Transitions in Qatar’s Architectural Identity
2016-09-26 18:00 - 20:00 (Europe/Moscow)
Ibrahim Mohamed Jaidah, renowned Qatari Architect and Group CEO & Chief Architect of the Arab Engineering Bureau, was invited to deliver the inaugural CIRS Monthly Dialogue of the 2016-2017 academic year with a lecture on “Transitions in Qatar’s Architectural Identity” on September 26, 2016. The talk focused on the definitions of Qatari architecture; its history, influences, aesthetics, and the future of its development.

Jaidah explained that the history of the Gulf region in general, and Qatar in particular, has always been one of global influences through trade routes and contact with neighboring countries and cultures including Basra, Najd, Zanzibar, India, and Iran, among many others. Qatari culture, he said, has always been a blend of borrowings “from the way we dress, to our dialogue, to our cuisine, to our music,” and to the diversity of the local architecture. These are all products of historical learning.

Defining the history of Qatari architecture, Jaidah noted that it falls into broad time periods that can be categorized according to pre- and post-oil styles of development. He explained that, in a few decades, Qatar achieved what other nations strived to accomplish over centuries, and this incredibly rapid growth has had massive effects on the nation and its architectural growth and design. The transition from one period into another occurred relatively rapidly, where Qatari architecture that was once defined by haphazard mud houses in the pre-oil period, was quickly transformed with oil wealth in the immediate post-oil period to encompass a growing town defined by cement and bricks, and, in the contemporary period, a global city brandishing steel and glass towers.

The invention of cultured pearls in Japan in the 1930s brought about the decimation of the pearling industry in Qatar—its primary source of wealth—plunging the nation into poverty and affecting its architectural development. “In the pre-oil period,” he recalled, “the architecture was quite straightforward; simple houses, courtyard houses, that expanded as the families required.” The architecture of this time period was defined by respect to the environment, sourcing local materials and building according to optimum orientations to make best use of the natural weather conditions. Jaidah noted that “all natural materials were used, and that is why it was responsive to the environment and it was pleasant to live in.” In fact, “the only thing that was brought from abroad was the wood—because we didn’t have enough trees—which we call the danshal was brought from either Zanzibar, from Iran—usually recycled from other buildings—and from India,” he said.

The discovery of oil a few years later, set Qatar onto the path of industrial wealth and with it immediate effects on the growth of the urban environment. Although the styles of the buildings and the arcades remained largely the same, natural materials were gradually being replaced by cement and bricks and architectural lines became more even and straight. In central Doha, “the clock tower, I think, is one of the most important buildings, because it was the start of the new construction,” made of concrete and other manmade materials. The old Ottoman fort that was the center of administrative rule, was replaced with the first diwan amiri. “As soon as the Ottomans left, the first thing the ruler did was to build the diwan amiri there in different stages because it had the most prime and historical control of the whole bay,” Jaidah explained. This transitional period was defined by a blending of natural and manmade materials that were combined within the same buildings.

This immediate post-oil period was defined by increasing incoming wealth, which was being transformed into the design of the local landscape. Prosperous residents were able to commission, for the first time, architects from India, Pakistan, and Lebanon to build unique, art deco designs, full of motifs and symbolic flourishes, or what Jaidah calls, “Arabian deco.” During this period, there was a whole era in the 50s that, unfortunately until today, is not considered as part of Qatar’s history, and so buildings have been systematically demolished to make way for the new high-rises and urban developments. Jaidah noted that he had an opportunity to preserve some of these buildings, and to document others, before they were demolished. Today, the renovation of the Fire Station building and its re-purposing to accommodate art initiatives and galleries is an example of preserving the early modern history of Qatar. He noted that these buildings are crucial to the story of Doha; “it doesn’t have to be a mud house to become history. Our modern history is what is forming the new generation.”

In what Jaidah describes as the contemporary “post-oil period,” there was a boom of construction and urban developments in the 1990s and 2000s, especially with massive land reclamation projects and the development of West Bay, Lusail, and the Pearl island. With the government’s announcement that it would rent buildings and offices in West Bay, a construction race took place to take advantage of the new policy, leading to massive growth in the construction and infrastructure sectors. However, Jaidah said, “there was a sort of scary moment because architecture became a commodity,” and towers were being constructed within a few short months. In this period, architecture became more about unique, innovative, fashionable, and flagship designs that completed with each other, and with other countries, rather than serving a function or harmoniously fitting within the exiting cityscape. Jaidah admits that during this period, not many of these construction were environmentally sustainable and “mistakes happened” in the rush to compete.

However, he argued in conclusion, “there was a wakeup call,” and new regulations were put in place to guarantee a more sustainable style of urban development, which is important for the future of the landscape and the environment. In the contemporary period, the architectural development of Qatar is taking a more measured and mature stance and is involving leading international architects. Today, there is “the beauty of getting people from all over the world to participate and to…redefine what is culture,” and to preserve our history, not only in architecture but in other areas of cultural development. Today, there is a kind of “cultural revolution” reconnecting Qatar to its history and heritage by taking the local, vernacular architecture into the future. Today, Jaidah concluded, “there is a language that is being created, sensitive to the environment and to the culture”—one that is as respectful of the past as it is open to the future.

Ibrahim Mohamed Jaidah is a researcher and author of The History of Qatari Architecture and 99 Domes who grew up in the old neighbourhood Al Jasra in the heart of Doha. He ranks as a pioneer of a new architectural movement, which combines the far reaching influences of traditional Qatari architecture with modern style, creating memorable landmark structures that are helping to shape the developing State of Qatar. Jaidah is a highly recognized architect who has won numerous awards such as the Islamic Cities Award, the Arab Town Organization Awards, and has been nominated for the Agha Khan Awards. In 2005, Jaidah was honored with the medal of the State of Qatar Encouragement Award. His projects reflect the cultural, historical, and environmental contexts in which they exist. Ibrahim is a dedicated advocate for sustainability and is a co-founding member of the Qatar Green Building Council.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications.

The Resource Curse in the Gulf Working Group I
2016-10-09 09:00 - 2016-10-10 15:00 (Europe/Moscow)
On October 9-10, 2016, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) held a working group under a research initiative on “The ‘Resource Curse’ in the Gulf.” During the course of two days, assembled participants identified key gaps in the literature on rentier states of the Persian Gulf, while leading discussions on a variety of related subtopics: rent distribution and development of institutions; political legitimacy; military establishments in the Persian Gulf; stability and instability; human rights in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states; gender equality; entrepreneurship; and education, occupation, and Khaleeji youth.

The working group discussions commenced with a session led by Matthew Gray on “Rentier Wealth: Curse or Cure for the Gulf.” During his session Gray provided a broad overview of existing theories of the resource curse, and identified a number of questions relating to its application in the Persian Gulf. After presenting the main arguments on the resource curse that have been made by scholars over the past decades, Gray provided a review of several questions that remain understudied or that have not been adequately addressed. Amongst other things, Gray suggested that the issue of state autonomy in rentier states is not as empirically established as theory suggests it is, and in fact remains highly debatable. It is important to provide greater empirical evidence of rentier-driven state autonomy (or a lack thereof), and studying this question within the GCC states would provide for an original case study. Gray also argued for a deeper understanding of Gulf state capitalism, and particularly the role of elites and resource rents. In rentier states institutions and corporations may serve as tools for forging patrimonial networks. These social dynamics in state institutions and corporations raise a question on the extent to which patrimonial networks are steered and maintained by resource rents. Gray suggested another important research gap exists in terms of labor policies in hydrocarbon-rich states studied from an interdisciplinary context. Insofar as foreign relations and history are concerned, Gray pointed out that there has been no comprehensive work on developing a theory of international relations in the Persian Gulf that is centered on rents and resources. Finally, there is a need for a comprehensive history of rents and rentierism in the Persian Gulf, from pre-oil rentierism to post-oil rentierism.

Desha Girod led a discussion session on the topic of “Rent Distribution and the Development of Institution in the Gulf.” Girod has carried out a comparative research project examining the challenges that faced institutional development in very different sorts of resource-based economies. She has studied the historical evolution of institutions in two African states, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon, against developments in two GCC oil states, Kuwait and Oman. Girod’s findings suggest that pre-oil discovery is important when considering the evolution of institutions in rentier states. Her examination of Equatorial Guinea and Gabon suggested that the extractive economies that were developed by colonial powers weakened state institutions and destroyed existing social pluralism. The colonial legacy led to a particular development of institutions in these two nations. Kuwait and Oman did not experience the same sort of pre-oil extractive economic conditions through colonial domination, and colonial powers were not interested in intervening in the domestic politics of either of these two states. Based on her ongoing research, Girod suggested that further study is important to assess how certain conditions (such as weak institutions) conventionally attributed to the resource curse may be in fact be an artifact of an earlier curse (such as the colonialism or institutions developed to assist the colonial project of exploiting natural resources) that shaped the development of certain key institutions. Further research is also needed so that we have a stronger explanation than the current one in the literature that suggests that “weak” versus “strong” institutions can determine whether the resource curse is suffered or avoided. It is also important to study how institutions in the GCC evolved over time, through a historical study of the sorts of institutions that existed in the Gulf during the time of hydrocarbon discovery, and how these subsequently shaped the ways in which rents were used by the modern states that came into being. Another area of research suggested by Girod is on the role of external actors in the GCC, their impact on institution building and the use of rents.

Building on Girod’s discussion, Mehran Kamrava led a discussion on “Political Legitimacy and Scaling Back during an Oil Bust in the Gulf.” Kamrava claimed that there are differences among GCC states in terms of patterns of state building, social cohesion, rent-driven policies, relationship between ruling families and tribes, and bureaucracies. These differences are stimulated by implicit understandings between ruling families and other stakeholders, such as the merchants, pre and post-oil discovery. Stakeholders’ corporatism and marital bonds between ruling families and stakeholders contributed to the resilience and adaptability of the social contracts between ruling families and stakeholders; and thus to the establishment of enduring ruling bargains. Kamrava also argued that Persian Gulf states have reacted differently to fluctuations in oil prices. The variance in reactions raises a question: what are the conditions that shape states’ responses to changes in oil prices? Kamrava added that in countries where the State establishes strong clientelistic relationships with the merchant class through offering contracts, the merchant class becomes more dependent on the State, especially during times of downturn. How did entrepreneurial classes and States react in three different oil bust cycles? What was the relationship between state and business in previous oil cycles? And what does this tell us about institutional evolution between the three oil boom and bust cycles? Kamrava also claimed that States have responded to economic downturns by promoting nationalization of the labor force, which has decreased the efficiency of state institutions. Finally, Kamrava argued that identity politics captures public imagination rather than issues such as transparency and accountability. This questions how governments use salient concerns, during times of economic downturns, to influence social cohesion in the society.

Mohammad Reza Farzanegan focused his discussion on “Oil Rents and the Military in the Gulf.” Farzanegan raised seven original research questions that address critical gaps in the literature on the impact of oil revenues in rentier economies on military establishments. First, he claimed that a systematic analysis of the correlation between GCC military spending and oil prices is missing. Thus, what is the impact of positive and negative oil price shocks on military spending? Second, Farzanegan claimed that the effect of oil revenues on military spending depends on the level of corruption. This raises the question: how does the quality of political and economic institutions matter? Third, he argued that increasing military spending may increase political stability at higher levels of oil rent; while at lower levels of oil revenues, increasing military spending may require cutting social spending such as subsidies and other transfers, leading to reduction of life satisfaction of locals and higher political instability. Thus, it is critical to examine how do fluctuations in oil revenues matter insofar as the effect of military spending on political stability is concerned. Fourth, since Middle Eastern countries have one of the highest levels of military spending burden around the world, how does economic growth impact military spending? Fifth, is there a military spending threshold pegged to oil rents and growth? Sixth, Farzanegan discussed the youth bulge in the GCC, and how this can be a burden on governments if oil rents decrease. He asked if there is any moderating role of oil rents and military in the stability-youth nexus. Finally, Farzanegan highlighted the effect of oil rents on corruption, which questions how the involvement of military establishments in politics can impact corruption insofar as military spending is concerned.

Jessie Moritz led a discussion session on the topic of “Resource Rents and Stability/Instability in Gulf Societies.” Moritz argued that there is a difference between “resource abundance” and “resource dependence.” She stated that resource abundance promotes regime stability, but resource dependence promotes violent conflict or instability. In examining this issue, Moritz raised a series of questions, among which: what makes an individual, or a group of people, challenge the State? And how do states co-opt public dissatisfaction? Moritz also emphasized the importance of studying exceptions to rentier logic, rather than just focusing on commonalities between rentier economies. She claimed that studying these exceptions lead to another series of questions, such as: how effective has state co-optation been, especially on the subnational level? What causes subnational groups to move away from the royal court’s side, to the opposition’s side? Is political loyalty determined by rent distribution? What has happened to reformist groups, especially when oil prices are at a low? How effective will broader societal movements be? Will they be able to influence state policies? And will they side with particular factions of the regime against others?

Zahra Babar led a session on “Hydrocarbons and Human Rights in the GCC.” Babar suggested that the “universality” of human rights remains highly contested, with polarization between which rights are meant to be prioritized in different contexts. Within the GCC there continue to be limitations on political and civil rights for individuals, while rentier resources may have led to the evolution of greater protections for economic and social rights of citizens. Most of the studies of the Gulf states are from the perspective of human rights in authoritarian and non-democratic contexts, and have not applied the lens of rentierism and human rights. Babar identified a number of research gaps in relation to the evolution of human rights issues in rentier-based political economies of the region. Among other things, Babar raised the need to study the question of the impact of falling or rising oil prices and how they increase or limit political freedoms and human rights in the GCC. A second research gap raised by Babar was on the role of international actors and external patrons, and the advancement of human rights in Gulf oil monarchies. Human rights regimes have found greater means of imposing disciplinary mechanisms (such as sanctions or isolation) on “pariah states” that somehow are presented as being outside the norms of international relations. How do human rights actors interact with more complex cases such as the GCC states that have been considered to be “security partners” or “economic partners” and critical to the global energy economy? A third set of research questions center on the narrative of citizenship and its sets of rights across a spectrum of GCC distributive states which vary in the degrees of capacity to distribute. Post 2011 increasingly the GCC states have been conflating their goal of “protecting economic rights” of citizens with increasing measures to securitize citizenship – how is this impacting the regional human rights narrative? Finally Babar raised a number of areas of research in relation to the Gulf oil sector and human rights. Clashes and confrontations between the global oil industry and international and transnational networks of human rights have been increasingly commonplace from Sudan to Ecuador, how come we have not seen the GCC as a locus of this exchange?

Following Babar’s discussion, Gail Buttorff led a session on “Hydrocarbon Wealth and Gender Equality in the Gulf.” Buttorff started off her session by highlighting the major differences between GCC states in terms of level of rentierism, political economy, and social cohesion. She then listed three original research topics. First, she discussed the various nationalization policies that have been employed across the GCC, and how their impact on female participation in the labor forces remains understudied. Buttorff also claimed that the impact of fluctuations in oil prices on government efforts to boost female labor force participation is also understudied. Finally, Buttorff discussed the link between female labor force participation and political empowerment. She raised a question: does female participation in higher levels of government reflect improvements in women suffrage in the GCC?

Hanadi Al Mubaraki shifted the working group discussions to examine “Oil Wealth and Entrepreneurship in the Gulf.” Hanadi started her discussion with highlighting GCC governments’ efforts to encourage and support entrepreneurship and innovation. Yet, she claimed that there has not been any literature on the success or failure of projects supported by GCC governments. Al Mubaraki highlighted the importance of studying entrepreneurship policies in the GCC in comparison to policies employed in other developed regions. Al Mubaraki also raised attention to the challenges and opportunities in establishing Technology Commercialization programs in GCC universities, which have impacted the evolution and internationalization of GCC based entrepreneurship. Finally, Al Mubaraki questioned the outcomes of business development programs—such as business incubation programs, innovation programs, accelerator programs, and small and medium-size enterprises—on entrepreneurship in the GCC.

Crystal Ennis concluded the working group discussions with a session on “Education, Occupation, and Khaleeji Youth Success.” Ennis claimed that there is a mismatch between Khaleeji youth’s education and job market demands. Yet, this is not the only challenge Khaleeji youth face. She claimed that class, rural divide, gender, and family status factor in education and job options among youth in the GCC; this is a topic that deserves further study. Another issue is the limited production base in the GCC that impacts the analysis of Khaleeji youth labor, and our understanding of youth contribution to global production. Ennis also argued that there is a critical need to investigate the impact of neo-liberal ideologies on the social construction of youth in the hyper-modernity of the GCC, and the factors that shape economic citizenship among youth in the GCC, especially when it comes to the private sector. Ennis also discussed the impact of expats’ expertise on the learning development of Khaleeji youth in the private sector. The impacts of neo-liberal ideologies and expats’ expertise raise a question on Khaleeji youth’s perception of their belonging to the labor market.

Mehran Kamrava, Director of CIRS, concluded the working group with emphasis on the contribution of the working group discussions to literature on the resource curse in the Persian Gulf, which will be published in a special issue by CIRS in the near future.

See the working group agenda hereRead the participants’ biographies hereRead more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Hanadi Mubarak Al-Mubaraki, Kuwait UniversityZahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarGail Buttorff, University of KansasCrystal Ennis, Leiden UniversityMohammad Reza Farzanegan, Philipps-Universität MarburgDesha Girod, Georgetown UniversityMatthew Gray, Waseda University, JapanIslam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarSuzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarJessie Moritz, Australian National UniversityMoamer Qazafi, Georgetown University in QatarElizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

The 2016 U.S. Presidential Election
2016-10-18 18:00 - 20:00 (Europe/Moscow)
On October 18, 2016, CIRS hosted a Panel discussion on “The 2016 US Presidential Elections,” featuring Joshua Mitchell and Clyde Wilcox, professors in the Government Department at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, and world renowned authorities in their respective areas of expertise. Mitchell specializes in political theory and, among other topics, has written on religion and freedom in the United States. Wilcox has written extensively on interest groups, public opinion, electoral behavior, and campaign finance. The discussion was moderated by Mehran Kamrava, Director of the Center for International and Regional Studies.

Mitchell opened the debate by framing his speech around a central question: “Why did Trump so easily take the nomination?” He clarified that: “my task here…is not so much to defend Trump, but rather to explain him through the lens of the history of political thought.” Giving some background to the current political climate, Mitchell painted a picture of the United States as a nation sharply divided, stating that “there are two different Americas right now.” One America is reflected in the power and wealth of Washington, and other key urban centers, where property prices and incomes are soaring, while “the other America is an America of despair, drug addiction, suicide, low-paying jobs, and never-ending condescension toward ‘flyover’ country.”

Because of such sharp divisions between wealth and poverty, and indeed the growing rifts within US politics, a “populist uprising” in the form of an outlier candidate like Trump has been a long time coming. Examining key political moments to explain Trump’s success, he argued that during the Cold War, factions of “the Republican Party hung together not by virtue of internal coherence, but by virtue of what they were opposed to—namely, progressivism within, and the Cold War without.” After the end of the Cold War, Mitchell noted, there really was no reason for the party to be held together since their common interest was defeated, thus, “it was just a question of time before that party fell apart; if it wasn’t Trump, it was going be somebody else, sooner or later.”

In the aftermath of the Cold War, a new type of political thought was cultivated in young people who began defining their lives around issues of “globalization” and “identity,” which have become the central features of contemporary political engagement. These terms differ greatly to how politics was conceptualized in the past, revolving around notions of the sovereign state and the rational citizen, as outlined in the treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and Hobbes’ Leviathan in 1651. Today, sovereignty is no longer located in the state, but is located “above the state,” in global norms, international trade and laws, and transnational organizations, and “below the state,” in identity politics. “You have this tremendous paradox: the disembodied citizen who imagines his or her identity in relation to others, and politics as activism—not citizenship,” Mitchell explained.

Currently, the battle being waged in the US—as well as in Europe as seen in the Brexit vote—is whether the future of politics will continue along the lines of the post-1989 organizing principle of globalization and identity politics, or, whether someone with Trump’s ideals will dismantle the current political arrangement. Trump has enthralled his electorate by turning the tide on a world obsessed with globalization by offering fervent claims that borders matter, immigration policy matters, national rather than universal interests matter, entrepreneurship matters, decentralization matters, and, finally, that politically correct speech—an essential component of identity politics—does not matter. “When Trump says crass things,” for example, “the way he thinks through this problem is in terms, not of sin but, of error,” Mitchell argued. The counter reaction to Trump’s rogue behavior, with Hillary Clinton’s campaign being a chief proponent, is to utilize the old American religious tropes of “purity” and “stain.” Mitchell noted that this revival of a religious language is a deeply troubling development in which Trump and his supporters are tarnished as deplorable and irredeemable, further diving the country along political and racial lines. Especially because Hillary Clinton is white, he argued, her democratic campaign is even more driven to chastise the faults of white America, and its seeming penchant for racism.

These two sides of the divide fall along the historic conservative and left set up of US politics, which is anathema to, and leaves little sustenance for, the third alternative, which is a Liberal regime that has no interest in either of these types of divisive party politics. In conclusion, Mitchell argued that “the battle for the future is not over identity politics or the state. I think identity politics and globalization have lost. The question now before us is whether we are going to have a liberal state or an illiberal state.” As a final thought, Mitchell noted that, along with the current political impasse, there is yet another tremendous danger being instigated by the media who refuse to accept Trump—the officially nominated Republican Party candidate—as legitimate, thus fueling a growing crisis of authority.

Clyde Wilcox offered a different narrative to Mitchell’s historical political analysis by focusing on the current electoral contest and the likely outcome. Despite Trump’s many political liabilities, he remains close in many polls. The key question that needs to be answered, therefore, is “how can it be that a man who is catastrophically unprepared, and who is not trying, is still somewhat close” in the polls? Wilcox argued that the narrow gap in the poles is worrisome, because “Donald Trump is, let’s be honest, catastrophically unprepared to be president. He lacks the knowledge to be president, he lacks the curiosity to attain the knowledge…he is making no effort to appeal to the voters he would need to win, which include women and minorities.”

Wilcox noted that current polling and survey data are all indicating that Hillary Clinton will win the election. However, survey data have been wrong in the past, and there are reasons for why Trump might actually win. Elections have been traditionally predicted by consulting a series of abstract models that include a number of variables related to economic indicators, employment figures, and GDP rates. In this particular election, however, there is another key factor that is determined by what Wilcox termed “the 8 year itch,” where voters become disenchanted with the incumbent party and elect the alternative option in order to receive a fresh start. By this token, he argued, Republicans would normally be expected to win a close election, if the Democrats and Republicans nominated equally attractive candidates.

A key rallying cry for the Republicans has been that this is an election about the forgotten white people in impoverished small towns, “but when we look at survey data, we something slightly different: the people who support Trump are not the ones who have lost the jobs, those people are actually Hillary Clinton people. Trump’s people are actually slightly above average in income, not a whole lot, but slightly above average. The single best indicator of who supports Donald Trump right now is racial resentment,” with increasing numbers of confederate flags being raised as a symbol of this growing antagonism.

Another reason for the narrow gap in the polls is because Hillary Clinton has a number of obstacles stacked against her, including the very fact that she is one of the Clintons—a name synonymous with the political status quo for almost three decades—along with a number of scandals arising from some of her questionable acts. Despite “being the most admired woman in America when she was Secretary of State,” Clinton must also overcome the disadvantages of running as a female candidate, and the many sexist characterizations of her temperament, her decision-making skills, and her political will. “The Republicans have been bashing her consistently for the last six years,” Wilcox said. “She has the highest negatives of any presidential candidate in our history, except for one: Donald Trump.”

Although he admitted that Hillary Clinton is a much weaker candidate than the Democrats would normally have offered, Wilcox did not believe that these weaknesses necessarily translate into her being a bad president. He argued that the US is a polarized nation of partisans, with many people traditionally voting for the same party at every election. In this case, however, Trump has become such an unpredictable political liability that many staunch Republicans have publicly voiced their disappointment with the candidate, with many opting to vote for Hillary Clinton, thus further destabilizing the Republican Party.

In conclusion, Wilcox argued, while many of Trump’s supporters are outspoken and proud to vote for him, it is possible that many others who plan to vote for Trump are, in fact, too ashamed to say so publicly, thereby skewing the polling data. Donald Trump, meanwhile, has already predicted that the election is fraudulent if Clinton wins, and has encouraged his supporters to challenge Clinton supporters in the event that he loses the election. If Hillary Clinton does indeed win, Wilcox argued, it is very likely that the Republications will be holding hearings on impeachment within the year. Either way, he concluded, “I come away with a rather pessimistic view of the future of American politics; it has been the ugliest election in my lifetime, and I hope that on their deathbeds my children will be able to say it was the ugliest in theirs.”

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications.

Trump’s Election and the Need for a Mass Movement for Constitutional Reform
2016-11-23 12:30 - 13:30 (Europe/Moscow)
In his November 23, 2016 talk, “Trump’s Election and the Need for a Mass Movement for Constitutional Reform,” Anatol Lieven, Professor of International Politics at Georgetown University in Qatar, spoke about the recent US elections in the broad context of the United States Constitution. Today, many Americans consider the Constitution “sacred,” and would reject even the smallest changes to it, even though it has undergone twenty-seven successful amendments over its history. This passionate attachment comes from the Constitution’s central importance to American civic nationalism and national identity, and its success in framing the United States as it grew to become the most powerful country on earth.

This is not really a problem if a system delivers good government and basic, consensual civic peace, however, Lieven said: “I fear that the US Constitution is, as it presently exists, less and less able to do this.” As things stand today, “the Constitution is beginning to work massively in favor of one section of the American population and American politics, namely white conservatives, who are not anxious to give up the advantages that this system gives them,” he said.

Other western democracies have made changes to their constitutions over the years, but systems that have been as successful as that of the USA over a long period will find it more difficult to change. But however successful it may have been in the past, “A system which is not capable of even limited and pragmatic change may be in serious trouble,” Lieven cautioned. Because of the way that US presidential elections work, and because of the institution of the US Electoral College, Hillary Clinton won the popular vote in this election, but Donald Trump won because he secured the Electoral College votes. The same thing happened with Al Gore and George Bush in 2000. “As far as I know, the United States is the only presidential democracy in the world that operates in this this way,” he said.

