Migrant Labor in the Gulf - Working Group III
2010-10-10 18:00 - 2010-10-11 18:00 (Europe/Moscow)
On October 10–11, 2010, CIRS held its third and final meeting of the “Migrant Labor in the Gulf” working group. Each participant submitted a draft paper in advance of the meeting. The goal of the meeting was for those taking part to critique each other’s work and advise the authors as they prepare a final draft for submission to a planned edited volume titled Migrant Labour in the Gulf (Columbia University Press/Hurst, 2012).

CIRS launched the “Migrant Labor in the Gulf” initiative in 2008. The working group is composed of experts in the field of migrant labor who hail from a variety of different academic disciplines, including anthropology, sociology, history, and political science. The working group is also composed of the four CIRS Research Grant awardees: Andrew Gardner from the University of Puget Sound/Qatar University, Arland Thornton and Nathalie Williams from the University of Michigan, Susan Martin from Georgetown University, and David Mednicoff from the University of Massachusetts-Amherst.

The participants adopted different perspectives on migrant labor. Some focused on macro trends that drive migration and define labor patterns within the GCC and among sending countries. In addition, several participants employed ethnographic methods to analyze the lived experiences of the migrants themselves.

The term “migrant labor” was historicized in order to analyze how the relationship between the citizen and the migrant in the Gulf has traditionally centered around the question of labor. Connections between the Gulf and other parts of the world were built around the pearling industry, trade, kinship relations, and religion. Migrant labor is usually depicted as a transient activity, and although many laborers are indeed short-term employees, this masks the fact that there are long-term and more culturally and socially-integrated forms of labor that exist in the Gulf. Importantly, historicizing migrant labor in the Gulf is useful in pointing out all the actors that are often excluded from discussions. Racialized hierarchical systems can be attributed to British colonial relations, and the establishment of the multinationals and the oil industry in the region.

Further, the participants examined the issue of gender in relation to migrant labor. Migrant labor in the Gulf tends to be highly gendered, where construction work and public sector work is dominated by males, and domestic work is performed by females. In general, and not just in the Gulf, domestic work falls outside of the purview of a country’s labor laws because domestic work is not considered part of the market economy. However, the participants argued that including domestic work within the framework of labor was not necessarily a solution to the problems associated with this type of employment. Here, the participants agreed that migrants should not be examined solely in terms of labor, but their social relations, political beliefs, and social formations should be examined as well.

Another key discussion was based on GCC states’ nationalization plans. The researchers spoke about the importance of not overlooking these schemes as the development of local human resources is a main target for most Gulf nations in the future. There has been little research regarding these nationalization schemes because of the difficulties of their implementation. As the Gulf strives toward knowledge based economies, long-term development is regarded as the responsibility of the national workforce. Although the nationalization strategies of the GCC countries differ, nationalization policies are geared towards breaking decades-long dependence on foreign labor in both the public and private sectors. In future, lower illiteracy rates, better global technological connectivity, and more women in leadership roles all pave the way for increased diversification of the Gulf economies.

The working group addressed other significant issues such as the ‘kefala’ system, human trafficking, illegal migration, and regional regulation efforts. The participants relied on a variety of data sources, including in-depth interviews, field observation, survey research, as well as demographic and other statistical data. The edited volume will be the first of its kind to be produced within the region.

Click here for the working group’s agenda
Read about the working group’s first and second meeting
Read more about this research initiative

Participants include:

Attiya Ahmad, Wesleyan UniversityZahra Babar, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarMary Breeding, The World BankJane Bristol-Rhys, Zayed UniversityJohn T. Crist, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarAndrew Gardner, University of Puget SoundMehran Kamrava, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarPardis Mahdavi, Pomona CollegeSusan Martin, Georgetown UniversityDavid Mednicoff, University of Massachusetts–AmherstSuzi Mirgani, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarCaroline Osella, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of LondonFilippo Osella, University of SussexKasim Randeree, Oxford UniversityHélène Thiollet, Sciences PoArland Thornton, University of Michigan, Ann ArborNathalie E. Williams, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator

Iraq in the Balance: Security and Democracy After the U.S. Troop Withdrawal
2010-10-19 08:00 - 18:00
In light of the United States’ withdrawal of troops from Iraq, CIRS organized a panel discussion to analyze the political upheavals that have taken place in Iraq and to gauge the possible outcomes. The panel took place on October 19, 2010, at the Intercontinental Hotel in Doha and featured Anthony Cordesman, the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic & International Studies, Laith Kubba, Director of Middle East & North Africa at the National Endowment for Democracy, and Rend Al-Rahim, Executive Director for The Iraq Foundation.

Anthony Cordesman began with an overview of the current security and military operations in Iraq. Addressing the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, he said that “the U.S. now has four Advisory and Assist brigades in Iraq. These are full combat brigades” that provide military assistance to Iraqi forces. The U.S. continues to fly aircraft over Iraq to provide satellite intelligence and there are major airbases in neighboring Kuwait, military facilities in Qatar, fleet headquarters in Bahrain, as well as other naval capabilities in the area. “Withdrawal,” therefore, “is relative,” argued Cordesman. The United States will continue to play a role in Iraq, but “when the new Iraqi government comes to office, it has to define what the strategic partnership agreement means,” he said.

The U.S. Transition in Iraq: Iraqi Forces and the U.S. Military Aid from Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Currently, Iraq is importing and building up its military capabilities to aid in its counter- insurgency operations. However, Cordesman warned, “even if you delivered equipment tomorrow, Iraq does not have the facilities – the training and the background – to make that equipment effective. There is probably no worse way to acquire military equipment than to rush large amounts into a force that isn’t prepared.” To this effect, the United States is providing military advisory missions and is assisting with the purchase of military equipment and trainers. “This, in part, is driven by the fact that Iraq remains under a major budget crisis and will remain in that crisis for at least two to three years,” he said.

In terms of the ongoing threat of violence, Cordesman argued that, despite media portrayal, the levels of violence have decreased and have become concentrated in certain areas. He said that “the patterns of violence are not easily measurable,” but, in comparison to Afghanistan, there is greater stability. There remains a worrying level of outside interference, foreign support, and importing of illegal weapons for extremist purposes from Syria and Iran, which back Sunni and Shiite causes respectively.

In conclusion, Cordesman argued that, in future, “you cannot develop effective police without an effective judicial system and jails, and you cannot develop either one without an effective government presence in the field.” The United States will continue to support Iraq and give aid depending on how much Iraq needs or allows. Cordesman said that he has often heard Iran being described as the hegemon of the Gulf, but, to put things into perspective, “in the last five years, ignoring Iraq, the Gulf Cooperation Council countries have spent more than ten times as much on defense as Iran, and more than seventeen times as much on arms imports.”

Iraq and the Military Balance in the Gulf from Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Rend Al-Rahim gave the second speech in which she outlined the current precarious position in which Iraq finds itself. She argued that “we are, in fact, in a situation where Iraq is verging on tipping in one direction or another.” Indeed, “the next four years are going to indicate what Iraq is likely to be as a state.”

During her talk, Al-Rahim focused on three essential questions. The first concerns whether Iraq will remain one country, or whether it will become divided along ethnic and religious lines. The second question wonders whether democracy will become the prevailing governing ideology, or whether Iraq will revert to its historical system of autocratic and authoritarian rule. The third and final question asks whether Iraq will become a functional state that is able to maintain security for its people and deter external threats and pressures.

The answers to these questions, Al-Rahim said, can be defined by the problems that arise from constitutional and political challenges in the country. There are a variety of problems associated with Iraq’s constitution. She noted that “the constitution was written in a period of about three months, but, most importantly, it was written without the participation of the Sunni community who boycotted the process and refused to participate in the negotiations that produced the constitution. They were eventually persuaded to ratify the constitution.” Al-Rahim noted that “because of the haste with which the constitution was written, it is riddled with internal contradictions, ambiguities, lack of clarity, and is essentially, an unbalanced document that does not have a fully-fleshed conception of what the state is and how the state is going to function.” Indeed, “if the Iraqi federal government was to follow the constitution today, literally and strictly […] it would not be able to provide internal security – the article about security specifically says the federal government is in charge of Iraq’s security against external threats; it does not talk about internal threats.” Al-Rahim argued, “to the extent to which the Iraqi government functions, it is functioning extra constitutionally.”

There are two major areas – internal and external – where there are serious political challenges, Al-Rahim argued. The first of these is “the reductionist approach to Iraqi society that began in 2003 that was adopted by the U.S. administration” and this is the view of Iraq as being divided into Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish factions that have their own conflicting agendas. She argued that “this is neither an accurate, nor a healthy description of Iraqi society.” The second problem is the unease with which Iraq is identified within the region and how it relates to neighboring countries. Al-Rahim questioned whether Iraq can actually identify itself as an Arab country given the sizeable Kurdish and Shiite populations that do not consider themselves Arabs.

Finally, Al-Rahim argued that because of these constitutional and political variables, “there is still no common agreement among the political elite about what Iraq is or indeed what Iraq should be.”

The third and final speaker was Laith Kubba whose talk centered on the question “what impact will the U.S. withdrawal have on Iraq’s role in the region?” He also questioned whether the country would be able to stabilize after the withdrawal, especially with the prospect of civil war looming on the horizon.

For the eighty years before the invasion, Kubba argued, Iraq was a balancing force in the region and “maintained a strong position among the Arab countries; it was quite influential and independent.” However, “with the invasion in ’03 that order inside Iraq ended,” he said, and it has become a weak state that no longer poses a threat to its neighbors, or to the international community.

Kubba outlined the current trends that are driving the Iraqi political scene, both internally and externally. He argued that for a combination of economic and political reasons, the U.S. significantly reduced its troops. “Back in ’08, as Obama was elected, there was the dawn of a new policy on Iraq.” The focus has now shifted back onto the Iraqi government as “the perception of a diminishing U.S. presence throws the ball back to Iraqi players.”

Externally, a weakened Iraq will change the nature of the power balance in the region. “When the U.S. invaded Iraq, it more or less warned the neighbors not to interfere in Iraq; Saudi Arabia was kept in check; Syria was kept at bay; Turkey, for reasons of its own, decided not to cooperate. So, effectively, Iran was in a position to do what it wanted because it had no working understanding, or working relationship with the U.S. and it has built a very complex presence inside Iraq” that has made it extremely influential on a number of fronts, both culturally and militarily. Importantly, “As its neighbors look at Iraq, can they be indifferent to what sort of order is emerging in Iraq? The answer for Iran, Turkey, Syria, and Saudi Arabia is a definite ‘no.’” What happens in Iraq will have a direct influence and impact on their security and interests. Until Iraq becomes autonomous and independent, neighbors will have opportunities to influence the country.

Looking to the future of Iraq, Kubba said that there are two competing visions. The first perceives of Iraq as a modern state that has a clear citizen-state relationship irrespective of communal loyalties. He argued that despite the upheaval caused by the U.S. invasion, “the most positive outcome is that Iraq has set itself up with an electoral system” and there is now tremendous pressure on the government to take the public’s demands into account – something that Iraq has not experienced in a long time. The second vision sees Iraq as a weak and fractured state that has strong ethnically divided communal centers or provinces. The various factions will be encouraged to overlook political agendas in favor of sectarian ones. Finally, Kubba argued that “the new order is yet to materialize; we are still in a transitional phase in Iraq and I think it will take a while before the new order is shaped.”

