Center for International and Regional Studies

CIRS Launches CURA Program
2018-09-10 12:00 - 15:00 (Europe/Moscow)
On September 10, 2018, CIRS formally launched the CIRS Undergraduate Research Advancement program (CURA) by hosting a reception that was attended by GU-Q students, staff, and faculty members. CURA aims to support GU-Q students in the development of their passion for research, by assisting them in developing new skills and providing opportunities for students to present on and publish their research findings.

During the launch, Professor Mehran Kamrava, Director of CIRS pointed out that CIRS has had a robust program of supporting student development since the earliest days of its establishment. He suggested that: “The CURA program gives coherence and direction to this effort by imparting on our students the skills to engage in in-depth research, to present the results of this research in an academic forum, and to publish it for wider audiences,” he said. “We are excited to be working with our CURA Fellows and with the broader student community to ensure CURA’s continued growth and success in the coming years.”

One aim of CURA is to help enrich the undergraduate experience by encouraging students to cultivate research skills beneficial to their studies and careers. To this end, CIRS will hold a research skills workshop each semester on the essential components of the research process and writing of scholarly papers. CURA workshops are open to all GU-Q students and are designed to offer hands-on experience, combining a presentation of techniques with hands-on application of the skills in peer-led group exercises. The first workshop, Designing a Research Question, takes place in October of this year, featuring a presentation by Professor Kamrava and facilitated by Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS Project Manager, and Islam Hassan, CIRS Research Analyst.

“The CURA program gives coherence and direction to this effort by imparting on our students the skills to engage in in-depth research, to present the results of this research in an academic forum, and to publish it for wider audiences.”

Ayesha Iqbal (class of 2022) said by attending the workshop, she was able to narrow the scope of her research, and discern and access the relevant literature in the field. “CURA’s exercises, like mind-mapping, colleague critique, brainstorming sessions and, most importantly, Professor Kamrava’s guidance and expertise, have helped me construct my research question and formulate a sustainable research plan.” She added, “Research is at the heart of Georgetown and I am extremely excited to begin this journey with CURA.” The next workshop will be offered in early February, 2019. You can read more about the CURA Workshops here.

GU-Q students have the opportunity to conduct independent research and submit their work for consideration to the CURA Paper Series. The process of selecting papers is rigorous and competitive. This is an unparalleled opportunity for students to have their work professionally reviewed and published by a reputable source. The CURA Lunch Talk series is another initiative that will give students a platform to present their independent research in a public forum.

Nine GU-Q students joined CIRS as CURA Fellows for the 2018-19 school year; CURA Fellows work for the Center and are also mentored by CIRS staff in a range of areas. CURA Fellows provide research assistance, and also engage in tasks related to publication, administration, and project management. Fellows participate in peer mentorship programs designed to facilitate student to student learning, and also hone their analytical skills by convening one seminar each semester on a current CIRS research project. Fellows are invited to discuss papers written by experts in their respective fields, and share their conclusions with the authors of the papers in the CIRS Working Group organized around that research project.

Mehaira Mahgoub (class of 2019), a CIRS research fellow said, “As a senior preparing to enter the real world, I found the chance to develop my academic research skills with CIRS to be exciting and incredibly useful.” After joining the CIRS team, she said, “I was able to gain valuable insight on Middle Eastern and international politics from topics like the patterns of migration in the Middle East to Russian foreign policy.”

Khansa Maria, CIRS Project Assistant and CURA Fellow

Troubled Waters: Insecurity in the Gulf
2018-09-12 18:00 - 20:00
Amidst international disputes and conflicts, the Gulf region stands out as a political hot zone. Seeking to find out why the region is so chronically unstable, Mehran Kamrava, Professor and Director of the Center for International and Regional Studies at Georgetown University in Qatar, set out to explore this phenomenon in depth. He performed extensive field research, interviewing government ministers and experts from Abu Dhabi, Riyadh, Muscat, and Tehran, among others, over several years. His research led to the book, Troubled Waters: Insecurity in the Persian Gulf (Cornell University Press, 2018) and he presented his findings at a CIRS book talk on September 12, 2018.

Kamrava began by sharing three particularly memorable conversations. In every interview he posed the question: “What is the biggest security threat that your country faces?” Often, he said, he received predictable answers. In Riyadh, he was told the threat was “Tehran;” in Tehran, it was “obviously the Americans.” However, the foreign minister in Muscat surprised Kamrava with the answer, “unemployment.” The official had explained that if young people were not employed they had the potential to get into trouble. “That really showed me an awful lot about the maturity of Omani foreign policy,” Kamrava said, especially given that Oman has a reputation for negotiating “very subtle, very complex diplomacy in a very mature, reasoned way.” In another interview, he had asked a senior cabinet minister why his country had suddenly introduced conscription. The minister explained that if the youth were bored and idle they can get into trouble, and also “ISIS recruits on the internet.” That also, was not the clichéd answer that one might hear when interviewing a cabinet minister, Kamrava said.

Kamrava happened to be in Riyadh in 2014, at a time when Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain had withdrawn their ambassadors from Qatar, an impasse that lasted eight months. During an interview with a senior prince in the foreign ministry, the official realized that Kamrava was from Georgetown University in Qatar—not Georgetown in Washington, DC. The prince’s reaction was, “Qatar! We can close our airspace to them. We can impose a blockade on them. We can suffocate them. We will not let Qatar Airways fly.” Kamrava told the audience that at the time he did not understand why the prince had become so agitated. Three years later, in 2017—when Saudi Arabia led the current blockade against Qatar—it dawned to him that if a simple professor had heard these comments, officials in Doha certainly knew and were making contingency plans, and the Saudis were in motion to further sever relations with Qatar.

Kamrava said he was struck by an insight he gained from meeting with foreign ministers and other officials in Iran. He said that everyone had told him that the experience of the Iran–Iraq war guides their country’s foreign policy making today. He was told, “We never forget that the Arab countries of the region lined up one after another to beat up on us. And Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and a number of others gave billions of dollars to Iraq from 1980 to 1988. And we will not forget that the Americans gave satellite information to the Iraqis to more effectively put chemical weapons on Iranian troops, and told them about Iranian troop movements.” As a scholar of Iran, Kamrava said he had not fully grasped that the memory of the war was “such a living memory.”

As a result of his many interviews and conversations, Kamrava said the causes and dynamics that have made the Gulf region so chronically insecure can be clustered into four broad categories. The first, he said, is how the region’s security architecture is structured, and has been structured for a long time. “Nobody has thought about a win-win scenario; everybody has thought about a win-lose scenario,” he said, explaining that the regions’ security is viewed terms of a zero-sum game—that is, the only way to protect one’s interests is at the expense of someone else’s interests.

The second reason for the region’s insecurity is the “pervasiveness of identity politics.” He broadly outlined the region’s political history. The Middle East from the 1950s on, could be considered “the era of secular nationalism.” From the late 1970s onward, the dominant narrative was one of political Islam. In that period, he said, “the salvation of the region lay not so much in nationalism, which was underlined by secular, non-religious assumptions, but in embrace of political interpretations of religion.” After 2011, he said, “what became important—what became one’s core source of identity—wasn’t just religion in broad terms, but specific sectarian identities within religion.” Kamrava described sectarianism’s deep, colonial roots in the Middle East, citing the divide-and-rule tactics of the British and French in agitating sectarian sensibilities.

“What we’re seeing today, it isn’t so much sectarianism, but a process of re-sectarianization of the Middle East.”

The third reason, Kamrava said, is that many regional actors are belligerent. “Agency matters. It’s not only institutions that matter, people matter. Political science—politics—is ultimately the art of exercise of power, or the science of exercise of power.” He continued, “What we see in our region, particularly since 2013-2014, is the coming to the fore of entirely new generations of leaders who are not playing by the old rules of the game, they are making their own rules,” and are unwilling to be bound by traditional diplomatic experiences, he said.

The final reason he offered for the breakdown of security in the region is what he called the “security dilemma.” That is, when a country increases its own security, it inadvertently makes other countries feel more insecure. “If you buy a new weapon system then your adversary next door feels a new threat, so they have to do the same thing,” thus creating a vicious cycle. How to get out of this cycle? Kamrava said, “You talk to each other. You build trust. You take the first step. And, of course, nobody is willing to talk to each other. We do not have any forum for dialogue.”

Looking to the future, Kamrava offered four questions for consideration. First, what role is the United States going to play in the region? Are the Americans going to step in and say that the Saudis and the Iranians must learn to share the region? Second, what will happen in Iran? Iran is in the cusp of change, he explained, with the impending departure of the aging Supreme Leader Khamenei, the Iranian political landscape will certainly undergo fundamental changes. This will in turn effect President Rouhani’s consensus politics, and the role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

“What we see in our region, particularly since 2013-2014, is the coming to the fore of entirely new generations of leaders who are not playing by the old rules of the game, they are making their own rules.”

The third question concerns the future of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Kamrava described the GCC has “being on life support,” since the start of the blockade on Qatar. “Nobody wants to be the party responsible for pulling the plug” on the GCC, Kamrava said. He projected a continuation of life-support status with technical cooperation, but as far as “having a common defense force, having meaningful political and economic integration—that, I believe, is thing of the past.”

The last and “probably most vexing” question is the long term outlook for energy. The region would not have had its strategic significance if it didn’t produce oil and natural gas, he said. If current trends continue—increasing energy independence in relation to the Gulf region, Kamrava said, “This region will, quite unfortunately, remain insecure for some time to come.”

Article by Khansa Maria (class of 2021), CURA Administrative Fellow

Mehran Kamrava is Professor and Director of the Center for International and Regional Studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Qatar. He is the author of a number of journal articles and books, including, most recently, Troubled Waters: Insecurity in the Persian Gulf (Cornell University Press, 2018); Inside the Arab State (Oxford University Press, 2018); The Impossibility of Palestine: History, Geography, and the Road Ahead (Yale University Press, 2016); Qatar: Small State, Big Politics (Cornell University Press, 2015); The Modern Middle East: A Political History since the First World War, 3rd. ed. (University of California Press, 2013); and Iran’s Intellectual Revolution (Cambridge University Press, 2008). His edited books include The Great Game in West Asia: Iran, Turkey, and the Southern Caucasus (2017); Fragile Politics: Weak States in the Greater Middle East (2016); Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East (2015); The Political Economy of the Persian Gulf (2012); The Nuclear Question in the Middle East (2012); and The International Politics of the Persian Gulf (2011).

Science and Scientific Production in the Middle East Working Group I
2018-09-16 09:00 - 2018-09-17 16:00
On September 16–17, 2018, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) hosted the first working group under its research initiative on “Science and Scientific Production in the Middle East.” Over the course of two days, scholars discussed issues around: the social impact of scientific research; Islamic ethics and legitimacy of scientific innovation; women and science in the Middle East; social inequality, economic policies and scientific innovation; sanction regimes; and the military-industrial complex.

Sari Hanafi began the working group discussions with his presentation on “The Social Impact of Scientific Research in the Middle East.” During his presentation, Hanafi discussed four main issues: the relevance of research and internationalization; profiles of Middle Eastern academics; transnational scientific networks; and production versus usage of knowledge in the region. Hanafi stated that based on his study, research publications in Arabic appear to be less influential, and scholarship as well as scholars located outside the region hold more influence. As far as citations are concerned, Arabic publications when compared to research that is published in English are less cited. Research produced in Arabic tends to have less visibility to academics and scholars, as there are no proper databases that capture all Arabic language publications. Much of the research produced in the region, instead of being carried out at within a university setting by academics, is carried out for policy purposes by professional researchers and tends to be funded by international organizations for short, limited periods of time. This is primarily because there is not enough funding being devoted to academic research, and professional researchers are dependent on policy institutes and foreign donors for accessing funds. This has a significant impact on the sustainability and long-term production of scientific research and knowledge, as well as its consumption. There are an absence of intermediary institutions in the Arab world that connect universities to industry and society. Hanafi concluded his presentation with by identifying a few of the core challenges for attaining social impact through scientific research in the Arab world: there is lack of trust in science in the region; research and science are not considered as value neutral; societal debate is part and parcel of research in the region; authoritarian states are not committed to developing evidence-based policies; conducting critical research impacts academics and they can find themselves marginalized and their careers negatively impacted; knowledge production needs to become more socially distributed; and Arab universities have little control over or involvement in scientific production.

Ayman Shabana focused his discussions on “Islamic Ethics and Legitimacy of Scientific Innovation.” Shabana opened his remarks by raising the questions of why Islamic ethics are important for legitimation of scientific innovation, and even what Islamic ethics mean. There have been few deep studies examining the relationship between Islamic ethics and science or scientific innovation in the Muslim world, particularly in the Middle East. It is important to also examine who the key stakeholder and actors involved in the domain of Islamic ethics and science are. Emerging social concerns pertaining to legal, theological, and moral domains have challenged the Islamic normative tradition and its authority. From theories of evolution and astronomical calculations in the 1900s to modern biomedical technology, Islam has been invoked either to justify or condemn scientific advancement. In grappling with the issue of Islam and scientific production, Shabana identified four gaps in the literature that deserve in-depth study: the role of muftis/Muslim adjudicators and judicial scholars and the relationship between Islam and science; Islamic ethics and warfare in the Middle East; Islamic bioethics and human enhancement; and Islamic ethics and artificial intelligence.

Rana Dajani’s remarks at the working group discussion focused on the topic of “Women and Science in the Arab World.” Dajani posited that there is a general assumption that there are low numbers of females engaged in Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) in many parts of the world, but statistics show that in the Arab world and East and South East Asia this is not necessarily the case. In fact in the Arab world there are higher numbers of woman in STEM fields than in the United States, and this needs to be further explored. If gender equality is better in Nordic countries than in the Arab world, what are the reasons for such high female representation in STEM fields in the Arab world as opposed to northern Europe? Dajani argued that despite social conditions that are considered to limit girls’ educational choices and perceived traditional norms challenging women’s empowerment women, the number of females in the STEM fields continues to grow. However, women’s professional participation in STEM fields remains disproportionate to the number of female students pursuing STEM education—there are more young women studying in these areas that are not reflected later on in the labor market. Dajani suggested a few gaps in the literature which need further studying. Among other things she suggested that research was needed to examine the long-term impact of the segregated educational system on female educational choices, and specifically whether girls who study in single-sex environment have a greater tendency to pursue STEM-based higher education. Dajani also suggested that there is a need to further understand how Arab women are impacting the scientific workplace, and women’s influence on scientific laboratories and innovation hubs. Other sub-areas that need to be studied are mentoring schemes in sciences for women and the impact of female scientists as role models for young women and men.

Building on Dajani’s discussion, Abelkader Djeflat discussed “Science and Social Inequality in the Middle East.” Djeflat argued that the pervasive social inequality in the Middle East has been obstructive to the advancement of sciences and scientific production in the Middle East. Social disparity has not only manifested in the high unemployment rates across the region, but also in youth’s access to knowledge. Elites have more access to foreign technology, scientific discovery, and research than lower classes. This incongruent access to knowledge is passed down through generations cementing inequality, and ultimately frustration, between social classes. Djeflat argued that there is a need to study the social system in the Middle East, and identify the dysfunctional social institutions that create such disparity in the access to knowledge between social classes.

Mehran Kamrava presented Parviz Tarikhi’s comments on “Sanctions and Scientific Production in Iran.” Tarikhi suggests that science and scientific production in Iran remain dependent on the state politically, ideologically, and financially. The state’s control over science and scientific production in Iran led to three structural problems. First, given that the state is the biggest funder of scientific research, there has been an ostensible disparity in allocation of public funds to scientific research. Instead of funding research that contributes to scientific production and knowledge, the state has funded pretentious projects that boost national pride domestically, and project an image of a powerful, advanced Iran internationally. Second, state’s control of scientific production has circumcised the parameters of constructive scientific criticism. Finally, many scientific endeavors funded by the state have been considered sensitive to national security; hence, impacting the circulation of scientific information. In addition to the aforementioned structural problems, Tarikhi highlighted the role of sanctions in further hampering scientific production in Iran. He claimed that because of sanctions, the trend towards brain-drain has picked up dramatically, and more Iranian scholars and scientists have been leaving the country than ever before. In addition, Iranian scholars face limited access to scientific production outside Iran both for education and contribution purposes, as some journals do not accept papers from Iranian scholars. However, the sanctions contributed to the growth of cosmopolitanism among Iranian scientists in diaspora and those in Iran. Tarikhi highlighted a number of areas that deserve further studying, among which: the inverse relationship between sanctions and science; sanctions impact on the criticism of scientific production; Iranian scientists’ ability to conduct independent scientific research; immigration and scientific cosmopolitanism in Iran; and the internal quality of dissent, and how it impacts scientific production in Iran.

Tariq Da’na concluded the working group discussions with his presentation on “The Military-Industrial Complex and Technological Advancement in Israel.” Da’na provided an overview of Israel’s business-political-military relations. He argued that the military-industrial complex in Israel could be traced back to pre-statehood. Israel Military Industries, currently known as IMI Systems, was established in the 1933. This company, and the Israeli military-industrial complex at large, played a significant role in the Israel’s state building process in the 1950s and 1960s. Da’na claimed that given the central role the Israeli army plays in politics, the Israeli military-industrial complex remains worth studying. Da’na identified key gaps in the literature on the Israeli military-industrial complex, among which: the connection between Israeli academia and military apparatus, the indigeneity of Israeli scientific production the privatization of security in Israel; privatization of Israeli checkpoint and prisons; and comparisons between the Israeli and Egyptian military-industrial complexes in 1960 to the 1980s.

For the working group agenda please click hereFor the participants biographies please click hereRead more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarRana Dajani, Hashemite University, JordanTariq Dana, Doha Institute of Graduate Studies, QatarAbdelkader Djeflat, University of Lille, FranceMohammed Ghaly, Hamad Bin Khalifa University, QatarSari Hanafi, American University of Beirut, LebanonIslam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarSuzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarAyman Shabana, Georgetown University in QatarElizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

CURA Workshop: Designing a Research Question
2018-10-04 12:00 - 16:00
On October 4, 2018, CIRS hosted its first CURA workshop for students. “Designing a Research Question” was intended to outline the research process and offer strategies for developing a research question. This was accomplished through the process of finding and narrowing a research topic, identifying a research problem, and devising a research question to address that problem.

CIRS Director, Professor Mehran Kamrava, led an interactive session with the participants about his preferred research methods and techniques. He shared the steps he expects of his students when writing their research papers; from choosing a research question and conducting the research process, to organizing the research findings and writing the paper. Kamrava emphasized the need to begin research with a broad area of interest and not a specific question, in order to avoid personal bias and to fully evaluate existing data and resources before identifying a topic. He addressed the importance of planning and organization to academic writing and explained his method of structuring papers. He further shared his expectations of students enrolled in his courses.

The workshop was facilitated by Islam Hassan, CIRS Research Analyst, and Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS Project Manager. Participants were all GU-Q students, and the following CURA fellows provided direction during the workshop: Mohammed Al-Jaberi, Chaïmaa Benkermi, Aiza Khan, Mehaira Maghoub, Riham Mansour, Khansa Maria, and Fatemeh Salari. The facilitators and fellows led exercises encouraging participants to apply and practice the workshop skills on their own research questions.

The exercises helped students to arrive at a succinct research question from their broad areas of academic interest. Personal interests ranged from “Artificial Intelligence in India” to “Islamophobia in China.” Students worked in small groups and discussed their topics in-depth with their peers and mentors. In the first exercise, students were provided with a set of questions to ask themselves and their peers to guide a conversation to a focused area of interest for further deliberation. Next, participants were asked to identify what needed further research and how they would tackle it. Students discussed their different approaches. For the last exercise, students volunteered their research questions for everyone to critique.

The workshop was attended by twenty-five students from every class year, from freshmen working on their first college papers to seniors preparing for their final theses. Everyone engaged in peer learning, with third- and fourth-year students sharing their learned experiences, and first- and second-year students sharing their own perspectives and approaches. Students who successfully completed the workshop were awarded electronic badges that could be shared on their LinkedIn profiles.

This was the first research workshop that CIRS has planned for the purpose of enhancing students’ research abilities. GU-Q students will have another opportunity to participate in a CURA workshop in the spring semester.

“As a freshman starting her career at an institution as research intensive as Georgetown, this workshop proved to be a great kick start for my journey as a researcher,” commented Aimen Khan, a participant in the workshop. Another participant, Jasmin Afifi described the workshop as “enjoyable, informative and enlightening.”

Article by Aiza Khan (class of 2020), CURA Research Fellow

Access Denied: Banning Qatari Ships from Blockading States
2018-10-17 12:45 - 13:45
On June 5, 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt cut diplomatic ties with Qatar, imposed a blockade, and immediately moved to close off access to Qatar, with an embargo on air, sea, and land traffic to and from the country. These punitive measures were based on allegations that Qatar was supporting terrorism, which Qatar denied, and were used to pressure Qatar to comply with a list of demands in order to end the blockade, which Qatar rejected.

Muna Al-Marzouqi, Assistant Professor of Maritime and Commercial Law at Qatar University’s College of Law, was invited to share her research on this subject at CIRS on October 17, 2018. Her presentation concerned “access denied” to Qatari ships by the blockading states, and specifically the legality of the ban. Al-Marzouqi studies this unique aspect of the Gulf crisis through maritime laws, and she has probed the question of whether the blockade is in conformity with principles of international laws and conventions.