The US presidential election campaign has essentially been reduced to fifteen states, those needed to win the Electoral College, according to Lieven, and the other thirty-five states are ignored to a considerable degree. This has created a somewhat odd image of American democracy in the world. Lieven asked, “Is the United States, in fact, a democracy? Well, the obvious answer is no, of course it isn’t, because it wasn’t intended to be.” The founders were notoriously suspicious of democracy, which they associated with the threat of anarchy and mob rule leading to tyranny, according to Lieven. They put barriers against democracy into the Constitution, and it was almost forty years later that the US actually became a more or less democratic country in the (then) sense of a country where all adult white males had the vote.

The founders’ intention was to create a system that would prevent tyranny while providing reasonably good, though very limited government. “It was, above all, to create a system that would last, that would create institutions that could mediate and reconcile different interests,” among thirteen very different states, Lieven said. This balanced state powers against those of the central government. The battles of states’ rights remain critically important to this day, especially when it comes to racial and cultural issues, Lieven said. This is what led to the secession of the South before the Civil War and the battles over states’ rights in the 1940s–60s, as the white South fought to retain racial segregation and discrimination.

While some of the workings of the Constitution have been transformed, formal institutions such as the Electoral College remain in place. The founders saw it as a kind of temporary parliament, a national assembly of elected, independent legislators who had made promises to their electors, but were also free to choose the president as they saw fit. In this context, direct democratic election was secondary, according to Lieven. “Today we have a situation where the Electoral College remains in certain respects highly undemocratic, but is democratically nailed to the candidate to whom they have promised their vote in advance,” he said.

When the Constitution was formulated, the smallest state had roughly one-twelfth of the population of the largest state, and most states had roughly similar populations. In 2010, there were seven states with more than 10 million people each, and they had fourteen US senators. These are the big, urban states, multi-racial and largely Democratic in their leanings, and they account for approximately 45 percent of the US population. There were seven states with fewer than one million people in 2010, accounting for about 2 percent of the total US population. These are overwhelmingly Republican leaning states with white conservative populations, and they also have fourteen US senators. Basically, this means that California has roughly 40 times less representation than a state like South Dakota.

The problem of democracy in the House of Representatives is a different one. Currently in the House of Representatives, due to the rights held by the states under the Constitution, forty-three out of fifty states have their constituency boundaries for the House determined by state legislatures and state executives, and they are politically manipulated. This despite the fact that the House was always conceived as a national popular legislature, popularly elected. The drawing of constituency boundaries to produce solid, unchangeable majorities for one party or another is favored not just by Republicans but also by black Democrats, who see this as a way to guarantee black representation in Congress (and their own seats).

As a result of this effectively rigged system, in this year’s election, Republicans won the national popular vote, but by a margin vastly smaller than the number of seats won in the House. In 2012, Republicans lost the popular vote by a wide margin but gained a majority of seats. “This raises not just questions about democracy, but it creates additional problems in America, especially a polarized America,” said Lieven. Only around seven per cent of House seats were really contested in the last four elections. The result of this is to push the real political contest for the House from the area envisaged by the Constitution (elections) and into party primaries, in a way that inevitably favors extremists and increases polarization—since there is no longer any need for candidates to try to win candidates from the middle ground or the opposing party. “Battles in party primaries always, always—in every country—tend to favor active activists and extremists,” said Lieven.

The courts have challenged individual cases of drawing district maps, but Lieven said, “It seems obvious that this should be done the way it is done just about everywhere else in democracies, which is to have an impartial national—not politically chosen—electoral commission that will distribute the seats, and be subject always to judicial review,” Lieven said. “The Supreme Court has to judge according to the Constitution, and it is very difficult to challenge the system as a whole constitutionally, given the power of states’ rights. Additionally, there is the pretty strange provision under the Constitution that the Supreme Court has far greater powers than those of any other Supreme Court that I know of in the world. Powers that are, in effect, legislative—not just judicial,” said Lieven. “And the Supreme Court has repeatedly made laws—not interpreted them—made new laws that have radically changed aspects of American life,” he said. When to this are added the Constitutional provisions that Supreme Court judges are chosen by the President, and for life, there is a very real possibility that (with a number of Democrat judges nearing the end of their life), President Trump could ensure a Republican grip on the Supreme Court for a generation to come, putting the Republicans in a position constitutionally to block large parts of a future democratic president’s legislative agenda—completely irrespective of the popular vote.

Lieven predicted that as America changes demographically and whites sink from a majority to a plurality of the population, the effective disenfranchisement of millions of urban Americans and the demand for constitutional reform are going to become a much bigger issue in the future. However, he said it is highly unlikely that the Democrats under their existing leadership will raise this issue effectively.

Due to the Senate distribution, the way the House is arranged, and the certainty the Supreme Court would do nothing about it such a demand for change would have to be pushed for by a mass popular movement—as in the struggle against slavery and for civil rights. The Democratic leadership that produced Hillary Clinton is far too cautious and intertwined with the US economic elites to consider such a radical step. Fortunately, Bernie Sanders has shown the deep desire among much of the rank and file of the Democratic Party for a more radical path.

However, Lieven cautioned against a movement for Constitutional reform couched in terms of democratic rights for racial minorities, as this would be sure to drive many moderate working class whites into the ranks of the reactionary opposition. Instead, he summoned up the examples of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Martin Luther King when in his last years he campaigned for social and economic justice for all Americans. Lieven called for “A movement for democratic reform, linked to economic justice, appealing to the disadvantaged and disenfranchised urban poor of all races, and couched in terms of the need to renew American democracy in the name of American nationalism and America’s national image in the world.”

Anatol Lieven teaches International Politics at Georgetown University in Qatar. He received a BA in History (double first) and a PhD in Political Science from the University of Cambridge. Before joining academia, he spent most of his career as a foreign correspondent for British newspapers, and later as a member of think tanks in Washington DC. Between 2007 and 2014 he worked in the War Studies Department of King’s College London, where he remains a visiting professor. His main project at present is a book on the history of the Pashtun ethnicity in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the context of the wider history and theoretical analysis of modern nationalism (commissioned by Yale University Press). His taught courses at Georgetown in Qatar include international security issues; US foreign policy; war and diplomacy in Afghanistan and South Asia; comparative political systems and the history, theory and comparative study of nationalism. He is author of numerous books, including Pakistan: A Hard Country (2012); America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism (second edition 2012); and Ukraine and Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry (1999).

Article by Jackie Starbird, Publications and Projects Assistant at CIRS.

Did Democracy Lose this Round? And Why?
2016-11-28 08:00 - 17:00 (Asia/Qatar) | Education City, Al Luqta St, Ar-Rayyan, Doha, Qatar
Azmi Bishara, General Director of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue lecture on the topic “Did Democracy Lose this round? And Why?” on November 28, 2016. While these questions were posed in regard to the state of democracy in the Arab world in the wake of the recent uprisings, he noted that some of these concerns could be equally applied to the failure of liberalism in the West, and the rise of increasingly right-wing tendencies.

Bishara gave four broad explanations for why this round of democratic transition has failed in the Arab world, with a background of the brutality of old regimes and the oppression of civil protests. The first of these was that Arab political elites of both the opposition and the ruling factions could not come to any compromises or agree on shared settlements in the wake of the Arab uprisings. This, he said, was because “the Arab political elite, had no democratic culture”. He rejected the tendency to blame popular culture. Democratic cultures take time to flourish in society in general, and are learned over many years through various aspects of a nation’s foundational systems, including its educational system, the institution of which is the responsibility of political elites in the transitionary phase.

To this effect, Bishara argued that there is no such thing as a “democratic revolution,” since “democracy happens afterwards through reform, not through revolutions. This includes the French Revolution. It did not lead to democracy at the beginning; it needed a long process of reform to reach democracy at the end.” It is a historical norm that after mass societal and political changes, opposing political elites enter into rounds of negotiation regarding the future direction of the country. This did not happen in the post Arab uprisings. He argued that “the young people who went out to the streets, protesting torture, humiliation, and physical abuse of human beings, thought that…they actually achieved or finished the job when Mr. Mubarak and Mr. Zine El-Abidine resigned or abdicated.” In earnest, the protestors delivered their hard won changes to the political elites in order to transform the new raw political environment into actionable, viable reforms, but no such restructuring took place.

The second reason for why democracy did not take root in the region is because of the failure to find a balance between democracy and liberalism—something that was achieved only relatively recently in Western nations in the post-World War II period. Today, we understand that “democracy in itself is not only majority rule; it is not only a question of the ballots; and it is not only a question of free elections,” Bishara argued. “Now when we speak of principles of democracy that should be respected by the majority, we actually mean liberal rights,” he said. These are the meta-constitutional principles that have not been taken to heart by Arab political movements. Even as traditionally conservative parties finally began to accept democracy in the shape of ballots and elections, they did not respect or believe in the related liberal principles. While it is understood that the more radical Islamic movements, like the Islamic State, openly reject democracy in general, in the post-Arab uprisings, “even the mainstream Islamic movements who accept democracy as majority rule underestimated how important civil liberties are for the co-called new Arab middle class, without which you cannot build anything,” and without which the urban centers will be lost—as was witnessed in Egypt when the Muslim Brotherhood took control.

Bishara’s third reason for the failure of democracy is due to the ways in which modern Arab regimes are engaging in the divisive and dangerous politicization—and polarization—of the multiethnic, multicultural, and sectarian social structures of their societies, especially in the countries of the Levant. Recently, there have been concerted attempts “to mobilize political loyalties to nondemocratic ruling regimes by using subnational affiliations repoliticized sects, identities, ethnicities, tribes,” which was not the case in the past, he said. This policy of so-called secular regimes elicited feelings of sectarian discrimination and confessional reaction among the people. In fact, “political sectarianism, which is exploiting these lines of identity in the struggle to control the state, is a new phenomenon.” Bishara noted that it would be impossible to build a sustainable democracy within these polarized and factionalized societies.

A fourth reason for why democracy has failed in the Arab world is due to the military’s historical stranglehold on political systems in some of these countries. When imperial powers withdrew from Arab lands, new national armies were created from the remnants of colonial military structures, and these emerged as the most organized and powerful entities from the chaos of newly forming postcolonial nations. Bishara said that “we still live the issue of politicization of the military in the Arab world,” and these armies have become increasingly politically motivated. Powerful figures within Arab militaries have strong political ambitions and think of themselves as both powerholders and as watchdogs in the balance of power. For example, in “Egypt, the army achieved a kind of autonomy before 2011,” but when the government collapsed during the Egyptian protests, “the army thought that there was an opportunity, reinforced by the inability of the elites to reach a bargain,” he explained. He drew a comparison between Sisi’s military coup in Egypt and that of Pinochet in Chile in the 1970s.

Although these many political impasses facing the Arab world might seem insurmountable, Bishara concluded on a positive note by arguing that “these hard times are suitable for rethinking,” and for encouraging a new generation of political elites who can accept disagreements and who can debate and bargain to reach compromises with each other for the sake of a future that respects democratic principles.

Azmi Bishara is the General Director of the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies and the Chair of the Board of Trustees of the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies. A prominent researcher and writer, Bishara has published numerous books and academic papers in political thought, social theory, and philosophy, in addition to several literary works.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications.

Mishal Husain on "News and Views in a Post-Truth World"
2016-11-30 18:00 - 20:00 (Europe/Moscow)
Mishal Husain, one of the BBC’s best-known presenters, delivered a CIRS Focused Discussion on “News and Views in a Post-Truth World” on November 30, 2016. Her talk gave insights into how journalists navigate through, and respond to, ever-changing news environments, particularly during seismic world events such as the Arab uprisings and the recent spectacle of the US presidential election. Relaying her journalism experience, spanning over two decades in the field, she said: “I am aware, and feel the privilege of the job I do, not just the places I go to, but the moments in time and, certainly, the access to both the powerful and the powerless.”

Husain reflected on how the UK’s recent EU referendum was reported, highlighting the duty of the BBC and other broadcasters to ensure due impartiality in political coverage, the controversy about “fake news” in the wake of Donald Trump’s election victory, and her concerns about hearing “mainstream media” employed as a term of abuse.

Many people have become progressively dismissive of traditional, established news channels that reach a mass audience, and there is a growing environment in which people are seeking to reinforce their own views, rather than opening up to a culture of informed debate. “The debate about fake news is very compelling at the moment, but the influence of stories that are misleading at best will also require careful scrutiny.” Ultimately, she noted, all this is leading to the increasing circulation of misinformation, the dismissal of facts, and the erosion of truth.

In conclusion, she argued that there is a personal responsibility for people to examine the facts and to weigh the evidence. “I am deeply concerned today about the echo chamber, but also what I see as the lack of a critical thinking mindset, which is now even being identified as a bulwark against radicalization.” Husain stated. She talked about the importance of a wide range of news sources, particularly for minority communities, and an openness to explore other opinions and perspectives. “Our capacity for citizenship will not improve unless these personal skills are developed.”

Mishal Husain appears on the influential Today programme on BBC Radio 4 and presenting the main Sunday evening news on BBC1. She also presents on location from around the world, including Pakistan after the killing of Osama Bin Laden and the Peshawar school massacre, and the Middle East through the Arab uprisings and the Syrian refugee crisis. For many years she was one of the main presenters on the international channel BBC World News, and while based in Washington between 2003 and 2004, her nightly news broadcasts developed a keen following among American viewers on PBS. She was also based in the BBC’s Singapore bureau for a time, presenting business news programmes, and her sustained focus on Asia took her to the Beijing Olympics in 2008 and the Shanghai Expo in 2010. Mishal has presented four critically acclaimed BBC documentaries: Malala—Shot for Going to School, and How Facebook Changed the World on social media and the Arab uprisings, and a three-part series on the life of Mahatma Gandhi. In 2016, her hour-long film Britain & Europe: The Immigration Question was screened days before Britain’s landmark EU referendum vote. In January 2016, she was named by the Sunday Times as one of the 500 most influential people in Britain, and in 2015 she won the London Press Club’s Broadcaster of the Year award and was the Women in Film and TV Awards Presenter of the Year. In 2013, she was one of the Financial Times’ Women of the Year and in 2009 the Times named her as one of the top five most influential Muslim women in Britain.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications.

Climate Vulnerability in South Asia's Coastal Cities
2017-01-10 09:00 - 2017-01-11 17:00 (Europe/Moscow)
On January 10-11, 2017, urbanists, governance experts, and climate change specialists gathered in Doha for a two-day workshop co-hosted by the Strauss Center for International Security and Law at the University of Texas at Austin and the Center for International and Regional Studies at Georgetown University in Qatar to consider climate change vulnerability and governance in coastal cities of South Asia.

Topics debated in the workshop include the nature and definition of various understandings of climate vulnerability, the role that coastal geographies and ecologies play in exacerbating climate vulnerability, the impacts of climate change on urban settlement and migration, and the governance challenges faced by cities as they attempt (or in some cases do not attempt) to address their climate change vulnerabilities. The conversation was specifically designed to generate comparative discussion across coastal cities in the region with particular attention paid to coastal mega-cities of the region including Chennai, Dhaka, Karachi, Kolkata, and Mumbai.

Key policy-relevant questions considered by the workshop participants include:

How should we understand climate-related vulnerability in South Asia’s changing urban context?How should we think about governance vulnerabilities as we contemplate climate hazards?In which ways will climate change transform the ways that coastal cities encounter their physical and governance environments?How will the anticipated phenomenon of mass displacement and migration challenge our accepted understandings of sovereignty and the protection missions of the state, the city, and the community?How does and should our understanding of the science of climate change affect the ways policy is developed across borders and governance systems?

The workshop was the latest in an ongoing series of conversations on this topic organized by Dr. Paula Newberg as part of the Strauss Center’s research initiative on Complex Emergencies and Political Stability in Asia (CEPSA). The research program explores the diverse forces that contribute to climate-related disaster vulnerability and complex emergencies in Asia, the implications of such events for local and regional security, and how investments in preparedness can minimize these impacts and build resilience. CEPSA is a multi-year initiative funded by the U.S. Department of Defense’s Minerva Initiative, a university based, social science research program focused on areas of strategic importance to national security policy.

Please click here to view Agenda

Participants and Discussants:

Kamran Asdar Ali, University of TexasNausheen Anwar, Institute of Business Administration, KarachiZahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMisba Bhatti, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarSheryl Beach, University of TexasTimothy Beach, University of TexasSolomon Benjamin, Indian Institute of Technology MadrasJason Cons, University of TexasVinita Damodaran, University of SussexRupali Gupte, Collective Research Initiatives Trust, MumbaiArif Hasan, Architect, Planner, and Social Researcher, KarachiIslam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarIftekhar Iqbal, Universiti Brunei Darussalam, BangladeshGarima Jain, India Institute for Human Settlements, BengaluruMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarM. Hafijul Islam Khan, International Centre for Climate Change and Development, BangladeshMathangi Krishnamoorthy, Indian Institute of Technology MadrasAnatol Lieven, Georgetown University in QatarSohail Malik, Innovative Development Strategies, IslamabadPaula Newberg, University of TexasMahesh Rajasekar, Taru Leading Edge and Taru Research Information Network, IndiaAsad Sayeed, Collective for Social Science Research, KarachiAli T. Sheikh, Leadership for Environment and Development (LEAD), PakistanSam Tabory, Chicago Council on Global AffairsClare Wait, Georgetown University in QatarAdeel Zafar, Simon Fraser University, British Columbia

Middle Power Politics in the Middle East Working Group I
2017-01-15 09:00 - 2017-01-16 15:00 (Europe/Moscow)
On January 15-16, 2017, the Center for International and Regional Studies held a working group under its research initiative on “Middle Power Politics in the Middle East.” Over the course of two days, participants identified key gaps in the literature on the international relations of the Middle East through the lens of middle power theory. The participants led discussions on a number of related subtopics, including: Middle Eastern middle powers and the international system, middle powers and the 2011 Arab uprisings, domestic politics, middle powers’ cooperation and competition, humanitarian diplomacy, norm entrepreneurship, and conflict resolution and mediation.

The 2011 Arab uprisings have been an evolving moment of significance in the Middle East. While increasing domestic instability in some of the traditionally strong states led to a retraction in their capacity in international and regional affairs, smaller states were suddenly given an opening for more prominent engagement. It remains to be seen whether these smaller states’ regional and international status-seeking endeavors are of a durable, sustainable nature. During the working group, scholars examined the post-2011 dynamics of the international relations in the Middle East through the lens of middle powers.

There is ambiguity in the scholarly literature in terms of providing an exact definition for middle power states, and little work has been done on which states might qualify for middle power status within the context of the Middle East. The first topic discussed during the CIRS meeting revolved around the characteristics for determining whether, or not, a state is able to claim middle power status. These characteristics include, among others, states’ relative hard-power capabilities, their capacity to exert influence over regional events, their financial resources, their institutional strength and bureaucratic capabilities, and their relative autonomy. Participants also discussed common foreign policy features among Middle Eastern middle powers. These states tend to impact their immediate sphere, are regional balancers, have the capacity to bargain with super powers and great powers, establish alliances with lesser powers, and generally do not engage in warfare. Another issue in studying middle power politics in the Middle East is the limitations in middle power theory as to how it only focuses on the international hierarchal structure of power, and disregards the multiple hierarchal substructures within the international order. In other words, there are middle powers that pursue this role on the international level, and others who pursue it only within their respective regions. This raises a number of questions: Should the Middle East be defined based on exceptionalism, and thus needs a new definition of middle power? Can a middle power be a nondemocratic government, and not a good global citizen, such as in the Egyptian and Saudi cases? And do middle powers have to share similar pillars of foreign policy agendas? In other words, is the concept of middle power theoretically so diverse as one, for example, cannot compare Iran to Australia as middle powers?

Since status is a self-proclamation met with international recognition, the interactions of Middle Eastern middle powers with extra-regional powers, the expectations of global powers from middle powers in the region, and Middle Eastern middle powers expectations from other global middle powers are all issues worth in-depth examination. Moreover, the perceptions of middle powers in the Middle East with regard to international options, especially with the rise of China, Russia being a potential partner, and the South-South relations, remain profoundly understudied.

When discussing how the Arab uprisings reconfigured the power relations of the Middle East, it is evident that domestic dynamics impact foreign policy agendas. The post-2011 dynamics force us to reconsider traditionally understood conceptions of power, state, and sovereignty. The transnational impact of the Arab uprisings on middle powers in the region, in terms of political ideologies and migration patterns, have led to realignments of alliances. For example, under the current Egyptian leadership, President Abdel Fatah Al Sisi tried to pursue a balanced foreign policy by strengthening the Egyptian relations with Russia. In other incidents, it revived rivalries, such as the Saudi-Iranian case. The realignments and revival of animosities were results of discrepancies in regional actors’ rhetoric on the Arab uprisings. The discrepancies in rhetoric manifest the impact of agency on the identity of states, especially in totalitarian regimes of the Middle East. The transitions in leadership in many countries of the region, despite their various natures, have re-shaped the foreign policy agendas not only of these states, but also across the Middle East. United Arab Emirates is an example, as the transition in leadership from Sheikh Zayed Al Nahyan to Sheikh Khalifa Al Nahyan was coupled with a transformation of Emirati foreign policy, which became more assertive.

Agency, size, and material capacity of middle powers matter in assessing their influence, particularly as they are expected to take part in directly shaping the regional order, and indirectly influencing the international order. Thus, based on material capacity, countries like Egypt, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the pre-2003 Iraq could be considered destined middle powers. Israel and Algeria may be considered middle powers; while countries like Qatar and UAE are influential regional actors. Some participants questioned the concept of “destined middle powers,” suggesting that states should have an interest in seeking a middle power status in order to be one. This interest should not be only expressed by the political leadership, but also supported by cohesive centers of power within the state, and commended by the public. A mismatch between interests of the leadership and its constituencies impacts the country’s ability to claim a specific status in the regional or international order. If the leadership fabricates a state identity that does not fit with the public narrative, tensions in the foreign policy of the state are inevitable. Therefore, material capacity and interest in seeking a middle power status are both indispensible.

Furthermore, colonial legacies have impacted states interests and public narratives. For example, Algerian foreign policy is an extension of its nationalist movement that, for years, fought for independence. These colonial experiences encourage states to avoid conceding sovereignty to regional alliances that may hinder their status and influence. The UAE, as an example, sought an independent foreign policy agenda to escape the Saudi hegemony over the Gulf Cooperation Council. At the same time, Middle Eastern middle powers tolerate alliances that may support their regional activism and competitions. Delving deeper in the Saudi hegemony over the GCC, one can see that Middle Eastern middle powers act differently through regional organizations than other middle powers as they aim to dominate rather than collaborate. However, economic interdependence among Middle Eastern middle powers has been the key to cooperation.

Norm entrepreneurship activities of Middle Eastern middle powers are critical in studying middle power politics in the Middle East. Humanitarian diplomacy has been a prominent form of norm entrepreneurship exercised by middle powers across the world. When it comes to the Middle East, there has been Western scrutiny and skepticism on Middle Eastern charity organizations’ activities, especially after the September 11 attacks. This has impacted not only humanitarian diplomacy of individual countries, but also regional organizations, such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference, as member states scaled back their charity activities to avoid accusations of supporting terrorism. This has impacted Middle Eastern states that seek a middle power status by using philanthropy as a way to project themselves as global good citizens.

Middle Eastern middle powers have also pursued other forms of norm entrepreneurship, such as conflict resolution and mediation. Since being involved in mediation is a key component of the behavioral definition of middle powers, Middle Eastern middle powers (and aspiring middle powers) have acted as active mediators and honest brokers. However, the Middle East is not an ideal setting for studying norm-driven mediation for three main reasons. First, there is a scarcity of comprehensive agreements and a tendency to only perpetuate ceasefires. Second, oil-rich countries of the Middle East seeking middle power status have relied only on incentive-diplomacy, which is not viable in ongoing diplomatic crises. Third, there is an ostensible weakness of multilateral settings and institutions in the Middle East.

Finally, why do countries seek a middle power status? There are not necessarily common motivations among states to pursue a middle power status. Each state has its own domestic, regional, and international dynamics at play driving its pursuit for a middle power status. Some states pursue status-seeking endeavors as a legitimization strategy. Claiming a higher status in the international or regional order induces the public and helps in preempting the spillover of instability to the country, as in the case of the UAE. It also drives attention away from domestic challenges affecting the public such as low GDP, youth population bulges, and budget deficit, such as the case in Saudi Arabia.

At the end of the working group, Mehran Kamrava, Director of CIRS, concluded the session with emphasis on the contribution of the working group discussions to the literature on middle power politics, to be published in an edited volume in the near future.

Please click here to view the AgendaRead more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarJonathan Benthall, University College LondonSuleyman Elik, Istanbul Medeniyet UniversityIslam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarSimon Mabon, Lancaster UniversityImad Mansour, Qatar UniversityRobert Mason, American University in CairoSuzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMarco Pinfari, American University in CairoAmin Saikal, Australian National UniversityAdham Saouli, University of St. AndrewsNael Shama, University of St. AndrewsJackie Starbird, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarElizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarYahia Zoubir, KEDGE Business School, France

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

CIRS Screens Suzi Mirgani's Short Film Caravan
2017-01-19 12:30 - 13:30 (Europe/Moscow)
Award-winning filmmaker Suzi Mirgani recently hosted a screening of her latest work, titled Caravan, to an audience of students, staff, faculty, and guests at Georgetown University in Qatar (GU-Q). The short film, which premiered at the Doha Film Institute’s Ajyal Youth Film Festival late last year, tells the story of members of a cross-section of Qatari society stuck in a traffic jam.

Mirgani, who is the manager and editor for publications at GU-Q’s Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS), also used the screening as opportunity to share more about the production and themes in the work. The five-minute long short film, which was shot on location at The Pearl Qatar, took a day to film and more than two months to prepare for. It depicts a type of lyrical relay, as the camera zooms in and out of the stationary cars. The voices and thoughts of drivers and passengers stuck in the traffic jam play out in a stream of consciousness style.

