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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20150113T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20150113T190000
DTSTAMP:20260405T000447
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SUMMARY:CIRS Presents Abdullah Al-Arian's New Book on the Muslim Brotherhood
DESCRIPTION:On Tuesday\, January 13\, 2015\, CIRS hosted a book launch and reading by Abdullah Al-Arian\, Assistant Professor of History at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar. Answering the Call: Popular Islamic Activism in Sadat’s Egypt\, published by Oxford University Press in 2014\, “examines the means by which the Muslim Brotherhood was reconstituted during Anwar al-Sadat’s presidency. Through analysis of structural\, ideological\, and social developments during this period in the history of the Islamic movement\, a more accurate picture of the so-called ‘Islamic resurgence’ develops-one that represents the rebirth of an old idea in a new setting. \n \n \nWhen revolutionary hero Gamal Abdel Nasser dismantled and suppressed Egypt’s largest social movement organization during the 1950s\, few could have imagined that the Muslim Brotherhood would not only reemerge\, but could one day compete for the presidency in the nation’s first ever democratic election. While there is no shortage of analyses of the Muslim Brotherhood’s recent political successes and failures\, no study has investigated the organization’s triumphant return from the dustbin of history. \n \n \nThe Muslim Brotherhood’s success in rebuilding its organization rested in large part on its ability to attract a new generation of Islamic activists that had come to transform Egypt’s colleges and universities into a hub for religious contention against the state. Led by groups such as al-Gama’ah al-Islamiyyah (The Islamic Society)\, the student movement exhibited a dynamic and vibrant culture of activism that found inspiration in a multitude of intellectual and organizational sources\, of which the Muslim Brotherhood was only one. \n \n \nBy the close of the 1970s\, however\, internal divisions over ideology and strategy led to the rise of factionalism within the student movement. A majority of student leaders opted to expand the scope of their activist mission by joining the Muslim Brotherhood\, rejuvenating the struggling organization\, and launching a new phase in its history. \n \n \nAnswering the Call is an original study of the history of this dynamic and vibrant period of modern Egyptian history\, giving readers a fresh understanding of one of Egypt’s most pivotal eras.” Read more from Oxford University Press. \n \n \nAbdullah Al-Arian received his doctorate in History from Georgetown University. He holds a Master’s degree in Sociology of Religion from the London School of Economics and his BA in Political Science from Duke University. He is co-editor of the Critical Currents in Islam page on the Jadaliyya e-zine. He is also a frequent contributor to the Al-Jazeera English network and website. His first book\, entitled Answering the Call: Popular Islamic Activism in Sadat’s Egypt was published by Oxford University Press in 2014. In fall 2014\, he was the Carnegie Centennial Visiting Fellow at the University of Denver’s Korbel School of International Studies. \n \n \n 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/cirs-presents-abdullah-al-arians-new-book-muslim-brotherhood/
CATEGORIES:CIRS Faculty Lectures,Dialogue Series,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20150110T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20150111T170000
DTSTAMP:20260405T000447
CREATED:20220929T085218Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20221005T070431Z
UID:10001476-1420880400-1420995600@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Re-Emerging West Asia Working Group I
DESCRIPTION:On January 10-11\, 2015\, CIRS held the first Working Group under its research initiative on “Re-Emerging West Asia.” Included in the meeting were academics representing the South Caucasus states of Azerbaijan\, Georgia\, and Armenia\, as well as scholars from Iran and Turkey. Over the course of two days\, the participants discussed a number of relevant issues and identified existing gaps in the literature. Topics discussed during the meeting included\, amongst other things\, the new geopolitical competition in the South Caucasus and the role of external actors\, energy diplomacy\, soft power politics\, and a variety of societal and ethnic dynamics in the region. \n\nOpening the discussion\, participants considered the changing geopolitical environment in the South Caucasus\, the rise of competition between external powers\, and the emergence of new actors. China has exhibited an increasing interest in expanding its role in the region\, an example of which can be seen in the People’s Liberation Army’s agreement with the Armenian military. In Georgia\, the Orthodox Church has been receiving Russian money\, whereby this and other engagements with civil society demonstrate an interest by Russia to shape domestic policies in its neighborhood. Pipeline politics have also encouraged political and financial connections between Turkey\, Georgia\, and Azerbaijan in influencing the regional geopolitical competition. While scholarship on the region has tended to view the North and South Caucasus as two distinct areas\, Working Group participants suggested that these regions share similar economic and political conditions. Additionally\, cross-border and transnational connections such as the Lezgian population in southern Dagestan and northern Azerbaijan continue to draw the involvement of external actors like Russia. \n\nBetween the Persian Gulf states\, the Middle East\, and the Southern Caucasus\, economic factors and regional crises may provide comparative points for academic consideration. Comparisons can be drawn between the rentier dynamics in Azerbaijan and the Gulf states. Similarities in governance have also led scholars to speculate whether an event similar to the Arab Spring could take place in Armenia and Azerbaijan. However\, one should be cautious when assuming too much similarity between these two regions\, as the historical influences shaping their political pathways have been quite distinct. On the issue of religion and ethnicity\, Azerbaijan views “Muslim identity” as a threat to its ethnic identity whereby in the case of Georgia\, religiousness emerged as a countermovement to Sovietism. \n\nSuch sentiments have allowed movements such as the Gulen schools in Central Asia and the South Caucasus states to flourish in receptive societies. Fethullah Gulen’s Islamic movement became active in the 1980s when Turkey entered its liberal economic phase. In 1992\, shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union\, Gulen-inspired businessmen and teachers opened their first school in Azerbaijan followed by another in Kazakhstan. The opening of such schools came at a time when several Central Asian and South Caucasus states had a dire need for better quality education\, which the secular curriculum of the Gulen schools provided. Prior\, to the demise of the Gulen movement’s relationship with the AK party in Turkey\, Turkish foreign policy was aligned with Gulen’s vision\, perceiving of it as one of the best representations of Turkish soft power in the region. The schools led to the creation of an elite community that was proficient in Turkish and sympathetic to a moderate Islamic ideology\, creating significant educational and societal connections between the two regions. \n\nConventionally\, Turkey’s shift in foreign policy in regards to soft power has focused on the AKP’s engagement of state and non-state actors in the Balkans and the broader Middle East. Little is mentioned in soft power literature that focuses on Turkey’s soft power activities in the South Caucasus. Another research gap is that while there are many studies focusing on soft power and non-state actors\, more work needs to look at state actors’ effect on soft power. Such studies should focus on the construction of foreign policy narratives\, political values and cultural exchanges. Moreover\, the subjects of soft power should be better studied in terms of their attraction to soft power\, the limitations soft power holds and the relationship between soft and hard power. Participants problematized the difficulty in studying Turkey’s soft power in the South Caucasus considering the differences that exist from one country to another. For instance\, there has been a level of resistance to Turkish soft power in Central Asia due to the Islamic undertones it holds. \n\nIn terms of hard power\, Turkey utilized its role as an energy transit state to sell gas to European markets. Discussant argued that Turkey’s centrality and its geopolitical position as an energy hub has led it to have a more streamlined trading philosophy. Yet\, one of the main components of an energy hub requires it to have an open and well-regulated market\, something that the AKP party struggles with considering their strong emphasis on trade centrality. Energy was also used a political tool in Azerbaijan and Georgia. In the 1990s\, the major goal for energy diplomacy was the implementation of pro-western policies and the consolidation and promotion of support for the regime\, a strategy that was only successful up until the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Participants outlined several emerging trends that needed further study\, such as Azerbaijan’s economic relationship with East Asia\, the possibility of supplying energy to Iran and Iraq and future transit options for the South Caucasus with the newly proposed Nabucco pipeline. \n\nDiscussants observed that US policy towards regional development in the South Caucasus has deprived Iran from playing its natural role in the region and expanding its interaction with neighboring states. Based on the developments that took place after the formation of the Islamic Republic\, we can see different discourses in Iranian foreign policy towards the Caucasus and mutual perceptions that arise from both the Iranian and Azerbaijani sides. From an Iranian viewpoint\, the lesson that was learnt from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is that without the engagement of Russia\, security issues can rarely be solved. After the collapse of the Soviet Union\, despite the common culture and mutual past shared between Iran and Azerbaijan\, relations between the two countries have remained strained over the situation of Azeris in Iran. The Azeris constitute a significant part of the population in Iran\, however Azeri ethnic identity and the use of Azeri language\, alongside other ethnic languages\, has not been taught or practiced in schools in Iran. In return\, the Azerbaijani state has counteracted these efforts by embarking on a historical mission to create a national awakening in order to understand their identity and embrace their independence from Iran. Discussants questioned to what extent is the salience of the Iranian-Azeri relationship contingent on the political relations\, considering that the ethnic dimension only reappears when relations become strained between the two countries. \n\nIn the case of the South Caucasus states\, post-Soviet Armenia has been characterized by crime and corruption which have allowed a few businesses to gain exorbitant amounts of power. These oligarchs are closely linked to the state. Selected individuals and companies act as ‘commodity-based cartels’\, controlling the export and import rights for key products such as sugar\, oil\, alcohol and cigarettes. In return these oligarchs deliver to the state assured ballots and votes. Trade embargoes and closed borders have allowed for the corruption of Armenia’s economy and the strengthened the dominance of the oligarchs. Discussants observed that oligarchs in Armenia enter parliament for status and immunity\, not understanding the potential power they may have in drafting legislation or by impeding the law. Moreover\, more scholarly interest should focus on comparisons of Georgia and Armenia considering their similar variables but radically different political reform strategies. \n\n\nSee the working group agenda\n\n\n\nRead participant biographies\n\n\n\nRead more about this research initiative \n\n\n  \n\nParticipants and Discussants: \n\n\nHamid Ahmadi\, Institute for Middle East Strategic Studies\n\n\n\nHaya Al Noaimi\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\n\n\n\nLeila Alieva\, University of Oxford\n\n\n\nMeliha Benli Altunışık\, Middle East Technical University\n\n\n\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\n\n\n\nBayram Balci\, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace\n\n\n\nMichael B. Bishku\, Georgia Regents University\n\n\n\nRichard Giragosian\, Regional Studies Center\n\n\n\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\n\n\n\nElaheh Koolaee\, University of Tehran\n\n\n\nAlexander Kupatadze\, University of St Andrews\n\n\n\nJeffrey Mankoff\, Center for Strategic and International Studies\n\n\n\nDionysis Markakis\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\n\n\n\nSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\n\n\n\nElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\n\n\n\nGareth Winrow\, Independent Research Analyst and Consultant\n\n\n  \n\nArticle by Haya Al-Noaimi\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/re-emerging-west-asia-working-group-i/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20141201T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20141201T190000
DTSTAMP:20260405T000447
CREATED:20141123T104906Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T115753Z
UID:10001028-1417456800-1417460400@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Neha Vora on "Impossible Citizens: Dubai's Indian Diaspora"
DESCRIPTION:On December 1\, 2014\, Neha Vora\, Assistant Professor of Anthropology at Lafayette College\, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue on the topic “Impossible Citizens: Dubai’s Indian Diaspora.” Much of the research she conducted was during the “boom” years of Dubai’s economic growth\, when “Brand Dubai” was establishing the city as a commercial and tourism hub to attract international attention and investment. During this period\, “the landscape of Dubai was shifting drastically […] moving away from the older South-Asian dominated downtown neighborhoods around the Dubai Creek […] and away from older forms of mercantalism and maritime trade\,” towards a more corporate\, westernized\, and multinational capitalist enterprise. \n \n \nThe thrust of Vora’s research questioned the paradox of how the middle-class Indian communities of Dubai have a strong sense of belonging even though there are no certain paths to citizenship or permanent residence. “Indians have practically zero access to any form of permanency in Dubai. They cannot naturalize\, or even gain permanent residency” due to the Kafala system that ties people to their employment visas and sponsors\, Vora explained. Such a sense of belonging\, she argued\, occurs through “substantive\,” or “unofficial” ideas of community that are not based on the technicalities of citizenship\, but\, rather on strong senses of historical and cultural affiliation. Because of the historical mercantile and cultural connections\, many Indians see the Gulf states as an extension of India and not necessarily as a separate geographical and cultural entity. Indians in Dubai have access to the familiar signs of home including language\, food\, clothing\, and cultural practices and trends.  \n \n \nDebunking the idea that migrants to the Gulf desire assimilation and citizenship\, Vora argued that many of the middle-class Indian residents of Dubai see themselves as having temporary economic goals\, which\, once achieved\, signal their return to the homeland. In an anthropological vignette\, Vora introduced the audience to Rohit\, one of her interlocutors and an architect and long-term Indian resident of Dubai. Even though he has lived for over three decades in Dubai\, and it is where his children were born and raised\, he still considers himself a temporary economic migrant. Describing Dubai as “an air-conditioned bus” that offers comfort\, but is always in transit and thus an unstable place of residence\, “Rohit in many ways exemplifies the Indian middle-class dream in Dubai. He had managed to accumulate wealth during his time in the Gulf\, had improved the living conditions of his extended and immediate family\, and was setting himself up for a comfortable retirement in India\,” Vora reported. For many middle-class Indians\, such as Rohit\, expatriation to the Gulf states is seen as a sign of status and perceived as a privilege\, but one that can be terminated at any time. Thus\, economic migrants have adapted to feeling simultaneously settled and yet always transient. \n \n \nImportantly\, the middle-class Indian business communities of Dubai see themselves as actively contributing to local economic development and distinguish themselves from others who depend on state “welfare\,” be they low-income South Asian laborers\, Western expatriate professionals\, or even local national beneficiaries of state subsidies. The middle-class Indians that Vora interviewed were keen to describe themselves as economic contributors to Dubai\, and as “good self-enterprising foreign residents of the city\, not bad welfare-reliant citizens\,” she said. \n \n \nHowever\, despite many describing themselves as purely economic migrants with no desire for ties to the state\, the majority of Indian businesspeople and professionals do in fact actively contribute to\, and replicate state policies. “Middle-class and elite South Asians\, for example\, espoused certain neoliberal market values and liberal ideas about citizenship\, while participating in non-liberal forms of patronage and exploitation that reproduce social stratification and forms of hierarchical citizenship among the Indian diaspora in Dubai\,” Vora argued. By establishing business operations and hiring workers under the Kafala system\, they actively promote UAE government’s policies by reproducing local and legal norms. \n \n \nVora concluded by explaining that even though Dubai still largely retains its South Asian character\, things are changing fast. In Dubai’s effort to modernize older Indian mercantile neighborhoods of the city\, and to attract a more “westernized” client\, “rents had gone up\, formerly lower-middle-class neighborhoods were being turned into luxury apartments\, and Indians felt less job security than ever before\,” she said. This rapidly changing environment has served to further unsettle the Indian communities that have been living and working for generations in the older areas of Dubai. \n \n \nNeha Vora’s research focuses on citizenship and belonging within the Gulf Arab states\, particularly among South Asian diaspora populations. In addition to a number of journal articles\, Vora is the author of Impossible Citizens: Dubai’s Indian Diaspora\, was published in 2013 by Duke University Press. A recipient of multiple awards and fellowships\, she is currently in Doha working on a project that investigates the impacts of knowledge economy transformation and American branch campus expansion on Qatar. \n \n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/neha-vora-impossible-citizens-dubais-indian-diaspora/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20141120T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20141121T170000
DTSTAMP:20260405T000447
CREATED:20141208T125659Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T103552Z
UID:10001032-1416474000-1416589200@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Youth in the Middle East\, Working Group I
DESCRIPTION:On November 20-21\, 2014\, in partnership with the youth-oriented social initiative organization\, Silatech\, CIRS launched the “Youth in the Middle East” research initiative with a two day working group meeting. The meeting was hosted by the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS) at the Georgetown University campus in Washington\, DC\, where participants gathered from various countries of the world and from a multitude of disciplinary backgrounds. \n \n \nThe participants discussed the need for greater definition of the factors that constitute “youth” as a distinct subset of society. Although they agreed that age and maturation were the common determining characteristics of youth\, there was less consensus about the specific age ranges within which youth should be bracketed as a unit of analysis. Problematizing this further\, they discussed how “youth” as a formative stage of life can differ dramatically depending on particular cultural contexts. In some cases\, and especially for those with low or no income or those who inhabit conflict zones\, young people are often prematurely obliged to take on adult roles and responsibilities\, thus curtailing the notion of “youth” as experienced by their cohorts in other parts of the world. Rather than quantifying youth according to age brackets\, the participants argued that the notion of youth could be considered as a fluid and inconsistent network of social relations. The participants highlighted the fact that youth cannot be analyzed as a homogenous category\, but must be thought of as having a multitude of variants. \n \n \nAlthough the topic of Middle Eastern youth was discussed from different theoretical and practical lenses\, some key central themes emerged\, including the fact that\, in many instances\, youth in the Middle East tend to face tough political and economic conditions. Local national youth in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council do not necessarily share the same economic hardships as the young economic South Asian migrants in the GCC\, but they do share similar forms of political exclusion as experienced by their counterparts in other areas of the Arab world.  \n \n \nSince many countries of the Middle East are experiencing a demographic “youth bulge\,” unprecedented numbers of young people are all vying for what little resources and opportunities exist. Broader economic structural issues were discussed in relation to the sustainability of the Arab development model and its failures. Many countries of the Middle East are rentier economies that exacerbate ongoing forms of political quiescence. The events of the Arab uprisings did much to highlight the faults associated with autocratic governance\, but have not led to any major changes\, leaving young people more aware of the problems that plague their nations\, and\, thus\, ever more frustrated. \n \n \nAccess to the economic and political normative activities of society is denied to many in places where the social contract has been poorly adhered to\, if at all. Exclusion\, however\, is context dependent\, and each society fashions its own definitions of exclusion. In impoverished neighborhoods that are lacking in infrastructure and opportunities\, Middle East youth groups actively create their own forms of distinct social networks that are\, in many ways\, more intimate and reliable than those of more affluent areas. Thus\, such informal youth associations and marginal forms of participation mean that youth are not necessarily socially excluded from their immediate surroundings\, but are more likely to be economically and politically excluded from the more “formal” social structures. Such class dimensions play a role in how youth experience their lives and their aspirations for the future\, with many young people active in both formal and informal means of participation. \n \n \nWhether in the public or private sectors\, access to the privileges of the formal market is hindered crony capitalism and unfair political concessions\, giving rise to increased informal practices among many Arab youths. Autocratic leaders have been benefitting from deregulation\, even as they impose restrictions on local markets. The explosive mix of neoliberal policies and simultaneous authoritarian ones has resulted in an anti-competitive environment with little room for small and medium enterprises. This is why there are very few start-ups or entrepreneurial endeavors since there is little encouragement of creative business\, skill development\, or mobilization of human capital. Neoliberal reforms have benefitted only a small elite group of people\, and has done little to improve the lives of the majority. \n \n \nBecause the informal sector operates largely outside of the formal economy\, and is mostly extra-legal or illegal\, there has been little research conducted into these ventures\, including the gender dimension and how women fare in such environments. For the most part\, in the academic and popular literature\, youth issues tend to be viewed from the perspective of young males\, concentrating on the condition of their welfare\, education\, and employment\, with little attention directed at females and the challenges they face. \n \n \nIncreasingly\, the vacuum left by failed state structures has been steadily filled by Islamic movements in many countries of the Middle East. These mostly grassroots institutions are becoming increasingly intertwined in youth’s daily lives\, and have powerful influences on youth behavior. In order for young people to be directed towards formal channels of economic activity\, the participants explained that there needs to be more effort made by the government\, as well as businesses and the private sector\, to invest in job creation and vocational training\, especially for those with low levels of education. The participants advised\, however\, that there needs to be a fine balance between the valorization of manual labor and the encouragement of schooling and education. \n \n \nThe failed education model in many Arab states is a symptom of the failed state economic model\, and often produces a vicious circle. The participants further discussed means of educational reform and how the Arab state promises employment as a reward for education. This often only leads to further frustration when educated youths come up against a variety of entry barriers to the labor market. There are few effective transitions from school to employment\, and a severe lack of skills and behavioral competencies development. Further compounding this is the crisis of the social sciences; the Arab educational system rewards technical and technocratic career paths\, with little encouragement of alternative careers in the humanities\, arts\, and cultural avenues. These disciplines are far from institutionalized at the school level\, and even less so in the labor market\, making the humanities unappealing and often gendered. \n \n \nOther issues under discussion included Arab refugees and forced migration; nationalization policies across the GCC; and youth voices in public spaces as well online through a variety of information communication technologies and social media channels. In conclusion\, the participants encouraged further investigation into broader theoretical questions involving the future of political Islam and democratization efforts. The participants offered a series of policy recommendations that could be implemented across the Middle East and North Africa\, and ways of promoting resilience rather than violence through a variety of avenues\, including cultural and educational activities\, as well as means of removing entry barriers to the market by encouraging grassroots business opportunities and networks.  ‎ \n \n \n\nSee the Meeting Agenda\nRead Participants Biographies\nRead more about this Research Initiative \n\n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nOsama Abi-Mershed\, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies\,Georgetown University\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nDavid Beck\, Silatech\nDawn Chatty\, University of Oxford\nRaj Desai\, Georgetown University\nKristin Smith Diwan\, American University School of International Service\nPaul Dyer\, Silatech\nSherine El Taraboulsi\, University of Oxford\nNader Kabbani\, Silatech\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nSamer Kherfi\, University of Sharjah\nAdeel Malik\, University of Oxford\nDionysis Markakis\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nJennifer Olmsted\, Drew University\nAnders Olofsgard\, Stockholm School of Economics\nOmar Razzaz\, King Abdullah II Fund for Development of the Jordan Strategy Forum\nNatasha Ridge\, Sheikh Saud bin Saqr Al Qasimi Foundation\nMichael Robbins\, Princeton University\nDjavad Salehi-Isfahani\, Virginia Tech\nEdward Sayre\, University of Southern Mississippi\nEmad Shahin\, Georgetown University\nHilary Silver\, Brown University\nElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nTarik Yousef\, Silatech\n\n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/youth-middle-east-working-group-i/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20141117T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20141117T200000
