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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140622T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140623T180000
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SUMMARY:Social Currents in the Maghreb Working Group II
DESCRIPTION:On June 22-23\, 2014\, CIRS held the concluding Social Currents in the Maghreb research initiative working group in Washington D.C. Participants gathered for the second time to discuss their research findings and solicit feedback from a multi-disciplinary cohort of working group members. The topics and themes discussed ranged from the mobilization of social movements in the Maghreb to language as politics and dissent in cultural production. \n \n \nFollowing the Arab uprisings\, the rise of Islamist parties has led to renewed interest in Islamist politics and a proliferation of debates surrounding the role of Islamist parties and movements in North African politics and society. Despite increased scholarly attention to Islamist politics\, the literature remains predominantly narrow in its scope\, neglecting ideological and political innovations within Islamist parties\, and the diversity and divisions that exist within the Islamist sphere as a whole. One of the ways in which Islamist parties in North Africa have exhibited ideological innovation is by adopting new ideological references that are based on a national framework\, rather than the commonly adopted “eastern” interpretations on the relationship between Islam and politics. By primarily referencing Algerian Malek Bennabi’s work\, and Ghannouchi’s earlier writings\, al-Nahda is “nationalizing an essentially internationalist project”. This is indicative of a change in the flow of ideas in the Maghreb and the shaping of Islamism based on local experiences. While ideological innovation is taking place in the formal political sphere\, younger generations of Maghrebis are increasingly distancing themselves from institutional politics and finding alternative ways of performing “every-day Islamism” through associations that are more focused on the betterment of society\, rather than the hierarchical mechanisms of institutional politics. Decreased trust in the formal political sphere as an agent of change has led to this diffusion of what it means to be “Islamist” and a growing perception of the distance from “politicking” as a source of success for these associations. \n \n \nOn the other hand\, for young people who believe that religion should play a more central role in politics\, Salafism has become a significant outlet to achieve political objectives. Participants discussed Salafism in relation to its three broad categories of scriptural\, Jihadi\, and political Salafism. Of particular salience is the adoption of Jihadi Salafism by young Islamists who are unsatisfied with the Islamist parties in power and the absence of radical change. The rise of Jihadi Salafism in the Maghreb– even before the Arab Uprisings – has led to the co-optation of Sufism by the state to counterweigh the rising threat of Jihadi Salafism; this has led to what some participants claimed was a “revival” of Sufism in the political sphere. Despite seeming state co-optation\, participants problematized “Sufism” as a term and discussed that it entails much more than mere reflective esoteric practices but rather\, has institutional politics embedded within – complicating what is generally perceived as a “quietist” movement.  \n \n \nWorking group members also discussed the Polisario movement and the question of the Western Sahara. While the Polisario is predominantly thought of as an “Algeria-backed movement”\, it has increasingly diversified its support base since the 1990s\, to include non-state actors such as activist NGOs\, the Sahrawi diaspora and international aid agencies. This flexibility and adaptability has contributed to the movement’s resilience and accordingly this transformation has largely blurred the movement’s boundaries between being an armed and un-armed movement. \n \n \nIn questioning dominant narrow conceptions of North Africa\, participants further problematized terms such as the “Arab” uprisings\, which fail to recognize the linguistic and cultural heterogeneity of the region. Decades of Amazigh activism throughout the Maghreb has challenged the Arab nationalist ideologies of Maghrebi states. By utilizing a discourse of democracy\, pluralism\, and diversity throughout the decades and particularly in the “Berber Spring” of the 1980s\, their movement largely dovetails with demonstrations of the “Arab Spring” that call for social justice and rule of law. Similarly in Mauritania\, the Haratin have played a dominant role in shaping the way human rights issues are debated in Mauritanian society and in the political quest for democracy. \n \n \nDifferent states of the Maghreb\, such as Algeria and Morocco\, have appropriated cultural diversity and co-opted various Amazigh activists\, bringing forth the fragmentation and internal divides that exist within the Amazigh movement itself\, particularly with regards to generation and class. In addition to the heterogeneity that exists within the Amazigh movement and the Maghrebi states\, the Amazigh movement is a transnational one that expands the cultural-geographic space of Barbary\, essentially raising questions about the boundaries of those nation states and how territorial boundedness relates to the lived experience. In the Mauritanian context\, while the Haratin are characterized as those of “slave descent”\, they do not constitute a homogenous group\, but rather identify as Arabs\, Berbers\, Africans and Mauritanian. Participants noted that in shifting social and political landscapes the politics of self-racialization come in to play\, where in different moments the Haratins are racialized as “black Africans”. \n \n \nWith the neo-liberalization of culture\, “Berberness” does not merely represent an object of struggle\, but is also an “aestheticized iconography of the visual urban field”. Paralleling the commodification of Berber heritage is Jewish heritage tourism and cultural conservation in Morocco. While Moroccan Jewish history is a valued economic asset that has become central to national tourism revenues\, local support and discourses continue to be overshadowed by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict\, largely overlying Moroccan Jewish history.  Due to this low level of national multicultural consciousness\, there are a number of Moroccan Amazigh and Muslim activists that focus their activities on incorporating the local history of Jews in school and university curricula in order to broaden and deepen the understanding of Jews within Morocco’s historical cultural diversity. \n \n \nWhile official promotion of multiculturalism has largely led to celebratory interpretations that presume it as a precursor to social justice and democratization\, its intersection with elements of neo-liberalism masks deeper negative socio-economic repercussions. In Morocco for instance\, official rhetoric that promotes multilingualism has further stratified society by placing a heavy burden on students and young Moroccons to manage multiple languages. Due to language requirements in the education system\, structural inequalities and limitations exist that discriminate against those who cannot afford private schooling\, essentially excluding them from national and international economic arenas. While the poorer populations of the Maghreb continue to be excluded from global mobility due to these structural limitations\, other populations – particularly those of the sport elite – have widened their scope of migration destinations. In the context of sport migrant communities\, participants discussed the states of the GCC as increasingly becoming part of the Maghrebi social imaginary\, and in some ways replacing Europe as the prime target for migration. \n \n \nPreceding and during the Arab uprisings\, labor movements have mobilized to address socio-economic woes in the Maghreb. In Morocco\, labor unions pressed for material demands and partially achieved them through a series of strikes\, sit-ins and protests during the uprisings of 2011. What is important to highlight is that labor was always able to mobilize and connect with the struggle of other groups. Perhaps in recognition of such\, the Moroccan government has become particularly capable and effective in its ‘divide and conquer’ tactics to avert the creation of a broad alliance that seeks to connect actors in the political sphere. As such\, participants highlighted the importance of not only investigating the negotiations that take place between labor movements and the government\, but between labor and the myriad of social movements that exist in the Maghreb\, as it may affect the labor movement’s strategies in broadening their concrete demands beyond the economic sphere. \n \n \nThe case-study of labor movements highlights that socio-economic woes have always been present in Maghrebi society\, and more importantly so\, that groups mobilized to address their demands prior to the Arab uprisings. Beyond formal mobilization\, cultural production in the Maghreb also indicates that other forms of dissent were also prevalent within society. In looking at post-colonial film and dissent in Tunisia\, participants discussed the works of Moufida Ttali\, Nouri Bouzid\, Ferid Boughedir\, Mahamd Zran\, and Moncef Dhouib. These films challenge the sociocultural status quo by contesting taboos\, expanding social boundaries and forming “the critical basis for challenging the governmental and political state apparatus itself”. How these films are received by the Tunisian public and whether or not they inspired political action is much more obscure; what is evident however is that dissent was prevalent in the consciousness and works of many Maghrebi artists. \n \n \n  \n \n \n\nRead participant bios\nSee the working group schedule\nRead more about this research initiative\n\n \n  \n \n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nOsama Abi-Mershed\, CCAS – Georgetown University\nJean R. AbiNader\, Moroccan American Trade and Investment Center (MATIC)\nMahfoud Amara\, Loughborough University\nAlice Bullard\, IRA-USA\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nAomar Boum\, University of Arizona\nCharis Boutieri\, King’s College London\nMatt Buehler\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nFrancesco Cavatorta\, Université Laval\nNouri Gana\, University of California\, Los Angeles\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nRicardo René Larémont\, Binghamton University\nDwaa Osman\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nZekeria Ould Ahmed Salem\, University of Nouakchott\nPaul Silverstein\, Reed College\nElizabeth F. Thompson\, University of Virginia\nElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nAlice Wilson\, University of Cambridge\n\n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Dwaa Osman\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/social-currents-maghreb-working-group-ii/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140608T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140608T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T002519
CREATED:20140914T144540Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T124020Z
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SUMMARY:World Regions: The Middle Eastern Pivot Working Group I
DESCRIPTION:On June 8\, 2014\, CIRS and the Stony Brook Institute for Global Studies (SBIGS) held the first working group under the collaborative research initiative World Regions: The Middle Eastern Pivot. Scholars from various disciplinary backgrounds gathered for the meeting in Doha to discuss topics related to the concept of “regions\,” the construction of regional identities\, and world regions and civilizations. \n \n \nParticipants began the working group meeting with a discussion of “a Pangaean approach to world regions.” The new-old approach to world regions categorized regions using physical and meta-geographical distinctions. Physically\, the distinction is the seven continents that resulted as a fragmentation of the old super-continent Pangea. Other meta-geographical distinctions are: nation-states\, which arise out of political categories; North-South and core\, periphery\, and semi-periphery economic categorizations; and cultural distinctions such as the occident and the orient. However\, this traditional way of studying regions lacks the incorporation of the human impact on the geo-body\, which is largely affected by techno-scientific means.  While the new-old approach fragments the earth based on a predominantly socio-cultural perspective\, the new-new approach—or the Pangea II project—seeks to integrate the techno-scientific lens with the cultural studies lens. Our socio-natural impact gives rise to a global techno-scientific culture requiring new imagery and a re-mapping of the world—as Pangea II. Participants also discussed the importance of language when constructing and re-mapping regions. The notion of “world” regions emphasizes the diversity and divisions between various regions\, whereas the concept of “global” regions may focus more on the interconnections and overlaps\, accounting for the ongoing change that is occurring to earth as a whole and providing a binocular view that incorporates socio-cultural and socio-natural constituents. \n \n \n“The Islamicate civilization and the Persianate world” was the second topic of discussion amongst participants. The growth of Orientalism by the end of the eighteenth century led to a shift from a unitary to a plural notion of civilization. The Orientalist approach to civilization used language as the decisive marker\, and as such\, based on the generation and influence of the Persian language\, the Persianate world is considered to be a civilizational zone. Max Weber’s approach to civilization replaces language with religion as the main marker. In this conception\, the Islamicate civilization is constituted as a world region. These conceptions of world regions are not mutually exclusive and as such identities can be intersecting and overlapping allowing one to be simultaneously Muslim\, Persianate and Middle Eastern. In considering world regions as a unit of analysis\, geographic\, cultural or political\, and structural coherence are considered to be the basic criterion. Geographic coherence was evident in ancient and medical empires that were territorially contiguous. Political coherence is produced as a result of polity formation. A framework for considering political coherence is “Sheldon Pollock’s idea of the vernacular millennium where the ecumenical languages—Sanskrit\, Latin and Arabic—recede to make possible the growth of vernacular languages and cultures as a result of polity formation with the rise of local monarchies.” While Arabic was the lingua franca of the Islamic Civilization\, Persian became a complimentary lingua franca to Islam where the Samanids in the tenth century played a particularly major role in spreading Islam as a world religion. A core component of the third criterion – structural or institutional coherence—is the legal order and juridification of norms and organizing logics. Islamic law—or Sharia—is predominantly private law and developed under the Islamicate civilization. Public or constitutional law however did not develop under this civilization and the idea of an “Islamicate monarchy” as a “political ethic” was largely derived from the Persian idea of kingship—signifying another area of great overlap between the two worlds. \n \n \nIn exploring the topic of the “Islamicate Ecumene in MENA and South Asia before Colonial Empires and Nation-States”\, participants discussed the monopolization of literature by two dominant framings on geographic entities: that of the ecumene (ethno/cultural/religious civilizational aspects) and that of the empire (political aspects). Nestled between these geo-entities framings is one that is more socio-cultural and socio-economic—one that focuses on activities centered on exchange and one that includes people who were not part of the elite—such as students\, teachers\, pilgrims\, traders etc. The neglect of the latter geo-entity accounts for the relative absence of the Middle East and South Asia in comparison to other parts of the world in the scholarship of global histories. Addressing this third geo-entity fills a huge gap in the scholarship and facilitates the reconstruction of salient spheres of social communication that took place prior to the nineteenth century.  By embracing philology\, and drawing on social-scientific techniques that create cardinal visualization\, scholars can facilitate the study of conceptual history and the reconstruction of spheres of spatial communication in past contexts. \n \n \nWhile addressing the Arab World and the Middle East as overlapping world regions\, the “Middle East” as a defined region was problematized by the working group members. Characterized as “one of the most relative terms\,” scholars have long debated what geographical\, cultural\, political and historical patterns give coherence to this label. Despite these disputes in the nomenclature of the Middle East\, participants nonetheless engaged with the region. Paralleling an earlier discussion of shifts in regional centers and the reversal of center and periphery\, participants questioned whether there is a shift in the regional centers of gravity in the Middle East—moving away from the previous centers of power and economic activity of Baghdad\, Cairo and Damascus\, to that of the Persian Gulf states. In order to understand whether the center of gravity is shifting\, scholars of the region need to have a better read of the intellectual landscape of the Middle East. Much of what we know about the production of knowledge in the region is related to that of political activists\, but not much is known about political thinkers in Middle Eastern society. Whether or not places such as Dubai for instance\, signify authentic cultural centers of knowledge production in the region could help us understand whether such regional shifts are in fact occurring. Some participants\, however\, questioned whether there remain any centers of gravity\, or perhaps just a series of networks that interlace throughout the region. \n \n \nBridging regional studies and social science disciplines\, participants delved into the topic of “The Middle East and International Relations Theory.” Each of the four schools of IR thought (i.e. the power\, interdependence\, Marxist\, and constructivist schools) has particular relevance to the region. For instance\, the power school emphasizes realism and attributes the shape of the region to the actions of great powers—this is fitting to the Middle East because the shape—and definition—of the region is in fact a product of great powers. When interpreting the modern world\, however\, another type of realism emerges—realism of power that is defined by the ability to produce and develop techno-scientific knowledge\, emphasizing the modern need for civilizations to be progressive as compared to traditional civilizations that did not emphasize the growth process. Though the power school remains salient\, it does not account for the power of regional actors nor take into consideration non-state actors. The school of constructivism on the other hand—which is a late comer in IR theory—brings forth the importance of ideas\, thereby bringing IR theory closer to social thinking and allowing for deeper analysis and engagement with the internal dynamics of the region. Neo-constructivism—perhaps the most effective of all—integrates the material dimensions of the latter three IR theories (power\, economy\, class) and that of ideas. \n \n \nLast on the agenda\, working group members tackled the topic of “Central Eurasia as a World Region.” Central Eurasia encompasses multiple ethnic groups and languages making it difficult to define this region as a region. Although linguistic similarities between Uzbeks and Kazaks for instance indicate a level of cultural similarity; natives of these countries do not perceive it to be the case largely due to the linguistic and geographic borders that were reified through the soviet institutions of the twentieth century. From an internal perspective\, national legacies of the region make it hard to identify central Asia as a region as its inhabitants have historically emphasized maintaining separateness. Additionally\, from the perspective of outsiders such as international aid donors\, the divergent developmental trajectories of the countries within also undermines regional coherence (for instance\, while Kazakhstan is undergoing rapid economic progression\, countries like Tajikistan and Afghanistan are seen as failing states by the international community). The various aspects of language\, culture\, geography\, diasporas and the ways in which international organizations engage with the region\, reveal multiple layers of regional identity that may be mobilized by people. Thus\, while the region may be a construct of western academic discourse\, there are moments when people evoke regional unity for certain purposes. Ascertaining when these moments occur and for what purposes contributes to the understanding of the ways in which people themselves evoke regional coherence.  \n \n \n\nSee the participant bios\nSee the Working Group agenda \nRead more about this research initiative \n\n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nLaura Adams\, Harvard University\nSaïd Arjomand\, Stony Brook University\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nNerida Child Dimasi\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nBarb Gillis\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nBahgat Korany\, The American University in Cairo\nDwaa Osman\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nWolf Schäfer\, Stony Brook University\nGagan Sood\, London School of Economics\nElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\n\n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Dwaa Osman\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/world-regions-middle-eastern-pivot-working-group-i/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140603T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140604T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T002519
CREATED:20140914T145509Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T124031Z
UID:10000863-1401782400-1401904800@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:The State and Innovation in the Gulf Working Group II
DESCRIPTION:On June 3-4\, 2014\, CIRS held the second working group under the State and Innovation in the Gulf research initiative. Participants reconvened in Doha to discuss their paper submissions that collectively analyze efforts of GCC states to diversify their oil-based economies into knowledge-based economies (KBEs)\, the manifestation of these efforts on the ground\, and the structural realities that facilitate or hinder this transition. \n \n \nSignificant dependence on the oil and gas industry has led to the development of national visions and strategies that actively seek to diversify GCC economies. These diversification efforts are not merely related to the diffusion of risk by decreasing dependence on the volatile oil and gas sector\, but are rather increasingly intertwined with elements associated with KBEs—namely job creation and the development of sectors with high knowledge content. Global rankings such as the World Bank’s Knowledge Assessment Methodology database provide a comparative indication of the status of knowledge economies around the world. While GCC countries rank below European and North American countries in the World Bank’s KAM database\, they also score significantly higher than other states in the MENA region. Despite this relative indication of GCC rankings\, participants questioned the applicability of these assessments to the region due to the Gulf’s peculiar economic transition throughout the decades. Developed countries around the world—those that tend to score higher on these global rankings—have gone through a developmental evolution from agrarian to industrial economies\, then transitioned to information societies\, which led to the present knowledge economies. Gulf states however\, are attempting to leapfrog from pearling and trading economies to robust KBEs. The core cause of this rapid transition in the region—in comparison to other resource-based economies such as Norway—is attributable to the concurrent discovery of oil and establishment of nationhood\, leading Gulf rulers to focus on strengthening their rule by building physical infrastructure\, providing basic services\, and essentially suspending the diversification process. Production oriented structures and practices were thus sidelined by robust oil earnings\, leading participants to question: can countries which have not been through the industrial revolution enter the knowledge economy phase of development? \n \n \nOne of the ways in which Gulf states are attempting to build the foundations of their respective KBEs is by heavily investing in human capital and intangible assets through the establishment of vast educational and research facilities. By replicating and adopting models of education from abroad\, this form of investment enables Gulf states to “leapfrog the lengthy and costly process of indigenous growth and maturity”—indicating a strong motivation to catch-up with the developed world and compete in the global race for innovation. While borrowing and replicating models may have its advantages in reducing the time and cost of establishing native educational systems\, the process of borrowing\, adoption and implementation is a complex and costly one itself.  Cultural transmission is one of the core components of education\, and as such\, having a standard model that is imported from abroad omits the required cultural and contextual fit for education systems to be locally effective. Second\, excessive reliance on foreign models and external providers retards the growth of local capacity building in the Gulf—essentially hindering the ability to foster knowledge and expertise produced locally.  Despite this tendency to replicate and borrow\, Gulf states have exhibited forms of innovation in developing their education systems. Education City—the flagship of Qatar Foundation in Qatar—is a model of clustered international branch campuses (IBCS)\, where a number of foreign universities operate under the umbrella of Education City. This clustered model of IBCs creates opportunities for integrating the educational experiences of the different universities\, allowing students to cross-register for classes and providing a platform for joint-degree programs and research collaborations to take place. Due to the benefits of this model of clustered IBCs – or the Education City model – other regions of the globe are attempting to adopt it. While the benefits are clear\, it is a costly endeavor and its global level of diffusion will largely be dictated by the ability of states with fewer resources than Qatar to effectively replicate the model. \n \n \nLarge investments in higher education are tailored towards developing the skills of the national workforce and producing the “knowledge worker” that is required by KBEs. Despite this investment in human capital however\, Gulf nationals are continuously drawn to employment in the public sector—where they accrue large benefits from the state—as opposed to seeking employment in the private sector. While foreigners comprise the bulk of GCC populations and as such dominate the private sector\, they have a temporary presence in the labor market due migration policies that limit their duration of stay. This has adverse effects on developing KBEs due to hindering local knowledge retention and transfer of imported foreign knowledge. In developed countries\, the private sector is traditionally conceived of as the bearer and fosterer of innovation; however\, with minimal presence of nationals in the private sector and the temporally limited presence of expatriates\, there exists a large disjuncture between investment in human capital and labor market outcomes that reap the benefits of these investments. In an attempt to fill this gap\, GCC states are promoting entrepreneurship by developing institutions that support local entrepreneurs and SMEs\, with the aims of building a robust private sector that is promotive of innovation. In the recent years\, the SME ecosystem has witnessed a mushrooming of institutions and organizations mandated to cater their services towards the support of private business. While the strategies and infrastructure for SME promotion may be set in place\, the pervasive rentier arrangement in the Gulf provides a thick security blanket of social benefits that continues to deter nationals from fostering an entrepreneurial spirit—a spirit that is largely based on uncertainty and risk-taking. \n \n \nIncreasingly so\, it is apparent that what is lacking in the GCC is not necessarily the infrastructure or the investment in pillars of a knowledge based economy—but in creating an environment and a national system that is conducive to knowledge creation and innovation. When it comes to university-industry-government collaborations\, it appears that the role of the government in incentivizing both universities and industries to collaborate in knowledge exchange and management is weak in some GCC states such as Qatar.  As such\, industries continue to operate in silos\, curtailing the diffusion of knowledge throughout the economy. Moreover\, it becomes evident that while state rhetoric is supportive of creating KBEs that foster innovation\, the structural realities of Gulf states—namely the rentier arrangements and the demographic imbalance—actively mitigate against the translation of these national visions and strategies into concrete realities\, hindering the realization of KBEs and keeping innovation at shallow levels. \n \n \n\nSee the participant bios\nSee the Working Group agenda \nRead more about this research initiative\n\n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nHaytham Abduljawad\, Qatar Petroleum\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nJohn Crist\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nCrystal A. Ennis\, Balsillie School of International Affairs\nMartin Hvidt\, Zayed University\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nDaniel Kirk\, Emirates College for Advanced Education\nSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nDwaa Osman\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\n\n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Dwaa Osman\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/state-and-innovation-gulf-working-group-ii/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140513T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140517T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T002519