In the film, the actors are located on a literal bridge to nowhere, as the end of the road disappears into the sand. Mirgani explained that this can be seen to symbolize a path from prosperity to nothing, as construction is still underway on the man-made island. The mix of built and unbuilt can also be viewed as a metaphor for the rapidly developing country, and its often transient residents. “If you give in to the traffic jam, it can be a space of reflection,” said Mirgani.

Featuring vehicles filled with taxi drivers, tourists, and families (speaking languages ranging from Arabic to Tagalog and Urdu), the film represented the range of nationalities, interests, and languages present in Qatar. “This film was a reflection of what I see on a daily basis,” said Mirgani.

The CIRS researcher, who has edited and written numerous books on topics ranging from food security in the Middle East to media and politics, is also the director of 2014’s Hind’s Dream. That film won the jury award for artistic vision at the 2014 Ajyal Film Festival, and has screened at film festivals around the world.

Article by Lauren Granger, Georgetown University in Qatar Media Writer

Highly Skilled Migrants: The Gulf and Global Perspectives Working Group II
2017-01-29 09:00 - 2017-01-30 17:00 (Europe/Moscow)
On January 29-30 2017, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) hosted a working group on “Highly Skilled Migrants: The Gulf and Global Perspectives.” This working group took place under a broader joint research project on Highly Skilled Migrants in Qatar which was launched last year by Zahra Babar, CIRS Associate Director, and two co-collaborators, Nabil Khattab of the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, and Michael Ewers of Qatar University’s Social and Economic Survey Research Institute. A number of scholars with regional and global experience on the topic of skilled migration were invited to present their articles during the two-day meeting, and receive feedback from the group. The topics discussed in the working group included, among others: “involuntary immobility” of highly skilled migrants in Qatar; the impact of highly skilled migrants on GCC economies; structural factors and recruitment of highly skilled migrants in the GCC; transition from oil- to knowledge-based economies; categories, visa classes and visa programs of skilled migrants; integration in the workplace; and the global competition amongst different countries seeking to attract highly skilled migrants.

Zahra Babar, Michael Ewers and Nabil Khattab started the discussion by presenting their article on “Immobile Highly Skilled Migrants in Qatar.” In investigating the motivations and experiences of highly skilled migrants in Qatar, the authors analyze the results of a nationally representative survey of 300 high-skilled expatriates in Qatar, as well key-informant interviews with 32 individuals. During their presentation, the authors presented their data and suggested that given the research carried out, it could be argued that under certain circumstances highly skilled migrants might become “involuntarily immobile” in Qatar. The authors suggest that under the restrictive migration regulations present in Qatar, certain groups of highly-skilled migrants face conditions of involuntary immobility, as they are unable to switch jobs easily either for professional advancement or to escape unsatisfying work experiences. This research study also explores the relationship between highly skilled migrants’ countries of origin, and their experiences in Qatar, particularly their motivations for coming here and for staying. Some of the data collected demonstrate that instability, conflict, and insecurity at home for certain Arab communities of highly skilled workers in Qatar means that they are also made involuntarily immobile as they cannot return home or move to resettle in a third country.

Martin Hvidt led a discussion on the subject of the impact of highly skilled migrants on the economies of the Gulf States. Hividt’s paper addresses the actual and potential contribution of highly skilled migrants to the growth of the Gulf states. He explores the nexus between economic growth in the Gulf States and immigration of highly skilled migrants. While it is nearly impossible to document the actual impact on the economy of this group of migrants due to lack of data, Hividt analyzes and identifies not only the potential positive contributions the highly skilled migrants have, but focuses closely on the barriers embodied in the policies that manage the intake and labor market conditions of the migrants.

Francoise De Bel-Air presented her research article that focuses on the structural factors in the GCC which are spurring policy changes for highly skilled migrants. De Bel-Air shared data on the characteristics and backgrounds of highly skilled migrants working in the GCC, using available demographic and labor force surveys available for various states. De Bel-Air also reviewed the policy framework adopted for highly skilled workers in the region, and particularly certain reforms that have been implemented since the late 2000s. De Bel-Air stressed that policies have developed and been influenced along three pillars of economization, securitization, and management of migration. Del Bel Air concluded by suggesting that there are structural explanations for the reforms of migration policies and the way they directly impact or do not impact highly skilled professionals in the region.

Binod Khadria’s article shifted the discussions to “Transition from Oil- to Knowledge-Economies and Indian Student Mobilities to the Gulf: Education Cities in Three GCC Counties.” In his paper, Khadria examines the transition of GCC countries from oil-economies to knowledge-economies. He analyzes this transition by tracing the development of four educational cities in four GCC cities: Doha in Qatar, Dubai and Abu Dhabi in UAE and Jeddah in Saudi Arabia. Khadria argues that the transition economies of the three countries are trying to tackle their worsening balance of trade arising from the decline in export of oil and natural gas in recent years. In doing so, he analyzes two trends: expansion in the number of Indian students in foreign universities in the GCC countries; and deepening of the foreign direct investment (FDI) in the education sector in the aforementioned cities.

Building up on Khadria’s article, Payal Banerjee led a discussion on “Skilled Migration: Categories, Visa Classes and Visa Programs.” Banerjee offered an introductory analysis of the different visa classes and typologies, the skilled/unskilled dyad in particular, to investigate how the reification and normalization of “skilled immigration,” as a category, result in very troubling outcomes. She argued that once a motif classification gets cemented on the basis of the absence or presence to skills/education, immigrants’ entitlements, legitimacy, and success and failure get calibrated on the basis of individual characteristics. This obfuscates the salience of racially coded structural inequality that is evidenced in a number of recent studies, which document skilled immigrants’ downward occupational mobility and various forms of marginalization, despite educational qualification and language skills. Furthermore, Banerjee claimed that the skilled/unskilled binary detracts from analyzing the role of immigration/visa policies in the production of tenuous legal status, which results in immigrants’ exploitation and vulnerability, in the low-wage as well as skilled, high-wage sectors.

In her presentation, Micheline van Riemsdijk discussed “Integration of Highly Skilled Migrants in the Workplace: A Multi-Scalar Model.” She argued that skilled migrants are often expected to adapt easily to the host culture based on their social, cultural, and human capital. However, these migrants experience integration challenges that have been little addressed in the literature. Using a case study of foreign-born engineers in the Norwegian oil and gas industry, van Riemsdijk proposed a multi-scalar conceptual framework to examine the integration of skilled migrants in the workplace. She combined literature on immigrant integration and diversity management with data from interviews and a survey of foreign-born engineers. The framework van Riemsdijk developed serves as a tool to move beyond single-scale, unidirectional studies of immigrant integration toward a multi-scalar, inter-linked conceptualization of the integration of skilled migrants.

Finally, Lucie Cerna and Mathias Czaika’s article steered the discussion to investigate the “Rising Stars in the Global Race for Talent? A Comparative Analysis of Brazil, India, and Malaysia.” The article examines how emerging economies increase their attractiveness for international talent. In order to analyze the strategies of the “global South” to attract or retain high-skilled people, the authors focus on the three emerging economies: Brazil, India, and Malaysia. Based on 15 expert interviews in these countries, the authors describe the short-term practices and long-term strategies of these three countries in reversing the brain drain by recruiting and retaining highly skilled workers. They argue that while Malaysia has become an active player and innovator on the international talent recruitment market, the other two countries still consider themselves as “self-sufficient” by relying either on their domestic skill supply or on engaging with their skilled diaspora in the case of India. Finally, the authors argue that despite the rising demand for human capital in these three countries, which are at different stages in a “migration policy transition,” they still lack sufficient legal, administrative and economic provisions to bring in skilled foreign workers in significant numbers.

At the conclusion of the meeting, Babar, Ewers, and Khattab highlighted that the original contributions of the group’s articles to the existing literature would greatly expand the scholarly lens on highly skilled migrants, moving it outside the traditional focus on OECD countries. The articles are due to be published in a special issue of a journal in the near future.

See the working group agenda here
Read the participants’ biographies here
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Payal Banerjee, Smith College
Lucie Cerna, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Amanda Chisholm, Newcastle University
Françoise De Bel-Air, Gulf Research Center, Geneva, and the European University Institute
Michael Ewers, SESRI, Qatar University
Islam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Martin Hvidt, University of Southern Denmark
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Nabil Khattab, Doha Institute for Graduate Studies
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Jackie Starbird, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Micheline van Riemsdijk, University of Tennessee Knoxville
Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

The Regional Humanitarian Crisis
2017-02-07 18:00 - 20:00 (Europe/Moscow)
Reach Out To Asia is a Qatar-based non-profit organization that works to ensure that people affected by crisis across Asia and the Middle East have continuous access to relevant and high-quality primary and secondary education. Since its inception in 2005, ROTA has had a vision of providing education for children and youth to discover their potential to become full, responsible citizens building their communities and their futures. Today ROTA has education and development projects in thirteen countries and it has a major strategic initiative to build local capacity and community service in Qatar.

Essa Al-Mannai, the executive director of ROTA, delivered the talk, “The Regional Humanitarian Crisis: How ROTA is Mobilizing Resources to Tackle the Refugee Crisis through Education,” at the Center for International and Regional Studies on February 7, 2017. He shared these grim figures about the status of refugees today:

Currently there are twenty-one million refugees in the world.
About fifty percent of the world’s refugee population is children.
On average, a refugee will live away from home for seventeen years.

There are sixty-five million forcibly-displaced people worldwide. This number is comprised primarily of internally-displaced people who do not have any country or state that would acknowledge their citizenship, and the aforementioned twenty-one million refugees. Tragically, against these disheartening numbers, Al-Mannai reported that only 107,000 refugees were resettled in 2015. He cautioned of the danger of just looking at the magnitude of these problems in terms of the numbers, however. “When we talk about refugees, we are talking about humans with ambitions. People who have hopes and the right to fulfill life dreams,” he said.

ROTA upholds education as the top priority in humanitarian crises because children are the most marginalized and most vulnerable. Providing access to education in safe, nurturing environments can enable children to develop critical lifelong skills. Al-Mannai explained that it is essential for children in emergency situations to have a sense of normalcy, to make friendships, build self-confidence, acquire knowledge, and have a chance to become something in the future. Furthermore, he said, “The simple fact is that illiteracy is isolation, and isolation can lead to destructive tendencies towards the self and towards others.”

What benefits does the world get by educating refugees? “It’s our moral obligation as humans to identify and respect the human mind through fulfilling its desire to learn, to acquire knowledge, to ask questions, to debate, and ultimately to create something,” said Al-Mannai. It is a human need for everyone, regardless of status or where you are from, and he said, “without education this right is denied.”

Another benefit of educating refugees is the huge return on investment for a country that has experienced a crisis, such as the civil war in Syria. Eventually there will need to be resettlement and rebuilding. “Do you want to rebuild a country with engineers and doctors or people who are illiterate?” Al-Mannai asked. “The benefits of education are self-evident.” He reported that, according to the World Bank in 2016, education is an investment where, overall, each year of schooling will raise individual earnings by ten percent; bringing better results than almost any other form of investment. However, of all the international aid that goes for emergencies, only 1.4 percent goes to education.

The Syrian refugee crisis rose from 3.7 million in 2015 to 4.8 million in 2016. Schools were severely in need, with a broken-down infrastructure and limited teacher capacity and access to materials. ROTA’s basic approach to this dire situation was to increase teacher capacity and offer non-formal education, because schools simply could not meet the great needs of the refugee populations. “Education goes beyond the book, the teacher and homework,” Al-Mannai said. Non-formal education can provide a support system to children and youth and offer a positive environment with psychosocial support, and other assistance. ROTA does not just build schools, they take a holistic approach because, he explained, “education is a multi-party process that engages the community, the government, ministries of education, the school directorate, the parents, and even the teachers and the school administration.”

Al-Mannai said a shift is occurring in the global agenda for international humanitarian work and development. In the year 2000, leaders from 189 countries gathered at the United Nations and approved eight Millennium Development Goals by 2015. Progress was achieved in a number of those goals, but the new target is Sustainable Development Goals. The big lesson learned from the international community, according to Al-Mannai, is that “Giving is not enough. We have to give, but we also have to build local capacity.”

Global development goals are moving from quantity measures towards quality. According to Al-Mannai, the focus in the past was on the most needy, poorest countries; now there is recognition that everyone must be included to achieve targets. The previous approach was top-down, donor to beneficiary; now it is bottom-up, and developing capacity is the new goal. Al-Mannai said the new understanding is that top-down will never work, because the needy will continue to come back and ask for more. Teaching people to build their capacities, systems, and governance are the new global directions. The current draft of the Sustainable Development Goals has seventeen goals, and include peace, stability and human rights.

ROTA is building local capacity in Qatar through youth engagement, community service, and global citizenship. ROTA has created various platforms for youth to become active locally and internationally, and to serve as representatives of Qatar in the region. To date, over one-thousand youth have been trained by ROTA. There are currently eighteen Qatari-based youth clubs, each with its own unique vision and mission. Some international platforms that Qatari youth have participated in include the UN General Assembly and the UN World Humanitarian Summit, and ROTA hosted the Global Youth Consultation in 2015, which shapes youth engagement in humanitarian work.

ROTA is a partnership-led initiative, working with organizations in other countries, because Al-Mannai said, “One solution will not fit all, and no one organization has all the solutions.” There are many humanitarian and aid organizations, each with their competitive edge and good capacities. ROTA is mobilizing resources and is building the capacity of the community as a whole, and is partnering with other local non-governmental organizations to increase its impact.

Not since World War II has the world witnessed the number of refugees that we are witnessing today, according to Al-Mannai. The world is developing, but there is a huge percentage of the world that is lagging behind, and he says, we are at risk of these two worlds growing apart from each other. ROTA’s deep commitment to partnership, sustainability, and building local capacity could go far in reversing this alarming trend.

Essa Al-Mannai was appointed as ROTA’s Executive Director in 2010. Under his leadership, the organization has led initiatives in thirteen countries and local programs in Qatar. Additionally, ROTA has led adult literacy trainings, youth leadership programs, and programs designed to benefit students and teachers. He has served on the steering committees of various international and local groups in the fields of development and social responsibility. Recently, Al-Mannai represented the Qatar NGO sector at the high-level event on Refugees’ Education in Emergency Situations hosted by the Permanent United Nations Missions of Portugal, Qatar and Turkey.

Article by Jackie Starbird, Publications and Projects Assistant at CIRS.

Leading the Faithful: The Role of Religious Authorities in the Middle East Working Group II
2017-02-12 09:00 - 2017-02-13 17:00 (Europe/Moscow)
On February 12-13, 2017, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) held its second working group under the research initiative on “Leading the Faithful: The Role of Religious Authorities in the Middle East.” Over the course of two days, working group participants presented a number of draft papers investigating the dynamics, the position of, and the role played by religious leaders of assorted religious communities present in the Middle East. While some of the papers provide nuanced historical depth when tracing the role of religious leaders, others cast their attention to the role of religious leadership during more recent times, particularly in the wake of increasing confessional and sectarian civil conflict seen in the wars in Iraq and Syria. The draft papers focused on a number of specific themes and case studies, and together provide an examination on the following areas: the role of Sunni authority from a historical perspective; the evolution of the marja’ and Shi’i religious leadership in the Middle East; the role of Sufi religious leaders and orders in the Middle East today; the evolution of leadership and authority over the Hajj; the conditions of the Alawite community and the role of the Alawi Sheikhs in Syria in the current context; and case studies on the religious leadership of the Mandaean, the Yezidi, and the Shabak religious communities.

The opening session of the meeting was devoted to discussing Professor Tamara Sonn’s paper on the topic of “Who Speaks for the Umma? Sunni Authority and Religious Leadership in the Contemporary Middle East.” In her paper, Sonn suggested that there is no single source of Sunni religious leadership in the contemporary Middle East. Due to political and demographic changes over the past century, Sunni religious leadership is in a state of transition. Traditional nodes of religious authority have been called into question, and are themselves evolving. As well, non-traditional sources of authority are emerging and, in some cases, have become sufficiently institutionalized to supplant traditional authorities. Sonn briefly described traditional sources of religious authority in Sunni Islam. She also provided an overview of political and demographic developments that called traditional authorities into question. In addition, Sonn surveyed representative examples of both reformed traditional authorities and emerging non-traditional religious leaders in the Sunni Middle East. Finally, she concluded with some observations about long-term trends in Sunni authority and religious leadership in general.

Following on from the discussion on the role of authority and religious leadership for the Sunni community, Sajjad Rizvi presented his paper on Shi’i leadership and the making of a marja’, focusing on the role of Sīstānī and Shi’i Religious authority in the Twitter Age. In his paper, Rizvi considers the question of how one becomes a marja’, particularly in reference to the authority of that marja’. Rizvi focused his discussion on an examination of Sīstānī, and the shift and development of the marja’ in the form of the “Sīstānī model” in the age of social media. Rizvi argues that globalization has both increased the power and reach of the marājiʿ; but yet, ironically, made their significance more local. The increasing consensus of the political role of the marājiʿ is clear in Qum, Najaf and beyond. Rizvi also claims that the recent developments in Iraq have shown that the theory of the authority of the jurist (wilāyat al-faqīh) is no longer just Iranian, nor does the support for it signal a disloyal support for the Iranian state and its jurisdiction. What is properly Iranian and Iraqi in the contemporary world cannot be so easily compartmentalized; this further complicates the question of the role of “Iran” in Iraq. A study of the marāji’ demonstrates that there is more than one conception ofmarja’iyya and of the ḥawza, as well as multiple claimants and potential centers of power for the marāji’. In other words, Rizvi argues that the marja’iyya is traditional and local as well as dynamic and transnational, quietest and conservative as well as politically engaged and reforming. Finally, Rizvi unpacks whether the marja’iyya will survive.

Mark Sedgwick led a working group discussion on his paper that examines Sufi religious leaders and orders in the Middle East today. Sedgwick’s paper studies the basis and nature of the primarily esoteric, person-centered authority of the Sufi shaykh in the context of the ṭarīqa (Sufi Order), and Sufi doctrine. Sedgewick in his paper raises the interesting point about the inverse relationship between the power of the shaykh and the size of the ṭarīqa. The smaller the order over which he asserts leadership, the more direct and over-riding is the authority of the shaykh. The larger the order, the more diffuse and limited is the authority of the shaykh. In addition, Sedgewick also examines the foundation and nature of the primarily exoteric, scripture–centered authority of the Sufi shaykh beyond the ṭarīqa, which includes the social influences of the person-centered authority. Sedgewick argues that this sort of authority diminished during the twentieth century. Sedgwick’s paper concludes with an exploration of more recent developments, particularly the political promotion of Sufism by some states, such as Morocco, as an alternative to other forms of “radical” Islam.

In his presentation, Robert Bianchi focused the discussion on “Religious Authorities and Reimagining the Hajj.” Bianchi argued that the Saudi data leave little doubt that the quality of care for Hajjis varies enormously depending on several key factors which policy makers and religious leaders must address with greater honesty and determination. Year in and year out, the most vulnerable pilgrim populations are poor people, women, and children from across Africa and Asia as well as foreign workers, refugees, and illegal migrants living in Saudi Arabia. Most of the current proposals for Hajj reform ignore these high-risk groups. Saudi planners focus on promoting year-round pilgrimage to boost tourism revenues and high-end infrastructure. In most other countries, government-run Hajj agencies are busy cutting market-sharing deals with private business cartels and their political patrons. The combined effect of these policies is to weaken what remains of already inadequate regulations that are vital to the protection of all Hajjis. Meanwhile, support is also growing for more sweeping proposals to reimagine and reinvent the Hajj instead of fine-tuning the status quo. Some of these reforms are particularly likely to test the ingenuity and influence of religious leaders from all backgrounds because they challenge longstanding custom.

Leon Goldsmith presented his paper on “The ‘Alawī Sheikhs of Religion: A Brief Introduction.” He argues that the ‘Alawī religious leadership has always lacked structure or explicit roles, but nonetheless, filled an important function in the social milieu at local levels. The ‘Alawī mashayikh would cooperate to mediate among individuals and with other groups at times of danger or tension such as in 1936, 1973 and possibly in 2016 as indicated by the unverified Declaration of an Identity Reform. He also claimed that pressures were exerted on the sect to conform to mainstream religious identities, whether Sunni or Shi’i, throughout the twentieth century from both inside Syria and at the regional level. Moreover, Goldsmith claimed that the Ba’th/al-Asad regime has coopted ‘Alawī religious leadership as an instrument of regime maintenance since 1982. The effect of this has been to further divide religious leadership between the traditional and regime-appointed mashayikh. The appointment of regime loyalists as religious sheikhs has seen the standard of sheikhs deteriorate and they have lost respect and independent status in their communities. Finally, the growing corruption and opportunism creeping into the ‘Alawī religious class at the expense of the traditional sheikhs bode poorly for the future of religious leadership as a positive agent for political transformation and stability in Syria.

Albert de Jong shifted the discussion to pseudo-Islamic sects in his presentation on “Kings on Earth, Angels Beyond: Spiritual Elite Communities in the Contemporary Middle East.” de Jong argues that within the mosaic of religious communities of the pre-modern and modern Middle East, there is a wide range of religious communities that predated the rise of Islam alongside a cluster of communities that decidedly came into being after the Islamic conquests, in various distinct geographical, religious, and social contexts. de Jong questions how wholly distinct religious communities have not only survived, but also almost continually increased in the Middle East. He credits their survival and expansion to the organizations of these religious groups, and the role of their leaders. de Jong suggested two fundamental patterns of the social and religious organization that have contributed to the survival and growth of these religious groups: endogamy; and the characteristic division of the community into a small section of specialists in whom knowledge of the tradition is vested, and a large majority who do not (need to) know much about their religion.

Michael Leezenberg presented the last paper of the working group that examines the transformations in the leadership of minority religious communities in Northern Iraq: the Yezidis, Shabak, and Assyrians in Northern Iraq. In his paper, Leezenberg discusses these three religious communities that in some ways have shared the same fate, that of to some degree being at the mercy of their geography, a geography that has left them ensnared by ongoing conflict which has only accelerated over the past three decades. While these communities were certainly vulnerable even during the Baathist years, in post-Saddam Iraq their conditions have grown much more precarious status. Most recently they have suffered by becoming a target for violence directed at them by ISIS. In his paper Leezenberg traces the at times converging and at other times diverging trajectories of these groups, focusing particularly on the role of their religious leaders and how they have dealt with crises and conflict at different points in the bloody history of the region.

See the working group agenda hereRead the participants’ biographies hereRead more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarRobert Bianchi, Shanghai International Studies UniversityAlbert de Jong, Leiden UniversityLeon Goldsmith, University of Otago, New ZealandIslam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMichiel Leezenberg, University of AmsterdamSuzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarSajjad Rizvi, University of ExeterMark Sedgwick, Aarhus University, DenmarkTamara Sonn, Georgetown UniversityJackie Starbird, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarElizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

Higher Education Policies and the Emerging Over-education Crisis in the Middle East
2017-02-19 12:30 - 13:30 (Europe/Moscow)
Student enrollment in higher education institutions has rapidly increased in most Middle Eastern countries in recent years. Governments have shown a strong commitment to higher education, and there has been broad support from politicians and citizens for establishing more universities and increasing access to higher education. However, in recent years, the supply of university graduates in many fields of education has exceeded the labor market demand and the unemployment rate among university graduates has increased. Unfortunately, so far this high unemployment rate has not led to a reduction in student enrollment. Instead, some Middle Eastern countries have fallen into an “over-education trap,” according to Nader Habibi, Professor of Economics and Middle East Studies at Brandeis University.

The over-education trap, as defined by Habibi, includes the following process: university graduates who cannot find employment in their university majors will eventually accept low-skill and semi-skilled jobs that do not require a university degree. In doing so they reduce the employment opportunities for high school graduates, who would have been employed for these jobs traditionally. Consequently, high-school graduates face higher unemployment rates (crowded out by university graduates), and many will conclude that their only option for avoiding unemployment is a “university education.”

Habibi presented his talk, Higher Education Policies and the Emerging Over-education Crisis in the Middle East, at the Center for International and Regional Studies on February 19, 2017. He argued that there must be a balance between quality and quantity of education in the region. “Getting a degree in physics and then getting a job in chemistry or another job that requires a university degree is not big a waste of resources; you’re still a university graduate working in some other field,” Habibi said. “But if you are a university graduate and you are working in a field that does not really need the skills of a university education then you have to think about the resources you (and the government) have devoted to your education.”

Habibi began his research on conditions of higher education in Egypt, Iran, and Turkey about four years ago. Along with local research partners in these countries, he has conducted research on the earnings of university graduates, examined the motivations behind why individuals choose to get degrees, interviewed policymakers, and studied higher-education planning patterns.

There is strong cultural demand for higher education everywhere, but this was not the case forty or fifty years ago, he explained. “In 1976, it was unheard of for university graduates to be unemployed in Iran, but in 2011 the unemployment rate for university graduates was nineteen percent.” Habibi reported that in many MENA countries today, the unemployment rate for people with university degrees is higher than high school graduates.

In the past two decades, because of the political acceptance of privatization of higher education, policymakers have been able to expand higher education without expanding the government expenditure by the same proportion. Therefore, in a way, the fiscal burden of expansion has been reduced through privatization. “In these countries, enrollment has increased, but the burden of education on government has not increased,” Habibi said. Politicians did not foresee that increasing enrollment would become a massive burden. “The cost of education is to a large extent a burden on the entire society,” he said, “so we should justify the return to education not just for the individual but for the entire society, by taking into account the massive government investment in tertiary education.”

A common feature among Middle Eastern countries is that governments take a very active role in educational planning, Habibi said. This is not the case in Europe and the United States, where a large number of universities are private, and governments do not really have much control over admission and enrollment policies. He said there are two primary justifications for governments expanding educational opportunities in higher education, economic justification (labor market demand for university skills) and social demand.