DTSTAMP:20260405T000447
CREATED:20141120T102022Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T103600Z
UID:10001025-1416247200-1416254400@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Buthaina Al Ansari on Female Leaders in Qatar
DESCRIPTION:Buthaina Al Ansari\, founder and Chairperson of Qatariat T&D Holding Company and Senior Human Resources Director at Ooredoo\, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue on the topic of “Sheroes—How Female Leaders are Changing Qatar” on November 17\, 2014. Al Ansari introduced the talk\, which focused on the status of female leadership in Qatar\, by explaining that it is largely males who are recognized for their endeavors and achievements\, while women are rarely celebrated to the same degree. “There are male and female achievers\, but there are only ‘heroes\,’ and I do believe there should be ‘sheroes\,’” she said. \n \n \nAl Ansari is a member of the MENA Business Women’s Networks\, an ambassador for Women Leading Change Qatar\, a board member of Qatar Business Women’s Association\, and a Mentor at the Qatar Professional Women’s Network Circle. She shared her insights on what makes a successful businesswoman\, with a particular focus on how Qatari women can achieve a more competitive position within the local and international market. Al Ansari divulged her recipe for success\, including the most important ingredients required in any business venture. The first element of success is to have a supportive family structure. She argued that in the Arab World\, it is especially important for women to have a family that understands the imperatives of any business endeavor\, and the necessities of splitting time and resources equally between the needs of the home and those of the business operation. Once one has the backing and support of one’s family\, the second element of success that Al Ansari advocated was a solid foundation in the form of education. She noted that “in Qatar\, we have a strong system of education”—especially for women—which should be capitalized upon. \n \n \nThe third element of success\, as suggested by Al Ansari\, is to take risks\, and to not be afraid of challenging the norm. This\, she said\, is the defining characteristic of any entrepreneur. Al Ansari explained that she had to take personal risks in order to further her business career. She had begun her studies as a biomedical science student\, but was always aware that this vocational path was pre-determined by her family’s definition of success. Al Ansari decided to take the risk of changing her degree to business administration in order to fulfill her personal objectives. “I took risks in my thoughts\, I took risks in my decisions\, and I took risks in my plans\, and that has opened a lot of doors and opportunities for me\,” she explained. However\, Al Ansari did acknowledge that such freedom of choice and deciding for oneself were not necessarily options that were open to all Qatari females. \n \n \nOnce an educated risk-taker has completed the first crucial steps towards achieving a successful business career\, Al Ansari’s final piece of advice was to differentiate oneself from the surrounding competition. She argued that it was of vital importance to “market yourself\, position yourself\, and brand yourself\,” and focus on a particular segment of the market. “I chose the women’s segment in Qatar. I want to empower them\, I want to guide them\, and I want to enable them\,” she said. Qatari males represent 68 percent of the Qatari labor force\, while Qatari women represent only 32 percent. Thus\, Al Ansari argued that it was important for women to work harder and to take on more active roles in order to balance the labor market. \n \n \nGender imbalance aside\, Al Ansari concluded by saying that “in Qatar\, we are at the development phase. Whether you are a mother\, a wife\, a student\, an employee\, or a business owner\, we have to contribute together to invent the economic scene in Qatar [by] investment in economic capital\, education\, environment\, and health.” \n \n \nButhaina Al Ansari holds a Master’s Degree in Business Management & HR Strategic Planning from Qatar University\, and a Master’s Degree in Human Resource Management from the American University of Cairo. As an entrepreneur and Chairperson of Qatariat T&D\, she collaborates with innovative and best-in-class organizations to raise the benchmark and quality of expertise in Qatar. Qatariat services include—Training & Leadership\, Media & Publishing and Business Consulting. In 2012\, she received the L’Officiel Qatar’s Most Inspirational Arab Woman of the Year Award. She has been voted by CommsMEA as one the Top 50 Female Telecoms Executives\, and for the past several years she has been named by ArabianBusiness.com as one of the 100 Most Powerful Arab Women. \n \n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/buthaina-al-ansari-female-leaders-qatar/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Distingushed Lectures,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20141116T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20141116T170000
DTSTAMP:20260405T000447
CREATED:20141130T133720Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210829T124401Z
UID:10001030-1416128400-1416157200@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Ian Almond Faculty Research Workshop
DESCRIPTION:Ian Almond\, Professor of World Literature at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\, headed a CIRS Faculty Research Workshop on “Dissecting the Native Informant: A Case Study of Nirad C. Chaudhuri” on November 16\, 2014. The workshop was held to discuss his latest work examining the related ideas of melancholy\, political conservatism\, and native informancy. It takes the figure of a twentieth century Indian thinker\, Nirad C. Chaudhuri\, and considers his oeuvre under the changing optics of a number of different topics—all in an attempt to understand how an Indian intellectual such as Chaudhuri was able to defend passionately the legacy of the British Empire\, and even slander the culture and mentality of his fellow Indians. Almond also extended this to present-day “native informants” such as Fareed Zakaria\, Fouad Ajami\, and Enrique Krauze. \n\nAlmond’s book initially began as a straightforward monograph on the Indian writer Nirad C. Chaudhuri (1897-1999)\, but soon developed—over the four years it took to write it—into a much more nuanced project: the study of how conservative\, pro-Western intellectuals are formed in postcolonial environments. What started out as just another book on an infamously Anglophile Bengali writer began to reveal implications for the whole type of the “native informant.” Under the rubric of four different approaches—Islam\, the archive\, melancholy\, and Empire—he not only enters into the intricacies of Chaudhuri’s intellectual constitution\, but also develops insights into the internalization and reproduction of ideology. Each chapter tries to articulate the Indian context of the investigation—what Chaudhuri’s peers in the Bengali and wider Indian tradition had to say about Muslims\, or sadness\, or libraries—but also brings in a strong comparative dimension. In one chapter\, for example\, the book considers the year 1947 in three different cities—Calcutta\, Mexico City\, and Istanbul—and examines three melancholy texts that were being written in those cities that year (Autobiography of an Unknown Indian\,  El Laberinto de la Soledad\, and the Turkish novel Huzur). \n\nAlmond tries to show how Chaudhuri’s views on Islam—on its cultures\, followers\, and faith—reveal a jumbled bag of different voices in Chaudhuri\, each of which belonged to a different vocabulary\, and drew on a different constellation of beliefs. As a consequence\, he takes a look at how Chaudhuri made use of the archive—of libraries\, galleries\, and museums—which not only throws light on the origin of some of these vocabularies\, but also illuminates the process of self-alienation which his extensive reading accentuated. It was a process which fissured and undermined Chaudhuri’s notion of Indianness\, dethroning it from the center of his persona and opening him up to a wide variety of foreign registers; amongst the many consequences of this alternative intellectual development was an increasing disdain for the culture of his own community\, and a growing empathy for the perspective of the Empire which ruled over it. In the penultimate chapter of Almond’s book\, the melancholy which arose from this situation is shown to compose of a number of different elements—not just the inevitable tristesse which accompanies all processes of alienation\, but also a sense of loss at the withdrawal of the imperial entity whose presence had taken on such a metaphysically central place in his life. In the final chapter\, he considers Chaudhuri’s relationship to empire in the context of similar intellectuals from very different regions—the right-wing Mexican intellectual Enrique Krauze\, the Arab journalist Fouad Ajami\, and the U.S. educated Indian writer Fareed Zakaria. \n\nThe participants who came to speak on Almond’s book were based at universities from a variety of different regions. Mahmut Mutman spoke of the relationship between Empire and Literature\, and the way imperialist sensibilities were able to foster (in positive as well as negative ways) literary creation; Kathleen Hewett-Smith saw Chaudhuri as someone who seemed to seek in Empire a form of codified knowledge\, and compared Chaudhuri’s love of the library to the Turkish novelist Orhan Pamuk’s own interest in the archival. Tariq Mehmood spoke of the need for greater historical context in understanding figures such as Chaudhuri\, whilst Sibel Irzik spoke on the Freudian distinction between melancholy and mourning\, and asked why some losses for Chaudhuri were necessarily more melancholic than others. “Chaudhuri”\, she said\, “lost an empire he never had.” Sheetal Majithia alluded briefly to the way World Literature has been promoted as an effort to limit postcolonial studies\, and spoke of the ways Chaudhuri could be useful to schools of analysis such as Affect Theory.  \n\nIan Almond received his PhD in English Literature from Edinburgh University in 2000. He is the author of four books\, most recently Two Faiths\, One Banner (Harvard University Press\, 2009) and History of Islam in German Thought (Routledge\, 2010)\, and over forty articles in a variety of journals including PMLA\, Radical Philosophy\, ELH\, and New Literary History. He specializes in comparative world literature\, with a tri-continental emphasis on Mexico\, Bengal and Turkey. His books have been translated into eight languages\, including Arabic\, Russian\, Turkish\, Korean\, Serbo-Croat\, Persian and Indonesian. He is currently working on a history of Islam in Latin America. \n\n\n\n\n\nCIRS supported Ian Almond’s book\, The Thought of Nirad C. Chaudhuri: Islam\, Empire and Loss (Cambridge University Press\, 2015)\, by hosting a research workshop in which selected scholars were invited to the Georgetown University-Qatar campus to discuss the manuscript and to give critical feedback on the book chapters ahead of publication. \n\nRead biographies of the participantsSee the workshop agenda\n\n 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/ian-almond-faculty-research-workshop/
CATEGORIES:CIRS Faculty Research Workshops
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20141027T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20141027T190000
DTSTAMP:20260405T000447
CREATED:20141120T103139Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T103639Z
UID:10001026-1414432800-1414436400@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Ole Wæver on Security in a Post-Western World
DESCRIPTION:Ole Wæver\, Professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science\, University of Copenhagen\, and Director of the Center for Resolution of International Conflicts\, delivered a CIRS Focused Discussion on October 27\, 2014 on the topic “Global Security in a Post-Western World.” Introducing the lecture\, Wæver noted that when world events change so quickly and so radically\, it is always important to understand the basics of international relations theories\, no matter how old-fashioned an idea that may seem. In international relations\, it is tradition to want to comprehend the “big picture\,” in terms of how one country relates to another and under what kinds of power relations within the international system. \n \n \nGiving some historical background to the topic\, Wæver explained that the idea of the singular “superpower” is one that has its roots in Eurocentric history\, and goes back to a time where Europe was central to world events\, especially during the colonial period and up to the Cold War. However\, since the end of the Cold War\, the question of what kind of international political system has replaced the older\, more traditional bipolar global engagement of superpowers is still being debated in the discipline. There have been a great many shifts in global engagement. Nations have since attempted to adapt to the new transition and to the decline of powerful global ideologies as they reconstruct their security allegiances within power vacuums. Wæver argued that we are currently in a radically different system to that of the past bipolar world where giant powers faced off against each other. So\, how did we get to this stage of finding ourselves in a post-Cold War period and\, what he called\, a post-West period? The answer is in what comes after bipolarity: is it unipolarity or is it multipolarity? Or\, is it neither? \n \n \nThe post-Cold War period saw the rise of an ideologically-victorious United States\, with power and influence all over the world. However\, Wæver argued\, it is evident from events of the recent past that the United States can no longer claim power based solely on market or military might. Around 2005\, there was a turning point where the centric approach began showing signs of weakness. The Iraq and Afghanistan wars proved to be a poor strategy\, and one in which the United States failed to dominate. Further\, the 2008 global financial crisis completely damaged US legitimacy as a global market leader. “The US is really not dominant enough to be able to impose order\,” he said. \n \n \nPerhaps then the idea of multipolarilty could be considered a more appropriate definition in its acknowledgement of fluid and shifting alliances\, but\, Wæver argued\, it is still a concept that is unsatisfactory to describe current international system structures. The idea of multipolarity is problematic since within any group of nations\, some are more powerful than others. Thus\, these concepts are unstable\, and we need a new definition of what is taking place in the global balance of power. \n \n \nCurrently\, the world is increasingly made up of many great powers with fewer superpowers in neither a unipolar nor a multipolar world. “No one is really thinking of themselves as global players\, they are all anchored and rooted in regions\, mostly interested in their own regions\, somewhat interested in neighboring regions\, and occasionally concerned about global questions\,” he explained. Thus\, if there is no longer an ongoing struggle for the prime position within the global order\, we need a different type of definition\, and a different type of understanding for this new global configuration. \n \n \nIn conclusion\, Wæver said that\, ultimately\, many of these issues come down to basic assumptions and ways of thinking. In this sense\, the current configuration of world politics is post-Western in three very distinct ways: in power politics that is no longer Western-centric; in the value order that is no longer based on a singular framework of interpretation; and\, finally\, in the understanding of international relations theory and concepts of polarity and global security\, where we now see a greater role for theories that emanate out of different geographic and cultural contexts—ones that are not dominated by Western modes of thinking. \n \n \nOle Wæver is most known for coining the concept of “securitization” and developing what is commonly referred to as the Copenhagen School in security studies. His research interests include international relations and security theory\, sociology of science\, religion in international relations\, climate change\, conflict analysis\, and the role of national identity in foreign policy. He has published and broadcast extensively in the field of international relations and securitization theory. His most recent publications include the contribution of a chapter to Capturing Security Expertise: Practice\, Power\, and Responsibility (Routledge\, forthcoming 2015). His most recent peer-reviewed journal article\, “The Theory Act: Responsibility and Exactitude as seen from Securitization” appears in International Relations (2014). \n \n \nOle Wæver\, Professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science\, University of Copenhagen\, and Director of the Center for Resolution of International Conflicts\, delivered a CIRS Focused Discussion on October 27\, 2014 on the topic “Global Security in a Post-Western World.” Introducing the lecture\, Wæver noted that when world events change so quickly and so radically\, it is always important to understand the basics of international relations theories\, no matter how old-fashioned an idea that may seem. In international relations\, it is tradition to want to comprehend the “big picture\,” in terms of how one country relates to another and under what kinds of power relations within the international system. \n \n \nGiving some historical background to the topic\, Wæver explained that the idea of the singular “superpower” is one that has its roots in Eurocentric history\, and goes back to a time where Europe was central to world events\, especially during the colonial period and up to the Cold War. However\, since the end of the Cold War\, the question of what kind of international political system has replaced the older\, more traditional bipolar global engagement of superpowers is still being debated in the discipline. There have been a great many shifts in global engagement. Nations have since attempted to adapt to the new transition and to the decline of powerful global ideologies as they reconstruct their security allegiances within power vacuums. Wæver argued that we are currently in a radically different system to that of the past bipolar world where giant powers faced off against each other. So\, how did we get to this stage of finding ourselves in a post-Cold War period and\, what he called\, a post-West period? The answer is in what comes after bipolarity: is it unipolarity or is it multipolarity? Or\, is it neither? \n \n \nThe post-Cold War period saw the rise of an ideologically-victorious United States\, with power and influence all over the world. However\, Wæver argued\, it is evident from events of the recent past that the United States can no longer claim power based solely on market or military might. Around 2005\, there was a turning point where the centric approach began showing signs of weakness. The Iraq and Afghanistan wars proved to be a poor strategy\, and one in which the United States failed to dominate. Further\, the 2008 global financial crisis completely damaged US legitimacy as a global market leader. “The US is really not dominant enough to be able to impose order\,” he said. \n \n \nPerhaps then the idea of multipolarilty could be considered a more appropriate definition in its acknowledgement of fluid and shifting alliances\, but\, Wæver argued\, it is still a concept that is unsatisfactory to describe current international system structures. The idea of multipolarity is problematic since within any group of nations\, some are more powerful than others. Thus\, these concepts are unstable\, and we need a new definition of what is taking place in the global balance of power. \n \n \nCurrently\, the world is increasingly made up of many great powers with fewer superpowers in neither a unipolar nor a multipolar world. “No one is really thinking of themselves as global players\, they are all anchored and rooted in regions\, mostly interested in their own regions\, somewhat interested in neighboring regions\, and occasionally concerned about global questions\,” he explained. Thus\, if there is no longer an ongoing struggle for the prime position within the global order\, we need a different type of definition\, and a different type of understanding for this new global configuration. \n \n \nIn conclusion\, Wæver said that\, ultimately\, many of these issues come down to basic assumptions and ways of thinking. In this sense\, the current configuration of world politics is post-Western in three very distinct ways: in power politics that is no longer Western-centric; in the value order that is no longer based on a singular framework of interpretation; and\, finally\, in the understanding of international relations theory and concepts of polarity and global security\, where we now see a greater role for theories that emanate out of different geographic and cultural contexts—ones that are not dominated by Western modes of thinking. \n \n \nOle Wæver is most known for coining the concept of “securitization” and developing what is commonly referred to as the Copenhagen School in security studies. His research interests include international relations and security theory\, sociology of science\, religion in international relations\, climate change\, conflict analysis\, and the role of national identity in foreign policy. He has published and broadcast extensively in the field of international relations and securitization theory. His most recent publications include the contribution of a chapter to Capturing Security Expertise: Practice\, Power\, and Responsibility (Routledge\, forthcoming 2015). His most recent peer-reviewed journal article\, “The Theory Act: Responsibility and Exactitude as seen from Securitization” appears in International Relations (2014). \n \n \nArticle by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/ole-w%c3%a6ver-security-post-western-world/
CATEGORIES:American Studies,Dialogue Series,Distingushed Lectures,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20141025T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20141026T170000
DTSTAMP:20260405T000447
CREATED:20141130T104024Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T103648Z
UID:10001029-1414227600-1414342800@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:The Changing Security Dynamics of the Gulf
DESCRIPTION:On October 25-26\, 2014\, CIRS held its first Working Group under “The Changing Security Dynamics of the Gulf” research initiative. Academics from various disciplines gathered for their first meeting to discuss evolving national and regional security dynamics\, and to identify research gaps that need to be addressed. The group drew attention to different\, prevailing definitions of security\, including military\, regime\, and human security.  Amongst other themes\, participants debated existing security arrangements in the Gulf and how regional relations may pose security threats to individual Gulf states’ national interests. \n \n \nOpening the discussion\, participants focused on the concept of securitization theory. Classical approaches to security focus on the measurable characteristics of a threat\, such as balance of power and military capabilities. Securitization theory examines how certain issues are transformed into security concerns by the state or by political actors and other stakeholders. \n \n \nState security usually hinges upon military\, regime\, and resource stability. As a result\, state surveillance mechanisms are effective safeguards in ensuring the legitimacy and stability of the regimes in power. In places such as Bahrain\, there are sectarian angles associated with regime security. Other forms of threat perception identify political\, human and environmental concerns\, all factors that can contribute to a populations’ feelings of “relative deprivation”.  More recently\, in the Gulf\, human insecurity has been exacerbated by the interventions of non-state actors such as ISIS. \n \n \nDuring the Working Group the “personality element” of regional rulers was also discussed. Often in Gulf states there is no differentiation between the type of threats that are perceived as impacting the personal security of regime leaders and those that affect the security of the state as a whole. Questions were raised as to the relevance of critical security perspectives to the Gulf context\, particularly when there is a proliferation of fragile institutions. Oftentimes\, the severe demographic imbalances in the Gulf lead to a general consensus amongst the indigenous population to accept the regime’s definitions of what constitutes a security threat \n \n \nParticipants also discussed the weaknesses of collective security arrangements in the GCC. During Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait\, GCC member states were immobile for several weeks and unable to provide a unified\, robust response. This inaction resulted in the Kuwaiti royal family having to escape to Saudi Arabia until the monarchy was restored. Commonalities in security concerns amongst the ruling Gulf regimes reinforce the shared security interests dominant in this region and the institutional importance of the Gulf Cooperation Council in highlighting these concerns. The Council also contemplated extending membership invitations to both Jordan and Morocco\, at a time when the GCC felt that it had barely survived the first upsurge of revolts threatening its stability. The invitations were an act of commitment on part of the Gulf states towards monarchic regimes in the region. However\, working group participants questioned the purpose of this collective security arrangement\, considering the Council’s history of cooperation during times of crisis and its tendency to prioritize national interest once external threats dissipate.  \n \n \nIn addition to broad thematic areas the discussions also mentioned a number of specific cases\, including the UAE\, Saudi Arabia\, Bahrain and Iran. In the UAE’s case\, having gone through significant foreign policy changes since the death of Sheikh Zayed Al Nahyan\, the United Arab Emirates identified the danger of militant Islamism as the biggest threat to the security of the regime and state. In March 2013\, a group of activists and members of the Emirati community signed a petition urging the regime to shift to a more democratic society\, calling for election of all members in the National Federal Council and the bestowing of legislative and regulatory powers upon this body. Approximately\, 64 out of 94 activists on trial were found guilty and accused of having ideological sympathy with the Muslim Brotherhood. Today\, the UAE has made an extensive effort towards involving itself in North Africa’s politics\, partly encouraged by Egypt’s support. Both Qatar and the UAE have exerted substantial effort in North Africa\, in an effort to develop their geostrategic roles in the region. From a security perspective\, North Africa is of utmost relevance to the Gulf\, as it acts as a gateway to Europe\, heightening inter-Gulf state competition over regional relevance. \n \n \nIn Bahrain\, the lack of political institutions makes it difficult to gain insight into the political views of the Bahraini population and how they perceive threats to security. GCC states have been very deliberate in structuring political conflict and defining what constitutes a threat to the state\, and have often used sectarian sentiments for this purpose. During the February 14th demonstrations state-sponsored Sunni counter-mobilization efforts were a reaction to the rebellion organized by the Shiite majority in Bahrain. One month later\, over five thousand troops were dispatched by neighboring Gulf states in an effort to contain and localize the uprisings. Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province was also inspired by the uprisings taking place in Bahrain\, whereby the province of Qatif\, with a population of 95 percent Shiites\, demonstrated in solidarity with Bahrain when Saudi troops arrived. \n \n \nWorking Group members also discussed how some Gulf states\, such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain\, have been showing greater vulnerabilities in their rentier bargain with their citizenry. Since 2011\, the majority of Gulf states have reinvigorated their rentierism\, by increasing salaries and providing jobs in the labor market\, in an effort to discourage people from contesting the regimes’ legitimacy. Scholars suggested that not all the Gulf states are alike\, and in some of the Gulf states maintaining rentier disbursements are proving challenging\, as state capacity to deliver is stretched. Certain Gulf states with larger indigenous populations and less financial transparency such as Saudi Arabia\, have been facing serious cracks in the rentier bargain\, whereby 70 percent of Saudi nationals live in rented accommodation due to the inability of the state in providing national housing for its local population. The growing demographic imbalances in Gulf states have only added to the complexity of the local population relationship with the labor market\, often intensifying underlying tensions between locals and expatriates. This proves to be problematic for the regimes in power considering that the rentier bargain is the foundation of Gulf regimes’ legitimacies. \n \n \nThe most common explanation for the success of Gulf State’s domestic security and the continuity of the ruling elites has been the presence of hydrocarbon energy\, which guarantees geostrategic value to the West and protection for the Gulf states. The management of domestic security has generally been conducted through the strategy of combined cooption and repression of the masses. Such tactics can be witnessed in Bahrain during the 2011 uprisings where sixty people were killed and numerous political activists were jailed and detained for indeterminate lengths of time. In the case of Saudi Arabia\, cooption lead to the creation of hundreds of jobs for people in an effort to remedy the economic situation within the country. Working Group members also discussed linkages between religion\, tradition\, and oil\, arguing that Gulf states often cultivate national identities that are corresponding to their domestic security interests. \n \n \nWhen Gulf states were granted their independence in 1971\, it was apparent that a Gulf “national” identity was not based on principles of self-determination or collective history. This was due to the fact that the trucial states were only under a British economic and political protectorate\, having not experienced or been inherently changed by a colonial process. At the time\, most coastal states in the Gulf were comprised of either nomadic or seafaring tribes. Amongst these tribes were substantial populations of Iranians and Indians who were part of the mercantile classes. In more recent times and with the creation of city states\, there has been an active rejection of external and non-indigenous identities. Gulf regimes have also made a conscious effort to create a national identity that is based on tribal and religious heritage in order to enforce their domestic legitimacy. The question of whether the creation of national identities can lead to “imagined communities” was problematized by the discussants. Namely\, the idea that Gulf states revalorize national and tribal ties as a way to construct a narrative based on national and sectarian sentiments.  \n \n \n\nSee the working group agenda\nRead participant biographies\nRead more about this research initiative\n\n \n  \n \n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nRogaia Abusharaf\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nHaya Al Noaimi\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nAlanoud Al Sharekh\, Secretariat of the Supreme Council for Planning and Development in Kuwait\nKhalid Almezaini\, Qatar University\nAbdullah Baabood\, Qatar University\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nGawdat Bahgat\, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Study\, National Defense University\nPatricia Duran\, Independent Researcher\nNader Entessar\, University of South Alabama\nJustin J. Gengler\, Qatar University\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nJoseph A. Kéchichian\, King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies\nAnatol Lieven\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nDionysis Markakis\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nToby Matthiesen\, University of Cambridge\nSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nJean-Marc Rickli\, Kings College London\nDavid Roberts\, Kings College London\nMarc Valeri\, Center for Gulf Studies\, University of Exeter\nElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nOle Wæver\, Center for Resolution of International Conflicts\,University of Copenhagen\nLuciano Zaccara\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\n\n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Haya Al-Noaimi\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/changing-security-dynamics-gulf/
CATEGORIES:American Studies,Dialogue Series,Regional Studies
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20141013T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20141013T200000
DTSTAMP:20260405T000447
CREATED:20141014T121103Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T123845Z
UID:10000806-1413223200-1413230400@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Justin Gengler Monthly Dialogue
DESCRIPTION:Justin Gengler\, Senior Researcher at the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI) of Qatar University\, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue on “Studying Public Opinion in Qatar” on October 13\, 2014. SESRI conducts nationally-representative\, scientific household surveys of the different social groups residing in Qatar\, including the local national population\, professional expatriates\, and labor migrants. Giving some background to the state of survey research in Qatar\, Gengler noted that the in-depth\, nation-wide study of public opinion in the Gulf region is still in its infancy. In this context\, it is important to think about “what we mean by public opinion or studying public opinion in the Gulf region—especially in a place where people don’t always associate mass attitudes as being part of the decision-making process\,” he explained. \n \n \nGiving specific examples of how responses can change according to context and over time\, Gengler argued that there are three general levels of dealing with collected data. A primary level of data analysis is “descriptive” in reporting basic distributions of survey responses to a particular question. A secondary level of data analysis offers a basis for temporal or cross-societal comparison and so offers enhanced analytical value. A tertiary level of data analysis delves more deeply into survey results not only by situating the data in context\, but by moving beyond the question of “what” to explain the “why” of survey responses. \n \n \nIn order to demonstrate how and why responses can vary\, Gengler displayed results to the survey question “Which country poses the greatest challenge to Qatar?” In the summer of 2010\, approximately 19 percent of Qatari national respondents identified Israel as the greatest challenge. This result in and of itself carries little meaning unless it is compared to those from other years as well as to events occurring during the relevant time periods. “After the events of 2011 and the ramping up of sectarian rhetoric and sectarian feeling in the Gulf\, you see that threat perceptions change in a very predictable or a very systematic way\, which is that Iran emerges as a much greater threat in the public imagination.” As such\, Qatari responses to the same question in 2011 were very different\, with the proportion of nationals identifying Iran as the greatest challenge more than doubling over the previous year. In relation to “data situated within temporal or societal context\, the thing of interest is not responses to a specific question\, but relationships between responses and other variables\,” he said. \n \n \nA final level of analysis when examining data is to look at the interaction between the interviewer and the respondent. This is especially important for the data gathered in Qatar and elsewhere in the Gulf region\, because “for social and economic reasons\, there are very few nationals employed as field interviewers. We might think this is a problem because we are asking citizens about their opinions on sometimes sensitive topics\, so it is a question whether or not the answers we receive are reliable\,” he argued. In order to assess the reliability of responses and the impact of Qatari nationality on survey results\, Gengler divided two teams of Qatari and non-Qatari students to conduct a field experiment surveying 1\,200 Qatari nationals. Contrary to expectations\, there were no great variations in answers given to Qatari interviewers versus answers given to non-Qatari interviewers regarding sensitive political questions. Rather\, the differences lay in “social questions that touch on the issue of the expatriate-national divides … as well as the relaxation of naturalization laws\,” he noted. \n \n \nConcluding the talk\, Gengler’s gave a positive outlook for the future of survey research in the Gulf. He argued that “there is a newfound appreciation in the Gulf region in particular—including at the elite level—for survey research\, because it is objective rather than partisan or coming from a simply ideological standpoint; it is based on empirics; and also because states see the value in staying ahead of public opinion.” \n \n \nJustin J. Gengler completed the first-ever mass survey of political attitudes in Bahrain in 2009 as part of his doctoral dissertation for the University of Michigan\, titled “Ethnic Conflict and Political Mobilization in Bahrain and the Arab Gulf.” This project forms the basis of a forthcoming monograph on group conflict in the rentier state\, to be published in early 2015 in the Indiana University Press Series in Arab and Islamic Studies. He is a contributor to the volume Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf\, published by Hurst/Oxford University Press. His work has also appeared recently in Middle East Policy (2012)\, Journal of Arabian Studies (2013)\, and Middle East Law and Governance (2013)\, in addition to numerous policy-oriented publications.  \n \n \nArticle by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/justin-gengler-monthly-dialogue/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Distingushed Lectures,Regional Studies
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END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140927T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140928T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T000447
CREATED:20141120T120559Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T123903Z
UID:10001027-1411840800-1411927200@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:The Digital Middle East: Working Group I
DESCRIPTION:On September 27-28\, 2014\, CIRS held the first Working Group on “The Digital Middle East” research initiative. Academics from various backgrounds gathered for this first meeting to discuss their research findings and papers around the Digital world in the Middle East. The topics ranged from the effects technology has had on the Arab uprisings to state measures being undertaken to incorporate technology into everyday life. \n \n \nOpening the discussion\, participants focused on how the socio-political landscape of the Arab world has been changing due to the spread of the Internet. In places such as Egypt and Iran\, youth have taken to technology to express their discontent towards political regimes\, trying economic conditions and social injustices. The decentralized nature of the media model has led to mass social movements arising in several Arab states\, helping facilitate in the fall of several regimes and the severe weakening of others. In the Gulf states\, digital anonymity in places such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait has provided an outlet for the youth to articulate themselves online without fear of reprisal. As a result\, political experiences were no longer isolated to the offline world\, they were incorporated into digital form having been able to transverse physical\, cultural\, and national boundaries.  \n \n \nPeople’s instantaneous connections on social media have encouraged academic focus on civil engagement frameworks and the creation of online civil societies that are both inclusive and transnational. In the case of Egypt for instance\, online activism has radically affected the nature of mediated experiences since 2011. Prior to the establishment of video sharing and communication platforms\, coverage of political events was heavily reliant on television and print journalism. But during the Arab Spring\, in certain states social media allowed for the most reliable coverage of events due to the impact of state censorship on traditional media forms. During the Arab uprisings\, cyber communities also were made possible by the work of individuals that would spend a substantial amount of time online\, collating and contributing crucial information through various digital platforms\, without monetary compensation. Discussants voiced their interest in understanding how the nature of information transmittance into the digital world has had an effect on labor theory of value in relation to free labor. \n \n \nThe events of the Arab uprisings have also instigated changed patterns in political behavior in various social groups\, especially among women. Engaging in the digital landscape in the Middle East has proven to be a liberating experience\, forging alternative collectivities defined by a common\, greater cause and uninhibited by definitions of gender\, class or race. However\, while social movements may initially emerge online\, a physical space is still necessary for civic action to occur. During the uprisings women took to the streets alongside their male counterparts; yet\, sexual harassment and various other grave violations during protests still took place in great numbers\, outlining the disparity in behaviors that still exist in the offline world. \n \n \nIt is important to note that women’s activity online also extends to gaming and game development. Recent published reports on videogame consumption in Europe and America show that female gamers far outnumber males. The trend of female gamers is also on the rise in the Middle East\, tangible proof of which can be seen in the recent phenomenon of Saudi Arabia’s annual female-only gaming convention. Participants at the working group noted that even though a digital divide still exists between the genders\, the expedited evolution of the digital world has given users more of a stake in shaping alternative discourses on gender in the region. \n \n \nWorking Group members also discussed linkages between videogames and activism. Recently videogames have become places of encounter in the digital landscape\, where users engage with one another in a non-physical space. Interviews conducted with producers and users of videogames show that they do not perceive videogames as having the potential to influence thought. However\, state initiatives in Iran show otherwise\, with the launching of the Iran Computer and Video Game Foundation created with the intention of portraying positive Muslim identities in videogames. The traditional narrative in videogames produced in other parts of the world often portray Muslim characters as terrorists and villains\, whereas the Iranian foundation aims to portray Muslim characters in a more favorable light while also improving the videogame economy by supporting local game development. Access to videogames in the Middle East is a relatively simple process\, due to the lack of robust copyright laws. The illegal nature of these pirated copies leads to a lack of recorded sales\, which in turn affects the gathering of quantitative data on gamer demographics such as age\, gender\, income level\, and time spent playing. Questions that arose from this discussion called for more quantitative and qualitative research on user profiles and needs. \n \n \nIssues of intellectual property infringement are widespread in the Middle East\, due to the lack of a unified copyright law\, creating a myriad of issues surrounding this topic. Considering that the globalization of media culture has not been accompanied with equivalent access to media\, people in the Middle East infringe on copyright out of convenience and comfort. Such behavior can affect software designers greatly because it restricts developers from selling their products in a fair market. However\, for educational purposes\, software piracy has contributed greatly to the education of younger generations by giving them free access to expensive software that they could train and learn from. \n \n \nWorking Group members also discussed the role state actors have had in the changing face of the digital world\, choosing to develop once offline activities such as commerce and governance into electronic format. Naturally\, the growth of political activity and online activism has also caused states to rethink their methods of authoritarianism\, leading to acts of state censorship targeting social media sites\, such as in the cases of Iran and Turkey. This has led to much debate about the role technology plays within existing power structures in state and society.  This innovative technological behavior in the Middle East is indicative of growth in access and usage of the Internet\, yet limited statistical analysis is available to fully understand this phenomenon. \n \n \nCommerce has always played an integral role in strengthening and sustaining Middle Eastern societies both historically and at present. With the advance of technology\, commerce has taken a different form in the shape of online shopping. In 2013 approximately a third of GCC residents accessed the internet only to shop\, a 7 percent increase from the year before. The e-commerce experience in the Gulf has also made use of various digital platforms\, created initially for sharing pictures and communication purposes\, to selling products online. The change in cultures of consumption has been aided by the development of digital technology\, yet evident gaps in the e-commerce model\, such as efficiency and growth\, still need to be addressed and accounted for. \n \n \nIn terms of e-governance in the Gulf\, attempts have been made in recent years to use technology as a way to improve information and service delivery to citizens. Practically\, this proved to be harder to implement as issues of transparency conflicted with Gulf government’s initial commitment to e-governance. Discussants problematized the centralist nature of Gulf states as being an obstacle for e-governance\, especially since citizens are often suspicious of various state initiatives and often are too fearful to fully engage with the state and its agencies online.   \n \n \n\nSee the working group agenda\nRead the participant biographies \nRead more about this research initiative\n\n \n  \n \n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nIlhem Allagui\, Northwestern University in Qatar\nHaya Al Noaimi\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nJon Anderson\, Catholic University of America\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nMarion Desmurger\, UNESCO Representation in the Arab States of the Gulf & Yemen\nShahd Dauleh\, Qatar’s Ministry of Information and Communications Technology (ICTQatar)\nMuzammil M. Hussain\, University of Michigan\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nGholam Khiabany\, Goldsmiths University of London\nDionysis Markakis\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nDamian Radcliffe\, Qatar’s Ministry of Information and Communications Technology (ICTQatar)\nVit Šisler\, Charles University in Prague\nAnnabelle Sreberny\, School of Oriental and African Studies\, University of London\nMark Allen Peterson\, Miami University in Ohio\nDaniel Varisco\, Qatar University\nElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nShafiz Affendi Mohd Yusof\, Universiti Utara Malaysia\nLuciano Zaccara\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nNorhayati Zakaria\, Universiti Utara Malaysia\nMohamed Zayani\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\n\n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Haya Al-Noaimi\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/digital-middle-east-working-group-i/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140916T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140916T190000
DTSTAMP:20260405T000447
CREATED:20141014T114755Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T123922Z
UID:10000805-1410890400-1410894000@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Attitudes to Cybersafety and Online Privacy in the Middle East
DESCRIPTION:Damian Radcliffe\, leader of the Rassed research program at Qatar’s Ministry of Information and Communications Technology (ictQATAR)\, delivered the inaugural CIRS Monthly Dialogue of the 2014-2015 academic year with a lecture on “Attitudes to Cybersafety and Online Privacy in the Middle East” on September 16\, 2014. Emphasizing the importance of the topic\, he noted that\, despite their varying characteristics\, most countries around the world share similar concerns regarding issues of cyber safety\, online privacy\, and data security. This has become a global conversation\, and one that is no less relevant to the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. “There are very consistent values and attitudes that can often be found amongst internet users even though they might be from incredibly different countries and cultures\,” he explained. \n \n \nIn order to test whether this hypothesis was indeed applicable to the countries of the Middle East\, Radcliffe conducted research into Arab attitudes towards cyber safety\, online privacy\, and data security. Collaborating with researchers from a previous World Economic Forum study conducted in 2011\, Radcliffe and his team surveyed just under 3\,000 internet users from 14 countries across the Middle East. When combined with the previous study\, the global sample surveyed was over 11\,000 internet users covering nearly 60 countries. “One of the reasons we were really keen to take this project was the fact that it also gave us the opportunity to benchmark the experience of internet users in the Middle East with other people around the world\,” Radcliffe explained. The research questions covered five specific areas of study including\, usage of ICT and other technologies available in the household; attitudes towards the internet; concerns of internet users; trust in different online actors and online players; and behaviors of internet users. \n \nAttitudes to Cybersafety and Online Privacy in the Middle East  from ictQATAR  \nThis comparative dataset gave the research a broad range of results as well as ones that could be broken down geographically and categorized as emanating from the GCC region\, North Africa\, or a combined MENA figure which also included some additional respondents from the Levant. The resulting data gave the researchers the opportunity to make specific differentiations between the various regions of the Arab World. For example\, one of research findings highlighted the fact that differences between internet behaviors in the GCC and North Africa can be attributed to socio-economic factors. “People in the GCC are much more likely to access the internet on the move given smartphone penetration in the region…over 70% in Saudi and Qatar\, whereas it is something like 2% in Egypt\,” Radcliffe reported. \n \n \nWhile there were some important key differences between internet users worldwide\, the overall research findings proved Radcliffe’s initial hypothesis which stated that Middle East internet users are not so dissimilar from others around the globe. “Equivalency in terms of technological access as a regional figure compared to the rest of the world was pretty good. In fact\, if you look at the GCC\, there is much higher access to advanced forms of technology than there are in many other parts of the world\,” he noted. The research team found that internet users in the Middle East\, especially younger users\, were very active online and were positive about the impact of the internet on their lives. \n \n \nIn comparison to the global average in terms of attitudes towards the internet\, one main distinction of Middle East internet users was their tendency to place very little trust in those organizations that only existed online\, which explains why “e-commerce here is much less prevalent than it is in other markets. In fact\, within the region\, people are much less likely to engage in e-commerce than they are in any of the other regions that we surveyed. They are also among the least likely to bank online. Traditional methods of shopping and banking still remain popular\,” Radcliffe explained. Another key difference was Middle East internet users’ tendency to be more trusting of traditional forms of authority\, whether in terms of government or financial institutions. The research results indicated that regional internet users were generally in favor of having governing authorities regulate internet content and were not too concerned about the safety of their personal information online. This is in stark contrast to those surveyed in Western countries who tended to be more wary of government and financial institutions\, which is most likely a symptom of the recent economic crisis in those countries. \n \n \nRadcliffe ended the lecture by highlighting some thoughts for the future of digital technologies\, arguing that\, with increased availability of personal surveillance technologies\, issues of trust will most likely intensify in future. The more digital devices in the world\, the greater the risk of security breaches\, but simultaneously the greater the possibility of doing this differently and more constructively. “New technologies will bring new challenges\, but also new opportunities\,” he concluded. \n \n \nDamian Radcliffe is an award-winning content creator\, journalist\, and researcher who has led diverse teams at the intersection of journalism\, media innovation\, and civic engagement for nearly 20 years. He currently leads the Rassed research program at Qatar’s Ministry of Information and Communications Technology (ictQATAR)—an initiative which explores the impact of ICT on society and the potential afforded by emerging technologies. His team has published over 80 studies\, presentations\, articles and infographics since mid-2012—in both English and Arabic—and their work as featured across a broad range of regional and international media. Their research was in the Top 1% of globally viewed content on LinkedIn’s SlideShare platform in 2013. \n \n \n\nRead the full Report in English\nRead the full Report in Arabic\n\n \nArticle by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications  \n \nInfographic: The attitudes of Internet users in the Middle East towards Cybersafety\, Security and Data Privacy   from ictQATAR​ مواقف مستخدمي الإنترنت في منطقة الشرق الأوسط حيال السلامة ولأمن على شبكة الإنترنت   from ictQATAR​
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/attitudes-cybersafety-and-online-privacy-middle-east/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140813T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140814T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T000447
CREATED:20140914T142514Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T103722Z
UID:10000858-1407916800-1408039200@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Transitional Justice in the Middle East - Working Group II
