Attitudes to Cybersafety and Online Privacy in the Middle East
2014-09-16 18:00 - 19:00 (Europe/Moscow)
Damian Radcliffe, leader of the Rassed research program at Qatar’s Ministry of Information and Communications Technology (ictQATAR), delivered the inaugural CIRS Monthly Dialogue of the 2014-2015 academic year with a lecture on “Attitudes to Cybersafety and Online Privacy in the Middle East” on September 16, 2014. Emphasizing the importance of the topic, he noted that, despite their varying characteristics, most countries around the world share similar concerns regarding issues of cyber safety, online privacy, and data security. This has become a global conversation, and one that is no less relevant to the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. “There are very consistent values and attitudes that can often be found amongst internet users even though they might be from incredibly different countries and cultures,” he explained.

In order to test whether this hypothesis was indeed applicable to the countries of the Middle East, Radcliffe conducted research into Arab attitudes towards cyber safety, online privacy, and data security. Collaborating with researchers from a previous World Economic Forum study conducted in 2011, Radcliffe and his team surveyed just under 3,000 internet users from 14 countries across the Middle East. When combined with the previous study, the global sample surveyed was over 11,000 internet users covering nearly 60 countries. “One of the reasons we were really keen to take this project was the fact that it also gave us the opportunity to benchmark the experience of internet users in the Middle East with other people around the world,” Radcliffe explained. The research questions covered five specific areas of study including, usage of ICT and other technologies available in the household; attitudes towards the internet; concerns of internet users; trust in different online actors and online players; and behaviors of internet users.

Attitudes to Cybersafety and Online Privacy in the Middle East from ictQATAR
This comparative dataset gave the research a broad range of results as well as ones that could be broken down geographically and categorized as emanating from the GCC region, North Africa, or a combined MENA figure which also included some additional respondents from the Levant. The resulting data gave the researchers the opportunity to make specific differentiations between the various regions of the Arab World. For example, one of research findings highlighted the fact that differences between internet behaviors in the GCC and North Africa can be attributed to socio-economic factors. “People in the GCC are much more likely to access the internet on the move given smartphone penetration in the region…over 70% in Saudi and Qatar, whereas it is something like 2% in Egypt,” Radcliffe reported.

While there were some important key differences between internet users worldwide, the overall research findings proved Radcliffe’s initial hypothesis which stated that Middle East internet users are not so dissimilar from others around the globe. “Equivalency in terms of technological access as a regional figure compared to the rest of the world was pretty good. In fact, if you look at the GCC, there is much higher access to advanced forms of technology than there are in many other parts of the world,” he noted. The research team found that internet users in the Middle East, especially younger users, were very active online and were positive about the impact of the internet on their lives.

In comparison to the global average in terms of attitudes towards the internet, one main distinction of Middle East internet users was their tendency to place very little trust in those organizations that only existed online, which explains why “e-commerce here is much less prevalent than it is in other markets. In fact, within the region, people are much less likely to engage in e-commerce than they are in any of the other regions that we surveyed. They are also among the least likely to bank online. Traditional methods of shopping and banking still remain popular,” Radcliffe explained. Another key difference was Middle East internet users’ tendency to be more trusting of traditional forms of authority, whether in terms of government or financial institutions. The research results indicated that regional internet users were generally in favor of having governing authorities regulate internet content and were not too concerned about the safety of their personal information online. This is in stark contrast to those surveyed in Western countries who tended to be more wary of government and financial institutions, which is most likely a symptom of the recent economic crisis in those countries.

Radcliffe ended the lecture by highlighting some thoughts for the future of digital technologies, arguing that, with increased availability of personal surveillance technologies, issues of trust will most likely intensify in future. The more digital devices in the world, the greater the risk of security breaches, but simultaneously the greater the possibility of doing this differently and more constructively. “New technologies will bring new challenges, but also new opportunities,” he concluded.