Labor market justification arises from manpower planning. Based on long-term forecasts for economic growth and industrial development, the government estimates the amount of skilled labor that is needed in each specific field. Social demand for higher education, on the other hand, is based on the desire of students and their families for higher education, according to Habibi. Social demand is generally larger than the labor market demand because citizens observe that university graduates tend to earn more income, hold a higher social status, and have improved social interactions and opportunities. While there are many obvious social and cultural benefits to having a more educated population, he said, “You also have to look at the employment and labor market conditions for university graduates.”

Habibi shared some statistics about recent spikes in university enrollment. Between 1995 and 2015, Iran and Turkey each saw enrollment increase by almost five hundred percent. With a population of ninety million, Egypt has 2.5 million university students enrolled at present; Turkey’s population of eighty million has five million university students. Egyptian citizens aged 25-29 who hold a university degree increased by an astounding eighty percent in this timeframe.

Universities in Iran expanded very rapidly, especially since 2005, “because of political reasons and because of populist pressure,” Habibi reported. If you are a graduate in computer science or law, he said, you should have good opportunity for employment. However, “we see surprisingly high unemployment rates in these and some other university majors like architecture and civil engineering.” He reported that in Iran in 2016, the unemployment rate for male university graduates was thirteen percent, and 65.5 percent for females.

Habibi and his colleagues observed that in every country policymakers received some practical recommendations for addressing the issue of over-education through workforce planning, (for example, estimating the labor market need for university programs, and admitting students according to set requirements). But in every proposed case, he said, “solutions were rejected by policymakers because social demand for higher education was so strong that they could not say no to families that wanted to send their children to university. . . . Rather than focusing on labor market demand, politicians focused on satisfying the social demand for higher education, which has now resulted in unemployment and underemployment.”

Habibi cited two countries that have been able to contain the problem of over-education, Germany and Singapore. Germany uses vocational training programs in high schools that are popular and effective, and many students choose the vocational education for manufacturing jobs because they find good-paying jobs after graduation. This system has worked because there is cooperation between the private sector corporations and the vocational training schools, Habibi said. Singapore has been successful in resisting populist demand and puts strict limits on university admissions. The government achieved this by reducing the role of the ministry of higher education in determining the enrollment quotas for universities, and it has empowered the ministry of manpower to play a more important role in higher-education planning. As a result, enrollment limits are closely linked to labor market demand projections for each university major.

“There are some steps that can be taken to prevent over-education, but they will require political will,” Habibi said. He cited the need for economic planning and a “cap and trade” concept, where a cap is placed on the number of students admitted into each major (for example civil engineering), and universities then compete for enrollment permits. He said the over-education crisis reminds him of the issue of inflation, and how countries manage to fight it. Using this analogy he said, “As long as the parliament is in charge of monetary policy it is hard to fight inflation because members of parliament would like to satisfy their constituency by increasing government expenditures and they will force the central government to finance the budget deficit by printing more money. However, when the central bank of a country is independent the politicians cannot force it to print money and cause inflation.” Transferring the higher education enrollment decisions to an independent body away from political and social pressures, can have a similar effect in preventing over-education.

Nader Habibi is the Henry J. Leir Professor of the Economics of the Middle East at Brandeis University’s Crown Center for Middle East Studies. Before joining Brandeis University in June 2007, he served as managing director of economic forecasting and risk analysis for Middle East and North Africa with Global Insight Ltd. Habibi has more than twenty-eight years of experience in teaching, research and management positions; including vice-president for research in Iran Banking Institute (Tehran), assistant professor of economics in Bilkent University (Ankara), research fellow and lecturer on the political economy of the Middle East at Yale University.

Article by Jackie Starbird, Publications and Projects Assistant at CIRS.

Sports, Society, and the State in the Middle East Working Group I
2017-03-12 09:00 - 2017-03-13 15:00 (Europe/Moscow)
On March 12-13, 2017, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) held a working group under its research initiative on “Sports, Society, and the State in the Middle East.” During the course of two days, participants identified key gaps in the literature on sports in the Middle East through the lenses of their various disciplines. The participants led discussions on a number of related subtopics, including: the historical evolution of sports in the Middle East; nationalism, identity and sports; ethno-national conflict and sports; social inclusion, gender, and sports; fans, brands, sponsorships and the commercial development of sports; the politics of football in the Levant; physical education; the evolution of sports media; Khaleeji soft power, branding and sports investments; and GCC mega sporting events and foreign relations.

Murat Yildiz led the opening discussion on “The Historical Evolution of Sports in the Middle East.” Yildiz identified a number of questions that remain understudied in the literature on the history sports in the Middle East. He proposed that it would be worthwhile to develop a unique periodization of the Middle East through the lens of sports, and that such a periodization might look quite different from the social and political markers that are most commonly applied when separating the region into different historical eras. Yildiz also suggested that the question of the relationship between late imperial structures and sports development in the region needs further study. It is also important to understand why Middle Eastern states had attempted to promote sports in rural areas, and how this has contributed to our understanding of the urban history of the Middle East. Clearly there have historically been factors that have led to certain sports being more successful and popular in the region, with others less so. Yildiz claimed that studying these factors would contribute to the existing literature.

Nadim Nassif provided an overview of new research questions in relation to “Nationalism, Identity, and Sports in the Middle East.” Nassif argued that there is a “Gold War” and a global race among Middle Eastern states seeking to engage in sports for the purpose of branding, image-building, and reputational gain. The scholarship that looks at the role of sports in identity and nation-building in the Middle East is incomplete, as it has focused primarily on the cases of Palestine, Lebanon, and Yemen. Nassif emphasized that the study of sports in the Middle East has not provided enough empirical evidence for how sports are playing into or trying to counter the broader sectarian divisions across the region. Nassif suggested that there are three levels of analysis which need to be applied in order to understand the role of sports in Middle Eastern politics: the relationship between regime type and sports development; the strength or weakness of the state and the role of sports in nation-building; and the different echelons of stakeholders, and their particular motives behind their engagement in sports. Among other questions which need to be addressed, he suggested: What are the factors that impact ethno-national rivalries in sports? How can states promote national identity through sports when in fact so many “national” sports teams rely heavily on foreign players and coaches? How do states position themselves regionally and internationally by hosting mega elite sports events? How do sports investments contribute to national identity? Is there a correlation between self-identity and involvement in sports? Do sports serve as a tool to stimulate or counter sectarianism and sub-national identities? Additional questions that are relevant examine the role of diaspora- and homeland-players in stimulating public support to national teams, the evolution of cross-national identities and sports, and the role of political parties in appointing heads of national sports federations.

Closely related to questions raised during Nassif’s session, Tamir Sorek led a discussion on “Ethno-national Conflict and Sports in the Middle East.” Sorek explored how sports can impact public attitudes in countries experiencing ethno-national conflicts, and how sports can promote the exclusion of ethno-linguistic and religious communities. For example, he raised a question: How does the performance of an Arab star in the Israeli national team impact Jews’ perceptions of Arabs? The same question could also be asked with regards to Copts in Egypt, and other communities in the ethnically and religiously plural Middle East. Another issue Sorek raised is the display of nationalism in sports arenas. He claimed that at the time some states are antagonistic towards displays of overt nationalism in sports arenas (i.e. Israel’s response towards Palestinian identity expressed in public), other states remain agnostic towards such displays (i.e. Lebanon). Sorek also raised an interesting question on the value of sports sanctions as a tool for modifying the behavior of states seen to be acting outside international norms.

Nida Ahmad continued with a discussion on identity, social inclusion, and exclusion by examining the issue of gender and sports in the Middle East. Ahmad raised a number of questions in relation to women’s participation in sports in the Middle East, including how social media has shaped female athletes’ ability to communicate at the national, regional, and international level with their audiences and fan-bases. She also suggested that there are new forms of physical activity which are gaining popularity among women in the MENA region, particularly “action” sports. Ahmad observed that there is increasing agency of for women in terms of creating a new narrative around sports. Female athletes and sports participants are influencing the regulatory environment, changing local and regional norms, and perhaps making sports more accessible to Muslim women at a global level. There has been a gradual easing of regulations that had previously prohibited the wearing of hijab in international sports competitions. International sportswear brands’ have also made a strategic shift towards producing sportswear designed for Muslim women athletes, such as the Nike “Pro Hijab” advertising campaign demonstrates. Ahmad also suggested that some Middle Eastern states have promoted women in sports as a means to counter radicalization in their societies. Additional worthwhile contributions to the literature could be examining underground females’ sports competitions, the emergence of senior female sports officials and their role in sports organizations and federation, and girls’ inclusion in athletic programs through the educational system.

Simon Chadwick led a session on the commercialization of sports in the Middle East. Chadwick stated that there is a sizable sports economy in the Middle East which is valued at about sixteen billion US dollars, and yet it remains significantly understudied. Chadwick proposed five approaches to studying the sports economy in the Middle East: fans, brands, sponsors, commerce, and the future. Expanding on this, Chadwick raised a number of questions: on what basis do fans engage with sports? How is this manifested in their choices, thinking, and behavior? How are sports brands built? And what contribution can this make to the business of sport in the Middle East? What forms can sponsorship in the Middle East take? And how should sponsorship deals be managed to ensure maximum effectiveness? What is the economic and commercial role of sport in the Middle East? And how should the challenges faced by the industry be addressed? And finally, what role will new sports and new sports formats play in the Middle East?

Dag Tuastad shifted the discussion to “The Politics of Football in the Levant.” Tuastad claimed that football remains at the center of politics in the Levant. It reflects cultural and social processes in the region; in addition to being a space for political struggle between the social units of state. Therefore, given that remembering takes place in individual minds through membership, Tuastad argued that football should be studied as a critical constituent of the social memory of peoples of the Levant. This would explain the active remaking of the past through social groups’ attachment to the past. Tuastad gave a number of examples that justify his argument, among which: Palestinians and their invented symbols that represent their identity in Jordanian stadiums; primary solidarity groups, “tribal football”; how Hamas took control over football clubs and resumed the league once it came to power; and the Palestinian football league of Beirut.

Following Tuastad’s discussion, Ferman Konukman explored “Physical Education and Sports Development in the Middle East.” Konukman traced physical education through the imperial history of and in the Middle East. This raised questions on how colonial experiences impacted the physical education system in the GCC? And what is the role of foreign physical educators in the development of sports in the wider region? He also highlighted how, later on during state building processes, physical education served as a bonding and nation-building strategy, particularly in Turkey, Egypt, Iran, and the GCC states. Konukman then focused the discussion on physical education curriculum in the Middle East, and asked: How has physical education in the Middle East accommodated students with special needs? What is the perception of female students towards physical education in the Middle East? How do co-ed classes impact physical education in the Middle East? These questions led the discussion to issues around policymaking, graduate and executive sports management programs, and elite sports academies in the Middle East.

Mahfoud Amara discussed another aspect of sports: “The Evolution of Sports Media in the Middle East.” Amara started by highlighting the various types of sports media that range from state television’s sports channels; sports magazines that turned into television channels; private-owned channels; cable-channels; football clubs television channels; and YouTube channels. The wide variety of sports media channels and popular sports programs provoked questions around the international legislation of broadcasting, and migration of sports journalists. Amara highlighted BeIN Sports as an understudied case-study. He raised questions, among which: Is BeIN Sports commercially viable, or underwritten by the government similar to Al Jazeera news? Why did Aljazeera Sports transform into BeIN Sports? In the competitive structure of media rights, does Qatar have the capacity to compete in the broadcasting market? Is BeIN Sports an example of economic diversification? What role does social media play in competing with BeIN Sports? What intellectual property rights exist in broadcasting mega sports competitions? And how are they enforced?

Nnamdi Madichie led a discussion on “Khaleeji Soft Power, Branding, and International Sports Investments.” Madichie focused his session on the role of states in the development of sports for branding, and claiming regional leadership purposes. He highlighted how such endeavors by states are not only to claim international and regional recognition, but also to consolidate legitimacy domestically. In analyzing states’ sports endeavors, Madichie investigated issues around sports tourism; investments in elite sports; sports diplomacy; sports foreign investments; and promoting Khaleeji products in European stadia.

Finally, Danyel Reiche discussed “GCC Mega Events and Foreign Relations: Reputational Gain or Loss?” Reiche started his discussion by defining mega-sporting events, which he claimed are events that have global or continental appeal. There are two dimensions of mega sports events: hosting, and participation. Insofar as hosting mega-sporting events in concerned, he raised questions around: What drives hosting mega sports events in the GCC?Why do some GCC states still behind in terms of hosting mega sports events? Why do not GCC states cooperate in hosting mega sports events? What is happening with the infrastructure states invest in after the sporting event? Reiche also raised issues around perceptions of hosting mega sports in GCC by nationals and expats, and the impact of hosting such event on the local society. With regards to participation, Reiche discussed specialization in specific sports, and institutional promotion of participation.

In conclusion, Mehran Kamrava, Director of CIRS, thanked the participants for identifying key gaps in the literature on sports in the Middle East. It is worth noting that the participants will contribute empirically-grounded articles addressing these questions, among others, to be published in an edited special issue under the auspices of CIRS.

Click here for the working group’s agendaClick here for the participants’ biographyRead more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Nida Ahmad, University of Waikato, New ZealandMahfoud Amara, Qatar UniversityZahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarSimon Chadwick, Salford University, ManchesterIslam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMonèm Jemni, Qatar UniversityMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarFerman Konukman, Qatar UniversityCraig LaMay, Northwestern University in QatarNnamdi Madichie, London School of Business and ManagementSuzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarNadim Nassif, Notre Dame University, LebanonDanyel Reiche, American University of BeirutTamir Sorek, University of FloridaJackie Starbird, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarBetsi Stephen, Georgetown UniversityDag Tuastad, University of OsloElizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMurat Yildiz, Skidmore College

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

Migrant Recruitment Fees and the GCC Construction Sector
2017-03-19 12:30 - 13:30 (Europe/Moscow)
While human rights issues faced by low-wage migrant workers in the Gulf region have been widely reported on, the related issue of “recruitment fees” paid by these workers in their countries of origin – central to the experience of so many migrants – hasn’t received as much attention.

There are legitimate costs associated with recruitment and migration, according to David Segall, a policy associate with New York University’s Stern Center for Business and Human Rights, who researches construction industry migrant labor in the Gulf. “The point is that recruitment is not free; it costs money to find workers, to skills-test them, to process visas, to interview them, and to make sure they’re qualified for the job that you’re hiring them for,” Segall said.

But according to Segall, in the current predominant recruitment model in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, clients throughout the supply chain do not pay their suppliers for services rendered. As a result, instead of project clients and construction companies bearing these costs, the most vulnerable migrant workers usually pay for their own recruitment—and then some—in violation of GCC and international law.

“Every single player in the chain seems to have leverage over their supplier, and that leads to downward pressure on wages and upward pressure on costs of migration” ultimately borne by migrants, Segall noted in his talk, “Migrant Recruitment Fees and the GCC Construction Sector,” at the Center for International and Regional Studies talk on March 19, 2017. Fatima Al-Dosari, a research consultant at Stern, Qatari citizen, and graduate of Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., joined Segall and shared her insights on migrant workers in Qatar.

What Segall called an “inverted payment chain” has clients (such as a government, a government-sponsored development project, or a private company) at the top of the supply chain and low-wage workers at the bottom. In between, there are layers of employers/sponsors, registered recruiters in South Asian sending-countries, and unregistered local “subagents.” According to Segall, “Clients are not actually paying their suppliers for the services that are rendered . . . or they are getting paid. So it flips the entire chain, such that at the end of the line it is the migrant worker who essentially foots the bill for all of the costs of migration, plus some.”

Segall and his colleagues are trying to understand why this is occurring and what makes it so ubiquitous in the GCC for low-wage construction workers, who mostly come from India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Segall and Sarah Labowitz, co-director of the NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights, have conducted more than a year of research in this pursuit, primarily focusing on workers from India and Bangladesh. They will publish their findings in a report in early April.

Segall and Labowitz found that an imbalance of power between multiple economic players leads to an inversion of the normal fee-for-service payment business model. Supply chain pressure begins with intense competition in the construction industry in the Gulf, where companies often submit bids at less than normal market value just to break into the region. In order to keep these bids competitive in such a hot market, construction firms generally do not include the cost of recruitment in their bids to clients, and they do not pay the recruiters that service them. Smaller subcontractors and GCC-based “manpower firms”—which import, employ, and lease out labor for short-term projects—also avoid paying their recruiters.

Why would a recruiter in South Asia take on work if they are not getting paid by the employer? Segall explained that recruitment is also a very crowded market, and the current expectation is that construction clients will not pay for low-wage workers. “Recruiters also have to make a living, and if we acknowledge this is a legitimate service they are providing, it would be legitimate for them to take a service fee [from the employing company] and earn a small profit,” he said. But Segall said that with few exceptions, recruitment firms will agree to take a contract without payment: “We hear time and time again from recruiters, ‘if we’re not fulfilling it, someone else will.’”

In order to keep their doors open and earn a profit, then, recruiters must take money from prospective migrants themselves. “If they are not being paid by the client, they have to get paid by somebody. They have very little leverage to push back if they are not receiving payment from the employer.” Additionally, he said, corruption among recruitment agencies is a major problem. Among the few recruiters who are paid by construction company clients, reports indicate that some charge workers anyway, essentially “double-dipping.”

Recruitment agencies (and therefore employers and their clients) themselves rely on unlicensed sub-agents to access remote populations of inexpensive labor, because they don’t have access to or requisite social networks in certain common regions of migrant origin. The subagents, who are not paid by the registered agents that commission them, in turn charge additional fees to prospective workers. Segall argued that sub-agents should be registered, legalized, regulated, and priced into bids as a legitimate cost to borne by the employer and client.

Segall said the actual cost of recruitment may be in the range of US$400-700, excluding flight costs. However, Indian migrants end up paying between $1,000 and $3,000, and Bangladeshis can pay from $1,700 to $5,200. The discrepancy is due both to layers of recruiters and subagents throughout the process—each of whom takes a cut of profit—and to markups to the cost due to kickbacks. For example, recruiters are willing to pay significant amounts to representatives of the employer merely for the right to a visa, Segall said—sometimes up to $1,300, a cost ultimately paid for by the worker. Migrants also end up paying for other illegitimate costs and markups, such as kickbacks by recruiters to visiting employer representatives and markups to flight ticket charges.

Finally, migrant workers agree to pay recruiters because of the imbalance between supply and demand for workers and jobs. If a worker doesn’t pay a recruitment fee, many others in line behind him will. Segall argued that opportunities to enter the GCC are actually quite limited. While there are twenty-five million migrants currently in the GCC, and in any given year hundreds of thousands of new workers will arrive, “there are still tens of millions more who would come if they could,” said Segall.

And although there is corruption in most migrant-sending countries—and among recruiters—according to Segall, if an employing company is not paying its recruiters, there must be corruption. “You’re essentially creating a model where there is no option but to charge the workers,” he said. “If ever there is to be a comprehensive solution to this issue, construction companies and their clients will need to adopt a ‘pay and investigate the recruiter’ model.”

Fatima Al-Dosari works on migrant workers’ welfare, which has taken her to labor camps in Qatar, where she has met with laborers and heard their concerns. She said that attitudes of Qataris toward migrant workers are changing and the Qatar government is increasing efforts toward sustainable change, but many challenges—particularly with regard to social attitudes toward migrants—remain. “Both Qataris and non-Qataris have an obligation and responsibility to create change,” she said, adding that it “won’t happen without collaboration.”

David Segall is a research scholar and policy associate with the NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights. The Center conducts research and advocacy on issues at the intersection of these two realms, pushing for sector-specific, standards-based approaches to the most serious rights challenges in global supply chains. Previously, Segall directed the Human Rights in Iran Unit at The City University of New York, and he served as an Associate in the Middle East and North Africa Division of Human Rights Watch.

Article by Jackie Starbird, Publications and Projects Assistant

The "Resource Curse" in the Gulf Working Group II
2017-04-02 09:00 - 16:00 (Europe/Moscow)
On April 2, 2017, CIRS held the second working group under its research initiative on “The ‘Resource Curse’ in the Gulf.” During the working group, the participants presented their original contributions to the literature on rentier state theory, and covered a variety of related subtopics, including: rents, neopatrimonialism, and entrepreneurial state capitalism in the Gulf; co-optation mechanisms in rentier state theory; imperial origins of the oil curse; the resource curse, gender, and labor nationalization policies in the GCC; and military spending and corruption in rentier states.

Mathew Gray began the discussion with his paper on “Rentierism’s Siblings: On the Linkages between Rents, Neopatrimonialism, and Entrepreneurial State Capitalism in the Persian Gulf Monarchies.” In his article, Gray asserts that the politics of the Gulf have been changing rapidly for the past two decades or more, and continues to do so. The patterns of state and regime control are becoming more complex and sophisticated, and the simple rentier explanation, if it was ever suitable, is long out of date. Thus, Gray highlights the necessity of combining theories of late-stage rentierism with two other concepts, namely neopatrimonialism and entrepreneurial state capitalism, to better explain the political dynamics and arrangements in the GCC. Gray argues that rent is not only a tool of justification and co-optation used by states, but also links closely to neopatrimonialism and entrepreneurial state capitalism. Neopatrimonialism is essential to how state capitalism operates, and to ensuring that the political benefits derived from state capitalism reach the state and the ruling elite. State capitalism also provides a commercial realm within which the regime can create and manage elites, and develop the patron-client relationships that are a salient feature of Gulf politics.

Jessie Moritz led the discussion on her paper that questions the resilience of rentier theory’s hypothesis that the state effectively co-opts the public via rent disbursement, and thus avoids having to either reform or face opposition and dissent. In her paper on “Reformers and the Rentier State: Re-evaluating the Co-optation Mechanism in Rentier State Theory,” Moritz suggests that the argument that the oil and gas-rich GCC have, through their rent-based wealth distributions, effectively bought off society needs some pressing against. In her examination of informal and formal opposition in Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman since 2011, Moritz provides a nuanced analysis of the effectiveness of the rentier “co-optation mechanism” at the sub-national level. Drawing on a series of over 130 semi-structured interviews conducted with Gulf nationals, Moritz uncovers evidence of both rent-seeking behavior as well as open political dissent to state authority among nationals. Even Gulf citizens who contend with heavy material disincentives to challenge state authority do so if there are political motivations for it. Mortiz’s research highlights three underlying forces that can overpower rent-based incentives for political quiescence in the GCC states and propel the public to openly challenge the state: ideology, repression, and inequality.

Desha Girod presented her paper co-authored with Meir Walters on the “Imperial Origins of the Oil Curse.” Girod and Walters’ purpose in writing this paper is to explore why some leaders of oil-rich states invest their rentier earning in socio-economic development while other leaders largely spend this wealth on themselves and their networks of support. The rentier literature suggests that oil is a curse when it is discovered or exploited in countries that have weak institutions at the time of oil discovery or exploitation. However, this causal explanation needs to be tested further, as not all states with weak or nascent institutions at the time of oil discovery distribute hydrocarbon-derived wealth in the same way, as can be seen by the behavior of the GCC states. Other factors may exist at the time of oil discovery which incentivize leaders of states to spend on broad-based development and their populations despite the lack of existence of strong national institutions. In order to understand these dynamic in more detail, Girod and Walters trace the evolution of rent distribution in two oil-rich states in the Arabian Peninsula (Kuwait and Oman) that experienced remarkable development yet, like paradigmatic cases of the oil “curse,” contained weak national institutions at the time of oil discovery. However, unlike the classic cases, the nascent leaders and regimes in Kuwait and Oman lacked a dominant political class with access to coercive institutions capable of marginalizing their rivals. Imperial powers active in the region did not build coercive colonial institutions for extractive purposes because they had historically viewed the region as poor in natural resources. Unlike their behavior in other parts of the Middle East, imperial powers did not need to develop coercive extractive institutions nor an established hegemonic class of local clients to carry out the colonial project. As a result, at the time of independence the GCC rulers had to spend their oil revenues on development as a survival strategy and in order to placate any potential rivals. This paper thus suggests that the oil curse on development is modified by a pre-existing curse of natural resources and colonial extractive intent.

Gail Buttorff shifted the discussions with her paper (co-authored with Nawra al-Lawati and Bozena Welborne): “Cursed No More?: The Resource Curse, Gender, and Labor Nationalization Policies in the GCC.” The authors argue that recent scholarship posits that the resource curse has gendered as well as economic effects on oil-rich economies, entrenching paternalistic relationships that disadvantage women’s entry into the labor force in states such as those of the Middle East. Upon closer examination, however, it appears that oil may not be the most compelling argument to explain Arab women’s low presence in the workforce—especially since we see relatively high levels of women in the labor force within the Gulf Cooperation Council member states. The authors’ analysis suggests that oil-driven development might even boost female labor force participation as a by-product of labor nationalization policies.

Mohammad Reza Farzanegan concluded the working group discussions with his paper on “The Impact of Oil Rents on Military Spending: Does Corruption Matter?” Farzanegan’s study shows that the level of corruption matters in how oil rents affect the military spending of different countries. Using panel data covering the 1984–2014 period of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries (including Gulf Cooperation Council countries), the author argues that the effect of oil rents on military budget depends on the extent of political corruption. Oil wealth boosts military spending when corruption (measured by the re-scaled ICRG index) exceeds a critical score of five (out of six) in the MENA region. The intermediary role of corruption in the military–oil nexus is robust, controlling country and year fixed effects, and a set of control variables that may affect military spending.

These original, empirically grounded contributions have been published as an edited volume and in a CIRS special issue of the Journal of Arabian Studies.

Click here for the working group’s agendaClick here for the participants biographiesRead more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarGail Buttorff, University of Kansas, USMohammad Reza Farzanegan, Philipps-Universität MarburgDesha Girod, Georgetown UniversityMatthew Gray, Waseda University, JapanIslam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarAnatol Lieven, Georgetown University in QatarSuzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarJessie Moritz, Australian National UniversityGerd Nonneman, Georgetown University in QatarJackie Starbird, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarElizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

Target Markets: International Terrorism Meets Global Capitalism in the Mall
2017-04-05 12:30 - 13:30 (Europe/Moscow)
On September 21, 2013, four members of the Somalia-based militant group al-Shabaab attacked the upscale Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya. The attack turned into a 4-day siege, as Kenyan police and military were ill-equipped to manage the chaotic and dangerous situation. In the end, at least 71 people were killed—including civilians, soldiers, police officers, and the four terrorists—and many more were wounded.