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator

Barbara Stowasser Lectures on Concepts of Time in Islam
2010-10-25 08:00 - 18:00
Barbara Stowasser, Director of the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University, was invited to Doha to deliver aFocused Discussion on the subject of “Time Sticks” and concepts of time in Islam, to Georgetown faculty and staff.

Stowasser began the lecture by noting that “time is essential to the very structure of Muslim communal life. Time of ritual and worship of Muslim obligation are regulated according to celestial events – both lunar and solar.” She studied how the hours of the five daily prayers of Sunni Islam are controlled by the movement of the sun as well as its absence, and how these rituals have been reconfigured in today’s globalized world of regimented time-keeping. The Islamic calendar, she argued, has been instrumental in holding the Islamic world together over geographic distances and over many centuries.

In order to calculate prayer times in the pre-modern era, it was common to use “time sticks.” These, Stowasser said, are simple astronomical technologies that use shadow-length to measure daylight hours. They were part of religious knowledge and practice in all pre-modern societies, including that of the ancient Egyptians, the Babylonians, the Chinese, the Greeks, and the Romans. Unfortunately, she said, very few of these have been preserved in the Muslim world, but are prominently described in the literature.

Stowasser explained the difference between the notion of “seasonal time” that was used in the past and our modern conception of “abstract time.” In a world where the day is divided into abstract, standardized, and equal hours, “the five Islamic ritual prayers endow the day with a specific pulse that remains a vital sign of time perception in Muslim societies,” as these prayers are pegged to the older tradition of seasonal time and unequal hours. For millennia, other than those who resided on the equator, Stowasser argued, human patterns of living and working were organized around local astronomical time that differed along shorter and longer hours of daylight throughout the year.

Examining prayer times and standardization problems that arise as a result of geographical latitudes, Stowasser argued that they vary in length depending on their position between the equator and poles. Since “Islamic prayer times depend on terrestrial latitudes, this requires that prayer times should be defined in terms of shadow increase, not shadow length, which varies according to degree of latitude,” she said. Thus, shadow length in Mecca and Medina would not correspond with shadow lengths in other latitudes. “In the classical hadith, the historical and the normative are intertwined,” said Stowasser, and so, over time, the five daily prayers were negotiated and then established.

Surveying different historical periods, Stowasser said that in the Islamic world, the beginning of a new day started at dusk, and so was in keeping with the mechanisms of the lunar calendar. With the advent of the mechanical clock in the fourteenth century, time gradually became standardized across the nations. In the modern era, in order to coordinate regional time for the establishment of railroad and telegraph systems, longitudinal calculation was required to organize different time zones separated by geographic distances. “Technological progress has meant chronographic and calendrical standardization that eventually took on global validity. The Islamic prayer times are now regionally computed, often by electronic means,” Stowasser said. Moreover, “technology has also created the concept of linear time; a relatively recent Western invention that is replacing or is poised to replace the multiple subjective and situation specific times of the past […] The new form of clock-based time is producing a new form of global psychology where time equals punctuality, efficiency, and economic rationality.”

In conclusion, Stowasser said that “by way of early conquest and expansion, the Islamic realm fell heir to several much older civilizations that had long traditions of scholarship in the theoretical and applied sciences. From an early date, the science tradition was integrated into an Islamic world view,” said Stowasser. Currently, we are faced with Eurocentric and Western-enlightened critiques that claim pre-Islamic civilizations were profoundly mistrusted by an ever stricter Islamic orthodoxy. She argued, however, that the pre-modern Islamic texts do not support this critique. “In the Islamic world today, the Western calendar provides a global point of reference, even where the Islamic year reigns supreme,” but, she said, in some areas of Yemen and Saudi Arabia, “the old system has survived and created a system of double time-keeping.”

During the past several decades, Stowasser’s research and publications have focused on Islam and gender, which has made her one of the early pioneers on this topic in the West. Among her publications is Women in the Qur’an, Traditions and Interpretation and she co-edited and contributed to the volume Islamic Law and the Challenges of Modernity. At Georgetown, Stowasser developed and taught all the graduate courses on Qur’anic tafsirand introduced the study of Islam and gender into the curriculum. Stowasser was the former Chair of the Department of Arabic (now the Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies, in Georgetown College).

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator

Nuclear Question in the Middle East: Regional Perspectives
2010-11-07 08:00 - 18:00
On November 7, 2010, CIRS held a Working Group meeting to discuss regional perspectives related to the ongoing “Nuclear Question in the Middle East” research initiative that CIRS commenced in May 2010. The project is designed to look into nuclear proliferation concerns associated with the GCC states’ aims of establishing nuclear power capabilities in the region. Through close examination of the complex political and economic issues involved, CIRS aims to give due diligence to study of the topic.

The meeting was divided into broad thematic sections, including 1) regional security and arms control; 2) civilian nuclear energy programs; 3) Israel’s nuclear program and security in the Middle East; and 4) regional perspectives of Iran’s nuclear energy program.

The participants began by surveying the security climate across the region. They noted that the complexity of arms control and weaponization in the region is worth further in-depth study. In many cases, the countries of the Middle East have strategic alliances with various different countries and this produces complex political networks. The participants argued that what is unique about the state of security in the Middle East is that, despite always being seriously affected by foreign influence, many countries in the region have historically made strategic decisions against the advice of foreign allies. In the past, Iraq’s weapons program was closely associated with Western countries as a buffering measure against the Islamic Republic of Iran and, yet, Iraq had its own independent motivations and initiated various clandestine nuclear programs.

Further, the threat perception, they argued, was “sub-regional” in that the countries of the Middle East are more concerned with neighbors’ security programs, rather than regional ones. Morocco, for example, is less concerned with Iran and Israel’s nuclear ambitions than it is with Libya’s. Threat perceptions, therefore, are based on geographic location and proximity of security hazards, and are the basis for driving regional security policies. The participants also considered the power of nuclear ambitions in the face of non-conventional terrorist threats.

Despite tremendous pressure exerted by Western powers, many countries of the Middle East have voiced their right to pursue nuclear ambitions. Many, however, do not have the necessary capacity, infrastructure, and technological capabilities. The countries that do, such as the GCC states, have opted for rational economic strategies by seeking contracts from Asian firms to build their nuclear plants, rather than relying on the expertise of their Western allies. The strength of the Israeli lobby has meant that the United States has been discouraged from engaging in these regional GCC initiatives.

The threat from Iran is often attributed as one of the main drivers behind the GCC states’ nuclear ambitions, the participants argued. Despite this credible threat, there are various other factors that are just as influential. Issues such as energy consumption, economic stability, climate change, and the depletion of natural resources in the GCC have become of paramount importance to the establishment of nuclear energy ambitions. Further to these practical issues, notions of prestige and image-building are also key drivers for the acquisition of nuclear power in the region.

In conclusion, the participants argued that it was oil and gas prices that have caused the “nuclear renaissance” in the Middle East. The interest in nuclear programs in this case is based on nuclear power rather than on the fuel cycle and enrichment possibilities for weapons.

Read more about this research initiative

Working Group Participants:

Mustafa Alani, Gulf Research CenterSalih Al Mani, King Saud UniversityZahra Babar, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarKai-Henrik Barth, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarJohn T. Crist, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarNabil Fahmy, American University in CairoRiad Kahwaji, INEGMAMehran Kamrava, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarSuzi Mirgani, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarAdnan Shihab-Eldin, Adviser and Member of Kuwait National Nuclear Energy Committee (KNNEC)Debra Shushan, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarAbdullah Toukan, Strategic Analysis and Global Risk Assessment (SAGRA)

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator

Miriam Cooke Lectures on Heritage Projects in the GCC
2010-11-07 08:00 - 18:00
Miriam Cooke, Professor of Arab Cultures at Duke University and Fall 2010 Scholar-in-Residence at the Museum of Islamic Art in Doha, delivered the November CIRS Monthly Dialogue on the topic of “The Tribal Modern: The Past as Future.”

In examining a variety of “heritage projects” in Qatar and the Gulf states, Cooke acknowledged the literature of Ibn Khaldun and his binary scheme of distinction between the desert nomadic, otherwise known as “badawa,” and the sedentary urban, known as “hadara” in many current Arab cultures. The “badawa” symbolizes nomadism, loyalty, and tribalism and “hadara,” on the other hand, is symbolic of modernity, urbanization, and individualism. Both concepts are used to distinguish the “self” from the “other” in Arab societies. When used to describe the self, Cooke argued, either word has positive connotations, but when used to describe the other, it is often tinged with criticism of the other’s way of life, be it modern or traditional. “These two terms,” she argued, “are current in Gulf vocabulary, and are deployed to designate cultural differences.”

Cooke argued that both concepts are constitutive of the heterogeneity inherent in Arab cultures and so it is important “to bring the two cultures together in such a way that they complement and enhance each other and strengthen the modernization efforts underway” in many Gulf states. These largely oppositional tropes between the traditional and the modern, Cooke noted, are negotiated and played out in the current “heritage projects.” Areas such as Suq Waqif in Doha are primary examples of how the old and modern aspects of Qatari culture are intertwined in architectural design of public spaces.

In order to further explore these underlying cultural imaginings, Cooke contacted Mohamed Ali, the designer and architect of the restoration of Suq Waqif. She noted that “it was through him that I began to see that ‘badawa’ and ‘hadara’ are being braided together.” In order to reconstruct the old market area, the architect, “finding very little reliable historical documentation, interviewed old people for fragments and figments of their imagination.”

Suq Waqif differs greatly from the highly modernized cityscape of the downtown financial district of West Bay, and, so, Cooke argued, the architecture of Doha has become an assimilation of the old and new and of the ‘badawa’ and ‘hadara.’ She noted that “where the skyscrapers compete for the prize in cutting-edge Western technology and aesthetics, and the Museum of Islamic Art was designed to blend the architectural variety of Islamdom into a single seamless whole, Suq Waqif was to be made of local materials and to embody the spirit of the Gulf.” Indeed, Cooke argued, “Suq Waqif, for me, is the emblematic working out of the tribal modern.”

This historical reference to cultural and tribal purity, or asala, is a symptom of globalization and modernity, argued Cooke, as nations attempt to rebuild cultural identities after years of colonial struggle. She noted that “the Arab world states, whose citizens are the first generation to grow up with a national, rather than a regional, identity, are involved in a future articulation of a largely unrecorded past that lies buried under the surface of identical newly global cities.” In this sense, many of these renovation projects are state-sponsored and are in service to the idea of the patriotic.

Cooke confirmed that “heritage projects erase pre-national ethnoscapes and deterritorialize lifestyles. They provide the tabula rasa on which the mass migrations of workers can be projected as new. Colonialism disappears behind the façade of ethnic purity and isolation. The heritage that is being revived glosses over four centuries of struggle between the Portuguese, the Ottomans, and the British for control of the valuable waterways that link the Fertile Crescent with the Indian Ocean.”

Concluding the lecture, Cooke argued that, in any of these heritage projects, whether architectural, sartorial, or linguistic, it is not an actual tribe that is being revived to serve as the backdrop for the embodiment of cultural purity, but the “idea” of a tribe. In fact, she said, “it doesn’t matter that Suq Waqif is a simulacrum; it produces the ideal, the idea, and the feel of the authentic (the aseel).”