CREATED:20141012T051602Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T124043Z
UID:10000804-1399968000-1400349600@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:CIRS Travels to New Delhi
DESCRIPTION:As part of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar’s efforts to foster academic and institutional linkages with organizations around the world\, members of the Center for International and Regional Studies\, SFS-Q faculty\, and Georgetown University staff traveled to New Delhi\, India\, on May 13-17\, 2014. During the four day trip\, the cohort of Georgetown community members held an alumni reception and met with various research foundations\, policy think tanks\, and universities in India including: the Observer Research Foundation\, Delhi Policy Group\, and Jindal Global University – School of International Affairs. During each of these visits\, SFS-Q faculty and CIRS researchers—Mehran Kamrava\, Abdullah Al-Arian\, Mark Farha\, Gary Wasserman\, and Zahra Babar—gave talks pertaining to their respective areas of research and engaged in academic discourse and dialogue with professors\, researchers\, dignitaries\, and students based in India. Linking the Gulf region to India\, professors from Doha and researchers\, dignitaries\, and UN officials from India discussed issues of mutual interest and concern in the West Asia region—particularly\, in the context of “Nuclear Trends in West Asia\,” and “Regional Responses to the Iran Nuclear Deal” during the visit to the Observer Research Foundation.  Broadening the geographic area of focus\, SFS-Q faculty gave talks at the Delhi Policy Group on “Changing dynamics in West Asia\, the Persian Gulf\, and the Middle East\,” addressing issues related to Iran and Persian Gulf security and evolving domestic political dynamics in Egypt. At Jindal Global University – School of International Affairs\, students\, professors\, researchers\, and journalists gathered for a workshop on “Internal and External Dynamics in the Middle East Post-Arab Spring.” During the meeting\, participants covered an array of research areas ranging from external and internal security in the Gulf\, to the “stalled revolution in Egypt” and sectarianism in the Middle East. \n \n \nThese various engagements enabled participants to explore and exchange research on the Middle East and India\, linking the two regions academically and having a dialogue on geographic\, social\, political\, and economic connections. The meetings also provided SFS-Q faculty with a platform for professional development. The professors were able to give multiple talks\, share their research and insights with the various organizations\, and additionally benefit from the expertise and knowledge of their counterparts at various policy and academic research institutions and universities in India.  \n \n \n\nSee the Observer Research Foundation meeting agenda\nSee the Delhi Policy Group meeting agenda\nSee the Jindal Global University workshop agenda
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/cirs-travels-new-delhi/
CATEGORIES:Regional Studies
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140512T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140512T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T002519
CREATED:20140915T083602Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T124108Z
UID:10000792-1399881600-1399917600@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Insights into the Qatari Legal System
DESCRIPTION:Mohammed Abdulaziz Al-Khulaifi\, Associate Dean of Academic Affairs and Assistant Professor of Commercial Law at Qatar University and the 2013-2014 CIRS-Qatar University Fellow\, delivered the final CIRSMonthly Dialogue lecture of the 2013-2014 academic year on May 12\, 2014. The topic of discussion was “Insights into the Qatari Legal System\,” wherein Al-Khulaifi gave an overview of Qatari regulations\, the judicial and legislative sectors\, and the relationship between legislation and developments in Qatar. Current Qatari legislations are divided into two main categories. The first is public law\, which involves the public authority such as international law\, constitutional law\, and criminal law. The second is private law\, which includes civil and commercial laws. \n \n \nAl-Khulaifi gave some background to Qatari legal history by noting that\, since the 7th century\, early Qatari society referred to custom and Shari‘ah when solving disputes\, which were used extensively in cases put forth by pearl divers of the time. Despite the Gulf countries’ subscription to the British mandate in the modern period\, Shari‘ah law remained as the prevailing law for citizens. Since Qatari society has always been regulated by a traditional form of social governance\, “it would be majorly incorrect to say that the history of law in Qatar started with the issuance of the official gazette in 1960\,” he explained. With Qatari independence in 1971\, there was an overhaul of the legal system wherein “British courts were eliminated and replaced by the ‘Qatari justice courts\,’” which presides over civil\, commercial\, and criminal law\, while the Shari‘ah court presides over family and inheritance issues. \n \n \nSince the establishment of the hydrocarbon industry in Qatar\, the country’s legal system went through a significant transformation to pave the way for foreign corporate and economic interests and investments. This has been achieved by adopting laws that ease the legal process for doing business\, and by aligning with many of the international norms\, he noted. Currently\, “Qatar is engaged in a tremendous number of high-value projects\,” as “the country is involved with approximately US$250 billion worth of projects related to the preparation of the FIFA World Cup 2022\,” he added. \n \n \nDescribing the legal process itself\, Al-Khulaifi explained that\, in order for one of the ministries to propose issuing a law\, it is first prepared as a “draft” created by specialized legal committees in the Council of Ministers\, which is then presented to the Shura Council for consideration. Upon acceptance\, the Shura Council returns the “draft” to the Council of Ministers to be crafted into its final form and then to be issued by the Office of His Highness the Emir. Once it is signed by His Highness the Emir\, it is sent to the Ministry of Justice for publication in the official Gazette of the State for application in public life. “It is also quite crucial to emphasize that the Qatar legislations are mostly similar in content to the legislations in the Gulf region and the Arab World\,” he continued. \n \n \nIn conclusion\, Al-Khulaifi noted that Qatar was ranked 14th in the 2011-2012 Global Competitiveness Ranking. Since there is such growth in the commercial and business sectors in Qatar\, which are continually expanding\, there should also be vigilance regarding the application of the law\, and dealing with any necessary revision as needed. “This fact should continuously notify the legislator and lawmakers in the country to cope with the ultimate development in the different fields of law by reviewing the existing laws and providing new reliable regulations that would legally protect […] development in Qatar\,” he concluded.Article by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications.Mohammed Abdulaziz Al-Khulaifi graduated from Qatar University with a Bachelor degree in Law (LL.B) in 2007 and received his Master of Laws (LL.M) and Judicial Science Doctorate (J.S.D) degrees from University of California\, Berkeley in 2011. Al-Khulaifi received the State Ph.D. award from H.H. Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani\, the Qatari Emir\, at Qatar Education Excellence Day in 2012. Besides his academic work\, Al-Khulaifi is an authorized Qatari attorney at Abdulaziz Saleh Al-Khulaifi’s law office in Doha. In addition\, he has been consulted by governmental institutions to present his legal opinions on matters related to commercial legislations in the state of Qatar. 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/insights-qatari-legal-system/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140427T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140428T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T002519
CREATED:20140914T150427Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T124123Z
UID:10000864-1398621600-1398708000@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Healthcare Policy and Politics in the Gulf States Working Group I
DESCRIPTION:On April 27-28\, 2014\, CIRS convened the first working group under the research initiative Healthcare Policy and Politics in the Gulf States. Healthcare practitioners\, strategists and social scientists from various disciplinary backgrounds gathered over two days to discuss the rapidly changing health profile of the region\, the existing conditions of health systems\, and the challenges posed to healthcare management across the six countries of the GCC. \n \n \nIn recent decades\, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) governments have heavily invested in socioeconomic development and have increasingly played an instrumental role in the development of healthcare systems. Rapid transformation of health systems took place between the mid-1970s and the early 1990s across the six GCC States. Commonalities between GCC states\, such as geographic location\, political order\, the presence of hydrocarbon reserves\, and the large influx of foreigners into the region\, have created common threads across the healthcare industries of Bahrain\, Saudi Arabia\, Oman\, Kuwait\, Qatar\, and the UAE. The evolution of healthcare systems\, however\, has not been uniform across the region\, with Oman (ranked 8th in the 2000 World Health Report on health systems) and Bahrain experiencing more successful models of development as compared to their Gulf counterparts. The participants attributed this development to two salient features in healthcare planning: local healthcare leadership and progressive planning that focused on comprehensive health services. The healthcare leadership involved in the organization and planning of Oman’s healthcare system in the early 1970s was predominantly comprised of local expertise allowing for models of development that were based on local needs and that were conducive to the local environment catering towards long-term development of the sector. This stands in comparison to the “mercenary mentality” that was characteristic of foreign healthcare leadership in other GCC States. Bahrain was amongst the first in the GCC to set up primary healthcare centers enabling a significant proportion of the population to easily access health services—a sector that continues to be under-developed in other GCC states as they disproportionately give emphasis to secondary and tertiary care.  Despite disparate levels of healthcare services development across the GCC\, the GCC secretariat has adopted some common plans and models that provide a regional approach to the sector. One example is the GCC-wide common purchasing in the pharmaceutical industry\, which started in the mid-1970s and has\, accordingly\, had a major impact on the market. More recently\, GCC ministers of health have agreed to create a unified mental health improvement plan to develop a sector that has long been neglected in the region and that is in need of transformation. \n \n \nWhile GCC healthcare expenditure continues to be on the rise\, there remains a significant gap between investments in healthcare and health outcomes of Gulf citizenry. Rapid urbanization rates and changes in lifestyle have resulted in populations that exhibit a high prevalence of diabetes and obesity (in Qatar\, for instance\, 70% of nationals are overweight and 40% are obese). Chronic non-communicable disease is on the rise in the Gulf and\, as such\, preventive medicine and lifestyle health are of growing importance\, emphasizing a necessary shift from the current focus on secondary curative care.  Moreover\, primary care – considered to be the “gate-keeper” of healthcare models in developed countries around the world – plays a key role in preventive medicine\, emphasizing the need to provide incentives to patients for its utilization. In addition to the type of care\, participants emphasized the need for multidisciplinary teams—incorporating nutrition experts and diabetes educators\, for instance—to effectively prevent a rise in the prevalence of chronic disease. \n \n \nWhile Gulf nationals predominantly suffer from these lifestyle diseases\, the expatriate and migrant populations of the GCC have health profiles that are distinct from nationals.  The three tiered population of the region—comprised of locals\, long-term residents\, and more transient migrant workers—requires Gulf governments to plan accordingly for the health needs of each population. One segment of the population\, short-term migrants\, is largely employed in the construction sectors of the GCC and\, as such\, incorporation of occupational health and safety in the healthcare model is another component that the Gulf is increasingly focusing on. Much like the need for preventive care in the case of lifestyle diseases\, primary needs for occupational health—such as safety assessments and hazard identification—are not healthcare related but are related to prevention. To have an effective systems approach to occupational health however\, a feedback system needs to be incorporated that includes frontline workers and allows for open communication with higher management. Achieving this form of participatory health planning and management\, however\, is very challenging in hierarchical settings that lack labor unions and labor management. \n \n \nIn addition to satisfying the health needs of foreign migrant residents—who comprise the bulk of GCC populations—GCC states have to cope with their reliance on foreign skills to supply their healthcare workforce. This poses broad risks to the region as the excessive reliance on foreign human resources may leave GCC states vulnerable in times of regional sociopolitical instability should there be an exodus of the foreign workforce. In the absence of political crises\, however\, challenges remain. In the hospital setting or workplace where nurses\, physicians\, and staff come from a variety of different cultures\, speak a multitude of languages\, and have been trained under different schools and standards\, the effectiveness of providing care is challenged. Additionally\, the hierarchical social organization that was outlined in the context of the construction industry is also prevalent in hospital settings—much of it due to many of the GCC states’ sponsorship system (kefala) where tenuousness exists in the work-status of foreign staff. This tenuousness affects relationship dynamics between local and foreign staff and between patients and hospital staff. \n \n \nWhile participants of the working group tackled a multitude of topics—ranging from substance abuse in the Gulf to social organization of nursing practices—a common challenge facing scholars studying healthcare in the region is the lack of both available and published data. Thus\, while the industry is rapidly evolving\, scholarship on the topic remains limited and is constrained by the limited availability of information\, underscoring the need for additional research on the area. \n \n \n\nRead the participant bios\nSee the working group schedule\nRead more about this research initiative\n\n \n  \n \n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nMohamad Alameddine\, American University of Beirut\nSamir Al-Adawi\, Sultan Qaboos University\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nMatt Buehler\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nNerida Child Dimasi\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nSuhaila Ghuloum\, Weill Cornell Medical College in Qatar; Hamad Medical Center\nBarb Gillis\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nCother Hajat\, United Arab Emirates University\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nNadir Kheir\, Qatar University\nNabil Kronfol\, Lebanese Healthcare Management Association; Center for Studies on Ageing\nRavinder Mamtani\, Weill Cornell Medical College in Qatar\nTatjana Martinoska\, Enertech Qatar\nSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nDwaa Osman\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nJanet Rankin\, University of Calgary Qatar\nSalman Rawaf\, Imperial College London; WHO Collaborating Center for Public Health Education and Training\nGanesh Seshan\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nRosemary Sokas\, Georgetown University\nElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\n\n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Dwaa Osman\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/healthcare-policy-and-politics-gulf-states-working-group-i/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140427T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140427T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T002519
CREATED:20140915T054415Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T103822Z
UID:10000885-1398585600-1398621600@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Gary Wasserman Lectures on “Why Are We Here (in Doha)?”
DESCRIPTION:Gary Wasserman\, professor of Government at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\, delivered a CIRS Focused Discussionlecture titled\, “Why Are We Here (in Doha)?” on April 27\, 2014. Encouraging discussion among members of the Georgetown University in Qatar community\, Wasserman noted that he did not have an answer to the question posed in the title of the lecture\, but would offer five different possible models that approach an answer. \n \n \nThe first model is to consider Georgetown University in Qatar as an extension of the American imperium. In this model\, the United States offers the Middle East region two of its key capabilities: military bases for regional security\, and US schools providing world class education—in other words\, what political scientists call hard power of economic wealth and military weapons as well as soft power of ideas. In this sense\, Wasserman argued “we are the American superpower in its educational garb.” \n \n \nThese offerings are not necessarily negative and may be key to the current peace and prosperity in much of the world. The limitation to this model\, however\, is that the faculty and educators at Georgetown in Qatar do not necessarily serve as ideal ambassadors of US government policy. They are more likely to dissent\, to question\, and to challenge official US policy in their critical scribblings\, and in their informed debates with students and others\, whether at home or abroad. Moreover\, the Qatari hosts are hardly a passive colonized people; they initiated this relationship\, they pay for it\, and they negotiate the contract under which Georgetown in Qatar operates\, at the least as equals.  \n \n \nOn the opposite end of the spectrum lies the second model offered by Wasserman—the “expat model.” Here\, individual members of the Georgetown community travel abroad to practice their professions; a practical task that is not always integrated into that of any larger\, more idealized notion of a Western institution. In this sense\, he argued\, “we are well-compensated hired help. We are here to fill a job and provide a service that cannot be produced locally; arguably a home-delivered prestige commodity—a Western brand name.” However\, Wasserman’s objection to this model is that\, whether consciously or not\, Georgetown is expected to\, and is in fact\, changing behavior\, as all educational institutions are wont to do. \n \n \nThe third model is the “contract model\,” where Georgetown is obligated to act as a professional school for training diplomats in and for Qatar. The institution was invited by its Qatari hosts to offer some\, but not all\, aspects of the Georgetown college experience\, sanitizing the more controversial elements of US culture and society. Wasserman’s reservations of this model center on the fact that very few of the graduates actually end up in the foreign service\, and so the Georgetown education is far more encompassing than merely a training center for diplomats. “We are in fact as close to a liberal arts college as Education City gets\,” he explained. \n \n \nWhich leads to the fourth model\, that of “liberalism\,” where Georgetown can be seen as spreading secular humanism in the form of the widest possible inquiry and tolerance of freedom of thought and expression\, especially as for those who struggle with social oppression in terms of gender\, race\, or sexual orientation. However\, Wasserman’s objection to the applicability of this model is that even though Georgetown invites students to think for themselves\, the institution is in fact asking them to subscribe to a particular Westernized ideal of thinking. By being in Qatar\, Georgetown must reconcile with the reality that it does not operate in a liberal society that elevates individual thought above all.  Rather it is one where family\, community\, and religious ties are more highly valued. The students from this region are a complex mix of loyalty and obligation to their families and societies\, along with a desire to integrate into globalizing outlooks and identities. This mixed campus experience makes it difficult for Georgetown to “cleanly” deliver the traditional Western ideals of liberalism. Nor should we\, Wasserman stated. \n \n \nThe fifth and concluding model Wasserman offered is what he called “the muddled bubble.” In this model\, Georgetown in Qatar is operating\, without a set blueprint\, in an environment of messy uncertainty. This\, he argued\, will necessarily mean that the institution is at the interface of different and changing cultures. “We occupy what should be an uncomfortable\, unpredictable\, but potentially innovative space\,” he argued. The model of the bubble demands that Georgetown in Qatar seek a degree of autonomy\, not only from potentially reactionary local pressures\, but also from the foreign traditions and interests of the main campus. The “muddled” part of the model\, he explained\, comes from the experimental\, unclear process by which we create an unusual blend of transnational students prepared for an unclear and unique future. Thus\, Wasserman concluded\, we should celebrate our unique position of being muddled “not by a clash of civilizations\, but by a confusion of civilizations.”  \n \n \nArticle by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications.  \n \n \nGary Wasserman has fashioned a career in teaching\, political consulting and writing. Previously he taught graduate students at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Nanjing\, China.  He received his Ph.D. with Distinction from Columbia University. He recently wrote Politics in Action: Cases in Modern American Government (2012)\, and Pearson is publishing the 15th edition of his text\, The Basics of American Politics (2015). His MOOC\, “The Game of American Politics\,” is available online this spring. 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/gary-wasserman-lectures-why-are-we-here-doha/
CATEGORIES:American Studies,Dialogue Series,Distingushed Lectures,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140421T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140421T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T002519
CREATED:20140915T134059Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T124230Z
UID:10000793-1398067200-1398103200@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:New Paradigms for a Palestine in Perpetual Limbo?