Damian Radcliffe is an award-winning content creator, journalist, and researcher who has led diverse teams at the intersection of journalism, media innovation, and civic engagement for nearly 20 years. He currently leads the Rassed research program at Qatar’s Ministry of Information and Communications Technology (ictQATAR)—an initiative which explores the impact of ICT on society and the potential afforded by emerging technologies. His team has published over 80 studies, presentations, articles and infographics since mid-2012—in both English and Arabic—and their work as featured across a broad range of regional and international media. Their research was in the Top 1% of globally viewed content on LinkedIn’s SlideShare platform in 2013.

Read the full Report in English
Read the full Report in Arabic

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

Infographic: The attitudes of Internet users in the Middle East towards Cybersafety, Security and Data Privacy from ictQATAR​ مواقف مستخدمي الإنترنت في منطقة الشرق الأوسط حيال السلامة ولأمن على شبكة الإنترنت from ictQATAR​

The Digital Middle East: Working Group I
2014-09-27 18:00 - 2014-09-28 18:00
On September 27-28, 2014, CIRS held the first Working Group on “The Digital Middle East” research initiative. Academics from various backgrounds gathered for this first meeting to discuss their research findings and papers around the Digital world in the Middle East. The topics ranged from the effects technology has had on the Arab uprisings to state measures being undertaken to incorporate technology into everyday life.

Opening the discussion, participants focused on how the socio-political landscape of the Arab world has been changing due to the spread of the Internet. In places such as Egypt and Iran, youth have taken to technology to express their discontent towards political regimes, trying economic conditions and social injustices. The decentralized nature of the media model has led to mass social movements arising in several Arab states, helping facilitate in the fall of several regimes and the severe weakening of others. In the Gulf states, digital anonymity in places such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait has provided an outlet for the youth to articulate themselves online without fear of reprisal. As a result, political experiences were no longer isolated to the offline world, they were incorporated into digital form having been able to transverse physical, cultural, and national boundaries.

People’s instantaneous connections on social media have encouraged academic focus on civil engagement frameworks and the creation of online civil societies that are both inclusive and transnational. In the case of Egypt for instance, online activism has radically affected the nature of mediated experiences since 2011. Prior to the establishment of video sharing and communication platforms, coverage of political events was heavily reliant on television and print journalism. But during the Arab Spring, in certain states social media allowed for the most reliable coverage of events due to the impact of state censorship on traditional media forms. During the Arab uprisings, cyber communities also were made possible by the work of individuals that would spend a substantial amount of time online, collating and contributing crucial information through various digital platforms, without monetary compensation. Discussants voiced their interest in understanding how the nature of information transmittance into the digital world has had an effect on labor theory of value in relation to free labor.

The events of the Arab uprisings have also instigated changed patterns in political behavior in various social groups, especially among women. Engaging in the digital landscape in the Middle East has proven to be a liberating experience, forging alternative collectivities defined by a common, greater cause and uninhibited by definitions of gender, class or race. However, while social movements may initially emerge online, a physical space is still necessary for civic action to occur. During the uprisings women took to the streets alongside their male counterparts; yet, sexual harassment and various other grave violations during protests still took place in great numbers, outlining the disparity in behaviors that still exist in the offline world.

It is important to note that women’s activity online also extends to gaming and game development. Recent published reports on videogame consumption in Europe and America show that female gamers far outnumber males. The trend of female gamers is also on the rise in the Middle East, tangible proof of which can be seen in the recent phenomenon of Saudi Arabia’s annual female-only gaming convention. Participants at the working group noted that even though a digital divide still exists between the genders, the expedited evolution of the digital world has given users more of a stake in shaping alternative discourses on gender in the region.