There are several laws that govern maritime trade. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is a body of laws, customs, and agreements that applies to all nations, and governs how nations interact in maritime matters. Maritime law considers activities and events related to the seas that, for example, would apply to shipping companies, their clients, and their employees.

The blockade has prevented all vessels owned by the Qatari government or a Qatari citizen from being accepted at the ports of the blockading countries. In fact, in the first weeks of the conflict, vessels owned by other countries that were bound for or arriving from Qatar were also denied access the blockade countries’ ports. However, Al-Marzouqi said, Qatar’s minister of transportation and telecommunication filed a complaint with the International Maritime Organization seeking permission for foreign and Qatari vessels to enter these ports and, as a result, foreign vessels were allowed access to Saudi, UAE, and Bahraini ports, but Qatari vessels remained banned.

While analyzing the impact of the blockade, Al-Marzouqi pointed out that Qatar regularly imported goods from the blockading countries—such as food, pharmaceutical products, and other daily essentials—but no longer has access to these. Vessels do not only dock at these ports for fuel and repairs, she explained, but also for humanitarian reasons like medical assistance or ship maintenance. So there are many aspects of trade that are affected by the shipping ban.

Al-Marzouqi has researched the applicable international rules to determine which apply to the blockade. “There are rules from maritime conventions, trade conventions, and also from the principles of international law that may be applicable,” she said. The Law of the Sea regulates the right of coastal states to take some measures against foreign vessels. One of the rights of foreign-flagged vessels is to have “innocent passage” into the territorial waters of foreign states. She explained that any vessel, whatever the nationality, has the right to enter the waters of another foreign state. In the current case of Qatar, however, no Qatari vessel is currently allowed to enter the waters of the blockading states—let alone be granted safe passage. She explained that the term “innocent passage” means that ships can pass through the waters without breaching any laws or doing harm, “and Qatari vessels are now deprived of this right.”

“The actions taken against the state of Qatar are actually unjustified, unreasonable, arbitrary, and outrageous.”

Another applicable treaty in this situation is the Convention on International Régime of Maritime Ports of 1923, which remains in force today. This convention obligates states party to the convention open their ports to other states; however, none of the blockading states are signatories to this convention—including Qatar. Thus, this convention only has a “persuasive effect” on states, but it is a part of the customary international law. Al-Marzouqi said that all states are obligated to apply the rules articulated in the convention, and therefore “states should not deny access to ports.”

One of the most important international conventions is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1994. GATT regulates trade between states and its principles encourage states to adopt free-trade policies and eliminate barriers to trade. By suspending maritime navigation to and from Qatar and hampering trade with the state, the blockading nations are going against the principles of free trade. Al-Marzouqi pointed out one exception to these rules: in a situation where states need to protect their national security interests, they are allowed to resort to these measures. This gives rise to the question of whether Qatar is enough of a national security threat to merit a response like the blockade.

Al-Marzouqi said, based on her research, these claims of threats to national security “do not have any basis, and thus the blockade is a not a legal response,” because the blockading countries have failed to provide any substantial proof to strengthen their claims of Qatar’s security or terrorism threat. In response, Qatar has filed cases with international organizations like the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Al-Marzouqi argued that the case against Qatar does not meet the security exception to the applicable rules, and therefore, “the actions taken against the state of Qatar are actually unjustified, unreasonable, arbitrary, and outrageous.”

Principles of international law urge states to work together to find solutions to crises like this. Al-Marzouqi pointed out that the blockade against Qatar is “a political problem that leads to legal consequences.” There is no international body with the authority to impose binding decisions on states to stop actions that are not in conformity with international law, she said, except for the ICJ. However, “the blockading states don’t want to solve the problem by amicable means or by judicial means,” she said. There is a presumption in law that applies to the blockade, Al-Marzouqi said, where the refusal of all mediation and negotiation attempts by the blockading nations indicates “that they have no evidence to show that Qatar is a terrorist country.”

Article by Khansa Maria, CURA Administrative Fellow

Muna Al-Marzouqi is Assistant Professor of Maritime and Commercial Law at Qatar University College of Law. She received her LL.B from Qatar University College of Law and a Masters degree in law from the University of California, Berkeley. She obtained her doctorate in the field of Maritime Law from Tulane University.

CURA Seminar: Informal Politics in the Middle East
2018-10-25 14:00 - 16:00
In October 2018, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) held a CURA Seminar under its CURA (CIRS Undergraduate Research Advancement) initiative. Each semester, CURA Fellows come together for an active discussion of research papers that were submitted to a current CIRS research project. The papers are shared in advance of the seminar, and CURA fellows attend prepared to critique the papers that they have read. At a later stage, selected CURA fellows attend a CIRS scholarly research working group to share fellows’ feedback with the paper authors. CURA was introduced to support the research needs of undergraduate students at Georgetown University in Qatar, and to provide them with opportunities to enhance their research skills by discussing and critiquing papers from CIRS research initiatives. This CURA seminar was under CIRS’ research initiative on “Informal Politics in the Middle East,” where the CURA fellows discussed two papers addressing the blurred line between formal and informal politics and how it shapes government and society within Yemen and Turkey.

Abdul Rehmaan Qayyum (class of 2021) kicked off the CURA Seminar discussion by presenting Charles Schmitz’spaper titled “Weighing the Tribal Factor in Yemeni Politics.” The paper discusses the role of tribes in Yemeni politics. In the North, the Houthi tribe exploits tribalism in pursuit of legitimacy and power, while the South rejects the tribal system, perceiving it as an uncivilized system. Schmitz addresses the role of tribalism while juxtaposing it with the role of Saudi Arabia, the different political parties (such as the Islah party), militias, and the Hadi government. Schmitz claims that tribes function across state institutions. Tribal sheikhs participate in the government and parliament, control areas out of the weak Yemeni state’s reach, and collect taxes on behalf of the state. However, tribes are not the sole actors in Yemeni local politics. External actors, such as Saudi Arabia; local political parties; and the conflicts within the government all factor into shaping Yemeni politics, even more so than tribalism.

Khansa Maria (class of 2021) presented Michelangelo Guida’spaper titled “Çay Politics: Informal politics in Turkey and the Example of Vote Mobilization in Istanbul and Şanlıurfa.” The paper conveys the power of informal politics in Turkey, focusing on the cities of Istanbul and Şanlıurfa. In the aforementioned two cities, political parties’ campaigns and manifestos are less effective in swaying voters toward a specific candidate during elections. Community leaders and voters’ communal affiliations play a much more effective role in influencing public votes. Guida mentions how in a survey conducted in 2005 by the Reuters Institute Digital News Report in the district of Üsküdar Kadıköy and Küçükçekmece portrayed the impact of media on voters, highlighting that 33 percent of people mistrusted TV, and over 50 percent mistrusted the media and preferred to listen to their community leaders and which candidate they support for reference. As a result of the public mistrust in media and the role of community in Turkish politics, several political parties, particularly the AK Parti, use informal space to win votes. Instead of organizing big media campaigns and rallies, these political parties interact with voters face-to-face, and organize community events as unconventional ways of campaigning.

Subsequent to each paper presentation, the CURA fellows engaged in an insightful discussion on the structure and organization of the paper, the employed theoretical and conceptual frameworks, the sources used, and the clarity and strength of the argument. While focusing on the concept of informal politics and its relationship with formal politics in the Middle East, the CURA fellows employed the theories and research tools and skills of their respective majors—namely international politics, culture and politics, international economics, and international history—to assess, critique, and provide feedback on the discussed papers.

Following the CURA Seminar, Chaïmaa Benkermi (class of 2021) and Riham Mansour (class of 2019) presented the CURA fellows’ comments and feedback at CIRS’s second working group on “Informal Politics in the Middle East.”

For the participants’ biographies, please click here

Article by Hala Eid, CURA Publications Fellow at CIRS

Informal Politics in the Middle East Working Group II
2018-10-28 09:30 - 2018-10-29 17:00
On October 28–29, 2018, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) held the second working group under its research initiative on “Informal Politics in the Middle East.” Over the course of two days, a number of scholars were convened to discuss issues including: the tribe in Yemen, the Dīwãniyya in Kuwait, ‘ashwa’iy cities in the Middle East, social activism in Egypt, vote mobilization in Turkey, women in Iran, and agricultural associations in Saharan Algeria.

Charles Schmitz initiated the working group discussions by presenting his article on “Weighing the Tribal Factor in Yemeni Politics”. Schmitz argues than many consider the tribe to lie at the heart of Yemeni politics and society, and that existing scholarship tends to overemphasize the tribe while not giving enough attention to other institutions or dynamics which are core to understanding Yemen. Schmitz suggests that political parties, the military, various other state institutions, and civil society are all key actors that need to be studied alongside the tribe and tribal dynamics. Entirely ignoring the role of the tribe in Yemen is of course not possible, but what needs to be closely examined is how important or influential tribes are in the contemporary Yemeni political landscape. Assessing the tribal factor is a challenge because of two main realities: the diverse conceptual approaches to understanding Yemeni tribes, and the transformation of Yemeni society and tribes. Schmitz argues that not only is there a great deal of debate about the nature of a tribe, but the last half century also produced new hybrid forms of politics such as the rise of tribal shaykhs in Yemen’s national political institutions, state officials’ use of tribal custom to resolve disputes, and the use of clan identity to secure loyalty in the national security apparatus of Yemen.

Clemens Chay shifted the discussion to “Dissecting the Spatial Relevance of the Dīwãniyya in Kuwait: An Inquiry into its ‘Publicness.’” In his article, Chay argues that as an integral component of Kuwaiti culture, dīwāniyyas have also become spaces where informal politics and formal political negotiations are enacted. In its most basic form, the dīwāniyya has historically served as a social space where people gather. Surviving the transition from its traditional relevance in pre-oil Kuwaiti society towards current forms of urbanized society, the dīwāniyya continues to be relevant as a space for social exchange. This article explains how the dīwāniyya’s spatial relevance is attributed to its “publicness,” and its quality of enabling face-to-face communication that technology has failed to provide. Departing from an understanding of public space, this article shows how the dīwāniyyastraddles the public-private divide. The space’s malleability has ensured its persistence; its capacity for socialization has led to its use by different societal groups, including foreign diplomats. Crucially, this article shows how an informal and indigenous mode of grassroots diplomacy provides an expression of public sentiment.

Building on the Chay’s discussion, Deen Sharp discussed another form of informal spaces in his article: “In the Age of ‘ashwa’iy Cities.” Sharp argues that urban studies, since the start of the new millennium, has stressed the importance of studying the urban fringes and moving away from the rather myopic study of metropolitan cores that have traditionally dominated urban theory, and assumed to stand in for broader urban processes. However, there has been a significant rise of urban perspectives from the global south, in the context of the continued urbanization that has accelerated in more recent years. The contemporary processes of urbanization in the Middle East and the debate on formal and informal urbanism in the region have contributed significantly to the rise of such perspectives. Hence, Sharp argues that the way we study and think about urbanization in the Middle East, and its political importance, is undergoing a rapid change. Finally, he suggests that we are not living in an urban age of “global” or “ordinary” cities, but rather ‘ashwa’iy (haphazard) cities.

Islam Hassan presented Amr Hamzawi’s article on “Egypt’s Resilient Social Activism.” Hamzawi argues that in light of Egypt’s ruling generals’ crack down on civil society, secular opposition parties, and Islamist movements since 2013, four forms of anti-authoritarian platforms have shaped social activism in Egypt: single-cause initiatives that are opposing human rights abuses and advocating for the rights and freedoms of the victims; professional associations that are defending freedoms of expression and association; student groups that are challenging the systematic interference of the security services in their affairs and the permanent presence of security forces on campuses; and the labor movement that is galvanized by deteriorating economic and social conditions and by the government’s repression of labor activists. In addition, spontaneous eruptions of popular anger in response to human rights abuses have become politically significant.

Michelangelo Guida shifted the discussion to Turkey with his paper on “Çay Politics: Informal Politics in Turkey and the Example of Vote Mobilization in Istanbul and Şanlıurfa.” Guida argues interpersonal relations, face-to-face, and person-to-person relationships dominate Turkish public life. Or example in Istanbul, besides conventional political meeting, parties prefer door-to-door political campaigning, visiting families, businesses, and associations of immigrants for a sohbet, intimate conversation, over a glass of tea. AK Party has succeeded in using this form of informal politics as a tool to mobilize votes. Guida also argues that Turks prefer to use existing tribal, family, hemşehri, or community networks to have access to public life. This article examines the interactions between formal and informal political structures, particularly during elections, in modern day Turkey.

Shahla Haeri discussed “Perilous Adventures: Women and Civil Society Participation in Iran.” In her article, Haeri argues that from the early days of the establishment of Islamic Republic, educated urban Iranian women have been actively engaged with the state and civil society in all spheres and domains, despite the many legal and political hurdles thrown on their paths by the state’s medieval gender policies. Their activism, however, was not initiated by the drastic structure sociopolitical changes. Women engaged with the civil society well before the establishment of the Islamic Republic, though perhaps not in such wide scale. Haeri examines women’s success in demanding and partially achieving political authority and representation in governmental and non-governmental organizations, and the evolution of the relationship between women and the Islamic Republic since 1979.

Finally, Jackie Starbird presented Nejm Benessaiah’s article on “Micro-movements and the Politics of Change in Saharan Algeria.” Benessaiah argues that rather than a linear progression from traditional, hierarchical forms of governance to modern, democratic ones, the present governance composition in Saharan Algeria reveals the continued existence of several, mixed forms of political behavior. Among these forms of political behavior: authoritarian (still to some degree the family, the ashīra, the cazzāba and the state); liberal market-driven, competitive behavior (the labor market, mercantile selling of goods, consumption of goods and services); and consensus-based egalitarian decision-making (associations). The existence of these mixed modes of governance could be seen as evidence for a society in transition, as newer forms gradually replace the old. Instead of the eclipse of the “traditional” by a monolithic modernity, Benessaiah argues that this hybrid composition of governance in Saharan Algeria in fact constitutes a locally negotiated form of modernity itself. The Mozabite associations are able to challenge the hierarchy of the local elites, not by violence or even direct conflict, but by simply doing things differently, by organizing in inclusive, voluntary ways, and actually achieving results.

For the working group agenda, click here
For the participants’ biographies, click here
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Chaïmaa Benkermi, Georgetown University in Qatar
Misba Bhatti, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Clemens Chay, Durham University, UK
Paulino Rafael Robles-Gil Cozzi, Qatar University
Michelangelo Guida, Istanbul 29 Mayis University, Turkey
Shahla Haeri, Boston University
Islam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Riham Mansour, Georgetown University in Qatar
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Charles Schmitz, Towson University, Baltimore
Deen Sharp, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Jackie Starbird, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

Book Launch: Environmental Politics in the Middle East
2018-11-11 18:00 - 20:00
On November 11, 2018, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) launched its recent book on Environmental Politics of the Middle East (Oxford University Press/Hurst, 2018), edited by Harry Verhoeven, Associate Professor of International Relations and African Politics at Georgetown University in Qatar, who presented the research findings at a CIRS Dialogue. In Verhoeven’s words, the book tries “to unmask, to contest, to deconstruct some of the leading environmental narratives that have emerged throughout this macroregion.” He said that these storylines are not just the products of the Middle East, but of interactions between other parts of the world and the states, societies, and markets of the Middle East.

Verhoeven argued that the idea in which nature itself shapes political, economic, and social outcomes, has long been intuitive: “perhaps there is no better illustration of this than the old saying that ‘Egypt is a gift of the Nile.’ As if the mere fact that water flows down from the Ethiopian highlands—and from Lake Victoria in Central Africa, all the way to Egypt—in and of itself would explain all the political and social processes that have been happening in Egypt.”

Environment is often assumed to be, he said, “an exogenous and independent variable shaping the dependent variable”—that is, political, social, and economic outcomes. This notion has a very long history that can be traced back to many illustrious intellectuals. Verhoeven explained that the concept of “environmental determinism”—that environmental outcomes fundamentally shape political and economic thinking—was propagated by Aristotle, who held the idea that in certain types of topography, specific political civilizations would emerge.

Such thinking also underpinned the writing of Ibn Khaldun, who was, Verhoeven argued, perhaps the greatest thinker of the fourteenth century. Khaldun divided the world into seven different types of climatic zones, each of which had a specific outcome in the form of social organization, culture, and political systems associated with it. “The idea here, fundamentally, is that climate, the environment as an exogenous variable, shapes human outcomes,” Verhoeven said.

“Khaldun’s ideas were also used—or, more pertinently, abused—by European colonialism in this part of the world,” Verhoeven said. The classic British and French explanations for why the West was richer and more powerful than parts of North Africa and the Middle East, was in part environmental. Reading the historical chronicles, particularly of the French colonization in Algeria starting in 1830, he said, “one is struck by the repetition of how the French essentially blamed the local population for mismanaging natural resources and therefore justified seizing the land and expropriating its people.” Colonists defended their exploits on the basis that they had far greater knowledge of scarce resources, he explained, and rationalized their efforts as “making a contribution to humanity, and to civilization as a whole.”

“The very way we think about the environment, the way we represent it, the way we try to intervene upon it is not an apolitical exercise. It is an exercise that is essentially concerned with questions of distribution. Who gets what? Who is accountable for what? Whose narrative is told, and whose narrative is not told? Who has the authority to decide on whether to call an environmental problem, a development problem, or a security problem?”

Verhoeven said environmental determinism is still very present in the dominant patterns of thought about the links between the environment, economic development, and politics today. “Technocratic environmentalism” declares itself to be resolutely apolitical and carried forward by the planet’s most erudite minds. One of the world’s most influential economists, Jeffrey Sachs, proposes “a profession of rigor, insight, and practicality” using positivist methods. Technocratic environmentalists believe that science can be and should be a value-free endeavor. Politics in this reading is a corrupting variable, which should not be factored into explaining processes of environmental change, and that interventions should be left solely to experts. However, as Verhoeven explained, this opens the door for highly authoritarian decision-making, in which ordinary people are treated as ignorant and not worthy of participation.

A second, influential way of thinking about the environment, politics, and development, comes out of a more pessimistic tradition, Verhoeven said, which goes back to the Reverend Thomas Malthus, who warned that human capacity to shape nature was limited. This perspective holds that a point will come where population growth outstrips agricultural growth. Such a scenario would lead to a rebalancing of population levels through the combination of famine, war, and disease, or so Malthus prophesized, Verhoeven explained. Today’s discourse of so-called water wars or climate wars—the idea that when societies or entire regions run out of water and food they irredeemably are on a path to war—echoes Malthus’s dystopian visions, he said.

The intuition underpinning “water wars” is the well-known “tragedy of the commons,” a parable about resource use inspired by the famously pessimistic Thomas Hobbes, Verhoeven said. This is the idea that when finite resources have to be shared, in the absence of an external authority which regulates the consumption of individual parties, communities will inevitably deplete the resource as it is in the interest of every individual to consume as much as one can. When these resources are essential for life, like water, people are willing to fight to the death over them, or so the parable goes. “People who believe in water wars are essentially telling you that they need some kind of ‘Leviathan,’ some kind of external central authority, that limits our consumption of resources and that protects us against ourselves,” he said. The empirical evidence, however, Verhoeven argued, suggests otherwise.

An alternative conceptualizing of how environmental factors, development, and politics are linked was illustrated by the thesis of one chapter of Environmental Politics in the Middle East, which Verhoeven presented. Every year, huge amounts of forests are destroyed in southern and central Somalia to bring charcoal to Middle Eastern markets for shisha smoking and grilling of meat. The Gulf appetite for the high-quality charcoal harvested from Somalia’s acacia trees directly contributes to environmental degradation, economic underdevelopment, and violent conflict. It illustrates how resource degradation in one part of the world is intimately linked to process of consumption and accumulation elsewhere. Not only is tree cover in southern Somalia reduced, deforestation driven by charcoal exploitation makes the land increasingly prone to erosion, flash-flooding, and chronic drought. Moreover, the taxation of charcoal by both jihadist groups like Al-Shabab and foreign interveners like the Kenyan Defence Forces contributes directly to the decades-long conflict that has been raging in Somalia.

Verhoeven concluded by restating the book’s central message: “The very way we think about the environment, the way we represent it, the way we try to intervene upon it is not an apolitical exercise. It is an exercise that is essentially concerned with questions of distribution. Who gets what? Who is accountable for what? Whose narrative is told, and whose narrative is not told? Who has the authority to decide on whether to call an environmental problem, a development problem, or a security problem?” The key point is thus that environmental and political issues cannot be analytically seen as separate, in this region or elsewhere. The issues at stake are fundamentally issues of power. The CIRS book is about the ways in which certain groups of people are branded as enemies of the state, are criminalized, and are shut-out of media access—ostensibly because of their activism around the environment, but really because of the way they challenge powerholders across the Middle East and North Africa. Environmental Politics in the Middle East is about “who has a right to say what, on which authority, and who is systematically—over time and over space—being excluded.”