DESCRIPTION:Sam Bahour\, Managing Partner at Applied Information Management (AIM)\, Director at the Arab Islamic Bank and a policy adviser to the Al-Shabaka Palestinian Policy Network\, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue lecture on “New Paradigms for a Palestine in Perpetual Limbo\,” on April 21\, 2014\, which centered on the persisting nature of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Bahour explained that it is not just the overt acts of Israeli violence and injustice that Palestine must overcome\, but the “peace industry” itself that has been built around the problem and that paradoxically sustains the struggle even as it attempts to aid in its resolution. A solid superstructure of international NGOs\, human rights organizations\, advocacy groups\, academic think tanks\, cultural programs\, and solidarity groups have been constructed around the conflict\, and thrive off of its existence. \n \n \nBahour argued that Palestine is in a state of perpetual limbo because “today’s Israeli position rests on the assumption that procrastination will continue to tilt the strategic balance increasingly in Israel’s favor.” Decade by decade\, he adumbrated key instances of how power relations between Israel and Palestine were incrementally and consistently skewed in favor of the Israeli state and with the backing\, or indifference\, of much of the international community. The Israeli occupation has ingrained ideological pathologies that do not conceptualize Palestinians as equals or as deserving of equality. “We are not facing a right-wing Israeli government. We are facing the state institution of Israel\, which has embedded within it an exclusivist ideology of Zionism bent on maintaining a world view which gives preferential treatment to Jews\, and is bent on redemption of the land of Israel\,” Bahour explained. \n \n \nIsrael is reticent to reach a final settlement and to put an end to the conflict because of four perceived alternatives to a negotiated agreement—all of which are in Israel’s favor and which undermine the Palestinian position. The first is for Israel to prolong negotiations indefinitely by feigning progress even as it encroaches on Palestinian lands and rights. The second is for Israel to set up a pseudo-provisional two-state arrangement wherein a weakened Palestinian authority masquerades as a Palestinian government. The third is a unilateral separation dictated by Israel\, and the fourth is for Egypt and Jordan to assume control of the occupied territories. \n \n \nHowever\, “Israeli strategic planners overestimate their own strength and underestimate the strategic opportunities available to the Palestinians\,” he said\, as these four Israeli-favored outcomes can be challenged by the reorientation of Palestinian strategy through four new paradigms. These include putting an end to the idea of a two-state negotiation; the reconstitution of the Palestinian authority into a more proactive entity serving Palestinian priorities; the elevation of intelligent resistance over negotiations and the reassertion of national unity through reform of the PLO and eliciting international third-party support; and the shift from a two-state solution to a bi-national or unitary democratic single state. When Palestinians finally concede to the fact that a genuine negotiated outcome is not being offered by the Israelis\, they will be able to conscientiously reject the idea of a two-state solution. \n \n \nShifting to his perspective as a Palestinian parent\, Bahour spoke about how his daughters perceive the future of Palestine. Although his children are aware of the total military occupation that restricts their lives\, their modern and globalized attitude means that they think differently on the same issues\, and have their own opinions on how the conflict should be resolved. Speaking from the perspective of the Palestinian youth generation\, his daughters lamented the futility of fighting against Israel’s behemoth military and nuclear power and expressed their fatigue with decades of struggling for an international law which cannot be implemented. They opted instead to redefine Palestinian self-determination\, and to come up with a radical alternative that is both unimaginable and unacceptable to the older generation of Palestinians: conceding that the Palestinians are powerless to create a viable state under the current conditions\, thus surrendering the Palestinian struggle for statehood in return for their full human\, civil\, and political rights within the structure of the Israeli state. \n \n \n“The issue of Palestine reflects a historical injustice so large and so blatant that its flame refuses to extinguish\,” he argued\, but this new paradigm of self-determination as envisioned by Palestinian youth turns the model of the conflict on its head and defies decades of orchestrated Israeli control with its counter-intuitive offering. Thus\, Bahour concluded\, the youth generation “is at a crossroads between continuing on the statehood path\, which we are losing by the day […] or to drop statehood and call for civil rights.” \n \n \nSam bahour is a Palestinian-American based in Al-Bireh/Ramallah\, Palestine. He is a freelance business consultant operating as Applied Information Management (AIM)\, specializing in business development with a niche focus on start-ups. He was instrumental in the establishment of the Palestine Telecommunications Company and the PLAZA Shopping Center\, and recently completed a full term as a Board of Trustees member at Birzeit University. He serves in various capacities in several community organizations\, including serving as a policy adviser to Al-Shabaka\, the Palestinian Policy Network\, a member of the core Local Reference Group of the Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI)\, and co-founder of the Dalia Association. Sam writes frequently on Palestinian affairs and has been widely published. He is co-editor of HOMELAND: Oral History of Palestine and Palestinians and may be reached at sbahour@gmail.com. He blogs at www.epalestine.com.  \n \n \nArticle by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/new-paradigms-palestine-perpetual-limbo/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140415T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140415T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T002519
CREATED:20140915T053733Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T103851Z
UID:10000883-1397548800-1397584800@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Networked Arab Publics and Contention in the Digital Age
DESCRIPTION:Mohamed Zayani\, Associate Professor at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\, delivered a CIRS Focused Discussion lecture on “Networked Arab Publics and Contention in the Digital Age” on April 15\, 2014. The talk was based on Zayani’s ongoing book project\, which analyzes the changing relationship between media and politics in the Arab world\, especially as it relates to the Arab uprisings in Tunisia. The book provides an ethnographic account of evolving media practices that bring into focus the intricate relationship between the emerging digital culture in the Arab world; youth engagement and youth involvement; cyber dissidence and resistance; and political expression. Zayani was prompted into further investigations on the subject because in much of the literature\, the role of media\, especially social media\, was either highly inflated or unduly analyzed\, leaving little room to cogitate upon the complexities of the nuanced relationship between people\, media\, politics\, and power. \n \n \nExamining the media’s role in the Arab uprisings\, Zayani highlighted the importance of country-specific studies. There has been a tendency to cast the countries of the Arab uprisings into a single homogenous phenomenon under the rubric of the “Arab Spring\,” without paying attention to the important contextual differences between each state. Tunisia proved to be a crucial site of convergence for media\, politics\, and popular contention as it was the first Arab country to connect to the Internet in 1991 and the first overt site of the Arab uprisings. Thus\, Zayani analyzes the correlation between Internet penetration and political change\, arguing that “on the one hand\, the country lived under the rule of a regime that proved adept at modernizing authoritarianism and ensuring regime durability. On the other hand\, the country adopted an avant-garde Internet development model and purposefully sought to build a digital infrastructure that is capable of positioning the country as a model for an aspiring networked society in the age of globalization.” Attempts to balance these two factors was a challenge for the Tunisian regime\, which ultimately collapsed under the pressure of a technologically-equipped and vocalized public. \n \n \nAs Arab media quickly developed during the 1990s creating a virtual public sphere where political issues could be discussed relatively openly\, this schism became even more pronounced. Internet activism was especially propelled by a number of factors including the demographic reality of the region\, which was encompassed in a youth bulge where two-thirds of the Arab world are below the age of 25. “The conundrum was that this significant socio-demographic category has been largely left out of political life – or at least that was the perception.” Importantly\, this significant and growing youthful population was buoyed by two simultaneous phenomena of mass education and mass media\, both of which were significant in their challenge to traditional constructions of authority and advocacy of critical thinking. \n \n \nFocusing on questions of political socialization\, Zayani’s study is geared towards answering a central question: “how do young people become politicized on the Internet?” This goes against the general assumption that Arab youth were\, on the whole\, politically marginalized and disinterested. The events of the Arab uprisings proved the contrary\, and Arab youth exhibited strong political consciousness\, activism\, and engagement. The main overlooked issue is that they tend to express their political stances through means other than formal political structures. \n \n \nThus\, Zayani concluded by noting the importance of challenging traditional categorizations of what it means to be political\, explaining: “My study aims to redirect attention from the formal political institutions of the Arab world to the politics of everyday life.” In this reformulation\, digital contention yields more than just dissidence; it encourages other forms of assertiveness associated with the concept of citizenship. \n \n \nMohamed Zayani is an Affiliate Faculty with the Communication\, Culture and Technology Graduate Program and the 2013-1014 Faculty Fellow with the Center for Regional and International Studies. His works include Reading the Symptom (1999)\, Arab Satellite Television and Politics in the Middle East (2004)\, The Al Jazeera Phenomenon: Critical Perspectives on New Arab Media (2005) and The Culture of Al Jazeera: Inside an Arab Media Giant (2007). He is a recipient of numerous grants\, including a Social Science Research Council grant\, and a Member of the UNESCO Committee of Experts on Cultural Diversity. \n \n \nArticle by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/networked-arab-publics-and-contention-digital-age/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140412T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140413T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T002519
CREATED:20140914T223257Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T124254Z
UID:10000865-1397289600-1397412000@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:The Evolution of Gulf Global Cities Working Group II
DESCRIPTION:On April 12-13\, 2014\, CIRS held the final Working Group of “The Evolution of Gulf Global Cities” research initiative. Academics from various disciplinary backgrounds as well as architects\, urban planners and designers gathered for the second meeting to discuss their research findings and papers around the theme of Gulf cities. The topics discussed ranged in their geographic coverage of the Persian Gulf and in their temporal analysis extending back to the early-twentieth century until the present-day. Elements of continuity and change in the urban landscape were discussed against the political\, cultural and historical backdrop of the Gulf region. \n \n \nRapid urbanization and rising skylines have invigorated academic focus on cities of the Gulf. Opening the discussion\, participants questioned the way in which Gulf cities are discussed in a highly depoliticized manner within popular discourse. Gulf cities are categorically described as transnational and global cities that are also “prosperous\, modern and stable in a larger\, more volatile and impoverished region”—how do these depictions diffuse images of the Gulf that constitute a certain ideological substrate? Discussants problematized the category of “city” itself\, and pushed their analysis further to incorporate more socially and politically nuanced understandings of space. For instance\, how do non-citizens live and fit within the space of the city? How do construction workers who help build the city find their place in these spaces that are generally depicted as transnational and metropolitan yet are highly segregated and limit the mobility of a cohort of its inhabitants? These are all questions that reflect on the current unspoken discursive formations of cities in the Gulf – formations that define ‘cities’ based on narrow and depoliticized interpretations. \n \n \nWhile the current depictions of Gulf cities as “transnational” and “global” assume a historical break and disjuncture with urban characteristics of the pre-oil Gulf\, participants discussed forms of transnational urbanism that were present in the early twentieth-century port cities. With its vast global networks\, the region has always exhibited elements of transnationalism—however\, its urban forms have also historically exhibited a privileging of homogeneity and unity of identity and class; a privileging that has led to the control and a morphological segregation and separation of difference. Looking at pluralism within the historical evolution of Gulf cities indicates that while they may have always been transnational\, they have not been equally cosmopolitan. \n \n \nGiving historical context to these spaces\, Working Group members discussed linkages between territory\, territoriality\, infrastructure\, and nation-building in the Gulf. In the case of the UAE\, infrastructure played a central role during the country’s transformation from an itinerant territory to a fixed one based on oil extraction and subsequently on real estate development. A tool utilized for developing territory\, infrastructure was also utilized by the political rulers as a nation-building medium that formed the essence of Emirati discourses on development\, its modern territorial order\, and ultimately the order of the state. Current major real-estate developers in the UAE—particularly in Dubai—continue to be under the basic control and power of the Emirati rulers\, highlighting real-estate’s distinctive role vis-à-vis the state in promoting economic growth and reinventing the identity of the city. \n \n \nWhile oil and gas revenues have heavily financed infrastructural developments and mega-projects in the Gulf\, recent strides to lay the post-oil era foundation and to develop knowledge-based economies have also influenced their urban fabric. The proliferation of “smart cities\,” cities within cities\, free trade zones\, mixed-use projects and tourism projects are indicative of this transition. Despite rapid urban development\, pockets of historical traditional neighborhoods continue to exist in the Gulf. These spaces provide meaningful insight into the sentiments of residents and their emotional attachment and belonging to place in the midst of the proliferating presence of gated compounds and large houses encapsulated by tall fences. Place identity is a central component of residential satisfaction and as a case-study of traditional neighborhoods in Muscat reveals\, the sense of community that residents ascribe to a place is what gives place meaning. Efforts to reconstruct and rehabilitate traditional neighborhoods around the Gulf—such as Msheireb in Doha\, which envisions bringing the heart of the city back to its roots—in fact risk losing “place-meaning\,” by practicing “place-making” and commoditizing the “traditional.” Across the Gulf\, stressed or “decaying fabrics” of historical areas in Bandar-Abbas experiencing physical and economic decline have expanded throughout the city. While the government has housing plans to renovate these areas\, low-income residents will most likely be pushed to the fringes of the city—exacerbating the “informalization” of their settlements and limiting their right to the city. \n \n \n\nRead the participant bios\nSee the working group schedule\nRead more about this research initiative \n\n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nPooya Alaedini\, University of Tehran\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nMarike Bontenbal\, German University of Technology in Oman\nMatt Buehler\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nNerida Child Dimasi\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nRemah Gharib\, Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies\nBarb Gillis\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nAhmed Kanna\, University of the Pacific\nArang Keshavarzian\, New York University\nSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nDwaa Osman\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nStephen J. Ramos\, University of Georgia\nAshraf M. Salama\, Qatar University\nEvren Tok\, Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies\nElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nFlorian Wiedmann\, Wiedmann Mirincheva Associates\n\n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Dwaa Osman\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/evolution-gulf-global-cities-working-group-ii/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140407T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140407T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T002519
CREATED:20140914T223604Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210829T124431Z
UID:10000866-1396857600-1396893600@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Prehistoric Myths in Modern Political Philosophy
DESCRIPTION:CIRS held its inaugural Faculty Research Workshop on April 7\, 2014\, led by Karl Widerquist\, Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar. Participants were invited to discuss his book titled\, Prehistoric Myths in Modern Political Philosophy. The manuscript is currently in its final stages of preparation and argues that many prominent contemporary political theories rely on false claims about human origins and life in non-state societies. This book shows how several dubious claims became widely accepted premises because they seemed plausible (or even obvious) to Europeans of the early colonial period. It shows how contemporary theories continue to pass on those premises\, often unnoticed and unchallenged\, and it assembles anthropological and archaeological evidence to refute them. Finally\, it discusses the ramifications of these findings for contemporary justifications of property\, inequality\, and the state. \n\nThe CIRS Faculty Research Workshop\, in the form of a closed-door\, one-day seminar\, gathers together a small number of renowned scholars to engage in a focused discussion on a book manuscript that is in its final stages of preparation and has been authored by a member of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar faculty. The gathering consists of a series of structured brainstorming sessions\, through which we engage in a thorough and critical discussion of the book manuscript. All participants will have read the entire manuscript in advance of the meeting and we ask individual scholars to lead focused group discussions on different chapters. \n\nSee the workshop agendaRead about the participants\n\nKarl Widerquist specializes in political philosophy. His research is mostly in the area of distributive justice—the ethics of who has what. He holds two doctorates—one in Political Theory form Oxford University (2006) and one in Economics from the City University of New York (1996). He is the author of Independence\, Propertylessness\, and Basic Income: A Theory of Freedom as the Power to Say (Palgrave Macmillan 2013)\, and coauthor of Economics for Social Workers (Columbia University Press 2002)\, Basic Income: An Anthology of Contemporary Research (Wiley-Blackwell 2013)\, Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend: Examining its Suitability as a Model (Palgrave Macmillan 2012)\, Exporting the Alaska Model: Adapting the Permanent Fund Dividend for Reform around the World (Palgrave Macmillan 2012)\, and the Ethics and Economics of the Basic Income Guarantee (Ashgate 2005). He is currently under contract to author or coauthor two more books: Prehistoric Myths in Modern Political Philosophy (Edinburgh University Press 2014) and Justice as the Pursuit of Accord (Palgrave Macmillan 2015).  \n\n\n\nCIRS supported the publication of Karl Widerquist and Grant S.McCall’s book Prehistoric Myths in Modern Political Philosophy (Oxford University Press/Edinburgh University Press\, 2017).