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator

Researching the Gulf: Thinking Outside the Box in Qatar
2010-11-10 08:00 - 18:00
Mehran Kamrava, Director of the Center for International and Regional Studies, gave a talk, entitled “Researching the Gulf: Thinking Outside the Box in Qatar”, at the American University of Beirut’s Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs. The event was sponsored jointly by CIRS and IFI.

Kamrava discussed the challenges and opportunities present in conducting social science research in the Gulf in general and in Doha in particular, focusing specifically on the research projects undertaken by CIRS and the roles, both current and potential, in influencing or shaping public policy in Qatar and elsewhere.

Beginning with a broader discussion of the establishment and purpose of CIRS as part of the School of Foreign Service in Qatar, Kamrava discussed the primary research focus and scholarly endeavors of CIRS and the broader consequences of these research initiatives on the state of social science scholarship and the encouragement of a culture of research in Qatar and elsewhere in the Gulf region. By undertaking in-depth, multiyear studies such as “nuclear programs in the Gulf,” “migrant labor in the Gulf,” and “food security and food sovereignty in the Middle East,” Kamrava told the audience that CIRS aims to contribute to our understanding of relevant political phenomenon through engaging in empirically grounded, original research.

The talk was followed by a question and answer session. A video of the event is available here.

Carol Lancaster on the Results and Consequences of the U.S. Mid-term Elections
2010-11-14 08:00 - 18:00
Carol Lancaster, Dean of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and Professor of Politics at Georgetown University, lectured to a group of Georgetown faculty and Qatar-based diplomats on November 14, 2010 on the subject of “The Results and Consequences of the US Mid-term Elections.”

The mid-term elections, Lancaster said, “were predicted to be a setback for Obama and predicted to produce a change in the Congress.” These forecasts, she said, were true insofar as “the change of party in the House of Representatives was dramatic,” but, although “the democrats will control the Senate, they will not control much, because in order to get anything through the U.S. Senate, you normally have to have sixty votes.”

Explaining various elements of the United States government structure, Lancaster said that “the Congress can block the president from doing almost anything that requires a congressional vote. […] Currently, the Republicans have the votes in the House to block legislation, but, similarly, Obama can block legislation from the Congress, because he has the veto power,” which, she said, “is a recipe for stalemate.”

One of the major issues that will be affected after the mid-term elections, Lancaster said, is the size and distribution of the federal budget. “The Republicans are either going to have to pass a budget, which means they are going have to compromise on a variety of issues because they cut everything they want, or not pass a budget, in which case, I think they’ll be blamed for impeding life and the economy of the United States.” If the Republicans do compromise with the administration in passing a budget, then the right-wing will become part of what they criticized in their bids to become elected – “too much wheeling and dealing in Washington.”

The second test, Lancaster argued, will be raising the federal debt limit. “If you don’t raise the limit on the federal debt and the federal government cannot borrow, then it cannot pay its bills. We will be essentially bankrupt.” In this case, “if the new Republican members of Congress, especially the very right wing ones, put above all else limiting the growth in federal borrowing and spending, they will have to block raising the debt limit for federal borrowing. If they do not vote to raise the limit, they will be blamed for what could be an economic disaster.”

Regarding the future of American foreign policy influenced by the Republicans, Lancaster argued that “I think what we are going to see is a more aggressive American foreign policy, if the Congress has its way. I think the people who will be coming into key positions – some of them at least – are more hostile to Iran, more supportive of Israel, and more hostile to North Korea.”

Further, Lancaster speculated how the results of the mid-term elections will be used to influence the 2012 elections. “The Republicans may decide that this is really the beginning of the presidential elections of 2012 and they will maneuver politically to position themselves for a better shot at the presidency.” In this case, the Democrats will need to make some serious changes to their mode of operation, because “over the last two years, Obama has left the definition of issues – the healthcare bill, the economic stimulus, etc. – to the opposition.” If he continues to let the Republicans define these issues through the media and other public forums, then, Lancaster said, the President may have a hard time winning a second term.

In conclusion, Lancaster argued that at every presidential election, the two parties are regularly being voted in and out and that is because “we have a closely divide electorate, which goes back and forth.” She added that “It isn’t that they are voting for something; it is that they are voting against something and that isn’t a very stable way of governing.” There are two underlying and largely contradictory philosophies that are the basis of the United States model. She argued that “since the beginning of the American republic, we have had a very strong libertarian impulse in our politics,” but “since the depression, we have had a ‘social democratic’ impulse which is more comfortable with government addressing social and economic problems.” There are tensions between these two traditions that are played out and negotiated every election year.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator

Foreign Policy and Regime Survival in Jordan
2010-12-01 08:00 - 18:00
Debra Shushan, the 2010-2011 CIRS Post Doctoral Fellow, delivered the December Monthly Dialogue on the topic, “Jordan in the Gulf Wars: Foreign Policy and Regime Survival,” where she illustrated key differences between Jordan’s foreign policy initiatives in the first and second Gulf Wars which, respectively, occurred in 1990-91 and from 2003 onward. Shushan noted that “the question that motivates this research is: How do non-democratic states make foreign policy?” Given the dearth of theorizing by political scientists on this question and the opacity of foreign policy-making in autocratic regimes, shedding light on the ways in which a country such as Jordan conducts its foreign policy is crucial in expanding the reach of international relations theories.

As Shushan indicated, Jordan took very different foreign policy positions regarding the two Gulf Wars. During Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the United States was moving beyond the Cold War era and becoming the world’s sole superpower. Led by President George H. W. Bush, the U.S. spearheaded an international coalition against Iraq and put pressure on other countries, particularly in the Arab world, to contribute troops and materiel. Jordan abstained from joining. However, with regard to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Jordan adopted a very different policy and became “an important tacit coalition partner of the United States” by supporting the war effort, most crucially through allowing military bases in eastern Jordan to be used in staging operations in Iraq.

Debra shushan monthly dialogue dec 1, 2010 slides from Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
In order to explain the drastic change that occurred between the Gulf Wars, Shushan stressed the importance of understanding the regime survival strategies employed by Jordan’s leadership. She maintained that “whether we are in democratic regimes or non-democracies, leaders care first and foremost about retaining power.” To this effect, regime survival depends on identifying and retaining the support of a group of key backers – what Shushan calls “a winning coalition” – which includes financial, social, and military elites, sometimes with the aid of foreign supporters. She argued that “a winning coalition can be more or less populist depending on the extent to which it incorporates support from the mass public.” In both Gulf Wars, Arab governments were faced with the choice of whether or not to back the U.S.-led coalition. Supporting the United States brought the prospects of economic rewards from the U.S. and its Gulf Arab allies, while adopting a neutral or pro-Iraq stance promised domestic support from publics attracted by Saddam Hussein’s populist, anti-imperialist, and pro-Palestinian rhetoric.

Based on interviews she conducted with Jordanian leaders who were close to King Hussein during the first Gulf War, Shushan contends that “because of the extreme strength of public opinion and the dramatic amount of support within the mass public for Saddam Hussein, if the Jordanian regime had in fact sided with the U.S.-led coalition, there was a genuine fear that the regime could be overthrown.” However, in the second Gulf War, economic considerations played a more prominent role in Jordanian foreign policy. In the years leading up to 2003, Jordan’s economic dependence had shifted from Iraq to the United States, with dramatic increases in U.S. aid to Jordan after Amman signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994 and substantial growth in Jordanian exports to the U.S. following the implementation of the Jordan-U.S. Free Trade Agreement in 2001.

In conclusion, Shushan argued that it was important to understand that not all non-democratic states act in the same way and that further research is necessary to elaborate ways in which varying domestic arrangements shape foreign policy initiatives. Also, she indicated that interesting questions remain regarding how public opinion affects foreign policy in non-democratic contexts. For example, how do autocratic regimes go about gauging the content and intensity of public attitudes? Shushan looks forward to pursuing these questions in her future work.

Debra Shushan comes to CIRS from the College of William and Mary in Williamsburg, Virginia, where she is an Assistant Professor of Government and member of the faculties of International Relations and Middle East Studies. She is working on a book manuscript that examines Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian foreign policies in the Gulf Wars through the lens of regime survival.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator

Political Economy of the Gulf Working Group II
2010-12-11 08:00 - 2010-12-12 18:00
On December 11–12, 2010, CIRS concluded the second session of its “Political Economy of the Gulf” research initiative with a two-day working group meeting that took place at Georgetown University in Qatar. Several experts on the political economy of the Gulf were invited back to Doha to present their chapter submissions and to discuss their original research during the two-day meeting. In the coming months, CIRS will gather the chapters in order to submit them for publication as an edited volume titled, The Political Economy of the Persian Gulf (Oxford University Press/Hurst, 2012).

The meeting was divided into several sections, including discussion on the demographic aspects of the GCC; the GCC monetary union; the “Dubai Model” of economic diversification; attempts at establishing knowledge-based economies in the GCC; the effects of rentierism on state autonomy; sovereign wealth funds; and Islamic banking models across the GCC.

The working group members discussed all of these issues within the overarching framework of rentierism and the relationships of mutual interdependence that become established between states and societies. Mutually beneficial rentier arrangements have guided the means in which the GCC countries have formed their oil-based economies and labor relations.

The working group participants examined the fact that over the past few years, the GCC states have become increasingly powerful actors on the global scene, and have become important markets for foreign investment. In order to adapt to changes within the global order, the concept of knowledge-based economies has become integral to the GCC states’ ambitious economic diversification attempts. In each GCC state, huge budgets have been allocated to programs that concentrate on issues of education, scientific research, increased flow of information, and investment in human capital.

The transition from oil-based economies to knowledge-based has had different levels of success in the various GCC states. The failure of the “Dubai Model” of economic development has meant that Dubai’s financial strategies, which were once seen as leading examples of economic progress in the region, are now being organized along more cautious and less ambitious investment plans. The GCC states’ various diversification plans, whether successful or not, have signaled official acknowledgment of the necessity of investing in a future of well-educated and qualified workforces that are able to compete in internationally.

Much of the budgets allocated to these diversification projects are funded by the GCC states’ sovereign wealth funds (SWF), which also came under examination by the working group members. Sovereign wealth funds are often constituted of staggering amounts of money that are used to sponsor large-scale projects in the interest of a country’s long-term development.

The participants discussed further financial considerations regarding “Islamic banking,” which was reported to be more developed in the Gulf region than anywhere else in the world. The participants examined Islamic banking methods across the various GCC states and compared them with those operating across Iran.

Members of the working group also looked at the political and economic possibilities of the GCC states forming a monetary union and how moving away from the U.S. dollar peg may or may not result in global imbalances in the value of the dollar. The participants concluded that many of the economic and political efforts currently underway in the GCC fall under a larger plan to establish the Gulf states as leading international powers. The GCC states have attempted to enhance their political stability both regionally and internationally and to increase their international bargaining power.

Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Alexis Antoniades, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarZahra Babar, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarJohn T. Crist, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarChristopher Davidson, Durham UniversityNada Eissa, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarSteffen Hertog, London School of EconomicsMehran Kamrava, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarFred Lawson, Mills CollegeSuzi Mirgani, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarDjavad Salehi-Isfahani, Virginia Tech UniversityJean-François Seznec, Georgetown UniversityNadia Talpur, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarKristian Coates Ulrichsen, London School of EconomicsRodney Wilson, Durham UniversityMohamed Zayani, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator

Zalmay Khalilzad on America and the Middle East: Future Challenges and Opportunities
2010-12-13 08:00 - 18:00
Zalmay Khalilzad was invited to deliver a CIRS Distinguished Lecture on the topic, “America and the Middle East: Future Challenges and Opportunities” on December 13, 2010, in Doha, Qatar. Khalilzad served as U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations (2007-2009), U.S. Ambassador to Iraq (2005-2007), and U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan (2003-2005).