Article by Khansa Maria, CURA Administrative Fellow

Harry Verhoeven is Associate Professor of International Relations and African Politics in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University in Qatar. He is the author of Water, Civilisation and Power in Sudan: The Political Economy of Military-Islamist State Building (2015), and Why Comrades Go to War: Liberation Politics and the Outbreak of Africa’s Deadliest Conflict (2016). He acquired his doctorate from the University of Oxford and was a visiting scholar at the University of Cambridge in 2016-17. He is Convener of the Oxford University China-Africa Network and is coeditor of the new Cambridge University Press book series on Intelligence and National Security in Africa and the Middle East.

Fundamentalist Metamorphosis: Hezbollah’s Ideological Evolution from Idealism to Pragmatism
2019-01-16 12:45 - 13:45
On January 16, 2019, CIRS invited Middle East analyst Massaab Al-Aloosy to discuss his research on “Fundamentalist Metamorphosis: Hezbollah’s Ideological Evolution from Idealism to Pragmatism.” During the talk, he mapped out the trajectory of Hezbollah (“Party of God”), a political and militant Shiʿa Islamist movement, from its origin to the present. The organization came into existence following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, and was primarily concerned with ending Israel’s occupation in Lebanon and supporting the Palestinian cause.

Before it was officially organized in 1985, Hezbollah worked as a clandestine operation inspired by several geopolitical events, including the Iranian Revolution and the overthrow of the shah in 1979, and Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionized Shiʿa theology, which was exported to Shi’a communities, including those in Lebanon. Aloosy said that Khomeini “gave a directive for the clergy in ruling the country and being involved in politics. This had great ramifications in the region as a whole, but specifically for the Shiʿa and the Arab world.”

Another event inspiring Hezbollah’s actions was Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 in its attempt to uproot the Palestinian Liberation Organization from southern Lebanon. According to Al-Aloosy, “This was a massive shock for the Lebanese and the Arab world, to see an Arab capital invaded by Israelis forces.” This event profoundly affected the Shiʿa in the Lebanon because of their constant friction with Israel, leading Hezbollah to launch military operations against Israeli targets, including an Israeli encampment—one of their most devastating attacks against the Israeli Defense Forces (IDS).

Hezbollah “reflected much of Iran’s revolutionary rhetoric; the oppressed versus the oppressors; siding with the people; creating revolutions throughout the region.”

Hezbollah sent an open letter to the world in 1985, declaring its goals. “It reflected much of Iran’s revolutionary rhetoric; the oppressed versus the oppressors; siding with the people; creating revolutions throughout the region,” Al-Aloosy said. One goal was to create an Islamic state, which proved extremely ambitious because Lebanon is a “multi-confessional, multi-religious, multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian country.” Another goal was to destroy Israel; Hezbollah “considered Israel as a cancerous gland, which should be completely destroyed; and they would not stop until they liberated every inch of Palestine,” he said.

In 1989, Saudi Arabia gathered many Lebanese politicians together and paid them handsomely to sign an agreement to end the Lebanese civil war and amend the divided political system, he said. Hezbollah was initially against the Taif Agreement, but later decided it was necessary to engage in Lebanese politics. Taking this pragmatic step, Al-Aloosy said, Hezbollah “had a revolutionary outlook that had completely changed with accepting the political system.”

During the 1990s, Hezbollah underwent a process of “refashioning Islamism,” Al-Aloosy said. In the 1980s, their positions had been quite extremist, but over time, “they changed all of this rhetoric, and they tried to change the interpretation of what they said.” Hezbollah’s focus was on Israel, and their perspective had become more nationalistic than Islamist. For example, Al-Alsoosy said that the rhetoric became: “We are here to liberate Lebanese land, mainly. This is our objective.”

The quest for an Islamic state remained, however, but it was “indefinitely postponed,” Al-Aloosy noted. Additionally, Hezbollah acknowledged that the goal of an Islamic state did not mean that it will be imposed by force, and it had to come with the consensus of all Lebanese. “You can imagine how impossible that would be,” Al-Aloosy said, “not even the Shiʿites themselves agree on an Islamic state.” Reaching a consensus among Lebanon’s many communities—including Sunnis, Christians, and Druze, among others—was considered an almost impossible feat, he said.

Further, in 1999, Ehud Barak was elected Prime Minister of Israel on a platform of withdrawing Israeli forces from Lebanon, which occurred in 2000. Despite this, Hezbollah continued its attacks on Israel from 2000 to 2006, but these were not as intense as those of the 1990s. In 2006, “a big miscalculation by both Hezbollah and Israel happened,” he explained. Now under the premiership of Ehud Olmert, Israel decided it would destroy Hezbollah. In 2006, a war erupted between Israel and Hezbollah, lasting for over a month. Hezbollah was not destroyed in this conflict, but, since then, the border between Israel and Lebanon has been comparatively quiet.

Syria, throughout the 1990s, had been using Hezbollahs’ attacks to pressure the Israelis to the negotiating table, Al-Aloosy said, but Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon deprived Syria of a very important negotiating tool with the Israelis. With the civil uprising in Syria in 2011, “this was yet another event that served to make Hezbollah’s ideology more pragmatic and less idealistic,” Al-Aloosy said. Instead of siding with the oppressed, Hezbollah chose to side with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

In conclusion, Al-Aloosy argued that Hezbollah has transformed from an offensive force against the Israelis to liberate the south of Lebanon, into a deterrent force. Hezbollah continues the rhetoric of liberating Palestine, he said, but does not actually do much about it. Hence, “when it comes to creating an Islamic state, it is very clear this goal is unattainable especially in the sectarian mosaic of Lebanon. Thus, they engaged in changing the rhetoric and changed their outlook indirectly.”

Article by Khansa Maria, CURA Publications Fellow

Massaab Al-Aloosy received his PhD and Masters of Art in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Previously, he worked with the World Peace Foundation and is currently working as a producer with the Al Jazeera Network. He is the author of a forthcoming book, titled Changing Ideology of the Hezbollah Insurgency and Civil War in the Middle East.

Russia and the Middle East Working Group I
2019-01-20 09:00 - 2019-01-21 16:00
On January 20-21, 2019, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) held the first working group under its research initiative on “Russia and the Middle East.” Over the course of two days, scholars were convened to discuss different aspects of Russian-Middle Eastern relations, including: Russian “responsibility to protect” in the Middle East; Russian “sovereign democracy,” Middle Eastern investments in Russia, migration between Russia and the Middle East, ISIS in the North Caucuses, Russia-GCC relations, the Yemeni civil war, and Russia-Iran and Russian-Maghreb relations.

Roy Allison started the working group discussions with his presentation on “Russian vs. Western “Responsibility to Protect” in the Middle East.” Allison suggested that RTP is too narrow for understanding normative claims-making competition between Western States and Russia in the Middle East. He added that Middle East is just one theater among others where Russia and the West have been competing over international norms relating to sovereignty and rights, as well as international justice and international order. Germane to this discussion, Allison suggested that the West is not a united bloc when it comes to normative claims making in the region, as a number of Western countries, such as the United States, currently appears to have slightly withdrawn. Allison highlighted a number of areas that could benefit from in-depth study, among which: the reception of Russian legal and normative claims by Middle Eastern states, the controversy of international legal claims, and the development of laws and norms about drones and other efforts to fight transnational terrorism.

Following Allison’s discussion, Viacheslav Morozov presented on the “Prospects of Russian ‘Sovereign Democracy’ in the Middle East.” Morozov argued that while Russia is not actively promoting sovereign democracy as a principle as strenuously as has done previously, the thinking behind sovereign democracy still exists in Russia’s foreign policy approach. There is complexity to determining exactly whether sovereign democracy is a model of governance that evolved in Russia or whether it is more of an ideology. Sovereign democracy is characterized by direct intervention by the state in running state affairs and the emphasis in “sovereign democracy” is on sovereignty rather than democracy. The rationale is that individual rights can only be protected when there is a strong state that can act as the vanguard of rights. In this line of thinking, sovereignty is understood as being non-interventionist. But given that democracy is an empty signifier, similar to “humanity,” Russia is questioning the universality of international constitutions. Finally, Morozov discussed the applicability of the Russian model of democracy in the Middle East.

Caner Bakir shifted the working group discussions to “Russia: An Emerging Market for Middle Eastern Investments?” Bakir claimed that Middle Eastern foreign direct investments in Russia are increasing, particularly by the United Arab Emirates. However, the share of Middle Eastern investments in Russia’s inward foreign direct investments is significantly small. Such reality provokes questions around Middle Eastern multinational corporations. Bakir proposed a number of areas related to Middle Eastern multinational corporations that deserve study. Among such topics: the dynamicity, drivers and challenges of multinationals; the impact of multinationals on state bureaucracy; the difference in multinational corporations’ behavior from one sector to another; the competitive advantages of Middle Eastern multinational corporations; and what Middle Eastern multinational corporations can offer to the Russian economy.

Andrei Korobkov discussed another aspect of Russian-Middle Eastern relations, particularly: “Contemporary Migration Patterns between Russia and the Middle East.” Korobkov stated that Russia and the Middle East, given their multiethnic histories, have always been key players in global migration patterns. However, particularly with the creation of the modern state in the Middle East and fall of the Soviet Union, Middle Eastern countries and Russia have followed the European model of immigration, by developing strict naturalization policies. Korobkov added that while the numbers of Middle Easterners immigrating to Russia—as students, former students, refugees, or spouses of Russians citizens—have been increasing, only two to three percent of Russians intending to leave Russia say they want to immigrate to the Middle East. Finally, Korobkov claimed that environmental and political factors will continue to drive migration from the Middle East to Russia.

Sergey Markedonov focused the discussion on “Russia, the Islamic State, and Wilayet Qawkaz.” Markedonov argued that the Middle East is of symbolic importance for Russian foreign policy, particularly with the ongoing Syrian conflict. Russia discovered new horizons in the Middle East that could help in Russia’s desire to compete once again with the United States for global dominance. However, besides the Russia-US rivalry, Markedonov claimed that the Islamic States in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is yet another major driver behind Russia’s recent involvement in the Middle Eats. ISIS is seen as one of Russia’s main security threats. The North Caucuses’ allegiance to ISIS and the establishment of the Wilayat Qawkaz have become a security priority to the Russian government. Markedonov delved deeper into investigating Russia’s state-Islam relations.

Nikolay Kozhanov shifted the discussion to “The Drivers of Russia-GCC Relations Post 2011.” Although the Soviet Union always had interest in forming closer ties with the Persian Gulf states for geostrategic motives, the Soviet Union and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf had had troubled relations instigated by ideological differences. With the fall of the Soviet Union, and particularly with the ascendance of Vladimir Putin to power, Russia started becoming increasingly pragmatic in its foreign policy. Kozhanov argued that over the past few years, Russia has been attempting for a rapprochement with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states; an attempt with high chances of success. However, Kozhanov highlighted the fact that Russia does not have diplomatic experience is dealing with the GCC states, with exception of Kuwait to a certain extent. The attempt of rapprochement is driven by Russia’s economic and security interests at the backdrop of sanctions imposed on Russia, Russia’s relations with the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the government’s pursuit to maintain a higher oil price. Kozhanov stressed the argument that the willingness for a rapprochement between Russia and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf is not one-sided. For the GCC states, better relations with Russia are important given Russia’s increasing involvement in the Middle East, particularly in Syria. As far as oil and gas production are concerned, it is in Saudi Arabia’s interest to have Russia “dance around” OPEC. Saudi Arabia is also interested in economic diversification. To that end, Russia could be a potential investor, and exporter of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) given Saudi’s current troubled relations with its main LNG exporter, Qatar. However, it is important not to limit the economic relationship between Russia and the GCC states to merely oil and gas. Russia also has developed economic relations related to high-tech and agriculture in the region. In conclusion, Kozhanov suggested that Russia’s close relations with Iran will remain an obstacle to solidifying its ties to the GCC. Further complications are caused by the current geopolitical rift between Qatar and its neighbors, as Russia is reluctant to pick sides in the matter.

Samuel Ramani focused his discussion on “Russia and the Yemeni Civil War.” Ramani argued that Russia has been reluctant to pick sides in Yemen unlike in Syria. However, it has been trying to bring conflicting parties to the dialogue table. In such attempt, Russia has been banking on its historical relations with Yemen, particularly South Yemen. Hence, Ramani claims that when studying Russia’s current mediation role in Yemen, one has to consider the Soviet Union’s role in the Yemeni civil war and unification process in 1990. Ramani claimed that one of Russia’s strategic interests in having a stable Yemen is to use it as a naval base to project power in the Red Sea. In addition, the administration in Russia has been finding ways to project and build up on its soft power to reintroduce itself as a key player in international institutions and multilateral negotiations. These attempts by the current Russian administration are palpable in Russia’s addressing of the humanitarian situation in Hodeidah, and the sending of a humanitarian convoy to whitewash its image in the Middle East, and project an image better than that of the “destructive” United States internationally. Ramani added that Russia’s diplomatic engagement with the Houthi rebels is worth exploring. Russia has consistently maintained its stance on inviting Houthis to the negotiation table while supporting the arms embargo and criticizing the Houthis’ missile attacks on Saudi and assassination of Ali Abdullah Saleh. However, Russia appears to have a disaggregated image of the Houthis. They draw a distinction between radical Houthis and the Houthi leader. Ramani also argued that there seems to be an ostensible synergy between Iran and Russia when it comes to perceived solutions to the Yemeni civil war. Both countries prefer diplomatic dialogue and object American military intervention.

Ghoncheh Tazmini sharpened the discussion on Russian-Iranian relations by presenting on “Iran: A Strategic Partner or a Provisional Counterweight?” Tazmini claimed that the relationship between Iran and Russia, at least on the surface, is inconsistent. There is a degree of ambiguity around the quality and durability of Russian-Iranian relations. Such ambiguity is stirred by actions such as the Russian delay in constructing a contracted light water reactor in Iran from 1995 to 2003, and the delay in delivering the Russian S300 missiles, which were dispatched a decade later. At the same time, Russia has supported Iran’s economy by inviting it to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana and supporting a three-year provisional free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union in 2018. As far as Iran is concerned, the Iranian leadership allowed Russian boots-on-ground on its territory, which is undoubtedly against the Iranian revolutionary, anti-imperialist narrative. Tazmini also claimed that Russian-Iranian relations have developed after the fall of the Soviet Union. Since then, the intensity and depth of Russian-Iranian relations have been significant. Having said that, Tazmini highlighted the importance of studying the Russian-Iranian relations through the prisms of ideations, preferences, and identities.

Yahia Zoubir concluded the working group discussions with his presentation on “Russia’s Maghreb Moment.” Historically, particularly during the Soviet Union era, Zoubir claimed, Algeria was the Soviets’ only partner in the Maghreb region. While it could be argued that Libya was military aligned with the Soviets, politically it was not. In recent years, Russia has been seeking a grand ingress to the Maghreb. Russia sees the Maghreb states as potential economic partners. Hence, the Russian government is in talks about establishing a free trade zone in Morocco and has recently signed a number of contracts with Maghreb states. These contracts include agricultural agreements with Morocco; tourism agreements with Morocco and Tunisia; and oil and gas, and infrastructural cooperation with Algeria. Zoubir explained that one of the reasons behind Russia’s increasing interest in the Maghreb is that, unlike the Americans and Chinese, the Russians see the Maghreb as an extension of the Mashreq. Hence, its importance stems from the Middle East’s importance to Russian interests. In addition, the Maghreb is part of the Mediterranean; a region Russia has interests in. In forging stronger relations with the Maghreb states, Zoubir claimed that Russia banks on the Russian oil and gas companies operating in Algeria, and its relations with the Algerian military.

It is worth mentioning that this research initiative will be published in an edited volume by CIRS in the near future.

To view the working group agenda, click hereTo read the participants’ biographies, click hereRead more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Roy Allison, University of Oxford, UKZahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarCaner Bakir, Koç University, TurkeyIslam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarAndrei Korobkov, Middle Tennessee State University, USNickolay Kozhanov, European University, RussiaAnatol Lieven, Georgetown University in QatarSergey Markedonov, Russian State University for the HumanitiesSuzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarViacheslav Morozov, University of Tartu, EstoniaAbdul Rehmaan Qayyum, Georgetown University in QatarSamuel Ramani, University of Oxford, UKGhoncheh Tazmini, London Middle East Institute at SOASTatiana Usova, Georgetown University in QatarElizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarLuciano Zaccara, Qatar UniversityYahia H. Zoubir, KEDGE Business School, France

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

Taking Measure of American Foreign Policy
2019-01-27 12:45 - 13:45
CIRS invited Richard L. Russell, professor at the National Defense University in Washington, DC, to deliver a talk titled “Taking Measure of American Foreign Policy” on January 27, 2019, in which he shed light on the Trump administration’s foreign policy. He began by noting that halfway through Trump’s term in office is an appropriate juncture for an assessment of his administration’s foreign policy, but a definitive doctrine still cannot be identified. “It’s really hard for me to discern a ‘Trump doctrine.’ I mean, beyond ‘Make American Great Again’ or ‘America First,’” Russell said. “Maybe that captures the tone of the administration’s foreign policy, but it doesn’t, in my view, capture a substance.”

Russell used two international relations theories—realism and liberalism—to analyze the direction of Trump’s foreign policy, but noted that it was hard to label Trump as either realist or liberal since the president does not fit into either school. Russell explained that Trump does not qualify as a liberal, because he pays no regard to global democracy. Typically, the United States promotes democracy abroad in order to minimize international risks, but Trump “doesn’t promote democracy, he doesn’t celebrate it, and he doesn’t honor it. In fact, personally, he favors authoritarian states,” like Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, Russel explained, Trump has alienated leaders of Western democracies, including the French, German, and British authorities.

Further, Russell argued that Trump does not fit into the liberal model because of his “disdain for multinational institutions,” as was evidenced by his backing out of the Paris Agreement on climate change and his scorn for NATO. The president has had harsh words for the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and the World Bank—international institutions that became the fabric of international relations after World War II, which foster economic, political, and social stability internationally, he said.

Trump “doesn’t promote democracy, he doesn’t celebrate it, and he doesn’t honor it. In fact, personally, he favors authoritarian states.”

Neither does Trump fit the realist model, Russell explained. While some might consider the president to be a realist, Trump has no appreciation for international balances of power. Traditionally, nation-states balance power to prevent the outbreak of international violence according to realist theory, but Trump is not working to accomplish this, Russell said. For example, while Trump is concerned about China’s trade policy, he does not balance militarily or politically against China. Similarly, the president has not counterbalanced Russia in Europe or the Middle East. Paradoxically, Russell said, while the Trump administration’s documents reflect a realist philosophy, they bear “no resemblance to what President Trump talks about.”

Russell explained that Trump thinks in terms of bilateral relationships and emphasizes the importance of nation-states at the expense of multi-actor alliances. “It is true that the nation-state is the pinnacle of power in international society, but all nation-states operate in a web of interconnected economic, political, and cultural exchanges,” and Trump is not disposed to even acknowledging this fact, Russell noted. For example, instead of communicating with Japan and South Korea, with which the US has formal alliances, Trump focuses on dialogue with North Korea. “That’s not the way to facilitate the formal treaty obligations that the United States has with the security partners in Asia,” Russell said.

Typically, a US president surrounds himself with people who share his philosophy or worldview, but Trump’s government is internally fractured, Russell noted. Even before his election, many traditional Republicans refused to support him. As a result, Trump has relied on congressional and military staff to fill posts in his administration, in the process blurring the lines between the military and civilian government. This, coupled with the fact that Trump has removed two national security advisors in two years, leaves him with an extremely fractured and inefficient team, Russell said. The interagency process—the multilayered decision-making process used by the executive branch in all recent administrations—is also breaking down, Russell said. Important decisions, like withdrawing from Syria, are made by Trump without consultation or critical expertise, and by neglecting the diplomatic corps. Currently, there is no Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East, for the Pacific, or for Europe, and many diplomatic posts are currently vacant.

In conclusion, Russell argued that Trump has managed to alienate the Intelligence Community during his time in office, and civil-military relations are at an all-time low. Since the president views the military as his political base, and has drafted military officers to fill national security positions, “Trump runs the risk of politicizing the military at the senior levels and in the rank-and-file,” Russell argued. Contrary to the president’s behavior, the US has always had “a military that’s apolitical—that is to say, it serves the US Constitution, not a president.” As a final word, Russell noted that the Trump administration is “breaking a lot of traditional norms that have held in both Republican and Democratic administrations in American foreign policy.”

Russell noted that the views he shared during this talk were his alone and not the views of the NESA Center or the US government.

Article by Khansa Maria, CURA Publications Fellow

Richard L. Russell is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington, DC. He also is a Lecturer at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. He received a PhD in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia and previously had appointments as Adjunct Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University’s Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service and Research Associate at Georgetown’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. Russell has published three books on intelligence, American foreign policy, and weapons proliferation in the Middle East.

Prospects for a Peaceful Democratic Transition in Sudan
2019-02-06 12:30 - 13:30
Abdelwahab El-Affendi, Dean of the School of Social Sciences and Humanities and Professor of Politics at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, was invited by CIRS to discuss the current uprisings in Sudan, with a lecture on “Prospects for a Peaceful Democratic Transition in Sudan” on February 6, 2019. Giving some background on the ongoing issue, El-Affendi explained that Omar al-Bashir has been the president of Sudan for three decades, since coming to power after a military coup in 1989. He is considered a tyrannical leader by many, and stands accused of crimes against humanity and war crimes by the International Criminal Court.