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/prehistoric-myths-modern-political-philosophy/
CATEGORIES:CIRS Faculty Research Workshops
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140324T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140324T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T002519
CREATED:20140915T140945Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T103924Z
UID:10000794-1395648000-1395684000@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Gas and Alternative Fuels: Present and Future Shares and Challenges
DESCRIPTION:Worldwide gas and energy exploration and production trends were the focus of a Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) Monthly Dialogue Series public lecture at Georgetown University in Qatar (GU-Q) on March 24\, 2014. The event\, titled “Gas and Alternative Fuels: Present and Future Shares and Challenges\,” featured H.E. Dr. Seyed Mohammad Hossein Adeli\, the Secretary General of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF)\, an international governmental organization\, which is headquartered in Qatar\, dedicated to promoting the global natural gas trade. \n\n“What do we do in Tornado Tower here in Doha?” asked Dr. Adeli\, who is also Iran’s former ambassador to Japan\, Canada and the United Kingdom\, and holds two Ph.D.s in economics and business administration. He answered\, “Our mission is to provide an authentic platform for the discussion of gas activity and a center for debate and the exchange of ideas\, to promote gas as a clean fuel\, increase the market share of gas\, and contribute to the stability of the global energy market. But our most important task is to develop dialogue throughout the energy market\, to be in contact with other producers\, exporters\, consumers\, academics\, and all other stakeholders.” \n\nDr. Mehran Kamrava\, Director of CIRS\, emphasized the importance of the Monthly Dialogue topic\, saying “We know that natural gas is the cleanest burning fossil fuel\, offering environmental and efficiency advantages over other energy resources. Combined with global energy needs that will only increase over time\, it’s vital that we understand the market and policy forces that will impact the relationship of supply and demand. The implications for Qatar’s economy and\, by extension\, its national vision development goals\, as well as the global economy\, are tremendous\, which is why we were so pleased to host an energy specialist of Dr. Adeli’s caliber on our campus for students\, faculty\, visiting dignitaries\, and the Doha community.” \n\nThe former diplomat discussed gas market dynamics at length\, which includes both liquified natural gas (LNG) and pipeline\, as well as an overview on the latest revolution in the energy sector\, shale oil. “There are huge technically recoverable shale gas resources globally\,” he said\, but noted the negative environmental impact and the required further technological and policy advances to unlock this resource potential. Other challenges faced by the energy sector include security of demand\, environmental impact of coal and the technological gaps “clean coal” still faces\, safety issues associated with nuclear energy\, and the hurdles of subsidies and high infrastructure investment requirements to make renewable energy profitable. \n\nAdeli also compared gas to other competing fuels in the global energy mix\, noting that only natural gas and renewable energy sources\, such as solar\, were on the rise\, as opposed to decreasing coal and oil use. “Gas consumption is increasing by 108 bcm (billion cubic meters) per year\, and needs to come into production\, which means we need enough investment\, development\, and trading to meet demands. Reserves are not enough. This is why it’s important to think about incremental increase per year.” Commenting on the supply side of the gas economy\, he said\, “Of course\, we have an abundance of supply. Most of the supply is resources and reserves that are undeveloped. But existing projects are under development\, and we are hopeful they will enter the streamline of production.” \n\nThe real issue\, he points out\, is the importance of country policies that ensure optimum gas production to meet both internal\, and export\, demands. “The dynamics of the economics of the gas domestic market everywhere is going to affect the external trade of gas. Most gas is traded domestically\, 70%\, and only 30% is traded internationally. When you talk about the Middle East as an exporter\, you have to start at the domestic market first\, assess the subsidies and efficiencies\, to understand how much international exports will take place.” \n\nThe GECF member countries together hold 67% of the world’s gas reserves\, and include Algeria\, Bolivia\, Egypt\, Equatorial Guinea\, Iran\, Libya\, Nigeria\, Oman\, Qatar\, Russia\, Trinidad and Tobago\, the United Arab Emirates\, and Venezuela. Kazakhstan\, Iraq\, the Netherlands\, and Norway have the status of Observer Members. Fossil fuels\, he concluded\, “have the lion’s share in the energy mix. In the power generation sector\, efficiency of natural gas is the highest compared to other fuels at around 58%.” As the demand for energy rises\, gas will continue to serve as a favorable source of energy\, which is good news for Qatar\, and for all of the members of the GECF. \n\nSeyed Mohammad Hossein Adeli is the Secretary General of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF). A career diplomat\, Dr. Adeli has served as Iran’s ambassador to Japan\, Canada\, and the United Kingdom. His previous positions also include Governor of the Central Bank of Iran\, Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic and Energy Affairs\, and Advisor to President of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Upon retiring from the diplomatic corps\, he founded the Ravand Institute for Economic and International Studies\, which is today one of Iran’s premier research and consulting firms. Dr. Adeli holds two PhD degrees\, one in business administration and the other in economics. 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/gas-and-alternative-fuels-present-and-future-shares-and-challenges/
CATEGORIES:American Studies,Dialogue Series,Environmental Studies,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140315T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140316T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T002519
CREATED:20140914T223913Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T103943Z
UID:10000867-1394870400-1394992800@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Arab Migrant Communities in the GCC Working Group II
DESCRIPTION:On March 15\, 16 2014\, The final working group of CIRS’ research project Arab Migrant Communities in the GCC was held in Doha. Grant recipients of this research grant cycle gathered with an additional cohort of migration experts and scholars to discuss their research findings and to solicit feedback on their draft paper submissions. The topics investigated ranged from broad migration policies in the GCC and their respective implications on the distribution of nationalities within the population\, to specific ethnographic case-studies highlighting the experiences of Arab expatriates in the Gulf. \n \n \nFrom the onset of the Gulf oil economy in the 1950s to the present era\, the ebbs and flows of Arab emigration to the GCC have largely been attributed to the Middle East’s regional geopolitical context and its influence on national migration policies. While Arab migrants formed a large component of the expatriate community up until the 1980s\, their presence in the Gulf has dwindled as Asian migrants from the East currently significantly outnumber non-GCC Arabs. The participants explained that although much of the literature attributes this shift to the geo-political context\, rapid development\, the ensuing change in Gulf economies and the aggregate increase in demand for low-skilled labor by the private sector has also contributed to the shift in the composition of the expatriate workforce. Labor data from Qatar indicates that non-national Arabs in the Qatari labor force predominantly feature in managerial and administrative sectors\, in professional\, scientific and technical activities\, and in services. Within particular occupations—such as teaching—Arab nationals have continued to have a steady and dominating presence primarily due to the shared linguistic and cultural affinities with nationals\, and as such\, demand for Arab teachers in the region shows no signs of abating. These tied porous identities coupled with the integral role of Arab migrants in teaching and children’s development\, has led to what some have dubbed as the “Egyptianization” of the education field and of local culture and dialects. Thus\, while GCC governments may source labor for low-skilled segments of the economy from various geographic regions\, Arab migrants will continue to have a dominant presence within sectors that require certain shared cultural\, linguistic\, and religious affinities. \n \n \nConcomitant with the rise in import of low-skilled labor has been the increased demand for high-skilled migrants as GCC states strive to develop knowledge-based economies. Participants additionally discussed Arab high-skilled migrants\, particularly those emanating from emigration-prone countries such as Lebanon. Within this cohort\, there is a significant presence of highly skilled female migrants that challenge the commonly perceived notion that Arab migrants to the Gulf are predominantly male. Moreover\, studies within Lebanon indicate that a substantial proportion of Lebanese females migrating to the Gulf are not married\, thereby also undermining the conception that female migrants are only present in their capacity as “sponsored – dependents” within the Gulf countries. \n \n \nBeyond demographics and economic stratification\, Working Group members discussed issues of identity\, transnationalism\, social inclusion and exclusion\, and every-day experiences of Arab expatriates. Interviews with highly-skilled Lebanese in Kuwait have indicated that while the Gulf continues to be an attractive destination for employment\, interaction and integration with nationals remains limited; this is largely attributed to the lack of provision of pathways to citizenship in the Gulf as compared to other popular destinations such as the USA or Europe. These sentiments of exclusion were also echoed by Egyptians residing in Kuwait that have characterized their stay as transitory and fleeting. While the long-standing presence of Egyptian communities in the Gulf has physically manifested itself in the areas of Khaitan and Farwaniya—labeled by some as “Cairo in Kuwait”—it is not uncommon to hear of feelings reflecting a transitory existence and fleeting relationships in Kuwait by Egyptian migrants. \n \n \nHowever\, these sentiments of lack of integration and limited inclusion do not reveal themselves uniformly across Arab communities; the decades-long presence of Arabs in the region has exhibited varying generational experiences and attitudes of migrants in the Gulf. A study of Palestinians in the UAE indicates that second-generation migrants tend to socialize with Emiratis much more than the first generation\, and as such feel more integrated. Other migrants reveal intergenerational tensions between their families and their Gulf sponsors\, as exhibited by the study of second-generation domestic-service Hadrami immigrants in Kuwait. While first generation Hadramis perceive success and dependency on the houses they serve as positively intertwined\, the second generation views this relation as a problematic one that impedes their economic and social mobility. \n \n \nThe participants also discussed outlooks and perceptions of second-generation Arab migrants in comparison to other expatriate nationalities and to GCC nationals within a university setting. Given that the geopolitical context of the region will continue to play a significant role in migratory practices\, student perceptions of the Arab uprisings and their socioeconomic impact on the region as a whole is vital. For instance\, one study indicates that outlooks on the future of the Middle East are not overly hopeful amongst students; surprisingly however\, for both GCC nationals and Arab expatriates alike\, unemployment remains a significant concern for youth. Thus\, the extent to which GCC labor markets will continue to absorb Arab migrants despite insecurities of national unemployment will have significant implications on regional migratory practices in the Middle East and the Gulf. \n \n \n\n	\nFor the working group agenda\, click here \n \n\n	\nFor the participants’ biographies\, click here \n \n\nRead more about this research initiative\n\n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nAbdullah M. Alajmi\, Arab Open University\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nMatt Buehler\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nNerida Child Dimasi\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nFrançoise De Bel-Air\, Institut français du Proche-Orient (IFPO)\nIsmail H. Genc\, American University of Sharjah\nBarb Gillis\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nManal A. Jamal\, James Madison University\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nSusan Kippels\, Sheikh Saud bin Saqr Al Qasimi Foundation for Policy Research\nGarret Maher\, Gulf University for Science and Technology\nSusan Martin\, ISIM – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service\nDavid Mednicoff\, University of Massachusetts – Amherst\nSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nGeorge Naufal\, American University of Sharjah\nMichael Newson\, International Organization for Migration\nGerd Nonneman\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nDwaa Osman\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nNatasha Ridge\, Sheikh Saud bin Saqr Al Qasimi Foundation for Policy Research\nNada Soudy\, Carnegie Mellon University in Qatar\nPaul Tacon\, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia\nAbbie Taylor\, ISIM – Georgetown University\nCarlos Vargas-Silva\, University of Oxford\nElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\n\n \nArticle by Dwaa Osman\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/arab-migrant-communities-gcc-working-group-ii/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140217T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140217T210000
DTSTAMP:20260405T002519
CREATED:20140915T141259Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T124339Z
UID:10000795-1392634800-1392670800@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Why did the Arab Spring miss the Maghreb?
DESCRIPTION:Matt Buehler\, the 2013-2014 Postdoctoral Fellow at CIRS\, delivered aMonthly Dialogue lecture on“Why did the Arab Spring miss the Maghreb? Continuity through Co-optation in Morocco and Mauritania\,” on February 17\, 2014. The talk summarized the results of in-depth fieldwork undertaken in Morocco and Mauritania\, where Buehler conducted over 100 interviews with politicians and policymakers. The central question guiding Buehler’s research was\, “Under what conditions did an Arab regime survive the Arab Spring?” Some popular theories currently on offer by scholars propose that monarchical states that have a wealth of natural resources\, a long history of military loyalty\, and a strategy of appeasing indigenous ethnic groups are more resilient and better equipped to overcome civil unrest than nations that do not enjoy similar privileges. In order to put these theories to the test\, Buehler argued that it was first necessary to outline the key infrastructural and political differences exhibited by his case study countries of Morocco and Mauritania. \n \n \nGiving some background to Morocco and Mauritania’s political structures\, Buehler challenged the prevalent thesis of the “monarchical exception\,” which states “that monarchies seemed to persist longer than non-monarchies.” He explained that\, for these two countries\, the regime’s mode of governance mattered little for authoritarian persistence\, as both states were able to weather the storm of protests that shook their governments in 2011 and 2012\, despite the fact that Morocco is a monarchy and Mauritania is not.” \n \n \nAnother theory Buehler examined suggests that countries with a wealth of natural resources\, such as the Arab countries of the Gulf\, will necessarily overcome civic discord by dint of their ability to placate any opposition by offering a series of concessions. However\, although Morocco has substantial natural resources\, Mauritania is poor in terms of natural endowments. Yet\, they both were able to stave off any serious opposition. This theory too\, Buehler argued\, was unsustainable. \n \n \nObservers argue that military loyalty is another crucial characteristic of regime survival\, and that the perseverance of Arab regimes depended on the degree of support given by the powerful underlying military state apparatus. The collapse of governments in Egypt and Tunisia are given as key examples. Yet\, Buehler argued\, whereas Morocco has a history of military loyalty\, “in Mauritania\, by contrast\, there is a very long history of military coups—every single Mauritanian president has been ousted by a coup.” \n \n \nFurther theories logically state that successful integration and assimilation of diverse ethnic minorities is necessarily a means of avoiding internal friction. “In some Arab countries\, maybe in Bahrain\, maybe in Syria\, you might think marginalized ethnic minorities seized the opportunity of the Arab Spring to assert their demands\,” Buehler said. However\, he pointed out that Morocco has done much to integrate its once marginalized ethnic groups\, but Mauritania made no such progress. Thus\, once again\, “we can’t say that ethnic integration was a very important factor in driving this process\,” he said. \n \n \nAfter having outlined the key dissimilarities between the two states\, the key question remains “what is the commonality in Moroccan and Mauritanian strategies of survival?” He answered this by saying that “these two regimes employed a very crafty\, robust strategy of co-optation\, which they used to build certain political parties—pro-regime political parties.” In order to study the much abused and complex phenomenon of “co-optation” more closely\, Buehler conducted a series of statistical tests throughout Morocco and Mauritania to gauge the extent of regime infiltration into rural politics. Buehler’s research findings conclude that Morocco and Mauritania’s strength “was their ability to monopolize the rural structures of power in order to buttress their rule during the Arab Spring.” \n \n \nIn sum\, Buehler warned against the simplistic categorization of Arab states\, and argued that there was no definitive answer as to why some regimes fell\, whilst others overcame popular unrest in the long run. As his research in Morocco and Mauritania attests\, both governments exhibited resilience in the face of the uprisings\, despite their fundamental differences in terms of political structure\, resource wealth\, military loyalty\, and ethnic integration. \n \n \nDr. Matt Buehler holds a PhD degree in government from the University of Texas at ‎Austin and he will begin ‎a tenure-track position at the University of Tennessee’s Department of Political ‎Science in fall 2014. Dr. Buehler has done extensive fieldwork in Tunisia\, ‎Morocco\, and Mauritania\, and is currently working on a book tentatively entitled The Social Base of Divide-and-Rule: Left-‎Islamist Opposition Alliances in North Africa’s Arab Spring. \n \n \nArticle by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/why-did-arab-spring-miss-maghreb/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140215T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140216T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T002519
CREATED:20140914T224334Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T104016Z
UID:10000868-1392451200-1392573600@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Transitional Justice in the Middle East - Working Group I
DESCRIPTION:On February 15-16\, 2014\, Regional and international experts gathered for the inaugural meeting of the CIRS “Transitional Justice in the Middle East” research initiative. While much of the scholarship on transitional justice has been conducted in other regions of the globe\, recent political transitions in the region have invigorated studies on the manifestation and application of transitional justice mechanisms in the Middle East. Various topics ranging from the theoretical underpinnings and scope of transitional justice to specific case-studies of Middle Eastern experiences related to reconciliation\, and restorative and retributive justice were discussed by the multi-disciplinary working group participants. \n \n \nIn beginning the discussion on transitional justice in the Middle East\, participants drew on past and current experiences of countries from around the globe in order to identify the most salient markers studied in the field. Studying transitional justice in a comparative perspective however\, has revealed that assessing its impact is not a seamless activity as the process itself continues to have shifting goals. Within transitional justice\, there is a myriad of objectives related to retributive justice\, deterrence\, vindication of victims\, and reconciliation that both practitioners and academics discuss and refer to. However\, each of these benchmarks remains elusive with regards to whom they address\, what form or shape they take\, and the mechanisms and institutions that are used to address them. For instance with regards to the vindication of victims\, the diversity in types of victims and the fact that the requirements of victims change over time\, further complicate the objectives. \n \n \nMoreover\, it is not clear how practitioners and scholars define victim-centered justice. At times\, and particularly in Islamic law and teachings\, there exists a structural tension between forgiveness and societal reconciliation and the private rights of retribution for the individual victim. A victim-centric approach would more actively advocate for the individual’s right to justice. In addition\, the scope of transitional justice is also a contested issue. While in the past it has primarily been about accountability for gross violations to human rights—particularly in relation to bodily harm—it has expanded its remit and is increasingly connected to development policy\, and economic\, social and cultural rights. This is particularly salient in the context of the recent uprisings in the Middle East\, where criminal liability for monetary and political corruption has been put on the transitional justice agenda. \n \n \nPart of the difficulty in defining goals and assessing impact lies in the issue of local versus international ownership over transitional justice processes. Since the 1990s\, mechanisms and processes of transitional justice have been heavily internationally driven and funded. Thus\, assessing where the demand for various goals stems from and the level of local ownership are vital when discussing case-studies of transitional justice and their respective impact. Concomitantly\, the local power dynamics that are at play in articulating demands also provide insight into why particular actors advocate for certain temporal boundaries of transitional justice as well as various mechanisms and institutional designs to deal with past injustices. Political parties and actors in Tunisia that have borne the brunt of state repression since the state’s independence\, particularly Ennahda\, have advocated for longer temporal boundaries of transitional justice that predate Ben Ali’s regime and extend back to the founding of the Tunisian state in 1956. In opting for a longer temporal boundary of transitional justice\, it is evident that Ennahda seeks to “deconstruct modernist narratives” of both Ben Ali and Bourguiba and to delegitimize the older political order. Other groups\, such as women that have been victims of state repression\, have sought to correct historical narratives of Tunisia’s state feminism and perceptions of women’s rights in Tunisia as being the most advanced in the Arab world. Ennahda women and women affiliated with Ennahda supporters are actively seeking in this transitory phase to provide accurate narratives about what the status was for all women in Ben Ali’s Tunisia by speaking out about gender injustices. \n \n \nMemories and narratives about the past are an integral part of a society’s transition post-conflict. There are more formal processes of truth telling and dealing with the past such as truth and reconciliation commissions and trials and tribunals; many of these visible processes however\, have been adopted by the state. Other informal processes involve civil society\, cultural production\, and non-recorded narratives. In dealing with the past\, participants specifically discussed martyrdom in North Africa and its role in transitional periods. Martyrs are employed into state-building efforts and the political agendas of political actors\, exemplifying how the past serves an agenda for the future; the FLN in Algeria\, for instance\, based a lot of its political strategies on mujahedeen or martyrs. Martyrs have also been deployed by citizens of the state\, as is the case in Tunisia\, who have advocated for communal reparations for those that have died during the protests and have simultaneously promoted a distributary vision of the state as seen in the slogan Haq Al-Thawra or “right of the revolution.” \n \n \nIn various post-atrocity transitions around the world\, constitutional development has been intertwined with the process of transitional justice. In dealing with past grievances and planning for the future\, constitutions provide a method of creating\, shaping and allocating power. Working group participants discussed the successful example of constitutional development in post-apartheid South Africa and the particular sequencing of the process. Dealing with injustices of the past presumes that the transitional justice process is a selective process that emphasizes certain problems and actors to the exclusion of others. While advantaging groups who were previously repressed\, transitional justice can also create obstacles to visiting certain issues by marginalizing them during the initial process. They can also be damaging by reifying particular solutions which become problematic for society in the long-run. Participants further questioned whether there is a trade-off between the timing and depth of transitional justice. In the South African example\, a consociational government drafted the interim constitution. Contrasted to the current situation in Libya\, where the presence of militias has created a “shallow” form of justice and where political isolation of previous regime members has taken worse form than de-Baathification in Iraq. Participants further discussed how structural constraints related to the ancien regime can also pose challenges to institutional development and the promotion of human rights—two areas that are closely linked with transitional justice processes. Where the security sector has been implicated in human rights violations and lacks accountability\, security sector reform is a focal point of institutional development. In Egypt\, the continued dominant role of the army has hindered efforts of security sector reform—reform that is particularly concerned with citizen and human security rather than that of the ruling powers. Although transitional justice promotes the development of constitutions and institutional reform\, whether it creates systems that align with values that are beneficial to societies in the long-run\, depends on a multitude of vital factors. \n \n \nWhile discussing constitutional development and transition\, participants noted the faulty assumption that transitional justice is linked to democratization and that the endpoint to the transition is in the form of a liberal democratic system. In fact\, in some cases such as the monarchies of Bahrain and Morocco\, transitional justice mechanisms have been implemented without the preface of political transition. Evidently\, in these cases\, democratization is not the end goal\, but rather\, the implementation of these mechanisms may enable monarchs to gain political capital both locally and internationally. In the absence of political transition the efficacy of truth commissions and the commissions of inquiry in Morocco and Bahrain\, respectively\, were discussed. In addition to the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms in countries without political change\, participants also discussed plans for transitional justice in cases of ongoing conflict—specifically\, in Syria where members of the opposition have already drafted detailed plans for transitional justice. \n \n \n\nRead the participant bios\nSee the working group schedule \nRead more about this research initiative \n\n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nRogaia Abusharaf\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nMohamed Arafa\, Alexandria University\nOmar Ashour\, University of Exeter\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nMietek Boduszynski\, Pomona College\nMatt Buehler\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nThomas DeGeorges\, American University of Sharjah\nMohammad Fadel\, University of Toronto\nElham Fakhro\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nDoris H. Gray\, Al Akhawayn University\nSune Haugbølle\, Roskilde University\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nChristopher Lamont\, University of Groningen\nClark Lombardi\, University of Washington\nSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nDwaa Osman\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nChandra Lekha Sriram\, University of East London\nIbrahim Sharqieh\, Brookings Doha Center\nSusan E. Waltz\, University of Michigan\nElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\n\n \n  \n \n \n​Article by Dwaa Osman\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/transitional-justice-middle-east-working-group-i/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140212T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140212T210000
