence shows that the current narratives for the study of Islam blur and do not clarify our understanding of its historical experiences. She emphasized the importance of the memory of Medina and the role of consultative rule and legal methodologies in Islam.

Moran Cruz and Khalafallah further argued that both religions, although different from one another, shared a common historical concern with notions of “legitimacy.” Legitimacy, in this historical sense, is an “established, recognized, and accepted framework (legal, cultural, moral, social, procedural) that is paramount for the survival of political authority.” Both Muslim and Christian histories have been concerned with legitimacy and this concern has shaped social and legal infrastructures. Both Moran Cruz and Khalafallah took turns at explaining particular convergences between Muslim and Christian historical discourses and noted similarities between the two religions and how they informed the means of governance around the Mediterranean in each religious tradition.

Beginning with an examination of their formative years and foundational texts, the speakers noted that in both religions, there are scriptural indications, even if implicit, regarding what makes good governance. For example, Khalafallah noted that in the Qur’an, there are instructions to “respect persons in authority…a general endorsement of the notion of collective decision-making, including an explicit directive to consult,” as well as an emphasis on notions of “egalitarianism and equality.”

In their formative years, there was the Pauline model of governance in the Christian context and the Medina model in the Muslim one, both of which are marked by persuasion, connections, negotiated settlement of disputes, as well as extreme fluidity. Using religion to legitimate political authority, the professors argued, became high on the agenda after the triumph of authoritarian states that were, for the most part, illegitimate. Moran Cruz noted that, subsequently, in the struggle for legitimacy, “both cultures have struck varying balances between theocratic and civil governments and between religious and political authorities.” The narratives in both religious traditions are similar with regard to these dynamics, although differing in other fundamental ways.

In conclusion, both Moran Cruz and Khalafallah argued for situating current narratives on Islam and Christianity and their relations to each other in their historical contexts in order to better understand their common experiences and differences vis-à-vis political authority as well as to be able to locate their current ones, rather than focusing on “otherness.”

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator.

Compromising Democracy: The Lebanese Example
2008-11-19 08:00 - 18:00
The Center for International and Regional Studies at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar hosted a luncheon talk for the visiting Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, Nabih Berri, on November 19, 2008.

Berri has been the speaker of Lebanon’s parliament since 1992. He is effectively one of three heads of state with the prime minister and president. Berri, an advocate of the March 8 Alliance in Lebanon, is also the head of the Shi’a Muslim AMAL Movement.

Berri began by extending gratitude to H.H the Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani and H.E. the foreign and prime minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabor Al Thani, for Qatar’s key mediatory role between rival Lebanese political factions, which ultimately led to the resolution of Lebanon’s political deadlock earlier this year via the Doha Agreement 2008. Berri confirmed the successful implementation of the accord, pointing to the election of a president, the approval of the constitution by all parliamentary members and the formation of a national unity government.

He also extended gratitude to the State of Qatar for its help with the reconstruction of Lebanon following the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, in areas ranging from “healthcare to homes to houses of worship.” Berri also invited further assistance to clear the 2.4 million cluster bombs that remain scattered throughout Southern Lebanon.

Berri’s address provided a theoretical overview of the basis and key characteristics of a “congruent democracy” as distinct from other forms of democracy, as well as a practical account of its realisation in Lebanon.

Congruent democracy, he explained, emanates and develops in situations of weak national unification and a divided, heterogeneous population. In particular, he stated that the most important characteristic of a congruent democracy is the element of ruling through a large coalition such as a national unity government.

In talking about Lebanon’s experience, Berri confirmed the country’s early adoption of this system of governance since May 23, 1926, with the establishment of its first constitution. He highlighted the constitutional provisions which are central to the concept of congruent democracy, namely, ensuring that all sects are equally represented in the cabinet and among public services functions, and that freedom of religion is absolute (Articles 95 and 9 of the Lebanese Constitution respectively).

Citing its independence in 1943 and a host of domestic, regional and international influences that led to constitutional amendments of 1990, Berri reinforced the fact that Lebanon’s democracy are not static.