Working Group members also discussed linkages between videogames and activism. Recently videogames have become places of encounter in the digital landscape, where users engage with one another in a non-physical space. Interviews conducted with producers and users of videogames show that they do not perceive videogames as having the potential to influence thought. However, state initiatives in Iran show otherwise, with the launching of the Iran Computer and Video Game Foundation created with the intention of portraying positive Muslim identities in videogames. The traditional narrative in videogames produced in other parts of the world often portray Muslim characters as terrorists and villains, whereas the Iranian foundation aims to portray Muslim characters in a more favorable light while also improving the videogame economy by supporting local game development. Access to videogames in the Middle East is a relatively simple process, due to the lack of robust copyright laws. The illegal nature of these pirated copies leads to a lack of recorded sales, which in turn affects the gathering of quantitative data on gamer demographics such as age, gender, income level, and time spent playing. Questions that arose from this discussion called for more quantitative and qualitative research on user profiles and needs.

Issues of intellectual property infringement are widespread in the Middle East, due to the lack of a unified copyright law, creating a myriad of issues surrounding this topic. Considering that the globalization of media culture has not been accompanied with equivalent access to media, people in the Middle East infringe on copyright out of convenience and comfort. Such behavior can affect software designers greatly because it restricts developers from selling their products in a fair market. However, for educational purposes, software piracy has contributed greatly to the education of younger generations by giving them free access to expensive software that they could train and learn from.

Working Group members also discussed the role state actors have had in the changing face of the digital world, choosing to develop once offline activities such as commerce and governance into electronic format. Naturally, the growth of political activity and online activism has also caused states to rethink their methods of authoritarianism, leading to acts of state censorship targeting social media sites, such as in the cases of Iran and Turkey. This has led to much debate about the role technology plays within existing power structures in state and society. This innovative technological behavior in the Middle East is indicative of growth in access and usage of the Internet, yet limited statistical analysis is available to fully understand this phenomenon.

Commerce has always played an integral role in strengthening and sustaining Middle Eastern societies both historically and at present. With the advance of technology, commerce has taken a different form in the shape of online shopping. In 2013 approximately a third of GCC residents accessed the internet only to shop, a 7 percent increase from the year before. The e-commerce experience in the Gulf has also made use of various digital platforms, created initially for sharing pictures and communication purposes, to selling products online. The change in cultures of consumption has been aided by the development of digital technology, yet evident gaps in the e-commerce model, such as efficiency and growth, still need to be addressed and accounted for.

In terms of e-governance in the Gulf, attempts have been made in recent years to use technology as a way to improve information and service delivery to citizens. Practically, this proved to be harder to implement as issues of transparency conflicted with Gulf government’s initial commitment to e-governance. Discussants problematized the centralist nature of Gulf states as being an obstacle for e-governance, especially since citizens are often suspicious of various state initiatives and often are too fearful to fully engage with the state and its agencies online.

See the working group agenda
Read the participant biographies
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Ilhem Allagui, Northwestern University in Qatar
Haya Al Noaimi, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Jon Anderson, Catholic University of America
Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Marion Desmurger, UNESCO Representation in the Arab States of the Gulf & Yemen
Shahd Dauleh, Qatar’s Ministry of Information and Communications Technology (ICTQatar)
Muzammil M. Hussain, University of Michigan
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Gholam Khiabany, Goldsmiths University of London
Dionysis Markakis, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Damian Radcliffe, Qatar’s Ministry of Information and Communications Technology (ICTQatar)
Vit Šisler, Charles University in Prague
Annabelle Sreberny, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
Mark Allen Peterson, Miami University in Ohio
Daniel Varisco, Qatar University
Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Shafiz Affendi Mohd Yusof, Universiti Utara Malaysia
Luciano Zaccara, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Norhayati Zakaria, Universiti Utara Malaysia
Mohamed Zayani, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Article by Haya Al-Noaimi, Research Analyst at CIRS

Justin Gengler Monthly Dialogue
2014-10-13 18:00 - 20:00
Justin Gengler, Senior Researcher at the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI) of Qatar University, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue on “Studying Public Opinion in Qatar” on October 13, 2014. SESRI conducts nationally-representative, scientific household surveys of the different social groups residing in Qatar, including the local national population, professional expatriates, and labor migrants. Giving some background to the state of survey research in Qatar, Gengler noted that the in-depth, nation-wide study of public opinion in the Gulf region is still in its infancy. In this context, it is important to think about “what we mean by public opinion or studying public opinion in the Gulf region—especially in a place where people don’t always associate mass attitudes as being part of the decision-making process,” he explained.