Victims and media analysts interviewed after the attack expressed their disbelief at violence entering into such a normal, everyday space. While violence and shopping may seem incongruous, Suzi Mirgani, author of the book Target Markets: International Terrorism Meets Global Capitalism in the Mall (Transcript Press, 2017), argues that violence is actually embedded in the history of the shopping mall, and is an integral feature of contemporary neoliberal practice.

Mirgani is Managing Editor for Publications at the Center for International and Regional Studies. She outlined the thesis of her book at an April 5, 2017 CIRS talk in which she highlighted the underlying history of militarism that permeates the concept and architecture of shopping malls as a contemporary commercial bunker. She explained the original shopping mall design from the 1950s was actually modeled on full-service army barracks, where everything could be found under one roof, including products, services, and entertainment. “In this sense, shopping malls represent an extension of the military-industrial complex,” Mirgani said.

The notion of shopping has become highly politicized and is increasingly framed as a patriotic duty, especially after the September 11, 2001 attacks, in an attempt to set clear boundaries between the value systems of “us and them.” However, Mirgani noted, in an era defined by the infiltration of neoliberal practice in all forms of everyday life, capitalism, globalization, and terrorism are interconnected.

The shopping mall is a site for the production of desire and consumption, and also for the production of contestation, Mirgani argued. It is a local space filled with global flows and tensions—including the circulation of international neoliberal policies as well as international threats and security efforts. “Westgate becomes a prism that reflects the fraught relationship between a voracious global capitalism and a destructive international terrorism,” she said.

“If we look beyond the jihadist angle of the story, and examine the nexus of security, marketing, and violence, a much more complex picture of the Westgate attacks arises,” Mirgani said. The Westgate Mall is situated in the Westlands district of Nairobi, adjacent to a slum. When it was built, the mall destroyed the informal markets in the area, so it was already a site of contestation. Mirgani said there is a division between urban spaces for those who can afford to partake, and an alien and discordant one for those who cannot.

Neoliberal capitalist practices, and by implication shopping malls, assist in the propagation of unequal power relations. In developing countries, shopping malls are imported wholesale with little regard for their existing surroundings. With its ubiquitous products offered by global distribution networks, “it is in the shopping mall that Nairobi most resembles New York. An attack on one can be symbolically read as an attack on the other,” Mirgani argued.

Cities are imbued with visible hallmarks of war: surveillance technology, barricades, weapons, patrols, and armed and masked personnel on both sides of the ideological divide, Mirgani said. Veterans returning to the US from Iraq and Afghanistan are top candidates for security jobs in shopping malls. In addition, there is an infiltration of surveillance into everyday spaces. The ubiquity of surveillance and CCTV footage means terror attacks are increasingly being recorded, disseminated, and consumed, she said.

Explaining the media’s role in the Westgate attack, Mirgani presented the event as a case study to examine how media networks and extremists each played a role in creating a “spectacle of terror.” She argued: “The Westgate Mall siege was a made-for-television event from the beginning.” Since witness testimonies of the attacks varied wildly, with many disagreeing on what they saw, the only real evidence was gathered from recordings from CCTV cameras and victims’ mobile phones. There was an extraordinary array of visual material produced over the four-day siege, serving to fuel 24-hour news network competition, feeding them with a steady stream of images, audiences, and advertising revenue. Mirgani explained how news networks and entertainment networks are vertically aligned, often owned by the same parent corporation, making their content similar in style and substance.

The violence of the attack was appropriated by both al-Shabaab and the media, making the relationship between them a kind of “symbiosis,” Mirgani said. In the past, extremists had to rely on the news media for the dissemination of their message, but through social media and other channels, they no longer are dependent on editors and network owners. Now there is a reversal of the traditional roles of audiences and news media in which social media users not only report breaking news, but are the source of breaking news. “Terrorists and their critics compete with one another through commodification of violence,” she said.

Mirgani said when she saw pictures of the Westgate Mall disaster, she was reminded of another atrocity from a few months before, the Rana Plaza building collapse in Bangladesh, in which over 1,000 people died. This was an eight-story commercial building, housing garment factories producing clothing for global brands. Questions emerged for Mirgani about the relationship between international terrorism and global capitalist practice. “Rana Plaza was not made into a global media spectacle as it did not fit within the lucrative ‘fear economy,’ and the prevailing discourse of terror,” she said. “We tend to separate violences: the violence in the capitalist mode of production is ‘normal,’ and to some extent even tolerable, but terrorist violence is alien and unacceptable.”

Atrocities of the neoliberal model are viewed as the unfortunate byproduct of conducting business in the Third World—using subcontractors and outsourced organizations—and not considered to be a problem with the model itself. Violence is a feature of global neoliberal practice as well as a feature of international terrorist practice, Mirgani said. “Even though terrorism and consumerism are conceived as antithetical practices, Westgate Mall provided a ground zero for these supposedly oppositional ends of the spectrum to meet on common ground.” The Westgate shopping mall case study is a space where daily consumption is increasingly militarized and where terrorism and security are increasingly commercialized, she said.

Suzi Mirgani is Managing Editor for Publications at CIRS. She is author of Target Markets: International Terrorism Meets Global Capitalism in the Mall (Transcript Press, 2017); and is co-editor of Bullets and Bulletins: Media and Politics in the Wake of the Arab Uprisings (with Mohamed Zayani, Oxford University Press/Hurst, 2016); and Food Security in the Middle East (with Zahra Babar, Oxford University Press/Hurst, 2014). She is an independent filmmaker working on highlighting stories from Qatar and the Gulf.

Article by Jackie Starbird, Publications and Projects Assistant at CIRS.

Brothers Behind Borders: Islamism and Nationalism in the Middle East
2017-04-18 18:00 - 19:00 (Europe/Moscow)
Abdullah Al-Arian asked his audience to reflect back six years, to the hopefulness that emerged in spring 2011, when decades-old authoritarian regimes were on the brink of collapse. Leaders of Tunisia and Egypt had been overthrown by mass uprisings in their respective countries; the regimes in Yemen and Libya were on the verge of collapse; Bashar Al-Assad was facing the largest threat to his rule in the form of a largely peaceful protest movement in Syria; and the monarchical rulers of Jordan, Morocco, and Bahrain had similarly witnessed popular mobilizations in the form of citizens demanding the recognition of their collective rights.

People across the world were witnessing what many believed to be the dawn of a new era in the Middle East, Al-Arian said, “one signified by an end of dictatorship and the rise of representative governments, equal citizenship, and respect for the rule of law.” But no sooner had the discussions about the post-authoritarian transition to democracy emerged, he said, than the conversation shifted to the question of what role Islamist movements would play in nation–states freed from the top-down imposition of secularism.

Al-Arian, professor of history at Georgetown University in Qatar, presented his talk, “Brothers Behind Borders: Islamism and Nationalism in the Middle East,” at CIRS on April 18, 2017. The topic is from Al-Arian’s research for a book in progress, where he is exploring the role of Islamist movements in large parts of the Arab region currently undergoing great societal change.

During the 2011 uprisings, he said, “some critics warned that the vacuum left by secular authoritarian rulers would simply be filled by a new tyranny in the form of political Islam.” As political parties representing the Muslim Brotherhood’s school of thought emerged across the region and proved to be the social movement most capable of exploiting the nascent political openings, Al-Arian said, “it was speculated that the Arab Spring would give way to an Islamist Winter, where the parties would undermine notions of national citizenship and erode state borders, culminating in the unification of Muslim Brotherhood movements from Morocco to Yemen, and perhaps even bringing about the restoration of the caliphate.”

“Of course, anyone who closely followed the post-uprising developments in places like Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Yemen knew this to be a complete fallacy,” he said. These political parties were far more focused on their respective domestic affairs than on fulfilling the goals of some abstract transnational ideological and political project, he said. “In fact, the posture of these parties over the course of the past several years has only confirmed what has been plain to see for some time: traditional Islamist groups that emerged out of the Muslim Brotherhood school of thought have adapted their missions to their local political and socio-economic contexts.”

Al-Arian suggested revisiting our understanding of Islamism with an eye toward its nationalist inclinations, which is the core of his research. “If we look back at the history of a transnational movement on the order of the Muslim Brotherhood, recognized by most as the prototypical representative of the phenomenon of political Islam, what would its relationship be to its respective national contexts in every place that it appeared?” he asked. “Is there one version of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin, or are there many? If there are indeed many ikhwanisms, as it were, how does the national context determine what shape they have taken through the years?”

Al-Arian said there are several reasons why it is critical to reassess our understanding of Islamist movements. First, he said, by looking at the past through a fresh lens, we come away with a different image of the historical legacy of political Islam; one that would draw a vastly different conclusion about the ability or even desire of Islamist movements to form transnational bonds in a post-authoritarian order. And, in the face of a growing regional and global insurgency by groups such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, Al-Arian said, it is perhaps more important now than ever before to distinguish between different strands of political Islam: those that have largely remained within the modernist Islamic tradition with its acceptance of nation–states, and those that have categorically rejected the designation of states in favor of a radically different political order.

Lastly, he said, it worth reexamining the role of Islamist movements now because of the continuing possibilities they hold for the future of a region that is in one of its most turbulent eras in modern history. A starkly different picture emerges, depending on whether we examine the role of these movements in contexts like Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait, and Tunisia, or their more highly contentious role in countries like Libya, Syria, Egypt, and Yemen, he said. “This is particularly crucial in light of the blanket designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization by several regional powers; a position that has been openly lauded by the current US administration.”

In light of the chronic lack of contextualization that dominates much of the policy debate around the question of Islamism, Al-Arian said, “I would argue that the Muslim Brotherhood, as a specific brand of Islamism with roots in the early twentieth-century Islamic modernist tradition, should be viewed as a nationalist force whose mobilization campaigns cannot be viewed in isolation from the broader developments within the state-building projects of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the Middle East. What I’m suggesting, essentially, is to write Islamists back into the nationalist histories of Arab states.”

There are several reasons why expressions of political Islam have been largely excluded from nationalist narratives, Al-Arian said. For one, scholars defining nationalism have tended to exclude any movements or ideologies that placed religious identity at the core of their program. Also, the historiography of Arab societies has privileged state-centered narratives. And, he said, “one can look at the posture of the movements themselves, which have historically disavowed any relationship to the nationalist movement and developed an ideological program that was committed to countering the dominant nationalist paradigms in their respective contexts.”

The debate around Islam and politics has come full circle, Al-Arian said. Over the course of the past decade, Islamist groups have abandoned “Islam is the solution” as a simplistic catchphrase in favor of an emphasis on particular values that their evolving interpretation of Islam promotes. “Indeed, the challenges that the latest iteration of Islamist activism faces are the same ones that confront political parties of all ideological stripes, namely, how to ensure that governments represent the interests of the majority of their citizens at a time when more people face the dangers of vast economic inequality and lack basic rights of freedom and security than at any other time in the recent past,” said Al-Arian.

Abdullah Al-Arian is Assistant Professor of History at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Qatar. He is co-editor of the Critical Currents in Islam page on the Jadaliyya e-zine. He is also a frequent contributor to the Al-Jazeera English network and website. His first book, Answering the Call: Popular Islamic Activism in Sadat’s Egypt, was published by Oxford University Press in 2014.

Article by Jackie Starbird, Publications and Projects Assistant at CIRS.

Mobility, Displacement, and Forced Migration in the Middle East Working Group I
2017-05-21 09:00 - 2017-05-22 17:00 (Asia/Qatar)
In December 2016 CIRS launched a grants cycle to fund empirical research on the subject of “Mobility, Displacement, and Forced Migration in the Middle East,” and on May 21–22, 2017 the first working group under this project was convened in Doha. Seven teams of successful grant awardees were brought together with a number of other scholars to discuss existing gaps in scholarship on voluntary and forced migration in the region, and how their proposed research projects address some of these gaps.

Natalia Ribas-Mateos spoke on the topic of “Borders and Mobility in the Middle East,” highlighting how globalization has created further transformation of geopolitical lines and borders we find across the world. In the Middle East, this transformation has been accompanied by two significant phenomena. First, the Middle East has witnessed a rise in restrictions placed on the mobility of refugees and migrants. Second, the region has been witnessing a decrease in the limitations on cross-border flow of goods, refugee encampments and settlements (formal and informal), human vulnerability and rights violations, and expanded border securitization. Mateos argued that these processes of transformation play out in remarkably stark fashion in border cities. Border cities in the Middle East have become a space where these contradictions are made most manifest. Such contradictions manifest in the differences between a common shared life (similar patterns among everyday border practices) and the reinforcement of borders, the deterioration of human rights conditions, and the reinforcement of the border closure. In researching the topic at hand, Mateos will investigate the transformation of geopolitical lines and borders through conducting fieldwork in selected border villages, towns, and cities in contemporary locations bordering Syria.

Rogaia Abusharaf, a professor at Georgetown University-Qatar as well as a grant awardee under this project, provided a more historicized view of forced migration through sharing insights on her project titled “A Story Worth-telling: Omani-Zanzibari Identity at the Intersection of Ethnic Cleansing and Forced Migration.” Abusharaf’s research project is based on the significant maritime networks that have historically existed for people across the Indian Ocean and the East African littoral. Although Oman’s official presence in Africa is often fixed to 1832 when Sayyid Sultan transferred the capital from Muscat to Zanzibar, many Omanis refer to migratory patterns that spanned over centuries before. Abusharaf suggests that these historic migrations, both before and after the settlement of the Al-Busaidi dynasty in the Zanzibar archipelago, lie at the heart of the creation of and persistence of a distinct Omani-Swahili identity and political subjectivity. Through the funding provided by CIRS, Abusharaf will examine the story of how the forced migration of Omanis from Zanzibar back to Muscat after the Zanzibari Revolution of 1964 affected their Omani-Swahili identity. Abusharaf suggests that the impact of this forced migration on Omani-Zanzibaris has not been explored, and her research hope to shed original light on three main questions: How do Omani-Zanzibaris think of themselves politically? How do they think of themselves socio-culturally? And how do they think of themselves linguistically? Abusharaf will conduct a multi-sited ethnography in Muscat and Zanzibar. She will gather personal narratives to elucidate the base theme of the trajectory of Swahili identities in Oman, and the extent to which these identities have been modulated by their forced migratory experience from Zanzibar. These interviews will be triangulated with archival research on the geopolitical representation of the Zanzibar revolution/genocide as established in the British National Archives and various manuscripts in Sultan Qaboos University in Muscat related to the return migration of Omani-Zanzibaris.

Aitemad Muhanna-Matar, a grant awardee, shifted the discussion to “Internal Displacement, (Re)-configuration of Gender Identity, and Potential Links to Radicalization: The Case of Syrian Refugees in Jordan.” Matar pointed out that most gender-specific work on Syrian refugees focuses on the material aspects of displacement, with insufficient attention given to the subjective effects. Muhanna-Matar’s project will study the Syrian refugee crisis’ impact on reconfiguring gender identity. There is also a gap in the scholarship in terms of whether such episodes of ‘forced’ gender reconfiguration potentially lead to forms of religious “radicalization”. Through her CIRS’ grant funding, Muhanna-Matar will explore how dynamics of coping with refuge- hood may lead to a gender identity crisis. In certain circumstances of violence and uncertainty, some men and women return to religion as a means of reaffirming a particular model of gendered identity that they perceive as being under threat. Muhana-Matar will also examine to what extent men and women’s experiences and strategies of coping with vulnerability have involved a (re-)configuration of their “normative” gender roles. In addition, she will investigate how these reconfigured gender roles are perhaps perceived as socially and culturally degrading to both men’s and women’s sense of human dignity. Finally, she will study how both men and women accommodate or resist processes of gender reconfiguration.

Leïla Vignal, a grant awardee, focused the discussion on “From Mobility to Refugee: Exploring the Mutli-layered Patterns of Syrian Refuge and Mobility in the Northern Bekaa, Lebanon: The Case of the Dayr al-Ahmar District.” Vignal pointed out that little research has been carried out in this region of Lebanon. Dayr al-Ahmar District is a predominantly Maronite area that holds religious significance to both Shia and Maronites. Vignal argued that Dayr al-Ahmar District has historically had close economic ties to Syria with seasonal migration of Syrian workers coming to the area to take up occupation in the agricultural sector. These circulatory patterns of migration that are tied to the annual agricultural cycle continue even now, during the current conflict. Vignal stated that the current Syrian conflict has however heightened tensions between confessional groups in the North Bekaa Valley. She suggested that this could partially be due to Hezbollah’s nearby headquarters and the fact that the communities hosting Syrian refugees are likely at odds with Hezbollah. CIRS’ grant allows Vignal to conduct in-depth fieldwork in the Dayr al-Ahmar region, in the North of the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon (muhafazet Baalbek-Hermel). Based on her findings, Vignal aims to illuminate the dynamics and the patterns of Syrian refugees in neighboring Levantine countries. In particular, Vignal hopes to put the current forced displacement of Syrians into the larger theoretical framework of migration and mobility, and connect the current forms of the Syrian displacement and refuge to a longer history of cross-border mobility, transnational connections, and migration in the Middle East.

Building up on Vignal’s discussion, Estella Carpi, a grant awardee, presented her research on “Local Markets and Crisis Responses in Border Cities: The Cases of Lebanon and Turkey.” Carpi argued that the nearly six-year-old Syrian crisis has led to a large number of refugees fleeing into the border towns of Gaziantep (Southern Turkey) and Halba (Northern Lebanon). As a consequence, Syrian refugee newcomers, older date Syrian migrants, and locals have formed new social networks that have reconfigured these two urban settings. In this framework, the sizeable presence of the international humanitarian apparatus assisting the refugees in border towns is changing local consumption cultures and leisure activities. Humanitarianism is here to be interpreted as a neoliberal force transforming local cultures and human geography in official states of emergency. In these increasingly hybrid social settings, the transformation of local, international, and refugee socio-cultural practices–traditions, habits, and public behavioral codes–is under-researched while able to unearth how the urban patterns of Gaziantep and Halba are presently changing. Through conducting empirical fieldwork in these two cities, Carpi will explore the fluid leisure and consumption cultures in international humanitarian settings in order to elucidate institutional and human components of border urban change. She aims to investigate how everyday practices change within and between local, migrant, and refugee communities in times of emergency and in response to neoliberal humanitarian policies and emerging cultures of everyday life arrangement.

Pooya Alaedini and Florian Weidmann have been awarded grant funding to study “The Impact of Afghan Refugees on the Social and Spatial Fabric of Tehran.” Pooya Alaeidini presented the project proposal at the working group, and opened his discussion by stating that the prolonged conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have led to more than forty years of Iran serving as a continuous host to large groups of refugees. While Iran has become one of the biggest host countries in the Middle East there remains a need for new insight into the development dynamics of refugee communities and their impact on and engagement with their surroundings in Iran. Alaeidini pointed out that the unprecedented scale of recent migration patterns has had a significant impact on urban development dynamics, particularly in the larger Iranian cities. Afghan refugee communities have begun to transform local urbanism in Iranian cities. Using the CIRS’ grant funds, Alaeidini and Weidmann will conduct fieldwork in Tehran, will conduct interviews with officials and refugees as well as site visits to various districts of the city for further visual examination. Alaedini and Weidmann will focus in particular on three main dimensions of these communities’ impact on their new surroundings: an active and conscious participation via community representatives in order to improve certain conditions; an indirect development of new spatial realities by investment patterns and general economic interaction; and last but not least the role of cultural aspects.

Ricardo René Larémont and Mustafa Attir, grant-awardees, discussed “Mobility, Displacement, and Forced Migration in Libya and Tunisia.” They claimed that of the three routes to Europe, the central route from Libya and Tunisia to Italy and Malta is the only one that has not been impeded and has expanded. It is the most viable route for migrants wishing to pass into Europe; yet, the effects of migration on Libya and Tunisia are relatively unstudied. The grant-awardees highlighted that Libya and Tunisia are not only points of departure for accessing Europe, but also points of destination, places where migrants often remain for extended periods of time and build permanent or semi-permanent communities. Though significant work in recent years has studied the impact of trans-Mediterranean migration on Europe, little to no research has examined its effects on North Africa. Through conducting individual and focus groups interviews, the researchers seek to address this lacuna by establishing foundational knowledge about the array of African and Middle Eastern migrants who have arrived in Libya and Tunisia. Though some of these migrants may attempt the dangerous crossing to Europe, many more choose–or are forced–to remain in these points of departure. In order to address the humanitarian tragedy and security risks that are currently unfolding in the region, this research will provide insights to understand these migrants, their experiences, and the communities they have formed.

Matt Buehler sharpened the discussion with his presentation on “Migrants in Morocco: Inclusion, Integration, and Societal Impact.” Buehler argued that scholars understand the causes of the crisis leading to the intensification of refugees and displaced persons in the Middle East and North Africa region but less is known about the native citizens’ opinions about foreign refugees who have resettled in their countries. Through an original, nationally representative public opinion poll of 2000 citizens in Morocco, a country where over 40,000 Arab and Black African refugees reside, Buehler explored whether Moroccans think African or Arab refugees have better chances of social integration and acquiring citizenship. Buehler claims that although Arab and Black African refugees fled similar conditions of conflict and war, ordinary Moroccans do not view them equally. Whereas Moroccans express attitudes of sympathy and compassion towards Arab refugees, they express attitudes of prejudice and racism towards African refugees. The poll explains this divergence in citizen attitudes, isolating the factors that predict why prejudice intensifies or abates if a refugee is African or Arab.

Thomas Schmidinger, a grant awardee, discussed “Forced Migration in Northern Iraq: A Comparative Study of Yezidis, Shabak, and Assyrians.” Schmidinger argued that the Daesh onslaught on Jebel Sinjar and Ninewah plain in Northern Iraq in August 2014 specifically targeted three minority groups: the Yezidis, the heterodox Shi’ite Shabak, and the Assyrian Christians. The Assyrians appear to have relocated to the Ain Kawa suburb of Erbil. The Yezidis have resettled in a number of refugee camps in and near Iraqi Kurdistan, but the majority appears set to immigrate to Europe. The Shabak, finally, first fled to Erbil area, but were subsequently encouraged to leave the refugee camps there and resettle in Shi’ite Southern Iraq. Through conducting fieldwork in Northern Iraq, Schmidinger and his co-PI Michiel Leezenberg will trace and compare the dispersal patterns of these groups after being driven away from their homes. The researchers aim to answer a number of questions: To what extent was there organized resistance by either KRG troops, local militias, and individual inhabitants? To what extent has there been pressure on the Shabak community to convert or assimilate to Twelver Shi’ism? To what extent has gendered violence (most famously, and notoriously, the enslavement and rape of thousands of Yezidi women) systematically been used as an instrument of war? To what extent do images of female fighters on the Kurdish side (a propaganda tool used most effectively by PKK and YPG guerrillas, but also by the Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga) reflect real empowerment of women rather than a mere propagandistic ploy? And to what extent has forced resettlement had differential effects on men and women, and on gendered sentiments of group identity and group honor?

Amani El Jack shifted the discussion to “Gender Dimensions of Displacement.” El Jack argued that issues of identity, nationality, and citizenship are instrumental in developing a gender-sensitive framework. She claimed that gender dimensions of displacement manifest in three different case studies. First, it is important to examine women-women relations. She aims to interview nannies and maids in locals and expats’ households to examine how gender relations between females are managed. In the Middle East, and particularly the GCC, most of the literature addresses issues around working conditions, but not how gender issues are negotiated in relation to exploitation and possibilities for solidarity. Second, El Jack argued that different patterns of migration lead to different gender consequences. Insofar as the Syrian civil war is concerned, displacement is not a consequence but rather used as a strategy of war. In relation to Syrian refugees in Turkey and Jordan, do women, men, and children face displacement differently? To what extent do women have access to power in refugee camps? And despite the difficulty of displacement, to what extent has it created opportunities for women to challenge the patriarchal system? Finally, El Jack claimed that displacement, social change, and transformation should be studied in relation to one another. Displacement is not limited to people, but also value systems. This displacement of value systems triggers transformation and social changes that manifest in the renegotiation and reconfiguration of gender roles.

Sherine El Taraboulsi-McCarthy discussed “Saudi Arabia’s Humanitarian Donorship and Yemeni Refugee: Values, Systems, and Interests.” El Taraboulsi-McCarthy looked broadly at Saudi Arabia’s humanitarian engagement in Yemen in terms of structure, allocation of funds, motivations, blockages, and opportunities. She also discussed the livelihood opportunities, remittances, blockages to survival, and regulatory frameworks of Yemeni refugees in Saudi Arabia, particularly Riyadh and Jeddah, in light of the conflict. After conducting interviews with different stakeholders in Saudi Arabia, El Taraboulsi-McCarthy argued that the structure of humanitarian donorship had changed drastically in Saudi Arabia since 9/11 up until 2015. The Ministry of Interior in Saudi Arabia was responsible for collecting funds from the public, monitoring the process of donations, and channeling these funds to the beneficiaries. Since 2015, the structure of donorship has started changing once again. New charitable organizations have emerged that function independently from the Ministry of Interior. For instance, King Salman Center focuses on Yemen, and acts as a channel to allocate resources and provide aid and relief to Yemen. The Center also allocates resources to crises elsewhere, such as Syria. El Taraboulsi-McCarthy argued that such humanitarian engagements are used as a tool of foreign policy to project Saudi Arabia as a “Kingdom of Humanitarianism.”

Finally, Nathalie Puetz led a discussion on “Migratory Connections between the Middle East, East Africa, and the Horn of Africa: Yemeni Refuge-seekers in Djibouti.” Puetz argued that scholarship on migration in and out of the Arabian Peninsula has focused primarily on Yemen’s (elite) Hadrami diaspora around the Indian Ocean basin or on (abject) labor migration to the Arab states of the Gulf. The current refugee and migration crisis in Yemen—entailing thousands of African refugees and Yemeni nationals fleeing Yemen for the Horn of Africa while African migrants continue to enter war-torn Yemen—demonstrates the need for sustained scholarly attention to the circular, cyclical, and mixed migration flows between Yemen and the Horn of Africa. Puetz will analyze this predicament through an ethnographic study of the Yemeni migrant and refugee communities being (re-)established in ports and cities across the strait aptly named Bab al-Mandeb (Gate of Tears). Through conducting interviews in four migrant/refugee receiving countries, namely Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Sudan, Puetz will investigate Yemeni refugees and migrants’ pathways, and will continue to engage with a number of families regularly as they move geographically, politically, and socially between communities and categories of displacement and belonging. She aims to understand the conditions of mobility and modes of citizenship navigated by non-elite, hybrid (e.g., African-Yemeni) communities at the margins of states and societies.