El-Affendi noted that the recent nationwide uprisings have been the most sustained in the country’s history, ongoing since December 19, 2018. “There has never been such widespread public support for a protest in the past. This protest is supported in almost every town of Sudan, among most classes of people, even among most along the spectrum—from Islamist to left wing,” which is unprecedented, he argued. Large gatherings, even wedding parties, have become sites of anti-government demonstrations. In former Sudanese revolutions, the ruling regimes fell in less than two weeks after the start of protests, largely because “the army—or sections of it—would side with the people and the regime would be forced away. This did not happen” in the current conflict, El-Affendi said. Even though the legitimacy of the government has been decreasing over the years, the military remains in support of it, and has not voiced opposition.

“There has never been such widespread public support for a protest in the past. This protest is supported in almost every town of Sudan, among most classes of people, even among most along the spectrum—from Islamist to left wing.”

El-Affendi explained that the current nationwide uprising was sparked by spontaneous anger, when “people went to their bakeries and found that bread prices had tripled one morning” in Atbara, a working-class town with a long history of labor unions—elements that contributed to the mobilization of protestors. The protests quickly spread to neighboring ad-Damar, the capital of the province, and adjacent Berber. It reached the capital city, Khartoum, within twenty-four hours. While the quick spread of the protests was surprising, it was understandable in the rapidly declining economic climate of Sudan.

Following a smaller uprising in September 2013, al-Bashir had tried to placate the public by holding so-called “national dialogues,” which gave people high hopes of serious reform, El-Affendi said. However, “the outcome of the negotiations was not up to expectations.” Essentially, nothing happened and the buildup of anger and frustration continued. In fact, El-Affendi argued, a Sudanese revolution has long been in the making, and was predicted to erupt years before the 2011 Arab uprisings, largely because of the controversial division of the country into two separate states, an excruciating loss for many in the north. “People had been predicting that this would be a trigger for an uprising because people would not accept this division of the country, and would blame the government for it,” he said.

In past Sudanese revolutions, when a regime fell, a transitional government would be set up by an alliance of political parties, trade unions and professional organizations, and there would be new elections, he said. “Now the revolutionaries are saying no.” The protestors are no longer interested in any form of consensual transition. People are so frustrated with the current regime that they are demanding that the entire structure of the government be dismantled, El-Affendi said. “The revolutionaries are very radical in their demands. They say we don’t want any negotiations with this government, we don’t want any talks with them.” As such, al-Bashir and his administration are on the defensive and mobilizing resources to reassert control. “At the moment, we are in a kind of deadlock where protests seem to be mounting and sustained, while the government seems to be able to hold the fort,” El-Affendi said.

In conclusion, El-Affendi suggested three possible solutions to the conflict: 1) the military can refuse to serve the government, similar to what happened in Tunisia and Egypt during the Arab uprisings; 2) the government can escalate the violence and start killing civilians to deter protests; 3) or a mediation effort can be implemented via the international community, through the African Union, for example. The former African Union President Thabo Mbeki had intervened in Sudan in the past, mediating situations like the conflict in Darfur in 2008, and the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan, he said. However, the Sudanese government seems to think it does not need international or outside help. Finally, El-Affendi characterized the situation as “a kind of Syrian scenario, where the regime will hold its own, but the protests will increase, and will probably become violent.”

Article by Khansa Maria, CURA Publications Fellow.

Abdelwahab El-Affendi is Dean of the School of Social Sciences and Humanities and Professor of Politics at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies. Previously, he was Head of the Politics and International Relations program at DI, and Coordinator of the Democracy and Islam program at University of Westminster. He also worked as a diplomat in the Sudanese Foreign Ministry and has worked as Editor or Managing Editor of several publications. He was a Visiting Fellow/Professor at the Christian Michelsen Institute in Norway, Northwestern University, Oxford University, Cambridge University, and the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization in Malaysia. He is the author of Genocidal Nightmares: Narratives of Insecurity and the Logic of Mass Atrocities (2015).

CURA Workshop: Introduction to Research Methods
2019-02-07 12:30 - 16:30
CIRS hosted its second CURA workshop for GU-Q students on the topic “Introduction to Research Methods” The workshop, held on February 7, 2019, presented a conceptual definition of research methods, introduced methodological approaches, addressed practical issues concerning data availability, and helped students to identify appropriate strategies for tackling their own research projects.

Justin Gengler, Assistant Research Professor at the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI) at Qatar University, gave a presentation that served to identify methodological and scientific research approaches. He shared the basics of theory building, including but not limited to, case studies, process tracing, large-N, surveys, and randomized experiments. He emphasized the concepts of internal and external validity as tools for evaluating the strengths and weakness of different methods.

“After attending the first CURA Workshop, the second one was definitely beneficial as it allowed me to build on my prior knowledge and work on my research skills.” – Khushboo Shah (class of 2022), CURA Administrative Fellow.

His key point was that some approaches are better suited for particular types of research questions, and that there exists a link between a research question and the method used to investigate it. Gengler led interactive sessions with the students in order for them to identify the best methodological approach given a specific research question. One exercise consisted of determining and explaining the dependent variable and the causal processes of different study cases.

The workshop was facilitated by Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS Project Manager, and Islam Hassan, CIRS Research Analyst, with the assistance of Shaza Afifi, Mohammed Al-Jaberi, Ameena Almeer, Chaïmaa Benkermi, Irakli Gobejishvili, Irene Promodh, Abdul Rehmaan Qayyum, and Khushboo Shah—all current CURA Fellows. The Fellows guided group activities that consisted of matching a research question to the most suitable methodological approach put forward by Gengler.

“The workshop taught me much more than just methodological research plans, but also how to cooperate and compromise as a group and appreciate each other’s contributions, regardless of how radically different they may seem.” – Irene Promodh (class 2021), CURA Research Fellow.

The different exercises, through both the PollEverywhere interactive medium and individual reflection, helped students identify the appropriate methodological approach to answer the research question: “How does university study abroad by Qatar-based students influence their attitudes toward gender relations in society and in the family?” After individual reflections, students formed small groups to come to an agreement on the following criteria for the predetermined question: the scope of the case to be considered; the level of analysis; the indicators and variables to be studied; the theoretical limitations of the chosen approach; and the practical challenges of the chosen approach. The groups then formulated their proposals and presented them to the full group for feedback and evaluation.

CURA Research Fellow Abdul Rehmaan Qayyum (class of 2021) commented that the workshop would “help people seeking to publish papers for CURA, researching for UREP, or even those who plan on pursuing a master’s degree.” Another participant described the group activity as “extremely helpful,” notably due to the feedback from CIRS staff and Professor Gengler.

Seventeen students from all class years attended the workshop. The workshop was useful for all participants, from freshmen working on their midterm papers to seniors preparing for their honors. Those who successfully completed the workshop were awarded electronic badges that could be shared on their LinkedIn profiles.

CIRS has been promoting students’ research skills and research methodologies through its CURA workshop series. GU-Q students will be able to participate in the next CURA workshop in fall 2019.

Article by Chaïmaa Benkermi (class of 2021), CURA Publications Fellow

Western Higher Education in Global Contexts
2019-02-13 12:45 - 13:45
Mohanalakshmi Rajakumar is a Qatar-based novelist and community course instructor at VCUarts Qatar who writes on topics related to gender, race, and pedagogy. On February 13, 2019, she presented a CIRS Focused Discussion, “Western Higher Education in Global Contexts,” in which she explored the topic of international branch campuses (IBCs)—such as Georgetown University in Qatar and other universities in Education City—and their growing popularity and impact on international development in education. She recently edited a book by the same title, published in 2018, which examines global perspectives on the internationalization of American higher education practices in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.

The premise of the IBC is the agreement between a national entity and a US-based institution that students will earn the same degree they would receive from the main campus, Rajakumar explained. Due to this arrangement, IBCs typically do not offer professors specialized training in cultural sensitivity because, “If it is the exact same degree, then there would be no additives, no preservatives, nothing at all changed,” she said. Students are also not oriented to the unique nature of studying at an IBC, which may vary drastically from their previous educational training.

Rajakumar shared a case study with the audience to show the importance of understanding the overlapping influences of cultural norms and diversity of values in multicultural classrooms. Such cases are a follow up to the larger project of the book, intended to feature the “brass tacks and lived realities for the people doing the teaching and learning” in IBCs, she said. According to Rajakumar, the main themes within the case study were conflicting norms about timeliness and people’s differing attitudes about authority figures in intercultural settings.

“This is a case that looks at authority; who has authority, who is allowed to question the authority, and the ways in which power circulates in a classroom.”

The central conflict in the case raised the critical question of who is in charge and what is open to negotiation in a university classroom. “Some people think rules are rules,” she explained. Others feel that, “Rules are rules, but they shouldn’t apply to ‘me’ because ‘I’ have this exceptional circumstance.” A one-size-fits-all model for teaching in international contexts is impossible to implement, she said, because students may find faults with their syllabi depending on the importance of the course to their major. Other factors also influence classroom behavior including gender, ethnic background, and personality types; therefore, there can often be conflict between faculty and students, as well as among students themselves.

Ultimately, Rajakumar explained, “This is a case that looks at authority; who has authority, who is allowed to question the authority, and the ways in which power circulates in a classroom.” She concluded by noting that an unfortunate reality of Western education today is that it is not molded to fit various cultural contexts. Additionally, professors and students at IBCs are not prepared for the unique learning process they are undertaking. “No matter whether it was Russia, Japan, Qatar, Lebanon—across all of our research sites, there was little to almost no training given to faculty for their particular cultural setting,” she said. IBCs seem to be perpetuating a Western narrative in this respect, and cultural awareness training is necessary for their future success.

Article by Khansa Maria, CURA Publications Fellow

Mohanalakshmi Rajakumar is a novelist and educator with a PhD in English Literature. Her work has been published in a variety of peer reviewed journals and books including Gender, Teaching American Literature, and South Asian Review, among others. Rajakumar has also been recognized for her work as a novelist. Her contemporary romance, Love Comes Later, won the Best Indie Book Award for Romance in 2013, and her coming-of-age novel, An Unlikely Goddess, earned her recognition as a finalist in the SheWrites New Novelist competition in 2011. Her edited volume, Western Higher Education in Global Contexts, contributes to the scholarship on the project of implementing and expanding US-influenced curricula in the Middle East and Asia.

Political Economy of the Contemporary Middle East Working Group I
2019-02-24 09:00 - 2019-02-25 15:00
On February 24-25, 2019, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) brought together a number of scholars to commence a new research effort on the “Political Economy of the Contemporary Middle East.” Over the course of two days, the participating scholars discussed a wide array of topics, including: neo-liberal policies post the 2011 uprisings; business interests of Middle Eastern militaries; private security and military companies; economic integration in the Levant and GCC; foreign direct investments (FDI) in North Africa and the GCC; state bureaucracy and the economy in Iran, as well currency and black market manipulations in Iran; development policies in the post-2011 GCC; and the emerging transformation of state-business relations in the GCC.

Angela Joya began the working group discussions by speaking on the topic of “Neoliberal Policies in the Post-2011 Middle East.” Joya provided a review of public sentiment towards economic conditions across the Middle East, and focused on different countries in the region in her discussion. Joya suggested that over the past seven years we have seen a range of public protest in the region which focus specifically on the economy and peoples’ grievances over poor economic conditions. The Arab Uprisings commenced with cases of self-immolation in Tunisia, a brutal form of protest to highlight the lack of financial and material wellbeing for average citizens. Since the Arab Uprisings while this momentum has diminished it has not complete gone away, and neither have the underlying economic issues. In Morocco public demonstrations erupted over the declining standards of living, rising costs of everyday goods, and increasing unemployment. In Egypt, since 2016, there has been a dramatic increase in poverty after the IMF-imposed structural reforms, however public protests have diminished. The economic conditions in Yemen, Libya, and Syria are dire, while Jordan is also seeing increasing economic dissatisfaction. While in several cases the economy is being aggravated by war and conflict, we see people trying to escape war and conflict, but also steady streams of Middle Eastern migrants trying to leave their countries as a result of economic hardship. Joya suggested that further academic exploration is needed to examine the extent of neoliberal reforms in the Middle East and what the implications of the new economic reforms are on social, economic, and political conditions. Joya stated that governments initially responded to protests and public signs of dissatisfaction by adopting bigger fiscal policies, increasing wages, and pumping money into the market. This led to heavy government borrowing and was then followed by restrictive spending measures, subsidies being cut, and then prices being liberalized, an ongoing cyclical repetition seen in this region.

Ahmed Hashim shifted the discussion to “Military Inc.-Private Sector Relations.” Hashim said that while militaries are designed to fight internal and external enemies, in the Middle East, they do a great deal more than that. Militaries in the Middle East have frequently engaged in the economy, often causing significant distortions. This provokes the question: Why and how does the military get involved in the economic sector? The military’s role in the economy increased dramatically as states moved from state-owned to liberal markets. Under the Socialist regime of Nasser in Egypt, for example, the military was involved in arms production, but it was also involved in the private sector and importation of products. Under Sadat the military’s engagement in the economy increased significantly, and since Mubarak there is no sector of the Egyptian economy that the military is not involved in. Hashim also asked: What impact does the military’s involvement in economy have on the economy and private sector? As Sadat dismantled the Nasser system, the military expanded dramatically in the economy. And since 2011, it is estimated that the military controls around thirty percent of the Egyptian economy. The setup encouraged the military’s involvement in real estate rather than expanding the production base. Hashim concluded his presentation with recommending further research on conscripted labors; the impact of the military on the private sector; competition versus collaboration between the military inc. and private sector; and competition among quasi-military inc.

Building on Hashim’s presentation, Shir Hever focused the discussion on “Private Security and Military Companies: The Case of Israel.” Hever highlighted five main areas that deserve in-depth academic study insofar as the Israeli military-industrial complex is concerned. The first area is the privatization of the Israeli security sector. Such privatization expanded to include the military, police, and prison services. Second is the Israeli Laboratory Model. In this regard, arms producing companies in Israel have marketed their products globally as experimented on-ground. However, Hever alluded that the success of such arms and technologies is questionable if the relationship between political events and the financial reports of companies is tested. He argued that an Israeli arms-producing company’s financial reports reached its peak in 2009 after the war in Gaza, and reached a second peak in 2012 after the second Gaza invasion. However in 2014 with the third Gaza invasion, the company’s revenues did not increase. The failure of the company’s arms and technologies to subjugate Palestinians and refrain them from indulging in resistance against the Israeli occupation shows the failure of the Laboratory Model. Finally, Hever claimed that a study of Private Military & Security Companies (PMSCs) and the internal conflicts between Israeli security, business, and state elites are worth studying.

Imad El-Anis shifted the discussion to “The Shifting Boundaries of Economic Integration in the Levant.” El-Anis raised a number of areas worth exploring with regards to economic integration in the Levant. He claimed that commercial institutions do not have the pacification effect, but information and communication technology (ICT) development could be a driver of economic integration in the region. However, ICT has been completely ignored in the region. El-Anis also alluded to the importance of special economic and infrastructure zones driven by resources, such as the aquifer in south of Jordan. He claimed that such resources can serve as modes of cooperation, reshaping the way production and trading is taking place. Among the topics that deserve studying is energy reserve discoveries in eastern Mediterranean. El-Anis argued that such discoveries are contentious, exploited by Israel. Finally, El-Anis claimed that the “pacifying effect” should be studying given that militarized interstate disputes need more attention given their impact on economic cooperation.

Leading the discussion to another significant sub-region of the Middle East, Mumtaz Hussain Shah presented on “The Puzzle of Foreign Direct Investments in North Africa.” Shah raised four important, original research questions. The first question has to do with the puzzle of productivity spillover in North Africa. Second is: Why have not FDIs contribute to short-term economic growth? And how can this be solved? Third, How do GCC states, despite the structural economic impediments and heavy regulation of the market, still increasingly receive FDIs? And what are the lessons learned for the Levant? Finally: How to make effective use of MNCs? Shah argued that there is not significant regional FDI investment in North Africa. Thorough and effective implementation of regional integration schemes, third generation of trade elements, investment in related expense, introduction of investor-friendly policies and nondiscriminatory legal and ethical frameworks could significantly improve FDI in the region.

Kian Tajbakhsh presented on “State Bureaucracy and Economy in Iran.” He claimed that the growth of state led developmentalism has been significant since the 1980s. Such phenomenon is not solely ostensible in Iran, but across the Arab Middle East as well. However, the lack of up-to-date data on the entire state bureaucracy remains an issue worth exploration. Tajbakhsh also alluded to the importance of studying performance and effectiveness of the state in economic growth, service delivery, human development, etc. This discussion led to the question: How state-bureaucracy is designed at different scales? Finally, Tajbakhsh argued that there is also a need to conduct a comparative analysis with other countries in the region to understand the impact of Iran’s theocratic system on the country’s economic system, and which other state bureaucracies in the region are operating under similar paradigms.

In sharpening the discussion on Iran, Esfandyar Batmanghelidj discussed “Currency and Black Market Manipulation.” Batmanghelidj claimed that the Riyal has lost around seventy percent of its value. Such devaluation raises the questions: To what extent is such devaluation a result of sanctions or development policies? And what are the relationships between trade exchange rate and inflation in Iran? In addition, given that oil revenue contributes substantially to Iran’s foreign currency reserves, which is important for imports heavy industrialization, sanctions on Iran’s sales of oil and gas has had an impact on foreign exchange, and hence on the prices of goods in Iran. Germane to this discussion, Batmanghelidj claimed that the Iranian Riyal is worthwhile for poor people. While for middle classes, the pasture of currency exchange is much higher as they seek purchases of imported electronics, automobiles, etc. There is an assumption that devaluation can boost exports. However, this does not hold under sanctions. Exporting of goods despite their low prices is not possible under sanction regimes. Batmanghelidj also highlighted that there are three different foreign currency exchange rates as result of the limited foreign currency reserves: one for essential goods, another for other goods, and third for hard currency at exchange shops. In addition to that, rent seekers have manipulated this system to generate profit, hence posing more challenge to importers. Finally, Batmanghelidj concluded his presentation with two questions: How do sanctions put pressure of Iran’s foreign currency reserves? And how do domestic rent seekers respond to the depletion of foreign currency reserves?

Yousuf Al Balushi focused his presentation on “Development Policies in the Post-2011 GCC.” He argued that the GCC countries face a number of issues in implementing developmental policies. Among such issues are: the consistency of public policy to achieve development goals; weak economic leadership in the GCC; the economic structure in the GCC states and size of government; and rent-seeking behavior. Al Balushi argued that other structural impediments also have an impact on development policies in the GCC, including: the state-business-society relations model, government tenders and societal expectations; the lack of business-led development. Al Balushi concluded his presentation with emphasizing the need to empower that private sector through strategic partnership with the state. Such endeavor would increase production and exports, which are fundamental to move toward more sustainable FDI mechanisms in the GCC.

Building on Al Balushi’s presentation, Ashraf Mishrif discussed “The Shifting Boundaries of Economic Integration in the GCC.” Mishrif kicked off his presentation by asking: Are we heading back towards globalization? With Brexit, the failure of NAFTA to remain intact, and the cracks in the GCC in light of the on-going crisis, there is a need to re-examine the global economic structure. In this regard, Mishrif raised the questions: Is the theory of regionalism still valid on the global scale? And what factors contribute toe the retreat of regionalism? There have been consistent setbacks in regionalism efforts in the GCC. This is ostensible in the common market endeavors. Inter-regional trade in the GCC suggests that regional integration in the GCC is marginal. It never amounted more than ten to eleven percent. In addition, there have not been attempts to use common markets to enhance regional integration in the GCC. It was the United Arab Emirates that was defined as the gateway to the GCC, leaving out other GCC member states. Hence, the implementation of regional integration in the GCC is worth exploring. Mishrif argued that one problem with the GCC integration is the hierarchal structure of the organization, starting with the General Secretariat that does very little in forming strategies. As for bureaucratic structure, it has failed to claim supranational mandate that could drive economic cooperation among the member states.

Anastasia Nosova concluded the working group discussion with her presentation on “Changes and Continuities in State-Business Relations Post-2011 Arab Uprisings: The Case of the GCC.” Nosova claimed that across the GCC, there is a class of merchant elite that has disproportionate privileges, and depends on the state. This class does not influence policies, with exception of Oman and Kuwait to an extent. It also competes with the rest of society over resources. Since 2017, state-business relations have appear to have gone through major transformation, particularly evident in the case of Saudi Arabia. There is a transformation in the nature of business in the GCC from being in the hand of business families and few members of the ruling families to a state instrument of development. For the past two years, contracts have been distributed on the basis of merit while previously these were awarded more on the basis of networks and connections between the state and business elites. Further studying this emerging trends in state-business relations in the GCC is critical and will be included in this project moving forward.

