Center for International and Regional Studies

War by Other Means? Iran under Sanctions
2013-03-12 08:00 - 18:00 (Europe/Moscow)
On March 12, 2013, CIRS organized a panel discussion on the topic of “War by Other Means?Iran under Sanctions,” featuring Mehran Kamrava, Director of CIRS; Mansoor Moaddel, CIRS Visiting Scholar; and Manata Hashemi, CIRS Postdoctoral Fellow. The objective of the panel was to have a discussion on the nature of the sanctions and their consequences for both the Iranian individual and the state. Mehran Kamrava, Director of CIRS, began the panel discussion with a summary of the history of the sanctions imposed on Iran, as well as their effects on the lives of ordinary Iranians. He recounted that the sanctions were imposed on Iran by the United States and other Western governments in reaction to the US embassy hostage incident in 1979, and as a means of isolating the Islamic Republic in the subsequent years. It was only twenty years later, however, that the Clinton Administration passed the “Iran Sanctions Act,” which made the sanctions regime an integral part of US foreign policy. The sanctions “were not really codified until the 1990s when the United States became far more concerned about Iran’s nuclear program,” Kamrava explained. Thus, the strict sanctions were used as a means to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program did not progress due to import and export embargoes. “The assumption was that once Iran stops enriching its nuclear capabilities, then the sanctions would be lifted,” he maintained.

In later years, while the Bush Administration threatened Iran with the possibility of war, the Obama Administration reacted to the Islamic Republic by increasing sanctions that constricted Iran even further. “It is the Obama Administration that has been far more aggressive in terms of the sanctions regime,” Kamrava argued, because President Obama has been trying to keep the Republicans at bay by adhering to institutional and congressional means of engagement instead of attacking or invading Iran.

The problem with comprehensive and encompassing sanctions is that they do not always differentiate between civilian and military needs, Kamrava explained. The sanctions imposed on Iran rarely target only the state as these restrictive measures have devastating effects on the civilian population as well. What is termed “dual-use technology” includes a whole spectrum of technological goods that are integral to the enhancement of military capabilities and, yet, are also essential for basic civilian industries. Civilian air travel is one such example where lack of essential materials means that passenger carriers have steadily deteriorated over the decades and cannot be refurbished. Further, humanitarian items, such as medicines, are exempt from the sanctions regime, and, yet, because of the strict sanctions on the banking system, it is difficult to conduct any kind of financial transaction to attain them.

Quoting from a recent Gallop Poll that asked ordinary Iranians how the sanctions affect their daily lives, Kamrava reported that most answered that they were personally affected. Interestingly, however, although most agreed that the nuclear program was the main reason for the imposition of sanctions, they blamed the United States for their personal suffering. Thus, “the sanctions are actually having the opposite effect, as compared to what the United States intended,” he explained.

Kamrava ended by drawing four broad conclusions, including: “sanctions have become the favored US instrument of pressure;” “there is a self-perception of suffering among the Iranian people;” “there is a high level of support for the nuclear program;” and, finally, “the US is getting largely the blame for the Iranian predicament on the part of the Iranian people.”

Manata Hashemi gave the second presentation in which she analyzed how Iran’s social and economic landscapes have been severely affected by US and EU sanctions, leading to a decline in the value of the rial and a sharp increase in the price of daily goods. “It is not just imported goods that have seen a price increase, the price of goods that are produced locally have also increased as some merchants use the slide in the rial as an excuse to raise prices,” she explained. Further, output across the country has seen a decline because of the restrictive measures, which has, in turn, led to a slash in jobs and an increase in unemployment.

However, contrary to international media discourses reporting on the extreme suffering of ordinary Iranians in their daily lives, Hashemi explained how people – especially those in the lower echelons of society – are coping with, and navigating around, these restrictions. “We know that the sanctions have certainly bitten; they brought inflation and a collapse in the currency; they have harmed many economic prospects for ordinary people, and, not surprisingly, they solidified general sentiment against the West,” she argued. However, government organizations have developed a series of campaigns in which handouts and utilities have been distributed to those most in need. In conjunction with these official measures, “non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have also contributed to mitigating the effects of sanctions by distributing non-cash material goods like clothes, school supplies, and other essentials to the poorest,” Hashemi contended.

People in the lower and middle echelons of society, do not simply wait for handouts, but get actively involved in bettering their own lives through a series of creative measures in order to soften the impact of the sanctions. Iranians have become more conscious of their spending habits and have transformed their shopping practices by purchasing locally produced goods that have been traditionally shunned as a sign of inferior quality and low social status. Other measures include taking on extra jobs – often in the informal market – or taking part in reciprocal exchange networks with family and friends. Hashemi said that “by allowing youths access to material possessions, not only do these types of clothing exchange networks help them keep personal expenses to a minimum, but, more importantly, they serve as a way for them to save face and to keep up their reputation among their peers.”

Hashemi ended by saying that people in Iran are not just finding ways to survive in a country so chocked by sanctions, but that they are striving for “the good life” and for a dignified life that is full of hope and aspirations. “Despite the hardships that the sanctions have posed, Iranians inside the county are finding ways to navigate around them to resist some of the more debilitating effects, and even to accrue small social and economic gains in spite of them,” she concluded.

Mansoor Moaddel was the final speaker and he ended the panel discussion by highlighting two major challenges to the Islamic Republic that “are capable of transforming the Islamic regime and contributing to the rise of moderate and democratic politics in Iran.” The first is the international community’s steadfast posture against the Islamic Republic’s nuclear policy and the second is a growing opposition movement within the country that is calling for liberal values and democratic governance. However, these two forces are not coordinated as the sanctions regime has overshadowed any other form of engagement with Iran. The irony, Moaddel said, is that the comprehensive sanctions have had more of a detrimental effect on democratic forces than it has on undermining the regime and its capabilities. Effectively, the “sanctions have undermined the private sector and the middle class, while enhancing the power of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards,” he explained.

Citing results of two polls conducted in Iran in 2000 and 2005, Moaddel said that there has been a major shift in the sentiments of ordinary Iranians towards liberal and nationalist values that stand in stark opposition to that of the ruling Islamic regime. Currently, a large percentage of Iranians value nationalism above religion as the basis for their identity. Moaddel argued that the international community’s lack of support for these new liberal attitudes is a missed opportunity.

There are a variety of alternative “smart” sanction models that could be pursued and others willing to support a change in strategy. Moaddel said that it was important to point out that not all interest groups in the US are in agreement that imposing sanctions on Iran is the best way of achieving objectives. While the Israeli lobby is keen on imposing ever more crippling sanctions, many US corporations are against them and more in favor of continuing trade relations with Iran. Moaddel argued that “effective sanctions, in my view, are ‘smart sanctions’ – those that effectively undermine the repressive capability of the regime, including the revolutionary guards, while enhancing the power of the democratic opposition.”

Western governments cannot see beyond their fears of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, when instead they should be encouraging the flourishing of civil society and the mobilization of the Iranian population towards calls for democratization. Moaddel concluded by saying that “the current crippling sanctions may in fact undermine the regime. They may at the same time destroy the organizations of the civil society and undermine the morale of the oppositions. Smart sanctions are good. Current crippling sanctions that are comprehensive and universal, which adversely affect the lives of all Iranians, are simply war by other means.”

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor of CIRS Publications

Deputy Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Zlatko Lagumdzija, on the Syrian conflict
2013-03-10 08:00 - 18:00
CIRS hosted a Focused Discussion featuring the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dr. Zlatko Lagumdžija. The event included an in-depth discussion of the Syrian conflict with senior diplomats and ambassadors, academics, and foreign policy analysts. Some of the topics of discussion included the course and direction of the Syrian conflict, the regional and international responses it has elicited, the pros and cons of outside military intervention in the conflict, and the rise in the scale of the refugees and the humanitarian disaster to which the conflict has given rise.

Maha Al-Hendawi Lectures on Inclusive Education in the Gulf
2013-02-19 08:00 - 18:00
Maha Al-Hendawi, the inaugural CIRS Qatar University Fellow for 2012-2013 and Assistant ‎Professor of Special Education in the College of Education at Qatar ‎University, delivered a ‎CIRSFocused Discussion on “Policy Borrowing in Education: the Example of Inclusive ‎Education in the Gulf” on February 19, 2013. Al-Hendawi began the lecture by noting that her ‎interest in the topic came from her own experience as a graduate from a US university who ‎returned to Qatar thinking that she would implement some of the policies and procedures she had ‎learnt and experience whilst studying abroad. ‎

Al-Hendawi explained that she was initially enthusiastic about introducing certain US-based ‎policies upon her return to Qatar. However, the reality on the ground proved otherwise, and she ‎began experiencing a fundamental problem with “policy borrowing.” Al-Hendawi’s direct ‎involvement with local schools, as well as with the Supreme Education Council, gave her greater ‎insight into the specific challenges of the local educational environment that policy borrowing ‎might not be able to solve, and that may even lead to a whole set of new and unforeseen ‎challenges. Al-Hendawi noticed that certain policies were not as successful in Qatar as they were ‎in the United States. She is currently working on investigating why these challenges exist and ‎what she could do to help formulate future policy directions. Al-Hendawi said, “I basically chose ‎one of the most important policies in Special Education, if not the most important policy in ‎Special Education, that is, ‘inclusive education,” as a case study, which followed the research ‎path set by renowned scholars in the field. ‎

The general definition of “inclusive education” is when students with disabilities are included ‎within the general education system and given access to a general education curriculum. There ‎are many different approaches to inclusive education worldwide, where some models advise that ‎students with only mild disabilities can be included. UNESCO, however, advocates for “full ‎inclusion” and an open school system where any student with disabilities, no matter the degree, is ‎able to access the general school system. This lack of consensus on what constitutes “inclusive ‎education” presents a number of challenges. For example, the Qatari school system adopted both ‎modified inclusion and full inclusion at different times and with different results. ‎

‎“The main reasons for borrowing policy, or borrowing the policy of inclusive education, are ‎globalization and international pressure,” Al-Hendawi said. It is important to put policy ‎borrowing in its proper context. “Here in the Gulf, when the policy of inclusive education came, ‎it came with education reform,” and a reorganization of the entire school system and curriculum. ‎Al-Hendawi argued that “timing is really important because it actually came post-9/11,” when the ‎West began questioning the Arab educational system in general and became directly involved in ‎its overhaul. This was a highly contentious issue that was debated in local media outlets all over ‎the Gulf.‎

‎“When the policy of inclusion started in the West, it came out of the human rights movements, ‎and it came out of the ideology of social justice, equity, equality, so it was actually a bottom-top ‎type of decision” that grew organically out of public demands. In the Gulf states, however, these ‎policy decisions are being imposed from the top-down. In this regard, even though the policies are ‎commendable and show results in their countries of origin, they have not had enough time to ‎filter through the social structures of Gulf countries.‎

In conclusion, Al-Hendawi warned that policy borrowing is a problem when it is implemented as ‎a “quick fix” to address an immediate issue. This is further exacerbated when policies do not take ‎into account the specific social, cultural, and political environments that may not always be ‎compatible with the implementation and aims of the policy. In short, careful and constructive ‎policy borrowing must be implemented in a way that takes into account local contexts in order ‎for it to become internalized by the adoptive country. ‎

Maha Al-Hendawi received her Ph.D. in Special Education and Disability Leadership from ‎Virginia ‎Commonwealth University. Her research interests include educational policies and ‎reform initiatives in ‎the region; academic interventions for children and youth with special needs ‎and those who are at-risk; and quality ‎preparation and training programs for educators. She has ‎published in the area of special education and has been a guest speaker in various events ‎and ‎activities.‎

In order to enhance local research productivity and build upon its established ‎collegial ‎relationship with Qatar University, CIRS launched an annual fellowship to be ‎awarded ‎to a member of Qatar University’s faculty. Maha Al-Hendawi was selected as the 2012-2013 ‎CIRS QU fellow. The fellowship will support Al-Hendawi in pursuing original research projects, ‎with the aim of publishing ‎research outcomes. ‎

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

Ambassador Munir Ghannam Lectures on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
2013-02-13 08:00 - 18:00
H.E. Munir Ghannam, Ambassador of Palestine in Qatar, delivered a Focused Discussion lecture ‎on February 13, 2013, on the topic of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Ambassador introduced ‎the lecture by noting that “the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which is part of the Arab-Israeli ‎conflict,” has a long and turbulent history that has been ongoing for over a century. Giving some ‎historical background to the conflict, the Ambassador recounted that “the whole story started at ‎the beginning of twentieth century when Palestine was put under the British mandate in 1922, ‎which then started a process of allowing hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants to ‎immigrate from several countries all over the world, but mainly from Europe,” because of the ‎atrocities that the Jews had been subjected to in general, and during the world wars in particular.‎

Over the course of the twentieth century, what was once known as Palestine was completely ‎altered. Through a series of concerted Israeli political and military efforts, Palestine was annexed, ‎occupied, and transformed into an illegitimate entity. Much of the land was renamed as Israel. ‎‎“At the beginning of the twentieth century,” Ambassador Ghannam explained, “the population ‎of Palestine was 89 percent Arabs – I mean, Arabs who are Muslims and Christians – and 11 ‎percent were Jews also living in Palestine and considered Palestinian.” By 1947, the ratios were ‎radically changed causing much friction and a series of conflicts, which spilled into neighboring ‎countries, and ignited an ongoing armed Palestinian resistance campaign. Currently, the Israelis ‎have introduced such dramatic shifts in the demography and geography of the area that they ‎have in effect changed the reality on the ground. ‎

After several rounds of failed negotiations over the years, the Palestinians found that there was ‎no way to reach an agreement with the Israelis to establish a viable contiguous Palestinian state in ‎the West Bank because of Israel’s constant absorption, confiscation, and annexation of land in ‎the West Bank and Gaza. “Whenever we reach an agreement, we find new realities on the ‎ground that don’t allow us to establish a state, and that is why a couple of years ago, we stopped ‎negotiations with the Israelis and we started trying to seek a solution at the United Nations and ‎the Security Council when we managed to have the status of an observer state,” he said. ‎

In conclusion, Ambassador Ghannam said that this new situation gives hope to the Palestinians ‎that a fresh round of negotiations can now take place with the support of the international ‎community to give the “two-state solution” international legitimacy and to eventually lead to a ‎sovereign and unoccupied Palestinian state. ‎

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor of CIRS Publications.