DESCRIPTION:On August 13-14\, 2014\, CIRS held the second working group meeting under the “Transitional Justice in the Middle East” research initiative. Regional and International scholars and experts gathered for the concluding meeting to solicit feedback on their individual paper submissions. The papers tackled a variety of themes and topics\, ranging from theoretical underpinnings of transitional justice\, to country-specific case-studies examining the pursuit of transitional justice and its implications. \n \n \nImplementation of transitional justice mechanisms in the Middle East is a relatively recent phenomenon\, and as such\, regional scholarly analysis and debates are in their nascent stages. Looking at the experiences of transitional justice in other regions of the globe can potentially provide some lessons to those interested in and working on processes that help societies cope with past atrocities. A significant amount of literature on transitional justice has focused on other parts of the world such as Latin America and Eastern Europe. However\, due to the complexities of transitions and variations between different national and political contexts\, there are no universal transitional justice mechanisms or tools that can be unilaterally applied. One size does not fit all in transitional justice\, but a comparative examination of global experiences allows us to gain a nuanced understanding of the questions that need to be asked in relation to transitional justice processes and goals. As outlined below\, various case-studies discussed during the two-day meeting unravel the complexities and layers of transitional justice. \n \n \nAdvocates of transitional justice increasingly call for victim-centered justice as a means of vindication for those who suffered and for promoting reconciliation between victims and perpetrators. While this appears to be a clear rationale for the pursuit of victim-centered justice\, its adoption proves to be much more complex. First\, identifying the needs of victims that were subject to state repression requires understanding the needs of various victims\, and acknowledging that their needs and desires may change over time. Second\, should the needs and goals of victims be identified\, deciding how they should be addressed also provides a multitude of options. From material reparation to moral compensation\, actors on the ground have to decide which institutional mechanism or design is best suited to addressing victims’ goals. In Tunisia\, the categorization of women as “secondary victims” highlights that even identifying who were actual victims of past persecution is a challenge. Secondary victims are those that were persecuted\, imprisoned\, or harassed because of their relationship to men who were deemed a threat to the state. Most women in Tunisia fall under this category\, particularly Ennahda women who for decades bore the brunt of state repression. This hierarchy of victimization and the inadvertent relegation of the needs of female victims to a secondary status of victimhood highlight the complexity in identifying and addressing needs of various members of Tunisian society.   \n \n \nThe Tunisian case also sheds light on other core elements of transitional justice. With regards to the timeframe that is subjected to transitional justice\, what marks the beginning of the transition? How far back should a society go in addressing past injustices? Working Group participants suggested that different political actors advocate for varying temporal scopes of transitional justice based on their visions of the post-Ben Ali state. While investigative commissions initially looked at abuses that happened after December 2010\, Ennahda advocated for stretching back the time-frame until 1956 in an attempt to deconstruct modernist narratives of statehood characteristic of the Bourguiba and Ben Ali state. \n \n \nCollective memory and memorialization are key aspects of transitional justice for societies dealing with past atrocities. In Egypt\, transitional justice practitioners have focused on measures of accountability and implementing institutional reforms\, whilst relatively neglecting the memorialization of past injustices. Without a focus on memorialization\, participants noted that Egyptians risk exclusionary narratives of the past. In their North African neighbors Tunisia and Algeria\, martyrdom has played a dominant role in the formation of collective memories. While martyrdom has been recast for the purposes of “historical justice” in Tunisia\, in Algeria it has been used by political elites to stymie efforts towards genuine transition. \n \n \nRecasting narratives of the past is linked to visions of the future\, highlighting the potential manipulation of transitional justice mechanisms by transitional elites. For example\, in post-Qadhafi Libya political exclusion has been avidly pursued by Islamist militias as a way to wage a proxy battle against their political opponents. The political isolation law passed in 2013 excludes all those who were involved with Qadhafi’s regime from participation in public life. The politics of exclusion has further fragmented Libya’s social fabric rather than promoting post-conflict reconciliation. It becomes a delicate matter where members of society can be held accountable for their behaviors whilst remaining included in the system. Efforts to move towards accountability upsets society as those that have vested interests in the preceding political order stand to lose their relative positioning. In the debate of peace vs. justice\, or more aptly characterized as stability vs. justice\, participants discussed extremes of political exclusion\, such as de-Baathification in Iraq\, to blanket amnesties in Yemen\, and their societal repercussions.  In Egypt\, addressing accountability has primarily been carried out in the form of criminal trials. Participants noted that while revolutionaries desired going through judicial structures to address past human rights violations\, the acquittal of Mubarak on charges of human rights violations and  the mass sentencing of pro-Morsi supporters combined with a trend of speedy trials and relative disregard for due-process\, has tarnished the image of the judiciary as an independent branch. Thus\, while those in office may have changed\, participants noted that there may in fact not be any real transition in Egypt due to the functioning of key state institutions of transitional justice—namely the judiciary and the security sector—in an authoritarian manner. \n \n \nWhile Egypt may be an example of a shallow transition\, other countries of the Middle East have introduced transitional justice mechanisms without any political transition. The monarchies of Bahrain and Morocco have both introduced truth commissions. The Equity and Reconciliation Commission in Morocco and Bahrain’s Independent Commission of Inquiry have both by and large identified human rights violations committed by agents of the security sector. This implicit admission of government responsibility has enhanced the monarchs’ credibility in both domestic and international circles. While the provision of forthright narratives may indicate a shift from the usual trend of “denial and deflection”\, these truth commissions have not led to substantial accountability for the past crimes of identified perpetrators. Linking the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms with human rights performance is not a straightforward feat. As participants noted\, the comprehensive implementation of transitional justice mechanisms—of both truth commissions and prosecutions—coupled with a hospitable political environment\, may have a positive impact on human rights performance. However\, it remains that transitional justice is a public policy tool\, and as such\, its mere existence does not indicate an improvement in human rights’ performance. On the same note however\, participants iterated that conceiving of an end point to transitional justice may be problematic. Much of the literature has a teleological approach to transitional justice\, conceiving of democratization as the desired end point. This common presumption is perhaps due to the fact that much of the literature on the topic rose out of Latin America. In the context of the Middle East\, and in an attempt to broaden the contextual scope of transitional justice\, the underlying question remains: what are we transitioning to in transitional justice? \n \n \n\nRead the participant bios\nSee the working group schedule\nRead more about this research initiative \n\n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nSahar Aziz\, Texas A&M University\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nJudy Barsalou\, El-Hibri Foundation\nMietek Boduszynski\, Pomona College\nTerry C. Coonan\, Center for the Advancement of Human Rights – Florida State University\nThomas DeGeorges\, American University of Sharjah\nNerida Child Dimasi\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nElham Fakhro\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nBarb Gillis\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nDoris H. Gray\, Al Akhawayn University\nBill Hess\, George Washington University\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nChristopher Lamont\, University of Groningen\nDionysis Markakis\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nDwaa Osman\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nIbrahim Sharqieh\, Brookings Doha Center; Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nChandra Lekha Sriram\, Center on Human Rights in Conflict – University of East London\nSusan E. Waltz\, University of Michigan\nElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nMarieke Wierda\, Grotius Center for International Legal Studies – Leiden University\n\n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Dwaa Osman\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/transitional-justice-middle-east-working-group-ii/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140622T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140623T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T000447
CREATED:20140914T144110Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T103727Z
UID:10000860-1403424000-1403546400@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Social Currents in the Maghreb Working Group II
DESCRIPTION:On June 22-23\, 2014\, CIRS held the concluding Social Currents in the Maghreb research initiative working group in Washington D.C. Participants gathered for the second time to discuss their research findings and solicit feedback from a multi-disciplinary cohort of working group members. The topics and themes discussed ranged from the mobilization of social movements in the Maghreb to language as politics and dissent in cultural production. \n \n \nFollowing the Arab uprisings\, the rise of Islamist parties has led to renewed interest in Islamist politics and a proliferation of debates surrounding the role of Islamist parties and movements in North African politics and society. Despite increased scholarly attention to Islamist politics\, the literature remains predominantly narrow in its scope\, neglecting ideological and political innovations within Islamist parties\, and the diversity and divisions that exist within the Islamist sphere as a whole. One of the ways in which Islamist parties in North Africa have exhibited ideological innovation is by adopting new ideological references that are based on a national framework\, rather than the commonly adopted “eastern” interpretations on the relationship between Islam and politics. By primarily referencing Algerian Malek Bennabi’s work\, and Ghannouchi’s earlier writings\, al-Nahda is “nationalizing an essentially internationalist project”. This is indicative of a change in the flow of ideas in the Maghreb and the shaping of Islamism based on local experiences. While ideological innovation is taking place in the formal political sphere\, younger generations of Maghrebis are increasingly distancing themselves from institutional politics and finding alternative ways of performing “every-day Islamism” through associations that are more focused on the betterment of society\, rather than the hierarchical mechanisms of institutional politics. Decreased trust in the formal political sphere as an agent of change has led to this diffusion of what it means to be “Islamist” and a growing perception of the distance from “politicking” as a source of success for these associations. \n \n \nOn the other hand\, for young people who believe that religion should play a more central role in politics\, Salafism has become a significant outlet to achieve political objectives. Participants discussed Salafism in relation to its three broad categories of scriptural\, Jihadi\, and political Salafism. Of particular salience is the adoption of Jihadi Salafism by young Islamists who are unsatisfied with the Islamist parties in power and the absence of radical change. The rise of Jihadi Salafism in the Maghreb– even before the Arab Uprisings – has led to the co-optation of Sufism by the state to counterweigh the rising threat of Jihadi Salafism; this has led to what some participants claimed was a “revival” of Sufism in the political sphere. Despite seeming state co-optation\, participants problematized “Sufism” as a term and discussed that it entails much more than mere reflective esoteric practices but rather\, has institutional politics embedded within – complicating what is generally perceived as a “quietist” movement.  \n \n \nWorking group members also discussed the Polisario movement and the question of the Western Sahara. While the Polisario is predominantly thought of as an “Algeria-backed movement”\, it has increasingly diversified its support base since the 1990s\, to include non-state actors such as activist NGOs\, the Sahrawi diaspora and international aid agencies. This flexibility and adaptability has contributed to the movement’s resilience and accordingly this transformation has largely blurred the movement’s boundaries between being an armed and un-armed movement. \n \n \nIn questioning dominant narrow conceptions of North Africa\, participants further problematized terms such as the “Arab” uprisings\, which fail to recognize the linguistic and cultural heterogeneity of the region. Decades of Amazigh activism throughout the Maghreb has challenged the Arab nationalist ideologies of Maghrebi states. By utilizing a discourse of democracy\, pluralism\, and diversity throughout the decades and particularly in the “Berber Spring” of the 1980s\, their movement largely dovetails with demonstrations of the “Arab Spring” that call for social justice and rule of law. Similarly in Mauritania\, the Haratin have played a dominant role in shaping the way human rights issues are debated in Mauritanian society and in the political quest for democracy. \n \n \nDifferent states of the Maghreb\, such as Algeria and Morocco\, have appropriated cultural diversity and co-opted various Amazigh activists\, bringing forth the fragmentation and internal divides that exist within the Amazigh movement itself\, particularly with regards to generation and class. In addition to the heterogeneity that exists within the Amazigh movement and the Maghrebi states\, the Amazigh movement is a transnational one that expands the cultural-geographic space of Barbary\, essentially raising questions about the boundaries of those nation states and how territorial boundedness relates to the lived experience. In the Mauritanian context\, while the Haratin are characterized as those of “slave descent”\, they do not constitute a homogenous group\, but rather identify as Arabs\, Berbers\, Africans and Mauritanian. Participants noted that in shifting social and political landscapes the politics of self-racialization come in to play\, where in different moments the Haratins are racialized as “black Africans”. \n \n \nWith the neo-liberalization of culture\, “Berberness” does not merely represent an object of struggle\, but is also an “aestheticized iconography of the visual urban field”. Paralleling the commodification of Berber heritage is Jewish heritage tourism and cultural conservation in Morocco. While Moroccan Jewish history is a valued economic asset that has become central to national tourism revenues\, local support and discourses continue to be overshadowed by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict\, largely overlying Moroccan Jewish history.  Due to this low level of national multicultural consciousness\, there are a number of Moroccan Amazigh and Muslim activists that focus their activities on incorporating the local history of Jews in school and university curricula in order to broaden and deepen the understanding of Jews within Morocco’s historical cultural diversity. \n \n \nWhile official promotion of multiculturalism has largely led to celebratory interpretations that presume it as a precursor to social justice and democratization\, its intersection with elements of neo-liberalism masks deeper negative socio-economic repercussions. In Morocco for instance\, official rhetoric that promotes multilingualism has further stratified society by placing a heavy burden on students and young Moroccons to manage multiple languages. Due to language requirements in the education system\, structural inequalities and limitations exist that discriminate against those who cannot afford private schooling\, essentially excluding them from national and international economic arenas. While the poorer populations of the Maghreb continue to be excluded from global mobility due to these structural limitations\, other populations – particularly those of the sport elite – have widened their scope of migration destinations. In the context of sport migrant communities\, participants discussed the states of the GCC as increasingly becoming part of the Maghrebi social imaginary\, and in some ways replacing Europe as the prime target for migration. \n \n \nPreceding and during the Arab uprisings\, labor movements have mobilized to address socio-economic woes in the Maghreb. In Morocco\, labor unions pressed for material demands and partially achieved them through a series of strikes\, sit-ins and protests during the uprisings of 2011. What is important to highlight is that labor was always able to mobilize and connect with the struggle of other groups. Perhaps in recognition of such\, the Moroccan government has become particularly capable and effective in its ‘divide and conquer’ tactics to avert the creation of a broad alliance that seeks to connect actors in the political sphere. As such\, participants highlighted the importance of not only investigating the negotiations that take place between labor movements and the government\, but between labor and the myriad of social movements that exist in the Maghreb\, as it may affect the labor movement’s strategies in broadening their concrete demands beyond the economic sphere. \n \n \nThe case-study of labor movements highlights that socio-economic woes have always been present in Maghrebi society\, and more importantly so\, that groups mobilized to address their demands prior to the Arab uprisings. Beyond formal mobilization\, cultural production in the Maghreb also indicates that other forms of dissent were also prevalent within society. In looking at post-colonial film and dissent in Tunisia\, participants discussed the works of Moufida Ttali\, Nouri Bouzid\, Ferid Boughedir\, Mahamd Zran\, and Moncef Dhouib. These films challenge the sociocultural status quo by contesting taboos\, expanding social boundaries and forming “the critical basis for challenging the governmental and political state apparatus itself”. How these films are received by the Tunisian public and whether or not they inspired political action is much more obscure; what is evident however is that dissent was prevalent in the consciousness and works of many Maghrebi artists. \n \n \n  \n \n \n\nRead participant bios\nSee the working group schedule\nRead more about this research initiative\n\n \n  \n \n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nOsama Abi-Mershed\, CCAS – Georgetown University\nJean R. AbiNader\, Moroccan American Trade and Investment Center (MATIC)\nMahfoud Amara\, Loughborough University\nAlice Bullard\, IRA-USA\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nAomar Boum\, University of Arizona\nCharis Boutieri\, King’s College London\nMatt Buehler\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nFrancesco Cavatorta\, Université Laval\nNouri Gana\, University of California\, Los Angeles\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nRicardo René Larémont\, Binghamton University\nDwaa Osman\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nZekeria Ould Ahmed Salem\, University of Nouakchott\nPaul Silverstein\, Reed College\nElizabeth F. Thompson\, University of Virginia\nElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nAlice Wilson\, University of Cambridge\n\n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Dwaa Osman\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/social-currents-maghreb-working-group-ii/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140608T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140608T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T000447
CREATED:20140914T144540Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T124020Z
UID:10000862-1402214400-1402250400@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:World Regions: The Middle Eastern Pivot Working Group I
DESCRIPTION:On June 8\, 2014\, CIRS and the Stony Brook Institute for Global Studies (SBIGS) held the first working group under the collaborative research initiative World Regions: The Middle Eastern Pivot. Scholars from various disciplinary backgrounds gathered for the meeting in Doha to discuss topics related to the concept of “regions\,” the construction of regional identities\, and world regions and civilizations. \n \n \nParticipants began the working group meeting with a discussion of “a Pangaean approach to world regions.” The new-old approach to world regions categorized regions using physical and meta-geographical distinctions. Physically\, the distinction is the seven continents that resulted as a fragmentation of the old super-continent Pangea. Other meta-geographical distinctions are: nation-states\, which arise out of political categories; North-South and core\, periphery\, and semi-periphery economic categorizations; and cultural distinctions such as the occident and the orient. However\, this traditional way of studying regions lacks the incorporation of the human impact on the geo-body\, which is largely affected by techno-scientific means.  While the new-old approach fragments the earth based on a predominantly socio-cultural perspective\, the new-new approach—or the Pangea II project—seeks to integrate the techno-scientific lens with the cultural studies lens. Our socio-natural impact gives rise to a global techno-scientific culture requiring new imagery and a re-mapping of the world—as Pangea II. Participants also discussed the importance of language when constructing and re-mapping regions. The notion of “world” regions emphasizes the diversity and divisions between various regions\, whereas the concept of “global” regions may focus more on the interconnections and overlaps\, accounting for the ongoing change that is occurring to earth as a whole and providing a binocular view that incorporates socio-cultural and socio-natural constituents. \n \n \n“The Islamicate civilization and the Persianate world” was the second topic of discussion amongst participants. The growth of Orientalism by the end of the eighteenth century led to a shift from a unitary to a plural notion of civilization. The Orientalist approach to civilization used language as the decisive marker\, and as such\, based on the generation and influence of the Persian language\, the Persianate world is considered to be a civilizational zone. Max Weber’s approach to civilization replaces language with religion as the main marker. In this conception\, the Islamicate civilization is constituted as a world region. These conceptions of world regions are not mutually exclusive and as such identities can be intersecting and overlapping allowing one to be simultaneously Muslim\, Persianate and Middle Eastern. In considering world regions as a unit of analysis\, geographic\, cultural or political\, and structural coherence are considered to be the basic criterion. Geographic coherence was evident in ancient and medical empires that were territorially contiguous. Political coherence is produced as a result of polity formation. A framework for considering political coherence is “Sheldon Pollock’s idea of the vernacular millennium where the ecumenical languages—Sanskrit\, Latin and Arabic—recede to make possible the growth of vernacular languages and cultures as a result of polity formation with the rise of local monarchies.” While Arabic was the lingua franca of the Islamic Civilization\, Persian became a complimentary lingua franca to Islam where the Samanids in the tenth century played a particularly major role in spreading Islam as a world religion. A core component of the third criterion – structural or institutional coherence—is the legal order and juridification of norms and organizing logics. Islamic law—or Sharia—is predominantly private law and developed under the Islamicate civilization. Public or constitutional law however did not develop under this civilization and the idea of an “Islamicate monarchy” as a “political ethic” was largely derived from the Persian idea of kingship—signifying another area of great overlap between the two worlds. \n \n \nIn exploring the topic of the “Islamicate Ecumene in MENA and South Asia before Colonial Empires and Nation-States”\, participants discussed the monopolization of literature by two dominant framings on geographic entities: that of the ecumene (ethno/cultural/religious civilizational aspects) and that of the empire (political aspects). Nestled between these geo-entities framings is one that is more socio-cultural and socio-economic—one that focuses on activities centered on exchange and one that includes people who were not part of the elite—such as students\, teachers\, pilgrims\, traders etc. The neglect of the latter geo-entity accounts for the relative absence of the Middle East and South Asia in comparison to other parts of the world in the scholarship of global histories. Addressing this third geo-entity fills a huge gap in the scholarship and facilitates the reconstruction of salient spheres of social communication that took place prior to the nineteenth century.  By embracing philology\, and drawing on social-scientific techniques that create cardinal visualization\, scholars can facilitate the study of conceptual history and the reconstruction of spheres of spatial communication in past contexts. \n \n \nWhile addressing the Arab World and the Middle East as overlapping world regions\, the “Middle East” as a defined region was problematized by the working group members. Characterized as “one of the most relative terms\,” scholars have long debated what geographical\, cultural\, political and historical patterns give coherence to this label. Despite these disputes in the nomenclature of the Middle East\, participants nonetheless engaged with the region. Paralleling an earlier discussion of shifts in regional centers and the reversal of center and periphery\, participants questioned whether there is a shift in the regional centers of gravity in the Middle East—moving away from the previous centers of power and economic activity of Baghdad\, Cairo and Damascus\, to that of the Persian Gulf states. In order to understand whether the center of gravity is shifting\, scholars of the region need to have a better read of the intellectual landscape of the Middle East. Much of what we know about the production of knowledge in the region is related to that of political activists\, but not much is known about political thinkers in Middle Eastern society. Whether or not places such as Dubai for instance\, signify authentic cultural centers of knowledge production in the region could help us understand whether such regional shifts are in fact occurring. Some participants\, however\, questioned whether there remain any centers of gravity\, or perhaps just a series of networks that interlace throughout the region. \n \n \nBridging regional studies and social science disciplines\, participants delved into the topic of “The Middle East and International Relations Theory.” Each of the four schools of IR thought (i.e. the power\, interdependence\, Marxist\, and constructivist schools) has particular relevance to the region. For instance\, the power school emphasizes realism and attributes the shape of the region to the actions of great powers—this is fitting to the Middle East because the shape—and definition—of the region is in fact a product of great powers. When interpreting the modern world\, however\, another type of realism emerges—realism of power that is defined by the ability to produce and develop techno-scientific knowledge\, emphasizing the modern need for civilizations to be progressive as compared to traditional civilizations that did not emphasize the growth process. Though the power school remains salient\, it does not account for the power of regional actors nor take into consideration non-state actors. The school of constructivism on the other hand—which is a late comer in IR theory—brings forth the importance of ideas\, thereby bringing IR theory closer to social thinking and allowing for deeper analysis and engagement with the internal dynamics of the region. Neo-constructivism—perhaps the most effective of all—integrates the material dimensions of the latter three IR theories (power\, economy\, class) and that of ideas. \n \n \nLast on the agenda\, working group members tackled the topic of “Central Eurasia as a World Region.” Central Eurasia encompasses multiple ethnic groups and languages making it difficult to define this region as a region. Although linguistic similarities between Uzbeks and Kazaks for instance indicate a level of cultural similarity; natives of these countries do not perceive it to be the case largely due to the linguistic and geographic borders that were reified through the soviet institutions of the twentieth century. From an internal perspective\, national legacies of the region make it hard to identify central Asia as a region as its inhabitants have historically emphasized maintaining separateness. Additionally\, from the perspective of outsiders such as international aid donors\, the divergent developmental trajectories of the countries within also undermines regional coherence (for instance\, while Kazakhstan is undergoing rapid economic progression\, countries like Tajikistan and Afghanistan are seen as failing states by the international community). The various aspects of language\, culture\, geography\, diasporas and the ways in which international organizations engage with the region\, reveal multiple layers of regional identity that may be mobilized by people. Thus\, while the region may be a construct of western academic discourse\, there are moments when people evoke regional unity for certain purposes. Ascertaining when these moments occur and for what purposes contributes to the understanding of the ways in which people themselves evoke regional coherence.  \n \n \n\nSee the participant bios\nSee the Working Group agenda \nRead more about this research initiative \n\n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nLaura Adams\, Harvard University\nSaïd Arjomand\, Stony Brook University\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nNerida Child Dimasi\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nBarb Gillis\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nBahgat Korany\, The American University in Cairo\nDwaa Osman\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nWolf Schäfer\, Stony Brook University\nGagan Sood\, London School of Economics\nElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\n\n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Dwaa Osman\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/world-regions-middle-eastern-pivot-working-group-i/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140603T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140604T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T000447