To view the working group agenda, click hereTo read the participants’ biographies, click hereRead more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Abdullah Al-Arian, Georgetown University in QatarYousuf Al Balushi, Central Bank of OmanAlanoud Al Maadeed, Qatar UniversityZahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarEsfandyar Batmanghelidj, Bourse & Bazaar, IranImad El-Anis, Nottingham Trent University, UKAhmed S. Hashim, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, SingaporeIslam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarShir Hever, The Real News NetworkAngela Joya, University of Oregon, USMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarNatalie Koch, Syracuse University, USSuzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarAshraf Mishrif, Qatar UniversityAnastasia Nosova, The Risk Advisory Group, UKAbdul Rehmaan Qayyum, Georgetown University in QatarKhushboo Shah, Georgetown University in QatarMumtaz Hussain Shah, University of Peshawar, PakistanKian Tajbakhsh, Columbia University, USElizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

A Local East African Newspaper v. the State and Market Forces
2019-03-11 12:45 - 13:45
Phoebe Musandu, professor of History at GU-Q and a scholar of African history, was invited to discuss her research on Kenyan newspapers in the colonial and post-colonial periods during a CIRS Focused Discussion, titled “Serve . . . as Best as We Can:” A Local East African Newspaper v. the State and Market Forces,” on March 11, 2019. Musandu began by providing some historical background, explaining that Kenya had been a protectorate as well as a colony of the British from 1895 to 1963. The country was subject to drastic structural reforms from the 1960s, with the press, in general, and newspapers specifically, playing an important role in shaping the narrative of the day.

In her research, Musandu examines the extent to which mass media are vehicles for public opinion. In order to study “not just the information, but who produces the information, how they disseminate it, and the power inherent in the ability to disseminate information and influence people,” she focused on the first African-owned newspaper in post-colonial Kenya, the Nairobi Times, which was established by Hilary Ng’weno in the 1970s. At the time, two pro-government, foreign-owned newspapers dominated the market, the East African Standard and The Nation.

Musandu argued that the odds were against the Nairobi Times from the beginning. This was largely due to a restrictive political environment and to the meager capital base of its owner, Ng’weno. In the colonial era, she explained, Africans had started and successfully managed newspapers, but the market had changed in the post-colonial era, such that a significant amount of capital investment was necessary to establish a newspaper. Musandu argued that “this was another challenge Africans faced in the transition to independence, and in the early years of independence—international banks did not want to give loans to Africans.”

However, despite these structural setbacks, Ng’weno was able to obtain loans from the Industrial Development Bank and from the National Bank of Kenya, which was a parastatal—a business partially controlled by the state. This put Ng’weno in the delicate position of having to report on the government, even as it was the newspaper’s primary funder, Musandu said. Repayment of these loans required that the Nairobi Times generate significant income from advertising, which put it at a great disadvantage to its established competitors.

Musandu contextualized the environment of news reporting in Kenya in its transition to independence. One of the oldest newspapers was the East African Standard, founded by influential British settlers and sold to Lonrho—formerly the mining company London Rhodesia—in 1967. The CEO of Lonrho, Roland Rowland, had a great sphere of influence in the UK and in Kenya, which included members of the Parliament, and President Jomo Kenyatta and his family. Rowland strategically invested in business opportunities through Lonrho, and every investment he made, and his interactions with the president and his family members, were covered extensively in the Standard. This served to increase Rowland’s visibility and power.

“The newspapers for them, I argue, were not about public opinion, they were not an end—they were a means to an end. The end being the protection and consolidation of economic interests outside of the newspaper itself.”

The other major daily, the Daily Nation, was primarily owned by the Aga Khan—the spiritual leader of the Ismaili branch of Shiite Islam. At a turbulent time when racial minorities, including many Asians, were migrating from Kenya due to political and economic uncertainty in the years immediately before and after independence, the Aga Khan urged Ismailis to remain and make the country their permanent home. He led the way by investing his personal/Ismaili funds in profitable ventures to improve investor confidence in the country and in a bid to contribute to the stabilization of the economy. Musandu said, “He used this newspaper to essentially communicate to the state the necessity of preserving a political and economic environment that was favorable to everyone—the majority and the minority.”

The East African Standard and the Daily Nation both allied themselves with the state, Musandu said. “They were very afraid of contradicting the government, and I think this was done precisely because they were using their publications to defend their investments.” This behavior revealed a continued trend of newspaper owners engaging centers of power in the interests of capital that dates back to the British colonial era, she said. “The newspapers for them, I argue, were not about public opinion, they were not an end—they were a means to an end. The end being the protection and consolidation of economic interests outside of the newspaper itself,” Musandu contended.

Furthermore, opposing the government narrative had drastic repercussions, according to Musandu. She gave an example of a highly regarded newspaper editor who was fired after publishing an article that was critical of government detention of university professors and students. Subsequently, the newspaper ran a public apology to the government on the front page. Musandu found numerous documents in the archives that showed how the government would summon the editors and owners of different publications in order to interrogate them when they stepped out of line.

The title of Musandu’s talk, “Serve as Best as We Can,” comes from the first edition of the Nairobi Times, in which Ng’weno outlined his goals for the publication. Musandu argued that he used those words because he understood the political environment in which he was operating, noting that Ng’weno was intent on taking on the established newspapers. “He wanted to raise the level of political discourse in the country, and wanted it to be fiercely independent,” she said. In conclusion, Musandu argued the prevailing political environment, in which the dissemination of news was secondary to vested interests in other sectors of the economy, meant that Ng’weno’s experiment with a free press was short lived, and he was forced to shut down his newspaper due to bankruptcy. The government bought the newspaper from him and re-branded it as the Kenya Times.

Article by Khansa Maria, CURA Publications Fellow

Phoebe Musandu is a scholar of African history. She has research interests in African historical methodology, mass media and has published papers in women and gender history. Her last major research project resulted in a manuscript she is preparing for publication that examines the establishment and operations of various secular newspapers in East Africa between 1899 and 1990. As a consequence of working on this project, she has also developed an interest in the history of other forms of mass media as well as African commercial history which she intends to cultivate in the long-term. She is the author of Pressing Interests: The Agenda and Influence of a Colonial East African Newspaper Sector (McGill 2018).

Healthcare Access for Single Male Laborers (SML) in Qatar: Research Roundtable II
2019-03-13 09:00 - 14:00
As part of the partnership between CIRS, and Qatar-based institutions to investigate the current state of healthcare provision to single male labors (SML), a second working group for this project was held on March 13, 2019. Scholars, practitioners, stakeholders, and government entities participated in the working group with the aim to examine SML’s access to healthcare in Qatar, and formulate policy recommendations for improvements of the state of migrants’ health.

The one-day working group served as a follow-up to the April 2018 preliminary brainstorming session. The discussion was divided into four broad themes: overview findings from the first working group, government services to SML, challenges and industry-led interventions; and the healthcare perspective. Experts presented their research and insights to provide a better understanding of migrant workers’ health conditions and healthcare delivery within Qatar.

CURA Seminar: Science and Scientific Production in the Middle East
2019-03-14 12:30 - 13:30
On March 14, 2019, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) held its second CURA Seminar for the 2018-2019 academic year. Coinciding with the second working group meeting on “Science and Scientific Production in the Middle East,” CURA fellows participated in the seminar discussing two submitted articles as part of the research initiative. Islam Hassan, CIRS Research Analyst, started the seminar welcoming the attendees and providing a brief overview of the research initiative then giving the floor to the CURA fellows to summarize and critique their assigned articles. Irakli Gobejishvili (class of 2022) and Khushboo Shah (class of 2022) served as presenters of the two articles, and Shaza Afifi (class of 2022), Khansa Maria (class of 2021), Riham Mansour (class of 2019), Abdul Rehmaan Qayyum (class of 2021), and Chaïmaa Benkermi (class of 2021) served as discussants.

Gobejishvili presented Tariq Dana’s paper titled: “A Cruel Innovation: Israeli Military and Security Production.” The paper studies the military-industrial complex in Israel as a field of technological advancement, a source of revenue, and as a “security apparatus.” The paper problematizes Israel’s arms trade with world regimes accused of committing atrocities, as the author claims.

Shah presented Abdelkader Djeflat’s paper titled: “Science, Technology and Socio-Economic Inequalities: What Inclusive Model for Arab Countries?” Throughout the different sections, the paper answers the questions: how have social inequalities hampered access to science and technology? How does the elitist access to science and technology work in the region? To what extent has the elitist access been obstructive to the advancement of science and technology? And how could we build a more inclusive and sustainable science, technology, and innovation (STI) system?

Subsequent to the paper presentations, the discussants kicked off the group discussion with their critique on the papers’ arguments and structure, and possible improvements. Two CURA research fellows, Ameena Almeer (class of 2020) and Irene Promodh (class of 2021), served as ambassadors to the Science and Scientific Production in the Middle East working group, and shared the comments and critique brought up at the CURA seminar.

For the participants’ biographies, please click here

Article by Mohammed Al-Jaberi, CURA Publications Fellow

Science and Scientific Production in the Middle East Working Group II
2019-03-17 09:00 - 17:00
On March 17 2019, the Center for International and Regional Studies held the second working group under its research initiative on “Science and Scientific Production in the Middle East.” This was a one day meeting where the convened scholars presented and critiqued papers that tackled a wide array of issues, among which: access to science and technology in the Middle East; Islam and bioethics; consumerism and scientific innovation; the sanction regime in Iran; the inheritance debate in Tunisia; and the military-industrial complex in Israel.

Abdelkader Djeflat started the working group discussion with his paper, co-authored with Labo Clersé, on “Science, Technology and Socio-Economic Inequalities: What Inclusive Model for Arab Countries?” In his paper, the authors argues that minerals, such as oil and gas, have generated enormous wealth in Middle Eastern countries, particularly the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. However, inequality prevails and large portions of the populations in the Middle East live in poverty. While most of the scholarship on the rising economic inequality in the region focuses on income distribution, political regimes, and social fragmentation, there is a gap as far as inequality of access to science and technology is concerned. The paper fills this gap by tackling three main questions: first, how have social inequalities hampered access to science and technology? Second, how does the elitist access to science and technology work in the region? And to what extent has it been obstructive to the advancement of science and technology? And third, what would be the impact of a more inclusive and sustainable science, technology, and innovation system?

Hatem M’henni focused the discussion on “Economic Policies, Consumerism, and Scientific Innovation in the Middle East.” In his paper, M’henni clarifies the theoretical underpinning of the relationship between consumerism and innovation, and examines this relationship in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Based on his study, M’henni introduces five main arguments. First, he states that innovation in the MENA region is still linear in nature. Second, the Middle Eastern companies continue to treat the consumer as a customer. Third, successful innovation experiences are, for the most part, the result of individual initiative rather than state policies. Fourth, economic and social needs are the main drivers of innovation. Finally, as the average level of education in the region is improving significantly, consumerism will inevitably contribute to innovation in the MENA region.

Ayman Shabana shifted the discussion to “Reproductive Genetic Counseling and the Burden of Choice within the Islamic Context.” In his paper, Shabana examines the process of genetic counseling within the framework of assisted reproduction. The paper investigates the moral burden associated with the choices that modern genetic applications have made available in this area of medical practice from an Islamic perspective. Shabana suggests that the moral consequences of genetic testing have to be analyzed at two related yet distinct ethical-legal and theological levels. At the ethical-legal level these moral consequences have to be evaluated in light of important principles such as procurement of benefit and avoidance of harm. At the theological level, however, assessment must reach beyond mere notions of benefit and harm to include core theological concepts such as divine creation and decree. This two-way analysis may help explain and guide the process of genetic counseling within the Muslim context.

Sari Hanafi presented his paper, co-authored with Azzam Tomeh, on “Beyond Religion and Secularism: Gender Equality in the Inheritance Debate in Tunisia and the Formation of the Non-Authoritarian Reasoning.” The paper discusses the current debate about equal inheritance for both men and women in Tunisia. It challenges many clichés, such as the religious versus the secular discourse, and examines whether those binaries hold true in the Tunisian context. The authors argue that the mapping out of the inheritance debate has shown three different logics: jurisprudential/textual, sociological, and legal. The authors conclude the paper by highlighting that the discussion occurring in Tunisia over inheritance uses common language, which allows for the reduction of authoritarian tendencies and polarization through means of dialogue.

Elizabeth Wanucha presented Parviz Tarikhi’s article: “Sanctions and the Scientific Community of Iran.” Tarikhi’s article sheds light on the main operatives and interlinks of sanctions and the Iranian scientific community. Although it is hard to estimate quantitatively the impacts of sanctions on the Iranian scientific community, Tarikhi claims that sanctions, particularly those imposed in the recent decade, have negatively impacted the Iranian community and subsequently the scientific community. Sanctions have also contributed to the growth of the Iranian scientific community in diaspora fleeing restrictions at home. Tarikhi also claims that the sanctions regime strengthened extremism and stimulated totalitarianism in the Islamic Republic.

Islam Hassan presented Tariq Da’na’s paper entitled “A Cruel Innovation: Israeli Military and Security Production.” Da’na argues that the Israeli army, which is the main source feeding Israeli militarism, is by virtue an instrument of organized violence. Ever since the violent birth of the State of Israel in 1948, militarism constituted the backbone of its body politic, national identity, society, economy, culture, foreign policy and worldview. The institutionalization of Israeli militarism is rooted in Political Zionism. With the formal initiation of the Israeli state-building in 1948, Zionist leaders espoused a militaristic-nationalist paradigm to underlie the process of nation-building. Hence, the Israeli military is not solely an institution concerned with external security, defense, and war. It was designed to play multiple social and economic functions and promote the culture of militarism. As a result, Israeli society is a militarized one, where citizens are actively involved in military activities, and the military is actively involved in non-military activities. Da’na provides an overview of Israel’s military industries and technologies, highlighting the interrelationship between Israeli military industries and technological development. He then moves on discuss the characteristics of Israel’s military and security innovation focusing on the dependency on the American system, the development of unethical technology, the military industry, and the complicity in worldwide atrocities. He concludes the paper with a discussion on the testing of weapons on the Great March of Return.

For the working group agenda, click hereFor the participants’ biographies, click hereRead more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Ameena Almeer, Georgetown University in QatarZahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarRana Dajani, Hashemite University, JordanTariq Da’na, Doha Institute of Graduate Studies, QatarAbdelkader Djeflat, University of Lille, FranceMohammed Ghaly, Hamad Bin Khalifa University, QatarSari Hanafi, American University of Beirut, LebanonIslam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarHatem M’henni, University of Manouba, Tunisia Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarIrene Ann Promodh, Georgetown University in QatarAyman Shabana, Georgetown University in QatarJackie Starbird, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarParviz Tarikhi, Space Science and Technology Specialist, IranElizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

The Impact of Business and Political News on the GCC Stock Market
2019-03-24 12:45 - 13:45
Alanoud Al-Maadid, Assistant Professor of Economics at Qatar University, examined how politics and economics are intertwined in the relationships of the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), an alliance founded in 1981 that includes Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman. She explored these dynamics by looking at the effect of news on GCC stock market returns in a Focused Discussion, titled “The Impact of Business and Political News on the GCC Stock Market,” at CIRS on March 24, 2019.

Al-Maadid explained that the forces of supply and demand is a general rule in economics. However, she said, behavioral economics—the effects of psychological, emotional, cultural, and social factors on decision making—may often go against what is implied in the standard economic model. “In behavioral economics, people are sometimes irrational and unpredictable, and they can make unpredictable choices,” she said. Thus, the field of behavioral economics has many practical applications, and is often used by policymakers, diplomats, and marketers.

Al-Maadid focused her presentation on the financial performance of GCC stock markets, and the high degree of market integration between GCC countries. “GCC stock markets seem to have similar trends,” she said, “when oil prices go down, stock prices go down” across the region. At the start of the GCC crisis in 2017, in which Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt instigated a blockade against Qatar, most of the stock prices in the GCC went down.

“When the stock market goes up, the news does not affect the stock market so much. However, when the stock market is down, if there is negative news, it affects the stock markets more.”

In her research, Al-Maadid found that GDP in the GCC is affected by positive and negative news. She used a linear dynamic model to illustrate how returns of stock prices are affected by both business news and political news. Al-Maadid collected weekly data on GCC news from Bloomberg to create an index of negative and positive political and business news. Control variables such as oil prices, macroeconomic announcements, and interest rates were also utilized.

In the period surveyed (2010–2018), Al-Maadid found that negative political news never exceeded the twenty percent mark—meaning that news content in GCC newspapers is predominantly positive. There was, however, considerably more negative business news content. “Most of the news coming out of the GCC is positive, especially political news. In business news, there is more negative news, but it is still less than thirty percent” of the total news content, she said. As part of her investigations, Al-Maadid used a tool found in financial econometrics, the Markov switching model, to measure the dynamics of negative news. She noted that “When the stock market goes up, the news does not affect the stock market so much. However, when the stock market is down, if there is negative news, it affects the stock markets more.” Results further revealed that political news has less impact than business news, and the stock market does not react as much to political news.

In conclusion, Al-Maadid highlighted the GCC’s “cross-border effect,” arguing that “When there is news from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, the effects are not only domestic—it affects all the other countries,” in the GCC. This is attributed to stronger economies and more integrated stock markets. Thus, Al-Maadid argued, the impact of the blockade against Qatar has negatively affected all GCC countries. If the blockade is lifted, it will have a positive cross-boundary impact for all stakeholders involved, she asserted.

Article by Khansa Maria, CURA Publications Fellow

Alanoud Al-Maadid is the 2018–2019 CIRS Qatar University Fellow. She received a PhD in Economics and Finance from Brunel University London in 2016 with a dissertation on “Effects of Oil Prices, Food Prices and Macroeconomic News on GCC Stock Markets.” She is a recognized researcher in the fields of economies of time series, the GCC stock market, and behavioral finance, and has taught courses on the Principles of Macroeconomics and Monetary Policy, among others.

The Marib Puzzle: A Case of Stability and Economic Activity in War-Torn Yemen
2019-04-03 12:45 - 13:45
Mohammed Al-Jaberi, a GU-Q senior majoring in Foreign Service and Arab Studies, and a CURA Publications Fellow, presented his research on “The Marib Puzzle: A Case of Stability and Economic Activity in War-Torn Yemen,” at a CURA Focused Discussion on April 3, 2019. Al-Jaberi, a citizen of Yemen, returned to his country this past year to conduct research towards his academic thesis in which he addresses the complexity of the war in Yemen, the political symbolism of the city of Marib, and the war’s sociocultural and political impacts on the country.

Focusing his study at the local level, Al-Jaberi examined two cities: the port city of Aden, and the city of Marib in the center of Yemen. His primary research question was: “Why does Marib have more stability and economic activity compared to the temporary capital, Aden?” Al-Jaberi defined “stability” as the absence of local conflict, sustainable access to public goods and services, and the resilience of the local government. In order to answer the central research question, he examined trade, commercial activities (semi- and fully-legal), and the money injected into Yemen by coalition forces—especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Giving background to when the ongoing war in Yemen began, Al-Jaberi argued that there are two significant and contested dates: September 21, 2014, is when Houthi rebels took over the capital city of Sana‘a and overthrew President Hadi; and March 25, 2015, is when Saudi Arabia intervened militarily with a coalition force in Yemen. Coalition supporters assert that the war began on the former date, whereas Houthi rebels deny that the conflict is actually a civil war, claiming that it is a Saudi-led aggression. The answer to this debate, Al-Jaberi said, depends on how one classifies the current conflict, and he posed the following questions: “Is it a civil war? Is it a transnational aggression? Should we blame Saudi Arabia for it? Should we blame the Houthis?” Thus, he attempted to address the widespread tendency to oversimplify the war in Yemen by framing it in terms of only two sides.

“Corruption, poverty, patronage networks, the absence of a meaningful nation-state, and the fragility of the system have all compromised Yemen’s current standing.”

Al-Jaberi identified three major causes of the war: the failure of a transitional process after the 2011 Arab uprisings; the inability to resolve historical grievances in terms of North and South Yemen; and Yemen’s limited role in the international community. “Corruption, poverty, patronage networks, the absence of a meaningful nation-state, and the fragility of the system have all compromised Yemen’s current standing,” he said. Because of these issues, “Yemen has become a playground for international powers to exercise their influence and to enact their hegemony,” Al-Jaberi argued.

The reality in Yemen today is its division into three different states: the Sana‘a area is under Houthi control; Aden and the south are controlled by the UAE and its affiliated forces; and “the ‘Marib state’ is a center that contains political actors within President Hadi’s camp who want to maintain a unified Yemen,” Al-Jaberi argued. Of these three states, the literature, media coverage of the war, and the behaviors and actions of foreign delegations visiting the country conclude that Marib appears to be the only stable region in the country, he said. Though interviews, analyses, and time spent in Yemen, however, Al-Jaberi said, “I found that stability, and stable economic activity, in the two regions of Aden and Marib was not absolute, but a matter of relative reality.” The war in Yemen has become normalized, and is a “lucrative business,” he said.

Al-Jaberi concluded by highlighting the two outcomes of his research. He argued that stability in Yemen is being directly affected by two different systems: patronage networks operating in Marib, on the one hand, and the UAE and Saudi Arabia operating in Aden, on the other. The first concerns the shift from the historical center of Yemen—the capital Sana‘a—to Marib. He argued that this was not an example of successful local governance; rather, it is due to historical political elites “with their tribal, military, religious, technocratic connections” maintaining power by shifting to a different city. Those who operate and control the government of President Hadi “are part of a network of patronage that controls everything,” Al-Jaberi said. Thus, the increase of economic activity in Marib is due to redirecting resources, rather than the actual creation of new businesses. The second concerns how the economy of Yemen is being further politicized by the discrepancies between how the South is being influenced by UAE, and how the North is being influenced by the Saudi Arabian monarchy.