Richard Schofield on Britain Territorializing when Decolonizing the Gulf
2013-02-05 08:00 - 18:00
Richard Schofield, an expert on the study of historical territorial disputes, delivered a CIRS ‎Monthly Dialogue lecture on “Territorializing when Decolonizing: Britain Tries to Square its ‎Circles in the Gulf, 1968-1971” on February 5, 2013. Schofield, who is Convenor of the Master’s ‎programme in Geopolitics, Territory, and Security at King’s College in London, examined the ‎period of the late 1960s and early 1970s when Britain announced its plans to leave the Gulf and ‎end the regional Pax Britannica. During this time, there were several territorial issues and ongoing ‎disputes that Britain needed to confront before its departure. “In the late 1960s, Britain was ‎faced with a whole set of territorial issues between protected states, and between protected ‎states and their neighbors,” Schofield said.‎

By examining recently released British foreign office documents, Schofield highlighted a set of ‎disputes that were ongoing in the 1960s, including northern Gulf worries that continued on from ‎the 1930s posed by Kuwait and its boundary dispute with Iraq, and, in particular, the intersection ‎of boundaries and territorial claims between Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar in relation to ‎the access corridor of Khor Al-Udaid.‎

Before its departure, Britain actively encouraged Gulf states into increased cooperation with each ‎other and attempted to contribute towards a future grouping of Arab states on the western side ‎of the Gulf in what was termed “Gulfery.” In order to achieve some movement on these ‎territorial issues, the United States proposed solving several disputes simultaneously as a package ‎of disputes. This included proposing to the Shah that Iran drop its claim to Bahrain, that Britain ‎help Iran gain ownership of islands in the lower Gulf, and that a maritime boundary agreement be ‎signed between Saudi Arabia and Iran allowing oil companies in to develop the area. “One of the ‎things that was really troubling the States around this time was the failure of Saudi Arabia and ‎Iran to finalize a boundary agreement so that they could open up the hydrocarbon reserves of the ‎northern Gulf,” Schofield explained. Towards the end of the 1960s, however, these deals rapidly ‎unraveled and became unfeasible.‎

One particular case-study that Schofield examined was the “bizarre” boundary agreement signed ‎between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi in 1974. The only way to make sense of this agreement, ‎according to Schofield, is to delve into the complex history of the dispute. “The agreement of ’74 ‎was bizarre […] for the way in which it dealt with both offshore and onshore boundary ‎definitions” because even though most of the territory lay within the Abu Dhabi boundary, the ‎agreement read that all hydrocarbons in the area would be considered as belonging to Saudi ‎Arabia. Similarly, the offshore agreement read that Saudi Arabia could mount military ‎installations on some of the islands said to belong to Abu Dhabi. ‎

Adding to the complexity of the agreement, the onshore boundaries and the offshore boundaries ‎were negotiated at different times and with different results. Schofield said that “it was an ‎unusual and messy situation – you don’t see it replicated anywhere else.” In a time when Britain ‎was taking less responsibility for protected states’ foreign relations, many of these territorial ‎agreements were being signed without the consent of Britain. “We move to a rather nonsensical ‎position where the southern Qatari land boundary was seen as a Saudi concern, yet its ‎southeastern maritime limits a British one,” Schofield said. ‎

In conclusion, Schofield argued that territorial boundaries in the Gulf were traditionally drawn ‎up according to “cultural and historical” agreements. Historically, Gulf states exercised control ‎over non-linear nodes of land as opposed to large swathes of continuous areas. Thus, Gulf states ‎do not always respect modern boundaries and may view them as political, divisive, and an ‎ongoing source of contestation. Modern political economic concerns and requirements for the ‎legal division of hydrocarbons according to clearly demarcated borders are thus incommensurable ‎with traditional Gulf claims to land and resources.‎

Richard Schofield is widely recognized as a leading academic authority on the international ‎boundaries of Arabia and its surrounding region. He has written extensively on territorial aspects ‎of Arabia and the Persian Gulf region, and has acted as adviser on territorial disputes to the ‎governments of Barbados, Bahrain, Jordan, Yemen, as well as to the Negotiations Support Unit ‎of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Ramallah. ‎

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications.

H.E. Kasit Piromya on Southeast Asia's Role in Global Food Security
2013-01-22 08:00 - 18:00
Former Foreign Minister of Thailand and career diplomat Kasit Piromya was the featured speaker ‎for a CIRS Monthly Dialoguelecture on January 22, 2013. His Excellency Piromya’s talk, titled ‎‎“Southeast Asia’s Role in Global Food Security,” focused on the role of Southeast Asian ‎countries as major exporters of food and as the “food cradle” or “food kitchen” of the world. ‎

According to Piromya, when combined, Southeast Asian countries rank in the top ten global ‎food producers and exporters. “There is no food shortage and there is no famine in Southeast ‎Asia so we feel confident that we can be the supplier of food for the decades to come,” he said.‎

Addressing the important connections between Southeast Asian countries and the Gulf ‎Cooperation Council (GCC) states, Piromya pointed to the great potential for long-lasting ‎cooperative agreements between the two sides. He noted that Gulf states are secure in oil, gas, ‎and energy, whilst Southeast Asian countries enjoy food security. This presents optimum grounds ‎for partnerships and working together to achieve common goals and mutually beneficial ‎arrangements where one part of the world has particular resources that can be of benefit to other ‎areas of the globe. “The first thing that comes to mind,” Piromya claimed, “is the ‎complementarity of Southeast Asia and the Gulf states.” ‎

Despite this natural partnership between Southeast Asian countries and the Gulf states, major ‎questions remain regarding how this complementarity between food security cooperation and ‎energy security cooperation can be achieved. Piromya offered several possible scenarios for cross-‎regional cooperation. ‎

The first, he said, is for the trading partners to establish and agree upon long-term contracts to ‎trade food and energy resources. Another option is for Gulf states to enter into joint venture ‎agreements with existing Southeast Asian organizations to actively invest in farms and related ‎activities in Southeast Asian countries. This scenario will allow Gulf investors to work directly ‎with food production experts in order to increase productivity and returns on investment. A final ‎suggestion is to create stockpiles of food that can be kept in storage and utilized as and when ‎needed. He explained that “Thailand, as a major food exporting country, pledged 50,000 tons of ‎rice into the stockpile for emergency situations.” These stockpiles can be stored on land or in the ‎form of “floating stockpiles” on ships that are directed towards areas of need anywhere in the ‎world. This option requires that countries maintain emergency stockpiles ready to deploy in ‎disaster situations and that countries work in conjunction with international organizations like the ‎World Food Programme to deliver food aid to countries in need. For example, “when there was ‎an earthquake in Haiti a few years back, Thailand was the biggest contributor in terms of ‎humanitarian assistance; we provided the largest amount of rice,” he said.‎

Countries in Southeast Asia and the Gulf could work together to tackle some of the more ‎prescient global food security issues. In his former capacity as Foreign Minister, Piromya was ‎directly involved in negotiations with the World Food Programme to provide food aid, especially ‎rice, in times of crisis in the Asia Pacific region and on the east coast of Africa. Similarly, “the ‎Gulf states, with so much financial endowments, could also play a very important role in terms of ‎humanitarian assistance,” he said. To this end, it is imperative that ASEAN countries and GCC ‎state leaders establish a more consistent political dialogue between the two regions. ‎

Taking this regional cooperation a step further, Piromya argued for the necessity to go beyond ‎food aid and to think of partnerships that can be maintained at the level of research and ‎development. He concluded by saying that there is great interest in researching and investing in ‎alternative and renewable energy sources in many Southeast Asian and Gulf states. Currently, in ‎Thailand, alternative energy is being produced from food sources such as tapioca, palm oil, and ‎molasses. This is a mutually beneficial area for both regions to work closely together. ‎

Earlier in the day, H. E. Piromya met with Georgetown University SFS-Qatar students to share ‎his experiences as a career diplomat and relay various anecdotes about his forty years in the Thai ‎Foreign Service. Later in the day, he spoke to various ambassadors and embassy staff stationed ‎in Qatar at a luncheon talk organized by CIRS. During the meeting, he discussed his optimism ‎for Qatar’s future in light of the Arab Spring, globalization, and increased liberalization. With the ‎inevitable depletion of natural resources, he argued that Qatar has invested wisely in its future ‎knowledge-based economy. “Qatar will take the future in its own hands, manage the wealth all ‎over the world, and manage itself also as an open society.” As a final thought, Piromya said that ‎Qatar has taken and will continue to take a leading role in many global issues ranging from sports ‎to climate change.‎

His Excellency Kasit Piromya is a career Thai diplomat, politician, and academic. He previously served as Thailand’s ambassador to Russia, Indonesia, Germany, Japan, and the United States. From 2008 to 2011, he was Thailand’s Minister of Foreign Affairs. Currently, H. E. Piromya is a member of the Thai Parliament representing the Democrat Party.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications.

Politics and the Media in the Post-Arab Spring Middle East Working Group I
2013-01-05 18:00 - 2013-01-06 18:00
On January 5–6, 2013, CIRS held a working group meeting under the research initiative “Politics and the Media in the Post-Arab Spring Middle East.” Given the profound socio-political transitions within Arab states in the wake of the Arab Spring, participants used a multidisciplinary approach to analyze shifts in the role of the media and how it is articulated in everyday spaces of cultural production within the region.

With the rise of new media and its increasing integration within traditional media, participants discussed how media is positioned in the new political scene. Evolving ruling bargains in the region have been translated into evolving information bargains where distinctions between processes of information production and reception have become increasingly blurred. The notion of the public becoming an active participant in media processes, translates into a society that has increasingly become in a state of self-information. This is evident in countries such as Saudi Arabia, where people have bypassed state operations and sidelined leaders by taking media tools such as Twitter into their own hands in what is indicative of a move from centralization to decentralization of information.

The media landscape in countries that successfully toppled their dictators exhibits elements of both continuity and change, as countries such as Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen are in the process of re-articulating the position of the state in relation to society. Remnants of authoritarianism continue to impact Egypt where state media institutions are perceived as being “ikhwanized,” while signs of political liberalization are emerging in neighboring Libya, where media practitioners are allowed to more freely criticize political leadership.

In addition to understanding the changing political dynamics of the region, the media landscape gives insight on the current socio-political forces at play. With the rise of Islamist parties in the wake of the Arab uprisings, the secular-Islamist divide has dominated much of the discourse around the region. However, closer analysis of Islamic television in the region provides a more nuanced understanding of the different Islamic movements gaining ascendency. Participants discussed the Da’wa movement (the Islamic outreach movement) as a field of cultural battle that is internally divided and diverse. Islamic channels are not the normative alternative to secular channels as commonly misconceived, rather Islamic television as a social practice addresses moral notions of citizenship by providing competing forms on what it means to be Muslim.

As with most long-scale and prolonged political upheavals, Arab transitional media is offering mobilizing information and is increasingly being used as a platform for voicing opinions. Historically, Arab journalists have viewed themselves as agents of social change; much more than just purveyors of information, they are interpreters of public life.

While discussing whether there is an Arab journalism culture that can be attributed to the region as a whole, the participants advocated for a de-westernization of media studies that assesses the intricate micro-processes evident in Arab journalism, and studies how people negotiate their subjectivity within their broader socio-political constraints.

Participants also discussed the “multi-vocality” present in the media in terms of language, cultural spaces of production, and social actors. Arab graffiti, regarded as a visible form of politics, has exploded in the region, yet remains greatly understudied. Going beyond the content of “visible politics” and understanding the style and aesthetics of graffiti gives greater understanding of the language utilized to resonate with people’s interests, grievances, and needs. Other forms of production, such as musalsalat (serialized television shows), were discussed by working group members as avenues for understanding socio-political phenomena of the revolutions.

Various social movements have also used the media as an instrument of activism. These social movements have a myriad of players that utilize numerous media tools and adapt them to their respective needs. Social media has enabled diasporic communities to organize, mobilize, and contribute decisively to issues playing out in their homelands. Wary of the misconception that social media is all inclusive, participants pointed to the class-based accessibility of the internet and social media sites. Notions of inclusion and exclusion led participants to question what media spaces marginalized communities use to speak and who their audience is.

In the wake of the Arab revolts, Hezbollah has become an increasingly controversial player in the region. Although the popular uprisings did not occur in Lebanon as they did in other Arab countries, the political mosaic of Lebanon reflects the politics of the region, and understanding the media strategies of Hezbollah gives insight into how people interact with the media as sectarian sensibilities in the region are heightened. While Hezbollah is a Shia organization, its affiliated television station, Al-Manar, avoids sectarian rhetoric, portraying itself as pan-Islamist and pan-Arabist and boasts of a wide variety of audiences coming from different sectarian affiliations.

In tackling the political economy of media in the Middle East, working group participants questioned whether state policies are directly reflected in the strategies and content of state-owned or state-sponsored media outlets. The range of actors involved in media production, from directors and producers to journalists in the newsroom, merits a distinction between funders and creators of various media forms. Media cities were also discussed as useful sites of cultural production where structures of power and forms of resistance can be understood. An example of such is the strict control of the Egyptian Media Production City by the ruling Muslim Brotherhood, where a supposed beacon of media freedom is dominated by the ruling political party.

Over the last decade, there has been growing localization of news providers in the Arab world as people become increasingly concerned with issues pertaining to their daily lives. In what is dubbed as the “post Al-Jazeera era,” participants discussed what this means for US public diplomacy in the region. The failure of Al-Hurra to operate as an effective foreign policy tool for the US government, begs the question “what media tools and mechanisms will the US government utilize in the face of increasing competition from localized news providers?” As media becomes increasingly dispersed, social actors and governments alike will alter their communication strategies to accommodate the shifting Arab media landscape.

For the working group agenda, click here.
For the participants’ biographies, click here.
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Marwa Abdel Samei, Cairo UniversityWalter Armbrust, University of OxfordZahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarFatima El Issawi, London School of EconomicsNaila Hamdy, American University in CairoManata Hashemi, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarJoe Khalil, Northwestern University in QatarSahar Khamis, University of MarylandMarwan Kraidy, University of PennsylvaniaZahera Harb, City University LondonDina Matar, SOAS, University of LondonNourredine Miladi, Qatar UniversitySuzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarYasmin Moll, New York UniversityDwaa Osman, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarLarbi Sadiki, University of Exeter; Qatar UniversityPhilip Seib, University of Southern CaliforniaNadia Talpur, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarMohamed Zayani, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Article by Dwaa Osman, Research Analyst at CIRS

Weak States in the Greater Middle East Working Group I
2012-12-08 11:00 - 2012-12-09 21:00
On December 8–9, 2012, CIRS convened its first Working Group meeting under the research initiative “Weak States in the Greater Middle East.” Participants employed a multi-disciplinary approach to critically analyze the terminology of weak and failing states, and the political implications associated with states being characterized as such. In addition to exploring cross-cutting themes on the global weak states discourse, individual case studies of Middle Eastern countries were discussed to highlight the range of domestic, regional, and global causes and consequences of state fragility.

The Working Group began with a discussion on the notions and terminology of state failure and weakness. Through the lens of standardized classifications of states and their capacity, weak states are defined as those that are considered to lack certain distinct qualities and the ability to provide adequate social, economic, and political goods to their citizenry. Indexes crafted by different organizations label strong, weak, and failed states based on indicators that measure state institutional capacity, political goods provided by the state, and security and stability within the state. These rankings are utilized by policy makers to assess the status of a state and to accordingly develop policies that promote economic development, provide humanitarian assistance, and support political stability. During the working group, the various methodologies used to construct indexes, and the ability to meaningfully interpret the rankings were questioned. The aggregation of a diverse set of states, based on indicators that highlight certain symptoms without taking into account the causes and dynamisms of certain conditions on the ground, offers a monolithic conception of states’ success and failure.

This classification of states has directed the focus of donor countries and multilateral organizations to those states that are ranked at the bottom end of the state strength continuum. When assessing the effectiveness of aid allocation in weak states, the participants debated the various routes of aid delivery, the strategic interests of donor states, and the different types of aid provided. In some cases aid allocation fulfills the mere purpose of paying off elites for the strategic interest of the donor countries, while in other cases development institutions are created outside of the recipient state in order to achieve short term results, consequently undermining the state and exacerbating the original problem of capacity weakness.

The politicization of aid converges with the securitization of the weak state discourse. It is assumed that state weakness creates a permissive environment for non-state actors to thrive, thereby posing a non-traditional threat to global security. Policymakers believe that there is a positive quadratic relationship between non-traditional threat production and state failure or collapse. However, more recent scholarly work suggests that a collapsed state does not have adequate financial and logistical resources that criminal or terrorist networks need to function, while weak states do. It was suggested by some Working Group participants that the monolithic designation of weak states does not enable policy makers to understand the particular threat posed or to tailor an effective solution.

The Arab Spring has unmasked the fragility of states ruled by strongmen. The Working Group provided illumination on several states in the Middle East post Arab Spring, both in terms of their domestic functioning and their regional interaction. Libya’s Qaddafi was characterized by his personalistic and idiosyncratic rule of a state that lacked institutions. In the aftermath of Qaddafi’s fall, some have argued that this lack of institutions is a blessing in disguise, since the Libyan state is not weighed down by the previous regime’s judiciary and military-industry complex. Participants also discussed the security status of the post-revolutionary Libyan state with regards to militias, and the consequent spillover effect of arms going into neighboring countries. In the context of external intervention and its impact on state weakness, the case of Iraq was examined. Urban politics and post-war reconstruction in Iraq demonstrated that cities function as both the main loci of armed conflict and the main sites of state-building.

Indexes that quantify the state’s policies and institutional performance and grade them against weakness and strength, do not offer us a tool to understand the nuances of regime adaptability in the state. A monolithic conception of states, fails to understand countries such as Sudan where there are dynamic actors who bargain in a political marketplace. Over the last decade Sudanese political life has degenerated from one with an institutionalized core, to a regionalized political market place driven by an auction of allegiance. Characterized as an oligarchy, the ruling elite have been able to contend with competing local and regional centers of patronage in order to maintain central power and keep the periphery of the state from seriously threatening the regime. An increased focus on specific relationships, namely the disconnect between state and society is necessary in examining the question of center and margin in weak states.