A number of key changes were highlighted under the rubric of Lebanon’s evolving congruent democracy. The Chamber of Deputies’ Muslim to Christian seat distribution ratio was changed from 5:6 to an equal 6:6, to accommodate for a growing Muslim majority. He also discussed Article 69 of the amended constitution which deems the government as resigned if more than 1/3 of the members withdraw. Other points discussed include the veto right extended to the Council of Ministers to create a system of unanimous decision-making and a revision in the balance of executive power extended to the prime minister and president.

On the question of whether or not congruent democracy proved to be a successful political system for Lebanon, Berri confirmed its positive outcome.

“Lebanon is unlike any other country in the world, in the light of its steadfast commitment and continuous recourse to dialogue meetings held both locally and internationally,” he said. He pointed to talks held in Lausanne, Saint-Cloud, Taif and Doha, as key examples of the operations of a congruent democracy.

Berri explained that the congruence culture, while evolving to better reflect the socio-political changes of its time, “has always been rooted in the minds of the Lebanese nationals.” As distinct from an inevitably unsuccessful export product, he stressed the importance of a “home-made and national democracy which must be consistent with the nature and hopes of its people.”

Berri concluded that his country’s culture of congruence, regardless of its results, constitutes the “security and safety valve of Lebanon’s political system.” As such, the lacking ingredient in Lebanon is not the recognition of congruent democracy per se, but the need to observe and respect the principle.

During the concluding Q&A session, Berri recalled the great show of national unity during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, drawing upon examples of supported internal migration and united Lebanese resistance. Berri also highlighted nationalist ideologies, refusing the claim of a Lebanese “positive-neutral” political approach and endorsing Lebanon’s Arab identity and commitment to the Palestinian crisis. Finally, in countering the claim that the TAIF Agreement of 1989 runs parallel to a congruent democratic Lebanon, Berri ended by retracing Lebanon’s history from the days of Fakhreddine, who celebrated the unique demographics of the country where reconciliation and harmony should prevail.

James Reardon-Anderson on Rainfall and the American Civil War
2008-11-03 08:00 - 18:00
On November 3, 2008, James Reardon-Anderson, Dean of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, gave a lecture at CIRS’s Monthly Dialogue Series on the connection between “Rainfall and the American Civil War.” Dean Reardon-Anderson explained to the invited audience that the lecture was inspired by a class he regularly teaches entitled “Map of the Modern World,” which is a graduation requirement for all students.

Dean Reardon-Anderson began his lecture by suggesting that one way of understanding human behavior is by examining the fundamental natural forces – earth tectonics and atmospheric physics – that shape the stage on which history has been and is being performed. This lecture, which focuses on the geography of North America and the implications for the outbreak of the American Civil War, is a case study of that phenomenon.

Tectonic forces have produced a North American continent with high mountain ranges in the west and a broad flat plain in the middle, and lodged the center of this continent, which is home to the United States, between 30 and 50 degrees north latitude. Atmospheric forces produce extremely dry conditions at 30 degrees north, the locus of the American Southwest, and prevailing westerly winds across the rest of the country, which cause heavy precipitation over the western mountains, dry conditions on the central plains, and again wet conditions in the east.

The mix of weather conditions and the nature of the physical geography in the southeastern United States meant that the land was arable and conducive to the cultivation of cash crops, especially tobacco, sugar cane, and cotton. Because of the richness of the soil and the bounty of the harvest, these lands were geared towards mass-scale farming, which also meant that hundreds of people were needed to maintain the operations. This manual labor came in the form of slaves from Africa and elsewhere, shipped over to the Americas in order to toil in the fields and produce the crop. The northern areas, by comparison, had little need for such large-scale import of slave-labor, as the temperate weather meant that farming was in the form of small-scale food-crop agriculture. Due to the progressive urbanization and industrialization of the northeast, businesses were largely run by European immigrants and their extended families. In these areas, maintaining slaves during the long winters was, on the contrary, an expensive rather than a cost-effective enterprise.