Article by Khushboo Shah, CURA Administrative Fellow

Mohammed Al-Jaberi (class of 2019) is graduating from Georgetown University in Qatar with a B.S. in Foreign Service and M.A. in Arab Studies. His research interests revolve around development, state-building, and political Islam. He is currently working on a documentary film on the economic and personal struggles of young participants of war in Aden. In addition to his role as a CURA Publications Fellow at CIRS since 2016, he has held internships at Teach for Qatar, the United States Embassy in Doha, and Qatar Foundation.

The GCC Crisis: Qatar and its Neighbors Working Group I
2019-04-07 09:00 - 2019-04-08 17:00
On April 7-8, 2019, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) held the first working group under its research initiative “The GCC Crisis: Qatar and its Neighbors.” The two day meeting brought together several scholars to discuss a range of topics. These included, Qatar’s management of the crisis; the UAE’s perspective and position on the regional crisis; the roles of Oman, Kuwait, Iran, and Turkey during the rupture of GCC relations; the impact of maritime law in the lead up to and the immediate aftermath of the dispute; economic readjustments in Qatar during the embargo; the effects of the crisis on the Qatari stock market; reconfigurations of nationalism and national identity in Qatar; and, public opinion in Qatar after the blockade.

Mehran Kamrava commenced the working group with a presentation titled “Small State: Crisis Politics.” Kamrava highlighted the lack of nuanced, academic study of the GCC crisis and suggested that the current crisis needs to be contextualized within the context of broader and older tensions in regional relations, particularly those between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Such tension is a natural result of a small state being in proximity of a much larger state with regional ambitions. Much of the policymaking, state narrative, and perspectives of Qatari decision makers is driven by the fact that Qatar is a small state. Kamrava proposed several research questions, including: What does the crisis tell us about how small states manage their supply chains during times of crisis? Have Qatari nationalism and national identity gained greater salience over tribalism and kinship? What is it about Qatar’s decision-making process that has enabled the state to respond effectively to the current crisis? And, is there more to the notion of “subtle power?”

David Roberts followed with a presentation on “The Unhappy Neighbor: The View from the UAE.” Roberts applied the notion of “ontological security” in international relations to the ongoing GCC crisis. Roberts suggested that the ontological security concept can provide us with interesting insights into the UAE’s foreign policy, as well as the motivations behind Mohamed bin Zayed’s foreign policy objectives. Roberts argued that states may prioritize ontological security over physical security, and, as a result, often undertake specific actions in the foreign policy domain that may not meet any hard security concerns or interests. Ontological security could be applied to conducting an individual-level analysis by studying the moral principles of the UAE leadership and how these translate into the country’s assertive foreign policy, as seen in the country’s current leadership’s rise to power in 2004.

Muna Al-Marzouqi discussed “The Blockade of Qatar and Maritime Law,” highlighting four main research areas. First, Al-Marzouqi maintained, there is a need to examine how the maritime blockade on Qatar is contributing to the fostering of international maritime trade and strengthening maritime trade partnerships with countries such as Oman. Second, there is need for a legal analysis of issues related to disturbed shipping liability caused by the blockade. Third, there is the issue of the hijacking of Qatari fishing boats by the UAE. Finally, Al-Marzouqi posed the question of whether the maritime blockade can be considered as an act of aggression under international law.

Steven Wright focused his discussion on “Economic Readjustment in Qatar after the Blockade.” Wright highlighted five areas of potential research. To start, the shifting trade flows and changing economic linkages that have occurred since the rupture in regional relations need further examination. Wright asked: How has the loss of 40 percent of imports previously coming through Saudi Arabia and the UAE been addressed by Qatar? There was a spike in trade with Iran at the beginning of the blockade, as Qatar tried to quickly find new means of addressing its need for critical imports, particularly in food and agricultural products. However, more recently the percentage of trade between the two states has dipped to even lower than what it was before the blockade. New trade relations have been formed with a number of African and Asian countries, and the shift away from Iran may well be due to deliberate political considerations and a calculated desire of the Qatari leadership to limit its reliance Iran.

Also important, according to Wright, are the significant changes in the energy sector since the blockade, most noticeably in the behavior of the large state-owned oil and gas companies. Wright suggested that since the GCC crisis began, there has been an intensification in the role of Qatar Petroleum, and in particular its subsidiary Qatar Gas, in actively undertaking international engagements and building partnerships with international energy companies. These new developments, and how they impact Qatar’s long-term energy policy, can benefit from deeper examination.

Since the start of the crisis, Wright maintained, a strong narrative has appeared in Qatar around the need to develop self-sufficiency and to more actively involve the private sector towards this goal. Since the blockade, great emphasis has been placed on achieving self-sufficiency and security in food and agriculture. Two years on since the blockade, Qatar is now a net exporter of poultry products. Also, there has been a considerable upsurge in company registration in Qatar’s financial center. Wright proposed that there is a need to study whether this increase indicates anything significant.

Wright’s final point revolved around the question of how the Qatari economy has adjusted to the attack on the country’s currency? Following the blockade, there was threats of war, but a more significant threat was that of debasing the currency. However, Qatar has a strong credit rating, and there was a massive upsurge in the bond market, which made it easier for the country to secure its currency. Lastly, in-depth analysis of Qatar’s logistical supply management during the blockade merits further study.

Alanoud Al-Maadid led a discussion on the impact of the blockade on GCC stock markets. Al-Maadid focused on the financial performance of the stock markets, the high degree of market integration between GCC countries, and how positive or negative political and business news have impacted the performance of the regional markets since the Gulf crisis. Al-Maadid’s data demonstrates the most of the political news content in GCC newspapers leans towards the positive, while economic or business news reporting is often considerably more negative. She noted that when the stock market is in an upwards or strong position, the impact of negative news appears insignificant. However, when the stock market is in a weaker position, the impact of negative news seems to have a significant impact. Additionally, political news appeared to have less impact of on the stock market than business and economic news. Al-Maadid highlighted the GCC’s “cross-border effect,” arguing that the boycott of Qatar has negatively affected all GCC countries’ stock markets, and, if lifted, it will have a positive cross-boundary impact for all stakeholders involved.

Abdullah Al-Arian discussed the Muslim Brotherhood factor in the GCC Crisis. Al-Arian provided some insights into why the Muslim Brotherhood is so vigorously targeted by several GCC monarchies, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Al-Arian suggested that one of the primary reasons behind the distrust and dislike of the Brotherhood is the view that it cannot be “bought off” or co-opted by the Gulf states’ leadership. In addition, the Brotherhood’s transnational networks allow it to accumulate cross-border support and to potentially mobilize national populations across borders. The Brotherhood has frequently called for political reform, and its anti-monarchical stance instills unease in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Further complicating the matter is the different variations of Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated organizations in the Middle East, which makes it challenging to suppress the organization entirely or to it shut it down.

Al-Arian suggested that there are several potentially interesting areas of study to be undertaken. First, the overall impact of limited movement on the group due the blockade, needs to be studied. Second, the study of broader political order, needs in depth analysis. It is important to study whether Muslim Brotherhood groups are being used as proxies for political gains by the blockading countries. A third question to consider is whether the anti-Muslim Brotherhood stance is a form of regional Islamophobia being deployed by Gulf rulers in order to garner international support. Finally, it is important to have a deeper understanding of why Qatar has adopted a pro-Muslim Brotherhood position, and what benefit it perceives to accrue from its relationship with the Brotherhood.

Abdullah Baabood led a session on the role of Oman during the crisis. Baabood stated that Oman has been caught in the crossfire during the blockade, and while the leadership of Oman has tried to balance its relations with its various Gulf neighbors, the Omani public has demonstrated a more openly pro-Qatar stance in the midst of the crisis. While Kuwait played a more proactive role to play in mediating between the UAE/Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Oman has demonstrated an active interest in supporting a resolution of the ongoing dispute. Oman has a more complex and multicultural make-up than most of its GCC neighbours, as well as a different pattern of historical development, which has made its leaders more attuned to the need for compromise and peaceful accommodation. Oman is also suffering economic strains, which has been worsened by plummeting oil prices, and is facing increasing pressure from its own citizenry for better employment and financial conditions. Powerful neighbors like Saudi Arabia and the UAE have taken advantage of this and at times have further manipulated the situation to gain an upper hand. Economic concerns and domestic political stability are occupying most of the Omani leadership’s attention, which leaves it with little capacity to actively engage in resolving regional issues or taking a very strong stand in the matter.

Juan Cole focused on Iran’s role in the GCC crisis. Cole suggested that Iranian-Qatari relations are not usually of any great significance or importance to either state, but every once in a while relations are galvanized as was seen at the onset of the breakdown in GCC relations. Iran is not a militarily aggressive state, nor does it have hegemonic interests in Qatar, although occasionally there are tensions with Qatar in regards to the North Field gas reserves, which are shared by both states. In Syria, Iran and Qatar have been supporting opposite sides in the conflict, not due to ideological reasons, Cole suggested, but because Iran has critical, realist interests in the preservation of the Assad regime. Cole stated that it would be beneficial to the exciting literature to carry out a study on whether there is any long term traction to the Iran-Qatar relationship—will Qatar aim to strengthen and develop its economic and political relationship with Iran, or was the closeness early on in GCC crisis just a temporary marriage of convenience? Is there something significant in terms of the GCC crisis serving as a turning point in Qatar-Iran relations, or will this continue to be a relationship based on ambiguities?

Bulent Aras shed light on the role of Turkey during the crisis, and specifically its active support for Qatar as opposed to Saudi Arabia. It is important to study Turkey’s military presence, military cooperation, and joint defense arrangements with Qatar during the crisis, and what it signifies about Turkey’s expanding role in the region. Turkey’s deployment of military personnel to Qatar after the blockade directly provoked concern from NATO and European states. But whether the surge in Turkish military presence in Qatar was done out of genuine and strategic considerations or merely for symbolic reasons requires deeper analysis. Do Turkey’s growing military and economic relations with Qatar reflect the AK Party’s broader ideology of supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, or have these relations expanded as a result of other strategic and realist interests? Aras adduced that it may be a combined reflection of both nationalism and ideology that is driving this relationship, while also remembering that perhaps the support to Qatar is being extended mainly by Erdogan and the AK Party rather than the country itself.

Jocelyn Mitchell discussed how the Gulf crisis has led to reconfigurations in Qatari national identity, as well as different forms of expressions of nationalism. Mitchell suggested that nationalism can be conceptualized and studied at many different levels. In one respect, nationalism is ideational and serves as an ideology of who belongs and who does not to a particular imagined political community. Civic nationalism is constructed and developed, comes with various legal criteria and legal instruments, and is based on rights and duties of states and citizens towards each other. Civic nationalism can be more exclusive or more inclusive, based on how it is legally defined. Ethnic nationalism tends to be innately more bounded, as is based on common language and shared cultural heritage, which means it is hard to include broader groups within it. The sorts of nationalism that emerge in different contexts and eras change. This change, Mitchell suggested depends on lived experiences of social groups, and the means by which states try to develop or integrate parts of both civic and ethnic nationalism.

Following on from the GCC crisis, Mitchell suggested three particular areas of research regarding Qatari nationalism. First, to what extent is nationalism and national identity in Qatar changing, especially from one based on a regional ethnic narrative to one that is local ethnic and/or local civic national narratives? Second, if the various Qatari social groups are being incorporated into a new form of nationalism, how is this being done, and what are the mechanisms for new inclusions? Lastly, if the forms of nationalism and national identity are changing in Qatar, in what areas are these changes occurring, especially in the political and legal realms, or in terms of new socio-cultural behavior and norms?

The working group’s final presentation was by Justin Gengler. Gengler discussed the importance of public opinion, especially as a powerful tool for gathering data. Although Qataris have remained politically supportive of their state, especially since 2017, research needs to be conducted on various aspects of public opinion, especially citizens’ negative response to the payment of taxes; how many people blame the state for the crisis; whether or not social relations between citizens and non-citizens have changed; and the changes in tribal differences within the society. Gengler believed that these questions would return interesting results and seeking answers to them is essential to understanding the blockade.

The scholars discussed a range of issues related to the blockade and also identified key gaps in research. The issues discussed at the working group included the role of various countries, their ties with Qatar, and the use of tools such as public opinion.

To view the working group agenda, click hereTo read the participants’ biographies, click hereRead more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Abdullah Al-Arian, Georgetown University in QatarAlanoud Al-Maadid, Qatar UniversityMuna Al-Marzouqi, Qatar UniversityIan Almond, Georgetown University in QatarBulent Aras, Sabancı University, TurkeyAbdullah Baabood, University of Cambridge, UKZahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarChaïmaa Benkermi, Georgetown University in QatarJuan R.I. Cole, University of Michigan, USJustin Gengler, Qatar University Islam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarSuzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarJocelyn Sage Mitchell, Northwestern University in QatarKhushboo Shah, Georgetown University in QatarJames Reardon-Anderson, Georgetown University in QatarDavid B. Roberts, King’s College London, UKElizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarSteven Wright, Hamad Bin Khalifa University in Qatar

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

The History and Evolution of American Torture and Secret Prisons (1898–2008)
2019-04-16 12:45 - 14:00
GU-Qatar senior Ritica Ramesh presented her thesis research at a CURA Focused Discussion on April 3, 2019, in a talk entitled “History and Evolution of American Torture and Black Sites (1898–2008).” Ramesh outlined the history of the US government’s use of torture as an official policy in its warfare, going back to the Philippine-American War of 1898. Her initial interest in this topic developed during a semester abroad at Georgetown’s main campus in Washington, DC, when she was researching the criminal justice system, prisons, and punishment in the US.

Ramesh takes the cases of the Philippine-American War (1898–1902), the Vietnam War (1965–1972), and the Global War on Terror (2001–present), to demonstrate how the US government has devoted massive resources to the study and development of torture, and how various techniques have evolved over the last century—including the construction of “the ideal physical space in which to conduct torture,” she said.

Ramesh explained that although the United Nations Convention against Torture includes the physical and psychological aspects of torture in its definition of the term, it is difficult to find a concrete definition of torture due to the political nature of the practice, and because the definition has changed throughout history. Another important term is “black sites,” which she said are “usually—but not always—classified facilities that operate in an extralegal capacity, where clandestine military or intelligence operations are carried out.” The definition of black sites is contested and does not constitute a legal term; this is important because the US government has used black sites extensively to carry out torture.

“After the abolishment of slavery in 1865, torture against African Americans became more institutionalized, and this continued in the form of convict leasing and chain gangs.”

While Ramesh’s primary thesis was on torture conducted by the US government abroad during wartime, the development of torture in early American history took place on American soil. “American torture is closely linked to the domination of Native Americans as well as African Americans,” she said. As part of a domestic imperial project, American military forces frequently targeted indigenous peoples through reservation policies imposed in the late 1700s. During this time, people were forced into concentration camps, starved for days on end, and torture was used as a form of punishment, she said.

Slaves, especially Africans, faced horrendous abuses throughout American history. Slavery was a form of torture, along with practices such as branding people with hot metal, brutal beatings, and rape. Ramesh reported, “After the abolishment of slavery in 1865, torture against African Americans became more institutionalized, and this continued in the form of convict leasing and chain gangs.” She pointed out that in the American south, African Americans “were arrested for pretty much just existing,” and were compelled to perform exhaustive labor without pay under the convict lease system. When that practice was banned, another exploitative scheme arose—that of chain gangs. These are examples of how “the use of torture very much existed in America much before the American colonial project moved abroad,” Ramesh said.

“When the American colonial project began in 1898, America brought with it a very punitive system of policing and punishment that it fully exploited in the Philippines,” Ramesh said. During the Philippine-American War, “local Filipinos were seen as savages who needed harsh methods in order to be civilized like the whites. This really drove much of the American ideology during the Philippine-American War,” Ramesh said.

Interrogators in the Philippines experimented with torture techniques, including stress positions and beatings, and many Filipinos were imprisoned in concentration camps, where overcrowding, starvation, and diseases were very common, according to Ramesh. One of the foremost torture techniques used for the purposes of obtaining confessions in the Philippines was the “water cure,” in which water was forced into a victim’s throat and nose to induce a sensation of drowning. It is extremely painful and known to cause severe psychological trauma. This was a precursor to the torture technique known as waterboarding today, which is illegal under US and international law. However, the Central Intelligence Agency was discovered using waterboarding in secret prisons following the 9/11 attacks, justified as “enhanced interrogation.”

By the Vietnam War, other torture methods had been developed, particularly psychological control. The US government created a program called MKUltra, which studied the usefulness of LSD and other drugs for the purposes of interrogation and torture. The Phoenix Program marked the first time in American history that the government recognized the importance of conducting torture in a specialized physical space. Additionally, Ramesh reported, the US Army and the CIA created interrogation manuals that were used in military training curricula beginning in the late 1980s, but especially after 9/11 to increase effectiveness of torture in places like Guantanamo Bay. “The practice of torture abroad as well as in the domestic sphere are closely interlinked and cannot be separated,” she said.

After 9/11, the CIA opened black sites all around the world, including in Thailand, Afghanistan, Cuba, and Iraq, Ramesh said. However, when these illegal sites were discovered, public anger over US torture practices drove the government to establish floating prisons, which allowed the military to evade international law as well as domestic law, and the practice of torture was continued.

President Trump was vocal about his positive views on torture during the election campaign and throughout his presidency. Although a US senate investigation found that torture is not actually effective, Ramesh said, Trump has openly said that he would bring back the CIA’s enhanced interrogation program and water boarding, because he believes that it works. The rise of international law and norms has not deterred the use of torture, Ramesh said, but it has only encouraged the US government to come up with new evasive strategies.

Ritica Ramesh (class of 2019) is a Georgetown University in Qatar senior majoring in International History with a certificate in American Studies. She served as president of the Human Rights Club and was a founding member of the Future is Female Program. Her main research interests are American history, and the US criminal justice system.

Article by Abdul Rehmaan Qayyum, CURA Research Assistant

Firat Oruc CIRS Faculty Publication Workshop
2019-06-10 09:00 - 17:00
On June 10, 2019, CIRS hosted a Faculty Publication Workshop for Firat Oruc, Assistant Professor of English and Humanities at Georgetown University in Qatar, to discuss his forthcoming book Petromodernity and Film: A Cultural History of the Moving Image in the Arabian Peninsula. Several cinema studies scholars were invited to read parts of the manuscript, and to share their critiques with the author and each other during the one-day meeting. The research pivots around a key, yet unanswered, question: in what ways is the moving image a key source for tracing the cultural and political history of the Arabian Peninsula in the aftermath of the discovery of oil? Although film emerged in the last century as one of the most pervasive forms of communication, its social, historical, and cultural role in the early formations of hydrocarbon modernity in the Arabian Peninsula is yet to be explored.

With the recent regional and global rise of the Arabian Peninsula as a financial and political power, the establishment of film industries has been a shared ambition across these countries. As emergent new players in the regional as well as global media landscape, these countries have not yet achieved a commercially successful and globally influential film industry but have begun laying the foundations for a more sustainable cinematic infrastructure. These efforts toward the development of a film industry not only vary from one country to another but also take place on a peculiar terrain, where financial capacity clashes with “cultural conservatism;” the backing of the rentier state with abrupt official interventions; commercial goals with the arthouse model of the festival circuits; and global ambitions with local constraints. This project places the current Gulf cinema phenomenon in a historical context. The historical dimension brings forth important genealogies of film culture that are rooted in the early formations of hydrocarbon modernity in the region.

This project traces the history of film and visual representation in the countries of the Arabian Peninsula—namely, Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Yemen, Oman, and Saudi Arabia—in six stages: 1) The colonial emergence of cinema in the Arab Gulf in the 1930s under the regulation and monitoring of the British network of administrative personnel; 2) The use of film for publicity and propaganda purposes by the British Empire’s Gulf stations in the 1940s; 3) The production of documentary films by petroleum companies in the 1950s and 60s to represent (make visible) “the magic of oil;” 4) Visual ethnography and expedition films of the Arabian Peninsula by Western travelers, sailors, anthropologists, and archeologists; (5) The use of “militant filmmaking” to support left-leaning popular movements that emerged in the region in the 1960s and 70s; and 6) The emergence of indigenous filmmaking after independence. I argue that the history of the moving image through these stages and beyond offers us an important critical lens to analyze the modern development of Arabian societies and cultures.

The project’s primary objectives: The primary objective of the project is to analyze the historical development film and visual culture in the countries of the Arabian Peninsula; namely, Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Yemen, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. The project will offer a narrative of the modern development of Arabian societies and cultures through their visual representation.

Scholarly impact: This project will be the first comprehensive study of the history of film and visual culture in the Arabian Peninsula. It will make a unique original contribution to the scholarship on the cultural history of Arabia, on the one hand, and to world cinema studies, on the other. As such, the project promises to be a key reference source for scholars specializing in these fields. The project is also directly relevant to Qatari society and furthers the priorities established in the Qatar National Vision by constructing a visual cultural history of Qatar (along with other Gulf countries).

Expected outcomes of the project: The project is planned as a monograph for publication with Cornell University Press Persian Gulf Studies series.