Working Group participants debated whether states that are in the process of formation rather than political consolidation should be considered weak states. The Yemeni state, which is consistently labeled as weak or collapsing, is still in a state-building process where political negotiation continues to unfold. Characterized as a state with diffuse systems of localized authority, legal pluralism, and rife with weaponry, the Yemeni state falls short of the Weberian ideal of statehood. On the issue of weaponry, it was discussed that in Yemen, violence is a symbolic resource and not one that is utilized in ruthless fashion. Moreover, some argue that it is an innate cultural preference of Yemenis to refuse central authority, thereby negotiating a different model of statehood that does not necessarily converge with the Western model. Yemen’s constant state of semi-instability was attributed to the significant role of external actors. The neighboring Saudi Arabia for instance, is keen on preventing Yemen from having a strong centralized stable state. In order to prevent the state from imploding and for the sake of regional stability however, it is also keen on having the Yemeni state maintain certain institutional functions. By funding both the state and actors that challenge the central state, Saudi Arabia is able to maintain the constant semi-stability of its neighbor.

The participants also discussed the particular dynamics that shape institution building in Palestine. Palestine as a rentier and extractive state has built its institutions in the context of colonial domination where major institutions are developed to serve both the interests of the Palestinian state and the Israeli state. Moreover, Palestine is dictated by the “politics of antithesis” where outside leadership focuses on consolidating its own power by opposing the politics of the intifada elite at the expense of institution building.

Throughout the discussion on the weak states in the greater Middle East, the participants probed into the political economy that underlies the state classification system. More recently there have been country-led initiatives that monitor and report on issues facing troubled states, as seen by the G7+ initiative which creates a paradigm for countries to do their own fragility assessment. As new conceptions of statehood arise, the articulation of the development and security interests of global hierarchies of power may alter.

Click here for the working group’s agenda
Click here for the participants’ biographies
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Rogaia M. Abusharaf, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarZahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarBridget L. Coggins, Dartmouth CollegeJohn T. Crist, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarAlex de Waal, Tufts UniversityDaniel Esser, American UniversityManata Hashemi, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarMark McGillivray, Deakin UniversitySuzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarDwaa Osman, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarSarah Phillips, University of SydneyGlenn E. Robinson, Naval Postgraduate SchoolRobert I. Rotberg, Carleton UniversityCharles Schmitz, Towson UniversityNadia Talpur, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarFrederic Wehrey, Carnegie Endowment for International PeaceMahjoob Zweiri, Qatar University

Article by Dwaa Osman, Research Analyst at CIRS

Sheikha Aisha bint Faleh Al Thani on Qatarization and Gender Quotas
2012-12-04 08:00 - 18:00
Sheikha Aisha bint Faleh Al-Thani delivered a Monthly Dialogue lecture on the subject of ‎‎“Women in Qatar: Quotas, Qualifications, and Qatarization” on December 4, 2012. Sheikha Al ‎Thani is the chairperson and founder of Al Faleh Group, an organization that provides ‎educational products and services, and she also serves on the Board of Directors for the Supreme ‎Education Council, Reach Out to Asia, and Zaytuna Institute and College. ‎

Sheikha Al Thani began the lecture by noting that “despite great strides in education and ‎employment, a large gender gap remains in position of status in Qatar for women.” There is still ‎much work that needs to be done to close the gender gap in the labor market, especially in ‎relation to the integration of Qatari women on a level playing field in the workforce in Qatar, the ‎Sheikha argued.‎

Education is one of the key pillars of His Highness Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani’sVision ‎‎2030 for Qatar, and one of the greatest agents of change for the role of women. “Qatar has ‎become a regional leader in education,” and has invested heavily in reforming the K-12 ‎educational system led by the Supreme Education Council. In addition, some of the world’s ‎leading universities and educational institutions have been invited to impart quality education ‎and transfer knowledge and skills. Through these institutions and through the emphasis on ‎reforming educational policies, Qatari women are emerging as professionals who contribute ‎equally to the country’s sustainable growth in a knowledge-based economy. “There is a strong ‎positive correlation between employability and the quality of education a woman receives,” and ‎so women in Qatar have been increasingly and actively participating in the economy, the labor ‎market, and society. Thus, Qatari women are shattering old paradigms, the Sheikha said. ‎

In comparison to the neighboring Gulf Cooperation Coucil (GCC) states, Qatar has the highest ‎percentage of local women employed in the national labor market. Despite this positive statistic, ‎Qatar has the region’s lowest percentage of women in senior leadership roles, and trails far ‎behind the European average. “United Nations data showed that only 7% of people in senior and ‎managerial positions were women, which was the lowest in the region.” This means that “women ‎are still underrepresented in decision-making positions in many fields,” but, Al Thani argued, this ‎is gradually changing in Qatar as more educated women are continually changing the face of the ‎labor market.‎

Although education is one of the most powerful tools for the empowerment of women in society, ‎it is only one area of social, economic, and political participation. Qatar has positively introduced ‎gender quotas in national employment, but, the Sheikha argued, there is a risk that these are not ‎properly introduced. There still needs to be more done to tackle the careful implementation of ‎‎“Qatarization” and gender quota policies for the inclusion of women in the labor market. ‎‎“Because this lack of participation is holding the region back from further economic growth, ‎some governments have stiffened their resolve to ensure that unrealistic quotas are met,” she ‎argued. “Not surprisingly, many public and private sector managers are reluctant to hire and ‎retain nationals, especially women, whom they feel lack the skills needed for the job.” ‎

Thus, Qatarization and gender quota policies must be introduced in a careful and constructive ‎manner so that all stakeholders gain from women’s participation in the labor market. The Sheikha ‎gave the example of Qatar Petroleum (QP) as a company that has addressed Qatarization in a ‎strategic and systematic manner. “It has adopted a process for attracting qualified talent from all ‎available sources. This includes hiring entry level candidates directly from the ranks of recent ‎graduates from women’s colleges and vocational institutes,” she said. ‎

Such job placement programs and public-private partnerships providing a direct link between ‎educational institutions and the labor market is a must for future of Qatar. The connection ‎between education and the labor market cannot be stressed enough, the Sheikha said, as one ‎necessarily eases the burden on the other. Highly educated graduates will need less training from ‎their employers and this will lead to a smooth and symbiotic relationship between the two ‎spheres. ‎

In conclusion, the Sheikha offered some recommendations for the effective application of ‎Qatarization policies to address the gender imbalance in the Qatari labor market. “Introducing a ‎quota system for women will not be easy, and there is a risk of moving too fast, even for those ‎companies that are most aggressively tackling Qatarization.” Further, Qatar should implement an ‎education policy that takes into account practical skills such as professional development ‎programs and entrepreneurship programs to help women become innovators and entrepreneurs. ‎The transfer of knowledge and acquiring job skills are long and arduous processes that need time ‎to take shape. Educational reform has occurred relatively recently and so not enough time has ‎passed to be able to assess the success of these campaigns. “For reforms to be effective, ‎evaluation of policies must become an essential component of the process of monitoring so that ‎initiates can be revised and improved based on measured outcomes,” she explained. ‎

Although women in Qatar play a huge role in community and social development, raising ‎awareness about the possibilities of contributing to the country’s economy is important. Sheikha ‎Moza bin Nasser and her daughter Sheikha Al Mayassa are great role models for Qatar, the ‎region, and the world. ‎

Sheikha Aisha bint Faleh Al-Thani is the chairperson and founder of Al Faleh Group, a land mark ‎in Qatar providing educational products and services of the highest quality. Three schools, ‎including Doha Academy, fall under the group’s umbrella. After graduating from Qatar ‎University with a Bachelor’s in Education and a Bachelor’s in English Literature, Sheikha Aisha ‎went on to get a Master’s in Business Administration from the University of Hull in the United ‎Kingdom, followed by a Ph.D. in corporate governance from Cass Business School, at City ‎University, London. ‎

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

CIRS and the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs Discuss Climate Change in the Arab World
2012-12-03 08:00 - 18:00
The Center for International and Regional Studies and the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy ‎and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, held a Panel discussion on “Who or What ‎Drives Climate Change Policy in the Arab World?” on December 3, 2012. The panel featured ‎Karim Makdisi from the American University of Beirut; Roula Majdalani from the United ‎Nations’ Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia; Lama El Hatow from IndyACT-‎The League of Independent Activists; and Rabi Mohtar from the Qatar Energy and Environment ‎Research Institute (QEERI).‎

The panel moderator, Karim Makdisi, posed the question “who or what drives climate change ‎policy in the Arab World?” to the speakers and the audience. He argued that there needs to be an ‎examination of the drivers behind a reinvigorated interest in climate change among Arab ‎governments. In answer to this question, the first speaker, Roula Majdalani, advocated for the ‎state as the most important player in any climate change related issue. However, Majdalani said ‎that it was necessary to unpack the idea of the state and question who or what it represents. This, ‎she said, is especially relevant in the context of the Arab uprisings and “the dismantling of the ‎security apparatus.” The dissolution of various regional regimes does not necessarily mean that ‎the state per se has disappeared, but that there are new dynamics taking shape at the level of ‎governance, and this reformation is something that is new to many Arab countries.‎

The state, Majdalani said, plays a strategic role in climate change issues in its “ability for working ‎through complex governance structures, working at an inter-ministerial level, working with a long ‎range perspective, and working on issues that are transboundary, and in that sense the state really ‎is a key interlocutor in this process of negotiation.” It is also the main player in mobilizing ‎financing and ensuring the transfer of technology at the domestic and international levels.‎

The state has the main responsibility of addressing issues related to extreme climactic conditions ‎such as droughts and floods. It is, therefore, in the state’s interest to take a leading role in driving ‎climate change policy, especially in the countries of the Arab World where issues of water and ‎energy are paramount. The state is also responsible for safeguarding, preserving, and exploiting ‎natural resources without adversely affecting neighboring countries. Carbon emissions are ‎necessarily transboundary, and so the state must negotiate with its neighbors and, indeed, with ‎the international community for international climate related agreements.‎

In conclusion, Majdalani argued that the increasing interest in issues of climate change among ‎Arab nations provides a unique opportunity to reinvent the idea of the state as an entity that is ‎accountable, transparent, and responsible. ‎Traditionally, some Arab states have been strong in terms of forcefulness and authoritarianism, ‎but are weak when it comes to the will and capacity to tackle such irreversible environmental issues. ‎

Rabi Mohtar was the second speaker on the panel and he highlighted the crucial role of science, ‎research, and development in addressing climate change concerns. He argued that climate change ‎discourse is dominated by the key words of “adaptation” and “mitigation,” but that there needs ‎to be more critical investigation into exactly what it is that should be adapted or mitigated. ‎Current climate change data states that, on a global level, “the extremes in terms of climate are ‎getting hotter, but that doesn’t tell us where and how.” Further complicating the discourse, the ‎scientific knowledge on climate change is still in a nascent phase and much of the data is ‎contradictory and inaccurate. Mohtar argued that there is urgent need to invest in research and ‎development. QEERI, he said, is taking the lead on many such research initiatives in the region ‎and “embarking on an initial study that looks into the effects of climate change on dust and dust ‎storms.”‎

It is befitting that Qatar hosted the COP 18 conference, Mohtar said, since it is the Middle East ‎and the Arab World that are most affected by issues of increased population growth and the ‎concomitant stresses on food, water, and energy. The Middle East “is where the highest per ‎capita consumption of water and energy are taking place” and where food security is becoming ‎an increasing concern. “There is no single country in the whole region that is self-sufficient,” in ‎terms of food, and so “the food-water nexus is an extreme driver for climate change research that ‎we should be focusing on.” This includes investigating efforts to reintroduce dry land agriculture ‎that had been traditionally used in the countries of the Middle East since ancient times. Mohtar ‎conclude by saying that there is a significant need for a climate change model that is locally ‎developed for the region – one that is specifically designed for arid and semi-arid regions. ‎

The final speaker on the panel was Lama El Hatow who rallied for the importance of civil society ‎in climate change issues. She argued for “the role that civil society can also play by affecting and ‎influencing climate change policy in this part of the world.” El Hatow explained that civil society ‎in many countries of Arab World has been either dormant or non-existent. This was largely due ‎to “the oppressive nature of many Arab governments and the way that many social structures ‎function” in some Arab states. Since the regional uprisings, however, this scene has changed ‎dramatically and a space has been opened for civil society organizations to operate openly and ‎effectively. These new formations are increasingly made up of youth groups who are advocating ‎for a variety of issues and, more importantly, people are speaking out on all issues related to ‎human rights.‎

Since climate change issues are transboundary and of global concern, Arab civil society ‎organizations are teaming up with their international counterparts and pressing their governments ‎on unified issues. Although many of these groups have limited capacity, their passion for the ‎issues has made a significant difference. As a final thought, El Hatow said that although many ‎regional and international governments have made great strides in addressing issues of climate ‎change, civil society organizations are still needed as they act as a monitoring force and a constant ‎voice that prompts governments into further action. ‎

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

Speaker Biographies:‎

Karim Makdisi is an Associate Professor of International Politics and International ‎Environmental Policy in the Department of Political Studies and Public Administration at the ‎American University of Beirut (AUB). He is also the Associate Director of AUB’s Issam Fares ‎Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, and coordinates the Environmental Policy ‎component of AUB’s Interfaculty Graduate Environmental Science Program.‎

Roula Majdalani holds a master’s degree in Urban and Regional Planning from Syracuse ‎University. She worked with Dar Al-Handasah Consultants (London), from 1985 to 1988 as an ‎Urban Planner preparing surveys, sectoral studies and research activities for urban development ‎projects in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan and Morocco.‎

Rabi Mohtar founded the Global Engineering Program at Purdue University where he was a ‎Professor of Environmental and Natural Resources Engineering since 1996. His professional ‎activities addressed the important issues of Water – Energy Food nexus and its inter-linkages; ‎more specifically in developing and maintaining the environmental aspects of sustainable ‎development.‎

Causes and Consequences of Food Insecurity in the Middle East
2012-11-14 18:00 - 2012-11-15 18:00
In collaboration with partner organizations, Qatar’s National Food Security Program hosted the ‎‎“International Conference on Food Security in Dry Lands” in Doha on November 14th and 15th, ‎‎2012. National, regional, and international institutions participated in the conference and ‎addressed challenges facing dry lands in their pursuit of food security. The conference focused ‎on the three thematic areas of: (i) food security; (ii) water demand, resources, and management; ‎and (iii) responsible investment. As part of the focus on food security, the Center for ‎International and Regional Studies led a panel discussion titled “Causes and Consequences of ‎Food Insecurity in the Middle East” moderated by Zahra Babar, Assistant Director of research at ‎CIRS and co-editor of the forthcoming CIRS book Food Security and Food Sovereignty in the ‎Middle East (Oxford University Press/Hurst, 2014). The panel consisted of three panelists who presented three country case studies ‎that addressed economic, social, and political causes of food insecurity in Egypt, Yemen, and ‎Lebanon. ‎

Raymond Bush, a professor of African Studies and Development Politics at the University of ‎Leeds, presented on food security in Egypt. Although Egypt boasts vast areas of arable land, ‎as well as a high level of agricultural skill and know-how, it faces the problem of insufficient ‎food production. By exploring the Egyptian agricultural strategy since the onset of economic ‎liberalization in the 1980s, Bush highlighted that Egypt’s inability to defend its food security is ‎due to the exclusion of farmers and food producers from the political debates that set agricultural ‎strategies. Reflective of the governing regime, agricultural modernization strategies in Egypt have ‎been authoritarian in nature with limited outreach and sustainability. In the context of the Arab Spring, the increased Egyptian enthusiasm for political pluralism and rural empowerment may ‎lead to the co-operative inclusion of farmers in the agricultural policy debate and the eventual ‎improvement of Egypt’s food security situation. ‎