CREATED:20140914T145509Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T124031Z
UID:10000863-1401782400-1401904800@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:The State and Innovation in the Gulf Working Group II
DESCRIPTION:On June 3-4\, 2014\, CIRS held the second working group under the State and Innovation in the Gulf research initiative. Participants reconvened in Doha to discuss their paper submissions that collectively analyze efforts of GCC states to diversify their oil-based economies into knowledge-based economies (KBEs)\, the manifestation of these efforts on the ground\, and the structural realities that facilitate or hinder this transition. \n \n \nSignificant dependence on the oil and gas industry has led to the development of national visions and strategies that actively seek to diversify GCC economies. These diversification efforts are not merely related to the diffusion of risk by decreasing dependence on the volatile oil and gas sector\, but are rather increasingly intertwined with elements associated with KBEs—namely job creation and the development of sectors with high knowledge content. Global rankings such as the World Bank’s Knowledge Assessment Methodology database provide a comparative indication of the status of knowledge economies around the world. While GCC countries rank below European and North American countries in the World Bank’s KAM database\, they also score significantly higher than other states in the MENA region. Despite this relative indication of GCC rankings\, participants questioned the applicability of these assessments to the region due to the Gulf’s peculiar economic transition throughout the decades. Developed countries around the world—those that tend to score higher on these global rankings—have gone through a developmental evolution from agrarian to industrial economies\, then transitioned to information societies\, which led to the present knowledge economies. Gulf states however\, are attempting to leapfrog from pearling and trading economies to robust KBEs. The core cause of this rapid transition in the region—in comparison to other resource-based economies such as Norway—is attributable to the concurrent discovery of oil and establishment of nationhood\, leading Gulf rulers to focus on strengthening their rule by building physical infrastructure\, providing basic services\, and essentially suspending the diversification process. Production oriented structures and practices were thus sidelined by robust oil earnings\, leading participants to question: can countries which have not been through the industrial revolution enter the knowledge economy phase of development? \n \n \nOne of the ways in which Gulf states are attempting to build the foundations of their respective KBEs is by heavily investing in human capital and intangible assets through the establishment of vast educational and research facilities. By replicating and adopting models of education from abroad\, this form of investment enables Gulf states to “leapfrog the lengthy and costly process of indigenous growth and maturity”—indicating a strong motivation to catch-up with the developed world and compete in the global race for innovation. While borrowing and replicating models may have its advantages in reducing the time and cost of establishing native educational systems\, the process of borrowing\, adoption and implementation is a complex and costly one itself.  Cultural transmission is one of the core components of education\, and as such\, having a standard model that is imported from abroad omits the required cultural and contextual fit for education systems to be locally effective. Second\, excessive reliance on foreign models and external providers retards the growth of local capacity building in the Gulf—essentially hindering the ability to foster knowledge and expertise produced locally.  Despite this tendency to replicate and borrow\, Gulf states have exhibited forms of innovation in developing their education systems. Education City—the flagship of Qatar Foundation in Qatar—is a model of clustered international branch campuses (IBCS)\, where a number of foreign universities operate under the umbrella of Education City. This clustered model of IBCs creates opportunities for integrating the educational experiences of the different universities\, allowing students to cross-register for classes and providing a platform for joint-degree programs and research collaborations to take place. Due to the benefits of this model of clustered IBCs – or the Education City model – other regions of the globe are attempting to adopt it. While the benefits are clear\, it is a costly endeavor and its global level of diffusion will largely be dictated by the ability of states with fewer resources than Qatar to effectively replicate the model. \n \n \nLarge investments in higher education are tailored towards developing the skills of the national workforce and producing the “knowledge worker” that is required by KBEs. Despite this investment in human capital however\, Gulf nationals are continuously drawn to employment in the public sector—where they accrue large benefits from the state—as opposed to seeking employment in the private sector. While foreigners comprise the bulk of GCC populations and as such dominate the private sector\, they have a temporary presence in the labor market due migration policies that limit their duration of stay. This has adverse effects on developing KBEs due to hindering local knowledge retention and transfer of imported foreign knowledge. In developed countries\, the private sector is traditionally conceived of as the bearer and fosterer of innovation; however\, with minimal presence of nationals in the private sector and the temporally limited presence of expatriates\, there exists a large disjuncture between investment in human capital and labor market outcomes that reap the benefits of these investments. In an attempt to fill this gap\, GCC states are promoting entrepreneurship by developing institutions that support local entrepreneurs and SMEs\, with the aims of building a robust private sector that is promotive of innovation. In the recent years\, the SME ecosystem has witnessed a mushrooming of institutions and organizations mandated to cater their services towards the support of private business. While the strategies and infrastructure for SME promotion may be set in place\, the pervasive rentier arrangement in the Gulf provides a thick security blanket of social benefits that continues to deter nationals from fostering an entrepreneurial spirit—a spirit that is largely based on uncertainty and risk-taking. \n \n \nIncreasingly so\, it is apparent that what is lacking in the GCC is not necessarily the infrastructure or the investment in pillars of a knowledge based economy—but in creating an environment and a national system that is conducive to knowledge creation and innovation. When it comes to university-industry-government collaborations\, it appears that the role of the government in incentivizing both universities and industries to collaborate in knowledge exchange and management is weak in some GCC states such as Qatar.  As such\, industries continue to operate in silos\, curtailing the diffusion of knowledge throughout the economy. Moreover\, it becomes evident that while state rhetoric is supportive of creating KBEs that foster innovation\, the structural realities of Gulf states—namely the rentier arrangements and the demographic imbalance—actively mitigate against the translation of these national visions and strategies into concrete realities\, hindering the realization of KBEs and keeping innovation at shallow levels. \n \n \n\nSee the participant bios\nSee the Working Group agenda \nRead more about this research initiative\n\n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nHaytham Abduljawad\, Qatar Petroleum\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nJohn Crist\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nCrystal A. Ennis\, Balsillie School of International Affairs\nMartin Hvidt\, Zayed University\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nDaniel Kirk\, Emirates College for Advanced Education\nSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nDwaa Osman\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\n\n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Dwaa Osman\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/state-and-innovation-gulf-working-group-ii/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140513T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140517T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T000447
CREATED:20141012T051602Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T124043Z
UID:10000804-1399968000-1400349600@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:CIRS Travels to New Delhi
DESCRIPTION:As part of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar’s efforts to foster academic and institutional linkages with organizations around the world\, members of the Center for International and Regional Studies\, SFS-Q faculty\, and Georgetown University staff traveled to New Delhi\, India\, on May 13-17\, 2014. During the four day trip\, the cohort of Georgetown community members held an alumni reception and met with various research foundations\, policy think tanks\, and universities in India including: the Observer Research Foundation\, Delhi Policy Group\, and Jindal Global University – School of International Affairs. During each of these visits\, SFS-Q faculty and CIRS researchers—Mehran Kamrava\, Abdullah Al-Arian\, Mark Farha\, Gary Wasserman\, and Zahra Babar—gave talks pertaining to their respective areas of research and engaged in academic discourse and dialogue with professors\, researchers\, dignitaries\, and students based in India. Linking the Gulf region to India\, professors from Doha and researchers\, dignitaries\, and UN officials from India discussed issues of mutual interest and concern in the West Asia region—particularly\, in the context of “Nuclear Trends in West Asia\,” and “Regional Responses to the Iran Nuclear Deal” during the visit to the Observer Research Foundation.  Broadening the geographic area of focus\, SFS-Q faculty gave talks at the Delhi Policy Group on “Changing dynamics in West Asia\, the Persian Gulf\, and the Middle East\,” addressing issues related to Iran and Persian Gulf security and evolving domestic political dynamics in Egypt. At Jindal Global University – School of International Affairs\, students\, professors\, researchers\, and journalists gathered for a workshop on “Internal and External Dynamics in the Middle East Post-Arab Spring.” During the meeting\, participants covered an array of research areas ranging from external and internal security in the Gulf\, to the “stalled revolution in Egypt” and sectarianism in the Middle East. \n \n \nThese various engagements enabled participants to explore and exchange research on the Middle East and India\, linking the two regions academically and having a dialogue on geographic\, social\, political\, and economic connections. The meetings also provided SFS-Q faculty with a platform for professional development. The professors were able to give multiple talks\, share their research and insights with the various organizations\, and additionally benefit from the expertise and knowledge of their counterparts at various policy and academic research institutions and universities in India.  \n \n \n\nSee the Observer Research Foundation meeting agenda\nSee the Delhi Policy Group meeting agenda\nSee the Jindal Global University workshop agenda
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/cirs-travels-new-delhi/
CATEGORIES:Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140512T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140512T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T000447
CREATED:20140915T083602Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T124108Z
UID:10000792-1399881600-1399917600@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Insights into the Qatari Legal System
DESCRIPTION:Mohammed Abdulaziz Al-Khulaifi\, Associate Dean of Academic Affairs and Assistant Professor of Commercial Law at Qatar University and the 2013-2014 CIRS-Qatar University Fellow\, delivered the final CIRSMonthly Dialogue lecture of the 2013-2014 academic year on May 12\, 2014. The topic of discussion was “Insights into the Qatari Legal System\,” wherein Al-Khulaifi gave an overview of Qatari regulations\, the judicial and legislative sectors\, and the relationship between legislation and developments in Qatar. Current Qatari legislations are divided into two main categories. The first is public law\, which involves the public authority such as international law\, constitutional law\, and criminal law. The second is private law\, which includes civil and commercial laws. \n \n \nAl-Khulaifi gave some background to Qatari legal history by noting that\, since the 7th century\, early Qatari society referred to custom and Shari‘ah when solving disputes\, which were used extensively in cases put forth by pearl divers of the time. Despite the Gulf countries’ subscription to the British mandate in the modern period\, Shari‘ah law remained as the prevailing law for citizens. Since Qatari society has always been regulated by a traditional form of social governance\, “it would be majorly incorrect to say that the history of law in Qatar started with the issuance of the official gazette in 1960\,” he explained. With Qatari independence in 1971\, there was an overhaul of the legal system wherein “British courts were eliminated and replaced by the ‘Qatari justice courts\,’” which presides over civil\, commercial\, and criminal law\, while the Shari‘ah court presides over family and inheritance issues. \n \n \nSince the establishment of the hydrocarbon industry in Qatar\, the country’s legal system went through a significant transformation to pave the way for foreign corporate and economic interests and investments. This has been achieved by adopting laws that ease the legal process for doing business\, and by aligning with many of the international norms\, he noted. Currently\, “Qatar is engaged in a tremendous number of high-value projects\,” as “the country is involved with approximately US$250 billion worth of projects related to the preparation of the FIFA World Cup 2022\,” he added. \n \n \nDescribing the legal process itself\, Al-Khulaifi explained that\, in order for one of the ministries to propose issuing a law\, it is first prepared as a “draft” created by specialized legal committees in the Council of Ministers\, which is then presented to the Shura Council for consideration. Upon acceptance\, the Shura Council returns the “draft” to the Council of Ministers to be crafted into its final form and then to be issued by the Office of His Highness the Emir. Once it is signed by His Highness the Emir\, it is sent to the Ministry of Justice for publication in the official Gazette of the State for application in public life. “It is also quite crucial to emphasize that the Qatar legislations are mostly similar in content to the legislations in the Gulf region and the Arab World\,” he continued. \n \n \nIn conclusion\, Al-Khulaifi noted that Qatar was ranked 14th in the 2011-2012 Global Competitiveness Ranking. Since there is such growth in the commercial and business sectors in Qatar\, which are continually expanding\, there should also be vigilance regarding the application of the law\, and dealing with any necessary revision as needed. “This fact should continuously notify the legislator and lawmakers in the country to cope with the ultimate development in the different fields of law by reviewing the existing laws and providing new reliable regulations that would legally protect […] development in Qatar\,” he concluded.Article by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications.Mohammed Abdulaziz Al-Khulaifi graduated from Qatar University with a Bachelor degree in Law (LL.B) in 2007 and received his Master of Laws (LL.M) and Judicial Science Doctorate (J.S.D) degrees from University of California\, Berkeley in 2011. Al-Khulaifi received the State Ph.D. award from H.H. Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani\, the Qatari Emir\, at Qatar Education Excellence Day in 2012. Besides his academic work\, Al-Khulaifi is an authorized Qatari attorney at Abdulaziz Saleh Al-Khulaifi’s law office in Doha. In addition\, he has been consulted by governmental institutions to present his legal opinions on matters related to commercial legislations in the state of Qatar. 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/insights-qatari-legal-system/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140427T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140428T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T000447
CREATED:20140914T150427Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T124123Z
UID:10000864-1398621600-1398708000@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Healthcare Policy and Politics in the Gulf States Working Group I
DESCRIPTION:On April 27-28\, 2014\, CIRS convened the first working group under the research initiative Healthcare Policy and Politics in the Gulf States. Healthcare practitioners\, strategists and social scientists from various disciplinary backgrounds gathered over two days to discuss the rapidly changing health profile of the region\, the existing conditions of health systems\, and the challenges posed to healthcare management across the six countries of the GCC. \n \n \nIn recent decades\, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) governments have heavily invested in socioeconomic development and have increasingly played an instrumental role in the development of healthcare systems. Rapid transformation of health systems took place between the mid-1970s and the early 1990s across the six GCC States. Commonalities between GCC states\, such as geographic location\, political order\, the presence of hydrocarbon reserves\, and the large influx of foreigners into the region\, have created common threads across the healthcare industries of Bahrain\, Saudi Arabia\, Oman\, Kuwait\, Qatar\, and the UAE. The evolution of healthcare systems\, however\, has not been uniform across the region\, with Oman (ranked 8th in the 2000 World Health Report on health systems) and Bahrain experiencing more successful models of development as compared to their Gulf counterparts. The participants attributed this development to two salient features in healthcare planning: local healthcare leadership and progressive planning that focused on comprehensive health services. The healthcare leadership involved in the organization and planning of Oman’s healthcare system in the early 1970s was predominantly comprised of local expertise allowing for models of development that were based on local needs and that were conducive to the local environment catering towards long-term development of the sector. This stands in comparison to the “mercenary mentality” that was characteristic of foreign healthcare leadership in other GCC States. Bahrain was amongst the first in the GCC to set up primary healthcare centers enabling a significant proportion of the population to easily access health services—a sector that continues to be under-developed in other GCC states as they disproportionately give emphasis to secondary and tertiary care.  Despite disparate levels of healthcare services development across the GCC\, the GCC secretariat has adopted some common plans and models that provide a regional approach to the sector. One example is the GCC-wide common purchasing in the pharmaceutical industry\, which started in the mid-1970s and has\, accordingly\, had a major impact on the market. More recently\, GCC ministers of health have agreed to create a unified mental health improvement plan to develop a sector that has long been neglected in the region and that is in need of transformation. \n \n \nWhile GCC healthcare expenditure continues to be on the rise\, there remains a significant gap between investments in healthcare and health outcomes of Gulf citizenry. Rapid urbanization rates and changes in lifestyle have resulted in populations that exhibit a high prevalence of diabetes and obesity (in Qatar\, for instance\, 70% of nationals are overweight and 40% are obese). Chronic non-communicable disease is on the rise in the Gulf and\, as such\, preventive medicine and lifestyle health are of growing importance\, emphasizing a necessary shift from the current focus on secondary curative care.  Moreover\, primary care – considered to be the “gate-keeper” of healthcare models in developed countries around the world – plays a key role in preventive medicine\, emphasizing the need to provide incentives to patients for its utilization. In addition to the type of care\, participants emphasized the need for multidisciplinary teams—incorporating nutrition experts and diabetes educators\, for instance—to effectively prevent a rise in the prevalence of chronic disease. \n \n \nWhile Gulf nationals predominantly suffer from these lifestyle diseases\, the expatriate and migrant populations of the GCC have health profiles that are distinct from nationals.  The three tiered population of the region—comprised of locals\, long-term residents\, and more transient migrant workers—requires Gulf governments to plan accordingly for the health needs of each population. One segment of the population\, short-term migrants\, is largely employed in the construction sectors of the GCC and\, as such\, incorporation of occupational health and safety in the healthcare model is another component that the Gulf is increasingly focusing on. Much like the need for preventive care in the case of lifestyle diseases\, primary needs for occupational health—such as safety assessments and hazard identification—are not healthcare related but are related to prevention. To have an effective systems approach to occupational health however\, a feedback system needs to be incorporated that includes frontline workers and allows for open communication with higher management. Achieving this form of participatory health planning and management\, however\, is very challenging in hierarchical settings that lack labor unions and labor management. \n \n \nIn addition to satisfying the health needs of foreign migrant residents—who comprise the bulk of GCC populations—GCC states have to cope with their reliance on foreign skills to supply their healthcare workforce. This poses broad risks to the region as the excessive reliance on foreign human resources may leave GCC states vulnerable in times of regional sociopolitical instability should there be an exodus of the foreign workforce. In the absence of political crises\, however\, challenges remain. In the hospital setting or workplace where nurses\, physicians\, and staff come from a variety of different cultures\, speak a multitude of languages\, and have been trained under different schools and standards\, the effectiveness of providing care is challenged. Additionally\, the hierarchical social organization that was outlined in the context of the construction industry is also prevalent in hospital settings—much of it due to many of the GCC states’ sponsorship system (kefala) where tenuousness exists in the work-status of foreign staff. This tenuousness affects relationship dynamics between local and foreign staff and between patients and hospital staff. \n \n \nWhile participants of the working group tackled a multitude of topics—ranging from substance abuse in the Gulf to social organization of nursing practices—a common challenge facing scholars studying healthcare in the region is the lack of both available and published data. Thus\, while the industry is rapidly evolving\, scholarship on the topic remains limited and is constrained by the limited availability of information\, underscoring the need for additional research on the area. \n \n \n\nRead the participant bios\nSee the working group schedule\nRead more about this research initiative\n\n \n  \n \n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nMohamad Alameddine\, American University of Beirut\nSamir Al-Adawi\, Sultan Qaboos University\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nMatt Buehler\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nNerida Child Dimasi\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nSuhaila Ghuloum\, Weill Cornell Medical College in Qatar; Hamad Medical Center\nBarb Gillis\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nCother Hajat\, United Arab Emirates University\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nNadir Kheir\, Qatar University\nNabil Kronfol\, Lebanese Healthcare Management Association; Center for Studies on Ageing\nRavinder Mamtani\, Weill Cornell Medical College in Qatar\nTatjana Martinoska\, Enertech Qatar\nSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nDwaa Osman\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nJanet Rankin\, University of Calgary Qatar\nSalman Rawaf\, Imperial College London; WHO Collaborating Center for Public Health Education and Training\nGanesh Seshan\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nRosemary Sokas\, Georgetown University\nElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\n\n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Dwaa Osman\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/healthcare-policy-and-politics-gulf-states-working-group-i/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140427T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140427T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T000447
CREATED:20140915T054415Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T103822Z
UID:10000885-1398585600-1398621600@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Gary Wasserman Lectures on “Why Are We Here (in Doha)?”