To view workshop agenda click hereTo view Participants biographies click here

Participants and Discussants:

Hend F. Alawadhi, Kuwait University

Dale Hudson, New York University Abu DhabiMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarSheetal Majithia, New York University Abu DhabiBindu Menon, Delhi University

Negar Taymoorzadeh, New York UniversityAlia Yunis, Zayed University

Russia and the Middle East Working Group II
2019-08-25 21:30 - 2019-08-26 17:00
On August 25-26 2019, the Center for International and Regional Studies held the second working group under its research initiative on “Russia and the Middle East.” Over the course of two days, the convened scholars presented and received feedback on their papers that tackled a wide array of issues, including: Russia’s Middle East Policy, Russia and GCC relations; Russia and the Yemeni civil war, Russian-Iranian relations, Russia and the Maghreb, migration between Russia and the Middle East, Russian intervention in the Syrian conflict, and Russia’s state-Islam relationship.

Leonid Issaev initiated the working group discussion with his paper, on “Domestic Factors in Russia’s Middle East Policy.” In his paper, Issaev argues that analyses of Russia’s policy towards the Middle East need to be aware of the influence of Russian domestic politics on foreign policymaking. Particularly during President Putin’s second presidential term, domestic politics has been significant in determining Russian foreign policy. Following the end of the Cold War, Russia’s desire to avoid confrontation with the United States and as well as their preoccupation with internal matters meant that the Middle East occupied the periphery of Moscow’s attention. The Middle East began to draw significant interest from the Russian leadership Moscow with the onset of the Arab uprisings in 2011-2012. Domestic factors such as the protests against the results of the State Duma elections as well as the impact of lower oil prices on the Russian economy served to make the Middle East more important for Russia. Issaev suggests in his paper that Vladimir Putin also needed a new narrative for public mobilization during his third term in office, and engagement in the Middle East served this purpose well. For a number of reasons, Putin’s foreign policy on the Middle East has gained popularity and support from the political elite. However, Issaev concludes his paper by suggesting that in the current moment, the Russian public, especially the youth, are less interested in foreign policy and more concerned with critical domestic matters.

Elizabeth Wanucha presented Viacheslav Morozov’s paper on “Russia’s View of the Post-Cold War Global Order and its Policy in the Middle East.” The paper examines the significance of the Middle East for Russia as it has emerged within the Post-Cold War global order. The author argues that, despite the end of the Cold War, Russia’s relations with the West continue to influence its view of global affairs, and this includes how Russia positions itself in the Middle East. The chapter provides a genealogical account of Russia’s current engagements in the Middle East and focuses particularly on the drivers behind Moscow’s military intervention in Syria. Supporting the core argument of Issaev’s paper, Morozov suggests that Russian foreign policy is also influenced by domestic factors. As historical evidence of this, Morozov draws attention to Russia’s backing for the US intervention during the first Gulf war, suggesting that this was possible as at that time domestic political forces in Russia were decidedly pro-Western. The decision to support President Bashar Al-Assad against the general tide of the US and Western states backing the Syrian opposition was also partially made possible due to a change within Russian domestic politics and the anti-Western sentiments on the rise. The author concludes that Russia’s relationship with the United States and its allies will continue to drive future Russian foreign policymaking. However, challenging internal economic conditions, mounting strains on the social security system and increasing domestic protest might mean that Russian authorities are less able to confront the United States and will need to adopt a more measured approach.

Sergey Markedonov’s paper also combines domestic issues with foreign policymaking, as his paper examines “Russia’s State-Islam Relationship: Significance for the Middle East.” Markedonov studies the evolution of Russian foreign policy towards the Middle East through the lens of the state’s complex relationship with domestic Islam. Russia’s position of deliberate non-intervention in the Middle East has transformed considerably over the years, as its direct role in Syria clearly demonstrates. Markedonov suggests that one of the drivers for Russia’s activist role in the Middle East is the concern that Russian leadership has over the transnational mobilization capacity of political Islam. For the Russian state, transnational political Islam is seen as threatening primarily due to its indigenous Muslim population. The paper suggests that while there is a lack of adequate data regarding certain estimates suggest that the Muslim population of Russia is around 16-25 million people. The Russian state has a strong role in controlling Islam within the state and has clear red lines regarding what it considers to be unofficial Islam versus “traditional” or state-recognized Islam. Russia’s relationship with Middle Eastern states is at least partially based on its desire to control external influences that might influence its population of Muslim citizens, and particularly to suppress any political mobilization or radicalization on the basis of Islam.

Zahra Babar presented Mark N. Katz’s paper entitled “Different but Similar: Comparing Moscow’s Middle East Policies in the Cold War and Putin Eras.” In his paper, Katz examines and compares the Soviet era and Putin’s foreign policies towards the Middle East. Katz argues that the successes and failures of Moscow’s Middle Eastern foreign policies have occurred not only as a result of their deliberate efforts or mistakes but also because of the contexts and conditions in which they were developed and launched. Russia’s efforts in the Middle East have either been hampered or aided by policies pursued by the US and other actors. Katz also suggests that despite the great efforts that the Soviet Union made to engage in the Middle East, it can be argued that the Putin regime has actually managed to develop a better position for itself than the USSR ever did. With its clearly defined strong alliances that were ideologically based, the Soviet Union suffered in its ability to reach out to many other states that were in the US or Western alliance system during the Cold War. Some of the successes of Putin’s foreign policy in the Middle East can be attributed to the fact that Putin has managed to establish cordial relations with many different Middle Eastern states and stakeholders, through its strategy of balancing its multiple relationships without any ideological drivers. However, Katz does conclude that whether all these relationships will actually enhance or strengthen Russian interests in the region remains unknown at this stage. Russia today does not demonstrate the means or capacity to ensure resolution to regional conflicts it is engaged in, and without that and a return to stability the investments it has made may not necessarily pay off in any meaningful way.

Andrei Korobkov shifted the discussion to “Migration between the Middle East and Russia and the Post-Soviet Space: Structure, Scale, and Dynamics.” Korobkov’s paper looks at the forces at work in terms of migration flows between the Middle East and Russia as well as parts of the former Soviet Union (FSU). The collapse of the of USSR created six Muslim majority states that resulted in the creation of inter-regional migration patterns that have evolved into forms of international migration today. The author focused on flows of migrants from the Middle East to both Russia as well as other parts of the FSU. Korobkhov suggests that there is a potential for the development of existing chains of migration between the two regions that include emigration, immigration, and migrant transit. The types of migrant exchange that exists between the two regions include, trade migrations, both forced and voluntary, refugees, elite migrations such as students and highly skilled migrants, investment migration, labors, as well as traditional migration for settlement which primarily relates to Jewish Russians emigrating to Israel. The paper maintains that majority of these migration patterns are newly created and the percentage of exchange is currently low, with small numbers of people migrating from the Middle East to Russia and the FSU, and vis versa. These new migration corridors have a potential for expansion and diversification. However, this would require the formation of supportive migration policies, internal reforms, and simplification of visa and work permit acquisition in Russia.

Ghoncheh Tazmini presented a paper on “Iran: A Strategic Partner or a Provisional Counterweight?” Tazmini’s paper, which provides an in-depth discussion of Iranian-Russian relations, states that despite consistent contradicting strategic and ideological stances and frequently conflicting interests, Russia and Iran share a similar critical view of a global order that exists under Western hegemony. These similar views are shaped by both states’ historical experiences as ex-Imperial powers, geographic realities, and worldviews that stand in contrast to those imposed by Western-mandated norms of international relations. The author argues that within Russia’s challenge to the universality of the US-led liberal international order, Iran stands as a critical partner. Tazmini highlights that there is a methodological gap in the existing literature that does not factor in the role of ideas and identity in foreign policy, which is key to understanding Iran and Russia’s complex relationship. The paper sheds light on different areas of cooperation and solidarity between the two nations and looks at the patterns of convergence. The author concludes that for Russia, Iran is a strategic partner, and more than a bargaining chip to be leveraged to as part of Moscow’s mission to challenge the Western liberal international order.

Samuel Ramani discussed his paper on “Russia and the Yemeni Civil War.” Ramani’s article looks at the Russian policy of strategic non-alignment in the Yemeni civil war, which is in contrast to their military assertiveness in Syria. Russia’s stance of non-alignment has made it stand out from other nationals involved in the conflict and enabled it to have amiable diplomatic relations with different factions involved in the civil war i.e. President’s Hadi’s coalition, which is recognized by the UN as the legitimate government in Yemen and is backed by the Saudis, the Houthis, who control Northern Yemen and the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which has UAE’s support. The author states that this has helped Moscow gain the image of a potential referee and dialogue facilitator, as well as an important partner to reach any post-conflict resolution to the civil war. This has also situated Russia in a better situation to assume a greater role in securing oil exports through Bab el-Mandeb. The chapter also analyses Russia’s role in the Yemeni civil war and the impact it is having on its strengthening relationship with Iran and the impact on Moscow’s partnership with different Gulf monarchies. The paper concludes that though Russia has gained achievements through its stance of non-alignment in the Yemeni civil war, its successes are not entirely unquestionable and articulates how their policy would convert into an actual vision of peace settlement in Yemen.

Misba Bhatti presented Roy Allison’s paper on “Russian Normative Claims for its Intervention in the Syrian Conflict since 2015.” Allison argues that analyses of the Russian intervention in Syria, since 2015, lacks attention to legal and normative claims that the Russians have used to justify the major use of force in Syria. These claims are important, as they are not just abstract and juridical but have political and policy consequences. Moscow has tried to construct a convincing legal and normative case to gain the support of the states from the region and international community under the banners of counter-terrorism and upholding the Syrian state sovereignty. Russian leadership asserts that their intervention in Syria is “lawful” and “rightful” on the bases of intervention by invitation by the legitimate Syrian government. Moscow uses this card to question the legality of western state’s military strikes on Syrian territory, to deflect negative criticism received on the annexation of Crimea and to convey the legality of their intervention to its domestic political elites and public. Despite these efforts, Russia has received heavy critique from the international community, regarding the political legitimacy of the military operations, the legal authority of the Assad’s invitation and the gross violations against civilians by Assad regime. Allison states that despite Russia’s diplomatic response to these criticisms, Moscow has suffered serious reputation damage among many Middle Eastern states and its legal and normative claims have had little impact in convincing Middle Eastern public of the legitimacy of Russia’s military involvement in Syria.

Nikolay Kozhanov discussed “The Drivers of Russia-GCC Relations Post-2011.” Kozhanov discusses that after the Arab uprisings of 2011, a complex mixture of factors drive and impact the Russian-GCC relations. These include the ever-changing US-Russian relations, evolution of the energy markets, growing Russian presence in the region, regional rivalry and GCC-US relations. The author looks at Russian relation with two Gulf monarchies, Saudi Arabia and Qatar during the Arab Spring and Russia’s active support to Assad’s regime and states that though there was a period of geostrategic opposition, the channels of dialogue resumed in 2015 and now demonstrates a tendency of normalization. Russia’s growing involvement in GCC is concentrated in three arenas; first is political, to promote Russian option and stance on the world order, and create leverage to affect US and EU behavior, second economic, to ease pressure on Russian economy due to sanctions, involvement in OPEC+ and protect Russian interests in energy market and lastly security, to reduce and counter-terrorist threat emerging from the Middle East. The paper concludes that there is a limit on Moscow’s capacities to develop these relations further, as they are closely tied to Western approaches to the region and Moscow’s ability to fulfill its role as the regional broker. Also tied to this is Russia’s domestic policies that might affect the political relations with the GCC.

Yahia Zoubir shifted the discussion to “Making Up Lost Time: Russia and the Maghreb.” Zoubir draws attention to Russia’s increasing involvement in the Maghreb and argues that the Russian involvement in the region never completely ceased to exist but only diminished during the period when Russia was going through internal domestic problems. The paper looks at the history of Russian-Maghreb relations, particularly the central Maghreb, i.e., Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, and states that Putin has been able to capitalize on Soviet efforts in the region, to build a stronger Russian presence. Moscow has reestablished associations with Algeria and establish ties with traditional pro-Western allies, such as Morocco and Tunisia. Zoubir highlights that the main reasons for Russia’s growing presence in the Maghreb is its aspiration to reaffirm itself as a superpower and align countries in the region towards its anti-hegemonic sphere against the West. Moscow’s interest in the Maghreb also lies in its counter-terrorism efforts as well as being a market for Russian armaments and military equipment. For the Maghreb, Russia provides a credible counterweight to the US and is better received, as it does not impose any ideological conditionality. Zoubir concludes that though Russia cannot compete with China in terms of the resources it can provide, it is establishing a strategic presence in the Maghreb.

It is worth mentioning that CIRS plans to publish the aforementioned papers in an edited volume in the near future.

To view the working group agenda, click hereTo read the participants’ biographies, click hereRead more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMisba Bhatti, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarLeonid Issaev, National Research University in Moscow, Russia Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarAndrei Korobkov, Middle Tennessee State University, USNikolay Kozhanov, Qatar University Sergey Markedonov, Euro-Atlantic Security Center at the MGIMO Institute for International Studies, RussiaJoshua Mitchell, Georgetown University in QatarSuzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarSamuel Ramani, University of Oxford, UKJackie Starbird, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarGhoncheh Tazmini, London Middle East Institute at SOAS, UKElizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarYahia H. Zoubir, KEDGE Business School, France

Article by Misba Bhatti, Research Analyst at CIRS

Karine Walther on "American Missionaries, ARAMCO, and the Birth of the US-Saudi Special Relationship, 1889-1955"
2019-09-18 18:00 - 20:00
Karine Walther is Associate Professor of History at GU-Q, and a 2019–2020 CIRS Faculty Fellow. During her fellowship at CIRS, Walther is completing research on American missions in Saudi Arabia at the end of the nineteenth century and the ways in which the groundwork they laid over subsequent decades paved the way for American oil interests in the area. She presented her talk, “Spreading the Faith: American Missionaries, ARAMCO, and the Birth of the US-Saudi Special Relationship, 1889–1955,” also the title of her forthcoming book, at a CIRS Dialogue lecture on September 18, 2019.

Walther outlined the historical and ideological ties linking American religious, commercial, and political interests in the Middle East, beginning in 1889, when medical missionaries under the Reformed Church of America (RCA) arrived in the Arabian Peninsula as the “Arabian Mission.” Western medicine was the primary tool used in the missionaries’ efforts to convert Muslims to Christianity, and, within a couple decades, several mission stations and hospitals were opened in Basra (Iraq), Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman. By the end of World War I, the Mission had become the most important source of western medicine in the Arabian Gulf.

Using the Mission’s foundational documents, Walther demonstrated how the missionaries’ religious beliefs overlapped with secular understandings of the world at the time. Arabian societies had been placed on a ladder of historical development, in which “the United States was understood as occupying the most advanced rung, with a religious and moral duty to bring about the advancement of non-Christian societies,” she said. In addition to medical work, the missionaries opened schools at their mission stations to teach children the English language and industrial skills along with Christian biblical lessons.

Over time, the RCA missionaries forged close relationships with Gulf rulers, including the founder of Saudi Arabia, Ibn Saud, whom they met in 1914. Over the next three decades, the missionaries provided medical treatment to Ibn Saud, his family, and his soldiers. Walther reported that British political agents in the Gulf were, at the time, concerned about increased American political influence brought by the missionaries, given that establishing hospitals and public health programs was a tactic also employed by the British Empire to solidify its political control in the region.

According to Walther, “American oil developers benefited directly from the missionaries’ network of contacts, and later relied on their cooperation in advancing their strategic interests in the area.” The connection between American missionary work and the granting of oil concessions was made explicit in 1933, she said, when Ibn Saud signed a concession with Standard Oil—later ARAMCO (Arabian American Oil Company). Walther quoted the ruler’s own words: “The British want our oil … but wherever they go they take over. Our experience with Americans has been nothing but good. They’ve helped us. They’ve come here and served us. So I’ve given my concession to the Americans.”

Walther found substantial claims of America’s many contributions to Saudi Arabia’s development in a public relations book commissioned by ARAMCO in 1955—a time when the company was being accused of economic imperialism. Yet, Wallace Stegner’s Discovery! The Search for Arabian Oil, contained no acknowledgment of the missionaries’ role in the country’s development. “ARAMCO had coopted missionary rhetoric about progress and development and adopted the public health and education programs they had put in place in the five decades preceding the arrival of American oilmen in Arabia,” she said. Furthermore, while celebrating ARAMCO’s “benevolent presence” in Saudi Arabia, the book also ignored the company’s well known exploitative and racialized labor practices, she said.

According to Walther, Discovery! maintained that ARAMCO’s development work served as a “private Four Point program” in Saudi Arabia. This was in reference to US President Truman’s 1949 Point Four program calling for aid to help the Global South become “modern.” Under this Cold War policy, technical assistance was provided to developing countries in an array of fields such as science, agriculture, education, and economics. Walther said, “Modernity in this case was largely defined by the United States’ own strategic interests, the most important of these being the adoption of free market capitalism.” The primary goal of the Point Four program was to ensure developing countries aligned with the US in its ideological battle against Soviet Communism, she said.

RCA missionaries reflected wider trends in the mission field, Walther said, which maintained that missionaries should learn local languages and customs and study the religious faiths of the people they were trying to convert. As such, “in the first decade of the twentieth century, this type of missionary education would become more organized, more institutionalized, and more global,” she said. Thus, specialized schools were opened for the purpose of training missionaries in theological seminaries throughout the US, including at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton. At the same time, the British opened schools such as the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) for the purposes of training future imperial officers. “This tells us quite a bit about the difference between British and American interests in the Middle East during this time period,” Walther said.

Knowledge about the Middle East was becoming increasingly important to Americans, and, after WWII, ARAMCO also saw the advantage of its executives understanding the languages, history, religious beliefs, and cultures of Arabia, Walther reported. By the late 1940s, the US Department of State began calling for the creation of Middle Eastern Studies departments in American universities, “again driven by the goal of advancing American strategic interests in the Middle East,” she said. ARAMCO strongly backed these efforts and contributed substantial funding for these academic programs, Walther noted. Universities, in turn, relied on existing experts in the field, which included ARAMCO executives, US Department of State officials, British orientalists, and former missionaries.

In the late 1940s and 1950s, ARAMCO dramatically expanded its industrial education programs in Saudi Arabia to train young Arabs to work for ARAMCO. It also enlarged its medical facilities and set up malaria eradication programs—initiatives similar to those established by the Mission in previous decades. By the mid-1950s, the missionaries’ cooperation with ARAMCO brought unintended consequences that would make their own work obsolete in Arabia. Medical missionaries began competing with new facilities and hospitals provided by oil companies and governments. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Arabian Mission closed most of its hospitals and missionary stations due in part to this redundancy.

In conclusion, and “unsurprisingly, the missionaries’ goals of using technology to convert and ‘occupy’ Arabia were never realized,” Walther said. Even though Americans working for ARAMCO had more success in achieving their goals, they too would be forced to leave eventually. “The United States may have succeeded in spreading a certain faith to the Saudi State, but it was a faith in capitalism, not Christianity, that eventually won out,” she said.

Karine Walther is Associate Professor of History at Georgetown University in Qatar. She is the author of Sacred Interests: The United States and the Islamic World, 1821–1921 (UNC Press, 2015). Her second book, Spreading the Faith: American Missionaries, ARAMCO and the Birth of the US-Saudi Special Relationship, 1889-1955, will be published in 2020 by University of North Carolina Press. Walther is a CIRS Faculty Fellow for the 2019/2020 academic year.

Summary by Jackie Starbird, CIRS Publications and Projects Assistant

CURA Seminar: Political Economy of the Contemporary Middle East
2019-09-26 12:00 - 15:00
On September 26, 2019, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) held a CURA Seminar under its CIRS Undergraduate Research Advancement initiative. During the seminar, CURA Fellows came together for an active discussion of research papers that were submitted to CIRS research initiative on “Political Economy of the Contemporary Middle East.” The papers were critiqued, and the collective feedback was gathered, which was later shared with the research working group. CURA was introduced to support the research needs of undergraduate students at Georgetown University in Qatar, and to provide them with opportunities to enhance their research skills by discussing and analyzing papers from CIRS research initiatives.

Irene Ann Promodh (Class of 2021) opened the CURA seminar by presenting Esfandyar Batmanghelidj’s paper titled “The Ins and Outs of Iranian Industrial Resiliency under Sanctions.” The paper explores Iran’s economic situation and ability to sustain its industrial input under sanctions by analyzing the trade patterns between Iran, China, and Europe through graphical and statistical data. The author discusses the concept of re-export, which focuses on the trade patterns between Iran, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) through which Iran has been able to maintain its supply of European Industrial inputs. The main critique of the paper by the discussants is the structure and lack of explanation of graphs and observed data that describes the trade patterns between Iran and other countries.

Shaza Afifi (Class of 2022) presented Ashraf Mishrif’s paper titled “GCC’s Unsettled Policy for Economic Integration.” Mishrif examines factors explaining the retreat of economic integration in the GCC through the analysis of global and regional challenges. The paper evaluates the strength and capacity of the GCC as a union and explores how the setbacks of the European Union with Brexit, and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) affected regional economic integration globally. He argues that economic integration, in GCC, is undermined by the slow pace of political integration, lack of a monetary union, and the blockade imposed on Qatar in 2017. The main critique of the paper by the discussants is the lack of in-depth exploration and analysis of the GCC region that affected economic integration.