The second panelist, Martha Mundy, talked about the impact of food and agriculture policies on ‎property relations and the ecological base of food production in Yemen. A reader in Anthropology at the London School of Economics and a specialist in the ‎anthropology of the Arab World, Mundy argued that these policies were largely influenced by oil ‎rent and oil-derived political rent while significantly disregarding the Yemeni biosphere. As the ‎international community plays an increasingly more active role in guiding Yemen towards a food-‎secure future, Mundy emphasized the need to have a holistic approach that prioritizes farming ‎skills conducive to environmental conservation. The case of Yemen depicts that policies ‎surrounding food aid need to move beyond the sanctification of the “rules of the market,” which ‎have led to environmental degradation, farmers’ loss of capacity to produce food, and exclusion ‎of farmers from the agro-based revenue accumulated by the oligarchical state. ‎

Presenting the case of food security in Lebanon was Jad Chaaban, assistant professor of ‎Economics at the American University of Beirut. As a small-import dependent country, Lebanon ‎faces high risks of price volatility that negatively affect its ability to meet its food and beverage ‎consumption needs. The accessibility and profitability of agricultural produce is further hindered ‎by the oligopolistic concentration of supply chain inputs and food trade monopolies. In order to ‎overcome these food security challenges, Chaaban recommended the need for a national ‎integrated cross-sectoral food policy that takes into consideration the presence of long-term ‎residences such as refugees, recognizes farmers as legal units, enhances competition amongst ‎farmers, and supports local food production.‎

In addition to their respective case studies, the panelists discussed additional causes of food ‎insecurity such as food-waste and post-harvest handing as well as irresponsible agricultural ‎investment. The panelists emphasized that agricultural investments need to be socially conscious ‎and not just based on profit. These investments have repercussions beyond the land rented and ‎crop produced. The fact that those who produce food are generally the most food insecure ‎indicates that equity driven agricultural production has dire consequences on farmer families and ‎environmental preservation.‎

Article by Dwaa Osman, Research Analyst at CIRS

Sheikh Abdullah Bin Mohammed Bin Saud Al Thani on the Digital Generation
2012-11-07 08:00 - 18:00
H.E. Sheikh Abdullah Bin Mohammed Bin Saud Al Thani, Chairman of the Board of Directors ‎for Qatar Telecom (Qtel), delivered a CIRS Distinguished Lecture on “Technology and the ‎Digital Generation” on November 7, 2012. ‎

Al Thani began the lecture by giving an overview of Qtel and the changes it has undergone since ‎being restructured in the year 2000. As the national telecommunications carrier, the long-term ‎plans of Qtel were aligned with the vision that Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani set for ‎Qatar. “Our success starts from strong leadership and clear vision,” he said. The newly ‎restructured organization became a competitive international player, and its scope was broadened ‎to include data, media, and technology. Qtel was no longer a domestic telecommunications ‎organization, but, rather, one that had an international agenda. The new Qtel strategy focused on ‎wireless, broadband, and services in three regions across the Middle East, North Africa, the ‎Indian Subcontinent, and Southeast Asia. The organization went from having 500,000 customers ‎in one market to gaining 89 million customers across seventeen markets. ‎

Current trends and rapid transformations in the global telecommunications field include slow ‎growth, falling prices, and a multitude of new innovations, Al Thani said. Other threats come in ‎the form of fierce competition from non-traditional competitors such as media players, retailers, ‎service providers, and handset manufacturers who are all claiming their stake in the new media ‎field. However, Al Thani saw these challenges as a way to form new opportunities. He argued ‎that “by the year 2014, the number of mobile ‎connections will surpass the global population. Four out of five connections are made in the ‎developing world.” Al Thani argued that Qtel can thus be in the forefront of helping to provide ‎enhanced education, healthcare, and economic services to these growing technology users.

Moving from global challenges to regional concerns, Al Thani outlined how new media and ‎technology have impacted the Arab world. He argued that social media access was one of the ‎key driving forces behind the events of the Arab uprisings in 2011. “From January to March ‎‎2011, the usage of Facebook increased by more than 30% across the whole of the Middle East,” ‎Al Thani said. The internet and mobile technology was so critical to the fuelling of these social ‎movements that the governments of Egypt, Libya, and Syria attempted to block all forms of ‎access to internet technologies. “Digital technology is increasing the expectation of transparency ‎and accountability from government bodies and officials,” he said.‎

Al Thani identified this new technologically-literate demographic as the “Arab Digital ‎Generation,” or ADG, who have grown to represent 4% of the digitally active globally. He ‎described this contingent as being politically active, educated, independent, and business-‎minded. These youth, he said, will have a significant impact on the future of the Arab World. He ‎cautioned, however, that “while the ADG will fundamentally change Arab society, it will do so ‎keeping our rich traditions and values intact.” ‎

Because “social media has become a powerful tool for social change in the Arab states,” a serious ‎challenge that Al Thani identified as affecting global and regional societies is the issue of the ‎gender gap in relation to the use of, and access to, new technologies. “There are 46 million Arab ‎users on Facebook. Of this group, 70% are between 15-29 years old, and the majority is male.” ‎He identified the reasons for this gender gap as “social and cultural constraints on women, ‎privacy and security concerns, access to technology, and education and ICT literacy.” Through ‎its global operations, Qtel has backed new media as the primary tool of social empowerment and ‎is attempting to narrow the gender gap by providing special services that help women to gain ‎better access to education, small business management, healthcare, and childcare services. Al ‎Thani said that “providing women with access to ICT tools such as mobile phones can lead to a ‎better quality of life and wider economic growth. Empowering more women with more phones ‎can accelerate social and economic development.”‎

In conclusion, Al Thani argued that despite the new challenges presented by the changing ‎telecommunications space, “as business leaders, citizens, students, governments, and institutions, ‎we all need to rise to the occasion and use our influence to inspire, engage, and create ‎opportunities for the next generation. Overall, leaders in the Arab world should view these ‎changes as positive.” As a final thought, he said that the Arab Digital generation should become ‎empowered through communication and technology to help shape the future of industry and ‎society in order to ensure the stability of the Arab world.‎

H.E. Sheikh Abdullah Bin Mohammad Bin Saud Al Thani has been the Chairman of the Board ‎of Directors for Qatar Telecom (Qtel) and Qtel Group since 2000. In his capacity as Chairman, ‎His Excellency enjoys State Minister status. He has presided over Qtel’s expansion into 17 ‎countries and has enhanced Qtel’s revenue streams and its corporate governance in line with ‎international practices. ‎

Sheikh Abdullah previously held several high profile positions in Qatar, including Chief of the Royal Court (Amiri Diwan) from 2000 to 2005. He also served as a Member of the Qatari Planning Council. A certified pilot instructor from the British Royal Air Force, Sheikh Abdullah has an extensive background in both the military and in aviation. A flight school graduate from the British Army Air Corps, he completed his studies at the Senior Army War College, Carlisle Barracks in the United States of America.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

William Beeman Lectures on Iranian-Arabian Biculturalism
2012-10-22 08:00 - 18:00
William O. Beeman, Professor and Chair of the Department of Anthropology at the ‎University ‎of ‎Minnesota and President of the Middle East Section of the ‎American ‎Anthropological ‎Association, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue on “The ‎Khalijis: ‎Iranian-Arabian ‎Biculturalism in the Gulf Region”‎ on October 22, 2012. As an ‎introduction‎, ‎Beeman ‎‏gave the audience some background to what he described as “one of the ‎longest running toponymic ‎battles.” There has been disagreement in the recent historical period ‎over whether the body of water between ‎Iran and the Arabian Peninsula should be ‎called ‎‏‎“the ‎‏Arabian Gulf‎” ‎or the ‎‏‎“‎Persian Gulf‎.”‎ ‎

In order to resolve this historical contention, Beeman said that he uses the term ‎‎“‎Khalij” to ‎describe the body of water, and “Khaliji” to describe the residents of the region. These are terms ‎commonly used in the discourse of the region and are ‎understood in Arabic, in Persian, and in ‎some South Asian languages as well. “I want to call into question the nature of the identity of the ‎people who live in this region, and ‎rather than identifying them either as Persian or Arab, or ‎calling this body of water the Persian ‎Gulf or the Arabian Gulf, I want to make a case for these ‎individuals as residents of this region, ‎whether they are on the Iranian side or on the Arab side ‎independent of an exclusive Arab or ‎Persian identity,” he said.‎

Such communities are formed as a result of historical factors, including migration, trade, ‎shifting ‎colonial boundaries, or as the results of intermarriage or cultural borrowings that occur as ‎a matter of course ‎when populations come into contact. “The Khalij is a rich mélange of cultural ‎differences made up ‎of Arabic, Persian, South Asian, East African, Portuguese, French, and ‎English,” among others, Beeman noted. ‎

Linguistically, the people who live in this region have been comfortable communicating in a ‎number of languages, and even forming new ones that are a mix of Arabic, Persian, and Indian ‎languages. A similar example is Swahili – meaning “coastal” in Arabic – and the mutual influence ‎of Arabic ‎and East African languages on each other as a result of contact and ‎trade across the ‎Gulf of Aden. ‎‎“Many people living on either side of the Khalij are fully ‎bilingual, and frequently ‎tri- and quad-lingual,” Beeman said. ‎

The “geographical impenetrability” that separates the Khalij from the inland regions meant ‎that ‎people on both sides of the water had a closer cultural identity than what they shared with ‎their ‎own inland Arab or Persian communities in terms of cuisine, dress patterns, marriage ‎patterns, religious rituals, and ‎discourse structures.‎‎‏ ‏Often, because of the strong marriage and ‎trade ties, families would be ‎dispersed on both sides of the Khalij and, to this day, have strong ‎cross cultural and cross border ties. Before modern air travel, ‎the ease of maritime travel across ‎the Gulf and the difficulty of inland travel across deserts and ‎mountains meant that “people ‎living on the coast of the Khalij found that it was much easier to ‎communicate with each other ‎than it was to communicate with people who lived inland,” Beeman said. Boats ‎could carry much ‎heavier loads much more easily than any form of overland transport, ‎and so the Khalij was an ‎area that thrived both culturally and economically. ‎

In conclusion, Beeman said that, as a result of state and historical processes, there were several ‎events that had a profound effect on changing the unified nature of Khaliji culture, including ‎colonial territorial demarcations and competition. He argued that “the early impositions of state ‎structures in the region, which had been blissfully absent for ‎centuries, caused an overlay of state ‎identity, which has served to obscure the basic ‎commonalities between the members of the ‎population of this region.” Other events also contributed to the separation of the Khaliji ‎communities, including the consolidation of Iran under Reza Shah; the consolidation of Saudi ‎Arabia under Ibn Saud; the departure of the British from the Khalij that left a vacuum to be ‎filled by local ruling families who demarcated their territories accordingly; and, finally, the ‎Iranian revolution of 1978-1979 that changed the shape of the Iranian political and cultural ‎landscapes, and caused a break in the historical alliance between the cross-Gulf communities. ‎

Finally, the gradual encroachment of modern state structures into the region required a newly ‎‎“imagined” idea of identity that necessarily distinguishes one group or ‎nationality from another. ‎Beeman concluded that the shared culture of “Khaliji” identity belies this imagined separation ‎of ‎nationalities and promotes the idea of a diverse community that is ‎inherently multicultural. ‎‎“This,” he said, “is an ‘unimagined’ community; a community in fact, but not in name, ‎and not in ‎its social identification.” ‎

William O. Beeman was formerly Professor of Anthropology and Director of ‎Middle ‎East ‎Studies at Brown University. Best known as a Middle East specialist for more than ‎‎30 ‎years, he ‎has also worked in Central Asia, the Caucasus, Japan, China and South Asia. He ‎has ‎served as ‎consultant to the United States State Department, the Department of Defense, ‎the ‎United ‎Nations and the United States Congress. ‎

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

Social Change in Post-Khomeini Iran Working Group I
2012-10-20 08:00 - 2012-10-21 18:00
On October 20–21, 2012, The Center for International and Regional Studies launched one of its new research initiatives for the 2012–2013 academic year, “Social Change in Post-Khomeini Iran,” through a two day working group held in Doha. Over the course of the two day meeting, international and regional scholars addressed political, economic, and social aspects of ongoing domestic transformations within the Islamic Republic. Via a multidisciplinary approach, the working group offered in-depth analysis of the evolution of Iranian society in the post-Khomeini era, highlighting contemporary social and cultural trends.

Working group participants debated sources of the Iranian regime’s legitimacy, its survival strategies, and how successfully it has penetrated society over the past twenty-three years. The group discussed the role and functions of prominent state institutions, such as the Velayet e Faqih and bonyads, along with economic and political elites in contemporary Iran. The Velayet e Faqih has been seen as gaining increasing political power rather than religious influence during the post-Khomeini years. While many grand ayatollahs in Qom have rejected the authority of the Velayet e Faqih, its institutional strength and capacity extend throughout the Islamic Republic. Acting as parallel institutions to the state, the bonyads have also flourished and serve as both economic and political sources of state power. By addressing the needs of disadvantaged economic stakeholders, the bonyads serve to build a core of populist support for the regime. While the bonyads are commonly viewed as inefficient and corrupt, their distribution of state largesse aids the regime in developing a social base and in spreading its power to marginalized, rural parts of the country.

Some participants posited that both the political and religious legitimacy of the regime are in fact quite narrow within Iran, with the silent majority of the population rejecting the logic and essence of the system. Participants argued that there has been a social evolution in Iran that belies the ideological discourse often associated with the Islamic Republic. Through clientelism and institutional penetration, the regime in Iran has developed its capacity; however, most scholars agreed that Iranian society presents a dichotomy between how people live their lives and what the state wants to impose on its citizens. Some scholars attributed the gradual rise of liberalism within Iranian thought and society in the post-Khatami era to the deficiency of the Iranian state in garnering ideological support. This has also given rise to positive individualism within society, where religion as a political reference point is on the decline, and tolerance for the differences of others is a growing trend amongst the youth. Modernizing family dynamics, gauged through the lower birth rate, the rising age of marriage, and decrease in gender inequality perceptions indicate that Iranian society has transformed dramatically in the post-revolutionary years.

The participants also discussed the religious and secular intellectual trends from the pre-revolutionary era to contemporary times, in terms of religious orthodoxy and heterodoxy, religious reform and innovation, and secular critique. Within religious orthodoxy and heterodoxy the trends were marked by transformation from quietist traditional Islam in the pre-revolution era, to empowered and state-sponsored, ultra-orthodoxy in present times. Within religious reform and innovation, the liberal reading of Islam transformed into a radical reform movement as seen with disenchanted reformists in the Green Movement of recent years. Secular critique is viewed to have transmuted from liberal nationalism to liberal secularism.

During the past twenty years, Iran has experienced shifts and transformations in its growing economy. The gradual transition from a government-run, closed economy to a relatively diverse and open economy has led to an economic mindset guided by a nationalism based on technology. The participants discussed the securitization of commercial decisions coupled with techno-based nationalism and how this has had a relatively positive impact on enterprise development in Iran. The business community in Iran is increasingly focused on efficiency, profitability, and innovation. Contrary to common negative perceptions of the impact of international sanctions within the country, the scholars also deliberated the multi-faceted impact of sanctions on business development. Although average Iranians certainly suffer from sanctions, being cut off from regular import tracks has spurred entrepreneurs to diversify their activities, and has also led to a greater regionalization of Iranian businesses.

Iran exhibits a mixed socio-economic picture; it maintains the 10th highest ranking in the Human Development Index of the Middle East, as well as a middle-income status among developing countries. The lack of deep pockets of poverty and the fact that the state has ensured access to basic needs of food, electricity, and water, have meant that holistic understanding of the conditions of the poor in Iran have been overlooked. Additionally, the current framing of marginalized youth in the broader region depicts them as disenchanted with social and political life, drawn to more radical forms of political Islam. These speculative conclusions that the poor are more likely to be radicalized are not backed by empirical evidence. Broader scholarly efforts are needed to examine how urban poor in Iran have responded to poverty and marginalization. In terms of education, Iran is performing relatively well with declining levels of gender and geographic inequality. However, the current youth bulge in Iran is similar to that in countries around the region, where the inability of the labor market to absorb the youth bulge creates visible employment problems for young people exiting the educational system.