DTSTAMP:20260405T002519
CREATED:20140915T053104Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T104021Z
UID:10000881-1392202800-1392238800@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:The Paradox of Renewable Energy in Qatar
DESCRIPTION:Omran Al-Kuwari\, co-founder and CEO of GreenGulf\, delivered a CIRS Focused Discussion lecture on “The Paradox of Renewable Energy in Qatar” on February 12\, 2014. The talk was centered on the drivers of investing in renewable energy in the context of Qatar\, and how these have been radically transformed over recent years. The Gulf is seen as a single market\, Al-Kuwari said\, but it is important to point out the differences between the various regional states. “Qatar is a very unique country in the Gulf\,” as “it is the only country in the world that you can safely say has enough gas and enough power to supply itself and to export for the foreseeable future.” Qatar is in a favorable position because of its large natural gas reserves\, which has provided an increasingly advantageous energy option for a new generation of people. \n\nAl-Kuwari gave a brief historical overview of the Gulf region’s hydrocarbon exploitation efforts. The largest gas reserves in the world were discovered in the North Field between Qatar and Iran about thirty years ago. At the time\, this discovery was greeted with disappointment as natural gas commanded little value\, and was seen as inferior to oil and other hydrocarbons\, which were driving the global economy. However\, over the years\, as technology advanced\, and as environmental issues became more pertinent\, “gas became the fuel of choice for power production\,” he said. \n\nCurrently\, “Qatar is the only country in the GCC that could supply all its power—100%—from gas\,” meaning that it can exploit its oil reserves purely for export and revenue generation. Other countries in the region like Saudi Arabia\, Kuwait\, and Oman rely on oil to generate power supplies to drive their own national economies as well as international ones\, and so must divide oil reserves between national needs and international requirements. Such a model\, Al-Kuwari argued\, is ultimately unsustainable as these countries are burning their own oil\, which leads to loss of export revenue\, the rapid depletion of the resource\, as well as increased pollution. Thus\, “renewable energy has become a necessity\,” he said. In the Gulf\, this is a necessity that stems purely from an economic perspective\, regardless of the positive ideological and environmental advantages renewable energy offers. Oil and gas reserves will gradually become depleted\, and nuclear energy will take a long time to establish\, if at all. Renewable energy is actually the only viable alternative for many of the regional states\, as well as international ones. \n\n“Solar energy\,” Al-Kuwari said “is low-hanging fruit in the region” because of the large amount of predictable sunlight – on average\, the region receives ten hours a day in comparison to only five hours in other parts of the world. Al-Kuwari explained that “solar energy actually fits with our needs…it’s a good match for our region\, and it’s a good match for Qatar\, and it is easy to implement” because it is a resource that can be used to generate immediate power and does not even necessarily need to be stored. The paradox\, Al-Kuwari argued\, is why countries in the region have not taken full advantage of this abundant\, natural resource and why there is so much sunlight\, and yet so little infrastructure geared towards harnessing solar power. This paradox exists for two reasons\, he explained. The first is related to the question of cost and the second is related to lack of demand. While these prohibitive reasons were valid in the past\, the circumstances have now changed. Due to technological advancements in the area of renewable energies\, the costs have now been considerably reduced. Demand has simultaneously been increased because of an increase in population in all the countries of the region as well as an increase in industry and output. \n\nBecause Qatar is in a unique position in terms of having excess energy\, the decision-makers have the luxury of creating these projects from their foundation in a deliberate and efficient way that makes sense for the future. Importantly\, Al-Kuwari noted\, “because of Qatar’s long-term interest in becoming more of a diversified economy\,” these initiatives are being built from the ground up\, and are being established all across the country in a simultaneous and synergistic manner that makes cohesive and efficient sense. Currently\, GreenGulf is involved in multiple projects and encouraging the use of solar energy as a highly efficient and clean energy source that will ultimately lead to more awareness and education regarding the benefits of clean technologies. \n\nOmran Al-Kuwari is the co-founder and CEO of GreenGulf\, a clean technology and renewable energy advisory business focused on the development and management of renewable energy in the Middle East\, North Africa and Asia. He is an energy professional with over 10 year experience in the Energy Industry. After joining Qatargas in 1999\, Al-Kuwari worked for several joint ventures\, Qatar Petroleum affiliates and ExxonMobil in Doha and the United Kingdom. He was General Manager and Director of South hook Gas Company in London until August 2009\, Qatar Petroleum’s first major LNG trading venture abroad and the UK’s largest LNG importer. Al-Kuwari holds a BA in Business Administration from the George Washington University\, and an MBA from City University London. His research has focused on “Renewable Energy in Qatar” in 2010. \n\nArticle by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/paradox-renewable-energy-qatar/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Environmental Studies,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140120T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140120T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T002519
CREATED:20140915T061109Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T104028Z
UID:10000896-1390204800-1390240800@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Sustainable Development for ‎Economies and Corporations
DESCRIPTION:R. Seetharaman\, Group Chief Executive Officer of Doha Bank‎\, delivered the first ‎CIRS ‎Monthly ‎Dialogue of 2014 with a lecture on “Sustainable Development for ‎Economies ‎and ‎Corporations”‎ ‎on January 20\, 2014‎. Drawing on his experience as the head of a major ‎financial institution\, he explained how\, as a result of the global financial crisis\, ‎economic ‎systems ‎all over the world ‏have been shaken to their core and forced to undergo massive ‎transformations ‎at a fundamental ‎level. These global financial institutions have had to align ‎themselves according to a new world ‎order of financial market re-regulation in the interest of ‎creating ‎more ‎conservative\, cautious\, and sustainable global economies. ‎ \n \n \nSeetharaman adumbrated the unprecedented circumstances that affected global financial systems ‎over the past few years\, including the liquidity crisis that turned into a funding and solvency ‎crisis where entire nations such as Greece and Iceland experienced far-reaching economic ‎collapse. In these cases\, he argued\, politics and economics did not speak to each other on the ‎level of convergence that they should have. The liquidity crisis was addressed by unstable and ‎short-term solutions\, such as printing more money to improve the cash flow and to stabilize stock ‎markets\, but this was ultimately unsustainable. The problem was patched up on a superficial level\, ‎but the fundamental roots of the economic crisis remained. Because “we live in an ‎interconnected\, interdependent world\,” currency markets and commodity markets are ‎intertwined\, and what affects one affects the other. ‎ \n \n \nReeling from years of global economic stagnation and recession\, governments\, corporations\, ‎and ‎financial institutions have realized that massive overhauls in the system are necessary\, ‎Seetharaman ‎explained. “This crisis is an opportunity for the new world order\,” he advised. The ‎type of rapacious corporate capitalism and market speculation that defined the last few ‎decades ‎of deregulated market economies have altered in form and substance. Similarly\, countries that ‎adhered to a socialist structure of economic governance have also ‎found it necessary to change ‎their financial structures\, and have been making concerted efforts to end their isolation and ‎connect with the global ‎economy. In fact\, Seetharaman said\, these two formerly oppositional ‎economic ‎philosophies are increasingly becoming intertwined for a more effective and sustainable ‎economic ‎reality. “Mixed economies are the game changers. We have seen the emerging markets ‎incrementally producing ‎over 60% of gross domestic product in terms of global growth\, and ‎these economies have to be an integral part of the order of inclusive growth. This is why the G7 ‎has become the G8\, and G8 has become G20\,” he said. ‎ \n \n \nBecause financial institutions operate as much on public money as they do on private shareholder ‎assets\, the public-private partnership model is the most sustainable way of moving forward\, ‎Seetharaman advised. Taking the example of Doha Bank\, Seetharaman argued that private ‎shareholder money accounts for approximately 11 billion\, and yet customer deposits account for ‎an enormous 35 billion. It thus becomes obvious that even if a financial institution is private\, it is ‎often\, in reality\, public. The global financial crisis revealed that the public is in fact an important ‎stakeholder whose investments must be protected and not gambled with. “Whether you run a ‎socially responsible mission as a corporate head or a country head\, you have to practice social ‎responsibility. That way\, you will take care of all the stakeholders\,” he explained.‎ \n \n \nIn conclusion\, Seetharaman argued that because of the increase in patterns of globalized ‎connectivity on all levels\, ‎whether in terms of financial markets or broader issues of climate ‎change\, governance systems all over the ‎world must attempt to adhere to the same ethical\, ‎socially-responsible\, and sustainable standards. At the universal level\, we need to “set new ‎initiatives that are responsive to see the ‎United ‎Nation‏‎’s ‎mission ‎for eradication of extreme ‎poverty\,‎‏ ‏gender ‎equality\, ‎‏economic ‎sustainability\,‎‏ ‏primary ‎healthcare\,‎‏ ‏education‏\,‏‎ global ‎collaborations‏‎\,” he concluded.‎ \n \n \nDr. R. Seetharaman (www.seetharaman.org)\, Group Chief Executive Officer of Doha Bank\, is ‎a ‎recipient of ‎multiple doctorates from leading universities of the world\, including a PhD in ‎Global ‎Governance by European ‎University and Doctorate of Laws by Washington College. He ‎is a ‎Chartered Accountant and holds certificates ‎in IT Systems and Corporate Management. He ‎has ‎been named “Best CEO in Middle East” and “World Leader ‎Business Person” and is a ‎recipient ‎of “The Gullands Excellence Award as a Phenomenal Banker.” A regular ‎commentator ‎on ‎international finance in global media outfits such as BBC\, CNN\, FOX\, CNBC\, Sky ‎News\, ‎ABC\, ‎and Bloomberg\, he has transformed Doha Bank as one of the best performing ‎Banks in the ‎Middle East region.‎Article by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/sustainable-development-economies-and-corporations/
CATEGORIES:American Studies,Dialogue Series,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140107T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140108T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T002519
CREATED:20140914T224644Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T104053Z
UID:10000869-1389081600-1389204000@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Social Currents in the Maghreb Working Group I
DESCRIPTION:On January 7-8\, 2014\, CIRS held its inaugural Social Currents in the Maghreb Working Group in Washington D.C. While much of the mainstream media and recent scholarship on the Maghreb has focused on the political and security dimensions of the region\, participants gathered over two days to discuss the social changes and fluxes in contemporary Morocco\, Libya\, Tunisia\, Algeria\, and Mauritania. The Working Group provided an avenue of deliberation on social issues that precede the recent political transformations of the region\, and sought to examine the complex trajectory of its existing societal conditions. \n \n \nAs highlighted above\, much of the recent debates on the Maghreb have revolved around political transformations\, and more specifically on their relation to Islamic movements in the context of the Arab Spring. While the historical trajectory of Islamic movements and parties has generally been accounted for\, the internal dynamics of political parties have largely been neglected in the scholarship. Working Group participants highlighted the dynamics between Islamists and leaders of various political parties as well as generational dynamics within the parties. Political parties and movements as a unit of analysis need to incorporate internal notions of ideological hybridity that not only challenge the status-quo of the country’s political landscape\, but also of the movements’ longstanding policies and strategies. These internal subtleties allude to the ideological innovation of Islamic movements that move beyond the traditional prism of analysis of “moderation through inclusion” or “radicalization through repression”. \n \n \nIn addition to political parties and political Islam\, participants discussed religious practice and the anthropology of Salafism and Sufism. In the context of the latter\, Sufi observances and religious pilgrimages by the Tijaniyyah who migrate from West Africa to the Maghreb\, have created economic and social networks that permeate the two regions. While the Tijaniyyah movement has largely expanded to West Africa\, these Sufi networks have also traditionally served as vital linkages of knowledge production. \n \n \nAnother thread connecting the Maghreb to West Africa and the Sahel is the transnational element of Amazigh movements. While most scholars have focused on political and social struggles of the Amazighs in Algeria and Morocco in isolation\, their movements have become increasingly transnational in nature as they incorporate other Amazighs or social groups such as the Tuareg\, in their politics. With these attempts to create transnational connections comes a sense of national ambivalence as questions of identity are pushed to the forefront with regards to “Africanity” and “Amazigh-ness”. These questions do not allude to deep ethnic tensions between a certain social group and their respective national counterparts\, but rather serve to highlight contemporary politics and how it emerges in a changing political system with relative political openings or closings. \n \n \nHybrid identities were also discussed in the context of the Haratine in Mauritania. The Haratine\, or people of slave descent\, currently experience different levels of political and social subservience. The Haratine are also not a homogenous group and identify themselves as Arabs\, Berbers\, African\, and Mauritanian. Identity\, which may also be used as a political tool\, directly affects the strategic alliances that the Haratine movement builds in order to further its political cause in Mauritania. While much of the movement’s emphasis has been on political and social subordination\, economic emancipation has not been effectively addressed by the movement nor experienced by the Haratine today. \n \n \nOther movements such as the Polisario in Western Sahara have not gained much footing in their political trajectory but have secured greater access to economic funds. Contrary to conventional wisdom about the armed movement\, the Polisario has increasingly diversified its portfolio of economic and developmental funding to include non-state sources beyond Algeria. Resources from civil society organizations and family members abroad broaden the Polisario movement’s economic base of support and simultaneously affect the activities and investments of the movement. \n \n \nIn addition to identity politics\, the politics of language and its historical\, economic and social salience were discussed. The language of instruction in Moroccan schools for instance\, has largely been caught between the dual and seemingly contradictory goals of cultural and linguistic preservation (e.g. Arabic or Berber) and the necessity of equipping graduates with languages that meet global market needs (e.g. French or English). The language of instruction in the Moroccan education system is fragmented where Arabic is utilized in public primary schools and French in higher education. This tends to exacerbate the hurdles that socio-economically disadvantaged populations face in attaining social mobility as they move from one educational level to another. This linguistic fragmentation in the education system can be contrasted to the linguistic hybridity that is increasingly incorporated into the artistic expression of the youth. The incorporation of the Darija (colloquial Arabic) into cultural forms produced by youth serves as a means to deconstruct issues of identity and provides an underlying commentary on the language of politics as being distant from the everyday life; this artistic utilization of linguistic hybridity by youth was identified as an element of youth’s cultural and social entrepreneurship in the contemporary Maghreb. \n \n \nParallel to the politics of linguistic preservation\, participants discussed movements of cultural preservation\, specifically as it relates to Jews of North Africa. Jewish presence in Morocco and Tunisia has significantly diluted since the pre-independence era\, and concomitantly\, efforts to conserve and renovate Jewish heritage sites have been on the rise. While these preservation projects serve to keep the memory of the Jewish community in North Africa alive\, the politics of preservation also indicate that these movements seek to reify Jews to a past rather than an ongoing present. \n \n \nSports in relation to migration\, identity and political transitions in the Maghreb were also topics tackled by the participants. While Europe has been the main destination for athletes\, the GCC has more recently become a new lucrative destination for youth from the Maghreb. Issues related to reverse migration of athletes\, their sense of belonging\, and identity construction around religion and language are of interest in comparing the Gulf and Europe as prime sport destinations. Moreover\, with the political transitions in the region\, regimes have utilized sports for various strategic interests such as the promotion of reconciliation in Algeria or the rebuilding of the national sport system in Libya after decades of neglect by Qaddafi. \n \n \nThese societal threads\, from social movements by marginalized groups to the language employed by youth in artistic expression\, collectively shed light on the social underpinnings of the contemporary Maghreb.  \n \n \n\nRead the participant bios\nSee the working group schedule \nRead more about this research initiative \n\n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nOsama Abi-Mershed\, CCAS – Georgetown University\nLahouari Addi\, Centre de Recherche en Anthropologie Sociale et Culturelle (CRASC)\nMahfoud Amara\, Loughborough University\nNéjib Ayachi\, Maghreb Center\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nAomar Boum\, University of Arizona\nCharis Boutieri\, King’s College London\nAlice Bullard\, IRA-USA\nFrancesco Cavatorta\, Université Laval\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nRicardo René Larémont\, Binghamton University\nWilliam Lawrence\, George Washington University\nDwaa Osman\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nZekeria Ould Ahmed Salem\, University of Nouakchott\nPaul Silverstein\, Reed College\nLoubna Skalli-Hanna\, American University\nElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nAlice Wilson\, University of Cambridge\n\n \nArticle by Dwaa Osman\, Research Analyst at CIRS​
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/social-currents-maghreb-working-group-i/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20131211T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20131211T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T002519
CREATED:20140915T061512Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T104057Z
UID:10000897-1386748800-1386784800@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Zahra Babar on Arab Migrants in Qatar
DESCRIPTION:Zahra Babar\, Associate Director for Research at CIRS\, delivered a CIRSMonthly Dialogue ‎lecture titled “Working for the Neighbors: Arab Migrants in Qatar” on December 11\, 2013. Babar ‎proposed to examine some of the trends in Qatar’s dramatic population increase over the past ‎few decades\, paying particular attention to the demographic patterns of non-GCC Arab migrant ‎populations. “The migrant population in the Gulf in general\, and in Qatar in particular\, has ‎increased significantly over the past few decades\,” she said. In the 1990s\, the total population of ‎Qatar was about 500\,000 people\, and has increased threefold to almost 2 million in 2013. ‎Giving some background to her research\, Babar explained that “although we all are aware of this ‎large demographic presence of foreigners in Qatar\, surprisingly enough\, we actually do not know ‎very much about them.” Reliable data on who these people are\, where they come from\, how they ‎are integrated in the labor market\, and how they experience life in Qatar is scant. “Obtaining data ‎in Qatar on national and ethnic compositions of the migrant population is a huge challenge. Any ‎researcher trying to work on some aspect of labor migration in Qatar finds that the data ‎availability\, data accessibility\, and data reliability is very scarce\,” she noted. With Qatar’s hosting ‎of the 2022 FIFA World Cup approaching\, critical attention has focused on Qatar’s labor ‎practices with several high-profile and defamatory exposés in the international media. Babar ‎warned\, however\, that people should be wary of those who claim to have solid facts and figures ‎regarding migration and labor conditions in Qatar. “I hope you would remain skeptical when any ‎one of these articles proceeds to give you particular figures\,” she said. ‎ \n \n \nGuiding her research\, Babar explained\, was the question: “why is it important to talk about ‎nationality?” Nationality\, she said\, has a direct impact on one’s life in Qatar as a migrant\, ‎including how it determines salary structures\, benefits and prospects\, and how one experiences ‎life and work in the country. Thus\, “nationality has a strong correlation with how one is ‎integrated into Qatar’s labor market\,” she surmised. ‎ \n \n \nTracing nationality trajectories in Qatar over the past few decades\, she argued that ethnic and ‎national compositions of the expatriate presence have gone through a complete transformation. ‎Focusing on changes to the non-GCC Arab migrant populations in Qatar\, Babar highlighted the ‎significant decrease in numbers from 70 percent in the 1970s and 1980s to less than 20 percent ‎currently. Babar reported recent figures obtained from the Qatari Ministry of Labor\, which ‎placed non-GCC Arab expatriates in Qatar at 146\, 000\, or 13 percent of the total workforce. Of ‎these\, Egyptians comprise the largest percentage in terms of national composition\, closely ‎followed by Sudanese and Syrians. Together\, these three nationalities comprise 65 percent of the ‎total non-GCC Arab expatriate population in Qatar and 72 percent of the non-GCC Arab ‎workforce.‎ \n \n \nSituating these demographic changes historically\, Babar argued that the GCC states\, with their ‎burgeoning hydrocarbon industries and small populations\, were obliged to employ foreign ‎workers. Initially\, in the early days of the industry\, the logical choice was to employ workers ‎from neighboring Arab countries\, given the geographic\, linguistic\, religious\, and cultural ‎affinities\, and the ease of Arab integration into existing Gulf societies. However\, as these ‎massive hydrocarbon industries grew and globalized and as political economic imperatives ‎surpassed these initial sociocultural considerations\, there were dramatic shifts in the policies\, ‎practices\, and patterns of the Qatari labor market. ‎ \n \n \nEffectively\, non-GCC Arab migrants in Qatar have\, since the 1970s\, integrated into society by ‎maintaining their traditional family structures. Of the total non-GCC Arab residents in Qatar\, ‎only 52 percent are active in the labor force and contribute to the economy\, while 48 percent are ‎dependents—children and housewives. If this is compared to corresponding data from other ‎nationalities\, there is a significant and noticeable difference. There are only 17 percent non-‎working dependents in the Indian community and only 1 percent in the Nepalese community. ‎Further\, the discrepancy in these figures also reveals that non-GCC Arab migrants presumably ‎earn higher salaries to be able to maintain a dependent household in Qatar. Thus\, Babar argued\, it ‎is easy to see why Qatari policymakers would be more inclined to import cheaper and more ‎manageable labor from Asia. ‎ \n \n \nIn sum\, Babar concluded that\, “in Qatar\, the state and society are extremely concerned about the ‎demographic imbalance and the increasing presence of foreigners outnumbering them\, and so ‎really what they are looking for is to have their labor market needs met without any incremental ‎increase to the population.” ‎ \n \n \nZahra Babar is Associate Director for Research at the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS)\, Georgetown University-Qatar. Previously\, she worked in the international aid\, community development\, and poverty alleviation sector. Babar has served with the International Labour Organisation and the United Nations Development Programme. She also spent several years working in Pakistan with the Sarhad Rural Support Programme\, one of Pakistan’s large multisectoral rural development organizations. She has edited\, with Mehran Kamrava\, Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf\, and with Suzi Mirgani\, Food Security in the Middle East. Babar received her BA in Government from Smith College in Northampton\, Massachusetts\, and her MA from the School of International Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University\, New Delhi.Article by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications. 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/zahra-babar-arab-migrants-qatar/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Distingushed Lectures,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20131208T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20131209T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T002519