The Ambassador spoke about the relationship between the United States and the Middle East within two different contexts. The first, he said, “is the framework of thinking about the Middle East after 9/11, which was a decisive moment in American history in terms of its approach to this part of the world” and the second is the “transition to a new approach, which I think is in formation.” The word “transition,” he said, “implies continuity and change” of current policies as the United States adjusts to shifts in the global order.

Khalilzad defined the broader Middle East as stretching from Pakistan in the east to Morocco in the west and argued that in order to understand the relationship between the United States and the Middle East, it was first necessary to begin with observations regarding the impact of the events of September 11, 2001. Although the Ambassador pointed out that America is a heterogeneous country that is made up of a multitude of ideologies and schools of thought, he noted that “9/11 had a big impact on American thinking – on official American thinking.”

One significant change, Khalilzad argued, was that “9/11 made the United States think of this broad region geopolitically,” and as having real and lasting impacts on national and international security. The challenges of this region, he said, have the ability to reverberate around the world. In today’s integrated world, regional problems have great consequences for the entire international community. “In the post 9/11 environment,” Khalilzad said, “working towards a region that would be more at peace with itself and with the world became a strong tendency orientation in the U.S. foreign policy debate discussion and doctrines.”

It was within this framework that Khalilzad said the United States ventured into Iraq. “I believe Iraq, although it still remains in a difficult transition, is in an improved situation than it was at times in its recent past.” This is because the United States worked to “encourage a process of democratization and a belief that democratization through elections and support of civil society organizations was going to lead to a decrease in the unhappiness of the people” which produces extremism, he argued.

Other issues that impact the stability of the Middle East region’s development, the Ambassador said, is the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the problems in Afghanistan that transpired to be far more complex than the United States originally thought; and the lingering threat of Iran.

Taking all of these regional conflicts into account, Khalilzad spoke of how the United States has modified its approach to the Middle East. He argued that the Iraqi challenge is currently less than it was in the past, but the challenge of Iran and Afghanistan are becoming increasingly prominent. The challenge of terrorism and extremism has lessened in some areas, but, he warned, has spread and became stronger in other parts of the world. Other than these issues, East Asia has become an area of increasing geopolitical importance with the rise of China and India, and the challenges imposed by North Korea. The Ambassador said that “as a result of the shifts in the geopolitical issues in the world, there is going to be a greater focus on the issues of East Asia both in terms of diplomacy and in terms of military strategy for the longer term to adjust to the balance of power changes that are taking place.”

Looking to which issues will become important in the future, Khalilzad argued that “although political challenges remain, it is the future of the economy – particularly the US economy – that has gained in relative importance.” He continued by saying that “the U.S. position in the world ultimately rests on its economic and military power, and its military power cannot be sustained without its economic power being such to be able to afford the kind of capabilities that its global role so far has required.”

Concluding the lecture, the Ambassador said that these political and economic problems will necessarily result in adjustments in future U.S. policy. These adjustments will include “a greater emphasis on stability in order not to produce more demands on resources and effort on the part of the United States,” he said.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator

The Nuclear Question in the Middle East Working Group II
2011-01-09 08:00 - 2011-01-10 18:00
On January 9–10, 2011, CIRS concluded the second meeting of its “Nuclear Question in the Middle East” working group. The working group participants were invited back to Doha to deliver their chapter submissions and to critique each others’ findings and conclusions. The papers will be collected by CIRS in an edited volume titled, The Nuclear Question in the Middle East (Oxford University Press/Hurst, 2012). Seven international experts on the field discussed a variety of topics related to the study.

The participants stated that nuclear energy will always be considered of dual character and although many countries claim that they will establish a peaceful civilian program, there always remains suspicion that the program can be used for purposes of proliferation. Because a civilian nuclear program can be modified into a military one regardless of the original intention, there are a number of strict international nonproliferation laws and treaties that countries must adhere to in order to allay international suspicions.

Deliberating different models of regime survival strategies, the participants indicated that these have a bearing on why some countries have nuclear programs, while others steer clear of such projects. According to such “nuclear logics,” countries that wish to internationalize and integrate into the global economy by attracting foreign investment tend to avoid acquiring nuclear capabilities. Inward looking models, however, tend to want to acquire nuclear programs as they are less dependent on the global economy and as such do not adhere to international treaties. Further to macro level analysis of states’ nuclear ambitions, the participants also discussed the more detailed minutiae of such projects. As part of this analysis, the participants spotlighted the social psychology and the role of individual leaders in nuclear decision-making. Thus the group concluded that personal characteristics of decision-makers are key variables in understanding why and when states pursue nuclear power.

The nuclear programs of many countries of the Middle East were presented as case studies, including Israel, Egypt, Libya, Turkey, Iran, and the UAE. Countries such as the UAE, for example, cannot rely on their own oil supplies for their high energy intensive petro chemical and water desalinization industries. The energy and electricity demands in these countries are extremely high. Many argue that these countries must pursue a combination of hydrocarbon, renewable energy sources such as hydro and solar, as well as nuclear energy in order to meet their needs. In order to be in full transparency, the Abu Dhabi nuclear power program has been established in accordance with international treaties and protocols and by openly inviting foreign know-how and observers.

Concluding the second day, the participants discussed some overall themes that emerged from the meeting and a general theoretical overview of the nuclear issue in the Middle East. As an overarching framework, the chapters will address the issue of Middle East proliferation/nuclearization within the scope of the Iranian and Israeli shadows as well as the opaque relationship between civilian and security programs.

Participants and Discussants:

Zahra Babar, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarAvner Cohen, Woodrow Wilson International Center for ScholarsJohn T. Crist, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarMehran Kamrava, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarMustafa Kibaroglu, Bilkent UniversityThomas W. Lippman, Council on Foreign Relations and Middle East InstituteGiacomo Luciani, Gulf Research CenterMari Luomi, Finnish Institute of International AffairsSuzi Mirgani, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarMaria Rost Rublee, University of AucklandDebra Shushan, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarEtel Solingen, University of California, Irvine

Click here for the working group’s agendaRead more about the research initiative

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator

A Changing Kingdom: Saudi Arabia in 2030
2011-01-10 08:00 - 18:00
Thomas W. Lippman, former Middle East bureau chief of The Washington Post and adjunct senior fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Middle East Institute, was invited to Doha as part of the CIRS “Nuclear Question in the Middle East” working group meeting. In conjunction with the meeting, Lippman delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue on January 10, 2011. on the topic “A Changing Kingdom: Saudi Arabia in 2030.”

The subject of Lippman’s lecture revolved around likely future shifts in the religious, strategic, and economic principles of Saudi Arabia. There has been much literature written on the kingdom, especially since September 11, 2001, but, he argued, most of these are exaggerated accounts of radical Islam and extremism. In his new book, Saudi Arabia on the Edge: The Perilous Future of an American Ally, Lippman advocates a more sober approach to the country’s future, rather than dwelling on events of the past. Over the next two decades, Lippman argued, there will be seismic demographic and economic shifts that will affect all aspects of life in the kingdom. “Saudi Arabia has to make some very difficult and very expensive decisions in order to sustain economic growth and to maintain a basic standard of life for the population,” he said.

Listing some of the demographic and economic trends that are likely to occur, Lippman noted that “the population will grow probably by 70%, but it will grow at a slower rate than in the past.” The reason for this, he said, was because “women are collectively better educated than any previous generation and in Saudi Arabia, as anywhere in the developing world, better educate women marry later and have fewer children.” Because more women will enter the workforce, working women need a certain degree of personal mobility and will need to be able to drive legally. In the long run, he said, “Saudi Arabia cannot afford to educate all those women as it is doing, at great cost, and not recoup any of the economic output from that investment.”

Further, the current cost of living in Saudi Arabia is already extremely high and will only increase over the next few years. As such, it will become increasingly difficult to sustain large families in such an inflationary environment. Although Saudi Arabia is traditionally oil-rich, “the population has been growing faster than the GDP,” and so, Lippman argued, “the country will face the beginnings of what will be a difficult and expensive struggle to provide the population with basic necessities such as food, water, housing, and electricity.” A major consequence of the housing shortage is that the entire traditional way of life in Saudi Arabia, which is “based on living in the family compound, or in the village,” is going to change and we will see more people living in high rise apartment buildings in urban areas.

Lippman predicted that on the basis of the trends he discussed, “Saudi Arabia in twenty years, or at least by mid century, will inevitably be a more open, moderate, and educated country. It will be more like the rest of the developed world.” This is especially true since “the greatest test of the government and its ambitions was the Al Qaeda uprising” and its ultimate failure because of lack of popular support.

In conclusion, Lippman cautioned that unless there are some serious changes made, Saudi Arabia will be overwhelmed by its own demography, economy, and climate. These changes are not exactly a matter of choice; “the whole way of thinking about life and urban development is going to be inevitably transformed by the forces of demography and economics in Saudi Arabia.”

Lippman has been studying and writing about Middle East affairs for thirty five years. A frequent guest and commentator on television in the United States and in the Middle East, he is the author of five books about the Arab world, Islam and U.S. foreign policy and of several journal articles on related subjects.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator

Conspiracy Theories in the Arab World
2011-01-11 08:00 - 18:00
Matthew Gray, Senior Lecturer at the Center for Arab and Islamic Studies, Australian National University in Canberra, lectured on “Explaining Conspiracy Theories in the Arab World” on January 11, 2011.

Gray’s lecture was based on work conducted for his recent book on this topic, Conspiracy Theories in the Middle East: Sources and Politics (Routledge, 2010). He argued that because “conspiracy theories are real political language,” they are worthy of serious study. Although the proliferation of unverified stories is a social phenomenon that can easily fall into the delusional and exaggerated, they are nonetheless important indicators of social fears and apprehensions and can reveal underlying ideas often ignored by mainstream discourse.

The first daunting task of studying the phenomenon, Gray said, is to define what a conspiracy theory is. This is difficult because such theories sometimes turn out to be true or are widely believed to be true. In general terms, “a conspiracy theory almost always involves absolute secrecy and it nearly always is negative and disadvantages people. It often sounds like it is using a rational argument, but once you scratch beneath the surface, there is either a flaw of logic or a factual error.” As such, conspiracy theories flourish because they tend not to be falsifiable.

There are three main areas that enhance the conditions in which conspiracy theories flourish; these are historical, ideological, and state-society drivers. Gray argued that agreement on certain historical narratives can build a support network between the conspiracy theorist and the receiver. “History is important for laying the foundations of a conspiracy theory” and allows for a reappraisal of historical values and impacts and thus is a means of political engagement.

Ideology is a second main driver for conspiracy theories in Gray’s view. He explained that ideologies such as state-led development, Arab socialism, Arab nationalism, democracy, and Islamism, have failed to capture the imagination of the majority of people and, so, in the absence of a compelling ideology, conspiracy theories are rife.