Giving specific examples of how responses can change according to context and over time, Gengler argued that there are three general levels of dealing with collected data. A primary level of data analysis is “descriptive” in reporting basic distributions of survey responses to a particular question. A secondary level of data analysis offers a basis for temporal or cross-societal comparison and so offers enhanced analytical value. A tertiary level of data analysis delves more deeply into survey results not only by situating the data in context, but by moving beyond the question of “what” to explain the “why” of survey responses.

In order to demonstrate how and why responses can vary, Gengler displayed results to the survey question “Which country poses the greatest challenge to Qatar?” In the summer of 2010, approximately 19 percent of Qatari national respondents identified Israel as the greatest challenge. This result in and of itself carries little meaning unless it is compared to those from other years as well as to events occurring during the relevant time periods. “After the events of 2011 and the ramping up of sectarian rhetoric and sectarian feeling in the Gulf, you see that threat perceptions change in a very predictable or a very systematic way, which is that Iran emerges as a much greater threat in the public imagination.” As such, Qatari responses to the same question in 2011 were very different, with the proportion of nationals identifying Iran as the greatest challenge more than doubling over the previous year. In relation to “data situated within temporal or societal context, the thing of interest is not responses to a specific question, but relationships between responses and other variables,” he said.

A final level of analysis when examining data is to look at the interaction between the interviewer and the respondent. This is especially important for the data gathered in Qatar and elsewhere in the Gulf region, because “for social and economic reasons, there are very few nationals employed as field interviewers. We might think this is a problem because we are asking citizens about their opinions on sometimes sensitive topics, so it is a question whether or not the answers we receive are reliable,” he argued. In order to assess the reliability of responses and the impact of Qatari nationality on survey results, Gengler divided two teams of Qatari and non-Qatari students to conduct a field experiment surveying 1,200 Qatari nationals. Contrary to expectations, there were no great variations in answers given to Qatari interviewers versus answers given to non-Qatari interviewers regarding sensitive political questions. Rather, the differences lay in “social questions that touch on the issue of the expatriate-national divides … as well as the relaxation of naturalization laws,” he noted.

Concluding the talk, Gengler’s gave a positive outlook for the future of survey research in the Gulf. He argued that “there is a newfound appreciation in the Gulf region in particular—including at the elite level—for survey research, because it is objective rather than partisan or coming from a simply ideological standpoint; it is based on empirics; and also because states see the value in staying ahead of public opinion.”

Justin J. Gengler completed the first-ever mass survey of political attitudes in Bahrain in 2009 as part of his doctoral dissertation for the University of Michigan, titled “Ethnic Conflict and Political Mobilization in Bahrain and the Arab Gulf.” This project forms the basis of a forthcoming monograph on group conflict in the rentier state, to be published in early 2015 in the Indiana University Press Series in Arab and Islamic Studies. He is a contributor to the volume Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf, published by Hurst/Oxford University Press. His work has also appeared recently in Middle East Policy (2012), Journal of Arabian Studies (2013), and Middle East Law and Governance (2013), in addition to numerous policy-oriented publications.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

The Changing Security Dynamics of the Gulf
2014-10-25 09:00 - 2014-10-26 17:00
On October 25-26, 2014, CIRS held its first Working Group under “The Changing Security Dynamics of the Gulf” research initiative. Academics from various disciplines gathered for their first meeting to discuss evolving national and regional security dynamics, and to identify research gaps that need to be addressed. The group drew attention to different, prevailing definitions of security, including military, regime, and human security. Amongst other themes, participants debated existing security arrangements in the Gulf and how regional relations may pose security threats to individual Gulf states’ national interests.