CREATED:20140915T005002Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T124804Z
UID:10000870-1386525600-1386612000@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:The State and Innovation in the Gulf Working Group I
DESCRIPTION:On December 8–9\, 2013\, CIRS held a working group to launch the State and Innovation in the Gulf Research Initiative. Regional and international scholars and experts from various multi-disciplinary backgrounds convened to discuss issues related to the pursuit of a knowledge-based economy (KBE) throughout various states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). \n \n \nWithin the last decade\, members of the GCC have individually drafted\, formulated and launched development plans and strategies that convey the common drive among these states to create a knowledge based-economy. Although they have experienced large-scale rapid development due to abundant hydrocarbon rents\, rulers and public officials of these states have increasingly stated that economic diversification is necessary for the sustainability of economic growth. Diversification has been used almost interchangeably with the concept of developing a “knowledge-based economy\,” underscoring the ultimate goal of these states to reform education\, R&D\, ICT\, and other sectors that enhance productivity and scientific progress. \n \n \nInvestment in higher-education has been one of the most prominent manifestations of this drive towards developing KBEs. As a result of the lack of capacity and expertise of national public universities across the region to produce the necessary skillsets in their graduates fit for a KBE\, governments have increasingly invested in international branch campuses (IBCs). While IBCs are not a novel phenomenon across the globe\, organizations such as Qatar Foundation in Qatar have adopted unique organizational practices and arrangements of IBCs that are cluster-based. Graduates of these hosted top-tier US and European universities’ IBCs gain degrees that are identical to those obtained by graduates from the main campuses. While this model of imported universities is meant to transfer knowledge from one campus to another\, certain types of “knowledge” have more complex forms of adoption. Participants discussed the relative seamless transfer of the sciences\, while humanities programs that are embedded in social and cultural values may need to be adapted to fit the specific locale. \n \n \nThe investment in IBCs and research institutions indicates that the infrastructure to build a R&D culture and economy is present; however\, retaining the human capital to carry out research has proved to be a much more difficult feat. Small national populations throughout the GCC have resulted in the large import of human capital to satisfy labor market needs. However\, the resulting demographic imbalance between nationals and non-nationals has shaped the stringent residency rules in these countries\, which offer no formal pathways to citizenship. Although recruitment of labor has not proven to be much of a concern\, retaining a work-force that has a sense of long-term commitment and ownership over their work is something that organizations have to contend with. Thus\, while GCC states have attempted to create an environment of innovation and knowledge production through financial and infrastructural investment\, the ability to seed and harvest innovation with a largely transient population in place remains a question. Achieving sustainability in innovation requires a comprehensive approach that looks at the social dimensions of this transition to knowledge-producing economies. \n \n \nWhile higher education has been the focus of investment for these aspiring KBEs\, there has been a relative neglect of primary education systems in the GCC. Participants argued that in order to effectively enable systems for knowledge production and knowledge sustainability\, states should aim to produce knowledge “societies” rather than “economies” per se. Rote learning and functionalist approaches to education are prevalent from the primary years of education and act as hindrances to harvesting innovation. With critical thinking undermined and the value of knowledge beyond the labor market requirements rarely articulated\, fostering knowledge production and a risk-taking culture may be a distant achievement for the GCC states despite the presence of top-tier research universities. \n \n \nLabor market employment of nationals continues to be a main priority for GCC states. The nationalization of the education and tourism sectors reflect the government’s attempts to diversify their economies\, while minimizing national unemployment. Within the GCC\, there is also a big push for entrepreneurship and SME development\, which act as modes of employment that concomitantly spur innovation. Participants noted\, though\, that a multitude of systemic and ideational challenges face the state in encouraging entrepreneurship and innovation. Among other factors\, the systemic hurdles include institutional competition\, overly bureaucratic procedures\, as well as endemic inconsistencies between policies and monopolized market conditions. The ideational challenge on the other hand\, poses a hindrance that hits at the root of entrepreneurship development—the limited motivation for entrepreneurial innovation amongst citizens of the Gulf. Participants noted that the rentier path dependencies and the dual-wage structure between the public and private sector across the GCC obstruct incentives for innovation and entrepreneurism amongst nationals. In fact\, state attempts to invigorate the private sector through SME development\, has further embedded the public sector within the economy and entrepreneurship has become a new mode of state patronage and means of accessing rent. \n \n \nAs GCC states strive to develop “innovation cities”\, policy adoption and diffusion from well-established global KBEs is at play. What may be much more complex\, however\, is tackling the social dimension that is required to transition to a KBE\, and tailoring these policies to fit the local conditions. Fostering innovation may lead these states to revisit their rentier dependency policies aimed at nationals\, and to develop motivational mechanisms that incentivize the citizens to play a key role in the development of a knowledge-based economy.  \n \n \n\nRead the participant bios\nSee the working group schedule \nRead more about this research initiative\n\n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nAbdulkhaleq Abdulla\, United Arab Emirates University\nOsama Abi-Mershed\, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies\, Georgetown University\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nMatt Buehler\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nNerida Child Dimasi\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nJohn Crist\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nCrystal A. Ennis\, Balsillie School of International Affairs\nBarb Gillis\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nMartin Hvidt\, Zayed University\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nTanya Kane\, Texas A&M University at Qatar\nHiba Khodr\, American University of Beirut\nDaniel Kirk\, Emirates College for Advanced Education\nJim Krane\, Rice University\nSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nRabi Mohtar\, Qatar Foundation\nAnne Nebel\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nFirat Oruc\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nDwaa Osman\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nAndy Spiess\, GCC Network for Drylands Research and Development\nElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nKenneth Wilson\, Zayed University\n\n \nArticle by Dwaa Osman\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/state-and-innovation-gulf-working-group-i/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20131117T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20131117T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T002519
CREATED:20140915T050343Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T124818Z
UID:10000873-1384675200-1384711200@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:CIRS Research Roundtable
DESCRIPTION:In order to enhance local research productivity\, and build upon its established collegial ‎relationships with other research entities in Qatar\, CIRS hosted a “Research Roundtable” on November 17\, 2013. During this one-day event\, academics\, policy analysts\, and representatives of research institutions and think tanks discussed their respective research initiatives and activities in an attempt to identify research synergies across institutions. Participants additionally discussed the extent to which their research endeavors align with Qatar’s National Research Strategy\, and the linkages between their research output and policy making in the country. \n \n \nThe research landscape and various challenges faced by research organizations in Qatar were central discussions of the Roundtable. As with most early stage research economies around the globe\, capacity building of research institutions\, coordination between research organizations\, and establishing partnerships between research and policy-making bodies are core areas in need of development. In the past decade\, research organizations have mushroomed throughout Qatar and collectively cover a wide array of subject areas. At this stage in its development\, participants discussed Qatar’s need to build the capacity of organizations to conduct and disseminate research. More importantly\, the complex research landscape in Qatar requires a coordinating body that could generate awareness on the type of research carried out by various institutions. This would enable organizations to effectively articulate research synergies with other institutions\, avoid duplication of efforts\, and identify areas where research is needed. Communicating research activities and transferring knowledge output to policy making entities is also of importance. Informed decision making and evidence-based policy are contingent upon access to and knowledge of the relevant research. This Research Roundtable provided a platform for various members of the research community to highlight their research areas and share insights on the state of research in the country.  \n \n \nParticipants: \n \n \n\nIbrahim Sharqieh\, Deputy Director & Foreign Policy Fellow\, Brookings Doha Center\nNader Kabbani\, Director of Research and Policy\, Silatech\nFlorian Wiedmann\,  Urban Planning and Development Authority\nProfessor Tim Cable\, Director of Sports Science\, Aspire Academy\nHanan Abdul Rahim\, Associate Director SESRI\, Qatar University\nTatjana Martinoska\, Independent Researcher\nNoor Al Malki Al Jehani\, Executive Director\, Doha International Family Institute (DIFI)\nSanaa Alharahsheh\, Associate Researcher\, Doha International Family Institute (DIFI)\nSimon Hall\, Project Manager Qatar National Food Security Programme\nJohn Crist\, Director of Research\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nMehran Kamrava\, Director\, CIRS\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nZahra Babar\, Assistant Director of Research\, CIRS\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nSuzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor of CIRS Publications\, CIRS\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nDwaa Osman\, Research Analyst\, CIRS\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nElizabeth Wanucha\, Project Manager\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nNerida Child Dimasi\, Financial and Budget Analyst\, CIRS\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nBarb Gillis\, CIRS Coordinator\, CIRS\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/cirs-research-roundtable/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20131112T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20131112T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T002519
CREATED:20140915T061953Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T124829Z
UID:10000898-1384243200-1384279200@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Micha Kurz on “Mobilizing Communities in Occupied Jerusalem”
DESCRIPTION:Micha Kurz\, a co-founder of “Grassroots Jerusalem\,” delivered a CIRSMonthly Dialogue lecture ‎on “Mobilizing Communities in Occupied Jerusalem” on November 12\, 2013. Kurz works to ‎support a Palestinian platform for community-based advocacy in Jerusalem\, putting Jerusalem ‎back on the international map as a Palestinian capital. His lecture focused on the high degree of ‎misinformation regarding the political realities experienced by the increasingly segregated ‎Palestinian communities on the ground. Issues of escalating Palestinian impoverishment are often ‎marginalized\, and the daily suffering sanitized\, under the Israeli political narrative of “security ‎and peace.” Even though Israelis and Palestinians share some of the same physical spaces in the ‎city\, their experiences could not be more dissimilar causing ongoing conflict and tension. \n \n \nIn order to understand the history of Jerusalem\, Kurz said\, it is important to understand the ‎bifurcated histories of conflict. For Israelis\, the modern historical understanding of the tensions ‎starts in 1967 and the discussions of a “two-state solution\,” but for Palestinians this begins much ‎earlier in 1948 with the Naqba\, or catastrophe. In Israeli schools\, teaching a history of the Naqba ‎is practically an illegal topic\, Kurz argued. Thus\, many Israelis as well as communities in the West ‎do not have\, nor often care to have\, a full picture of what is happening on the ground. ‎ \n \n \nIf one goes back further in time\, before there were divisions between Israelis and Palestinians\, ‎there was a Jerusalem that was populated by Jews\, Muslims\, and Christians\, Kurz said. ‎‎Jerusalem was a central city in the region connecting the cities of Bethlehem\, Hebron\, and ‎Be’ar Saba’a in the South\, to Nablus\, Nazareth\, and Tiberius in the North. The city also ‎connected Jericho from the East\, through the oldest trade route in the world\, to the port of Jaffa ‎and the Mediterranean sea in the West. The city wasn’t just a spiritual or religious capital; it was ‎also an economic capital in the region. But Israel has detached the city from its suburbs and the ‎West Bank\, isolating Jerusalem\, and treating it as if it were a city in Europe\, not a capital in the ‎Middle East. ‎ \n \n \nIn an attempt to control demographics\, for the last four decades\, Israeli government policy has ‎been to keep Palestinian parts of the city underdeveloped\, while expanding mass Israeli ‎settlement housing projects—illegally according to international law. While Israeli settlement ‎grew on stolen Palestinian farmlands during the 1970s and 80s\, without the freedom to develop ‎their own neighborhoods\, young Palestinian families had no choice but to move out of town\, and ‎to live in the suburbs. Later\, in the 1990s during what was described as “a step toward Peace\,” ‎checkpoints were constructed limiting Palestinian access to the Central Business District and ‎with it access to the main market\, employment\, healthcare\, and education. Palestinians who were ‎caught at checkpoints or Israeli military house-raids and designated as not living within the ‎Israeli-defined borders of the city have had their “residency” status revoked. These no longer ‎have the right to visit their hometown without an Israeli issued permit. Israel finally severed ‎Jerusalem from its age-old suburbs with the construction of the “separation wall.” The “wall” was ‎built during the period known as “the Bush War on Terror\,” and its presence has often been justified under ‎the rubric of “security.” However\, it has been widely proven by many Israeli sources that this is ‎not the case\, and the “wall” has benefited the Israeli economy by segregating Palestinian cities ‎from one another. ‎ \n \n \nToday\, the Israeli government does not allow the Palestinian Authority jurisdiction in Jerusalem. ‎Without the right to vote in proper government elections\, Palestinian Residents of Jerusalem have ‎not been politically represented for the last four decades. Kurz discussed the divisions and ‎segregations that have occurred; Palestinians living in the suburbs of the city are physically ‎isolated and segregated from their communities and from basic amenities. As a result\, over 5\,000 ‎businesses have shut down over the past decade\, bringing unemployment\, poverty\, and rising ‎tensions to peak levels. The age-old character has been cleansed from Jerusalem together with its ‎Palestinian residents.‎ \n \n \nKurz lamented how “Israel has over time gained control of the land between the Jordan River ‎and the Mediterranean sea\, including the economy\, resources\, and the peoples living in it.” He ‎added later\, “I find it difficult to describe Israel either as a democracy or a Jewish state.” In ‎conclusion\, Kurz questioned how “Many people around the world still discuss a Two-State ‎Solution\, expecting ‘Peace\, Dialogue\, and Coexistence\,’ where I feel we ought to be discussing ‎human rights\, justice\, and leading practical conversations about freedom of movement and ‎development in an important regional capital.” ‎ \n \n \nMicha Kurz was born and raised in Jerusalem. During the second Intifada he learned about the ‎Israeli Occupation of Palestinian land and people first hand as an Israeli soldier. In 2004\, he was ‎a co-founder of “Breaking the Silence” and has since focused his work in Al Quds-Jerusalem\, “a ‎forgotten epicenter of the occupation. “Grassroots Jerusalem” has recently opened the doors to ‎Al Marsa (the Harbor)\, a Political Community Center and Legal Clinic built to counter the threat ‎on freedom of speech and assembly in Jerusalem today.‎ 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/micha-kurz-mobilizing-communities-occupied-jerusalem/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Distingushed Lectures,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20131007T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20131007T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T002519
CREATED:20140915T062413Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T124840Z
UID:10000899-1381132800-1381168800@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Abdullah Al-Arian Lectures on the Muslim Brotherhood
DESCRIPTION:Abdullah Al-Arian\, Assistant Professor of History at the Georgetown University School of ‎Foreign Service in Qatar\, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue lecture titled “From Revolution to ‎Coup: Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood” on October 7\, 2013. ‎ \n \n \nTestament to Egypt’s importance in the Arab World\, he argued that “whatever happens in Egypt ‎has a tremendous impact on the outcomes of movements across the entire region. We are already ‎seeing the consequence of that in places like Tunisia\, Syria\, Palestine\, and elsewhere.” To this ‎effect\, Al-Arian addressed three areas: first\, he traced the trajectory of the Muslim Brotherhood ‎over the last four decades of its history. Second\, he evaluated how that history shaped the ‎decisions and performance of the Muslim Brotherhood over the course of the last few years in ‎Egypt. Finally\, he ventured some possible scenarios for the future of the Brotherhood\, and its ‎place in Egyptian politics and society. ‎ \n \n \nGiving some background to the institution of the group\, Al-Arian noted that despite having been ‎formed eighty-five years ago by Hassan Al-Banna\, it experienced very few ideological or ‎organizational shifts over the years. During the presidency of Anwar Sadat in the 1970s\, Egypt ‎began a new era in which formative economic and political liberalizations were taking place\, ‎shifting power away from the military and towards a new urban middle-class. The Brotherhood’s ‎traditional support-base existed in rural Egypt\, but “during the course of its reconstitution\, the ‎organization’s veteran leadership tapped into this emerging social group that was increasingly ‎urbanized\, middle-class\, professional\, and\, to a certain extent\, more religiously devout due in ‎large part to disenchantment or disillusionment with the failures of the Nasser period\,” he argued. ‎The group entered into a modern phase of its history where Islamic activism was coupled with ‎practical concerns\, and economic prowess. At this time\, the Brotherhood worked on streamlining ‎its message in order to overcome an increasingly fragmented sense of Islamic identity\, and to ‎challenge the rise of competing movements that attempted to fill the void of post-colonial power ‎struggles. During this phase of its history\, “the Muslim Brotherhood is slowly beginning to ‎engage more directly with society and\, to a certain extent as well\, with the state\,” he explained.‎ \n \n \nSeeking to protect their vested interest\, and not wanting to jeopardize the tacit agreements ‎forged with the Mubarak regime over the years\, the Brotherhood acted cautiously when it came ‎to overt political engagement\, and remained on the margins of the 2011 uprisings. Al-Arian ‎suggested that “It’s not a revolutionary movement\, it’s a reform movement\,” which is ‎exemplified by the group’s reticence to join the civil society uprisings in Egypt at the early stages ‎of unrest. “It was only three days later\, when the momentum was clearly picking up that finally ‎the leadership reverses its decision and decides to flood Tahrir Square with its supporters who\, of ‎course\, played a very critical role in the biggest clashes between them and Mubarak’s security ‎agents\,” he said. After the fall of the Mubarak regime\, “the Muslim Brotherhood along with ‎millions of other Egyptians faced a very critical choice: do they support the transition to a new ‎government that was basically being put in place by the military\, or do they demand true ‎revolutionary change by opposing all attempts by the military to try to impose its roadmap for the ‎ensuing transition?” When Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohamed Morsi took office\, despite a ‎few token gestures to appease the public\, he made no major changes to the existing mode of ‎governance. In fact\, “the most critical institutions—the bureaucracy\, the judiciary\, the police\, the ‎intelligence services\, and most major ministries—would essentially continue to function with a ‎‎‘business-as-usual’ attitude\, with only cosmetic changes being made\,” Al-Arian noted.‎ \n \n \nAlthough the Brotherhood had a successful history of organizing grassroots civil institutions at ‎the community level\, the group lacked any form of expertise when it came to large-scale ‎economic and political proficiency necessary for the functioning of an entire nation. Thus\, during ‎their time in office\, the Brotherhood submitted to the entrenched authoritarian hold of the army ‎ensuring that it remain beyond recrimination despite the abuses committed during the uprisings\, ‎and that it would not be held accountable despite its undemocratic and opaque modes of ‎operation. Ultimately\, allowing the military to continue its control would be the group’s undoing ‎as “the Muslim Brotherhood was actually helping to create the climate in which a freely elected ‎president could be overthrown by the defense minister and head of the military\,” he contended.‎ \n \n \nIn conclusion\, Al-Arian argued that\, after a brief moment in charge\, the Muslim Brotherhood has ‎once again become an ostracized entity whose leaders have been imprisoned\, their institutions ‎destroyed\, their assets seized\, and their media shut down. As a final thought\, however\, he ‎posited that “an unintended consequence of the state’s desire to destroy the Muslim Brotherhood ‎will actually enable the development of alternative modes of organization and mobilization by ‎the remnants of the Muslim Brotherhood\, with a particular emphasis on the youth generation.”‎ \n \n \nAbdullah Al-Arian holds a doctorate in history from Georgetown University\, where he wrote his dissertation on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt during the decade of the 1970s. He received his Masters degree from the London School of Economics and his BA from Duke University. A frequent contributor to the Al-Jazeera English network and website\, Al-Arian is the author of the upcoming book Answering the Call: Popular Islamic Activism in Egypt\, 1968-1981\, to be published by Oxford University Press early next spring.Article by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications. 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/abdullah-al-arian-lectures-muslim-brotherhood/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Distingushed Lectures,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20131005T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20131006T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T002519