The participants also discussed the transformation in terms of demographics, and how this impacts Iranian society. Lower birth rates and the low male-to-female ratio, in combination with rising standards of education for women, have all led to delayed marriages. In the context of women’s status and marriage, the scholars delved into discussions on legal development in terms of the Islamic Republic’s reinstitution of family law and family courts and their consequential impact on the status of women within society. Some of the family laws, with particular reference to the divorce laws, were viewed by the working group members as having the unintended consequence of leading to the individuated subjectivity of women due to their increased litigating role. The continuous modification of marriage laws in Iran was regarded by the discussants as coming from different levels within society.

As a highly literate society, Iranians have appreciated poetry, prose, and non-fiction across the generations, and have continuously produced literary works against a political backdrop. Regarded as political and social commentary, the participants discussed post-revolutionary literature, with particular attention to women writers and the role of gender. In the post-Khomeini era, Iranian women writers have been on the rise and have been representative of a variety of socio-economic backgrounds. Women writers abroad have also been active actors in Iranian social and political commentary. The diaspora community as a whole, which is in constant transnational flows between the host and homeland, has contributed greatly to both the local and international discourse on life in the Islamic Republic.

Read more about this research initiative

Article by Dwaa Osman, Research Analyst at CIRS

Sir Tim Lankester on Britain's Foreign Aid
2012-10-08 08:00 - 18:00
Sir Tim Lankester, Chairman of the Council of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical ‎Medicine and Advisor on South East Asia to the consulting firm Oxford Analytica, delivered a ‎CIRS Focused Discussion on “The Politics and Economics of Britain’s Foreign Aid” on October ‎‎8, 2012. The talk was based on his recent book,The Politics and Economics of Britain’s Foreign ‎Aid: The Pergau Dam Affair (Routledge, 2012), which he described as “a case study of what can ‎go wrong when you do development assistance badly.”‎

Giving a background of the history of British foreign aid, Lankester said that the program was ‎initiated in the 1960s and was driven by the British government’s belief that it had a moral ‎obligation to its former colonies as well as practical political interests in those countries. In the ‎‎1980s, Lankester was the Permanent Secretary of the Overseas Development Administration – ‎the ministry responsible for development aid. During his time in the ministry, “one of the most ‎controversial projects ever funded by British aid” was taking place. This was the establishment of ‎the Pergau Dam and power-generating project on the Malay-Thai border, which “was the largest ‎funding in the history of British aid,” Lankester recalled.‎

The controversial Pergau Dam project was the result of a private agreement between some key ‎members of the Malay and British governments and was based on Britain providing Malaysia ‎with 200 million pounds worth of civil aid in return for sales of 1 billion pounds of defense ‎equipment. Lankester recalled that an agreement based on the offer of British aid in return for ‎arms sales was both unprecedented and against British policy and was thus divisive from the ‎start. To make matters worse, once the agreement was signed between the two governments, the ‎powerful contractors and companies assigned to building the project increased their estimates ‎and the total cost for the project almost doubled. ‎

Despite the increasing costs, and against the advice of British government officials and ‎economists, the project went ahead with the support of Mrs. Thatcher and a host of others with ‎special interests. Since both the prime ministers of Malaysia and Britain had backed the project, ‎the other government departments buckled under the pressure and did not offer sufficient ‎opposition to their leaders. Lankester described the situation as being one that suffered from ‎conflicting policy agendas and the “excessive mixing of politics, business, and conflicts of ‎interest.” ‎

In his capacity as Permanent Secretary, Lankester was tasked with evaluating whether or not the ‎money for the project was being properly and lawfully spent. Although the legal assessment at ‎the time showed that the project was lawful, the spend for the project was based on taxpayers ‎money and was so inefficient and uneconomic that Lankester felt obliged to formally ‎disassociate himself and the civil service from it. “This,” he said “is a story of politics and special ‎interests trumping sound development and sound economics.” Had there been more ‎transparency, it may have been possible for parliament, the media, and other interest groups to ‎formally oppose the project that ultimately damaged British-Malay relations at the time. ‎

In conclusion, Lankester said that he was curious to know whether the very same project would ‎have been viable today. His ex-post assessment, in light of increased gas prices over the years, ‎was that the project would still be an uneconomic one by today’s calculations. As a final thought, ‎he advised that the Pergau Dam case study provides valuable lessons for governments, and his ‎advice was that “it is better to be transparent than obscure,” “don’t say one thing and do ‎another,” “when things go wrong, don’t cover up,” and, lastly, “if you make one mistake, don’t ‎compound it by making another.”‎

Sir Tim Lankester is a member of the joint advisory board of the Georgetown University School ‎of Foreign in Qatar. He was UK Executive Director on the boards of the IMF and World Bank, ‎and later Permanent Secretary of the Overseas Development Administration. He was Director of ‎the School of Oriental and African Studies, London University, and from 2001 to 2009 ‎President of Corpus Christi College, Oxford. He has published articles and book reviews on aid ‎and development. ‎

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Editor and Manager for CIRS Publications

Frederic Wehrey on Libya's Aftermath and Syria's Future
2012-09-23 18:00
Frederic Wehrey, senior associate in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, gave the first CIRS Monthly Dialogue lecture of the 2012-2013 academic year on September 17, 2012. The talk titled, “Analogies at War: Libya’s Aftermath and Syria’s Future,” examined the different approaches that the international community has taken towards the Libyan and Syrian conflicts through the language used to frame the debate. The lessons learned from Libya are often given as examples of how to deal with Syria, regardless of the key differences that exist between the two countries.

Before the actualization of any type of mediation effort, Wehrey explained, analogies and linguistic interpretations of a conflict are employed by administrations and governments to either support or reject intervention. Following the theories of analogy presented by author Yuen Foong Khong in his seminal book Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton University Press, 1992), Wehrey argued that “not only are analogies used to justify policies, but they actually form part of the psychological and cognitive process that policymakers go through when they embark on decisions.” As such, analogies and the lessons of history figure prominently in foreign policymaking. The US decision to intervene in Libya was itself based on the lessons learned from past conflicts: “the analogy was that Benghazi was not going to be another Srebrenica,” Wehrey argued. Many decision-makers at the White House would have had direct experience of the failures of the international community to prevent the atrocities that took place in Bosnia and Rwanda in the 1990s. This would have prompted current policymakers to use past analogies to justify and build international support for an air campaign over Libya.

Assessing the overall impact of the NATO intervention in Libya, Wehrey recounted that it was a decisive turning point. The international community took multilateral action through consensus and so the intervention in Libya is being held up as a new model for foreign engagement, even being called “the Obama Doctrine,” he said. Moreover, in an era of increasing austerity in the US defense budget following the costly Iraq and Afghanistan wars, “certainly in the US, there is a mystique of airpower because it doesn’t put people at risk and it is relatively low-cost,” when used with precision. “This intervention, which did not cost a single US life, which was successful in toppling a dictator, and which used airpower and very minimal use of ground advisors, is very attractive,” Wehrey said.

This “Libya model” is now being used as an analogy in discussions on how the international community and the United States should approach the conflict situation in Syria. It is important to point out, Wehrey said, that there are a number of limitations in applying this model to the situation in Syria. Unlike the international community’s consensus towards the use of NATO airpower in Libya, there is no such agreement for a coalition operation in Syria. Further, in geographic terms, Syria has no extended coastline from which to guide operations and has high density urban areas making airstrikes a hazard to civilian populations. “The lack of a contiguous rebel-held zone in Syria is impeding our ability to deliver aid, and the lack of an extended coastline that permitted NATO intervention and permitted the rebel logistics to move weapons around and the role of strategic geography is different,” he argued. As such, the Libyan model is not generalizable and cannot be applied to Syria. “We have to take all of these differences into account and be very wary of the misuse of analogies, however appealing they are,” Wehrey explained.

Despite the recent attacks on the US ambassador in Benghazi, Wehrey said that he remains guardedly optimistic about Libya. The country still faces endemic instability as “the people are still digging out of the legacy of forty-two years of brutal Orwellian tyranny that pitted different elements of the society against one another,” he explained. What we are seeing now are “the micro convulsions of a revolution. These are conflicts that are playing out between tribes and between towns, and they are really a testament of how Qaddafi ruled. Despite patronage towards certain tribes, he marginalized others.” Libya has no institutions and, in many ways, this is a blessing as it allows the public to have some say in how these institutions get built from the very beginning. “It is important to remember that the legacy of Libya is still being written,” Wehrey concluded.

Frederic Wehrey’s research focuses on political reform and security issues in the Gulf states, Libya, and U.S. policy in the Middle East more broadly. Prior to joining Carnegie, he was a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation where in 2008, he led a RAND strategic advisory team to Baghdad, Iraq, focusing on post-surge challenges in support of Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I). A graduate of Occidental College, he received an M.A. in Near Eastern studies from Princeton University and a Ph.D. in International Relations from St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

The Evolving Ruling Bargain In The Middle East Working Group II
2012-09-15 11:00 - 2012-09-16 21:00
On September 15–16, 2012, the Center for International and Regional Studies kicked off the 2012–2013 academic year with a two-day working group meeting to discuss “The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East.” The members of the working group were invited to Doha for a second time to conclude the research initiative and to discuss their individual paper submissions on the topic. The first working group meeting took place on February 19–20, 2012.

The working group members, comprised of international and regional scholars of the Middle East, discussed the current period of “transition” in various Arab countries. Although social and economic grievances have been simmering in countries of the Middle East for decades, mass protests, rapidly sparked by individual acts of protest in Tunisia and Egypt, took place at moments where the old ruling bargain was suddenly viewed as unacceptable to a newly emboldened public. Thousands took to the streets in defiance of authorities to demand a new bargain with the state or to do away with that government altogether. The participants discussed histories of political regimes and other forms of social engineering to see how one state differs from another and how these changes may affect the future of these countries.

Before delving into the individual areas of inquiry, the participants questioned the terminology used to address issues related to the Arab uprisings. They analyzed the language employed in the discourse and marked the parameters of the debate on how to conceptualize the recent events in the Middle East. They discussed whether the events could be considered as “revolutions” leading to radical transformations of society, community, and political structure, or whether these upheavals would more properly be called “uprisings” or “rebellions” that have ousted an old regime by replacing it with a new one. Further, they questioned whether the social, economic, and political arrangements that existed in these countries can be termed “social contracts,” as this term implies involving at least two parties that negotiate to achieve mutually acceptable or agreed-upon arrangements.

Often, ruling bargains are based on formally codified laws, while others are unspoken assumptions that have evolved over time. In many cases, formal opposition and political parties in the Middle East represent the semblance of democratic processes without gaining any actual power. The participants argued that these parties do not challenge regime stability, but, in fact, strengthen the regime’s position at a symbolic level. The state presents itself as the provider of the national interests in return for political acquiescence. Yet, the participants said, despite this arrangement loaded in favor of the state, the government and opposition parties are in a constant state of negotiation – a push and pull attempt to redefine the boundaries of power, albeit in a controlled and limited way.

The scholars noted that the demands for a new ruling bargain were caused by a number of factors. The general public in many Middle East countries suffered similar economic and social grievances in relation to unemployment, corruption, inequality, and crony-capitalism. Additionally, there is a unique youth factor, where a growing population bulge exists for many Middle East and GCC countries. Within this segment of society are many young, educated, unemployed, and increasingly frustrated people whose aspirations, economic opportunities, and political liberties have been curtailed. Many of these young people have access to communication technologies in order to voice their frustrations on both national and international levels. Despite regime restrictions placed on the internet at the height of social unrest in Egypt, for example, social media played a pivotal role in circumventing state control and leading to unauthorized mobilization of the masses.

Other topics discussed include the rise of Islamic parties, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, and the polarization of societies along Islamist-secular lines; the emerging forms of relationship between state institutions like the military and police with different forms of civil society; the new forms of codifying the ruling bargain through recently formed laws, constitutions, and judiciary processes; as well as individual case studies related to the similarities and differences between Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain, among others.

Finally, the participants argued that it was too early to draw conclusions regarding the outcome of any of these uprisings and how recent upheavals will shape future social or political relations in the Middle East. With the fall of old regimes, many past restrictions have been lifted and new forms of electoral processes and vehicles of political expression will need to be placed effectively within existing state structures. At the conclusion of the CIRS initiative, the chapters will be collected into an edited volume to be published in the coming year.

Click here for the working group’s agenda
Click here for the participants’ biographies
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Ziad Abu-Rish, University of California-Los AngelesAbdullah Al-Arian, Wayne State UniversitySaïd Amir Arjomand, Stony Brook Institute for Global StudiesZahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarJason Brownlee, University of Texas-AustinJohn T. Crist, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarMarie Duboc, American University in CairoMark Farha, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarJohn Foran, University of California, Santa BarbaraBassam Haddad, George Mason UniversityShadi Hamid, Brookings Doha CenterManata Hashemi, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarNader Hashemi, University of DenverThomas Juneau, Department of National Defence, Government of CanadaMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarBahgat Korany, American University in CairoRussell E. Lucas, Michigan State UniversityQuinn Mecham, Middlebury CollegeSuzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarGerd Nonneman, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarDwaa Osman, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarNadia Talpur, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarNadine Sika, American University in CairoDirk Vandewalle, Dartmouth CollegeFred Wehrey, Carnegie Endowment for International PeaceFlora Whitney, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarMohamed Zayani, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

Lawrence Potter on the Rise and Fall of Port Cities in the Gulf
2012-05-16 08:00 - 18:00
Lawrence G. Potter, a 2011-2012 CIRS Visiting Scholar and Adjunct Associate Professor of International Affairs at Columbia University, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue lecture on “The Rise and Fall of Port Cities in the Gulf” on May 16, 2012. Potter’s lecture was designed to explain the economic, political, and ecological reasons why port cities in the Gulf came to prominence or declined over the centuries. As a conceptual introduction to the lecture, he argued that a distinction should be made between a port and a harbor. “A harbor,” Potter said, “is a physical concept, a shelter for ships;” whereas “a port is an economic concept, a center of exchange.”

Littoral settlements on the Gulf were born of maritime cultures based on pearling, fishing, and trade, allowing tribes to travel freely across waterways in search of ideal locations to pursue their livelihoods. The strength of these commercial and familial connections along the coast meant that “some tribes had settlements on both sides of the Gulf, most famously the Qawasim based in Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah who temporarily governed Bandar Langeh,” Potter said.

The migratory and transitory nature of sea-faring cultures meant that “the Gulf was oriented outward, toward the Indian Ocean, rather than inward toward the Middle East, and was part of a cosmopolitan world of mixed race, religion, and ethnicity,” as well as language, Potter said. Because of these maritime ties, port cities have always maintained a degree of economic and cultural independence from their inland counterparts. Importantly, these cultures defied the limited borders of nation-states where “settlements along the Persian coast often had closer relations with those on the Arab side than those in the interior, due to ease of communication,” he explained. Multicultural connections, whether based on family ties or trading relationships, often shielded port communities from the sectarian strife that afflicted many other parts of the Middle East. This cosmopolitan history of Gulf ports is starkly different from that of the more settled inland cities of Isfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, and Herat on the Iranian plateau. Historically, these were populated urban areas that had an established culture and that cultivated centuries of art and literature particular to a single geographical area.

“One striking fact about port cities in the Gulf is that many have had only a temporary period of fluorescence,” Potter said. In medieval times, the most important ports were to be found on the northern Persian shore of the Gulf, but in the 19th and 20th centuries, the ports on the southern Arab shore rose to prominence. Since ports are principally economic areas, their primary purpose is to facilitate regional and economic trade. If an environmental or political factor was to obstruct these trade routes in any way, “theKhalijis could easily move if dissatisfied. In a region where boats and not land constituted capital, it was easy to sail away and reestablish themselves elsewhere,” he argued.

The often harsh environment in the Gulf and lack of water and wood played key roles in the migration of populations from one port to establish another. Other reasons for abandoning a port include its physical destruction due to the harbor silting up. “In medieval times this happened to old Hormuz. In the 20th century, this happened to Sharjah, severely damaging its trade and giving the advantage to Dubai.” In order to overcome these environmental challenges and the lack of water and wood, some settlements imported fresh water and wood from nearby areas. Even though littoral settlements were maritime societies, the wood to build ships and dhows had to be imported from India and East Africa. Potter explained how such ecological challenges can have profound effects on the forming of a nation’s security apparatus by arguing that “the lack of wood was undoubtedly one reason why Iran did not have a navy until the twentieth century.”