Following the presentation of each paper, the CURA fellows engaged in an insightful discussion on the structure and organization of the paper, the employed theoretical and conceptual frameworks, and the clarity of the argument. After the discussions, two CURA fellows, AbdulRehmaan Qayyum (Class of 2021) and Khushboo Shah (Class of 2022), served as ambassadors to the “Political Economy of the Contemporary Middle East” working group and shared the comments and critique brought up at the CURA seminar.

For the participants’ biographies, please click here

Article by Salma Hassabou, CIRS Administrative Fellow

Political Economy of the Contemporary Middle East Working Group II
2019-09-29 09:30 - 16:30
On September 29, 2019, the Center for International and Regional Studies held the second working group under its research initiative on “Political Economy of the Contemporary Middle East.” During the meeting, the convened scholars presented and received feedback on their papers that tackled a wide array of issues, including: economic integration in the Levant and GCC, the Iranian economy under sanctions, fiscal decentralization in the Islamic Republic of Iran and anti-extractivist social movements and re-envisioning the political economy in North Africa.

Ashraf Mishrif commenced the working group discussion with his paper on, “The GCC’s Unsettled Policy for Economic Integration.” The paper presents a broad picture of the political-economic (dis)integration of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) since its inception in 1981. The study suggests that the GCC’s ineffective institutional structure and the lack of political will among its member states to implement and reinforce coordinated policies are the main factors that have led to a lack of meaningful integration. Mishrif suggests that currently, at a global level, there is a retreat from regionalism, as can be seen in some of the leading organizations such as the EU and NAFTA. While to retain relevance for its regional integration mission, the GCC must strengthen its institutional structure. Currently, the domestic political environment of its member states makes it unlikely that this can occur. GCC member states lack fundamental institutional components, such as elected parliaments and legislative bodies, which are needed to institute supranational policy-making. Mishrif also states that ideological differences, the rise of ambitious young leaders in Gulf ruling families, and differing foreign policy interests demonstrated by GCC member states have shown that politics and national interest trump economic logic when it comes to the GCC. The paper concludes that there is a low interregional trade between the member states (sixten percent in total) and that there is a need to reexamine and reevaluate the process of integration.

Angela Joya shifted the discussion to North Africa, with her paper, “Alter-globalization in the Middle East and North Africa: The Case of Anti-Extractivism in Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco.” Joya argues that the rise of new grass root rural movements in North Africa indicates that marginalized communities in the Middle East are beginning to press against processes of globalization and neoliberal economic logic. Joya’s paper presents a series of case-studies of different rurally-based social movements in Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, as examples of how people are rejecting neoliberal authoritarianism. The case studies suggest that local communities are mobilizing around environmental concerns and resource-extraction projects, and are demanding an alternative development model that better serves public needs. Mobilization against phosphate mining in the Gafsa basin in Tunisia, silver mining in Imider, Morocco and the fracking of shale gas in Ain Salah in Algeria, demonstrates that anti-extractivism lies at the core of these social movements. People are protesting against government policies that have not brought enough economic development at the local level, not significantly enhanced the quality of life for the people living in these regions where natural resources are being extracted. Conversely, some of these resource-extraction projects have led to deepening inequality among the local population, have had adverse environmental consequences, depleted local natural resources such as water, and negatively affected health conditions as a result of pollution. Joya argues that these people’s movements in North Africa show that the public is questioning the effectiveness of the growth-based economy model, which, while meant to counter unemployment and bring in investment to the country, has been capital intensive and has had negative consequences for rural communities. Joya states that these movements are broadening the demands for economic, social, and political justice and inclusion of local preferences and knowledge with environmental protection to bring about a change in the current development model.

Kian Tajbakhsh discussed his paper on “The Political Economy of Fiscal Decentralization under the Islamic Republic of Iran.” The article looks at the fiscal decentralization of local government in over 90 cities and municipalities in Iran. Using descriptive data and empirical analysis, the paper provides a detailed study of Iranian municipal finances and examines the extent to which fiscal decentralization has led to strengthening local government. In particular, Tajbakhsh questions whether the decentralization policy has created structures of local governance that are more responsive and accountable to voters’ preferences. In 1999, a new reform of establishing elected local government was implemented and backed by four political actors; the ruling Islamists, the Islamic reformists, the developmental Islamists, and the apolitical technocrats. Each had their motivation for supporting decentralization, which led to three distinct projects. The study conducted reveals that the elected municipalities have a narrow set of responsibilities and limited legal autonomy from the central government. Many of the municipalities collect revenues from local sources; however, this revenue decentralization is not accompanied by expenditure decentralization, which has led to a system of “perverse economy.” The author argues that the evolution of the local government in Iran, over the past two decades, can be explained by the theory of local electoral authoritarianism, in which the central government aims to install local electoral institutions to enhance its influence rather than allow dispersal of autonomy.

Esfandyar Batmanghelidj’s paper, “The Ins and Outs of Iranian Industrial Resiliency under Sanctions,” looks at the Iranian economy and industrial resiliency under sanctions and examines the relationship between the availability of industrial inputs and total industrial output and growth of the non-oil exports in Iran. Batmanghelidj argues that the sanctions imposed on Iran have been effective in cutting back Iran’s energy exports. However, for the past fifteen years, Iran has steadily increased its non-oil exports, through which the country is earning its foreign exchange. The increase in non-oil exports also has paved the way for Iran to trade with regional countries, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. The paper looks at how Iran’s imports are being sustained to maintain industrial output. The author identifies a process of “import reflection” through which Iran is able to maintain the availability of industrial input (intermediary and capital inputs) and steadily increase its industrial output. The study examines the trade data of Iran’s main partners, EU, China, UAE, and Turkey and Total Productivity Index of Central Bank of Iran, and demonstrations that the sanctions on Iran temporarily affected the relationship between European industrial exports to Iran and Iranian industrial productivity. However, Iran was able to substitute European industrial inputs with Chinese inputs and re-export required European goods via UAE and Turkey further, which enabled it to stabilize industrial productivity and bypass sanction pressures.

Misba Bhatti presented Imad El-Anis’s article on “Transport Infrastructure and Regional Integration in the Levant.” This chapter contributes to the study of regionalism by investigating the relationship between hard infrastructure and economic integration in the Levant. The author argues that regionalism and economic integration relies on the development of domestic and cross border transport infrastructure. The author assumes that a higher level of trade leads to economic integration, which leads to interdependency and political cooperation and stability. Despite the presence of commercial institutes, tariffs, and international institutions, such as Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement (GAFTA), any previous initiatives to deliver regional public goods and enhance domestic economic progress have been unsuccessful in the Levant. The chapter investigates the physical transportation infrastructure in the Levant and its impact on regionalism by addressing two main questions: 1) What is the condition of domestic and cross-border transport infrastructure in the Levant?; and, 2) What is the relationship between domestic and cross-border transport infrastructure? As a result of the study conducted, the chapter concludes that domestic and cross-border transport infrastructure performance is weak in several of the countries studied and that this weakness hinders regional economic integration.

To view the working group agenda, click hereTo read the participants’ biographies, click hereRead more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Adel Abdel Ghafar, Brookings Doha Center, QatarZahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarEsfandyar Batmanghelidj, Bourse & Bazaar, IranMisba Bhatti, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarAngela Joya, University of Oregon, USMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarSuzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarAshraf Mishrif, Sultan Qaboos University, OmanAbdul Rehmaan Qayyum, Georgetown University in QatarKhushboo Shah, Georgetown University in QatarJackie Starbird, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarKian Tajbakhsh, Columbia University, USElizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar

Article by Misba Bhatti, Research Analyst at CIRS

CURA Workshop: The Art of Hearing and Seeing Data
2019-10-10 12:00 - 16:00
On October 10, 2019, CIRS hosted a CURA workshop titled, “The Art of Hearing and Seeing Data: Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods,” by Assistant Professor of Government at GU-Q, Dr. Uday Chandra. The workshop provided participants with an insightful breakdown of the practical fundamentals of qualitative research and data observation. Ranging from freshmen to seniors, the participants actively engaged with the material and discussions led by Prof. Chandra, enabling them to build upon each other’s interpretations of the significance of plausible data across various forms of qualitative research. Through a simple ethnography-inspired observation exercise that students were required to complete prior to the workshop, students were able to contextualize the role of hearing and seeing data at the most rudimentary level, within the overarching theme of conducting qualitative research. As part of the discussion, students compared the sights and sounds they observed in public spaces at various campuses, in comparison with the audio-visual elements of the social atmosphere at the atrium in GU-Q itself, and explored the interactions between independent variables such as academic concentrations and gender ratios.

The workshop initially delved into the basics of quantitative and qualitative research, emphasized that each method has shortcomings, and can be used only to answer certain, specific research questions. Recognizing the “seduction of quantification” and the difficulty of demonstrating causation, not just correlation, and to accurately reflect social reality, enabled participants to contextualize the role of qualitative research methods within the wider framework of data observation. Prof. Chandra also highlighted the pitfalls of qualitative research in its inability to identify macro trends, geospatial mapping of micro-level data, establish patterns for large numbers of cases or variables, or even solve existential problems. Students learned that different methodological approaches should be used to strengthen the certainty of their theses.

Prof. Chandra used a personal example of his doctoral research titled, “Negotiating Leviathan: State-making and Resistance in the Margins of Modern India,” to demonstrate the practical workings of qualitative research. He shared his own experience in overcoming challenges pertaining to fieldwork. Salma Hassabou, CURA Administrative Fellow and workshop participant, commented, “I thoroughly enjoyed listening to Prof. Chandra’s personal experience with qualitative research because much of what we study is mostly theoretical in nature that not everyone knows how to apply it in practical research. The example he shared regarding his fieldwork tied the entire workshop together, and I found it incredibly helpful.”

The workshop also addressed concerns regarding the importance of credible research design and the need for a focused research question. The conversational nature of the workshop also allowed students to engage with the topic very closely and clarify areas of ambiguity within the spheres of both qualitative and quantitative research methods.

The workshop had a total of twenty-four participants, and the attendees who successfully completed all required tasks were awarded electronic badges to certify their enrollment and completion of this CURA workshop. CIRS hosts CURA workshops once every semester to encourage student research and to equip the GU-Q student body with the skills and practical knowledge needed to produce original research in the students’ respective fields of interest.

Article by Irene Promodh (class of 2021), CURA Research Fellow

Football in the Middle East Working Group I
2019-10-27 09:00 - 2019-10-28 17:00
On October 27-28, 2019, the Center for International and Regional Studies held the inaugural working group for its research initiative on “Football in the Middle East.” The meeting brought together regional and international scholars and experts to discuss some of the understudied areas related to football in the region and to identify original research questions in their respective areas of focus. Over the course of two days a number of topics were discussed, including, football academies, women’s football in Turkey, the FIFA 2022 World Cup in Qatar, beIN and sports broadcasting rights, football management and administration, football players’ perception of national identity, football clubs in Iran, Palestinian football players in Lebanon, youth refugees and football, football and regime legitimization, and football fans and protests in Algeria.

The working group began with Dr. Valter Di Salvo’s talk on Qatar’s strategies to build a high-performance football environment. Dr. Di Salvo, the Director of Football Performance and Science at Aspire Academy, compared the football environment of three countries, Spain, England, and Qatar, and stressed that building a successful football environment in Qatar needed an understanding of the local social context. A seven-goal plan was implemented by Aspire to develop and strengthen the game in Qatar. This included, data collection on a players’ performance and abilities; recruiting a professional group of staff and trainers; assessing the needs of coaches and players; formulating and implementing a training strategy; building of training facilities and assessment labs; integrating knowledge throughout the process; and finally sharing of knowledge with other partners for development of the game. The last goal led to the formation of the Aspire Fellows Community that presently has representation from 50 globally-renowned football clubs and federations and has 260 presentations in its database for knowledge sharing.

Building on the discussion of Qatar’s football development strategy, Dr. Wadih Ishaq spoke about Qatar’s hosting of the FIFA World Cup in 2022. Dr. Ishaq pointed out that while scholars and analysts have addressed football, politics, and socioeconomic issues, there is little work that offers an internal perspective on the World Cup and its implications for Qatari society, economy, and culture. Among other topics, it is important to study sports and education in Qatar, and the long term educational opportunities and job security for athletes.

Simon Chadwick spoke about the off-field management of football and highlighted a study by Jasoor Institute that measured the size of the sports economy in the Middle East. The study examined the broader sports landscape in the region and drew attention to major clubs and federations in the GCC member states. Chadwick suggested that in order to address the question of football management in the GCC, five areas need to be studied; fan engagement, investment, sponsorship, brands and branding, and industrial networks. Professor Chadwick identified a number of core research questions: How can football in the GCC region establish and build sustainable match day attendances? What role in the development of football in the region should investment play? What purpose do the portfolios of GCC region football sponsors serve? Can football club brands in the GCC region ever rival those of their international rivals? How is football contributing to broader industrial challenges facing the GCC region?

Ross Griffin explored the question of national identity and football players of the Qatari national team. The composition of the Qatari team contains a host of players born in countries such as Sudan, Iraq, Algeria, France, and Portugal. Their success as a national team presents the opportunity to revisit the complicated relationship between nationalism, football, and national identity from a player perspective. The identity dilemmas that inevitably ensue when athletes are naturalized has been given significant consideration by scholars of sport and nationalism. Financial gain, cultural affinity, and professional ambition have all been cited as motivating factors influencing an athlete’s decision to switch allegiances. Nevertheless, the majority of these analyses have been undertaken with the construct of a team, the fan, or the nation in mind. Ross Griffin suggested that there is a need to include the subjective perspective of players themselves in their performance of national identity.

John McManus stated that creating a strong legacy for the World Cup was an inherent component of Qatar’s bidding pitch. Training and development of sports administrators and industry experts are part of this legacy. McManus argued that the literature on sports administration often focuses on mega sporting events, and there is very little attention given to other forms of organized sporting competitions. It was suggested that there is a need to examine Qatar’s wider sporting landscape and to look at organizations such as beIN, Qatar Sports League, and Aspire Academy and address their roles when it comes to sporting legacy building. Some of the research questions that were put forward included looking at expatriate games and their administrations; examining what it means to be a sports administrator; exploring the administration of football clubs and federations; What is an event gypsy?; as well as moving away from western-centric literature and focusing on the Middle East specific context.

Craig LaMay drew attention to the beIN network and broadcasting rights in the Middle East. Pay television has changed the way people watch sports in the region, and other broadcasters often view beIN’s monopoly over broadcasting rights as aggressive. The network has 40 percent of global media rights, and these include copyrights and audio/visual rights over broadcasting. However, the network is not just limited to sports channels but also has several entertainment stations. Sixty percent of the content produced is in Arabic, and according to statistics, 66 percent of total viewership over television for the FIFA 2018 World Cup was through beIN sports channels. An understudied area with regards to the beIN network is the entry of the beOUTQ network, which is a pirate pay-television broadcaster and is an example of industrial level piracy of broadcasting. The network not only pirates channels from the beIN network but also channels from Europe and the US. Craig LaMay suggested the need to examine the nature of pay television and the issue of piracy in broadcasting and its implications for beIN in the long run.

The literature on sports gives examples of how sports can be used as a medium through which refugees can be integrated into the social and political fabric of a country. However, this is not always the case, as seen with Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The Palestinians in Lebanon are a stateless people, and the football federation in the country has put a cap on the number of Palestinian players that can play in a team. Each club team is allowed to have only one Palestinian player, and they cannot play as a goalkeeper. Palestinian are also restricted from holding property in Lebanon as well as are banned from 30 professions, which is another form of discrimination that they have to face. In response to these restrictions on joining Lebanese football clubs and teams, Palestinians have formed their leagues under which they have formed teams and hold matches. Danyel Reiche’s presentation shed light on these issues and proposed four areas, which could be studied in regards to Palestinian football players, i.e., Palestinian diaspora clubs elsewhere, Palestinian football in Israel, the condition of Palestinians as stateless people in Lebanon and the efforts to gain statehood by recognition. Reiche’s focus would be to examine the cap on players, when and why it was introduced, and discrimination of Palestinian players in Lebanese football.

Middle Eastern rules have frequently used football as a tool for regime legitimization. While much of the literature on this focus on the soft power aspects of football, Abdullah Al-Arian, proposed that there is more to states’ instrumental usage of football than soft power and brand-building. Abdullah Al-Arian suggested that football is used by states to pursue and achieve hard political objectives. States have used football for extending neo-imperial control and power consolidation, regime legitimization, countering threats, political repression, and to mask unpopular regional and domestic policies or sports-washing. None of these forms of legitimization are mutually exclusive, and states have used multiple of these at the same time. Furthermore, emphasis in the literature has been on identifying policies related to the national teams and federations, and not a lot has been written in regards to economic expansion and using clubs and ownership to explain some of these categories.

Maher Mezahi, detailed the history of football in Algeria, with the arrival of the game in the country with colonial rule, the formation of the first Algerian football club and the national team as a tool of protest against the colonizers and the subsequent use of football stadiums to protest against the political regime after independence. Football fans and club ultras express their political, social, and economic demands during matches in forms of songs that they produce and publically distribute. Mehar stated that the protesters who are currently rallying on the streets for regime change replicate the football fan behavior. They gather after Friday prayers, at a famous square, peacefully march around the town in Algiers, sing songs that are produced by football fans, and display anti-government calligraphy and tifos. The support from organized ultras and football fans has enabled the protesters, to organize and execute street protests and overcome the fear of law keepers.

Ramon Spaaij brought the discussion back to football’s role in the development and inclusion of refugees with a focus on youth refugees. Spaaij expressed that there is a Eurocentric focus and bias on the research conducted on the topic and that there is a mismatch between research sites and the locations where the majority of the world’s displaced people reside, with Turkey being the main exception. The reliance on policy categories limits academic research by constraining the type of questions asked, the objects of study, and the methods and analysis adopted. There is a need for research that uncritically accepts the boundaries of the field imposed by policy categories will tend to confirm and legitimize the assumptions made by actors. Some of research gaps that were identified included; over-emphasis on instrumental dimension vs experiential dimension of football, decolonizing research, ethical relationships in research, looking at different innovative methods, strengths-based approaches and reframing of refugees in terms of risk, threat and deficiency and capturing the diverse voices of refugees regarding their own sporting aspirations, needs and achievements as opposed to merely echoing dominant sport policy agendas.

The debate around gender issues and sports, particularly football, is a prevalent theme in the Middle East. The participants looked at female football players in Turkey for the following session. Yagmur Nuhrat identified three areas for further research on the topic; equality for women, with focus on the dynamics of equality rather than justice; knowledge production and better education for female football players; and the issue of space and spatiality and how that relates to the environment of playing fields and neighborhoods. Some of the questions that were put forward were; Can we achieve equality, and what kind of equality are we talking about when it comes to female football players? What are some of the elements of this struggle and resistance? What are the discourses when it comes to physical strength? How women’s’ empowerment is conceptualized by footballers and how they view this discourse? Female athletes may feel physically unsafe if they were not in a structured space. Even if it is exclusionary, how does this structured space create feelings of safety for women?

Alireza Farsi closed the working group meeting, with his presentation on politics and football clubs in Iran. Farsi detailed the playing history of the Iranian national team and explained the structure of the football federation in Iran. Iranian federation has sixteen registered teams, out of which only one is privately owned, whereas the rest of the fifteen teams are owned and managed by the government. It was proposed that the football in Iran needs a component of social responsibility, and the main driver behind should be the privatization of the clubs. Farsi gave an example of the income generated by the Premier League in England and stated that the privatization of the game could bring in economic and industrial growth as well as build up the private sector and cash revenues. The presentation also proposed strategies to initiate social responsibility and privatization plans, which could be applied to various federations across the Middle East.

In conclusion, Mehran Kamrava, Director of CIRS, thanked the participants for identifying key gaps in the literature on football in the Middle East. It is worth noting that the participants will contribute empirically grounded papers addressing these questions, among others, to be published in an edited volume under the auspices of CIRS.

To view the working group agenda, click hereTo read the participants’ biographies, click hereRead more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Ahmed Abbasi, Qatar Football Association, QatarAbdullah Al-Arian, Georgetown University in QatarNajwa Al-Thani, Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy, QatarMohammed Al-Thawadi, Aspire Academy, QatarZahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarChaimaa Benkermi, Georgetown University in QatarMisba Bhatti, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarSimon Chadwick, emlyon Business School, FranceValter Di Salvo, Aspire Academy, QatarAlireza Farsi, Shahid Beheshty University, IranRoss Griffin, Qatar UniversitySalma Hassabou, Georgetown University in QatarWadih Ishac, Qatar UniversityMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarCraig LaMay, Northwestern University in QatarJohn McManus, Qatar UniversityMaher Mezahi, Independent Football Journalist, Algeria Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarYagmur Nuhrat, Istanbul Bilgi University, TurkeyIrene Promodh, Georgetown University in QatarAbdul Rehmaan Qayyum, Georgetown University in QatarDanyel Reiche, American University of BeirutKhushboo Shah, Georgetown University in QatarRodney Sharkey, Weill Cornell Medical College in QatarRamon Spaaij, Victoria University, Australia Betsi Stephen, Georgetown UniversityElizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar

Article by Misba Bhatti, Research Analyst at CIRS