Opening the discussion, participants focused on the concept of securitization theory. Classical approaches to security focus on the measurable characteristics of a threat, such as balance of power and military capabilities. Securitization theory examines how certain issues are transformed into security concerns by the state or by political actors and other stakeholders.

State security usually hinges upon military, regime, and resource stability. As a result, state surveillance mechanisms are effective safeguards in ensuring the legitimacy and stability of the regimes in power. In places such as Bahrain, there are sectarian angles associated with regime security. Other forms of threat perception identify political, human and environmental concerns, all factors that can contribute to a populations’ feelings of “relative deprivation”. More recently, in the Gulf, human insecurity has been exacerbated by the interventions of non-state actors such as ISIS.

During the Working Group the “personality element” of regional rulers was also discussed. Often in Gulf states there is no differentiation between the type of threats that are perceived as impacting the personal security of regime leaders and those that affect the security of the state as a whole. Questions were raised as to the relevance of critical security perspectives to the Gulf context, particularly when there is a proliferation of fragile institutions. Oftentimes, the severe demographic imbalances in the Gulf lead to a general consensus amongst the indigenous population to accept the regime’s definitions of what constitutes a security threat

Participants also discussed the weaknesses of collective security arrangements in the GCC. During Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, GCC member states were immobile for several weeks and unable to provide a unified, robust response. This inaction resulted in the Kuwaiti royal family having to escape to Saudi Arabia until the monarchy was restored. Commonalities in security concerns amongst the ruling Gulf regimes reinforce the shared security interests dominant in this region and the institutional importance of the Gulf Cooperation Council in highlighting these concerns. The Council also contemplated extending membership invitations to both Jordan and Morocco, at a time when the GCC felt that it had barely survived the first upsurge of revolts threatening its stability. The invitations were an act of commitment on part of the Gulf states towards monarchic regimes in the region. However, working group participants questioned the purpose of this collective security arrangement, considering the Council’s history of cooperation during times of crisis and its tendency to prioritize national interest once external threats dissipate.

In addition to broad thematic areas the discussions also mentioned a number of specific cases, including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Iran. In the UAE’s case, having gone through significant foreign policy changes since the death of Sheikh Zayed Al Nahyan, the United Arab Emirates identified the danger of militant Islamism as the biggest threat to the security of the regime and state. In March 2013, a group of activists and members of the Emirati community signed a petition urging the regime to shift to a more democratic society, calling for election of all members in the National Federal Council and the bestowing of legislative and regulatory powers upon this body. Approximately, 64 out of 94 activists on trial were found guilty and accused of having ideological sympathy with the Muslim Brotherhood. Today, the UAE has made an extensive effort towards involving itself in North Africa’s politics, partly encouraged by Egypt’s support. Both Qatar and the UAE have exerted substantial effort in North Africa, in an effort to develop their geostrategic roles in the region. From a security perspective, North Africa is of utmost relevance to the Gulf, as it acts as a gateway to Europe, heightening inter-Gulf state competition over regional relevance.

In Bahrain, the lack of political institutions makes it difficult to gain insight into the political views of the Bahraini population and how they perceive threats to security. GCC states have been very deliberate in structuring political conflict and defining what constitutes a threat to the state, and have often used sectarian sentiments for this purpose. During the February 14th demonstrations state-sponsored Sunni counter-mobilization efforts were a reaction to the rebellion organized by the Shiite majority in Bahrain. One month later, over five thousand troops were dispatched by neighboring Gulf states in an effort to contain and localize the uprisings. Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province was also inspired by the uprisings taking place in Bahrain, whereby the province of Qatif, with a population of 95 percent Shiites, demonstrated in solidarity with Bahrain when Saudi troops arrived.