In conclusion, Potter highlighted the continued trajectory regarding the importance of port cities in the Gulf. “Today, the Khalijis have overcome the challenges of climate and lack of water, and continue to excel as the businessmen that they always were. The port cities are multinational, as they always were. The modern shopping malls of Doha and Dubai are just a modern version of what the great emporiums of Hormuz and Muscat must have looked like,” he said.

Lawrence G. Potter has taught at Columbia University since 1996. A graduate of Tufts College, he received an M.A. in Middle Eastern Studies from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, and a Ph.D. in History from Columbia. He taught in Iran for four years before the revolution. From 1984 to 1992 he was Senior Editor at the Foreign Policy Association. He specializes in the history of Iran and the Gulf and U.S. policy toward the Middle East.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

Sectarian Politics in the Gulf - Working Group II
2012-05-15 08:00 - 2012-05-16 18:00
On May 15–16, 2012, CIRS held a second working group meeting to conclude its research initiative on “Sectarian Politics in the Gulf.” Scholars and experts on the topic were invited to return to Doha for a second time to share their chapter submissions and to solicit feedback from members of the working group. CIRS will gather the complete chapters into a monograph under the title, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf. The first working group meeting took place on October 9–10, 2011.

The working group members began the meeting by discussing their different disciplinary definitions of what the terms “sectarian” and “sectarianism” might mean. In the literature on the topic, it has been notoriously difficult to come to agreement on a single workable definition of the terms involved. The CIRS project does not aim to reduce the term “sectarian” to a single definition, but to reveal the diversity at the heart of the subject and to open the debate up to its complexities. Although the term “sectarian” has strong—often negative—religious connotations, it is not based simply on religious difference, but implies a multifaceted mix of communal identifiers ranging from ethnic and tribal distinctions to political and philosophical beliefs and orientations. Regardless of the many theoretical and epistemological assumptions making up the discourse, the participants agreed that the heterogeneity of the subject was one that merited further nuanced study, especially in the context of the Arab uprisings. The participants emphasized the conditional nature of sectarian issues and examined why ethnic and religious differences come to the fore in some Gulf societies and not in others.

Topics discussed during the meeting include explorations of Baluch communities in the various Gulf states; Sunni-Shi’a communities in Iraq, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Iran; identity and politics as they relate to language, religion, ethnicity, national-minority status, and tribal affiliation; the historically cosmopolitan mix of ethnicities in Oman; among other studies into the history of sectarian communities in the Gulf states.

Most countries in the Middle East are heterogeneous societies that were created as a result of the design of colonial empires and their subsequent dissolution. Littoral settlements on the Gulf were born of maritime cultures based on pearling, fishing, and trade, allowing tribes to travel freely across waterways, intermingle with other cultures, and defy the limited and arbitrary borders of modern nation-states. As a result of independence, newly formed Gulf nations had to contend with the breakdown of the political order of the past, and many different ethnic, tribal, and religious groups clamored for political control, thereby unleashing sectarian struggles that may have been dormant, suppressed, or non-existent in the past. The dominant group that rose to power had to engage in the formation of a new identity for the nation—often one that was based on glorifying the regime’s own particular sectarian or tribal history at the expense of others. These new articulations of a largely unrecorded past had to be cultivated in these new Middle Eastern states in order to create a new sense of nationalism as well as to bolster political legitimacy for the ruling elite. Ruling groups created an official narrative of the state’s formation, which did not always reflect the reality of diversity and heterogeneity on the ground.

The participants agreed that the historical reference to cultural and tribal purity is a symptom of modernity, as nations attempt to rebuild cultural identities after years of colonial struggle. In these states, newly formed citizens were the first generation to grow up with a national, rather than a regional identity—a process that was not without friction to notions of identity. In this sense, many national heritage and renovation projects are state-sponsored and are in service to the idea of the patriotic, rather than loyalty to a certain communal sect. Today, the media plays simultaneous key roles in both upholding national unity and enhancing sectarian divisions. The Al Jazeera network in particular has given voice to the fragmented regional discourse with many taboo topics on sectarian issues being openly discussed.

The more contentious issues surrounding sectarian politics in the Gulf states, the participants agreed, are primarily shaped by shares in the rentier economy and the resulting political status of privileged groups over others. Mass protests in Bahrain, for example, were largely a product of socio-economic frustrations that ran along sectarian lines. The participants argued that it was important to examine how ruling regimes choose to either engage these sectarian elements or subdue them depending on how much extra wealth and benefits that the state is willing to share.

In the new political order of Iraq, the ascendance of Iraq’s Shi‘i has worried many Sunni governments who question the loyalty of the Shi’a communities in their states. This has been especially prominent in Bahrain, with Saudi Arabia having to intervene in order to militarily control the uprisings. The participants argued that these recent events have shown how sectarian struggles in one Gulf state has direct implications in another. A sectarian issue, therefore, cannot be thought of as indigenous to any one Gulf state, but as something that affects all of these countries and their identity formations.

In the wake of the Arab Spring, analyzing the varied sectarian communities in the Gulf is especially relevant to understand long silent and marginalized groups who have found a space to voice their discontents as a result of successful public uprisings elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa. The CIRS initiative is designed to not only study the different social groups who feel marginalized, but to also highlight those that have existed peacefully and who perceive themselves to be an inherent part of the social fabric of Gulf states.

Click here for the working group’s agenda
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Zahra Babar, CIRS, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarLois Beck, Washington University in St. LouisKristin Smith Diwan, American UniversityMichael Driessen, CIRS, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarRenaud Fabbri, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarMark Farha, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarJustin Gengler, Qatar UniversityFanar Haddad, University of LondonMehran Kamrava, CIRS, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarJackie Kerr, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarSuzi Mirgani, CIRS, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarMari Luomi, CIRS, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarJohn Peterson, University of ArizonaLawrence Potter, Columbia UniversityNadia Talpur, CIRS, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarMarc Valeri, University of Exeter

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

Michael Driessen on the Role of Religion in Modern Democracies
2012-04-24 08:00 - 18:00
Michael Driessen, a 2011-2012 Postdoctoral Fellow at CIRS and Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at John Cabot University, gave a CIRS Monthly Dialogue Lecture on “Religion-State Institutions and Patterns of Democracy: Religious Revivals and Secular Politics in Catholic and Muslim Societies” on April 24, 2012. The lecture was geared towards analyzing the relationship between religion and state politics in modern contemporary democracies and explored the question: “What does religiously friendly democratization look like?” in both Muslim and Catholic societies. Driessen explored the idea of religiously-friendly democracies and religiously-friendly democratization processes that occur in different political, social, and cultural contexts.

Driessen began the lecture by recalling the beginnings of the 2011 Arab Spring in the Middle East and North Africa and the prospects of increasing democracy in the region promised by these popular uprisings. This situation, however, was complicated by the election of Islamist-oriented political parties across the region. Driessen argued that “some of the dynamics that are seen to unfold in places like Egypt and Tunisia today are not so unique to Islam or so unique to Muslim-majority countries.”

Historically, opposition to democratic ideas and institutions by Catholic and Muslim political movements shared similar intuitions about the ideal role of religious authority in society. In contemporary scholarship on religion and politics, Driessen said, it is important to ask: “What kind of religion-state arrangements are actually possible in democracies?” One form of governance that does not adhere to strict religious or secular ideals and that does not treat these two seemingly opposing ideologies as mutually exclusive is the middle-ground of a religiously-friendly democracy. This combination of religion and democratic politics is capable of transforming the parameters of the struggle between religious and secular worldviews by relaxing the boundaries between religion and state. Religiously-friendly democracies define a situation where “neither religious actors nor the state can have power to coerce individual religious beliefs or individual religious identities in a democracy,” and where “unelected religious authorities cannot overturn or veto decisions made by elected political representatives,” he said.

Religiously-friendly democratization can be characterized by two interacting dynamics: increased political secularization in overtly religious societies on the one hand and religious-revival in overtly secular societies on the other. In some situations, “religious parties will often reach out to less religious and non-religious parties to reach out to a wider electorate in order to establish alliances with non-religious parties and, in doing so, they de-emphasize some of the most exclusive religious aspects of their ideology,” Driessen argued. This does not necessarily mean that the importance of religion fades, but that there is a platform of negotiation between the role of religion and other everyday concerns regarding economic goods and political beliefs. In this sense, “democracy empowers individuals; it allows for religious competition to take place and makes non-religious choices available and possible for individuals.” On the other hand, democracies can also promote and symbolically identify with religious symbols, values, and ideas by synchronizing national and holidays to national holidays and providing religious education in schools. Through these measures, “states socialize citizens into a national religious identity and in doing so push forward and help regenerate the connection between religion and the state,” he said.

Concluding the lecture, Driessen argued that religiously-friendly democracy helps to break the vicious cycle of religion and politics and “creates a different set of patterns for religious identities and the future of religious politics in dare I say, post-secular societies.”

Michael Driessen holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Notre Dame. He is finishing a book manuscript on “Religiously Friendly Democratization Processes” in the Mediterranean region that analyzes how religion-state arrangements help frame questions of religious and political identity in Muslim and Catholic societies.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

Food Security And Food Sovereignty In The Middle East Working Group II
2012-04-22 08:00 - 2012-04-23 18:00
On April 22–23, 2012, CIRS concluded its “Food Security and Food Sovereignty in the Middle East” research initiative with a two-day working group meeting. Sixteen scholars and experts participating in the initiative were invited back to Doha for a second time to share their findings with working group members and to critique each other’s paper submissions. Among the participants were nine of the CIRS Research Grant recipients who gave updates on the progress of their research projects. The first working group meeting took place in November 2011.

The strength of this CIRS research initiative is in its multi-disciplinary approach to the questions of food security and food sovereignty in the Middle East. The participants include economists, anthropologists, historians, and experts in agriculture and nutrition. The diverse range of expertise enables the project to bridge the epistemological divide between the qualitative and quantitative methodologies of social science. Current food security issues and corresponding world events are shifting from a largely economics-dominated model where the debate centered on macro-level issues of international development to one where sociopolitical factors are becoming increasingly active in how food is conceived, valued, and distributed as a human right rather than a market force. The individual papers cover a large portion of the Middle East, with case studies into the characteristics of food security projects of Qatar, Lebanon, Jordan, the Palestinian territories, Yemen, Egypt, and Iran, as well as studies into GCC foreign land investments in Cambodia and Ethiopia.

The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) defines food security as a condition of people having daily, unrestricted access to sufficient and nutritious food that enables them to live healthy lives. The global food crisis of 2008, therefore, was a defining moment for issues of food and the lack of access to it and steered countries’ attention towards aiming for “food security” and “food sovereignty” in the face of future crises. Importantly, the recent Arab Spring protests and political unrest across the Middle East region were partly triggered by rising food prices. Critics point out that such crises are as a direct result of global liberalization policies that allowed for multinational corporations to dominate food production and distribution value chains, making food a commercial commodity and making resistance to such international regimes much more difficult. As a result of current market dominated food systems, a central dilemma is whether it is more important to have a renewed promotion of a domestic production food security strategy, or to promote non-agricultural exports and use the resulting foreign exchange to import food stuffs.

In order to understand all the complex dynamics at work in the global shift in how food is perceived, valued, and commoditized, the CIRS research initiative offers insight into many of these issues. The participants engaged in a historical analysis of food regimes and the major systems that have allocated food resources through different economic, political, and market models. Different means of production since the nineteenth century, including increased industrialization and mechanization of farming and transportation in the early half of the twentieth century had varying effects on Middle Eastern countries’ relationship with food. Food production and distribution took on an international aspect where products gown in one place were exported to another as part of a globalized network of worldwide colonial projects.

Over the decades, countries began growing cash crops that had a comparative market advantage and so food took on a different meaning as something subject to market pressure rather than a means of human sustenance. Increased incomes and rapid population growth led to changing patterns of food consumption and demand for ever diverse types of food, which in turn placed further ecological constraints on land and water. A concomitant lifestyle shift from “traditional” diets based on the consumption of local market produce to “modern” diets based on meat, sugar, and processed foods purchased in supermarkets has had adverse effects on health with increased levels of malnutrition in the Middle East. Further to its market value, food was used as a political weapon of coercion and a tool of foreign policy, where dominant countries would either encourage or discourage the distribution of surplus food as reward or punishment.

Because Middle East countries import a large percentage of their food requirements, recent volatile hikes in global food prices have had severe adverse effects. At the macroeconomic level, this has contributed to inflation and trade deficits, and at the microeconomic household level, increased prices have contributed to increased poverty and food insecurity. Many countries have responded to the global food crisis of 2008 with decisions to increase domestic production of food. Other solutions include investment in highly controversial “foreign land acquisitions,” to grow food abroad. This may be at the expense of local populations in the host country who may become displaced and further impoverished by often unregulated and unscrupulous land deals.

In conclusion, the participants argued that the recent uprisings in the Middle East and the role of popular resistance to oppressive political and economic regimes may become an important factor of food security scholarship. It is not just the state that is characterizing policy in the Middle East, but on the level of the individual and the household, people are actively becoming involved in the issues that affect them. The scholars agreed that for the past few decades, research into the question of food security had been the domain of international economic and trade bodies that took a narrow and market-driven approach to analyzing food in relation to human existence. The CIRS project is an attempt to engage with a new paradigmatic shift in the field by suggesting that research into food security should incorporate the individual level of analysis as well as macroeconomic and political factors. This cross-disciplinary CIRS-sponsored book adds value to the literature on food security in its response to this changing orthodoxy. After final revisions based on peer comments and suggestions, CIRS gathered the complete chapter submissions into an edited volume that has been published by a university press.

Click here for the working group’s agendaRead more about the research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Amin Al-Hakimi, Yemeni Association for Sustainable Agriculture; University of Sana’aZahra Babar, CIRS, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarRaymond Bush, University of LeedsJohn T. Crist, CIRS, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarTahra Elobeid, Qatar UniversityMehran Kamrava, CIRS, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarMari Luomi, CIRS, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarSuzi Mirgani, CIRS Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarMartha Mundy, London School of EconomicsHabibollah Salami, University of TehranNadia Talpur, CIRS, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarFlora Whitney, CIRS, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarEckart Woertz, Princeton University

CIRS Grant Recipients:

Elisa Cavatorta, University of LondonJad Chaaban, American University of BeirutHala Ghattas, American University of BeirutShadi Hamadeh, American University of BeirutJane Harrigan, SOAS, University of LondonKarin Seyfert, American University of Beirut/SOAS, University of LondonBen Shepherd, University of SydneySalwa Tohmé Tawk, American University of BeirutMary Ann Tétreault, Trinity UniversityDeborah L. Wheeler, United States Naval Academy

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

A New Canadian-American Relationship
2012-03-26 08:00 - 18:00
David Dyment, senior research associate at the Center on North American Politics and Society at Carleton University in Ottawa, gave a CIRS Focused Discussion on March 26, 2012, titled “A New Canadian-American Relationship. The lecture summarized the main arguments in his book, Doing the Continental: A New Canadian-American Relationship (Dundurn, 2010). Dyment explained that the title of his book harked back to a song and dance routine that was popular in the 1930s called “Doing the Continental.” This, he said, was an apt metaphor for Canada’s relationship with the United States as he viewed this as a “rehabilitation project” that requires both sides to dance in time with each other by learning the necessary steps to conduct a smooth and mature partnership. “Part of what this book is about is our dance with the United States […] and so the twelve steps of ‘Doing the Continental’ are both a ‘rehabilitation program’ for someone who is perhaps recovering from an addiction – the twelve steps to recovery – and also steps that would be involved in a dance,” he explained.