Click here for the working group agenda

Click here for the participants’ biographies

Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf, Georgetown University in Qatar

Pooya Alaedini, University of Tehran

Mustafa Attir, The Libyan Academy for Graduate Studies, Tripoli

Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar

Matt Buehler, University of Tennessee

Estella Carpi, University College London

Assaf Dahdah, Aix-Marseille Université, France

Sarah Dryden-Peterson, Harvard Graduate School of Education

Islam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar

Amani El Jack, University of Massachusetts, Boston

Sherine El Taraboulsi-McCarthy, Humanitarian Policy Group at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI)

Mohammed Abu Hawash, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar

Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar

Michiel Leezenberg, University of Amsterdam

Ricardo René Larémont, State University of New York

Aitemad Muhanna Matar, London School of Economics and Jordan University

Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar

Emma Mogensen, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar

Nathalie Peutz, New York University, Abu Dhabi

Natalia Ribas-Mateos, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona

Thomas Schmidinger, University of Vienna

Sabika Shaban, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar

Jackie Starbird, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar

Leïla Vignal, University of Oxford

Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar

Florian Wiedmann, Internationale Akademie Berlin

Valbona Zenku, Georgetown University in Qatar

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

Inside the Arab State: Institutions, Actors, and Processes
2017-06-09 09:00 - 17:00 (Europe/Moscow)
On June 9, 2017, CIRS hosted a CIRS Research Workshop at the Georgetown University campus in Washington D.C. The workshop, which was a closed-door, one-day seminar, brought together a small number of renowned scholars to engage in a focused discussion on a book manuscript titled Inside the Arab State: Institutions, Actors, and Processes. This manuscript is currently in its final stages of preparation and has been authored by a member of our faculty, and CIRS Director Professor Mehran Kamrava. This is a book about state-society relations in the Arab world, focusing on the institutional make-up and composition of Arab states and how they have sought to establish coercive and ideological apparatuses enabling them to rule over society. Through a historical-institutional lens, Kamrava maintains that critical junctures provide a window of opportunity for state leaders to craft institutions and institutional arrangements that enable them to rule over society. Once these institutional arrangements are in place, two sets of dynamics begin to occur. At one level, as institutions mature and as their institutions become routine, they begin to develop lives of their own. Slowly, they assume internal dynamics that move them in one direction or another. The actors who created these institutions, however, may not always approve of the direction in which they are moving. Thus a potential area of tension develops between agency and structure—what state actors wish to see of the institutions of the state and how these institutions actually behave.

The participants at the CIRS research workshop are all scholars who work on the Middle East, some of who are members of the Georgetown University faculty, while the rest are affiliated with other universities and think-tanks based in Washington, DC. The workshop participants approached their individual chapters from their diverse disciplinary positions while understanding that the manuscript wished to receive a critique across conventional disciplinary divides. Each participant had been assigned specific chapters to read and review, and which they then had to present to the group and also offer their own comments. The workshop participants suggested vital changes to the manuscript in order to avoid certain pitfalls and to appeal broadly to its intended audiences.

A strong introductory chapter highlighting the core contribution of the volume to the vast literature that already exists on the post-Arab Spring Middle East was considered essential by several of the participants. The introduction ought to also provide some of the author’s reflections on and definitions of the terminology and key concepts that he uses throughout the book, such as institutions and agency. In addition, perhaps the introduction ought to introduce the larger outlines of the disciplinary debates that are currently placed later on in the volume. Some of the participants were very appreciative of the interdisciplinary approach of the workshop, but pointed out that from a historian’s perspective, the volume’s core approach towards a linear progress of the history of Middle Eastern states would be contested as such a linear view obscures the particularities of different Arab states’ experiences over time.

An additional criticism was that the book does not adequately represent the historical antecedents of the Middle East’s modern states, and provides no account of the colonial past and how there are continuities from the colonial past which have impacted the state-making and state-building processes. Some participants suggested laying out clearly at the outset how the book is addressing the agency-structure debate, and how the author is rendering a different or original contribution to the existing literature on this. Overall, several participants felt that whereas in its current shape several of the chapters have heavy theoretical components, these ought to be pulled out, either placed in the introduction or else reduced, so that there is more visibility to the book’s central narrative. The author thanked the workshop participants for these suggestions, which, he said, will greatly improve the overall quality of the manuscript.

Click here for the workshop agenda
Click here for the participants’ biographies
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Osama Abi-Mershed, Georgetown University​
Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar
Daniel Brumberg, Georgetown University​
Steven A. Cook, Council on Foreign Relations
Kristin Smith Diwan, Arab Gulf States Institute, Washington D.C.
Daniel E. Esser, American University’s School of International Service
Desha Girod, Georgetown University​
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar

Article by Zahra Babar, Associate Director of Research at CIRS

Middle Power Politics in the Middle East - Working Group II
2017-08-20 09:00 - 2017-08-21 17:00 (Europe/Moscow)
On August 20-21, 2017, CIRS hosted the second working group of its project on “Middle Power Politics in the Middle East.” Over two days, scholars discussed key gaps in the literature on the international relations of the Middle East through the lens of middle power theory. Participants led discussions on related subtopics including the role of Middle Eastern middle powers in the international system; in relation to the 2011 Arab uprisings; in terms of their domestic politics; their cooperation, competition, and norm entrepreneurship; their efforts at humanitarian diplomacy; and their forays in mediation and conflict resolution. Also discussed were a number of case studies, including Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Algeria.

May Darwich started the discussion with an exploration of middle power theory in both regional and global hierarchies. She argued that during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, middle power theory is frequently used in International Relations (IR) literature to examine the role of certain types of middle-ranking states. Although middle power theory seems to offer a rich testing ground for the analysis of state behavior in global and regional hierarchies, its application to the Middle East has been paradoxically scarce. In the region, an increasing number of states cannot achieve regional hegemony, but at the same time do not lend themselves to being categorized as small states. She argues that middle power theory affords some conceptual and theoretical adaptations to provide novel insights in comparing and assessing the behavior of this category of states in the Middle East. Darwich explores the transferability of the concept from international to regional hierarchies.

Adham Saouli focused his discussion on “Middling or Meddling? Domestic Origins of External Influence in the Middle East.” He argued that while the Middle East has failed to produce great powers, it has not been in short supply of influential regional middle power. These influential actors have played key roles in shaping the regional political order and also in both resisting and enabling international penetration of the region. Saouli discussed the constitutive and behavioral elements of middle powers in the Middle East and presented a conceptual analysis that identified six key attributes that a middle power should possess. He also examined the conditions that have enabled the pursuit of middle power politics in the region and identified four domestic variables that may hinder or induce middle power behavior. Lastly, he presented a detailed empirical analysis of three types of middle powers in the region: the Aspirant, the Constrained, and the Hesitant.

Marco Pinfari shifted the discussion to “Middle Eastern Middle Powers: The Roles of Norms in Mediation and Conflict Resolution.” Pinfari argued that one of the most recognizable behavioral traits of middle powers is their tendency—indeed, their “vocation”—to mediate in international conflicts and to engage in conflict resolution initiatives. Pinfari discussed case studies of conflict resolution initiatives promoted by three Middle Eastern middle powers since the 1980s, namely Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Despite whether or not these countries acted as norm entrepreneurs in the field of conflict resolution, he argued, there exists a sort of norm-based behavior. These cases, more specifically, includes instances of norm-driven positioning of mediators comparable to the international behavior of established middle powers like Sweden; of pragmatic but repeated use of norms as part of the content of mediation initiatives; and of norm-influenced foreign policy initiatives aimed at conflict prevention. The analysis of the political motivations behind these initiatives provides insights into the complex interplay between norm-based behavior, identity building, and symbolic rewards in the formation of the foreign policy priority by Middle Eastern middle powers, and the central role played by domestic priorities—from security concerns to regime survival—in these processes.

Jonathan Benthall examined another form of norm entrepreneurship in his paper, “The Rise and Decline of Saudi Overseas Humanitarian Charities as an Expression of Soft Power.” Benthall records and interprets the rise and decline of Saudi overseas humanitarian charities as an expression of soft power, with special reference to the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO or IIROSA). This and another prominent Saudi-based charity, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) were in effect closed down in early 2017. Founded in 1975, IIROSA grew as an expression of Saudi soft power and pan-Islamism—a policy that played a major role in the Soviet-Afghan war of the 1980s, including support for the mujahidin in concert with Western powers. By the mid-1990s IIROSA was the world’s largest Islamic aid organization. Following the dismissal of its secretary general in 1996, and the crises of 9/11 and the Al-Aqsa Intifada, which cast a cloud over nearly all Islamic charities, IIROSA’s activities were reduced, but efforts were made to revive them. In 2017, however, Benthall argues that the kingdom’s new policy of centralization, and its disengagement from the “comprehensive call to Islam,” resulted in IIROSA’s virtual closure.

In his paper “Middle Eastern Middle Powers in a Transitioning Multi-Polar World,” Imad Mansour interrogated the relationship between domestic governance and international action for middle powers. He argued that Middle Eastern middle powers have acted in most of the twentieth century to sustain a relationship of dependence on systemic opportunities, mostly procuring strategic rents, which aided state-building processes domestically. Since then Middle Eastern middle powers developed varied governance practices that translated into different relationships with the global system. However, not all Middle Eastern middle powers achieved similar measures of withdrawal from this dependence, a reality which impacts how they acted vis-à-vis the global political economy in the twenty-first century, and how they are likely to interact with unfolding dynamics represented most recently by major power relations and China’s rise.

In “Egypt’s Middle Power Aspirations Under Sisi,” Nael Shama looks into the foreign policy of Egypt under the leadership of President Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi from the perspective of middle power theory. He argued that following the revolution of the Free Officers in 1952, Egypt was a leading power in the Middle East—setting trends, spreading ideas, making war, and promoting peace. However, weighed down by economic difficulties and a population boom, the country’s influence has waned over the past few decades. He also argued that under Al-Sisi, Egypt has attempted to revive its middle power status, relying on active diplomacy and a substantial upgrade of military capabilities. Its efforts to play a leading role in regional politics are mostly evident in its policy towards the civil war in Libya.

Amin Saikal discussed another case study, that of Iran. He maintained that the Islamic Republic of Iran has achieved a level of power and resource capability to be able to impact geopolitical developments within its region and beyond, in support of what it regards to be its national interests. The country’s economic, and hard and soft powers, along with its size, geographical position, culture, and oil and gas riches need to be taken into account in this respect. As such, the country is able to affect events in its neighborhood, positively or negatively, and to deal with major powers from a strong bargaining position at bilateral and multilateral levels. Yet, the republic has not exuded an ideological disposition and a model of governance and state-building that could be attractive to its neighboring states or further afield. Nor has it exhibited a mode of foreign policy behavior that has persuaded many state actors in its region to be favorably disposed towards it. The republic is in variance—both ideologically and geopolitically—with these actors, and is regarded as an oddity in the international system. Meanwhile, it does not possess the military and non-military resource capabilities to be able to project much more than a defensive posture.

In his paper on “Saudi Arabia as a Middle Ranking Power,” Simon Mabon reflected upon the extent to which Saudi Arabia can be considered a middle ranking power, and explored the changing dynamics of the kingdom’s foreign policy in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. In doing this, Mabon examined three main points. First, he looked at the importance of Islam, which serves as a reservoir for normative influence. Second, he examined the regional security complex, looking specifically at the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and also between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Within these two rivalries, finally, he turned to the importance of diplomacy and normative values, considering how Saudi Arabia has positioned itself within the GCC, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and the United Nations Human Rights Council.

Robert Mason shifted the discussion to “Small State Aspirations to Middle Powerhood: The Cases of Qatar and the UAE.” He argued that small states such as Qatar and the UAE can break the mold of small state classification, but the tipping point to middlepowerhood for Qatar came and went during the Morsi presidency in Egypt. He argud that although Qatar and the UAE share a common approach by investing heavily in defense, aid programs, and diplomatic mediation, and through a range of subtle power tactics, they have not been equally successful. A history of terrorism, fear of political Islam, and the GCC Cold War with Iran have combined to make UAE foreign policy out as being particularly assertive. For Qatar, regional instability created conditions for opportunism and new alliances that propelled it into the realm of middlepowerhood, manifestly proven through open intelligence with Egypt and unprecedented influence in its political economy. Being short lived, it shows that the costs of breaking more than some of the features of small statehood can be high.

In “UAE: A Small State with Regional Middle Power Aspirations,” Islam Hassan argued that the UAE is a small state due to its limited material capacity and soft power capabilities. Yet it aspires to claim a middle power status within the Middle East. This aspiration is steered by system and domestic level conditions. Insofar as system level conditions are concerned, the 2011 Arab uprisings and the status race between the UAE and Qatar have compelled the UAE to engage more assertively with regional politics. Hassan claimed that five main domestic level conditions triggered the UAE’s assertive foreign policy. These conditions include a perceived need for preempting the spillover of regional instability; the failure of the GCC to stimulate a robust defense and diplomatic coordination; Saudi Arabia’s hegemony over the council; the rising economic power of the UAE and its capability to maintain the ruling bargain domestically and to project soft power regionally; the narrative of the UAE as being a model of modernity, tolerance, and happiness; and the transition in leadership. Collectively, the system and domestic level conditions have played a significant role in the UAE’s pursuit of a regional middle power status.

Finally, Yahia Zoubir examined the case of Algeria in “The Giant Afraid of its Shadow:” Algeria, the Reluctant Middle Power.” He argued that despite its qualifying capacity and capabilities, Algeria is unwilling to play a regional and international role concomitant with its military and economic capacities. He explored Algeria’s sources of power and its role as a regional mediator, which has contributed to its position as a middle power. Zoubir then discussed the Algerian civil war and how Algeria went into a decade of isolation. This isolation was followed by a return to the regional and international system, but this time with a focus on counterterrorism as a new norm projected by the Algerian state. He argued that mediation remains a constant in Algerian foreign policy, as evident in the examples of Algerian mediation in Libya and Mali after its decade of isolation.

See the meeting agendaRead participant biographiesRead more about this research initiative

Participant Biographies:

Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarJonathan Benthall, University College LondonMay Darwich, Durham UniversityIslam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarSimon Mabon, Lancaster UniversityImad Mansour, Qatar UniversityRobert Mason, American University in CairoSuzi Mirgani CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMarco Pinfari, American University in CairoAmin Saikal, Australian National UniversityAdham Saouli, University of St. AndrewsSabika Shaban, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarNael M. Shama, political researcher and writer, CairoJackie Starbird, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarYahia Zoubir, KEDGE Business School, France

Article by Islam Hassan, CIRS Research Analyst

Crisis in the GCC: Causes, Consequences & Prospects
2017-09-17 18:00 - 19:00 (Europe/Moscow)
“Crisis in the GCC: Causes, Consequences, and Prospects” was the topic of a panel discussion hosted by the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) at Georgetown University in Qatar (GUQ) on September 17, 2017. Featured panelists included Gerd Nonneman, Professor of International Relations and Gulf Studies at GUQ; Abdullah Baabood, Director of the Gulf Studies Center at Qatar University; and Shafeeq Ghabra, Professor of Political Science at Kuwait University. The presentation was moderated by Mehran Kamrava, GUQ Professor and Director of CIRS.

Over 350 guests attended the discussion on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) crisis. The speakers were invited to share their thoughts on the developments since the crisis began on June 5, 2017, when Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt severed ties and halted trade with Qatar. A series of drastic measures was launched by these countries, including the withdrawal of ambassadors from Doha and the expulsion of Qatari diplomats, the closure of airspace to all flights to and from Qatar, and the closure of the land border crossing between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The governments of Yemen, Libya, the Maldives, and others also severed ties, along with suspending air, land, and sea travel to and from Qatar.

A list of thirteen demands was issued, calling for Qatar to sever ties with terrorist organizations, close Al Jazeera and its affiliates, and curb diplomatic ties with Iran, along with other conditions. Last week marked one hundred days since the start of the blockade sparked a diplomatic crisis.

Gerd Nonneman began the discussion by outlining the causes of the situation and said, fundamentally, it is about how the three surrounding states want Qatar to accept what they view as its “proper” role in the region, “as a virtual vassal state that will not challenge Saudi Arabia’s leading role in the Arabian peninsula and the Gulf region, nor attempt to compete with the UAE for regional status and reach.” Qatar is a latecomer in terms of Gulf development, and its confident emergence as an independent actor since the 1990s, with the adoption of a number of policies that clash with Saudi, Emirati, and Bahraini preferences, have long irked some in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi in particular. The issues center around different attitudes over the possible role of political Islam in the wider region, Qatar’s relations with a number of groups that do not fit the policy preferences of other Arab regional players, and its diplomatic stance towards Iran, Nonneman said. The Arab Spring, and Qatar’s approach to it, made these issues especially acute.

Since the early 1990s, and particularly since 1995 when Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa took power, Qatar has striven to escape from underneath the Saudi shadow, Nonneman said. Hence the determination to “put Qatar back into its box”—especially in the eyes of the current leadership in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, and the enabling factor of the Trump presidency.

Qatar has considered possible threats and available resources in that light, Nonneman said. An internal political threat was virtually nonexistent and, if anything, the blockade has drawn the population closer to the leadership. Initial concern over a potential military threat quickly dissipated, given the important US and other international interests at stake in pre-empting that. The societal threat has been one of the most serious, with families and kinship groups being suddenly cut off from each other in unprecedented ways. The economic impact of the crisis is serious, but ultimately sustainable. Nonneman concluded that, while the blockade is expensive and painful, and the leadership therefore would certainly prefer to find a solution, “the crisis can be sustained if the alternative would be, in effect, sacrificing one’s sovereignty.”

Nonneman did not exclude a settlement of sorts in the medium term, since the interests of the US and the blockading countries are suffering damage, too, and wiser counsel might eventually prevail. But, he added, “I cannot imagine that trust in the GCC and especially in the current leadership in Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia, can be restored.” He concluded that “the suspicions that Qatar [like other small GCC states] always had about the organization and Saudi hegemonic ambitions in this region, have only been reinforced.”

Abdullah Baabood said that despite studying the region for years, nothing had prepared him for a crisis like this. He asserted that the countries making up the GCC, “despite being twenty-first century states, are essentially ruled as if they were in the ‘Middle Ages.’ We are ruled by families that still have these feuds and conflicts between them. You can’t really continue in this century doing it the same way,” he said.

The problem with a “Mediaeval style of leadership” in the region, he noted, is that anything can happen. “Leaders can be erratic, crises can appear out of nowhere, and can be based on fabricated news, as was the case with the current conflict. Unfortunately, we are going to have to work with this erratic leadership for a long time,” he said, “because some of them are still young and they are going to rule us for the next forty to fifty years.” Baabood said it is the mentality of a “mediaeval tribe” that has not really evolved. “Modernity is only fabric that we see in terms of the infrastructure, etcetera, but not when it comes to the political system,” he said.

Additionally, there is conflict and a contradiction in views for how the region should develop. “We have a conflicting narrative—a narrative between what the leadership in Qatar wants to see develop—including [regarding] the Arab spring—and another narrative that wants to keep the status quo, and perhaps even go back to before the status quo, taking us to police states, whether in Egypt or some of the GCC states. And they don’t want to change. They are going to blame any trouble on political Islam, modernity, democracy.” Ultimately, he argued “That is going to create resentment, more terrorism, and radicalization.”

On the GCC, Baabood said the conflict goes against the entire principles of the organization, which is based on cooperation and integration among the member states. The GCC has entered into a number of formal mutual agreements: on security, economic cooperation, and the free flow of people, goods, services, and finance. The GCC is supposed to be a rules-based institution with a charter requiring all GCC leaders making critical decisions to do so by unanimous agreement. In this case, the decision to impose the blockade did not go before the supreme council, he said, effectively revealing the hollowness of the institution.

“What we’re talking about is a fundamental flaw in how the GCC is working. Are we going to have a GCC at the end of the day if people can’t trust the charter, the agreements that these leaders have signed or are going to decide?” he asked. “It really deals a big blow to our future integration and cooperation.

Baabood argued that Qatar, so far, is winning the war of narratives. He said: “If you look at the media, four countries’ media is attacking one small country, but yet the country that is winning in the streets and hearts and minds of the people is Qatar. They are winning on an ethical, moral ground, not playing the victim, and explaining the situation as it is.” Baabood concluded by noting that “In terms of public opinion, globally I think Qatar is winning.”

Shafeeq Ghabra spoke on how he had personally experienced the crisis. When he awoke on June 5, 2017, while spending a sabbatical at the Arab Center in Doha, to the news of the boycott and the closure of borders, it reminded him of when Iraq threatened Kuwait in 1990. “It felt like war,” and he half-expected to see tanks in the streets. The news was all the more shocking for Ghabra, because in the time leading up to the blockade, the GCC states had seemed so united. They were fighting together in Yemen; they agreed on policy toward Syria; they had all worked against Muammar Gaddafi of Libya; they supported the Iraqi system in fighting ISIS; and they were all seemingly united on the war on terror. “What does this tell me about the region and the way politics suddenly shifted overnight?”

Ghabra said that he had been relieved by the Kuwaiti mediation efforts, and as well as when the Turkish parliament made the decision to send troops to Qatar two days into the crisis. He acknowledged the effective ways in which Qatar was managing the crisis, including opening new routes to Oman and Turkey, creating connections with Iran in terms of trade and ports, and managing to build on its relations with Europe. He argued that the boycotting countries did not expect such resilience; “they expected Qatar would immediately capitulate and say ‘whatever you want.’ But this did not happen. This was a major miscalculation in this approach of blockade and boycott.”

Ghabra concluded by noting: “In this context we see a new axis in the region, a new power structure, and Qatar has a new birth of its own. It’s liberated from certain contexts and relations; it can build new strategies and structures and approaches. And the blockade and the sanctions can slowly collapse under their own weight and out of their own irrationalism.” Looking to the future, Ghabra said: “Do I still believe that in 2022 we’re going to come to the [World Cup] games here? I believe we are!”

Abdullah Baabood is the Director of the Gulf Studies Center at Qatar University. Abdullah’s teaching and research interests are on the areas of international relations, international political economy especially on globalization and regionalism, and security and energy studies. He particularly focuses on the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) economic, social and political development and their external relations. Abdullah taught at different universities and institutions in Europe and before joining Qatar University, he spent four years as the Director of the Gulf Research Centre at the University of Cambridge, UK.

Shafeeq Ghabra is Professor of Political Science at Kuwait University. He received a BA from Georgetown in 1975, an from MA Purdue University (West Lafayette) in 1983, and PhD from the University of Texas at Austin in 1987. He was the founding president of the American University of Kuwait (2003-2006); and Director of the Kuwait Information Office in Washington DC (1998-2002), and the Center of Strategic Studies at Kuwait University (2002-2003). He is author of Palestinians in Kuwait: The Family and the Politics of Survival (Westview Press, 1987) and, in Arabic, Kuwait and the dynamics of State and Society (Afaq Books, 2011).

Gerd Nonneman is Professor of International Relations & Gulf Studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service in Qatar, where he served as Dean from 2011 to 2016. He holds a PhD in Politics from the University of Exeter, and Licentiates in Oriental Philology (Arabic) and Development Studies from the University of Ghent, Belgium. Prior to his appointment at Georgetown, he served as Professor of International Relations & Middle East Politics, and Al-Qasimi Professor of Gulf Studies, at the University of Exeter, where he also directed the Institute of Arab & Islamic Studies and the Centre for Gulf Studies. A former Executive Director of BRISMES (British Society for Middle Eastern Studies), he is editor of the Journal of Arabian Studies. He has published widely, in 12 books and some 50 articles and book chapters, on the politics and international relations of the Middle East, with a particular emphasis on the Gulf. Aside from his academic work, he has worked in the private sector in the Gulf region, and acted as a consultant to a range of companies, NGOs, governments and international institutions.

Article by Jackie Starbird, Publications and Projects Assistant

Sports, Society, and the State in the Middle East Working Group II
2017-09-24 09:00 - 2017-09-25 16:00 (Europe/Moscow)
On September 24-25, 2017, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) held a second two-day working group under its research initiative on “Sports, Society, and the State in the Middle East.” During this working group, contributors presented their draft papers on a number of subtopics related to their areas of expertise and interest, and received feedback and comments from the rest of the participants.

Murat Yıldız initiated the working group discussions by presenting his paper on “Sports in the Middle East: A Historical Overview.” In his paper, Yıldız offers a more complicated history of sports in the region by accomplishing three goals. First, he demonstrates that the spread, vernacularization, and popularization of sports in the Middle East were inextricably connected to broader social, political, economic, and cultural transformations during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Second, he traces the ways in which “Western” sports and physical activities were vernacularized throughout the region. Finally, Yıldız demonstrates how nation-building and state-building projects played an integral role in shaping the spread and discursive boundaries of sports.

Nadim Nassif presented his research on “The Development of Elite Sport Policies in the Middle East.” In this paper, Nassif argues that despite the large amount of financial and human resources at their disposal, Arab countries have achieved very modest results in the Olympics. Since 1996, when all twenty-two Arab countries participated in the Summer Games for the first time, these states have collectively won fewer than half the number of medals won by Italy, the Netherlands and Great Britain. Nassif’s paper attempts to answer the question of why the Arab Worlds’ resource and demographic wealth have not translated into greater national success in international sports competitions. He suggests that wealth and population are clearly not enough to ensure sports success if countries do not possess the political will to implement strategic policies for developing and supporting sports.