As more and more communities of people moved west across North America, the territories that applied to join as new states in the United States, grew from 13 in 1789 to 34 in 1861. Until 1850, these states were roughly divided between those in the southern areas and those in the north, and so too between the states that maintained slavery as an important economic enterprise, and those with little or no need for it to sustain their economies.

By the late 1850s, the southern states, whose economy relied on the growth and export of cotton, had exhausted the geographic regions that supported cotton plantations and could not viably expand beyond the areas to which they were confined. As the westward expansion of the North continued and the number of “free” states increased, the South found itself in an increasingly disadvantaged position. This ultimately resulted in the South’s attempt to secede from the union, and the Civil War ensued.

Ultimately, Dean Reardon-Anderson concluded, the levels of rainfall and other similar climatic factors played significant roles in precipitating the American Civil War.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator.

Commemoration of Mahmoud Darwish
2008-10-22 08:00 - 18:00
In honor of the memory of Palestinian Poet Mahmoud Darwish, CIRS hosted a literary evening to recall his life and his legacy. His Excellency, the Palestinian Ambassador to Qatar, Munir Ghannam, and Georgetown University Professor, Amira El Zein, were invited to share their thoughts on different aspects of the poet’s life and work. Ambassador Ghannam recounted Darwish’s biography from birth to death and El Zein, professor of Arabic, engaged with his art, speaking of the powerful metaphorical nature of his poetry. Drawn by the culturally binding subject of poetry, the audience was an eclectic mix of students, faculty, embassy staff, and poetry-lovers. The audience was treated to rare insights into Darwish’s life as both speakers relayed anecdotes about meeting the poet, conversing with him, and relaying what he meant to them as a personal friend.As an introduction to his talk, Ambassador Ghannam began by lamenting the loss of not only a great poet, but of “the voice of Palestinian resistance.” He recounted to the audience several episodes in the life of Mahmoud Darwish: how he was born in a land called Palestine that is no longer in existence; how he and his family were driven away from their homes by Israeli occupiers; how he was arrested on numerous occasions because of his inflammatory writings; how he went into exile to Russia, France, the United States, and Egypt; and how he returned and became actively involved in the politics of Palestine. Ambassador Ghannam spoke of the social, political, and economic struggles of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and how the realities and hardships of Darwish’s life figured prominently in his work as he translated his personal experience into poetry.

Ambassador Ghannam gave a bi-lingual recitation of some of the verses of Darwish’s famous poem “Identity Card,” which is believed to have defined Palestinian identity through language and, which became a symbol of Palestinian resistance. Over the years, Darwish gained a reputation as a leading voice of protest and became known as the national poet of Palestine. He even lent his words to the Palestinian cause by penning a famous speech delivered by Yasser Arafat at the United Nations and by wording the Palestinian Declaration of Independence. Darwish’s work, Ambassador Ghannam concluded, has been translated into many languages and several of his poems have crossed artistic disciplines and have been set to music by Marcel Khalife, making them popular to a wider audience.

Georgetown University Professor Amira El Zein concentrated on the metaphorical nature of Darwish’s work. In most of his poems, El Zein said, Darwish acknowledged the native American use of the “name” and the metaphor of home to give identity to, and keep alive, a home long gone. She argued that everything exists in language and so to keep the idea of home alive in language is to also keep the idea of returning to that home alive. El Zein quoted Darwish as saying “because I couldn’t find my home in the land, I found it in history.”

Language, El Zein said, does not mirror the world, but rather, Darwish created Palestine through poetry and that is why his use of language is such a powerful socio-political tool. The foundation of Israel not only appropriates the land, but perhaps more importantly, the histories, mythologies, and identities of the Palestinian people. All these elements of existential strife are interwoven through the poetic devices of Darwish’s work. El Zein concluded by telling the audience that she is in the process of translating a book of interviews with Darwish, which she had hoped to share with him.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator.