CREATED:20140915T005351Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T124900Z
UID:10000871-1380960000-1381082400@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:The Evolution of Gulf Global Cities Working Group I
DESCRIPTION:On October 5–6\, 2013\, CIRS held a two-day working group under the research initiative “The Evolution of Gulf Global Cities.” Scholars from various multi-disciplinary backgrounds as well as urban practitioners and architects examined historical\, social\, economic and political aspects of urban transformations in the Persian Gulf. \n \n \nDuring the working group\, group discussion bridged past and present conditions of Gulf societies in order to understand the evolution of urban centers across the region. Before the advent of the oil economy\, Gulf port cities were considered “cosmopolitan\,” with fluid borders and territories that deemed them as centers of cultural and economic exchange. While these cities are contemporarily integrated into global networks and continue to host large populations of foreign migrants from around the world\, the diversity and hybridity of the city has eroded into what participants characterized as “hyper-segregated and divided” spaces. \n \n \nAspects of these modern urban developments and features may be understood in relation to historical modes of globalization. Oil has served as a vital globalizing factor\, as its discovery brought an influx of international oil companies to the Gulf and led to the localization of global forces of international capitalism. This was clearly manifested in the development of company towns across the region\, which also provided new modes of institution building and urban planning. Many of these company towns—such as Kuwait Oil Company’s Ahmadi town in Kuwait—enforced socio-spatial segregation amongst its residents based on ethnicity\, occupational standing and socio-economic status. Dubbed by some participants as “neo-colonial capital enterprises implanted in space”\, these company towns resemble the segregated urban fabric of many Gulf cities today—underscoring the need to understand how the Gulf region has been and continues to be shaped by imperial and colonial legacies. \n \n \nThe contrast between the rigidity present in today’s cities compared with the mobility that Gulf port cities historically exemplified may be paralleled to ramifications of planned cities versus naturally created urban spaces. With the advent of state centralization\, master urban plans were introduced\, and increasingly the state managed the inflow of migrants through socio-spatial engineering. Of growing interest and importance is assessing the political economy of governance and its impact on the urban fabric. Various stakeholders\, including the ruling regimes\, governmental and political institutions\, the business community\, foreign consultants and local urban practitioners collectively affect the urban landscape. National strategies\, such as Qatar’s 2030\, envision a transition from a resource-based economy to a knowledge-based economy\, and have resulted in the development of large scale projects that aim to increasingly incorporate the city into global knowledge-economy networks. These state-driven transitions manifest in uneven spatial and social development at the city level\, where different spaces exhibit varying levels of global integration and where gentrification benefits an increasingly mobile capitalist class. \n \n \nDiversification from the oil-based economy has also led many GCC states to focus on developing the tourism sector. Cities such as Dubai and Doha have exhibited rapid commodification of their space\, heritage industry\, and environment in order to build venues tailored for tourism consumption. Particularly problematic is the limited version of regional and local history and identity presented by the emerging heritage industry\, as epitomized by the narrow representations of indigenous religious and ethnic minorities within national museums of contemporary Gulf cities. \n \n \nUnplanned spaces were also discussed by the participants. In Iran’s bustling port of Bandar Abbas\, informal settlements have spread on the city’s periphery. While Bandar Abbas appears to be an affluent port due to trade and revenues generated from illicit trading activities\, inequality and poverty are manifested in its urban slums and informal settlements. Periodical city plans however\, seek to upgrade and formalize these informal settlements by incorporating them within the city’s boundaries. This formalization process however\, does not provide avenues for community participation as urban planning continues to be developed by the central state. As agreed by the participants\, community participation in urban planning is vital for the social sustainability of the built environment. In contrast to today’s Gulf cities\, the built environment of traditional Middle Eastern cities was shaped by the end user and proved to be more “organic.” With the zonal segregation of today’s planned cities however\, residents have gradually lost the ability to have regular encounters and confrontations with each other—namely\, they’ve lost the urban sense of the city. As such\, only a social force as opposed to a top-down agenda can create social sustainability in these already planned cities. Around the Gulf\, civic groups have started to emerge that are attempting to restore urban fluidity and their right to the city. These grassroots attempts\, along with recent protests around the region\, depict a politicization of urban space where the city has become both a site and stake of political contestation. \n \n \n\nRead the participant bios\nSee the working group schedule \nRead more about this research initiative\n\n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nAla Al-Hamarneh\, University of Mainz\nNadia Al-Khater\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nFarah Al-Nakib\, American University of Kuwait\nPooya Alaedini\, University of Tehran\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nSamer Bagaeen\, University of Brighton\nJohn T. Crist\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nNerida Child Dimasi\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nNelida Fuccaro\, University of London\nBarb Gillis\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nAhmed Kanna\, University of the Pacific\nArang Keshavarzian\, New York University\nCatherine Lechicki\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nDwaa Osman\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nStephen J. Ramos\, University of Georgia\nMohammad Reza Farzanegan\, Philipps-University of Marburg\nAshraf M. Salama\, Qatar University\nMarcus Stephenson\, Middlesex University Dubai\nFlorian Wiedmann\, Frankfurt University of Applied Sciences\n\n \nArticle by Dwaa Osman\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/evolution-gulf-global-cities-working-group-i/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20130930T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20130930T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T002519
CREATED:20140915T052641Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20230806T071332Z
UID:10000880-1380528000-1380564000@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Luciano Zaccara on the Iranian Elections
DESCRIPTION:Luciano Zaccara\, Visiting Assistant Professor at Georgetown University SFS-Qatar\, delivered a CIRS Focused Discussion on the topic\, “Do Elections Matter? Reflections on the 2013 Iranian Presidential Polls” on September 30\, 2013. Answering this question in the affirmative at the start of the lecture\, he went on to explain why elections are so important to the Iranian political system. Having conducted extensive fieldwork in Iran\, Zaccara observed in-situ the last six electoral processes in Iran\, including the Presidential Elections of 2005\, 2009 and 2013; the Legislatives Elections of 2008 and 2012; and the Municipals and Assembly of Experts elections of 2006. He explained that “electoral life in Iran is very active; in the last 34 years of the Republic’s history there were 32 electoral processes in Iran\,” which reveals how significant elections are for the regime to legitimize its political processes and institutions.  \n \n \nGiving some historical background\, Zaccara noted that there have been a total of eleven presidential elections since the creation of the Islamic Republic. He added that only two presidents did not complete their terms; one was President Bani-Sadr who was impeached in 1980\, and the other was President Rajai who was assassinated in 1981. The third\, fourth\, fifth\, and sixth presidents\, Khamenei\, Rafsanjani\, Khatami\, and Ahmadinejad\, were elected for two terms\, which is the maximum allowable time in office. Of these\, Rafsanjani and Khamenei obtained the highest proportion of votes with 95 percent each. Although Ahmadinejad officially attracted more participation in the electoral process\, with figures reaching up to 83 percent\, he was the most contested candidate in the history of Iranian elections. \n \n \nElections in Iran are vital for the survival of the political system despite the various governmental constraints. He explained that “electoral processes have very important functions in Iran\, even within the authoritarian limits set by the constitutional and electoral frameworks\, which are very particular in the Iranian case.” Despite the uproar regarding the 2009 results\, electoral processes in Iran have important functions. “First\, they draw much light over the intra-elite dispute. Second\, they serve the government to check periodically on the people’s orientation. Third\, but no less important\, they bring candidates into office\, sometimes with unexpected results. And fourth\, they determine the government’s composition\,” Zaccara argued.  \n \n \nDescribing the electoral process itself\, Zaccara said that the voting system implemented in Iran in unique: there is no official registration of number of voters; the percentage of voters is calculated on a population census; and citizens can cast their vote in any polling station in the country. All these factors make it difficult for researchers and officials who study voting patterns to determine the exact proportion and geographic location of voters. Because of these unusual factors\, many international observers believed that the results of the 2009 elections were fabricated. However\, he said\, keeping in mind the way in which the electoral framework is implemented in Iran\, the history of result publication proves that these kinds of numbers are indeed possible. Zaccara added that a further difficulty for researchers is to compare election results over the years as the official information provided is not always consistent. \n \n \nDuring the 2013 elections\, 675 candidates were officially registered\, but only eight made it through the strict criteria to enter the final stages of the elections. Of these\, Rohani won the most votes and inaugurated his term as president on August 3\, 2013. The week before the elections\, Rohani had less than 10 percent of voting intention. However\, the day after a key debate where he emphasized the importance of foreign policy\, his popularity increased sharply indicating public interest in moving away from the isolationist policies of his predecessor. As a further indicator of the public’s desire for a new type of leadership\, he received only 39 percent of votes obtained in Qom\, which is considered the center of Shi’a religious clergy\, while in peripheral provinces such as Sistan-Baluchistan Rohani obtained more than 73 percent of the vote. In Tehran\, the most important and populated district he obtained 48 percent. \n \n \nIn conclusion\, Zaccara argued that\, on the domestic side\, the most recent elections in Iran provided a re-legitimation of the political system and a recuperation of the population’s trust after the events of 2009. “My hypothesis around the results is that the popular support towards a particular candidate is not ideological\, but highly circumstantial\,” he said. On the international front\, the elections have helped in the slow recovery of trust and opening up dialogue between Iran and the rest of the world. \n \n \nLuciano Zaccara is the director of the OPEMAM-Observatory on Politics and Elections in the Muslim and Arab World\, and an Honorary Research Fellow at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies\, University of Exeter. His previous positions include a postdoctoral fellowship at Institute of International Studies\, Autónoma University of Barcelona\, and several research fellowships at the Department of Arab and Islamic Studies\, Autónoma University of Madrid. He holds a Ph.D. in Arab and Islamic Studies from Autónoma University of Madrid and a BA in Political Science from the National University of Rosario in Argentina. His publications include the monograph El Enigma de Irán (2006)\, and the co-edited book Elecciones sin Elección. Procesos Electorales en Medio Oriente y Magreb (2009)\, as well as many articles on Middle East domestic and international politics\, and mainly on Iranian politics and elections.  \n \n \nArticle by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications. 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/luciano-zaccara-on-the-iranian-elections/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Distingushed Lectures,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20130913T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20130913T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T002519
CREATED:20140915T050727Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T104205Z
UID:10000874-1379059200-1379095200@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:AUB-CIRS Host Panel on Knowledge Translation
DESCRIPTION:The Consortium of Arab Policy Research Institutes (CAPRI) at the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs (IFI) and the Center on Knowledge-to-Policy for Health at AUB collaborated with CIRS to host a workshop on September 12\, 2013\, entitled “Knowledge Translation: Bridging the Gap between Research and Policy II”. This one-day event brought together academics\, representatives from research institutes\, policy analysts\, and advocates from around the region to understand the linkage between knowledge production and policy making in the Arab world. \n \n \nMultiple research centers and particularly policy research institutes (PRIs) have emerged throughout the Middle East in the recent years. In addition to independent institutions\, several universities have become more research oriented in acknowledgement of the value of knowledge production and its vital contribution to innovation and evidence-based advocacy. Moreover\, experts at the Center on Knowledge-to-Policy for Health at AUB noted that the incentive system of research in the region is evolving\, so that research centers and universities are increasingly engaging in areas of inquiry that are policy relevant. Since the majority of policy research institutes in the region are still in their nascent stages\, they face some significant challenges. For one\, the receptivity of policy makers to researchers remains limited as they rarely create spaces for utilizing research evidence in their policy making process. Secondly\, local research in Arab countries is perceived to have limited credibility\, and regional government officials continue to heavily rely on international consultants. Recommendations to alleviate those challenges were provided by experts at IFI\, suggesting that first\, research centers should develop credibility in a certain area over a number of years\, and second\, researchers should interact with state officials and policymakers in order to better understand their needs and keep them informed on their own research output. \n \n \nWith the presence of over 240 PRIs in the region\, institutes such as CAPRI are identifying ways of strengthening the outreach and communication strategies of research centers in order to enhance their efficacy in impacting policy. Workshop participants presented both their experiences in linking research with advocacy to influence policy change. In the case of theTobacco Free Initiative in Lebanon\, for example\, civil society organizations worked with researchers at AUB to achieve two goals. First\, they mobilized the public by transmitting information on the dangers of public smoking and second they augmented their advocacy to policy makers by informing them of the level of support within their voting constituency for policy change. During this process\, it was highlighted that research needs to be repackaged and transformed into something that is easily communicated in order to increase its receptivity. The media was identified as a vital intermediary between activists and their target audience\, both in mobilizing support from citizens and in influencing policy makers to achieve change. \n \n \nAlthough the Tobacco Free Initiative in Lebanon presents a success story\, it was recognized by the workshop participants that in other political settings different tactics need to be utilized. In more autocratic Arab countries where votes cannot be used as leverage\, policy advocates face the challenge of identifying means by which they can influence policy makers. Moreover\, while the media is a vital force in fostering change in some societies\, its utilization by activists in other countries may backfire. It was noted that in some states\, policymakers and members of the ruling regime may view this public form of policy advocacy negatively\, and take it as an attempt to destabilize the state. Thus\, in more autocratic settings\, policy makers fear setting the precedent whereby the media can drive policy\, and have accordingly resisted publicly communicated policy changes. Another point of departure from the Lebanese case study is the limited presence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or civil society organizations (CSOs) in other countries around the Middle East. As discussed during the workshop\, this has two major implications on linking knowledge production to policymaking. First\, policy advocacy transforms into a top-down process\, whereby activists introduce the initiatives to those in power rather than attempting to mobilize people behind their cause. Secondly\, with the limited presence of CSOs\, researchers are left with the task of producing research\, disseminating knowledge\, formulating evidence-based policy\, and engaging in policy advocacy. The latter directly falls in line with the new evolving role of researchers and universities that are increasingly reaching out to decision makers and affecting policy. Participants in the workshop concluded that while building the capacity of researchers to repackage knowledge for the policy world is a technical process\, developing a culture that is conducive to research-based policy requires social and political buy-in. \n \n \n\nSee the workshop schedule \nRead participant biographies\n\n \nArticle by Dwaa Osman\, Research Analyst at CIRS​
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/aub-cirs-host-panel-knowledge-translation/
CATEGORIES:Panels,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20130909T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20130909T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T002519
CREATED:20140915T062852Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T104210Z
UID:10000790-1378713600-1378749600@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:George Naufal on the Economics of GCC Migration
DESCRIPTION:George Naufal\, Assistant Professor of Economics at the American University of Sharjah and a ‎research fellow at the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)\, delivered a CIRS Monthly ‎Dialogue lecture titled\, “The Economics of Migration in the Gulf Cooperation Council ‎Countries” on September 9\, 2013. The lecture mapped the history of non-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Arab workers ‎migrating to GCC states\, and explained how and why there were ‎such dramatic changes to these migration patterns since the 1970s. \n \n \nNaufal elaborated upon the history of labor migration to the GCC states in order to explain why ‎these countries became a uniquely attractive destination for large numbers of foreign laborers. The ‎chief factor turning the region into a hub of temporary economic migration was the discovery of ‎large oil and natural gas reserves in the early twentieth century. Decades after the discovery of ‎hydrocarbon reserves\, during the time of the oil embargo of the 1970s\, Naufal explained that ‎‎“the GCC countries—Saudi Arabia first—received the largest transfer of wealth in human ‎history.” Because the local populations were small in number and inexperienced\, there was a dire ‎need to import foreign labor in order to fully exploit the nascent industry. Naufal recounted that ‎‎“in 1981\, when the GCC was formed\, the population was around 15 million” people living on a ‎relatively vast amount of land. As the growth of the hydrocarbon industry accelerated\, this in ‎turn led to increased economic growth and related development projects\, which required even ‎more labor power. “The ultimate goal was to develop and develop fast\, and the best way to do so ‎is to bring labor\,” he added. ‎ \n \n \nOwing to geographical proximity as well as shared language\, culture\, and religion\, “it was the ‎non-GCC Arabs who came first in the ‘70s and the ‘80s” as migrant workers to the GCC states. ‎However\, this influx was gradually capped in the mid-1980s when GCC governments realized that ‎the Arab migrant workers posed a disruptive threat by introducing their own domestic religious ‎and political ideologies\, which were not always welcome in the region. Naufal cited the first Gulf war as ‎‎“a structural break in the nationality\, or the source of workers\,” to the GCC. During this time\, ‎citizens of Middle East countries that supported Iraq were deported en mass from GCC states. ‎ \n \n \nThe large numbers of non-GCC Arab migrant laborers were replaced with Asian and South Asian ‎workers. Naufal argued that “the estimates put the non-GCC Arabs in the ‘70s to be around 70 ‎percent of the labor force and the Asians less than 20 percent.” These figures were almost exactly ‎reversed in 2005. GCC policymakers found that the Asian workers were economically beneficial ‎as they would work more for less pay\, and there was also less chance that they would be ‎politically\, religiously\, or ideologically influential. ‎ \n \n \nThe determinants of migration to the Gulf are the results of push and pull factors that are ‎international and domestic according to the needs of both the sending and receiving countries. ‎On their part\, South Asian and South East Asian laborers traveled to the GCC to escape ‎unemployment and poor standards of living in their home countries. “In comparison\, in 2010\, the ‎standard of living in Qatar\, measured by income per capita\, was 23 times that of Sri Lanka\, 35 ‎times that of Yemen\, 50 times that of Sudan\, and 70 times that of Bangladesh.” Naufal noted ‎that these macro-economic measurements translate on a micro personal level: “if you were an ‎Egyptian farmer in the ‘70s\, and you came to Saudi Arabia\, you made 30 times your salary. In ‎the 80s\, if you were a school teacher in Egypt\, you made 20 times your salary. In the 90s\, if you ‎were a Jordanian engineer\, you tripled your income by moving to Kuwait.” ‎ \n \n \nNaufal also explored the remittances phenomenon from the Gulf\, which “are much less volatile ‎and much more stable than foreign direct investment and foreign aid.” During the global ‎economic crisis\, remittances from the GCC remained strong\, “basically\, one fourth or one fifth of ‎remittances in the world comes from the GCC\,” he added. Pointing out the direct correlation ‎between GCC labor policies and the growth and development of labor sending countries that ‎receive direct remitted capital\, Naufal commented that Middle East countries have thus missed ‎out on potential investments and wealth that has been redirected to Asian countries. ‎ \n \n \nSimilarly\, he noted the direct correlation between geopolitical events and GCC labor policies. ‎Because of the volatility of many Middle East countries\, the GCC states are especially attractive ‎as a migration destination to the populations of neighboring Arab countries. Naufal argued that ‎‎“since World War II\, before the Arab Spring\, up until 2010\, the Middle East has had 28 serious ‎conflicts.” Conflicts result in high unemployment rates and a lack of job opportunities\, which for ‎a large youthful population spell serious future challenges. To this end\, he proposed that GCC ‎labor policies could have partially alleviated some of the employment stresses that resulted in the ‎Arab uprisings. ‎ \n \n \nIn conclusion\, Naufal noted the future challenges to the GCC labor market. “The GCC countries ‎were able to create\, in the last ten years\, 7 million jobs—that’s almost one million jobs a year\,” he ‎said. However\, job creation matters less than ensuring that the local population enters fully into ‎the labor market. Currently\, unemployment rates are extremely high for local GCC populations ‎who either refuse unattractive jobs\, or cannot compete with more experienced foreign workers. ‎‎“Countries in the Gulf have to think about what will happen to the price of oil and if at some ‎point they will be able to balance their budget\,” Naufal commented. In order to offset these ‎worries\, some GCC governments have begun diversifying their economies and investing heavily ‎in education to give the local populations a competitive advantage in any future labor market. ‎ \n \n \nGeorge Naufal has a Ph.D. in Economics from Texas A&M University. His primary research ‎includes migration and its consequences\, mainly the impact of remittances on the remitting ‎countries. Naufal’s research has focused mostly on the Middle East and North Africa region with ‎an emphasis on the Gulf countries. He is the co-author of Expats and the Labor Force: The Story ‎of the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries (Palgrave Macmillan\, 2012). His work has been cited ‎by regional and international media outlets including The National\, Gulf News\, and the New York ‎Times. Professor Naufal has served as a consultant on issues related to the Middle East. \n \n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications.