Nnamdi Madichie presented a paper titled “Unpacking the Internationalization of Middle East Sports Officials.” Madichie’s paper describes the trends, attitudes, behaviors, and changing configuration of sports participation in the region. Using a qualitative methodological approach—notably a mixture of observational research protocol (including personal and participant observations), ethnography and non-participant observation based on key readings of media clips on sports in the Middle East—Madichie argues that the landscape of sports business and management is rapidly changing in an environment unrenowned for certain professional sports.

Nida Ahmad’s paper on “Sportswomen in the Middle East and North Africa’s Use of Social Media: The Cultural Politics of Digital Identity Representation” examines the development of the diverse ways in which sportswomen in the region are engaging with social media to represent their identities. Female athletes are creating digital content, highlighting their professional sports identities, and establishing’s their reputations while at the same time keeping family, society, and culture in mind. Ahmad’s research paper is based on extensive qualitative interviews, and expanding the discussion to include digital platforms, Ahmad’s paper allows for an additional understanding of the sporting lives of women from the region.

Tamir Sorek presented his paper on “Ultras Hapoel Tel Aviv: Breaking Taboos and the Crisis of Israeli Liberal Secularism.” In this article, Sorek analyzes the rhetoric of Hapoel Tel Aviv’s hardcore fans and the demography of its wider circle of sympathizers. This examination reveals that the stadium rhetoric is actually an expression of fundamental social and political struggles between competing definitions of “Israeli-ness.” The transgressive rhetoric of Hapoel fans, Sorek argues, is partly related to the decline in the political power of the secular elite in Israel and the hardening of non-secular Israeli identity. In studying this topic, Sorek relies on: an online survey conducted in September 2012, the sample included 500 respondents who constitute a representative sample of the adult Hebrew-speaking population in Israel; a survey conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) in 2009, the sample included 2803 respondents who constitute a representative sample of the adult Jewish population in Israel; the website of Hapoel Tel Aviv fans; fans’ songs available on YouTube; and conversations with hardcore fans of Hapoel Tel Aviv.

Following Sorek’s discussion, Dag Tuastad led a discussion on “Football’s Role in How Societies Remember: The Symbolic Wars of Jordanian-Palestinian Football.” Through a case study from Jordan, Tuastad demonstrates how a dominant arena for battles over national social memories has been the football arena. These symbolic battles may be organized into three phases: First, from 1970 to the Oslo-process in the 1990s: Palestinian memorization of the civil war to reassert their national identity. Second, after the Oslo-process until the Arab Spring in 2011: East Bank Jordanians’ assertions of the historical roots of the alliance between East Bank tribes and the Jordanian monarchy. And finally, he draws attention to Palestinian refugees memorizing their common ethnic origin, confirming their refugee identities while being Jordanian citizens.

Ferman Knoukman shifted the discussion to “State-Building and Establishment of Modern Physical Education in Turkey.” In his paper, Knoukman argues that physical education classes had an important role for the state building project in the young Turkish republic. In supporting his argument, Knoukman first explains the establishment of modern physical education in Turkey and discusses the importance of the role of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in this process. Nation-building and educational development, as embedded parts of the modernization project, have been a common phenomenon across the Middle East, and by specifically studying this topic from the perspective of sports education this paper addresses a key gap in the literature.

Cem Tınaz presented his paper on “Assessment of Turkey’s Recent Sport Policies.” In his paper, Tınaz provides an overview of Turkey’s recent sports policy, identifies the pathways of the state for achieving success in sports, examines problems and deficiencies in national sport, and finally articulates the state’s reasons for hosting international sports events. For this research, Tınaz relies on thirteen semi-structured, in-depth interviews with former Turkish sports ministers and other sports authorities, including the CEO of Istanbul’s 2020 bid and the president of Turkish National Olympic Committee. Data generated from the interviews were analyzed, and results were examined. In addition to academic literature, government files, newspapers and other reports were also reviewed for the evaluation of the sports policies adopted by the Turkish government.

Building up on Tınaz’s paper, Danyel Reiche led a discussion on “Legacies of Mega-Sporting Events in Developing Countries: A Case Study of Lebanon.” Reiche’s paper provides a case study on experiences with hosting mega-sporting events in developing countries. The article follows a comparative approach by analyzing the legacies of four mega-sporting events hosted by Lebanon: The Pan-Arab Games in 1997; the AFC Asian Cup in 2000; the Francophone Games in 2009; and, the FIBA Asian Cup in 2017. Reiche examines the similarities and differences of the four events, identifying patterns in Lebanon’s previous experiences in hosting mega-sporting events and determining if it is beneficial for a small, developing country to bid for mega-sporting events in the future. He argues that there is a mixed picture when assessing Lebanon’s experiences with hosting mega-sporting events, with some short-term reputational gain but only a few indicators of long-term benefits for the country. Lebanon should give priority to youth and grassroots sports programs before hosting other mega-sporting events. For future bids, co-hosting with other countries might be a way to limit the financial risks for a developing country that struggles to provide its population with basic needs.

Simon Chadwick shifted the discussion to “The Business of Sports in the Gulf Cooperation Council.” In his article, Chadwick provides a brief examination of the GCC, specifically its economic profile, and then goes on to analyze the sports industry within the GCC. Initially, several common features of the industry are examined: economy and industry; soft power and diplomacy; nation branding and national identity; health and well-being; and socio-cultural factors. Chadwick then moves on to provide a statistical profile of sports in the region, and highlight a range of data focused on each GCC countries’ interest in sports, participation in sport, commercial revenues and economic contribution of sports. Thereafter, key issues pertaining to sports in the region are explored. Specifically: consumption; risk and security; regional tensions; resource management; economic and state pressures; and general observations (which broadly includes reference to specific GCC sports, such as camel racing). Finally, Chadwick draws conclusions in the context of the above.

Craig L. LaMay examined “The World Cup and its Challenge to Free Expression Norms in Qatar.” In his article, LaMay questions the effect, if any, which sports mega-events, and especially the World Cup, will have on Qatar’s free expression norms and laws. He claims that Qatar’s current media law is almost four decades old and by international standards both antiquated and repressive, and its penal code includes some severe restrictions on speech. On the one hand, it is tempting to argue that Qatar’s World Cup will have no effect on the environment for independent media in the country. But Qatar can be fairly described as both deeply traditional and aggressively modern. Much more than other states in the region, it has been open to its critics, including international human rights NGOs. Qataris themselves feel free to discuss and voice their opinions about public affairs; “Western” ideas about human rights and free expression are, if not accepted, accepted for consideration and debate. Qatar’s constitution, the only one in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council to be approved by voters, has an explicit free speech provision. Finally, Qatar’s modernization strategy rests on four pillars: sport, education, media, and art, which are all fundamentally expressive enterprises. Of these, none draws international media attention, or global audiences, like sport. After completion of the 2018 Russia Cup, Qatar can begin to brand and promote the 2022 tournament, and the country will almost certainly come under renewed pressure from international human rights groups and international news organizations to further liberalize its media environment, to clarify its rules for media practice.

Mahfoud Amara led a discussion on “Business and Policies of Sport TV Broadcasting in the MENA Region: A Case Study of beIN Sports.” Amara argues that the State-funded beIN Sport is dominating the market in the MENA region with exclusive rights to major professional leagues and World Championships of top sports. It is also currently present via different platforms (satellite, cable, and IPTV) in North America, Australia, Europe, and Asia. Amara claims that the emergence of Qatar as an affluent actor in the business of sports TV broadcasting has been met with mixed feeling. On the one hand, some welcome beIN Sports as it contributes to the finances of professional leagues that are, to a great extent, dependent on TV revenues to cover their growing expenditure, particularly rocketing players’ salaries. On the other hand, beIN Sports is grated with suspicion as it is accused of being a tool of Qatar’s international branding strategy and “soft power.” Hence in his paper, Amara examines: how beIN Sports is maintaining its dominance in the MENA region, controlling/protecting broadcasting signal, and negotiating with different national and regional TV Stations; and how beIN Sport is negotiating internationally its entry into different markets and coalitions. Finally, Amara explores the impacts of beIN Sports and Qatar international sports strategy on regional political dynamics.

Finally, Charlotte Lysa concluded the working group discussion with her paper on “Qatari Female Footballers: Negotiating Gendered Expectations through University Football.” In her paper, Lysa examines how Qatari female football players are enabling themselves to play football in a culturally acceptable way by maneuvering established social norms. By first and forehand focusing on their actions and their own recounts, Lysa explores how Qatari female footballers are using their agency to work around cultural barriers to public participation in sports. When reaching a certain age, there are special expectations in Qatari culture as for how a woman should act, in accordance with what her role in society and the family should be. Lysa argues that these expectations are affecting what physical activities women can and cannot participate in, and transgressing such norms can lead to sanctions from society, in form of a “bad reputation” and difficulties in finding a partner to marry. Centralized is the idea that “traditional” women should be modest and protected from exposure to men who are not their family members. Lysa’s research demonstrates that by participating in the “women only” spaces of university football teams, young Qatari women are bypassing social norms in society, thus avoiding possible sanctions from society.

Read the working group agenda hereRead the participants’ biographies hereRead more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Nida Ahmad, University of Waikato, New ZealandMahfoud Amara, Qatar UniversityZahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarSimon Chadwick, University of Salford, ManchesterIslam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarFerman Konukman, Qatar UniversityCraig LaMay, Northwestern University in QatarCharlotte Lysa, University of OsloNnamdi Madichie, London School of Business and ManagementSuzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarNadim Nassif, Notre Dame University, LebanonDanyel Reiche, American University of BeirutSabika Shaban, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarTamir Sorek, University of FloridaJackie Starbird, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarCem Tınaz, Istanbul Bilgi UniversityDag Tuastad, University of OsloMurat C.Yıldız, Skidmore College

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

A Taste of Pakistan: Music & Food from the North
2017-10-09 12:45 - 13:45 (Europe/Moscow)
On October 9, 2017, Waleed Zahoor, Publications Intern at Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS), and a senior student at Georgetown University in Qatar, was invited to hold a rabab recital, a stringed instrument known as the lion of instruments played mainly in Afghanistan, Iran, and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. Santosh Kulkarni, a seasoned musician, accompanied Zahoor by playing rhythmic beats on the tabla. The event titled, “A Taste of Pakistan: Music & Food from the North” was attended by a sizeable audience of faculty, staff, students, and members of the Pakistani community in Qatar. Delicacies from Northern Pakistan including chapli kebab were served for the guests.

Zahoor started the performance by introducing the rabab to the audience, many of who were listening to the instrument for the first time. He shared details about the structure and making of the artistic instrument, carved from a single piece of wood and decorated with intricate inlays of pearl. Zahoor also talked about the history of rabab, noting that attestations for rabab can be found in Persian texts dating back to 7th century CE. He also discussed the religious significance of rabab in Sikhism and Sufi Islam, and elaborated on how the instrument was played in Khanqahs in Iran and Afghanistan.

In the hour-long recital, Zahoor played a diverse selection of songs in Burushashki, Dari, Hindi, Pashto, Persian, and Urdu. He introduced the songs as he played them and translated verses from the songs for the audience. Zahoor also shared the romantic Pashto folk tale of Adam Khan and Durkhanai and the story of Mullah Mohammad Jon and Ayesha, a tale of two lovers from Afghanistan. Zahoor quoted famous poets and discussed how the rabab has left its mark on Persian and Pashto poetry as it is frequently mentioned by revered poets including Amir Khusrow, Ferdowsi, Ghani Khan, Hafez Shirazi, Muahammad Iqbal, and Rahman Baba. Zahoor ended the performance with a short improvisational piece that he played with Santosh, his partner on the tabla.

Waleed Zahoor is a senior at Georgetown University in Qatar, majoring in International Politics. He works as a Publications Intern at the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS). Zahoor has a deep interest in Pashtun history, culture, music, and poetry, and is a self-taught rabab player.

Water and Conflict in the Middle East Working Group I
2017-10-15 09:00 - 2017-10-16 16:00 (Europe/Moscow)
On October 15-16, 2017, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) held a working group under its research initiative on “Water and Conflict in the Middle East.” Over the course of two days, experts engaged in group discussions aimed at identifying a series of original research questions related to competition and cooperation over water in the Middle East. Topics discussed included: water conflict in the Middle Eastern context; trans-boundary water conflicts and cooperation in the Middle East; water scarcity and conflict in Iraq, Yemen, Jordan, and Lebanon; and the political and social constraints to achieving food security in water-scarce areas. Scholars also discussed ISIS and its attempts to strategically control water in parts of the Middle East, as well as how Turkey’s recent attempts to build dams on the Euphrates are affecting its relations with Iraq and Syria. Two working group sessions were also held with a specific focus on water and politics in the GCC states. The subject was discussed both with a focus on domestic political dilemmas faced by different Middle Eastern countries contending with scarce water resources at a national level, as well how inter-state relations in the region are influenced by tensions or competition over shared water resources.

Much of the Middle East is comprised of arid zones with limited available water resources. Over the past decades, the capacity of the region’s limited water resources to meet national needs has been further stretched by rapid population growth. Simultaneously, the mounting effects of pollution and waste have led to a significant deterioration in both the quality and quantity of water. In addition, poor water governance and development strategies at a national level have increased the gap between supply and demand. At the broader level, an increasing regional exposure to changing climatic events such as global warming is also of great concern. Water insecurity poses a significant challenge as well, impacting economic growth, and potentially leading to social and political instability. In many of the countries instead of investing in changing the culture of water usage and improving mechanisms for distribution, states have opted instead to expand citizens’ access to water through unsustainable means of water provision and expanding subsidies. Such behavior has intensified rather than mitigated water challenges across the region. At the national level there is a need for further research on water policies and practices, and what the social and political dynamics are that undergird them.

Scholars of the region have devoted considerable attention to studying the effects of above-ground shared water resources, and there is already an extensive body of work on the three main transboundary river basins of the Middle East, namely the Jordan River, the Nile, and the Tigris-Euphrates. What was raised during the working group was the need to examine trans-boundary or shared groundwater, particularly with regards to water conflict and cooperation in the Middle East, as this remains as an understudied subject. The region has a large number of groundwater aquifers, both renewable and non-renewable that are shared across multiple national borders. Aquifers are shared between Turkey and Syria, Syria and Jordan, Lebanon and Israel, Egypt and Libya, as well as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iraq amongst others. It is important to have a greater understanding of how states are navigating shared use of groundwater resources in the Middle East.

Focusing on water scarcity and conflict in Iraq, four critical issues stand out. The first issue has to do with Iraq’s geographical environment. It is a downstream state located at the tail end of the Tigris and Euphrates. This makes the country at risk of disruption in water supply caused by intentional or unintentional practices by the upstream countries. The issue of geographical location is coupled with climate change, permanent desiccation of Marshlands, change in microclimates and cross-boundary sandstorms, and divergence of priorities from investments into wetland infrastructure steered by political movements. The second issue facing Iraq is related to the hydro-politics of an emerging Kurdistan. After Kurdistan declared independence that was met by rejection from the Iraqi government along with Turkey, Iran and a number of other states, the future of Kurdish participation in multinational treaties is hard to imagine. The third issue has to do with water disputes between Iraq, Turkey, and Iran. Iraqis argue that Turkish and Iranian policies have damaged ecosystems in northern Iraq. Finally, Iraq faces a critical issue of water being used as a weapon. Non-state actors can use dams and water infrastructure, given their vulnerability as targets, as strategic and psychological weapons. These four issues are affected by poor water governance, climate change, and the continuous migration and displacement patterns.

Turning to Yemen, a significant portion of water resources are underground, and renewable water resources provide less than 10 percent of the estimated national need. Conflict over water in Yemen is not directly related to the current civil war, although of course the impact of violent conflict on people’s water access is undeniable. Broader dynamics predating the civil war remain at heart of the Yemeni water crisis. Four main areas deserve further in-depth research. First, there is a critical need to expand available data sets on Yemen’s water resources, and a need to develop and deploy data collection methods that are more applicable to the socio-political structures of the country. Second, issues related to management of water distribution and water flow, wells management, payments for domestic water supplies, and major food projects remain significantly understated in Yemen. Third, scholars need to pay attention to the local politics in Yemen insofar as tensions between households and peoples are concerned, and the impact of that on the increasing water and food security risks. Finally, there is a need to study agricultural activities that require less water, are drought resistant, and have high value.

Lebanon and Jordan are no different from other countries in the region with regards to limited natural resources not being the reason behind their water scarcity, but rather external and internal factors. With regards to the external factors, Jordan has issues with Lebanon and Syria insofar as the Upper Jordan is concerned, besides the issue of sharing the Jordan River with Palestine and Israel, and the Disi Aquifer with Saudi Arabia. For Lebanon, issues of water diplomacy revolve around the sharing of the Jordan River, an aquifer with Israel, and the Aasi and Kabir Rivers with Syria. This is in addition to the Wazani Aquifer and Hasbani River which were controlled by Israel during the occupation. With regards to the internal factors, the water infrastructure in Lebanon is perished, given that water infrastructure in some areas of Lebanon predates a century. Additionally, besides issues of pollution and climate change that are common factors across the region, the influx of refugees and displaced people adds significant pressure to Lebanon and Jordan’s water resources.

The aforementioned cases share a common factor with regards to water issues. While one ought not to undermine the scarcity of water resources in the Middle East, the most critical water issues lie beyond water resources. In other words, the non-biophysical constraints limit any technical solutions for water issues in the Middle East. Examples of non-biophysical constraints include, among other factors: socio-political stability, security, land tenures, and low farm-grade prices. These constraints are coupled with the issue of addressing the wrong problem. Decision-makers focus on finding the technical solutions for water issues while neglecting the aforementioned non-biophysical constraints that are at the core of water issues in the Middle East.

Shifting the discussion to non-state actors and management of water resources, one can see that ISIS boldly uses water as a weapon. While, for example, in April 2014 ISIS withheld the Fallujah Dam to stop water-flow and to deprive Shiites downhill in Baghdad from access to water, the group did not damage the water infrastructure in Iraq. ISIS realized its need for water for its own uses and electricity, and for the populations living within seized territories in order to win their support. Such behavior by ISIS raises questions about the definition of “weaponization” of water. Would preventing access to water based on race, religion, culture, etc., during times of dispute and competition over shared resources be considered weaponization of water? Is targeting water infrastructure similar to using water as a strategic tool? The example of ISIS also raises questions around the use of water by hybrid violent actors: state actors, non-state actors, militias, regional powers, international powers, etc. Under what circumstances is water used for strategic purposes? And what are the drivers and motivations behind such use? In addition, there seems to be a gap in the literature on studying the cooperation between militant groups and international organizations to supply water to deprived people.

In terms of hydro-politics and relations with neighboring countries, participants discussed the case of Turkey and its relations with Iraq and Syria. Although competition over shared water resources is usually assumed among neighboring countries, in fact cooperation seems to be more prominent. Nonetheless, the extent to which one party dominates the cooperative arrangement remains unclear. In other words, how does hydro-hegemony develop? In Turkey’s case, for example, scholars ought to explore Turkey’s technocratic and technoscientific approach in its pursuit to hydro-hegemony over shared water resources with Syria. There is also a gap in the literature on the neighboring countries’ perceptions towards Turkey’s hydro-hegemony. For example, to what extent are the Turkish water installations in southeast Anatolia seen as having an impact on the downstream countries? On a different note, there is limited literature on the pressure added to Turkish water resources as a result of the government policies toward hosting refugees.

While discussing hydro-hegemony, the participants highlighted another form of seeking hegemony over water. Particularly, they discussed the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) quest for hegemony over the Red Sea. Over the past decade, the UAE has been in a race to acquire operational and management rights over ports and economic zones along the Red Sea. This race was coupled by a significant Emirati naval presence in the Gulf of Aden and Bab Almandab Strait, in addition to Emirati private naval security companies. The Emirati activities in the Red Sea provoke the assumption that the UAE aims to claim hegemony over the Red Sea, which embraces one of, if not the, most important global shipping lanes. In this regards, questions were raised about the rationale and objective of the UAE’s pursuit to hegemony in the Red Sea, and how international relations theory can explain such behavior by a small state; the various strategies of the UAE to claim such hegemony, and what that tells us about small states behavior; and the responses of regional actors, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and international players, such as the United States, China, and Israel to Emirati activities in the red Sea.

The working group concluded with a session devoted to the GCC crisis that began in the summer of 2017, and its impact on Qatar’s water security. The current GCC crisis did not develop suddenly and in a vacuum, but rather had its roots in the earlier diplomatic imbroglio of 2014, when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Doha, and subtly threatened to close borders. In response, Qatar started preparing for a worst-case scenario, and enhanced strategic plans to contend with emergency conditions, particularly with regards to food and water. Given that Qatar relies heavily on imported food products, it started building closer trade ties with Iran and Turkey. Also since 2014, Qatar’s General Electricity & Water Corporation (Kahramaa) invested in lowering leakage in its water infrastructure, which reached below five percent in 2017. In addition over the past three years, Qatar has been investing in local industrial base for potable water, which was clear when the locally produced potable water quickly replaced that imported from Saudi Arabia after the severing of ties. Qatar’s main water issue, unlike the other aforementioned cases, lies in its lack of resources not mismanagement. There remains a critical dilemma with regards to how Qatar should deal with water scarcity. Given that Qatar’s limited groundwater is significantly depleted, investing in innovation and technology with regards to desalination, Qatar’s only option, is always on the table. However, the inefficiency of desalination plants and their limited capability to produce potable water remains a lasting problem.

For the working group agenda click hereFor the participants’ biographies click hereRead more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Farah Al Qawasmi, Qatar UniversityHussein A. Amery, Colorado School of MinesZahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarNadim Farajalla, American University of BeirutMark Giordano, Georgetown UniversityIslam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarBart Hilhorst, Water Resources SpecialistMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMarcus DuBois King, George Washington UniversityHelen Lackner, University of LondonSuzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarSabika Shaban, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarTobias von Lossow, Freie Universität BerlinPaul A. Williams, Bilkent University, Turkey

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS

The Arab Reform Agenda: Challenges, Promises, and Prospects
2017-10-30 12:45 - 13:45 (Europe/Moscow)
The Arab world today is experiencing “its second great fragmentation and reconfiguration of the past century,” according to respected journalist and Middle East analyst Rami G. Khouri. Acknowledging that there is not really an “Arab world,” and the Arab League only exists “on paper” anymore, he used the term “the Arab region” as a geographic description in his talk, “The Arab Reform Agenda: Challenges, Promises, and Prospects,” at the Center for International and Regional Studies at Georgetown University in Qatar on October 30, 2017.

Around World War I, the region was reconfigured by foreign powers—led primarily by Western powers—into its current state of nation-states, as countries like Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Iraq and others gradually came into being. Now, a century later, the 400 million citizens of Arab countries are experiencing another radical transformation, Khouri explained. What is different now is that local people are making many of the decisions about their fragmenting states and the reconfiguring of their society, he said. These are mostly Arab people, but also non-Arabs like Kurds, Iranians, Turks, and others, including the great powers.

Khouri shared a recent news item that captured for him the severity of the dilemma for Syria today— and for virtually all the Arab world. The Russians, Turks, and Iranians—three non-Arab powers who were engaged militarily in Syria—were meeting to agree on how to deploy their militaries inside the country. In the past, he said, “they used to meet in London and Paris or Washington to talk about what they were going to do about frontiers and sovereignties, but now they’re talking about how to behave militarily with their own troops inside Syria.” At the same time, the US and many others are also involved militarily in the country.

This example also explains in part how the Arab world got to its current situation, Khouri said. “The many different symptoms that we see: ISIS, refugees, sectarian violence, civil wars—these are all symptoms of underlying stresses, disparities, and distortions.” From about 1920-1980, he said, the lives for most Arab citizens were improving, and societies in the region were on a trajectory of relatively sustained, expanding, and equitable national development. “It wasn’t perfect, but for fifty or sixty years the region was mostly developing on the basis of nationalist developmental states in most countries,” he said.

The 1980s were the transitional period in the modern Arab world, he said. Populations grew faster than economic development; military families seized power in most of the Arab republics; and the monarchies in the region had established their own forms of governance, which were widely seen as legitimate, he said. But in the republics—Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia—the militaries essentially took over, and family rule took hold for decades on end, with some of these families still in power forty years or more later.

So the Arab region has endured decades of “autocratic, security-led, family-anchored, non-participatory, non-accountable political power, combined with the continuing negative impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its repercussions, and non-stop foreign military intervention,” which Khouri said has essentially never stopped since Napoleon arrived, with only some breaks in between foreign military action in the region. The modern period since the 1950s has witnessed almost non-stop foreign military interventions. Historically this meant the British, French, and Americans, he said, “but now we’re talking about the Russians, the Iranians, and the Turks also—actively involved militarily inside Arab countries, with their friends, allies and proxies.” And the circle of foreign military intervention continues to expand, he said, mentioning new Chinese military bases in the region, while Arab states also directly deploy their military forces in other Arab states, such as the Saudi and Emirati war in Yemen or Arab involvement in Libya.

It is no surprise that the Arab region has reached the current stage of “tumultuous conditions, chaos, warfare, some state collapse, savagery, and mass refugees in the tens of millions,” said Khouri. This did not happen suddenly, he noted, as there were many early warning signs indicating there was something seriously wrong in the region, starting in the 1970s. Surveys in recent decades revealed low trust in government institutions; people did not expect their futures would improve; poverty increased; educational results dropped across the region; corruption was perceived as being very high and permanent; there were high rates of unemployment and labor informality, especially among youth; and tens of thousands of the smartest and most dynamic young people emigrated permanently. A major early sign of stressed populations at the family level was the massive support for the Muslim Brothers in the late 1970s, he said.

Conditions worsened steadily in the 1990s and 2000s, “leading to the Arab Uprisings in 2010-2011, which was an extraordinary sign that something was seriously wrong in our societies,” he said. These and other factors led to the creation of Al Qaeda, ISIS, and other radical groups of that nature. “We have no reason to be surprised by what’s going on, but we do have reason to be shocked,” he said.

Khouri offered some very rough, personal calculations for what he called the “five distinct groups of Arabs” in the region today:

Around 10% are materially well off and have a very good life; Around 30% are basically middle-class, largely employed by the government, and live a decent life; Perhaps 50% (around 200 million) are low-income, poor, marginalized, and vulnerable; The remaining 10% comprise two groups lumped together: emigrants and refugees—people who left or were forced to leave; and the radicals and militants who took up arms and created their own militias, like the Islamic State. This last segment of the population has essentially—whether voluntarily or involuntarily—left the Arab-state system.