DESCRIPTION:Gary Wasserman\, professor of Government at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\, delivered a CIRS Focused Discussionlecture titled\, “Why Are We Here (in Doha)?” on April 27\, 2014. Encouraging discussion among members of the Georgetown University in Qatar community\, Wasserman noted that he did not have an answer to the question posed in the title of the lecture\, but would offer five different possible models that approach an answer. \n \n \nThe first model is to consider Georgetown University in Qatar as an extension of the American imperium. In this model\, the United States offers the Middle East region two of its key capabilities: military bases for regional security\, and US schools providing world class education—in other words\, what political scientists call hard power of economic wealth and military weapons as well as soft power of ideas. In this sense\, Wasserman argued “we are the American superpower in its educational garb.” \n \n \nThese offerings are not necessarily negative and may be key to the current peace and prosperity in much of the world. The limitation to this model\, however\, is that the faculty and educators at Georgetown in Qatar do not necessarily serve as ideal ambassadors of US government policy. They are more likely to dissent\, to question\, and to challenge official US policy in their critical scribblings\, and in their informed debates with students and others\, whether at home or abroad. Moreover\, the Qatari hosts are hardly a passive colonized people; they initiated this relationship\, they pay for it\, and they negotiate the contract under which Georgetown in Qatar operates\, at the least as equals.  \n \n \nOn the opposite end of the spectrum lies the second model offered by Wasserman—the “expat model.” Here\, individual members of the Georgetown community travel abroad to practice their professions; a practical task that is not always integrated into that of any larger\, more idealized notion of a Western institution. In this sense\, he argued\, “we are well-compensated hired help. We are here to fill a job and provide a service that cannot be produced locally; arguably a home-delivered prestige commodity—a Western brand name.” However\, Wasserman’s objection to this model is that\, whether consciously or not\, Georgetown is expected to\, and is in fact\, changing behavior\, as all educational institutions are wont to do. \n \n \nThe third model is the “contract model\,” where Georgetown is obligated to act as a professional school for training diplomats in and for Qatar. The institution was invited by its Qatari hosts to offer some\, but not all\, aspects of the Georgetown college experience\, sanitizing the more controversial elements of US culture and society. Wasserman’s reservations of this model center on the fact that very few of the graduates actually end up in the foreign service\, and so the Georgetown education is far more encompassing than merely a training center for diplomats. “We are in fact as close to a liberal arts college as Education City gets\,” he explained. \n \n \nWhich leads to the fourth model\, that of “liberalism\,” where Georgetown can be seen as spreading secular humanism in the form of the widest possible inquiry and tolerance of freedom of thought and expression\, especially as for those who struggle with social oppression in terms of gender\, race\, or sexual orientation. However\, Wasserman’s objection to the applicability of this model is that even though Georgetown invites students to think for themselves\, the institution is in fact asking them to subscribe to a particular Westernized ideal of thinking. By being in Qatar\, Georgetown must reconcile with the reality that it does not operate in a liberal society that elevates individual thought above all.  Rather it is one where family\, community\, and religious ties are more highly valued. The students from this region are a complex mix of loyalty and obligation to their families and societies\, along with a desire to integrate into globalizing outlooks and identities. This mixed campus experience makes it difficult for Georgetown to “cleanly” deliver the traditional Western ideals of liberalism. Nor should we\, Wasserman stated. \n \n \nThe fifth and concluding model Wasserman offered is what he called “the muddled bubble.” In this model\, Georgetown in Qatar is operating\, without a set blueprint\, in an environment of messy uncertainty. This\, he argued\, will necessarily mean that the institution is at the interface of different and changing cultures. “We occupy what should be an uncomfortable\, unpredictable\, but potentially innovative space\,” he argued. The model of the bubble demands that Georgetown in Qatar seek a degree of autonomy\, not only from potentially reactionary local pressures\, but also from the foreign traditions and interests of the main campus. The “muddled” part of the model\, he explained\, comes from the experimental\, unclear process by which we create an unusual blend of transnational students prepared for an unclear and unique future. Thus\, Wasserman concluded\, we should celebrate our unique position of being muddled “not by a clash of civilizations\, but by a confusion of civilizations.”  \n \n \nArticle by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications.  \n \n \nGary Wasserman has fashioned a career in teaching\, political consulting and writing. Previously he taught graduate students at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Nanjing\, China.  He received his Ph.D. with Distinction from Columbia University. He recently wrote Politics in Action: Cases in Modern American Government (2012)\, and Pearson is publishing the 15th edition of his text\, The Basics of American Politics (2015). His MOOC\, “The Game of American Politics\,” is available online this spring. 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/gary-wasserman-lectures-why-are-we-here-doha/
CATEGORIES:American Studies,Dialogue Series,Distingushed Lectures,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140421T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140421T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T000447
CREATED:20140915T134059Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T124230Z
UID:10000793-1398067200-1398103200@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:New Paradigms for a Palestine in Perpetual Limbo?
DESCRIPTION:Sam Bahour\, Managing Partner at Applied Information Management (AIM)\, Director at the Arab Islamic Bank and a policy adviser to the Al-Shabaka Palestinian Policy Network\, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue lecture on “New Paradigms for a Palestine in Perpetual Limbo\,” on April 21\, 2014\, which centered on the persisting nature of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Bahour explained that it is not just the overt acts of Israeli violence and injustice that Palestine must overcome\, but the “peace industry” itself that has been built around the problem and that paradoxically sustains the struggle even as it attempts to aid in its resolution. A solid superstructure of international NGOs\, human rights organizations\, advocacy groups\, academic think tanks\, cultural programs\, and solidarity groups have been constructed around the conflict\, and thrive off of its existence. \n \n \nBahour argued that Palestine is in a state of perpetual limbo because “today’s Israeli position rests on the assumption that procrastination will continue to tilt the strategic balance increasingly in Israel’s favor.” Decade by decade\, he adumbrated key instances of how power relations between Israel and Palestine were incrementally and consistently skewed in favor of the Israeli state and with the backing\, or indifference\, of much of the international community. The Israeli occupation has ingrained ideological pathologies that do not conceptualize Palestinians as equals or as deserving of equality. “We are not facing a right-wing Israeli government. We are facing the state institution of Israel\, which has embedded within it an exclusivist ideology of Zionism bent on maintaining a world view which gives preferential treatment to Jews\, and is bent on redemption of the land of Israel\,” Bahour explained. \n \n \nIsrael is reticent to reach a final settlement and to put an end to the conflict because of four perceived alternatives to a negotiated agreement—all of which are in Israel’s favor and which undermine the Palestinian position. The first is for Israel to prolong negotiations indefinitely by feigning progress even as it encroaches on Palestinian lands and rights. The second is for Israel to set up a pseudo-provisional two-state arrangement wherein a weakened Palestinian authority masquerades as a Palestinian government. The third is a unilateral separation dictated by Israel\, and the fourth is for Egypt and Jordan to assume control of the occupied territories. \n \n \nHowever\, “Israeli strategic planners overestimate their own strength and underestimate the strategic opportunities available to the Palestinians\,” he said\, as these four Israeli-favored outcomes can be challenged by the reorientation of Palestinian strategy through four new paradigms. These include putting an end to the idea of a two-state negotiation; the reconstitution of the Palestinian authority into a more proactive entity serving Palestinian priorities; the elevation of intelligent resistance over negotiations and the reassertion of national unity through reform of the PLO and eliciting international third-party support; and the shift from a two-state solution to a bi-national or unitary democratic single state. When Palestinians finally concede to the fact that a genuine negotiated outcome is not being offered by the Israelis\, they will be able to conscientiously reject the idea of a two-state solution. \n \n \nShifting to his perspective as a Palestinian parent\, Bahour spoke about how his daughters perceive the future of Palestine. Although his children are aware of the total military occupation that restricts their lives\, their modern and globalized attitude means that they think differently on the same issues\, and have their own opinions on how the conflict should be resolved. Speaking from the perspective of the Palestinian youth generation\, his daughters lamented the futility of fighting against Israel’s behemoth military and nuclear power and expressed their fatigue with decades of struggling for an international law which cannot be implemented. They opted instead to redefine Palestinian self-determination\, and to come up with a radical alternative that is both unimaginable and unacceptable to the older generation of Palestinians: conceding that the Palestinians are powerless to create a viable state under the current conditions\, thus surrendering the Palestinian struggle for statehood in return for their full human\, civil\, and political rights within the structure of the Israeli state. \n \n \n“The issue of Palestine reflects a historical injustice so large and so blatant that its flame refuses to extinguish\,” he argued\, but this new paradigm of self-determination as envisioned by Palestinian youth turns the model of the conflict on its head and defies decades of orchestrated Israeli control with its counter-intuitive offering. Thus\, Bahour concluded\, the youth generation “is at a crossroads between continuing on the statehood path\, which we are losing by the day […] or to drop statehood and call for civil rights.” \n \n \nSam bahour is a Palestinian-American based in Al-Bireh/Ramallah\, Palestine. He is a freelance business consultant operating as Applied Information Management (AIM)\, specializing in business development with a niche focus on start-ups. He was instrumental in the establishment of the Palestine Telecommunications Company and the PLAZA Shopping Center\, and recently completed a full term as a Board of Trustees member at Birzeit University. He serves in various capacities in several community organizations\, including serving as a policy adviser to Al-Shabaka\, the Palestinian Policy Network\, a member of the core Local Reference Group of the Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel (EAPPI)\, and co-founder of the Dalia Association. Sam writes frequently on Palestinian affairs and has been widely published. He is co-editor of HOMELAND: Oral History of Palestine and Palestinians and may be reached at sbahour@gmail.com. He blogs at www.epalestine.com.  \n \n \nArticle by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/new-paradigms-palestine-perpetual-limbo/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140415T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140415T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T000447
CREATED:20140915T053733Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T103851Z
UID:10000883-1397548800-1397584800@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Networked Arab Publics and Contention in the Digital Age
DESCRIPTION:Mohamed Zayani\, Associate Professor at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\, delivered a CIRS Focused Discussion lecture on “Networked Arab Publics and Contention in the Digital Age” on April 15\, 2014. The talk was based on Zayani’s ongoing book project\, which analyzes the changing relationship between media and politics in the Arab world\, especially as it relates to the Arab uprisings in Tunisia. The book provides an ethnographic account of evolving media practices that bring into focus the intricate relationship between the emerging digital culture in the Arab world; youth engagement and youth involvement; cyber dissidence and resistance; and political expression. Zayani was prompted into further investigations on the subject because in much of the literature\, the role of media\, especially social media\, was either highly inflated or unduly analyzed\, leaving little room to cogitate upon the complexities of the nuanced relationship between people\, media\, politics\, and power. \n \n \nExamining the media’s role in the Arab uprisings\, Zayani highlighted the importance of country-specific studies. There has been a tendency to cast the countries of the Arab uprisings into a single homogenous phenomenon under the rubric of the “Arab Spring\,” without paying attention to the important contextual differences between each state. Tunisia proved to be a crucial site of convergence for media\, politics\, and popular contention as it was the first Arab country to connect to the Internet in 1991 and the first overt site of the Arab uprisings. Thus\, Zayani analyzes the correlation between Internet penetration and political change\, arguing that “on the one hand\, the country lived under the rule of a regime that proved adept at modernizing authoritarianism and ensuring regime durability. On the other hand\, the country adopted an avant-garde Internet development model and purposefully sought to build a digital infrastructure that is capable of positioning the country as a model for an aspiring networked society in the age of globalization.” Attempts to balance these two factors was a challenge for the Tunisian regime\, which ultimately collapsed under the pressure of a technologically-equipped and vocalized public. \n \n \nAs Arab media quickly developed during the 1990s creating a virtual public sphere where political issues could be discussed relatively openly\, this schism became even more pronounced. Internet activism was especially propelled by a number of factors including the demographic reality of the region\, which was encompassed in a youth bulge where two-thirds of the Arab world are below the age of 25. “The conundrum was that this significant socio-demographic category has been largely left out of political life – or at least that was the perception.” Importantly\, this significant and growing youthful population was buoyed by two simultaneous phenomena of mass education and mass media\, both of which were significant in their challenge to traditional constructions of authority and advocacy of critical thinking. \n \n \nFocusing on questions of political socialization\, Zayani’s study is geared towards answering a central question: “how do young people become politicized on the Internet?” This goes against the general assumption that Arab youth were\, on the whole\, politically marginalized and disinterested. The events of the Arab uprisings proved the contrary\, and Arab youth exhibited strong political consciousness\, activism\, and engagement. The main overlooked issue is that they tend to express their political stances through means other than formal political structures. \n \n \nThus\, Zayani concluded by noting the importance of challenging traditional categorizations of what it means to be political\, explaining: “My study aims to redirect attention from the formal political institutions of the Arab world to the politics of everyday life.” In this reformulation\, digital contention yields more than just dissidence; it encourages other forms of assertiveness associated with the concept of citizenship. \n \n \nMohamed Zayani is an Affiliate Faculty with the Communication\, Culture and Technology Graduate Program and the 2013-1014 Faculty Fellow with the Center for Regional and International Studies. His works include Reading the Symptom (1999)\, Arab Satellite Television and Politics in the Middle East (2004)\, The Al Jazeera Phenomenon: Critical Perspectives on New Arab Media (2005) and The Culture of Al Jazeera: Inside an Arab Media Giant (2007). He is a recipient of numerous grants\, including a Social Science Research Council grant\, and a Member of the UNESCO Committee of Experts on Cultural Diversity. \n \n \nArticle by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/networked-arab-publics-and-contention-digital-age/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140412T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140413T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T000447
CREATED:20140914T223257Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T124254Z
UID:10000865-1397289600-1397412000@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:The Evolution of Gulf Global Cities Working Group II
DESCRIPTION:On April 12-13\, 2014\, CIRS held the final Working Group of “The Evolution of Gulf Global Cities” research initiative. Academics from various disciplinary backgrounds as well as architects\, urban planners and designers gathered for the second meeting to discuss their research findings and papers around the theme of Gulf cities. The topics discussed ranged in their geographic coverage of the Persian Gulf and in their temporal analysis extending back to the early-twentieth century until the present-day. Elements of continuity and change in the urban landscape were discussed against the political\, cultural and historical backdrop of the Gulf region. \n \n \nRapid urbanization and rising skylines have invigorated academic focus on cities of the Gulf. Opening the discussion\, participants questioned the way in which Gulf cities are discussed in a highly depoliticized manner within popular discourse. Gulf cities are categorically described as transnational and global cities that are also “prosperous\, modern and stable in a larger\, more volatile and impoverished region”—how do these depictions diffuse images of the Gulf that constitute a certain ideological substrate? Discussants problematized the category of “city” itself\, and pushed their analysis further to incorporate more socially and politically nuanced understandings of space. For instance\, how do non-citizens live and fit within the space of the city? How do construction workers who help build the city find their place in these spaces that are generally depicted as transnational and metropolitan yet are highly segregated and limit the mobility of a cohort of its inhabitants? These are all questions that reflect on the current unspoken discursive formations of cities in the Gulf – formations that define ‘cities’ based on narrow and depoliticized interpretations. \n \n \nWhile the current depictions of Gulf cities as “transnational” and “global” assume a historical break and disjuncture with urban characteristics of the pre-oil Gulf\, participants discussed forms of transnational urbanism that were present in the early twentieth-century port cities. With its vast global networks\, the region has always exhibited elements of transnationalism—however\, its urban forms have also historically exhibited a privileging of homogeneity and unity of identity and class; a privileging that has led to the control and a morphological segregation and separation of difference. Looking at pluralism within the historical evolution of Gulf cities indicates that while they may have always been transnational\, they have not been equally cosmopolitan. \n \n \nGiving historical context to these spaces\, Working Group members discussed linkages between territory\, territoriality\, infrastructure\, and nation-building in the Gulf. In the case of the UAE\, infrastructure played a central role during the country’s transformation from an itinerant territory to a fixed one based on oil extraction and subsequently on real estate development. A tool utilized for developing territory\, infrastructure was also utilized by the political rulers as a nation-building medium that formed the essence of Emirati discourses on development\, its modern territorial order\, and ultimately the order of the state. Current major real-estate developers in the UAE—particularly in Dubai—continue to be under the basic control and power of the Emirati rulers\, highlighting real-estate’s distinctive role vis-à-vis the state in promoting economic growth and reinventing the identity of the city. \n \n \nWhile oil and gas revenues have heavily financed infrastructural developments and mega-projects in the Gulf\, recent strides to lay the post-oil era foundation and to develop knowledge-based economies have also influenced their urban fabric. The proliferation of “smart cities\,” cities within cities\, free trade zones\, mixed-use projects and tourism projects are indicative of this transition. Despite rapid urban development\, pockets of historical traditional neighborhoods continue to exist in the Gulf. These spaces provide meaningful insight into the sentiments of residents and their emotional attachment and belonging to place in the midst of the proliferating presence of gated compounds and large houses encapsulated by tall fences. Place identity is a central component of residential satisfaction and as a case-study of traditional neighborhoods in Muscat reveals\, the sense of community that residents ascribe to a place is what gives place meaning. Efforts to reconstruct and rehabilitate traditional neighborhoods around the Gulf—such as Msheireb in Doha\, which envisions bringing the heart of the city back to its roots—in fact risk losing “place-meaning\,” by practicing “place-making” and commoditizing the “traditional.” Across the Gulf\, stressed or “decaying fabrics” of historical areas in Bandar-Abbas experiencing physical and economic decline have expanded throughout the city. While the government has housing plans to renovate these areas\, low-income residents will most likely be pushed to the fringes of the city—exacerbating the “informalization” of their settlements and limiting their right to the city. \n \n \n\nRead the participant bios\nSee the working group schedule\nRead more about this research initiative \n\n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nPooya Alaedini\, University of Tehran\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nMarike Bontenbal\, German University of Technology in Oman\nMatt Buehler\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nNerida Child Dimasi\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nRemah Gharib\, Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies\nBarb Gillis\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nAhmed Kanna\, University of the Pacific\nArang Keshavarzian\, New York University\nSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nDwaa Osman\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nStephen J. Ramos\, University of Georgia\nAshraf M. Salama\, Qatar University\nEvren Tok\, Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies\nElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nFlorian Wiedmann\, Wiedmann Mirincheva Associates\n\n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Dwaa Osman\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/evolution-gulf-global-cities-working-group-ii/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140407T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140407T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T000447
CREATED:20140914T223604Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210829T124431Z
UID:10000866-1396857600-1396893600@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Prehistoric Myths in Modern Political Philosophy
DESCRIPTION:CIRS held its inaugural Faculty Research Workshop on April 7\, 2014\, led by Karl Widerquist\, Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar. Participants were invited to discuss his book titled\, Prehistoric Myths in Modern Political Philosophy. The manuscript is currently in its final stages of preparation and argues that many prominent contemporary political theories rely on false claims about human origins and life in non-state societies. This book shows how several dubious claims became widely accepted premises because they seemed plausible (or even obvious) to Europeans of the early colonial period. It shows how contemporary theories continue to pass on those premises\, often unnoticed and unchallenged\, and it assembles anthropological and archaeological evidence to refute them. Finally\, it discusses the ramifications of these findings for contemporary justifications of property\, inequality\, and the state. \n\nThe CIRS Faculty Research Workshop\, in the form of a closed-door\, one-day seminar\, gathers together a small number of renowned scholars to engage in a focused discussion on a book manuscript that is in its final stages of preparation and has been authored by a member of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar faculty. The gathering consists of a series of structured brainstorming sessions\, through which we engage in a thorough and critical discussion of the book manuscript. All participants will have read the entire manuscript in advance of the meeting and we ask individual scholars to lead focused group discussions on different chapters. \n\nSee the workshop agendaRead about the participants\n\nKarl Widerquist specializes in political philosophy. His research is mostly in the area of distributive justice—the ethics of who has what. He holds two doctorates—one in Political Theory form Oxford University (2006) and one in Economics from the City University of New York (1996). He is the author of Independence\, Propertylessness\, and Basic Income: A Theory of Freedom as the Power to Say (Palgrave Macmillan 2013)\, and coauthor of Economics for Social Workers (Columbia University Press 2002)\, Basic Income: An Anthology of Contemporary Research (Wiley-Blackwell 2013)\, Alaska’s Permanent Fund Dividend: Examining its Suitability as a Model (Palgrave Macmillan 2012)\, Exporting the Alaska Model: Adapting the Permanent Fund Dividend for Reform around the World (Palgrave Macmillan 2012)\, and the Ethics and Economics of the Basic Income Guarantee (Ashgate 2005). He is currently under contract to author or coauthor two more books: Prehistoric Myths in Modern Political Philosophy (Edinburgh University Press 2014) and Justice as the Pursuit of Accord (Palgrave Macmillan 2015).  \n\n\n\nCIRS supported the publication of Karl Widerquist and Grant S.McCall’s book Prehistoric Myths in Modern Political Philosophy (Oxford University Press/Edinburgh University Press\, 2017).