Dyment argued that Canada has to deal with two major issues on a daily basis: managing its internal differences between mainly French-speaking Quebec and the English-speaking rest of the country, as well as managing its relationship with its neighbor, the United States. Acknowledging the many different nationalities represented in the audience, Dyment gave a basic overview of why Canada’s relationship with the United States is so important, including the 5,000 km border that runs between the two countries, the strong influence of US culture and media on Canadian daily life, the long-standing energy and trade relations between the two countries, and the increase in joint Canadian-US intelligence and security efforts post 9/11.

With a population of 30 million in Canada compared to 300 million in the United States, there are real fears on the ground of Canada being subsumed under North America. This, he said, is a relationship that must be managed carefully. “To this day, when people think about how to engage the United States and Canada, they come at it from two perspectives […] the left nationalist perspective – these are parties who are not comfortable with the American political culture – and the right continentalist perspective that favors close political and trade relations with the United States,” he said. This highly polarized, ideological debate between the left and the right means that Canadians normally fall into one or other category. In the interests if conducting research for the book, however, Dyment said that he was able to debunk some of the popular political myths that are perpetuated daily on both sides of the ideological divide. “Through empirical social science,” he was able to clearly see the pros and cons of both perspectives as he tested the merits of the contending schools of thought. “I realized this was a great opportunity to see the relationship differently so that we wouldn’t further our contending national competing ideologies, but, rather, step back and ask how […] can we best advance Canada’s national interest?” he said.

Canada, Dyment explained, is “the largest exporter of energy to the United States by far – more than Saudi Arabia.” Instead of concentrating on some Canadians’ sense of vulnerability and fear of the US, it is important to recognize the many positive contributions towards the United States. The provision of 40% of the US imports of natural gas makes Canada more of a “moose” than a “mouse,” he said. “We are faced with a force of nature in North America with this huge American partner that we have to be wary of – which is what the left nationalists would say – but which we can also benefit from so long as we tame that force in our national interest.”

In conclusion, Dyment argued that for a new Canadian-American relationship to be forged, Canada must acknowledge its unique contribution as the basis for Canada’s engagement in the world. It is important to ask “What can we do that the Americans can’t do?” and offer a particular set of skills and comparative advantage. This will make Canada stronger internationally as well as give it more clout with the United States. Through this new appreciation of Canada’s value, “we can go into the world making a unique contribution and be more helpful and more influential with our American allies,” he said.

A past director of Canada’s Parliamentary Internship Program, David Dyment has served as a senior policy adviser in the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and on the immediate staff of the Governor General of Canada (the Queen’s vice-regal representative). As a commentator in the media, he has been published in Canada’s leading newspaper, The Globe and Mail and other publications, and heard on the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the BBC, and in French on Radio-Canada. He received his doctorate from the Université de Montréal.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor of CIRS Publications

Shahla Haeri on Women and Political Leadership in Muslim Societies
2012-02-26 08:00 - 18:00
Shahla Haeri, a cultural anthropologist and a 2011-2012 CIRS Visiting Scholar, gave a Focused Discussion titled, “From Bilqis to Benazir: Women and Political Leadership in Muslim Societies” on February 26, 2012. Haeri’s current research interests revolve around examining Muslim women in positions of power, both past and present.

Haeri began her talk by critiquing western media accounts of the Arab Spring that pondered the motivations compelling Muslim women to suddenly become active in politics. She pointed out that there was nothing sudden or unprecedented about Muslim women’s participation in the political domain as evidenced by the long and rich history of women in leadership roles. Haeri recounted the Judeo-Islamic story of the Queen of Sheba, also known as Bilqis, as one that is prominent in the Qur’an and favorably portrays the queen as a wise, intelligent, and caring ruler. The story of the Queen of Sheba shows that “the Queen’s gender is immaterial to her leadership and governance, and gender politics plays no role in this Qur’anic story.” The story, however, has seldom played an important role in modern Muslim feminist discourse. “Given that this story permeates popular cultures and is explicitly specified in the Qur’an, what has prevented Muslim women from appropriating the Queen’s model of leadership and actively participating in the political life of their societies?” Haeri mused.

The answer to this question, she said, can be found in the dynamics of an alleged hadith, or prophetic saying, and its patriarchal resonance in Muslim societies. The Prophet is reported to have said “those who entrust their affairs to women will never know prosperity.” In order to reconcile these two opposing narratives, Haeri proposed juxtaposing the Qur’anic story that supports women’s political leadership with that of its reported condemnation in the hadith in order to determine the patriarchal and political machinations at work in undermining women in leadership roles.

As examples of Muslim women in power, Haeri offered Raziya Sultan, ruler of the medieval Mamluk dynasty in India; Benazir Bhutto, the late Prime Minister of Pakistan who was democratically elected as leader of a highly conservative Muslim nation; and Ayesha, the Prophet’s wife, who led the “Battle of the Camel” against the reigning Caliph Ali. By examining the many historical examples of Muslim women in positions of power, Haeri highlighted the religious ambivalence regarding Muslim women leaders rather than a categorical condemnation. Predominant patriarchal opposition, she argued, happens within a socio-political sphere, rather than emanating primarily from the scripture.

All these women, although hailing from different cultural traditions and historical periods, shared a distinguished genealogical pedigree and had support from their powerful fathers or husbands. As Haeri explained, “the patriarch’s support bestows power and prestige on the daughter, facilitates her presence in the public domain, and legitimates her political authority and activities,” thus working to silence her detractors. Here lies what she has called “paradox of patriarchy.” While “history provides ample examples of fatal rivalries between the imperial fathers and coveting sons, little is said on the political implications of the relationships between a patriarch and his daughter, whom he may indeed favor over his sons who are in a structural position to dislodge the patriarch from his position of authority.”

Haeri ended her discussion by noting that popular views against women in leadership were/are often emanating from patriarchal and political discourse, and not necessarily from religious or scriptural dictates. “Aware of the hierarchy of the sources of authority in Islam – that between the Qur’anic revelations supporting women’s leadership and the alleged Prophetic hadith opposing it – religious authorities bide their time until an opportune moment arises to challenge the authority of a queen, a sultan, or a prime minister.”

Shahla Haeri is an Associate Professor of Cultural Anthropology and the former director of Women’s Studies Program (2001-2010) at Boston University. Trained as a Cultural Anthropologist with specific focus on law and religion, Haeri has conducted ethnographic research in Iran, Pakistan, and India. Her ongoing intellectual and academic interests converge on the evolving yet contentious relationship between religion/law, gender, and the state in the Muslim world in general, and in Iran in particular. She is the author of Law of Desire: Temporary Marriage, Mut’a, in Iran (1989, 2006 4th pt. Arabic Tr.13th printing 2010), and No Shame for the Sun: Lives of Professional Pakistani women (2002/2004).

She is the recipient of the 2011-2012 Visiting Fellowship at Georgetown University’s Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) at Doha, Qatar. She has been awarded several grants and postdoctoral fellowships, including Henderson Senior Research Fellowships in the Humanities at Boston University (2008-2009), Women’s Studies in Religion Studies at Harvard Divinity School (Colorado Scholar; 2005-2006), Fulbright (1999-2000, 2002-2003), St. Anthony’s College, Oxford University (1996), American Institute of Pakistan Studies, (1991-1992), Social Science Research Council (1987-1988), Pembroke Center for Teaching and Research on Women, Brown University (1986-1987), and the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University (1985-1986).

Dr. Haeri has produced a short video documentary (46 min.) entitled, Mrs. President: Women and Political Leadership in Iran, focusing on six women presidential contenders in Iran in 2001. This documentary is distributed by Films for Humanities and Sciences (www.films.com).

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

Ambassador Larocco on the Gulf Looking East
2012-02-26 08:00 - 18:00
On February 26, 2012, CIRS hosted a Focused Discussion with Ambassador James Larocco Distinguished Professor and Director of the Near East South Asia Center at the National Defense University in Washington, DC. The talk titled, “The Gulf Looking East: Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Iran,” was supported by the United States embassy in Qatar. Citing full academic freedom, Larocco gave his take on the Gulf’s relationship with its neighbors “from Marrakesh to Bangladesh.” He explained to the audience how representing a research center afforded him freedom from the official US diplomatic stance, and that he was able to have frank conversations with Pakistani and Iranian authorities.

The Ambassador recounted his experiences as a diplomat in the Middle East. His interest in the region began in the 1970s and he has been a regular resident in the region for many years. Most recently, Larocco described his role as that of an educator, rather than an emissary of the US government. Describing, the Near East South Asia Center, he said that it is an institution that “was deliberately created to try to bring people together from this region to have serious dialogue, to create communities of influence, to eliminate misunderstandings, and to – as much as possible – open minds.” There are currently over 3,000 of the center’s alumni in leadership positions all over the world, he said. In fact, the alumni are so prevalent in politics, that they constituted members of both the government as well as the opposition in a recent political dispute in the Maldives.

The current nexus of power in the Middle East, the Ambassador said, includes Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Israel – all of which exert tremendous amounts of hard and soft power, and will continue to do so. Pakistan and Afghanistan, Larocco said, are in extremely difficult situations for which he did not see an immediate solution – although he suggested that Qatar’s diplomatic and economic efforts could play a leading role in the future of Pakistan.

Moving further east, the Ambassador said that he did not see China as a military threat, but as a country that has grown powerful through commerce. China’s expansion “is strictly based on its mercantilist policy of securing economic interest because China has to produce 20 million jobs every year.” Much of the US government’s efforts in South Asia, Larocco said, have been established in order to contain the growing influence of China, although this has never been acknowledged as official US policy. In the next few years, people will notice that US policy, as well as naval and military presence, will shift towards South Asia, he said.

Larocco concluded by saying that “the Middle East, for the most part in the United States, is a problem to be worked with and to be endured, whereas South Asia and the Asia Pacific region are considered the future for the policy of the United States”. In addition, because of its strategic geographic location, roughly 50% of all world trade passes through the Indian Ocean, and so this also increases the challenges that will be faced in relation to maritime security. Because the local institutions and infrastructure are inadequately equipped to deal with the myriad future challenges, including the increased threat of maritime piracy, the Ambassador explained that “the Indian Ocean is going to be the focus of either conflict or cooperation.”

Retired ambassador James Larocco joined the NESA Center as a distinguished professor in August 2009, after serving more than 35 years as a diplomat. During the past 15 years, he held key leadership assignments related to the Near East region, including Director General of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), 2004-2009; Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East, 2001-2004; U.S. Ambassador to the State of Kuwait, 1997-2001 and Deputy Chief of Mission and Charge D’Affaires in Tel Aviv, 1993-1996. His earlier postings included assignments as Deputy Director of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh Affairs at the State Department in Washington and key positions in American embassies in Egypt, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. He left the Foreign Service with the personal rank of Career Minister, which equates in U.S. military terms to Lieutenant General. During his career, Ambassador Larocco received numerous awards, including the Distinguished Service Award that was personally presented to him by then Secretary of State Colin Powell.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications.

Ahmad Sa'di on Population Management and Political Control
2012-02-21 08:00 - 18:00
On February 21, 2012, Ahmad H. Sa’di, Professor in the Department of Politics and Government at Ben-Gurion University of Negev, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue on the topic “Population Management and Political Control: Israel’s Policies towards the Palestinians in the First Two Decades, 1948-1968.” Sa’di based his lecture on the results of investigations into historical and archival Israeli documents regarding the management of the Palestinian population.

Israeli authorities and academics claim that Israel never conducted any form of systematic control of Palestinian populations. Yet, the documents that Sa’di analyzed rebuke this claim and list detailed descriptions of the extreme measures taken in order for Israeli authorities to control and reduce the size of the Palestinian population during the early years of establishing the Israeli state. These “archival documents could shed light and help clarify premises of policies, world views, dogmas, and what social scientists call discourses,” he said.

Sa’di recounted that Israel was established in 1948 through the occupation of 77.8% of historical Palestine. In November 1948, Israel conducted a census aimed at presenting a legal position to deny Palestinian refugees the right of return at the end of the war. “This census founded the political basis for a hierarchical order of citizenship rights and entitlements. Jewish settlers who arrived before 1948 were placed at the top, while Palestinian ‘present absentees’ were relegated to the bottom,” he explained.

Sa’di argued that Israeli state policies focused on three issues that would comprise the basis of the state’s future strategy regarding population surveillance and control and involved strategies toward decreasing the size of the Palestinian population; rearranging its spatial distribution; and subjecting it to a tight regime of control and surveillance. Beside overt and coercive transfers and ghettoization, other means of control included “insurmountable legal and practical hurdles in order to prevent the establishment of an organized political body to voice the opinions and concerns of the minority,” as well as encouraging Arab students to study abroad and establishing Arabic-language media networks that espoused Israeli ideology.

Further, more nuanced, measures involved the introduction of family planning and the initiation of measures for the liberation of women – particularly the raising of their educational standards. Israeli policymakers reached the conclusion that an increase in a woman’s education causes a decline in her fertility.

Sa’di concluded the lecture by pointing to the necessity of conducting independent archival investigation that questions the dominant discourse relayed by Israel. He argued that not only do these documents show what guided Israeli thinking in the early years of establishing the state, but also the relevance of Israeli regulations to current realities on the ground. “These tactics carry the fingerprints of Israeli diplomacy and aimed to absolve the Israeli State of liability for the actions of its agents,” Sa’di explained. He cautioned that it is always important to point to the discrepancy between representation and reality. This, he said, “should not be overlooked nor underestimated, particularly since Israel has always endeavored to present the image of a democratic, enlightened, and moral state.”

Ahmad Sa’di received a Ph.D. degree in sociology from the University of Manchester in 1991, followed by two years of service for a Palestinian NGO. Sa’di has published over 38 articles, in English, Arabic, Hebrew, German and Japanese, and most recently co-edited a book of Palestinian memoirs entitled Nakba: Palestine, 1948 and the Claims of Memory. His areas of interest include political sociology, the sociology of developing nations, social movements and political mobilization, and the discourse and methods of political control and surveillance used by Israel to control Palestinian citizens.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor of CIRS Publications

The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East Working Group I
2012-02-19 08:00 - 2012-02-20 18:00
On February 19–20, 2012, CIRS held a two-day working group meeting on the topic “The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East.” Several scholars and experts on the Middle East were invited to CIRS at Georgetown University’s Qatar (GU-Q) campus to take part in the discussions. At the conclusion of the research initiative, the working group participants will contribute chapters towards a book on the subject.

As a preliminary consideration before commencing presentations and discussions, the participants questioned the terms of the debate and offered different analyses of what “ruling bargain” might mean in different contexts and how this term differs from the notion of a “social contract.” There was consensus that every state-society relationship is bound by an unwritten and informal hegemonic understanding in the form of a social pact between the ruler and the ruled whether authoritarian or otherwise. In many countries of the Arab world, this general understanding between state and public has been less of a “bargain” and more of a top-down “imposition” of governance. However, the participants acknowledged that whether in authoritarian or democratic countries, the terms of a social contract are in a state of constant flux and are negotiated on a daily basis whether peacefully or through violent means of resistance and uprisings.

The participants identified the necessary methodological threads that bring together the various issues as well as the general theoretical tropes that will run throughout the project. A central theme that emerged is the nature of the relationship between the citizen and the state in the Middle East and how this has been renegotiated through citizen action. For the first time in modern Arab history, there have been demands for an alignment between the individual; the communal group whether gender-based, religious, ethnic, or tribal; civil society organizations; and government agencies. The participants argued that it was always important to discuss the Arab Spring at the level of the individual and how Mohamed Bouazizi’s spontaneous act of self-immolation resonated with millions of people across the region who shared similar grievances.

Although there have always been formal opposition parties in many Middle East states in one form or another, these functioned as part of the status quo and served as mechanisms of legitimation of the authoritarian state. The public protests that constitute the Arab Spring are a means by which publics in Egypt, Libya, and Tunis, as well as in other countries voice their dissatisfaction with the status quo. These protests are unprecedented and reveal the existence of a whole generation of people who demand change and who are, in effect, the informal opposition. People have carved out a platform within which they are active agents of change who are able to negotiate questions of power, identity, jurisprudence, and accountability. Media networks such as Al Jazeera, informal social media platforms, and human communication networks more generally acted as catalysts for transmitting ideas that have had far-reaching consequences and have inspired people all over the world to forge vibrant and creative political cultures of resistance.