The third factor revolves around problems in the state-society relationship in the Arab World. Gray described the Middle East as a place where opaque governing structures operate at the elite level of politics. It is an area where complicated bureaucratic networks and repressive state institutions often thrive. Under these conditions, Gray noted that “societies have trouble understanding how people in power operate” and this fosters the perfect environment for conspiracy theories to emerge.

Sometimes the reverse is true and conspiracy theories can suit those in positions of power. Indeed, “the state and the political elite can actually be the narrators of conspiracy theories,” he said. State-endorsed conspiracy theories can divert attention from other explanations or other pressing issues. “Conspiracy theories can help in the construction of a counter fact to confuse or disorient people. People get bombarded not just with factual information, but with bias, with conspiracy theories, and after a while, especially in a strict authoritarian context, it becomes difficult to know what the truth is, what is safe to say and not say,” explained Gray.

Concluding the lecture, Gray explained that conspiracy theories will continue to flourish in the wake of global television stations, new media, and communication technologies. “The paradox of communications technology is that just as you can spread fact and education very easily over satellite TV and the internet, you also get a fragmentation of knowledge and authority and it becomes very difficult for a lay listener or viewer to differentiate between someone speaking with formal, traditional authority and someone merely claiming to have authority,” he said.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator

Seymour Hersh on the Obama and Bush Foreign Policies
2011-01-17 08:00 - 18:00
Seymour Hersh is a Pulitzer Prize winning investigative journalist and author on national security issues for the New Yorker magazine. On January 17, 2011, he gave a CIRS Distinguished Lecture titled “The Obama/Bush Foreign Policies: Why Can’t America Change?” before an audience of 800 members of the community in Doha.

Hersh has covered everything from Vietnam to Iraq to Iran to the whole of the Middle East, and he regularly analyzes current U.S. foreign policy and issues pertaining to military intelligence, national security and the press. His bestselling books include, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House, The Dark Side of Camelot, and, most recently, Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib.

Currently, Hersh is at work on a new book in which he argues that the heightened sentiments of fear and reprisal after September 11, 2001, paved the way for a handful of neo-conservatives to take control of the White House with anti-Islam ideologies and policies. According to Hersh, the U.S. invasion of Iraq was presented to the public, both locally and internationally, as a crusade. The Cheney/Bush administration assumed that most people would back their actions because of the supposed nobility of the cause. “There is a tremendous amount of anti-Muslim feeling in the military community,” Hersh argued. “It is a crusade, literally.” What alarmed him most, Hersh explained, was not the drastic policy, but how easy it was to implement. None of the necessary checks and balances was put into place as the public acquiesced and the press became complicit and signed on to the narrative of the “global war on terror” without questioning the underlying motives.

The Obama administration has not made any significant improvements to how the U.S. is handling the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Hersh claimed. Since 2003, the war in Iraq has been a losing battle and has resulted in a “war of attrition.” Similarly, the war in Afghanistan is as unsuccessful now for the Americans as it was unwinnable for the Russians in the 1980s. “I truly don’t know any serious officer or special operator or civilian who has been in the war who has any confidence about it. We are not going to prevail in Afghanistan,” he said.

Although Obama’s rhetoric is very different from Bush’s, their policies remain very much aligned, according to Hersh. Unmanned drones continue to bomb targets in Afghanistan and continue to kill both legitimate targets and noncombatants indiscriminately. Obama is fully aware of the damage being done and yet has not tampered with the existing system nor done anything to stop it.

When it comes to American citizens being held in countries like Iran, “we complain bitterly in America about the lack of jurisprudence and the lack of a good legal system and, yet, how many people now are still in Guantanamo, suffering away?” Such double-standards continue to operate and are thoroughly counterproductive. “The truth is,” Hersh said “if they weren’t Al Qaeda when we captured them, and most of them were not, as many of you probably understand, they are now after seven, eight, nine years of being incarcerated without any hearings or any rights.” The insurgency is spreading and is becoming much more violent. Opportunism and morally questionable acts, Hersh argued, have been features of American governance for a long time. He said that “After WWII, we had a secret program of bringing and ‘de-Nazifying’ some of the German scientists who were valuable to our own energy and missile program.”

There was hope that much of the damage done during the Bush era would be fixed when the new administration was sworn in, but, Hersh argued, not much has changed in U.S. foreign policy since Obama took office. Many morally questionable acts like torture, the use of secret prisons, assassinations, and extraordinary renditions have continued unabated.

Hersh expressed his disappointment in Obama’s inability to learn from the mistakes of the Bush administration. He argued that, in America, “We are anti-history […] Why else would we make the same mistake we always make?” Hersh concluded by saying, “I am stunned and appalled that this president did not do what he said he was going to do.”

Earlier in the day, Hersh was invited to the Georgetown’s Qatar campus and spoke informally to faculty and students.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator.

Wikileaks and Intelligence Reform
2011-01-25 08:00 - 18:00
Carl Ford was Assistant Secretary of State and head of the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research under President George W. Bush. He gave a lecture at Georgetown’s Qatar campus on the topic, “Wikileaks and Intelligence Reform” on January 25, 2011. Ford is a Professorial Lecturer with Georgetown University’s Master of Science in Foreign Service (MSFS) program.

Ford began the discussion by saying that Wikileaks’ “basic assumption is that transparency should be complete and that every citizen should know everything that goes on in the government.” With such resounding ideals, “it’s hard to argue against the people’s right to know,” but the freedom of speech principles that Wikileaks is purporting to promote are naive and impractical in the current political climate. Ford argued that “complete transparency” is an idealistic principle that is sound in theory, but cannot be sustained in practice. There are many incidences where secrecy can and should be used as leverage in political negotiations that serve the national interest. “The fact is,” he said, “there are things that have to remain secret – not because we want to hide it from people, but because it is a practical matter, for national security interests.”

The Wikileaks saga has brought into public debate a variety of core questions about the relationship between societies and governments. Ford said that “this is an issue that is extremely important and extremely complex. There are major principles at stake: freedom of speech, press freedoms, and the ability for people to know what their government is doing.” These issues are fundamental to democracy and remain the tenets of any liberal state, but, Ford said, Wikileaks has hijacked and capitalized upon them as an excuse for testing the U.S. democratic system to its limit and doing untold damage to methods of information gathering and sharing.

Ford argued that although Wikileaks may have had good intentions when it exposed private and classified documents, its plan has backfired. Ford said that “Wikileaks is going to have the opposite effect of what the people who support it want.” As such, Wikileaks is self-destructive, counterproductive, and a short-term phenomenon that will have negative effects on transparency.

“I guarantee you,” Ford said, “that Wikileaks has already had a major impact on tightening down of security procedures and the flow of information, not only with our policy-makers, but within the intelligence community.” This means that the United States as well as other countries will necessarily become even less transparent than they were in the past. In future, reporters will find it hard to find sources and those who do leak sensitive material will face criminal charges.

In conclusion, any idea of future intelligence reform has been dealt a major set-back. “The knowledge of the U.S. intelligence community and the quality of our analysis will suffer because of Wikileaks. The information itself was not very important, but the damage it did to the process was what concerned most people in the intelligence community.”

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator

Mohamed Zayani Lectures on Transnational Arab Media
2011-02-01 08:00 - 18:00
Mohamed Zayani, Professor of Critical Theory at Georgetown University in Qatar, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue lecture entitled “Transnational Arab Media, Regional Politics and State Security: Saudi Arabia between Tradition and Modernity” on February 1, 2011.

Offering “a social sciences perspective which places the development of media within a broad, historical, cultural and socio-political context,” Zayani delved into the intricacies of the Saudi media systems, exploring how the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia came to be an important media player. “Although lacking the historical depth which characterizes other prominent media traditions in the region,” Zayani noted, “the rise of Saudi media is remarkable.”

Within the span of a few decades, Zayani explained, “the Saudis managed to develop a decentralized media empire which encompasses a plethora of media conglomerates, transnational foreign-based networks, pan-Arab satellite channels, influential newspapers, and regional publications.” Prominent Saudi media ventures include pan-Arab newspapers like Al Hayat and Al Sharq Al Awsat and television networks like MBC, Orbit, ART and Rotana. Interestingly, most of these ventures, which are in private Saudi hands, tend to be entertainment oriented.

Driving the Saudi interest in media, Zayani noted, is “what maybe loosely described as a security imperative.” The Saudi interest in media goes back to the 1960s, when the kingdom found itself confronted with “a number of cultural and political challenges.” The development of Saudi media is tightly connected to “internal dynamics” which are social, cultural and political in nature, and “external dynamics” which are related to geopolitical considerations, and historical regional rivalries.

While designing a “circumscribed domestic media system” which protects its social values, limits the influence of Western culture, and enhances its national identity, Zayani noted, “Saudi Arabia invested in a transnational, foreign-based media system which helped safeguard its interests in the face of hostile regimes in the region, promote its foreign policy and exert regional political influence.” Contributing to the rise of Saudi media is oil wealth, the establishment of a regional infrastructure of satellite technology and the receding role of traditional media players in the region.

For Zayani what is interesting to note is “not only how and why Saudi Arabia came to be an important media player, but also what kind of contradictions, disjunctions, and unintended consequences the Saudi investment in media created, and to what effect.” According to Zayani, “the liberalization, expansion and deterritorialization of Saudi media brought about a number of challenges and conflictual dynamics which cannot be easily managed, let alone reconciled.” The most important disjunctions point to an uneasy relationship between tradition and modernity, between a protectionist drive and a liberalizing impetus, between national identity markers and market imperatives, and between depoliticization and repoliticization.

In a fast changing Middle East, these disjunctions are potentially consequential. For Zayani, “tremendous wealth, business imperatives, strategic allies, and political clout have positioned the Kingdom well and helped it play an important media role in the region. However, these assets are no longer sufficient to claim influence in an increasingly entangled and congested Arab mediascape”

Pointing to the rise of competing media ventures like the heavy weight Al Jazeera and the wide adoption of new and social media, Zayani concluded that “the unfolding of the political reality of the Middle East will be deeply intertwined with the reconfiguration of the media dynamics in the region.”

Mohamed Zayani’s works include Reading the Symptom (1999), Arab Satellite Television and Politics in the Middle East (2004), The Al Jazeera Phenomenon: Critical Perspectives on New Arab Media (2005) and The Culture of Al Jazeera: Inside an Arab Media Giant(2007).

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator

Popular Uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt
2011-02-08 08:00 - 18:00
Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar held an open discussion on Tuesday, February 8, 2011, to discuss the recent political upheavals in Tunisia and Egypt and their implications on the Arab world. The discussion, organized by Professor Karine Walther and the Center for International and Regional Studies, featured four experts from Georgetown’s Qatar campus.

The roundtable discussion titled, “Popular Uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt: The Jasmine Revolution and Its Aftermath,” allowed members of the Georgetown community the opportunity to ask questions and discuss the events unfolding in Tunisia and Egypt. The speakers included Abdullah Al-Arian, a doctoral candidate in Georgetown’s History department; Sharif Elmusa, Visiting Associate Professor in the Political Science department; Daniel Stoll, Senior Assistant Dean of Academic Affairs; and Mohamed Zayani, Visiting Associate Professor of Critical Theory.

The first question posed by a member of the audience related to the role played by the Egyptian constitution in the event of a government transition. Commenting on the inherent problems with using Egypt’s current constitution to foster change, Al-Arian argued that in its present form, the constitution is an ineffective document. “The way that the constitution is structured is that it puts so much power in the president’s hands that it’s basically impossible to get anything accomplished without President Hosni Mubarak,” said Al-Arian.