When taking about the Arab world economically, Khouri said there are essentially two Arab worlds. There are the oil/energy producing countries—the smaller, wealthy emirates that do not suffer the same degree of fragmentation of the other states, with the possible exception of Bahrain. The other world—across the whole region—is a population that is “showing clear signs of pauperization, marginalization, disparities, and polarization between the wealthy and the poor.” This is creating intense pressures when you throw onto it foreign military intervention, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the continued Israeli colonization of Arab lands.

With the exception of the small wealthy states, in the rest of the region, “I think we can safely say the Arab States by and large have failed the twin tests of statehood and sovereignty that were initially implanted in their lands around a hundred years ago,” Khouri said. The Balfour Declaration of 1917, which gave British support to a homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine, he argues, led to “the indirect but significant impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict continuing to this day across the Arab world, and particularly on the psyche of ordinary Arabs. It has played a major role in the coming to power and staying in power of military security regimes in countries like Syria, Iraq, Libya, and other places, and it has had a major negative impact on the self-perception of ordinary Arab men and women.”

People across the region equate the Palestinian tragedy with the wider pressures that they feel in their own societies because of foreign military intervention, Khouri said. The colonial process that took root in Palestine with the Balfour Declaration still continues today, he said, “and you see this with the Russians, the Turks, and the Iranians trying to figure out how their troops are going to coexist inside Syria, let alone people outside Syria meeting to come up with new constitution for Syria.”

Rami George Khouri is an internationally syndicated political columnist and book author, professor of journalism, and journalist-in-residence at the American University of Beirut (AUB). He was the first director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at AUB, and is now senior fellow. He also serves as a nonresident senior fellow at the Kennedy School at Harvard University and is a recipient of the Pax Christi International Peace Prize.

Article by Jackie Starbird, Publications and Projects Assistant at CIRS.

Jeremy Koons Faculty Research Workshop
2017-11-05 09:00 - 17:00 (Europe/Moscow)
A new book manuscript by Jeremy Koons, associate professor of philosophy at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar (GU-Q), was featured recently in a CIRS Faculty Research Workshop. The manuscript The Ethics of Wilfrid Sellars was studied and discussed by specialist scholars from Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia during a full day event on November 5, 2017.

The manuscript explains that, suitably developed, Sellars’s ethical theory has the potential to develop the tools to answer pressing moral questions. These include questions on moral statements, moral reasoning, moral judgments and motivation, and how we fit morality into a scientific view of the world. Additionally, Koons shows that elements of Sellars’s theory can be enriched by contemporary philosophical work—work by later Sellarsian philosophers, by philosophers working on group intentions and cooperative rationality, and more. In resolving these tensions, and updating Sellars’s theory with more recent work in the field, what emerges from Koons’s manuscript is a strikingly original and comprehensive theory that has much to contribute to contemporary debates.

The CIRS Faculty Research Workshop is a closed-door, one-day seminar that brings together select renowned scholars for a focused discussion of a GU-Q faculty member’s book manuscript during its final stages of development. All participants receive the entire manuscript in advance of the meeting and each scholar leads a focused group discussion on assigned chapters.

This research workshop featured a talented group of internationally-recognized philosophers who specialize in Sellarsian and pragmatist philosophy. Participants engaged in a series of structured sessions on how this nearly neglected body of ethical theory has the potential to contribute to current philosophical debates on how best to answer crucial moral questions.

Participant Amir Saemi, faculty member at the School of Analytic Philosophy at the Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences, said: “It is very exciting to know there will be a book long discussion of Sellars’s ethical works. No doubt that such a book would be a huge contribution to the current moral philosophy. I congratulate Dr. Koons for undertaking such a valuable project.”

Attendees included Bana Bashour, American University of Beirut; Arudra Burra, Indian Institute of Technology Delhi; Dionysis Christias, University of Patras; Anjana Jacob, GU-Q; Bhaskarjit Neog, Jawaharlal Nehru University; Amir Saemi, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences; Lucas Thorpe, Boğaziçi University; Jack Woods, University of Leeds; and, Bill Wringe, Bilkent University.

See the workshop agendaRead biographies of participants

Jeremy Koons received his Ph.D. in Philosophy from Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. His research focus is ethics, epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of religion. Koons is author of Pragmatic Reasons: A Defense of Morality and Epistemology (Palgrave, 2009), and co-author, with Michael P. Wolf, of The Normative and the Natural (Palgrave, 2016).

US-Iranian Relations in the Age of Trump: Back to the Future?
2017-11-08 12:45 - 13:45 (Europe/Moscow)
In an October 13, 2017 speech, US President Donald Trump rejected the 2015 Iran nuclear deal—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action—the arrangement made between Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany. The agreement had lifted economic sanctions on Iran and placed strict limits on its nuclear program, and was a signature achievement of President Barack Obama. US legislation enacted in response to the agreement requires the president to certify every ninety days that Iran is in compliance with the agreement. Trump’s refusal to certify Iran’s compliance in October did not immediately pull the US out of the deal; instead it shifted the responsibility onto Congress, which now has sixty days to decide whether to reimpose sanctions on Iran, which could kill the historic deal.

Trump has frequently criticized the agreement, which he called “an embarrassment” and “the worst deal ever.” In his speech, he claimed that Iran had been on the verge of total collapse before the deal, and the country would have collapsed had it not been for the previous administration’s lifting of sanctions. Daniel Brumberg, co-director of Democracy and Governance Studies at Georgetown University, called this assertion “demonstrably crazy and false and baseless,” and said “anybody who has an understanding of how this system works knows that it is simply false.” Brumberg delivered a talk, “US-Iranian Relations in the Age of Trump: Back to the Future?” at the Center for International and Regional Studies on November 8, 2017. He described Trump in a January 2017 article as “a narcissistic personality” and said his projections in domestic and foreign policy were a reflection of that narcissism, adding, “This is dangerous.”

“I make the argument that those arguing for renegotiation know that this will not succeed. This is just a tactic to weaken support. They know that there can’t be a renegotiation of the deal and they don’t really want one at all.”

Brumberg said that Trump’s own advisors favored certification of the agreement and did not want to abandon it, but it was well known that Trump was raging about it. They had to find a way to channel his rage into a more productive approach, and they found a “compromise” by removing Trump from having to regularly certify that the Iran deal is in fact working. After he has been so publicly outspoken against it, this avoided the potentially catastrophic consequences of him outright quitting the Iran deal.

Trump’s speech would be interpreted in Tehran as the United States has decided to forgo the agreement and is getting ready to find a sanction-based or military-based solution, said Brumberg. “It revives the perception that runs deep along the hardliners in Iran that ultimately for the US, the only solution to Iran is to have regime change,” he said. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, told Iranian President Rouhani in 2015 that he was wasting his time with the nuclear deal and the US would renege on the agreement, according to Brumberg. And in the wake of Trump’s speech, the hardliners now feel vindicated, he said. “Now there’s this clampdown on the reformists and this motley coalition of forces that Rouhani has put together at a crucial time in Iranian history.” In the next few years the critical matter of who will succeed the Supreme Leader will be determined. In that sense, Brumberg said, as far as the hardliners are concerned, “the speech could not have come at a better moment. It worked beautifully—almost as if they had written the script themselves.”

Brumberg said that politically, for Iran’s own internal politics, it’s a disaster, “but it is also a disaster for US foreign policy.” He said that because there isn’t a coherent alternative to the agreement, Trump’s decision to undermine and sabotage it leaves the US without any policy at all. “When you don’t have a coherent policy, when there’s a vacuum, the chances for war increase. Now they’ve increased that much more.” It’s making everyone justifiably nervous, he said.

For many years the US-Iran policy was incoherent and was basically forged on the basis of tactics and no clear strategic view, Brumberg explained. For a long time the consensus policy had been maintaining and increasing sanctions, and applying more pressure with the hope that the regime would change, he said. But crippling sanctions never stopped Iran’s nuclear program, and they acquired more centrifuges and more capability over time.

American policymakers didn’t want to choose because the choice was difficult to make, Brumberg said. You have to go beyond tactics and have a strategic view of what you want to achieve and how you’re going to achieve it, he explained. The problem for the US has been a short menu of choices. Brumberg said he is “thoroughly dubious” about alternatives to the JCPOA, but he offered war as one possibility, which some Congress members have advocated. “There’s no such thing as a short-term war,” he said, and “there’s also no such thing as an overnight attack.” The military would say a short-term attack will provoke a long-term war, he explained. His other suggested strategies include engagement and diplomacy, with some sort of negotiated outcome; or containment and deterrence, which can go along with diplomacy and be blended in different ways.

Brumberg explained that Obama supported the agreement because of the lack of a better alternative. He had inherited a very weak hand after the G.W. Bush term, and the choice was an agreement or no agreement. “Once you decide on an agreement you’re going to negotiate. And negotiation means that each side gives in on certain kind of things,” he said. The agreement is not just a US-Iran agreement and it is supported by the international community. He believes it is still a good agreement that provides controls and intents and supervision of Iran’s program for the next 20 to 25 years, and possibly longer.

Brumberg asserted the possibility that if this agreement were to hold, and there would be an evolution in Iran’s own political system, it might actually help over time to open up the space in Iran, because from the perspective of the hardliners, “conflict with the United States is fundamental to their existence,” he said. “As soon as you don’t have that conflict their position is being undermined.” After the nuclear agreement was struck, there was a very sharp reaction backlash from the hardliners, he said, which was a measure of how seriously they took the agreement. The backlash was against Rouhani and his people, because from their perspective the deal was strengthening their domestic positions. Rouhani had been calling for international peacemaking and a world without violence, Brumberg said.

If you look at Trump’s speech and the critiques of many of the experts who know the situation, you can see that in terms of his criticisms of the agreement, they really fell short, Brumberg said. Trump either misrepresented the agreement or he distorted the facts on many issues. He said the agreement was about one thing only: nuclear weapons. Had the Iranians been asked to negotiate on the zero-enrichment of uranium policy, or terrorism, Hezbollah, or Israel, there never would have been an agreement, he argued.

Brumberg said, there’s a “nix or fix” scenario, meaning let’s fix or renegotiate, or nix it. He argued that you can’t renegotiate an existing agreement like this; you can start or propose new talks, but you don’t renegotiate, which Trump is pushing. “I make the argument that those arguing for renegotiation know that this will not succeed. They are waiting for the nix part. This is just a tactic to weaken support. They know that there can’t be a renegotiation of the deal and they don’t really want one at all,” he said. Most of the critics of the nuclear deal actually want regime change, however that’s going to happen. Blumberg’s solution is to use the elaborate mechanisms provided in the agreement for addressing concerns. “Jettisoning the agreement is no way of dealing with this challenge,” he said.

Daniel Brumberg is Co-Director of Democracy and Governance Studies at Georgetown University. He spent ten years as a Special Advisor to the United States Institute of Peace; and also served as a consultant to the US Department of State and the US Agency for International Development. He is the author of Reinventing Khomeini, The Struggle for Reform in Iran, (University of Chicago Press). He coedited Conflict, Identity, and Reform in the Muslim World: Challenges for US Engagement (USIP Press) with Dina Shehata; and Power and Political Change in Iran with Farideh Farhi (Indiana University Press).

Article by Jackie Starbird, Publications and Projects Assistant at CIRS.

Parental Discrimination over Diverse Schools: Evidence from a Randomized Online Survey in Denmark
2017-11-12 12:45 - 13:45 (Europe/Moscow)
The education achievement gap between ethnic minorities and majority populations is persistent and even widening in the United States and Europe, according to Mongoljin Batsaikhan, Assistant Professor in Economics at Georgetown University in Qatar. At a Center for International and Regional Studies talk on November 12, 2017, Batsaikhan explained that the leading explanations for the gap include segregation, discrimination, peer dynamics, and identity, which are factors that often play out early in children’s lives.

In 2015, Batsaikhan and his colleagues conducted a research study into how the ethnic composition of daycare institutions affects parental preferences in Copenhagen, Denmark. The team wanted to understand why people discriminate, and why segregation and discrimination are very persistent over generations. Many economic studies have documented the existence of discrimination, and segregating school children is known to have detrimental effects on ethnic-minority children, he said. Additionally, the environment in which kids grow up is important in forming their attitudes around diversity.

This study looked at parents’ preferences in choosing schools because parents tend to put a great deal of thought into school choice. The research team wanted to see how parents made their choices and whether they could find discrimination in the selection process. They were motivated by these questions: Does the diversity of the environment affect the children’s preference and racial tolerance? And, looking at parental preferences in daycares, how are they shaped by the ethnic composition of the daycare institution?

“It seems we have quite a lot of evidence that the environment kids grow up in is very important in forming a preference toward diversity.”

The motivation for the project was simple, Batsaikhan said. He referenced the Civil Rights Movement in the United States and its efforts to end racial segregation and discrimination beginning around the 1950s. The landmark US Supreme Court case “Brown v. Board of Education” banned the segregation of black and white children in public schools in 1954. Yet, African Americans in the US continue to face discrimination nearly sixty years later. “A lot of areas and schools have some sort of an ethnic clustering and segregation even now,” Batsaikhan said. Pointing to the Black Lives Matter movement today, he said, “People don’t just go out to the street and randomly protest. They feel discriminated against. The existence of discrimination is real.” Due to historical reasons we have this sorting and segregation problem, he said, and it persists today. The black/white achievement gap widened in the US in the 1990s, he said. “You would expect it would shrink when you remove the segregation, but it persisted and the gap persisted,” he said. The same thing has also been happening in Europe and in Denmark. When comparing ethnic Danes with minority children, often times the gap is greater, he said.

Parents’ school choice is a form of sorting, as are issues like neighborhoods with high tax rates and expensive housing that make it prohibitive for lower-income residents to enroll children in preferred schools, Batsaikhan said. Inside the school, the composition of the student population also has an effect on kids’ performance. “It’s not just the educational performance,” he said, “It is also exposure to a diverse community that will affect their future attitudes toward diversity.” Segregation creates a very strong sense of identity and people start labeling themselves and others (e.g. white, black, Asian), Batsaikhan said. Segregation affects children’s preferences and this was the motivation for this research, he said, “because parents’ preferences toward diversity become intergenerational.”

Economics literature has found that social interaction networks play a role in the formation of discriminatory beliefs toward other people, Batsaikhan said. A key question in the study was: If you have a bit of a diverse environment, will that affect children’s preference and racial tolerance? “It seems we have quite a lot of evidence that the environment kids grow up in is very important in forming a preference toward diversity,” he said.

Batsaikhan shared a 2004 study that found discrimination in employment hiring when an African American-sounding name was used in job applications. When the name of the applicant was changed to a white-sounding name, and everything else remained the same on an identical CVs, those with white-sounding names were more likely to be called for an interview. Economists then try to answer: What kind of discrimination it is: taste-based or statistical? Batsaikhan’s team attempted to answer this question using a randomized trial, a type of method to identify causality. They also used a Muslim-sounding name for the purpose of manipulating preferences and then to change parents’ perception by introducing additional information.

The Copenhagen Daycare Survey was carried out as part of a large project on daycare assignment mechanisms. The web-based survey was distributed to parents with a child aged 7-19 months. A sample of 5,000 was drawn randomly from city administrative registers and the response rate was about 50 percent. When the surveys were returned, they were merged with data held by Statistics Denmark, which holds extensive background information on citizens, such as a parent’s education and income.

In the survey, participants were initially asked to choose between two institutions that were based on sample testimonials from parents with children enrolled in daycare. Institution A was a highly-structured daycare, which is a preferred style of daycare in many cultures. Institution B values freedom in instruction and children play outdoors for much of the day. Northern countries tend to value this free-play institution more than structured daycare.

Seven different surveys were sent randomly, and each survey had six testimonials from parents sharing examples of what that liked about their school. Testimonials included a) the names of the parent and child behind the quote; b) the names plus the profession of the parent; c) no name or profession. Treatment choices included: a) only Danish-sounding names; b) a Muslim-sounding name; c) and the names with the parent’s profession included. A control group had no names associated with the testimonial.

The researchers first examined the role of the Muslim-sounding name in the survey to determine if there was a difference in the reactions to a minority name in the free-play institution versus the structured institution. The survey revealed that 75 percent of parents preferred free-play to structured daycare. The structured daycare was preferred by ethnic-minority parents, parents with lower education, low-income parents, families where the father earned more, and when the child being placed in daycare was a boy.

Interpretation was as follows:

Estimation 1. Comparing the responses of having an ethnic name in a free-play vs. structured institution; the latter had a negative and significant effect on the probability of preferring the structured institution.

Estimation 2. Changing the information about the ethnic background of the mother (a Muslim-sounding name) in the free-play institution had no significant effect on the probability of preferring the structured institution.

Regarding the type of discrimination, the researchers raised the question: Is there any effect on the preferences of information about the profession of the person behind the quote? The results showed that additional information about parent’s profession did not change the attitude toward the daycares with ethnic-minority names. This indicates that the discrimination is not statistical, at least the missing information is not associated with the profession or skill of the ethnic minority parents.

Finally, the researchers explored who preferred the structured daycare because that is where the discrimination exists. The initial exploration indicates that low educated mothers and ethnic minorities and low income families tend to choose the structured daycares. The team is planning to further explore this and identify who tend to discriminate more against the diverse daycares.

Mongoljin Batsaikhan is Assistant Professor of Economics at Georgetown University in Qatar. His research field is Applied Microeconomics, with a focus on social norms, discrimination, entrepreneurship, and small and medium enterprises in developing countries. His work has been published in Management Science, Economic Inquiry and Journal of Public Economics. He is a CIRS Faculty Fellow for 2017-2018.

Article by Jackie Starbird, Publications and Projects Assistant at CIRS.

Tensions in the Middle East: A Tentative Assessment
2017-11-28 12:45 - 13:45 (Europe/Moscow)
Mehran Kamrava and Gerd Nonneman, both Professors of Government at Georgetown University in Qatar and experts on Middle East politics, gave a talk entitled “Tensions in the Middle East: A Tentative Assessment” at GUQ on November 28, 2017. They presented a broad overview of some of the major developments occurring in the region, particularly in Syria, Iran, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, and some of the implications for Qatar and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

Kamrava opened with some background on the region since the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011. He explained that a decisive factor in influencing the outcomes of the uprisings was whether militaries abandoned their civilian leadership during the uprisings. In Tunisia and Egypt when the armed forces did abandon ostensibly civilian leaders, there was a transition of power. Where the military did not abandon their civilian leadership, or where the military itself was fractured, there were different outcomes—mostly in the form of civil wars, as seen in Syria, Yemen, and for somewhat different reasons, Libya.

The fracture of the post-uprising political system in these cases resulted in civil wars, and civil wars facilitated and were also brought on by weak states—or collapsed countries. In Syria, the top command of the armed forces stayed with the civilian leadership, and Syria degenerated into a tragic and bloody civil war. “That afforded the opportunity for a number of external actors to step into Syria in the same way they had stepped into Libya and then later in Yemen, to try and expand their influence,” Kamrava said. In 2012 and 2013, Syria became a battlefield for external actors. “What we have had is a stalemate in Syria, in which now the fate of Syria is being decided by non-Syrians.”

Iran’s self-interest drove it to be involved in Syria, and those interests dictated that Iran prop up the existing Syrian regime, Kamrava said. Iran and Russia became involved on the side of the Syrians at the same time that Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and initially Turkey, were trying to foster the collapse of Syrian regime. “Iran’s intervention and proactive involvement in Syria on the part of the regime only fed into and reinforced a sectarian narrative that had previously been framed by the Bahraini government and Saudi government, and Iran really only reinforced and added fuel to the sectarian fire through it’s own activities and initiatives,” he said.

“Always on the verge of implosion,” is Lebanon, whose political system is so inherently fragile that the country is susceptible to the slightest pressure from within or from the outside. The fragility of its political system has continued since Lebanon’s long civil war ended in 1991. That weakness of the Lebanese central authority continued, and the weaknesses gave birth to the armed group, Hezbollah. Kamrava said it’s important to remember that Hezbollah is a Lebanese entity. “It is a political group that is also armed, but it is also a political group that has engaged in an awful lot of civil society activities.” Hezbollah is also a close Iranian ally, which has been a point of contention for Israel, and also lately for Saudi Arabia.

Since 2013, Saudi Arabia has adopted a radically different foreign and domestic policy—as compared to any time in its history—because of the ascendance of new political actors in the Saudi system, namely the king, Salman, and his son, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman. Kamrava said Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic and foreign policy initiatives have repeatedly hit roadblocks since 2013. “The war in Yemen was supposed to be a two-month endeavor and it still continues two years on with no end in sight. The blockade of Qatar was supposed to be a two-week endeavor and it still continues with Qatar in no mood to settle. The competition with Iran has not gotten anywhere. Saudi efforts in Syria have reached a deadlock, and Saudi Arabia is now trying to organize its own Syrian opposition and it hasn’t gotten anywhere. And the forcible resignation of the prime minister of Lebanon seems to have backfired,” he said.

Despite these setbacks in foreign policy, Kamrava argued, Mohammad bin Salman appears to have had a number of successes on the domestic front. His domestic social and cultural reforms, curtailing the powers of the religious police, his anti-corruption drive, and his attempts at dismantling the Saudi “deep state,” all seem extremely popular with most Saudis and have so far not elicited any serious challenges.

Nonneman agreed that Saudi Arabia, and Mohammad bin Salman (“MbS”) in particular, are worth focusing on because of the country’s regional superpower status, its recent record of increased assertiveness, and the striking changes in domestic and foreign policy that have been in evidence—not least in the Qatar boycott. Yet he pointed out that the role of Mohammad bin Zayed (“MbZ”), the Crown Prince but de facto ruler of Abu Dhabi, is crucial in understanding many of these developments, given his own ambitions for Abu Dhabi and the UAE, and his influence on MbS.

He noted that when it comes to the UAE’s role in the boycott or other regional issues, it is important to distinguish the role of Abu Dhabi and its leadership. In UAE foreign policy, the sheikhdoms that really count have always been Abu Dhabi and Dubai, which are ruled by separate ruling families: the Al Maktoum in Dubai and the Al Nahyan in Abu Dhabi, Nonneman explained. For many years after the UAE’s seven constituent emirates came together in 1971, the federal constitution and the first president, Abu Dhabi ruler Sheikh Zayed, had brought a balance between unity and continued diversity—including in foreign policy and defense: Dubai had retained its separate defense force until 1997. This balance was managed to the benefit of the wider federation and of Dubai and Abu Dhabi in particular, each of which had much to offer the other.

Two shifts occurred in the UAE to change this picture, Nonneman said. First, Sheikh Zayed, the charismatic founding leader of the UAE, died, leaving his son Mohammad bin Zayed as the power behind the throne of the new emir of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Khalifa. MbZ was very different: “sharp, very ambitious for Abu Dhabi’s status and role, very strongly military- and security-oriented in his world view, and not particularly good at taking on board conflicting opinions.” There was, though, still a balance with Dubai and its ruler, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid. Then came the financial crisis of 1998, where Dubai suffered grievously and might have come close to bankruptcy, had it not been for some $20 billion dollars of support from Abu Dhabi. So the power relationship has shifted, with Dubai losing much of its autonomy in matters of foreign and security policy. Hence, also, the much better relations between the Al Maktum and Qatar’s Al Thani, and Dubai’s much more pragmatic attitude towards Iran, ceased to have the effect they once had, he said.

“Mohammed bin Zayed was likely the main instigator of the level of vitriol directed at Qatar, and of the harshness of the boycott,” Nonneman suggested, “out of his concern to contain any Qatari challenge to his policy concerns regarding Iran, the role of political Islam, and his essentially autocratic vision of rule—as well as any Qatari pretenses at regional prominence.” In much of this he found a sympathetic ear in MbS. Of course there had been frictions before in the GCC, and even limited armed clashes, but “never has there been anything like this—cutting off of social and kinship relations, and buckets of vitriol being thrown at other ruling families.” The apparent and public attempts at regime change in Qatar, “that was a novelty,” he said.

Understanding this shift requires an appreciation for how leadership and decision making have shifted in both the UAE and Saudi Arabia, where Nonneman drew a parallel between leadership in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. “Decisions are made more impetuously than before, without serious consideration of alternatives, and without feedback from the sorts of voices that might have questioned lines of thinking.” One of the positives of the old Saudi system was there was always a variety of voices heard in decision-making circles, and “policy was carefully calibrated and possible consequences and pros and cons debated. That’s gone.” In MbS’s court, “there is nobody who dares question what he has decided.” The handling of the operation in Yemen, the boycott against Qatar, and the virtual kidnap of Lebanese Prime Minister Harari, are examples of this much-narrowed decision-making environment, he said.

Nonneman agreed with Kamrava that the domestic reform agenda of MbS in Saudi Arabia is popular and holds out promise. Yet he cautioned that the key to success will not just be new social freedoms: it will be jobs—one of the key pressure points for the Saudi economy. “If the jobs don’t appear within the medium term, then I fear a lot of latent resentments are going to bubble back up again,” he said.

What does this mean for Qatar and the blockade? Nonneman said that there was little left in the toolbox of the boycotting countries—as the military option is off the table and Qatar has the wherewithal to sustain the blockade indefinitely. He did have one concern, regarding the potential of Iran being drawn into wider regional conflicts. “If, for instance, the original Saudi plan had worked—of removing Hariri as the fig leaf for Hezbollah’s presence in Lebanon—it might have led to a wider military conflict.” If such dynamics brought Iran into direct conflict with Israel and the US, it “would bring Qatar into a very difficult spot,” he suggested.

Kamrava said there is usually very little cost to countries that impose sanctions on others; they have fewer incentives to settle and to resolve the conflict. Saudi Arabia has very little incentive to end the blockade against Qatar. “For the foreseeable future I don’t necessarily see a resolution,” he said, “but the rupture is there to stay for some time.”

Article by Jackie Starbird, CIRS Publications and Projects Assistant.