Other issues that were discussed during the meeting include the effect of the Arab Spring on the rise of Islamist parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood; the effect of foreign influence on social unrest; the active participation of women in the political arena; questions of constitutional reform; future international relations and foreign policies; and the emergence of new political parties and discourses that have long been absent in many Middle Eastern countries. In addition, the scholars analyzed specific case-studies related to the situations in Syria, Libya, Egypt, Bahrain, Iran, Yemen, and Tunis. Although each country has its own set of complex political dynamics dictating possible outcomes, the participants also discussed the reasons why people in Morocco and Algeria did not join in public protests.

Towards the conclusion of the working group meeting the participants cautioned about using the word “revolution” to describe the uprisings in the Middle East. Even though they agreed that tremendous changes have taken place, they questioned whether it was possible to completely eradicate ingrained patronage networks and whether these post-authoritarian regimes would actually transition to democracies. A cloud of uncertainty still lingers over the fate of all these countries and so, during these unpredictable times, it is important to ask “what happens next?”

Click here for the working group’s agenda
Read more about the research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Abdullah Al-Arian, Wayne State UniversityHatoon Al-Fassi, Qatar University; King Saud UniversityMazhar Al-Zo’by, Qatar UniversitySaïd Amir Arjomand, The Stony Brook Institute for Global StudiesZahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarJohn T. Crist, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarMichael Driessen, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarMarie Duboc, American University in CairoJohn Foran, International Institute for Climate Action Theory; University of California, Santa BarbaraShahla Haeri, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarShadi Hamid, Brookings Doha CenterNader Hashemi, Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of DenverThomas Juneau, Department of National Defence, Government of CanadaMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarJackie Kerr, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarRami George Khouri, Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of BeirutBahgat Korany, American University in CairoFred H. Lawson, Mills CollegeMiriam Lowi,The College of New JerseyMari Luomi, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarQuinn Mecham, Middlebury CollegeSuzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarGerd Nonneman, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarJames C. Olsen, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarAhmad H. Sa’di, Ben-Gurion UniversityDirk Vandewalle, Dartmouth College

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

Peter Bergen Lectures on the Remaking of the Middle East
2012-02-13 08:00 - 18:00
On February 13, 2012, Peter Bergen delivered the 2011-2012 CIRS Faculty Distinguished Lecture titled, “The Awakening: How Revolutionaries, Barack Obama, and Ordinary Muslims are Remaking the Middle East.” In addition to being CNN’s security analyst, Bergen is a Schwartz Fellow at the New American Foundation and an adjunct lecturer in public policy at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Bergen was introduced to the audience by Will Cha, Student Government President at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar.

Bergen discussed five different, but interrelated topics, which he listed as “Al Qaeda, terrorism, Afghanistan/Pakistan, the Arab Spring, and the influence of President Obama on some of these issues.” On the topics of Al Qaeda and terrorism, Bergen explained how he was one of the few Westerners to have met the world’s most-wanted man, Osama bin Laden, face to face in 1997 in Eastern Afghanistan. During that interview, Bin Laden declared war on the United States because of its support for Israel, sanctions against Iraq, as well as other foreign policy critiques. Bin Laden described the United States as weak and scarred from all of its past failed wars and pullouts from Vietnam, Beirut, and Mogadishu. This analysis of a weak United States, Bergen said, was an important insight into why 9/11 happened because it showed that Bin Laden thought that he could pressure the United States into similarly pulling out of the Middle East. It turned out, however, that “9/11 was a major strategic error for Al Qaeda because, first of all Al Qaeda – which of course means ‘the base in Arabic’ – lost their base in Afghanistan,” he said. So, instead of the United States being pressurized to exit the Middle East, the reverse happened, and now, as a result, the United States has increased its presence on the ground in several different countries of the Arab world. Bergen continued by saying that “the 9/11 attacks were a strategic failure not only because they didn’t achieve the goal that Bin Laden wanted, but also because they led eventually to the defeat of Al Qaeda, and, in fact, to the death recently of Bin Laden himself.”

“Al Qaeda was losing the war of ideas in the Muslim world,” Bergen argued, not because the United States and the West were winning, but because Al Qaeda was losing any support it ever had through its detrimental demands and actions. “Al Qaeda and groups like it position themselves as the defenders of true Islam, but Muslims began to notice that many of Al Qaeda’s victims were, in fact, Muslims,” in Iraq, Indonesia, Jordan, and elsewhere in the world. This turned past supporters and sympathizers into outspoken opponents and enemies of Al Qaeda. Because “Bin Laden never proposed a positive vision of the Middle East,” in terms of economic, infrastructural, or developmental policies, he had nothing to offer Muslims but destruction, which is not an impressive prospect of future governance, Bergen explained. “The idea of an Al Qaeda hospital or an Al Qaeda school is an oxymoron,” he said.

The Arab Spring was an interesting backdrop for understanding exactly how weak and out of touch Al Qaeda was with Arab societies across the Muslim world, Bergen argued. The fall of Arab regimes signaled some of the most significant events in the region in decades, and, yet, Bin Laden was silent on these issues, despite his penchant for commenting on important world events over the years. Thousands of people marched through cities in Egypt, Tunis, and Libya, and yet none voiced any affiliations with Al Qaeda’s anti-Western ideologies. “Bin Laden’s foot soldiers and his ideas were notably absent in the events of the Arab Spring.”

Describing what he thought the future governance of the Middle East will look like, Bergen said that “the monarchies in the Middle East, for a variety of reasons, are going to be able to weather the Arab Spring fairly well.” This is because monarchies have the benefit of being able to transform themselves from absolute to constitutional, unlike dictatorships, which are by definition absolute.

Elsewhere in the surrounding region, although there is a rapidly increasing population and only 2% economic growth in Pakistan, there are still some emerging positives such as a strong independent media, judiciary, and civil society groups. Similarly, in Afghanistan, there have been some positive developments, especially in terms of schooling, a decrease in infant mortality, an increase in GDP, better infrastructure, and a general consensus on the ground that the country is heading in the right direction. A future problem that will surface, however, will be the withdrawal of United States financial support and the subsequent economic crisis, Bergen warned.

In conclusion, Bergen noted that President Obama’s popularity in the Middle East has been in a steady state of decline, stemming from, among other things, “the Obama Administration’s lack of real effort on the Israeli/Palestinian negotiations.” Many people thought of Obama as the “anti-war president,” but he surprised everyone by actually being very tough on national security and has engaged the United States in a variety of covert and actual wars all over the world.

For more than 15 years, Peter Bergen has traveled extensively throughout Afghanistan, Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and more recently Iraq, to report on national security and the Al Qaeda network. His work can be found in many prestigious publications including the New York Times, Washington Post, Vanity Fair, the Wall Street Journal, and the International Herald Tribune.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator

Anthony Appiah Lectures on Ideas of Cosmopolitanism
2012-01-23 08:00 - 18:00
On January 23, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University, delivered the first CIRS Monthly Dialogueof 2012 titled, “Being a Citizen of the World Today.” Appiah’s lecture was centered on the question of global citizenship and how historical intellectual theories of “cosmopolitanism” have a bearing on how people live their lives in the contemporary world. Appiah pointed out that the etymology of the word “cosmopolitan” is derived from the Greek “kosmos” meaning “world” and “polites” meaning “citizen,” and so “cosmopolitanism” literally means a “citizen of the world.” Taking the audience on a journey back to ancient Greece, Appiah relayed how current understandings of cosmopolitanism are inherited from ancient Greek political philosophy.

Appiah recounted that Diogenes, a philosopher and founder of the Cynic movement, was the first known European to ever look beyond the borders of the ancient Greek Empire to claim that he was a citizen of the world. Appiah explained that this statement made by Diogenes is a metaphor for tolerance of otherness and does not necessarily mean that Diogenes favored a single world government, which is precisely what Alexander the Great was attempting to do at that time through his project of world conquest and domination. People can think of themselves as fellow citizens and can care about the fate of their fellow human beings even if they are not members of a single political community. “Cosmopolitanism believes that every human being matters and that we have a shared obligation for one another,” he said.

Diogenes’ idea of cosmopolitanism entered Western philosophical traditions through the Stoics and has survived to this day through Christian and Islamic traditions that emphasize a spiritual affinity between all human beings. Similarly, the intellectual core of European enlightenment was based on the idea of global concern for humanity, without advocating a centralized world government. With the rise of Westphalian ideology, the idea of the nation state was consolidated through common cultural and linguistic affiliations between the people of a single geographical area. Although calls for national unity and homogeneity are always strong, Appiah noted that they are not all encompassing and there will always be diverse groups of people living in a single country. “Different communities are entitled to live according to different standards because human beings can flourish in many different kinds of society and because there are so many values worth living by,” Appiah said.

Because cultural diversity is a condition of the world, “conversation across identities, religions, races, ethnicities, and nationalities is worthwhile, because through conversation, you learn from other people with different, perhaps even incompatible, ideas from your own,” Appiah argued. As such, today’s globalization has made the ancient ideal of cosmopolitanism even more relevant; an individual can reach millions of international others through communications technologies and global media and economic systems.

As a final thought, Appiah explained that cosmopolitanism is an empowering concept and one that forms the basis of mutual respect for oneself and for others. He concluded that “if people were to manage their own lives, which is what they are responsible for, then they need the powers to do so. And the closer the powers are to people, and to small communities of people, the greater the control they can have over the shaping of their lives.”

Kwame Anthony Appiah joined the Princeton faculty in 2002 as Laurance S. Rockefeller University Professor of Philosophy and the University Center for Human Values. His current interests range over African and African-American intellectual history and literary studies, ethics and philosophy of mind and language; and he has also taught regularly about African traditional religions. Professor Appiah was educated at Clare College, Cambridge University, in England, where he took both B.A. and Ph.D. degrees in the philosophy department.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator

Walter Denny on New Ways of Looking at Islamic Art
2011-12-12 08:00 - 18:00
Walter B. Denny, Professor of Art History at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, gave a CIRS Monthly Dialogue lecture on “Innovation in the Visual Arts of Islam: New Ways of Looking at Islamic Art” on December 12, 2011. The lecture was a follow-up to a previous one Denny gave for CIRS at the “Innovation in Islam” conference that took place back in 2008. Subsequently, Denny contributed to the CIRS edited volume on Innovation in Islam: Traditions and Contributions, which was edited by Mehran Kamrava and published in 2011 by the University of California Press.

Contextualizing the concept of “innovation,” Denny described the ways in which it is understood in relation to art. He argued that innovation does not relate solely to the contemporary, but is, paradoxically, a historical feature of creative endeavors in all artistic categories. “One of the things that has always fascinated me about the history of Islamic art is the way that the past is constantly used as an inspiration for the present, and of course for the future,” he said. As an example, Denny said that the Mamluk style has been continually revived in the history of Egyptian architecture, as has the Ottoman style been reproduced in Turkey and elsewhere in the former Ottoman Empire. Innovation in art history is always based on something that came before, and “there is no such thing as total innovation. Innovation is always, to one extent or another, incremental,” he explained.

In much of the Islamic art that Denny examined, patterns and forms are not newly designed, but are borrowings from previous times, locales, and traditions that were either forcibly learned or subtly transferred as cultures came into contact with one another across the centuries. The geometric designs that have come to define art-works of the Islamic world are in fact derived from previous Roman traditions, Denny argued. This is not to say, however, that these works should not be considered innovative. Each iteration of a previous form is creating something new, and yet, it is something that must acknowledge its debt to a past formulation. Denny gave an example of how themes or motifs have been transferred from one culture to another to produce entirely new meanings. In ancient China, for example, the dragon was used as a powerful symbol of the cosmos, but when used in Ottoman artworks, it lost this meaning entirely and was instead used to symbolize a fearsome creature.

Dynastic patronages in Ottoman and Persian art ensured that certain styles were used in order to set their works apart from others, or, as Denny explained, the use of particular motifs is in fact, a traditional form of “branding.” These are innovations that are created specifically for works of art to stand out in the marketplace, and to signal the uniqueness of one culture or another. “The Ottoman Empire, consciously, as a matter of state policy, adopted certain forms in its art,” he said.

Not only is innovation a feature of art itself, but, Denny argued, it is also an aspect of how art is viewed and how we conceive of our relationship with artworks. Denny, Senior Consultant in the Department of Islamic Art at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, described how displays at museums are constantly updated over the years in order to give the viewer a better sense of the work. The ever new and sophisticated ways in which art is being displayed, lighted, and categorized, all move toward the development of a new type of relationship between the work of art and the viewer.

In conclusion, Denny said that the artist is constantly in a state of transmutation between the past and present, even at times being accused of plagiarism when his or her work too closely resembles another’s. Yet, Denny argued, much of what we consider to be works of art are in fact created by emulating what has come before. After surveying several innovations in the history of Islamic art, he concluded that “we are beginning to look at Islamic art as we should have looked at it all along – as a phenomenon; art that reflects the totality of the human experience, from the human psyche, to human belief, to patronage systems.”

Walter B. Denny joined the faculty of the University of Massachusetts Amherst Art History Program in 1970. His primary field of teaching and research is the art and architecture of the Islamic world, in particular the artistic traditions of the Ottoman Turks, Islamic carpets and textiles, and issues of economics and patronage in Islamic art. In addition to curatorships at the Harvard University (1970-2000) and Smith College (2000-2005) art museums, in September of 2002 he was named Charles Grant Ellis Research Associate in Oriental Carpets at The Textile Museum, Washington, DC. He pursued graduate study at Istanbul Technical University and Harvard University, receiving his M.A. and Ph.D. from Harvard.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, CIRS Publications Coordinator.

Fouad Ajami Lectures on the Arab Spring
2011-11-21 08:00 - 18:00
On November 21, 2011, CIRS hosted Fouad Ajami, a Senior Fellow of The Hoover Institution at Stanford University and co-chairman of Hoover’s Working Group on Islamism and the International Order, to discuss the recent Arab Spring in the Middle East. The event which was sponsored by Georgetown’s Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) took place at the university’s campus, and drew a large number of members from the Doha community.

The lecture, titled “Tracking the Arab Spring: The Best Day After a Bad Emperor is the First,” explored how the “Arab Awakening” started in Tunisia, went on to Egypt, then to many other countries, including Syria and Libya. Ajami described how the Arab Spring started with Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor, whose act became the catalyst for the Tunisian revolution that led to the stepping down of their former president and the spreading of riots to different countries in the Arab world.

“Arabs, for several decades walked by the wall and did nothing against these tyrannical regimes, but now they are eager to take their freedom and full rights… Luckily, now they decided not to heed and react to these regimes,” said Ajami while addressing the audience.

According to Ajami, who is a frequent contributor on Middle Eastern issues and contemporary international history for The New York Times, Foreign Affairs, The New Republic, The Wall Street Journal, among many other journals and periodicals.

“I am all in with the Arab Spring, I believed in it and still do; however, I am really worried about Egypt… If the Arab awakening did not succeed in Egypt, it will definitely affect the political, social, and economic situations in the other Arab countries… The economic freedom is linked to the political one; there is no political freedom in the absence of economic freedom,” he explained. Ajami believes that there will be a time when Arabs will chant in support of a great leader.

The event concluded with a question and answer session which generated a great deal of participation from the audience, whose members posed a range of questions for the speaker.

Georgetown University’s CIRS hosts a variety of regional and international experts through its Distinguished Lecture Series. Former speakers include prominent Middle East news correspondent Robert Fisk and Pulitzer Prize-winning author Thomas L. Friedman. These lectures are designed to raise awareness of regionally-relevant international issues.

Georgetown’s Center for International and Regional Studies in Qatar is a premier research institute devoted to the academic study of regional and international issues. CIRS sponsors a number of forums throughout the year facilitating dialogue and an exchange of ideas on a broad range of issues with the aim to engage and enrich the university students and community.

From 1980 to June 2011, he was the Majid Khadduri professor and Director of Middle East Studies at The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He began his academic career after receiving his PhD in political science from the University of Washington in 1973. He is the author of The Arab Predicament, The Vanished Imam, Beirut: City of Regrets, and The Dream Palace of the Arabs, The Foreigner’s Gift: The Americans, the Arabs and the Iraqis in Iraq and other works.