Elmusa echoed Al-Arian’s statement saying, “The regime has rewritten the constitution in such a way as to make it impossible for anyone else but the regime and the ruling party [NDP] to participate.”

In addressing how the constitution could prove useful, Stoll argued that the document provided a framework that could be used to implement change. “It’s a flawed document, but it’s a starting point,” said Stoll. Al-Arian agreed, adding that perhaps earlier versions of the constitution that vested less power in the Mubarak regime’s hands could be used as a “common frame of reference” to advance change.

In response to a question asking why the U.S. government had been slow to react and offer support to pro-democracy protesters in Tunisia and Egypt, Stoll answered that the Obama administration was perhaps acting cautiously. “It’s a political tightrope as to how a response is structured,” he remarked. Stoll explained that in the Egyptian case, the U.S. government was likely uncertain about whom to support since the Mubarak regime had successfully suppressed the emergence of a viable opposition leader.

Elmusa asserted that the U.S. government could perhaps do more by suspending the billions in aid it sends to the Egyptian military “without looking like they’re intervening.” In addition, he argued, this would allow the armed forces in Egypt to play a neutral role, rather than continue to act at the Mubarak regime’s behest.

Asked about the impact of the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, Zayani cautioned against two looming threats for the region. “One is that countries will try to preempt this rather than engage in real change.” He continued, “The other thing that happens, and there are signs starting to come out of this in Tunisia, is that real demand for real political and institutional change is being hijacked by more social demands.”

Speaking to the question of the reasons that led to pro-democracy protests in Egypt, Al-Arian responded that economic disenfranchisement due to decades of government corruption was largely at fault. “Imagine if you could get rid of all that [corruption]. So in terms of development, things can only look up,” concluded Al-Arian.

Article by Jennifer Ponard, Media Writer

The Euro's Future in the Balance
2011-02-10 08:00 - 18:00
Ibrahim Oweiss, Professor Emeritus of Economics at Georgetown University, delivered a lunch time lecture on February 10, 2011 on the subject of “The Euro’s Future in the Balance.” Oweiss was one of the founding members of Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, and also spent four years on the faculty of the School of Foreign Service in Qatar.

Basing his lecture on the question “what are the possible scenarios for the Euro’s future?” Oweiss explored the ways in which the Euro has shaped and will continue to shape the economies of the European Union countries. Although the Eurozone is a significant economic region of the world and has a combined population that exceeds that of the United States, the recent bailouts of Ireland and Greece by Germany have indicated a serious weakness in the zone’s strategy. “The future of the European unification project is on life support, while Germany’s fingers are on the power switch,” he said. Indeed, because “Germany has the only healthy economy in Europe,” Oweiss argued, “either all of the sovereign debts of Europe become German public debt or the Euro will collapse.”

Many of the Eurozone countries have adopted the Euro as their sole legal tender, while others, such as the UK, are members of the European Union, but have opted out of the Euro. “The Monetary policy of the Eurozone is the responsibility of the European Central Bank, though there is no common representation, governors, or fiscal policy for the currency union.” There needs to be cooperation between these elements “in order to help smooth fluctuations in the business cycle” and so this is represents a major weakness related to the Euro. “There is,” however, “some cooperation which takes place through the Euro Group, which makes political decisions regarding the Eurozone and the Euro.”

Before taking questions from the audience, Oweiss concluded that regardless of the negative of the economies of the Eurozone, the Euro will remain one of the world’s key currencies. When asked whether or not Eurozone countries could opt out of the Euro and return to their former currencies, Oweiss argued that although it was possible, it is unlikely. Finally, he argued that he does not expect the Euro to collapse as long as Germany holds onto the Euro and doesn’t return to the Deutsch mark.

As an international economic advisor, Oweiss worked for several governments and multinational corporations. He has authored over fifty scholarly publications including:Petrodollar Surpluses, Arab Civilization, and The Political Economy of Contemporary Egypt.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator

His Holiness Aram I Lectures on Interfaith Dialogue
2011-02-23 08:00 - 18:00
In collaboration with Georgetown University in Qatar’s Student Affairs department, CIRS organized a lecture on February 23, 2011, by His Holiness Aram I, Head of the Armenian Church in Lebanon on the subject of “Interfaith Dialogue.”

Introducing the themes of the discussion, His Holiness Aram I highlighted the increasing importance of religion in today’s world. He argued that “Religion has become a major public player in the world today. Religion has become an integral and inseparable part of international and inter-community relations.” Globalization and its ensuing pluralism have, in fact, increased the importance of religious participation, rather than decrease it. Religion is part of the geopolitics of every region, therefore, “inter-religious dialogue today has become a necessity […] Inter-religious dialogue is no more a question of options; it is a must,” he said. The question is not whether we should engage ourselves in dialogue, but how to go about doing this.

As with many countries in the world, Lebanon unifies various religious communities and confessional identities within the borders of a single nation. In order to understand the relationship between religion and everyday lived experience in the Middle East and elsewhere, His Holiness argued that inter-religious dialogue need not be a discussion based on intense metaphysical, theological, and scriptural issues, but, rather, should be a conversation that highlights the practicalities of religious worship and co-existence in the modern age. He argued that “diversity is a source of enrichment that should not polarize us.”

When people are faced with tremendous and radical change, they need to keep pace with changing realities. There are times, he noted, when religion is hijacked by political agendas; “the role of religion,” he said, “has sometimes been as a stabilizer and reconciler, and sometimes, it has been a destabilizer.” For this reason, His Holiness argued that “I warmly welcome the initiatives in inter-religious dialogue taken by Qatar.”

In conclusion, his Holiness said that “In this world, we need to talk to each other and to dialogue with each other, instead of talking about each other and against each other.”

His Holiness Aram I was elected Catholicos (the Head of the Armenian Church) in 1995. Called to serve as Primate of the Armenian Community of Lebanon during the Lebanese Civil War, His Holiness is a strong supporter of inter-religious relations, dialogue and co-operation. In addition to his numerous articles and reviews in Armenian, English, and French, His Holiness has authored over 15 books.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator

Rabbi Harold White on the Allure of Mysticism
2011-03-08 08:00 - 18:00
Rabbi Harold White, Georgetown University’s Senior Jewish Chaplain and Lecturer in Theology, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue lecture on “The Allure of Mysticism: Kabbalah as Pop-religious Culture or Serious Religious Practice?” on March 8, 2011.

White relayed his experience during his seminary schooling and said that it was not common at the time to be taught anything other than traditional religious thought. It was only later that he took a keen interest in the study of Jewish mysticism or Kabbalah. In Hebrew scripture, he said, the existence of divinity is presented as an existential reality and not something that should be proved through theoretical ponderings. Kabbalah is derived from Hebrew meaning “to receive,” the Rabbi said, and is the act of emptying oneself of narcissistic tendencies and opening oneself up to the divine.

The Rabbi discussed the ways in which Kabbalah has recently entered into the public vernacular. It is currently being popularized and embraced by a variety of public figures and celebrities, including Madonna and Britney Spears who, he said, engage with the teachings on a superficial level. This popularization of Kabbalah has occured through marketing of the teachings in commercial merchandise and simple sound-bites. The Rabbi argued that this has trivialized the mysticism because to truly engage in Kabbalah one must be a scholar of scripture and familiar with the history and traditions of religious practice.

In conclusion, Rabbi White argued that even though we are products of the modern world, religion allows us to live a life that is still filled with mystery and Kabbalah in particular is a celebration and enjoyment of that mystery. He ended the lecture by saying that “The world may not be comprehensible, but it is embraceable.”

The Rabbi was also invited to give a lunch lecture to Georgetown faculty, staff, and students on the history and ethos of Georgetown’s diversity programs.

Rabbi Harold S. White has been associated with Georgetown University for 43 years. He currently holds the position of Senior Advisor to the Program of Jewish Civilization at Georgetown University. He has occupied rabbinic pulpits at Temple Sinai in Washington and Temple B’nai Israel in Easton, Maryland. He serves as the Co-Spiritual Director for the Interfaith Family Project in Takoma Park, Maryland.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator

Karen Armstrong on the Core of Our Religious Traditions
2011-03-13 08:00 - 18:00
In a joint CIRS and Georgetown faculty Distinguished Lecture, Karen Armstrong was invited to share her thoughts on “The Core of our Religious Traditions” on March 13, 2011. Armstrong is a former Roman Catholic nun who left a British convent to pursue a degree in modern literature at Oxford, a best-selling author, and UN Ambassador for the Alliance of Civilizations.

Armstrong began by defining the contradictory role of religion in today’s globalized world by saying that although it contributes towards the building of a global community and teaches tolerance among disparate people, it is also regarded as the main cause of global violence and conflict. “I’m convinced,” she said, “that religion has a major contribution to make to one of the chief tasks of our time, which must surely be to build a global community where people of all persuasions can live together in harmony and respect.” However, Armstrong noted, it is important to point out that “In fact, the cause of war is usually ambition, hatred, and greed, but, often, these self-serving emotions are given an idealistic or a religious coloration in order to sanitize them.” Although she acknowledged the history of international conflict based upon religion, she argued that their specific motivations usually stem from the more individualistic concerns of a selfish few.

Speaking of the Axial Age between 900-200 BCE, Armstrong noted that this was a moment of history which was the center of humankind’s spiritual experience when all the major world religions had their origins. In China, during this time, Confucianism and Daoism were born; in India, Hinduism and Buddhism blossomed; in the Middle East sprung up the roots of monotheism, which would guide the teachings of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam; and in Greece, philosophical rationalism gave rise to Western philosophy, which became a religious movement in its own way. Armstrong explained that although these ancient traditions are distinct from each other, they share certain values that have shaped our current understandings of existence and have much to say to us in our modern world. Although these traditions have helped explain existentialism, Armstrong warned of the impossibility of fully knowing the unknown and said that “One of the things that has gone wrong in the modern age, and it is certainly true that religious people can be opinionated, exclusive, and intolerant, is that they insisted that when we speak of the ultimate reality, which has been called God, Nirvana, Brahman, and Dao, we think we know what we are talking about” and can define it implicitly. However, she argued, as in the Muslim belief that “God is greater,” the divine is always beyond the limit of what our language and thoughts permit.

As part of her scholarly inquiries into the history of religion, Armstrong said that within the English language, the word “belief” has changed its meaning over the centuries. Up until the seventeenth century, the word was pronounced differently in Middle English and came from the German “to love” and “to commit oneself” as well as the Latin root of “desire,” or “libido.” The word “belief” did not have the same connotations of “blind faith” and acceptance of doctrine that it does today. Armstrong said that, ultimately, “religion, of course, is not about thinking things or believing things, but about doing things. What is the Qur’an but a call to action? When the Qur’an talks of faith it doesn’t mean that we have to accept a whole lot of ideas, but it follows it up always with its performing the works of mercy, or the salihat,” wherein the Qur’an asks people to do good and look after the poor and the vulnerable, to free slaves, and care for orphans and widows.

Concluding the lecture Armstrong explained that every world religion has at its core the ethical principle of compassion. She said “It now seems to me quite clear that unless as a species we learn to treat all peoples as we would wish to be treated ourselves whoever they are and whatever their beliefs, we are not going to have a viable world to hand on to the next generation and that any ideology that breeds or encourages hatred and contempt is failing the test of our time and failing humanity.”