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/prehistoric-myths-modern-political-philosophy/
CATEGORIES:CIRS Faculty Research Workshops
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140324T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140324T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T000447
CREATED:20140915T140945Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T103924Z
UID:10000794-1395648000-1395684000@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Gas and Alternative Fuels: Present and Future Shares and Challenges
DESCRIPTION:Worldwide gas and energy exploration and production trends were the focus of a Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) Monthly Dialogue Series public lecture at Georgetown University in Qatar (GU-Q) on March 24\, 2014. The event\, titled “Gas and Alternative Fuels: Present and Future Shares and Challenges\,” featured H.E. Dr. Seyed Mohammad Hossein Adeli\, the Secretary General of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF)\, an international governmental organization\, which is headquartered in Qatar\, dedicated to promoting the global natural gas trade. \n\n“What do we do in Tornado Tower here in Doha?” asked Dr. Adeli\, who is also Iran’s former ambassador to Japan\, Canada and the United Kingdom\, and holds two Ph.D.s in economics and business administration. He answered\, “Our mission is to provide an authentic platform for the discussion of gas activity and a center for debate and the exchange of ideas\, to promote gas as a clean fuel\, increase the market share of gas\, and contribute to the stability of the global energy market. But our most important task is to develop dialogue throughout the energy market\, to be in contact with other producers\, exporters\, consumers\, academics\, and all other stakeholders.” \n\nDr. Mehran Kamrava\, Director of CIRS\, emphasized the importance of the Monthly Dialogue topic\, saying “We know that natural gas is the cleanest burning fossil fuel\, offering environmental and efficiency advantages over other energy resources. Combined with global energy needs that will only increase over time\, it’s vital that we understand the market and policy forces that will impact the relationship of supply and demand. The implications for Qatar’s economy and\, by extension\, its national vision development goals\, as well as the global economy\, are tremendous\, which is why we were so pleased to host an energy specialist of Dr. Adeli’s caliber on our campus for students\, faculty\, visiting dignitaries\, and the Doha community.” \n\nThe former diplomat discussed gas market dynamics at length\, which includes both liquified natural gas (LNG) and pipeline\, as well as an overview on the latest revolution in the energy sector\, shale oil. “There are huge technically recoverable shale gas resources globally\,” he said\, but noted the negative environmental impact and the required further technological and policy advances to unlock this resource potential. Other challenges faced by the energy sector include security of demand\, environmental impact of coal and the technological gaps “clean coal” still faces\, safety issues associated with nuclear energy\, and the hurdles of subsidies and high infrastructure investment requirements to make renewable energy profitable. \n\nAdeli also compared gas to other competing fuels in the global energy mix\, noting that only natural gas and renewable energy sources\, such as solar\, were on the rise\, as opposed to decreasing coal and oil use. “Gas consumption is increasing by 108 bcm (billion cubic meters) per year\, and needs to come into production\, which means we need enough investment\, development\, and trading to meet demands. Reserves are not enough. This is why it’s important to think about incremental increase per year.” Commenting on the supply side of the gas economy\, he said\, “Of course\, we have an abundance of supply. Most of the supply is resources and reserves that are undeveloped. But existing projects are under development\, and we are hopeful they will enter the streamline of production.” \n\nThe real issue\, he points out\, is the importance of country policies that ensure optimum gas production to meet both internal\, and export\, demands. “The dynamics of the economics of the gas domestic market everywhere is going to affect the external trade of gas. Most gas is traded domestically\, 70%\, and only 30% is traded internationally. When you talk about the Middle East as an exporter\, you have to start at the domestic market first\, assess the subsidies and efficiencies\, to understand how much international exports will take place.” \n\nThe GECF member countries together hold 67% of the world’s gas reserves\, and include Algeria\, Bolivia\, Egypt\, Equatorial Guinea\, Iran\, Libya\, Nigeria\, Oman\, Qatar\, Russia\, Trinidad and Tobago\, the United Arab Emirates\, and Venezuela. Kazakhstan\, Iraq\, the Netherlands\, and Norway have the status of Observer Members. Fossil fuels\, he concluded\, “have the lion’s share in the energy mix. In the power generation sector\, efficiency of natural gas is the highest compared to other fuels at around 58%.” As the demand for energy rises\, gas will continue to serve as a favorable source of energy\, which is good news for Qatar\, and for all of the members of the GECF. \n\nSeyed Mohammad Hossein Adeli is the Secretary General of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF). A career diplomat\, Dr. Adeli has served as Iran’s ambassador to Japan\, Canada\, and the United Kingdom. His previous positions also include Governor of the Central Bank of Iran\, Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic and Energy Affairs\, and Advisor to President of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Upon retiring from the diplomatic corps\, he founded the Ravand Institute for Economic and International Studies\, which is today one of Iran’s premier research and consulting firms. Dr. Adeli holds two PhD degrees\, one in business administration and the other in economics. 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/gas-and-alternative-fuels-present-and-future-shares-and-challenges/
CATEGORIES:American Studies,Dialogue Series,Environmental Studies,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140315T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140316T180000
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CREATED:20140914T223913Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T103943Z
UID:10000867-1394870400-1394992800@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Arab Migrant Communities in the GCC Working Group II
DESCRIPTION:On March 15\, 16 2014\, The final working group of CIRS’ research project Arab Migrant Communities in the GCC was held in Doha. Grant recipients of this research grant cycle gathered with an additional cohort of migration experts and scholars to discuss their research findings and to solicit feedback on their draft paper submissions. The topics investigated ranged from broad migration policies in the GCC and their respective implications on the distribution of nationalities within the population\, to specific ethnographic case-studies highlighting the experiences of Arab expatriates in the Gulf. \n \n \nFrom the onset of the Gulf oil economy in the 1950s to the present era\, the ebbs and flows of Arab emigration to the GCC have largely been attributed to the Middle East’s regional geopolitical context and its influence on national migration policies. While Arab migrants formed a large component of the expatriate community up until the 1980s\, their presence in the Gulf has dwindled as Asian migrants from the East currently significantly outnumber non-GCC Arabs. The participants explained that although much of the literature attributes this shift to the geo-political context\, rapid development\, the ensuing change in Gulf economies and the aggregate increase in demand for low-skilled labor by the private sector has also contributed to the shift in the composition of the expatriate workforce. Labor data from Qatar indicates that non-national Arabs in the Qatari labor force predominantly feature in managerial and administrative sectors\, in professional\, scientific and technical activities\, and in services. Within particular occupations—such as teaching—Arab nationals have continued to have a steady and dominating presence primarily due to the shared linguistic and cultural affinities with nationals\, and as such\, demand for Arab teachers in the region shows no signs of abating. These tied porous identities coupled with the integral role of Arab migrants in teaching and children’s development\, has led to what some have dubbed as the “Egyptianization” of the education field and of local culture and dialects. Thus\, while GCC governments may source labor for low-skilled segments of the economy from various geographic regions\, Arab migrants will continue to have a dominant presence within sectors that require certain shared cultural\, linguistic\, and religious affinities. \n \n \nConcomitant with the rise in import of low-skilled labor has been the increased demand for high-skilled migrants as GCC states strive to develop knowledge-based economies. Participants additionally discussed Arab high-skilled migrants\, particularly those emanating from emigration-prone countries such as Lebanon. Within this cohort\, there is a significant presence of highly skilled female migrants that challenge the commonly perceived notion that Arab migrants to the Gulf are predominantly male. Moreover\, studies within Lebanon indicate that a substantial proportion of Lebanese females migrating to the Gulf are not married\, thereby also undermining the conception that female migrants are only present in their capacity as “sponsored – dependents” within the Gulf countries. \n \n \nBeyond demographics and economic stratification\, Working Group members discussed issues of identity\, transnationalism\, social inclusion and exclusion\, and every-day experiences of Arab expatriates. Interviews with highly-skilled Lebanese in Kuwait have indicated that while the Gulf continues to be an attractive destination for employment\, interaction and integration with nationals remains limited; this is largely attributed to the lack of provision of pathways to citizenship in the Gulf as compared to other popular destinations such as the USA or Europe. These sentiments of exclusion were also echoed by Egyptians residing in Kuwait that have characterized their stay as transitory and fleeting. While the long-standing presence of Egyptian communities in the Gulf has physically manifested itself in the areas of Khaitan and Farwaniya—labeled by some as “Cairo in Kuwait”—it is not uncommon to hear of feelings reflecting a transitory existence and fleeting relationships in Kuwait by Egyptian migrants. \n \n \nHowever\, these sentiments of lack of integration and limited inclusion do not reveal themselves uniformly across Arab communities; the decades-long presence of Arabs in the region has exhibited varying generational experiences and attitudes of migrants in the Gulf. A study of Palestinians in the UAE indicates that second-generation migrants tend to socialize with Emiratis much more than the first generation\, and as such feel more integrated. Other migrants reveal intergenerational tensions between their families and their Gulf sponsors\, as exhibited by the study of second-generation domestic-service Hadrami immigrants in Kuwait. While first generation Hadramis perceive success and dependency on the houses they serve as positively intertwined\, the second generation views this relation as a problematic one that impedes their economic and social mobility. \n \n \nThe participants also discussed outlooks and perceptions of second-generation Arab migrants in comparison to other expatriate nationalities and to GCC nationals within a university setting. Given that the geopolitical context of the region will continue to play a significant role in migratory practices\, student perceptions of the Arab uprisings and their socioeconomic impact on the region as a whole is vital. For instance\, one study indicates that outlooks on the future of the Middle East are not overly hopeful amongst students; surprisingly however\, for both GCC nationals and Arab expatriates alike\, unemployment remains a significant concern for youth. Thus\, the extent to which GCC labor markets will continue to absorb Arab migrants despite insecurities of national unemployment will have significant implications on regional migratory practices in the Middle East and the Gulf. \n \n \n\n	\nFor the working group agenda\, click here \n \n\n	\nFor the participants’ biographies\, click here \n \n\nRead more about this research initiative\n\n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nAbdullah M. Alajmi\, Arab Open University\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nMatt Buehler\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nNerida Child Dimasi\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nFrançoise De Bel-Air\, Institut français du Proche-Orient (IFPO)\nIsmail H. Genc\, American University of Sharjah\nBarb Gillis\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nManal A. Jamal\, James Madison University\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nSusan Kippels\, Sheikh Saud bin Saqr Al Qasimi Foundation for Policy Research\nGarret Maher\, Gulf University for Science and Technology\nSusan Martin\, ISIM – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service\nDavid Mednicoff\, University of Massachusetts – Amherst\nSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nGeorge Naufal\, American University of Sharjah\nMichael Newson\, International Organization for Migration\nGerd Nonneman\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nDwaa Osman\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nNatasha Ridge\, Sheikh Saud bin Saqr Al Qasimi Foundation for Policy Research\nNada Soudy\, Carnegie Mellon University in Qatar\nPaul Tacon\, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia\nAbbie Taylor\, ISIM – Georgetown University\nCarlos Vargas-Silva\, University of Oxford\nElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\n\n \nArticle by Dwaa Osman\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/arab-migrant-communities-gcc-working-group-ii/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140217T110000
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DTSTAMP:20260405T000447
CREATED:20140915T141259Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210901T124339Z
UID:10000795-1392634800-1392670800@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Why did the Arab Spring miss the Maghreb?
DESCRIPTION:Matt Buehler\, the 2013-2014 Postdoctoral Fellow at CIRS\, delivered aMonthly Dialogue lecture on“Why did the Arab Spring miss the Maghreb? Continuity through Co-optation in Morocco and Mauritania\,” on February 17\, 2014. The talk summarized the results of in-depth fieldwork undertaken in Morocco and Mauritania\, where Buehler conducted over 100 interviews with politicians and policymakers. The central question guiding Buehler’s research was\, “Under what conditions did an Arab regime survive the Arab Spring?” Some popular theories currently on offer by scholars propose that monarchical states that have a wealth of natural resources\, a long history of military loyalty\, and a strategy of appeasing indigenous ethnic groups are more resilient and better equipped to overcome civil unrest than nations that do not enjoy similar privileges. In order to put these theories to the test\, Buehler argued that it was first necessary to outline the key infrastructural and political differences exhibited by his case study countries of Morocco and Mauritania. \n \n \nGiving some background to Morocco and Mauritania’s political structures\, Buehler challenged the prevalent thesis of the “monarchical exception\,” which states “that monarchies seemed to persist longer than non-monarchies.” He explained that\, for these two countries\, the regime’s mode of governance mattered little for authoritarian persistence\, as both states were able to weather the storm of protests that shook their governments in 2011 and 2012\, despite the fact that Morocco is a monarchy and Mauritania is not.” \n \n \nAnother theory Buehler examined suggests that countries with a wealth of natural resources\, such as the Arab countries of the Gulf\, will necessarily overcome civic discord by dint of their ability to placate any opposition by offering a series of concessions. However\, although Morocco has substantial natural resources\, Mauritania is poor in terms of natural endowments. Yet\, they both were able to stave off any serious opposition. This theory too\, Buehler argued\, was unsustainable. \n \n \nObservers argue that military loyalty is another crucial characteristic of regime survival\, and that the perseverance of Arab regimes depended on the degree of support given by the powerful underlying military state apparatus. The collapse of governments in Egypt and Tunisia are given as key examples. Yet\, Buehler argued\, whereas Morocco has a history of military loyalty\, “in Mauritania\, by contrast\, there is a very long history of military coups—every single Mauritanian president has been ousted by a coup.” \n \n \nFurther theories logically state that successful integration and assimilation of diverse ethnic minorities is necessarily a means of avoiding internal friction. “In some Arab countries\, maybe in Bahrain\, maybe in Syria\, you might think marginalized ethnic minorities seized the opportunity of the Arab Spring to assert their demands\,” Buehler said. However\, he pointed out that Morocco has done much to integrate its once marginalized ethnic groups\, but Mauritania made no such progress. Thus\, once again\, “we can’t say that ethnic integration was a very important factor in driving this process\,” he said. \n \n \nAfter having outlined the key dissimilarities between the two states\, the key question remains “what is the commonality in Moroccan and Mauritanian strategies of survival?” He answered this by saying that “these two regimes employed a very crafty\, robust strategy of co-optation\, which they used to build certain political parties—pro-regime political parties.” In order to study the much abused and complex phenomenon of “co-optation” more closely\, Buehler conducted a series of statistical tests throughout Morocco and Mauritania to gauge the extent of regime infiltration into rural politics. Buehler’s research findings conclude that Morocco and Mauritania’s strength “was their ability to monopolize the rural structures of power in order to buttress their rule during the Arab Spring.” \n \n \nIn sum\, Buehler warned against the simplistic categorization of Arab states\, and argued that there was no definitive answer as to why some regimes fell\, whilst others overcame popular unrest in the long run. As his research in Morocco and Mauritania attests\, both governments exhibited resilience in the face of the uprisings\, despite their fundamental differences in terms of political structure\, resource wealth\, military loyalty\, and ethnic integration. \n \n \nDr. Matt Buehler holds a PhD degree in government from the University of Texas at ‎Austin and he will begin ‎a tenure-track position at the University of Tennessee’s Department of Political ‎Science in fall 2014. Dr. Buehler has done extensive fieldwork in Tunisia\, ‎Morocco\, and Mauritania\, and is currently working on a book tentatively entitled The Social Base of Divide-and-Rule: Left-‎Islamist Opposition Alliances in North Africa’s Arab Spring. \n \n \nArticle by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/why-did-arab-spring-miss-maghreb/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140215T080000
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DTSTAMP:20260405T000447
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LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T104016Z
UID:10000868-1392451200-1392573600@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Transitional Justice in the Middle East - Working Group I
DESCRIPTION:On February 15-16\, 2014\, Regional and international experts gathered for the inaugural meeting of the CIRS “Transitional Justice in the Middle East” research initiative. While much of the scholarship on transitional justice has been conducted in other regions of the globe\, recent political transitions in the region have invigorated studies on the manifestation and application of transitional justice mechanisms in the Middle East. Various topics ranging from the theoretical underpinnings and scope of transitional justice to specific case-studies of Middle Eastern experiences related to reconciliation\, and restorative and retributive justice were discussed by the multi-disciplinary working group participants. \n \n \nIn beginning the discussion on transitional justice in the Middle East\, participants drew on past and current experiences of countries from around the globe in order to identify the most salient markers studied in the field. Studying transitional justice in a comparative perspective however\, has revealed that assessing its impact is not a seamless activity as the process itself continues to have shifting goals. Within transitional justice\, there is a myriad of objectives related to retributive justice\, deterrence\, vindication of victims\, and reconciliation that both practitioners and academics discuss and refer to. However\, each of these benchmarks remains elusive with regards to whom they address\, what form or shape they take\, and the mechanisms and institutions that are used to address them. For instance with regards to the vindication of victims\, the diversity in types of victims and the fact that the requirements of victims change over time\, further complicate the objectives. \n \n \nMoreover\, it is not clear how practitioners and scholars define victim-centered justice. At times\, and particularly in Islamic law and teachings\, there exists a structural tension between forgiveness and societal reconciliation and the private rights of retribution for the individual victim. A victim-centric approach would more actively advocate for the individual’s right to justice. In addition\, the scope of transitional justice is also a contested issue. While in the past it has primarily been about accountability for gross violations to human rights—particularly in relation to bodily harm—it has expanded its remit and is increasingly connected to development policy\, and economic\, social and cultural rights. This is particularly salient in the context of the recent uprisings in the Middle East\, where criminal liability for monetary and political corruption has been put on the transitional justice agenda. \n \n \nPart of the difficulty in defining goals and assessing impact lies in the issue of local versus international ownership over transitional justice processes. Since the 1990s\, mechanisms and processes of transitional justice have been heavily internationally driven and funded. Thus\, assessing where the demand for various goals stems from and the level of local ownership are vital when discussing case-studies of transitional justice and their respective impact. Concomitantly\, the local power dynamics that are at play in articulating demands also provide insight into why particular actors advocate for certain temporal boundaries of transitional justice as well as various mechanisms and institutional designs to deal with past injustices. Political parties and actors in Tunisia that have borne the brunt of state repression since the state’s independence\, particularly Ennahda\, have advocated for longer temporal boundaries of transitional justice that predate Ben Ali’s regime and extend back to the founding of the Tunisian state in 1956. In opting for a longer temporal boundary of transitional justice\, it is evident that Ennahda seeks to “deconstruct modernist narratives” of both Ben Ali and Bourguiba and to delegitimize the older political order. Other groups\, such as women that have been victims of state repression\, have sought to correct historical narratives of Tunisia’s state feminism and perceptions of women’s rights in Tunisia as being the most advanced in the Arab world. Ennahda women and women affiliated with Ennahda supporters are actively seeking in this transitory phase to provide accurate narratives about what the status was for all women in Ben Ali’s Tunisia by speaking out about gender injustices. \n \n \nMemories and narratives about the past are an integral part of a society’s transition post-conflict. There are more formal processes of truth telling and dealing with the past such as truth and reconciliation commissions and trials and tribunals; many of these visible processes however\, have been adopted by the state. Other informal processes involve civil society\, cultural production\, and non-recorded narratives. In dealing with the past\, participants specifically discussed martyrdom in North Africa and its role in transitional periods. Martyrs are employed into state-building efforts and the political agendas of political actors\, exemplifying how the past serves an agenda for the future; the FLN in Algeria\, for instance\, based a lot of its political strategies on mujahedeen or martyrs. Martyrs