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/george-naufal-economics-gcc-migration/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Distingushed Lectures,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20130907T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20130908T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T002519
CREATED:20140915T005752Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T104215Z
UID:10000872-1378540800-1378663200@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Arab Migrant Communities in the GCC Working Group I
DESCRIPTION:On September 7–8\, 2013\, CIRS held a two-day working group to discuss\, amongst other things\, the economic and political push and pull factors of Arab migration to the region\, the historical migration trajectory\, the current conditions and varied experiences of Arab expatriates residing and working in the Gulf\, as well as future trends in regional migration. Along with the five teams of research grant awardees\, who updated the group on their ongoing research and preliminary findings\, the working group participants consisted of a cohort of experts and scholars. In contrast to the burgeoning literature on Asian immigrants in the Gulf\, Arab migration to the region has been a neglected area of study. In order to fill this gap\, in early 2013 CIRS launched a grant-based research initiative on “Arab Migrant Communities in the GCC.” Five grant proposals were awarded to scholars to conduct fieldwork and original research on various topics related to Arab migration in the region. \n \n \nThe advent of the Gulf oil economy in the 1950s brought with it an influx of migrants\, initially predominantly from the Arab world. As the literature documents\, the stocks and flows of regional migration have altered throughout the years\, with the first Gulf War demonstrating a break in the inflow of Arabs and a dramatic increase in the import of an Asian work force. Viewed as more politicized in comparison to their Asian and Western counterparts\, Arab migrants in the GCC have historically been impacted by the geo-political atmosphere. In light of the recent uprisings throughout the region\, and more specifically in recognition of the political consciousness of Arab youth\, the participants discussed the significance of assessing perceptions of the Arab Uprisings amongst non-local students in the GCC. The attitudes of foreign students towards political and social change taking place in the region has significant implications for future policies related to labor and migration. While perceptions embedded in historical events or narratives impact the governance of migration\, they too influence the relations between the locals and the expatriate Arab. Mapping the historical-political consequences of the first Gulf War and more recently the Arab Uprisings provides a lens to assess how certain Gulf States have negotiated their tenuous relationship with their migrant Arab communities. Based on the historical context\, different generations of Palestinians in the UAE for example\, have exhibited varying experiences of cross-nationality interaction\, different degrees of willingness to engage on political issues\, and most substantially\, diverse levels of success in their ability to obtain Gulf citizenship. \n \n \nUnderlying the politics of migration\, the notion of impermanence and temporariness in relation to the “transient foreigner” was repeatedly discussed throughout the two-day working group. As participants pointed out\, the “temporariness of migration” in the Gulf states\, particularly as it relates to Arab migrants\, is an indication more so of their political and social status rather than the duration of their stay in the region. Several nationalities of Arab origin have resided within the GCC for decades\, resulting in a significant proportion of second and third generation GCC-born Arab expatriates. While limited pathways to citizenship have policy makers categorizing migrants as “temporary\,” numerous long-standing migrant communities of various Arab origins have carved out a more permanent presence within the GCC. \n \n \nAs the dominant Arab nationality throughout the GCC\, Egyptians have permeated a range of economic sectors and are generally considered to be the most diverse Arab expatriate community within the Gulf states. The diversity of the Egyptian community in certain states such as Kuwait is manifested in the demographically based socio-spatial and geographic distribution of Egyptians throughout the city. The diverse experiences and socio-economic statuses of Egyptians provide a valuable foundation for the analysis of “bonding capital” within the Egyptian community as well as “bridging capital” with the host community. Moreover\, as Egyptians in Kuwait constitute the second largest source of remittances to Egypt\, their impact on homeland development is substantial. While most studies focus on the micro-level impact of remittances at the household level\, experts discussed the need to assess its impact on macro-level development and particularly how it affects the home country’s investment climate. \n \n \nWhile most Arab migrants have traditionally migrated to North America and Europe\, they are increasingly choosing the GCC as a destination despite limited pathways to integration and citizenship. For instance\, the number of high-skilled Lebanese immigrants in Kuwait has exponentially increased in recent years. While assessing the push factors of Lebanese emigration to Kuwait\, participants identified the limited size and prospects of the Lebanese labor market\, along with issues of clientalism and corruption as major drivers of emigration. In addition to economic and political push factors of Arab migration\, a deteriorating “quality of life” in some home countries have led migrants to seek employment in Gulf cities\, which are characterized by high growth\, sound infrastructure\, and the accessibility of public goods. An increase in Jordanian female immigration to the Gulf suggests that the rising age of marriage\, the geographic proximity of the GCC\, the availability of job opportunities\, and the “comfortable lifestyle” offered have made this region the ideal destination for Arab female migrants. Moreover\, within certain sectors of the GCC labor market\, there appears to be a level of dependency on Arab workers\, most notably due to the shared Arabic language with the host country. Arab teachers\, for instance\, are a unique part of the labor force in the Gulf\, in that they cannot easily be replaced by Asians or Westerners. While the pull-factors to the GCC may outweigh the status of impermanence its migrants face\, Arab workers nonetheless accommodate their temporariness into their risk and decision-making process. Impermanent contracts affect the behavior of workers as manifested in their tendency to invest in the present rather any future-related endeavors. \n \n \nInvestigating intergroup-relations and particularly the relationship between Arab workers and GCC employers within the workplace was also discussed as a point of interest. In certain sectors\, there is a “privileging” of Arab workers and assessing opportunities or barriers to promotion and professional development in the Gulf is of importance. In addition to standard workplace relations\, the relationship between Hadrami migrants and their Kuwaiti employers is unique in comparison to other Arab expatriate experiences. Since the start of their migration to Kuwait in the early 1950s\, Hadramis were quickly absorbed into the domestic services sector. Throughout the decades\, a culture of dependency developed between Hadramis and their mo’azib (Kuwaiti sponsor and employer) where immigrants and their sons work for the same household for decades. What is exemplary in this relationship in comparison to other workplace relations is the inherent hierarchy and enduring commitment to the mo’azib that eliminates any possibility of competition with the locals. In comparison with other Arab immigrants that characteristically tend to be economically valued\, Hadramis are symbolically valued in the Kuwaiti community. These differences in the experiences of Arab migrants based on historical context and nationality offer a nuanced understanding on the evolving conditions of expatriates and the dynamics of migration in the Gulf. \n \n \n\nFor the working group agenda\, click here\nFor the participants’ biographies\, click here\nRead more about this research initiative\n\n \n  \n \n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nAbdullah M. Alajmi\, Arab Open University\nMohammed Al-Waqfi\, United Arab Emirates University\nHeba Arafa\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nNerida Child Dimasi\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nFrançoise De Bel-Air\, Institut français du Proche-Orient (IFPO)\nIsmail H. Genc\, American University of Sharjah\nBarb Gillis\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nManal A. Jamal\, James Madison University\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nSulayman Khalaf\, Abu Dhabi Tourism and Culture Authority\nGarret Maher\, Gulf University for Science and Technology\nSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nHeba Nassar\, American University in Cairo\nGeorge Naufal\, American University of Sharjah\nMichael Newson\, International Organization for Migration\nGwenn Okruhlik\, Middle East Institute – National University of Singapore\nDwaa Osman\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nNatasha Ridge\, Sheikh Saud bin Saqr Al Qasimi Foundation for Policy Research\nGanesh Seshan\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nNasra Shah\, Kuwait University\nNada Soudy\, Carnegie Mellon University in Qatar\nPaul Tacon\, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia\nAbbie Taylor\, ISIM – Georgetown University\nLuciano Zaccara\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\n\n \n​ \n \n \nArticle by Dwaa Osman\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/arab-migrant-communities-gcc-working-group-i/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20130605T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20130605T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T002519
CREATED:20140915T052405Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T104227Z
UID:10000877-1370419200-1370455200@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Women's Studies Circle Discuss Convention to Eliminate Discrimination against Women
DESCRIPTION:The Women’s Studies Circle made up of members from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar and Qatar University\, led a Focused Discussion supported by CIRS on June 5\, 2013. The discussion was moderated by Hatoon Al-Fassi\, a women’s rights activist and historian teaching at Qatar University. During the discussion\, a group of women from various academic and professional backgrounds discussed Qatar’s ratification of the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). The group focused specifically on Qatar’s reservations to CEDAW and its implications on gender equality. 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/womens-studies-circle-discuss-convention-eliminate-discrimination-against-women/
CATEGORIES:Panels,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20130518T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20130519T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T002519
CREATED:20140924T155843Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T104232Z
UID:10000798-1368900000-1368986400@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Weak States in the Greater Middle East Working Group II
DESCRIPTION:On May 18–19 2013\, CIRS held a second working group to conclude its research initiative on “Weak States in the Greater Middle East.” Participants met in Washington D.C. to discuss individual paper submissions that collectively scrutinize the prevailing weak states discourse in the region. Through thematic topics and specific case studies\, scholars employed a multi-disciplinary approach to assess historical\, political\, economic\, and social causes and consequences of state “fragility” within the broader Middle East. \n \n \nThe participants began by discussing the typology and characterization of governance indexes that construct a continuum of state strength based on a state’s ability to deliver baskets of political goods to its citizenry. These indicators seek to diagnose governance outcomes that are theoretically based on the Westphalian concept of the nation-state. However\, while examining the dynamic domestic and regional conditions of the Middle East\, participants questioned the normative premise of indices that disregard statehood and state-building as ongoing processes. During the discussion on defining “hollow-strong” states\, the limitations of monolithic conceptions of governance as compared to the significance of power struggles that lead to weak governance structures was highlighted. \n \n \nWhile indicators of grievances are undoubtedly evident in certain countries in the Middle East\, infusing these signs of governance weakness with a sense of history gives a much more nuanced understanding of current political predicaments facing the state. The categorization of states by donor agencies and foreign policy makers often elides the historical rootedness of contemporary governance structures. \n \n \nUnderstanding how leaders in the region maintained power for decades in the post-independence period provides greater insight to conceptualizing the relationship between regime type and governance outcomes. For instance\, while the Sudanese nation-state has increasingly disintegrated in the recent decades\, President Bashir and members of the local and regional ruling elite have maintained cohesion and allegiance via a modernized patronage system within the political market place. However\, this political oligarchy is constantly evolving and may become increasingly unstable as the ruling elite’s “political budget” dwindles in the face of a failed Islamist national project and diminishing financial revenues. Libya’s Qaddafi was also plagued by divisive patronage politics that inadvertently marginalized certain tribes\, ethnicities\, and geographical areas. In the post-Qaddafi period\, Libyans are grappling with issues of exclusion and reconciliation of groups that were affiliated with the regime as they move through a transitional period that seeks to create a new political order. Following the uprisings and fall of dictators\, the transitional period and ensuing instability in countries such as Egypt and Tunisia also highlights how the democratization process may endanger effective governance outcomes. \n \n \nWhile historical context and colonial legacy provide a more nuanced understanding of how certain regimes have attained and sustained power\, it also highlights how these power struggles have accordingly created weak governance structures. Institution building in the case of Palestine has largely been dictated by a constellation of factors: building institutions that serve Israel’s colonial interests as well as Palestinian interests; being a rentier-type state; and the consolidation of personalistic politics of the ruling elite at the expense of institution building in Palestine. \n \n \nMuch like Sudan\, Libya\, and Palestine’s historically rooted political trajectory\, participants highlighted the significance of understanding the political foundations of Yemen’s institutions. The Yemeni civil war (1962–1970) and the fall of the Imamate granted Yemen’s tribal sheikhdoms unprecedented power. While the political field was also dominated by the military and merchants connected to the military and the state\, the prominence of the tribal sheikhs has remained a persistent factor in determining the stability of the Yemeni state. Additionally\, Yemen’s domestic political landscape has been intruded upon by Saudi Arabia in order to secure its own strategic interests. The recent GCC agreement pushed forth by regional and international powers such as Saudi Arabia and the U.S. in the aftermath of the uprisings in Yemen\, has reinforced Yemen’s prevailing governance style\, and has therefore undermined state building efforts. Thus\, external actors are also directly implicated in structuring the governance of the Yemeni state\, where their level of support for state-building efforts is determined by their own geopolitical interests. \n \n \nThe role of external elements in determining domestic stability is not unique to the case of Yemen. In the Levant\, the Syrian crisis has illuminated Lebanon’s vulnerabilities to geopolitical currents. Sectarian elites and parties\, and specifically Hezbollah\, have emerged as strong political actors within Lebanon that have formulated their own foreign policy strategies. This has essentially opened up Lebanon as a political battlefield of geopolitical agendas. \n \n \nIn addition regional political dynamics\, interactions and contributions of diasporas to their home states also have implications on state building or rebuilding. While it is not possible to generalize how diasporas may impact developments back home\, scholars discussed the role of remittances and voting from abroad and how these relate to the security\, capacity\, and legitimacy of the home state in specific cases. \n \n \nThe significant role of donor agencies in development further highlights that state-formation is impacted by global agendas. The absorptive capacity and relationship between quantity of aid and aid effectiveness in states with weak institutions was also addressed by working group members. Gaps in state capacity and state willingness to provide for marginalized areas or groups have created pockets of NGO intervention in states within the broader Middle East. The marginalization and social exclusion of women in Sudan and Pakistan have led both local and international NGOs alike to deliver development projects\, such as micro-finance initiatives\, towards the economic empowerment of women. While these interventions specifically target the economic sphere\, their implementation may hinder or propel women’s political and social inclusion depending on the local context. \n \n \nBeyond absolute development needs\, it is evident that geopolitical dynamics determine both the quantity and quality of aid a country receives. For instance\, the presence of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula within Yemen’s borders and the consequent perpetual politicization of Yemen’s classification as a weak or failing state\, has dictated USAID’s strategy towards Yemen. USAID’s state-centric development approach for resolving conflict\, elides local nuances and perceptions of the Yemeni central government\, existing traditional legal norms\, and embedded blockages to reform within the government. These faulty stabilization intervention efforts may result in un-intended consequences—including increasing anti-western sentiments within Yemen. \n \n \nParallel to Yemen\, interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have sought to narrow the subnational space of governance in Iraq and Afghanistan. Cities of the global South have increasingly been framed in a securitized manner\, as loci for political violence and contestation. Thus\, at the expense of fomenting democratic pluralism at the subnational level\, intervening powers have prioritized elections at the national level in an attempt to attain and maintain political stability that is conducive to their military intervention interests. \n \n \nThese individual chapters that seek to challenge and critically analyze the causes and consequences of state “fragility” will be compiled into an edited volume on Weak States in the Greater Middle East (Oxford University Press/Hurst\, 2016). \n \n \n  \n \n \n\nClick here for the working group’s agenda\nClick here for the participants’ biographies\nRead more about this research initiative \n\n \nParticipants and Discussants:\n \nRogaia M. Abusharaf\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarLaurie Brand\, University of Southern CaliforniaMatt Buehler\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarAlex de Waal\, Tufts UniversityDaniel Esser\, American UniversityMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarMark McGillivray\, Deakin UniversityShoghig Mikaelian\, Concordia UniversityDwaa Osman\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarSarah Phillips\, University of SydneyGlenn E. Robinson\, Naval Postgraduate SchoolRobert I. Rotberg\, University of WaterlooBassel Salloukh\, Lebanese American UniversityCharles Schmitz\, Towson UniversityNadia Talpur\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarFrederic Wehrey\, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace  \n \n \n\nRead about the first working group	 \n\n \nArticle by Dwaa Osman\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/weak-states-greater-middle-east-working-group-ii/
CATEGORIES:American Studies,Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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