Armstrong’s books have been translated into forty-five languages. In addition to teaching, she regularly comments on religious affairs in England and the United States and is a columnist for the Guardian newspaper. In 2007 she was awarded a medal for Arts and Sciences by the Egyptian government for her services to Islam, the first foreigner to have been awarded this decoration. She is a recipient of the TED prize.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Publications Coordinator

New Geo-Political Realities of the Gulf
2011-03-22 08:00 - 18:00
Khaled Almaeena, Editor-in-Chief of Arab News, was invited to give a CIRS Focused Discussion on the topic of “New Geo-Political Realities of the Gulf” on March 22, 2011. Almaeena explained the relationship between the Gulf states and America and how each conducts its foreign policies. “The main thrust of the Gulf’s American relations,” he said, “is based on Saudi-American relations, which are now like a dysfunctional marriage” insofar as the two countries get along, but still do not see eye to eye when it comes to certain issues, such as the situation in Palestine.

Recalling the history of “Saudi-American relations” specifically, Almaeena explained that this alliance “initially started on an economic footing with the advent of the oil industry,” and then grew into a relationship based on military and security issues over the decades. By and large, this relationship was stable up until the events of September 11, 2001, after which the nature of the relationship was radically altered, both on the political and social fronts. Almaeen argued that “the media played a role that swayed people totally against Saudi Arabia” and created a division between America the Muslim world. In fact, he said, the situation was so bad that, as editor of Arab News, his office received a multitude of hate-mail from readers in the west accusing Saudi Arabia of involvement in the atrocities.

Out of all of the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia has one of the closest relationships with the United States. Although this relationship has meant that Saudi Arabia enjoys a strong regional and international political standing, for the very same reason, it reason it has suffered ridicule from other countries in the Arab world that see this relationship as a negative progression and a conflict of interest. Regardless, the Saudis understand that the main concern is to have and maintain a mutually beneficial relationship with as many countries as possible. This, however, is not always possible, as Almaeena argued, “We [Saudi Arabia] were being goaded by the United States to take a very negative and even a hostile stance against Iran.”

In conclusion, Almaeena said that change in Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the United States is inevitable. “For the Saudis and for the Gulf states, to go ahead with American policy dictates is detrimental,” he said. Although the relationship has been a rocky one in recent years, Almaeena did not give up hope on a future based on transparency and mutual respect. He explained that “an Arab-American rapprochement would be a great boon and benefit for the world.” This is especially important given the seismic political changes currently taking place all over the Middle East. The power of public and civil movements, he said, is teaching regional and international governments to reassess their foreign policies by first of all looking inwards and realizing the aspirations of their people.

Khaled Almaeena has held a broad range of positions in Saudi Media including CEO of a Public Relations firm, Saudi Television news anchor, talk show host, radio announcer and journalist. As the Editor-in-Chief of Arab News, the largest English-language newspaper in the Middle East, Almaeena steered the paper through the Gulf Crisis and pioneered bringing newspapers back to a liberated Kuwait.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator

Brendan Hill on Sin and Civil Society
2011-04-06 08:00 - 18:00
Brendan Hill, Associate Dean of Student Affairs at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue lecture on “Sin and Civil Society: Modernity and Moral Regulation in 18th Century England” on April 6, 2011. Attending the lecture were students, faculty and staff, locally-based ambassadors, and other members of the Qatar community.

Trained as a legal historian, Hill said that he did not set out to study morality and sin during his research, but soon became engrossed in the subject of eighteenth century criminalization of behavior and began to study the subject more seriously. Hill’s research focuses on the jurisdictional shifts and the movement away from ecclesiastical courts into secular courts and how this new form of legal, rather than religious, control and fashioning of behavior had different effects on society. He pointed to the paradox at the crux of his research which is that the eighteenth century is widely believed to be a time of enlightenment and growing secularization and, yet, Hill said during this time there was a growing number of prosecutions for moral offences largely documented by puritans in a movement called the Society for the Reformation of Manners.

Although there is no common definition of puritanism, Hill argued, there is a general consensus among historians that puritans believed that society should be ordered according to an ethical code that is derived from scripture. According to Calvin’s doctrine “the church instructs and the state enforces.” The reason why the fashioning of civil society was so important to puritans, Hill said, was because they believed that one person’s guilt was something that was burdened by all individuals in society. “If guilt and judgment are collective, then the crimes of even a few of us are going to visit God’s wrath upon the whole society. So, if the notion of sin becomes collectivized, then the notion of punishment also becomes collectivized,” Hill explained.

Hill highlighted the three main contributions that his research makes to the study of legal and church history. The first contribution is to further the understanding of the process of secularization that occurred in England in the eighteenth century and, by so doing, problematize the idea that enlightenment Europe was a complete move away from religion into the realm of reason. “Historians and political scientists tend to nowadays take it for granted that English society – and essentially European society – is a secular society” that worked toward the presumed replacement of religious imagination with reason and the separation of church and state. Hill argued that “my research is pointing toward less of a ‘secularization’ of the European imagination and more toward a ‘sacralization’ of civil society. Rather than becoming secular in the eighteenth century, England was in the process of conflating the secular and the sacred.”

The second contribution his research makes, Hill said, was highlighting the fact that puritans and puritanism didn’t really die out in the manner that the restoration literature suggests. Historians usually portray puritans as comical figures that no longer had a voice in the body politic during the eighteenth century. Hill, however, suggested that puritan movements actually found a more effective way of channeling their efforts to reform society through “the colonization of civil society” and infiltrating the emerging secular state as officially elected members of parliament.

A third contribution to the literature, Hill said, is to question the notion of positive progress. He argued that “there is an idea that civil society brings progress and that civil society eradicates old forms, and that civil society pushes the way through tradition and moves toward modernity.” But, he said, the complexities of civil society mean that a new formation of that society can never be fully divorced from the former ideology. Any supposedly liberal society will certainly have strong elements of conservatism in the mix. Hill said that he examines how “civil society in the eighteenth century was not only responsible for the creation of tolerance and the separation of church and state, but was also responsible for the sacralization of secular society.”

Hill concluded by outlining the reasons for the decline of official puritanim in England. He argued that the puritans became so prevalent a force in the ordering of civil society that the truly secular elements of the state, including the monarchs, became increasingly worried. Regardless of the decline of puritanism per se, puritans were in fact responsible for the creation of the police state and its monitoring of society as one of the hallmarks of modernity. “In a very strange way,” Hill said, “the Society for the Reformation of Manners created the modern state,” but their influence on current behavioral codes has been forgotten. Over the years, people have become increasingly ignorant of the puritanical basis of current laws, including those pertaining to prostitution and blasphemy.

Brendan Hill earned his B.A. in Philosophy from the University of Hawaii at Manoa and his Ph.D. in European History from Georgetown University. He specializes in church and legal history, and his research focuses specifically on the criminalization of sin and the creation of a godly society at the dawn of the modern era in England. In addition to teaching survey courses on the history of Europe, England and Ireland, he teaches smaller seminars on the cultural roots of ethnic conflict and on the evolving relationship between the secular and the sacred in modern Europe.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Publications Coordinator

Aly Verjee on Current Events in Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, and Sudan
2011-04-10 08:00 - 18:00
On April 10, 2011, CIRS and the African Student Club at Georgetown University in Qatar hosted a Focused Discussion with Aly Verjee, Senior Researcher at the Rift Valley Institute and a specialist on the contemporary politics of Africa. The lecture was on “Current Events in Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, and Sudan.” These were countries in which Verjee spent significant amounts of time conducting research and working as an elections observer.

Verjee began by describing current events in the Sudan and the possible outcomes of the recent referendum which was voted in favor of splitting the country into two. He argued that “One of the most interesting and important things about the referendum in Sudan was, of course, that it was accepted by both sides.” Despite the positives, Verjee said, the peace agreement privileges the ruling parties of both sides at the expense of the people. The referendum had very serious authoritarian undertones where the extremely high percentage of voter turnout was not necessarily due to an organically-formed civic mobilization movement, but, rather, because the ruling party went house to house to ensure all registered voters cast ballots. However, Verjee said, despite the exhilaration produced by radical social and political change to the country, it is important to not to lose sight of the unimplemented social and political rights of the people. Currently in Sudan, “We have this very unusual circumstance that the vote, which was largely democratic and which will herald the newest country in Africa, actually also means that we will have, from July when Southern Sudan becomes an independent country, two one-party states. That is a very unorthodox outcome of a democratic process,” Verjee argued.

Ever since the referendum took place, the international media has focused on describing what the “new” Sudan might look like. Since the north-south issue has become so prominent a topic, it is important not to forget the other areas of struggle such as Darfur and Kordofan, which have multi-ethnic and multi-religious populations that do not necessarily identify with the ruling Arab Muslim elite. The communities in these areas would like their rights respected and to enter into self-governance just as the south did.

The second country Verjee examined was “Djibouti, which is a stable country in a very unstable neighborhood.” The country is located in a geographically strategic area on the Bab el-Mandeb; the coastal gateway between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, which is one of the busiest shipping channels in the world. Verjee said that “Djibouti itself is not important in terms of international trade, but is very important in the international trade of East Africa.” This is because “85 million Ethiopians depend on all their imports coming through the port of Djibouti” since Ethiopians can no longer rely on Eritrea as a seaport because of deteriorating relations after Eritrea’s secession from Ethiopia. Further, he noted, although Djibouti is at the heart of international anti-piracy and anti-terror operations and “the host of the only U.S. military base in the whole of Africa,” its strategic location is simultaneously important as a channel for illegal migration from Africa into Arabia and Europe.

Moving on to Côte d’Ivoire, Verjee said that most people in the world should have an interest in what happens there, not least because it “is the most important country in the world in determining the price of chocolate,” as it is a main producer and exporter of cocoa beans. However, despite the country’s relative wealth, civil war has plagued the country for most of the last decade, leading to large numbers of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Currently, the country is again divided by the controversy surrounding the last round of presidential elections, where both Laurent Gbabgo and Alassane Ouattara claim that they are the true winners. “The elections that were held last year were supposed to end the crisis, but in fact, they have only deepened it,” he explained.

As a final thought, Verjee linked the three countries by drawing parallels between them, including the ways in which the media has shaped public perception and response to events in these places. Secondly, all three countries are linked by a history of disappointing interpretations of democratic elections. Thirdly, “in all three of these countries, there are strategic considerations” and each becomes prioritized internationally based on the richness of its resources or geographic location. Lastly, Verjee said, “In all three of these examples, we can see the prominence and centrality of individuals over systems.”

Aly Verjee is author of the recently published Race Against Time: the Countdown to the Referenda in Southern Sudan and Abyei. From 2006-2008, Verjee helped manage the logistics of the repatriation of Sudanese refugees from Kenya, Uganda, DR Congo and the Central African Republic. From 2008–2010, he helped lead the first ever international election observation mission in Sudan for The Carter Center. In addition, Verjee also has worked on various assignments in Afghanistan, Botswana, China, Cote d’Ivoire, DR Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal, Somaliland and South Africa.