have also been deployed by citizens of the state\, as is the case in Tunisia\, who have advocated for communal reparations for those that have died during the protests and have simultaneously promoted a distributary vision of the state as seen in the slogan Haq Al-Thawra or “right of the revolution.” \n \n \nIn various post-atrocity transitions around the world\, constitutional development has been intertwined with the process of transitional justice. In dealing with past grievances and planning for the future\, constitutions provide a method of creating\, shaping and allocating power. Working group participants discussed the successful example of constitutional development in post-apartheid South Africa and the particular sequencing of the process. Dealing with injustices of the past presumes that the transitional justice process is a selective process that emphasizes certain problems and actors to the exclusion of others. While advantaging groups who were previously repressed\, transitional justice can also create obstacles to visiting certain issues by marginalizing them during the initial process. They can also be damaging by reifying particular solutions which become problematic for society in the long-run. Participants further questioned whether there is a trade-off between the timing and depth of transitional justice. In the South African example\, a consociational government drafted the interim constitution. Contrasted to the current situation in Libya\, where the presence of militias has created a “shallow” form of justice and where political isolation of previous regime members has taken worse form than de-Baathification in Iraq. Participants further discussed how structural constraints related to the ancien regime can also pose challenges to institutional development and the promotion of human rights—two areas that are closely linked with transitional justice processes. Where the security sector has been implicated in human rights violations and lacks accountability\, security sector reform is a focal point of institutional development. In Egypt\, the continued dominant role of the army has hindered efforts of security sector reform—reform that is particularly concerned with citizen and human security rather than that of the ruling powers. Although transitional justice promotes the development of constitutions and institutional reform\, whether it creates systems that align with values that are beneficial to societies in the long-run\, depends on a multitude of vital factors. \n \n \nWhile discussing constitutional development and transition\, participants noted the faulty assumption that transitional justice is linked to democratization and that the endpoint to the transition is in the form of a liberal democratic system. In fact\, in some cases such as the monarchies of Bahrain and Morocco\, transitional justice mechanisms have been implemented without the preface of political transition. Evidently\, in these cases\, democratization is not the end goal\, but rather\, the implementation of these mechanisms may enable monarchs to gain political capital both locally and internationally. In the absence of political transition the efficacy of truth commissions and the commissions of inquiry in Morocco and Bahrain\, respectively\, were discussed. In addition to the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms in countries without political change\, participants also discussed plans for transitional justice in cases of ongoing conflict—specifically\, in Syria where members of the opposition have already drafted detailed plans for transitional justice. \n \n \n\nRead the participant bios\nSee the working group schedule \nRead more about this research initiative \n\n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nRogaia Abusharaf\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nMohamed Arafa\, Alexandria University\nOmar Ashour\, University of Exeter\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nMietek Boduszynski\, Pomona College\nMatt Buehler\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nThomas DeGeorges\, American University of Sharjah\nMohammad Fadel\, University of Toronto\nElham Fakhro\, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nDoris H. Gray\, Al Akhawayn University\nSune Haugbølle\, Roskilde University\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nChristopher Lamont\, University of Groningen\nClark Lombardi\, University of Washington\nSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nDwaa Osman\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nChandra Lekha Sriram\, University of East London\nIbrahim Sharqieh\, Brookings Doha Center\nSusan E. Waltz\, University of Michigan\nElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\n\n \n  \n \n \n​Article by Dwaa Osman\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/transitional-justice-middle-east-working-group-i/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140212T110000
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DTSTAMP:20260405T000447
CREATED:20140915T053104Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T104021Z
UID:10000881-1392202800-1392238800@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:The Paradox of Renewable Energy in Qatar
DESCRIPTION:Omran Al-Kuwari\, co-founder and CEO of GreenGulf\, delivered a CIRS Focused Discussion lecture on “The Paradox of Renewable Energy in Qatar” on February 12\, 2014. The talk was centered on the drivers of investing in renewable energy in the context of Qatar\, and how these have been radically transformed over recent years. The Gulf is seen as a single market\, Al-Kuwari said\, but it is important to point out the differences between the various regional states. “Qatar is a very unique country in the Gulf\,” as “it is the only country in the world that you can safely say has enough gas and enough power to supply itself and to export for the foreseeable future.” Qatar is in a favorable position because of its large natural gas reserves\, which has provided an increasingly advantageous energy option for a new generation of people. \n\nAl-Kuwari gave a brief historical overview of the Gulf region’s hydrocarbon exploitation efforts. The largest gas reserves in the world were discovered in the North Field between Qatar and Iran about thirty years ago. At the time\, this discovery was greeted with disappointment as natural gas commanded little value\, and was seen as inferior to oil and other hydrocarbons\, which were driving the global economy. However\, over the years\, as technology advanced\, and as environmental issues became more pertinent\, “gas became the fuel of choice for power production\,” he said. \n\nCurrently\, “Qatar is the only country in the GCC that could supply all its power—100%—from gas\,” meaning that it can exploit its oil reserves purely for export and revenue generation. Other countries in the region like Saudi Arabia\, Kuwait\, and Oman rely on oil to generate power supplies to drive their own national economies as well as international ones\, and so must divide oil reserves between national needs and international requirements. Such a model\, Al-Kuwari argued\, is ultimately unsustainable as these countries are burning their own oil\, which leads to loss of export revenue\, the rapid depletion of the resource\, as well as increased pollution. Thus\, “renewable energy has become a necessity\,” he said. In the Gulf\, this is a necessity that stems purely from an economic perspective\, regardless of the positive ideological and environmental advantages renewable energy offers. Oil and gas reserves will gradually become depleted\, and nuclear energy will take a long time to establish\, if at all. Renewable energy is actually the only viable alternative for many of the regional states\, as well as international ones. \n\n“Solar energy\,” Al-Kuwari said “is low-hanging fruit in the region” because of the large amount of predictable sunlight – on average\, the region receives ten hours a day in comparison to only five hours in other parts of the world. Al-Kuwari explained that “solar energy actually fits with our needs…it’s a good match for our region\, and it’s a good match for Qatar\, and it is easy to implement” because it is a resource that can be used to generate immediate power and does not even necessarily need to be stored. The paradox\, Al-Kuwari argued\, is why countries in the region have not taken full advantage of this abundant\, natural resource and why there is so much sunlight\, and yet so little infrastructure geared towards harnessing solar power. This paradox exists for two reasons\, he explained. The first is related to the question of cost and the second is related to lack of demand. While these prohibitive reasons were valid in the past\, the circumstances have now changed. Due to technological advancements in the area of renewable energies\, the costs have now been considerably reduced. Demand has simultaneously been increased because of an increase in population in all the countries of the region as well as an increase in industry and output. \n\nBecause Qatar is in a unique position in terms of having excess energy\, the decision-makers have the luxury of creating these projects from their foundation in a deliberate and efficient way that makes sense for the future. Importantly\, Al-Kuwari noted\, “because of Qatar’s long-term interest in becoming more of a diversified economy\,” these initiatives are being built from the ground up\, and are being established all across the country in a simultaneous and synergistic manner that makes cohesive and efficient sense. Currently\, GreenGulf is involved in multiple projects and encouraging the use of solar energy as a highly efficient and clean energy source that will ultimately lead to more awareness and education regarding the benefits of clean technologies. \n\nOmran Al-Kuwari is the co-founder and CEO of GreenGulf\, a clean technology and renewable energy advisory business focused on the development and management of renewable energy in the Middle East\, North Africa and Asia. He is an energy professional with over 10 year experience in the Energy Industry. After joining Qatargas in 1999\, Al-Kuwari worked for several joint ventures\, Qatar Petroleum affiliates and ExxonMobil in Doha and the United Kingdom. He was General Manager and Director of South hook Gas Company in London until August 2009\, Qatar Petroleum’s first major LNG trading venture abroad and the UK’s largest LNG importer. Al-Kuwari holds a BA in Business Administration from the George Washington University\, and an MBA from City University London. His research has focused on “Renewable Energy in Qatar” in 2010. \n\nArticle by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/paradox-renewable-energy-qatar/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Environmental Studies,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140120T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140120T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T000447
CREATED:20140915T061109Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T104028Z
UID:10000896-1390204800-1390240800@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Sustainable Development for ‎Economies and Corporations
DESCRIPTION:R. Seetharaman\, Group Chief Executive Officer of Doha Bank‎\, delivered the first ‎CIRS ‎Monthly ‎Dialogue of 2014 with a lecture on “Sustainable Development for ‎Economies ‎and ‎Corporations”‎ ‎on January 20\, 2014‎. Drawing on his experience as the head of a major ‎financial institution\, he explained how\, as a result of the global financial crisis\, ‎economic ‎systems ‎all over the world ‏have been shaken to their core and forced to undergo massive ‎transformations ‎at a fundamental ‎level. These global financial institutions have had to align ‎themselves according to a new world ‎order of financial market re-regulation in the interest of ‎creating ‎more ‎conservative\, cautious\, and sustainable global economies. ‎ \n \n \nSeetharaman adumbrated the unprecedented circumstances that affected global financial systems ‎over the past few years\, including the liquidity crisis that turned into a funding and solvency ‎crisis where entire nations such as Greece and Iceland experienced far-reaching economic ‎collapse. In these cases\, he argued\, politics and economics did not speak to each other on the ‎level of convergence that they should have. The liquidity crisis was addressed by unstable and ‎short-term solutions\, such as printing more money to improve the cash flow and to stabilize stock ‎markets\, but this was ultimately unsustainable. The problem was patched up on a superficial level\, ‎but the fundamental roots of the economic crisis remained. Because “we live in an ‎interconnected\, interdependent world\,” currency markets and commodity markets are ‎intertwined\, and what affects one affects the other. ‎ \n \n \nReeling from years of global economic stagnation and recession\, governments\, corporations\, ‎and ‎financial institutions have realized that massive overhauls in the system are necessary\, ‎Seetharaman ‎explained. “This crisis is an opportunity for the new world order\,” he advised. The ‎type of rapacious corporate capitalism and market speculation that defined the last few ‎decades ‎of deregulated market economies have altered in form and substance. Similarly\, countries that ‎adhered to a socialist structure of economic governance have also ‎found it necessary to change ‎their financial structures\, and have been making concerted efforts to end their isolation and ‎connect with the global ‎economy. In fact\, Seetharaman said\, these two formerly oppositional ‎economic ‎philosophies are increasingly becoming intertwined for a more effective and sustainable ‎economic ‎reality. “Mixed economies are the game changers. We have seen the emerging markets ‎incrementally producing ‎over 60% of gross domestic product in terms of global growth\, and ‎these economies have to be an integral part of the order of inclusive growth. This is why the G7 ‎has become the G8\, and G8 has become G20\,” he said. ‎ \n \n \nBecause financial institutions operate as much on public money as they do on private shareholder ‎assets\, the public-private partnership model is the most sustainable way of moving forward\, ‎Seetharaman advised. Taking the example of Doha Bank\, Seetharaman argued that private ‎shareholder money accounts for approximately 11 billion\, and yet customer deposits account for ‎an enormous 35 billion. It thus becomes obvious that even if a financial institution is private\, it is ‎often\, in reality\, public. The global financial crisis revealed that the public is in fact an important ‎stakeholder whose investments must be protected and not gambled with. “Whether you run a ‎socially responsible mission as a corporate head or a country head\, you have to practice social ‎responsibility. That way\, you will take care of all the stakeholders\,” he explained.‎ \n \n \nIn conclusion\, Seetharaman argued that because of the increase in patterns of globalized ‎connectivity on all levels\, ‎whether in terms of financial markets or broader issues of climate ‎change\, governance systems all over the ‎world must attempt to adhere to the same ethical\, ‎socially-responsible\, and sustainable standards. At the universal level\, we need to “set new ‎initiatives that are responsive to see the ‎United ‎Nation‏‎’s ‎mission ‎for eradication of extreme ‎poverty\,‎‏ ‏gender ‎equality\, ‎‏economic ‎sustainability\,‎‏ ‏primary ‎healthcare\,‎‏ ‏education‏\,‏‎ global ‎collaborations‏‎\,” he concluded.‎ \n \n \nDr. R. Seetharaman (www.seetharaman.org)\, Group Chief Executive Officer of Doha Bank\, is ‎a ‎recipient of ‎multiple doctorates from leading universities of the world\, including a PhD in ‎Global ‎Governance by European ‎University and Doctorate of Laws by Washington College. He ‎is a ‎Chartered Accountant and holds certificates ‎in IT Systems and Corporate Management. He ‎has ‎been named “Best CEO in Middle East” and “World Leader ‎Business Person” and is a ‎recipient ‎of “The Gullands Excellence Award as a Phenomenal Banker.” A regular ‎commentator ‎on ‎international finance in global media outfits such as BBC\, CNN\, FOX\, CNBC\, Sky ‎News\, ‎ABC\, ‎and Bloomberg\, he has transformed Doha Bank as one of the best performing ‎Banks in the ‎Middle East region.‎Article by Suzi Mirgani\, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/sustainable-development-economies-and-corporations/
CATEGORIES:American Studies,Dialogue Series,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140107T080000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20140108T180000
DTSTAMP:20260405T000447
CREATED:20140914T224644Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T104053Z
UID:10000869-1389081600-1389204000@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Social Currents in the Maghreb Working Group I
DESCRIPTION:On January 7-8\, 2014\, CIRS held its inaugural Social Currents in the Maghreb Working Group in Washington D.C. While much of the mainstream media and recent scholarship on the Maghreb has focused on the political and security dimensions of the region\, participants gathered over two days to discuss the social changes and fluxes in contemporary Morocco\, Libya\, Tunisia\, Algeria\, and Mauritania. The Working Group provided an avenue of deliberation on social issues that precede the recent political transformations of the region\, and sought to examine the complex trajectory of its existing societal conditions. \n \n \nAs highlighted above\, much of the recent debates on the Maghreb have revolved around political transformations\, and more specifically on their relation to Islamic movements in the context of the Arab Spring. While the historical trajectory of Islamic movements and parties has generally been accounted for\, the internal dynamics of political parties have largely been neglected in the scholarship. Working Group participants highlighted the dynamics between Islamists and leaders of various political parties as well as generational dynamics within the parties. Political parties and movements as a unit of analysis need to incorporate internal notions of ideological hybridity that not only challenge the status-quo of the country’s political landscape\, but also of the movements’ longstanding policies and strategies. These internal subtleties allude to the ideological innovation of Islamic movements that move beyond the traditional prism of analysis of “moderation through inclusion” or “radicalization through repression”. \n \n \nIn addition to political parties and political Islam\, participants discussed religious practice and the anthropology of Salafism and Sufism. In the context of the latter\, Sufi observances and religious pilgrimages by the Tijaniyyah who migrate from West Africa to the Maghreb\, have created economic and social networks that permeate the two regions. While the Tijaniyyah movement has largely expanded to West Africa\, these Sufi networks have also traditionally served as vital linkages of knowledge production. \n \n \nAnother thread connecting the Maghreb to West Africa and the Sahel is the transnational element of Amazigh movements. While most scholars have focused on political and social struggles of the Amazighs in Algeria and Morocco in isolation\, their movements have become increasingly transnational in nature as they incorporate other Amazighs or social groups such as the Tuareg\, in their politics. With these attempts to create transnational connections comes a sense of national ambivalence as questions of identity are pushed to the forefront with regards to “Africanity” and “Amazigh-ness”. These questions do not allude to deep ethnic tensions between a certain social group and their respective national counterparts\, but rather serve to highlight contemporary politics and how it emerges in a changing political system with relative political openings or closings. \n \n \nHybrid identities were also discussed in the context of the Haratine in Mauritania. The Haratine\, or people of slave descent\, currently experience different levels of political and social subservience. The Haratine are also not a homogenous group and identify themselves as Arabs\, Berbers\, African\, and Mauritanian. Identity\, which may also be used as a political tool\, directly affects the strategic alliances that the Haratine movement builds in order to further its political cause in Mauritania. While much of the movement’s emphasis has been on political and social subordination\, economic emancipation has not been effectively addressed by the movement nor experienced by the Haratine today. \n \n \nOther movements such as the Polisario in Western Sahara have not gained much footing in their political trajectory but have secured greater access to economic funds. Contrary to conventional wisdom about the armed movement\, the Polisario has increasingly diversified its portfolio of economic and developmental funding to include non-state sources beyond Algeria. Resources from civil society organizations and family members abroad broaden the Polisario movement’s economic base of support and simultaneously affect the activities and investments of the movement. \n \n \nIn addition to identity politics\, the politics of language and its historical\, economic and social salience were discussed. The language of instruction in Moroccan schools for instance\, has largely been caught between the dual and seemingly contradictory goals of cultural and linguistic preservation (e.g. Arabic or Berber) and the necessity of equipping graduates with languages that meet global market needs (e.g. French or English). The language of instruction in the Moroccan education system is fragmented where Arabic is utilized in public primary schools and French in higher education. This tends to exacerbate the hurdles that socio-economically disadvantaged populations face in attaining social mobility as they move from one educational level to another. This linguistic fragmentation in the education system can be contrasted to the linguistic hybridity that is increasingly incorporated into the artistic expression of the youth. The incorporation of the Darija (colloquial Arabic) into cultural forms produced by youth serves as a means to deconstruct issues of identity and provides an underlying commentary on the language of politics as being distant from the everyday life; this artistic utilization of linguistic hybridity by youth was identified as an element of youth’s cultural and social entrepreneurship in the contemporary Maghreb. \n \n \nParallel to the politics of linguistic preservation\, participants discussed movements of cultural preservation\, specifically as it relates to Jews of North Africa. Jewish presence in Morocco and Tunisia has significantly diluted since the pre-independence era\, and concomitantly\, efforts to conserve and renovate Jewish heritage sites have been on the rise. While these preservation projects serve to keep the memory of the Jewish community in North Africa alive\, the politics of preservation also indicate that these movements seek to reify Jews to a past rather than an ongoing present. \n \n \nSports in relation to migration\, identity and political transitions in the Maghreb were also topics tackled by the participants. While Europe has been the main destination for athletes\, the GCC has more recently become a new lucrative destination for youth from the Maghreb. Issues related to reverse migration of athletes\, their sense of belonging\, and identity construction around religion and language are of interest in comparing the Gulf and Europe as prime sport destinations. Moreover\, with the political transitions in the region\, regimes have utilized sports for various strategic interests such as the promotion of reconciliation in Algeria or the rebuilding of the national sport system in Libya after decades of neglect by Qaddafi. \n \n \nThese societal threads\, from social movements by marginalized groups to the language employed by youth in artistic expression\, collectively shed light on the social underpinnings of the contemporary Maghreb.  \n \n \n\nRead the participant bios\nSee the working group schedule \nRead more about this research initiative \n\n \nParticipants and Discussants: \n \n \n\nOsama Abi-Mershed\, CCAS – Georgetown University\nLahouari Addi\, Centre de Recherche en Anthropologie Sociale et Culturelle (CRASC)\nMahfoud Amara\, Loughborough University\nNéjib Ayachi\, Maghreb Center\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nAomar Boum\, University of Arizona\nCharis Boutieri\, King’s College London\nAlice Bullard\, IRA-USA\nFrancesco Cavatorta\, Université Laval\nMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nRicardo René Larémont\, Binghamton University\nWilliam Lawrence\, George Washington University\nDwaa Osman\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nZekeria Ould Ahmed Salem\, University of Nouakchott\nPaul Silverstein\, Reed College\nLoubna Skalli-Hanna\, American University\nElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar\nAlice Wilson\, University of Cambridge\n\n \nArticle by Dwaa Osman\, Research Analyst at CIRS​
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/social-currents-maghreb-working-group-i/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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