Part 1: Imam Yahya Hendi's Journey with Islam
2011-04-18 08:00 - 18:00
Imam Yahya Hendi delivered a two-part CIRS Focused Discussionseries taking the audience on “A Journey with Islam in the 21st Century.” The lectures were co-sponsored and hosted by the Museum of Islamic Art in Doha. The first lecture took place on April 18, 2011, and focused on “The Paradigms of Islamic Ethics, Human Rights, and Social Justice,” where Hendi examined the religious roots of social justice in the Qur’an.

He argued that since Islam’s main goal is to bring about peace and social justice to the world, there is a prominent theme that calls for the welfare of all within society with a particular focus on the poor and vulnerable. Hendi said that themes of benevolence and social democracy are often forgotten or even belittled by Muslims who have interpreted the text to suit their own political agendas. “I challenge Muslims, asking them to produce, what I call, a new agenda of how they speak about Islam and how they understand Islam in a way that preserves the authenticity of the text and the authenticity of the essence of faith and yet allow themselves to question and ask tough questions,” he said.

Although the past should be respected, contemporary socio-political challenges and the needs of the moment should be respected as well in order to deal with these new realities. Muslims, Hendi said, need to be honest in the critique of the negative aspects of their communities, rather than fear backlash. Historically, communal knowledge, public practice, and debating known as “’urf” was considered to be a valuable source of Islamic ethics that was consensual and agreed upon by members of the public or Umma. However, more recently, Islamic ethicists and scholars have tried to exclude social contributions to Islamic knowledge by claiming sole authority in such matters. “We need to have ethical teachings that are realistic, that deal with reality, and that actually can be practiced,” in order for ethics to be an attainable and manageable concept that is performed by all. Indeed, the Imam said, “Islamic ethics honors the concept of ‘wajib’ and tells us about our responsibilities – both personal and public.”

Imam Hendi is the Muslim chaplain at Georgetown University, the first American University to hire a full-time Muslim chaplain. Imam Hendi is also the Muslim Chaplain at the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, MD. He has written numerous publications on many topics, including women in Islam, women and gender relations in Islam, the second coming of the Messiah, Islam and biomedical ethics and religion and Islam in the United States.

Read about Part 2 of the Imam’s lecture series.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator

Part 2: Imam Yahya Hendi's Journey with Islam
2011-04-19 18:00 - 20:00
Imam Yahya Hendi delivered a two-part CIRS Focused Discussion series taking the audience on “A Journey with Islam in the 21st Century.” The lectures were co-sponsored and hosted by the Museum of Islamic Art in Doha. Hendi’s second lecture took place on April 19, 2011, and highlighted “Women and Gender in the Islamic Religious Texts and Culture.” He argued that the Qur’an clearly states the respected place that women occupy within Islam and argued that many current instances of sexism are as a result of misinterpreting religious text for particular instances of social and political control. Hendi explained that gender relations in the Arab world and beyond are often the result of particular cultural settings rather than scriptural interpretations. Finally, he said that one gender can only be understood in relation to the other and so it is important for each to always speak of women in Islam in relation to men.

The first lecture took place on April 18, 2011, and focused on “The Paradigms of Islamic Ethics, Human Rights and Social Justice.”

Imam Hendi is the Muslim chaplain at Georgetown University, the first American University to hire a full-time Muslim chaplain. Imam Hendi is also the Muslim Chaplain at the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, MD. He has written numerous publications on many topics, including women in Islam, women and gender relations in Islam, the second coming of the Messiah, Islam and biomedical ethics and religion and Islam in the United States.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator

Arab Spring: European Insights
2011-04-28 08:00 - 18:00
On April 28, 2011, CIRS hosted Teodor Baconschi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, who gave European insights into the recent and ongoing Arab uprisings taking place in the Middle East. Attending the lecture were Qatar-based ambassadors and embassy staff, representatives from both regional and international think-tanks and research institutes, as well as Georgetown University faculty.

Rashid Khalidi on the Arab Revolutions of 2011
2011-05-22 08:00 - 18:00
On May 22, 2011, Rashid Khalidi, Edward Said Professor of Modern Arab Studies at Columbia University, delivered the final CIRS Distinguished Lecture of the academic year on the topic “The Arab Revolutions of 2011.” Khalidi noted that not enough time has passed to be able to truly analyze the impact and consequences of the Arab Spring, and so he offered some preliminary observations regarding the uprisings. He argued that “this juncture may be unprecedented in modern Arab history. Suddenly, despotic regimes that were entrenched for over forty years are vulnerable.” In a short period of time, some key regimes crumbled after having clung to power for so long and as a result of the challenging efforts of ordinary people. Khalidi said that “This is a moment, when we are suddenly facing the prospect of entirely new possibilities in the Arab world.It comes after decades, when nothing seemed to change in this region.”

Several factors distinguish these uprisings from previous Arab revolutions, including the peaceful nature of the movements and the protestors’ insistence on abstaining from violence, Khalidi argued. Although the publics of Tunis and Egypt came out in force to air their displeasure with the status quo, they rejected the use of violence. For the first time in recent years, Western media carried images of peace-loving, middle class, and charismatic Arabs, instead of the usual portrayal of Middle East publics as violent Islamic fundamentalists. “This is thus a supremely important moment, not only in the Arab World, but for how Arabs are perceived […] in the West – a people that has been systematically maligned in the Western media for decades are for the first time being shown in a realistic and positive light,” he said.

The Arab uprisings stemmed from the public’s frustration not only with despotic Arab regimes, but also with injustices made global through corporate privatization of public resources at the expense of social welfare. “What we have been seeing across the Arab World are not just revolutions for democracy, for freedom, for dignity, and for the rule of law, they have also been revolutions against the neo-liberal world order and the free-trade market fundamentalism dogma underpinning it,” Khalidi maintained. Any new government formed after the ousting of the old regime must attempt to fulfill the economic and social needs of their populaces whilst resisting pressure from the West to engage in the very economic globalization practices that led to the revolutions in the first instance.

Khalidi pointed out that many of these Arab countries are still unstable and that nothing has been concretely decided about their future political paths. He argued that the task ahead will be daunting for the new leaders of these societies as they will have to envision new social and political forms. “Building a workable, functioning, democratic system will be much, much, harder than overthrowing Mubarak or Ben Ali,” Khalidi argued. Any new system must avoid the pitfalls of the old regime and needs to target the old centers of power and corruption which have not altogether disappeared. This, he said, is a scenario that is not unique to these Arab countries as “we know a lot about entrenched powerful interests dominating a democratic political system from the American experience. This is a problem every democratic polity suffers from.”

In sum, Khalidi explained that “we must never forget that this is the Middle East, which because of its energy resources and its unique strategic position is the most coveted region of the world and, in consequence, the region of the world most penetrated by foreign interests.”

Khalidi is editor of the Journal of Palestine Studies and was an advisor to the Palestinian delegation to the Madrid and Washington Arab-Israeli peace negotiations from October 1991 until June 1993. He is author of many books, includingSowing Crisis: American Dominance and the Cold War in the Middle East (2009); The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood (2006); and was the co-editor of Palestine and the Gulf (1982) and The Origins of Arab Nationalism (1991).

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Publications Coordinator

Libya and the International Community: The Way Forward
2011-09-13 08:00 - 18:00
CIRS began its 2011-2012 lecture series with a Focused Discussion on “Libya and the International Community: The Way Forward” given by the Director of Brookings Doha Center, Salman Shaikh, on September 13, 2011. During the lecture, Shaikh outlined some significant ways in which the Libyan uprising differs from others in the region and the lessons that can be learned from the success the rebel movement has had in gaining international support. “One very important lesson that we did learn – very different from Iraq – was the importance of moving with international legality. That is why I place such emphasis on UN resolutions – something we didn’t work through satisfactorily in the Iraq case,” he commented.

The Libyan revolution, which began in February 2011, followed on from other uprisings in the Arab world. Shaikh argued that “Tunisia and Egypt, in particular, acted as a catalyst for unprecedented courage being exhibited by Libyans themselves in throwing off the despotic rule of Muammar Qaddafi for 41 years.” What sets this particular revolution apart from neighboring ones, however, is that it had the backing of the international community through United Nations resolution 1970, which refers Qaddafi to the International Criminal Court and resolution 1973, which sanctioned a “no-fly zone” over Libyan air space. The United States was instrumental in setting up the no-fly zone and, yet, he explained, the US government has been successful at maintaining some distance from any active engagement in the fighting so as not to be seen supporting yet another war in the Arab world.

Shaikh argued that the GCC states and the Arab League paved the way for other nations to join the coalition against Qaddafi and galvanized the opposition. Such support for the fall of the regime, he said, countered the hesitancy exhibited by Russia and China to get involved in council action. The GCC and the Arab League called for the international community to support the rebels and oppose Qaddafi. Other actors who have a direct stake and play a significant role in the changes currently taking place in Libya include NATO, the United Nations, and the African Union. Yet, Shaikh pointed out, it is not only countries and governments that support the ousting of Qaddafi and give legitimacy to the rebel movement, as the majority of civilians in the region also gave their backing. Importantly, he said, whether through the media or on the ground, “we didn’t see a single significant protest in the Arab world against the military intervention in Libya. Very different again to what we saw regarding the Iraq case.”

Concluding with some thoughts on what needs to be done for a smooth transition of leadership in Libya, Shaikh described the roles that need to be filled and the actions that need to be taken in the near future. “I suspect that there is no real appetite from NATO member states to have real ‘boots on the ground,’” he said. However, Shaikh continued, Libyans will need assistance in other areas, such as technical assistance in terms of policing and demobilization of fighters. It will also need support in constitution and electoral reformation as well as ensuring the socioeconomic welfare of the people.

An area that needs much attention during the transition is in terms of reconciliation. “It is interesting to note,” Shaikh said, “that Libya is a fairly homogenous society in terms of its ethnic and sectarian make-up, but, of course, it is a tribal society.” Thus, there needs to be real inclusivity and representation in decision-making regarding any changes made at a governmental level. He argued that “putting in a timetable for speedy elections or for a quick constitution-making process is not a panacea. This requires a much larger process of national dialogue and reconciliation.”

Salman Shaikh is the Director of the Brookings Doha Center and a Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy in Washington, DC. Shaikh has held numerous posts of significance both in the international system and the Middle East. In particular, he worked with the United Nations for nearly a decade, primarily on Middle East policy, as the special assistant of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and as political adviser to the UN Secretary General’s Personal Representative for Lebanon during the 2006 war. He also served as the Director for Policy and Research in the Office of Her Highness, Sheikha Mozah Bint Nasser Al-Missned, the Consort of the Emir of Qatar.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator

The Role of Universities in National Awakenings
2011-09-14 08:00 - 18:00
CIRS hosted a Focused Discussion by Mohammad-Javad Zarif, Vice President for International Relations at Iran’s Islamic Azad University, on September 14, 2011. Zarif spoke to a small gathering of ambassadors and embassy staff about “The Role of Universities in National Awakenings.” He argued that the recent uprisings can be attributed, in part, to the increased level of education among the youth in the region and to their growing political awareness, leading to further social demands. In order to deal with these new developments and patterns of frustrated behavior towards leadership, it is necessary to question old political paradigms and come up with new ways of dealing with public pressures. Zarif argued that the idea of globalization can no longer be challenged; we live in an interconnected world where one country’s actions will affect another’s – whether within the same region or across the globe.

Zarif has had a long and illustrious career in the Iranian diplomatic corp. From 2002 to 2007, Zarif served as the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic to the United Nations, and from 1992 to 2002 he was Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs.