Working Group members also discussed how some Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, have been showing greater vulnerabilities in their rentier bargain with their citizenry. Since 2011, the majority of Gulf states have reinvigorated their rentierism, by increasing salaries and providing jobs in the labor market, in an effort to discourage people from contesting the regimes’ legitimacy. Scholars suggested that not all the Gulf states are alike, and in some of the Gulf states maintaining rentier disbursements are proving challenging, as state capacity to deliver is stretched. Certain Gulf states with larger indigenous populations and less financial transparency such as Saudi Arabia, have been facing serious cracks in the rentier bargain, whereby 70 percent of Saudi nationals live in rented accommodation due to the inability of the state in providing national housing for its local population. The growing demographic imbalances in Gulf states have only added to the complexity of the local population relationship with the labor market, often intensifying underlying tensions between locals and expatriates. This proves to be problematic for the regimes in power considering that the rentier bargain is the foundation of Gulf regimes’ legitimacies.

The most common explanation for the success of Gulf State’s domestic security and the continuity of the ruling elites has been the presence of hydrocarbon energy, which guarantees geostrategic value to the West and protection for the Gulf states. The management of domestic security has generally been conducted through the strategy of combined cooption and repression of the masses. Such tactics can be witnessed in Bahrain during the 2011 uprisings where sixty people were killed and numerous political activists were jailed and detained for indeterminate lengths of time. In the case of Saudi Arabia, cooption lead to the creation of hundreds of jobs for people in an effort to remedy the economic situation within the country. Working Group members also discussed linkages between religion, tradition, and oil, arguing that Gulf states often cultivate national identities that are corresponding to their domestic security interests.

When Gulf states were granted their independence in 1971, it was apparent that a Gulf “national” identity was not based on principles of self-determination or collective history. This was due to the fact that the trucial states were only under a British economic and political protectorate, having not experienced or been inherently changed by a colonial process. At the time, most coastal states in the Gulf were comprised of either nomadic or seafaring tribes. Amongst these tribes were substantial populations of Iranians and Indians who were part of the mercantile classes. In more recent times and with the creation of city states, there has been an active rejection of external and non-indigenous identities. Gulf regimes have also made a conscious effort to create a national identity that is based on tribal and religious heritage in order to enforce their domestic legitimacy. The question of whether the creation of national identities can lead to “imagined communities” was problematized by the discussants. Namely, the idea that Gulf states revalorize national and tribal ties as a way to construct a narrative based on national and sectarian sentiments.

See the working group agenda
Read participant biographies
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Rogaia Abusharaf, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Haya Al Noaimi, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Alanoud Al Sharekh, Secretariat of the Supreme Council for Planning and Development in Kuwait
Khalid Almezaini, Qatar University
Abdullah Baabood, Qatar University
Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Gawdat Bahgat, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Study, National Defense University
Patricia Duran, Independent Researcher
Nader Entessar, University of South Alabama
Justin J. Gengler, Qatar University
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Joseph A. Kéchichian, King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies
Anatol Lieven, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Dionysis Markakis, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Toby Matthiesen, University of Cambridge
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Jean-Marc Rickli, Kings College London
David Roberts, Kings College London
Marc Valeri, Center for Gulf Studies, University of Exeter
Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Ole Wæver, Center for Resolution of International Conflicts,University of Copenhagen
Luciano Zaccara, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Article by Haya Al-Noaimi, Research Analyst at CIRS

Ole Wæver on Security in a Post-Western World
2014-10-27 18:00 - 19:00
Ole Wæver, Professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, and Director of the Center for Resolution of International Conflicts, delivered a CIRS Focused Discussion on October 27, 2014 on the topic “Global Security in a Post-Western World.” Introducing the lecture, Wæver noted that when world events change so quickly and so radically, it is always important to understand the basics of international relations theories, no matter how old-fashioned an idea that may seem. In international relations, it is tradition to want to comprehend the “big picture,” in terms of how one country relates to another and under what kinds of power relations within the international system.

Giving some historical background to the topic, Wæver explained that the idea of the singular “superpower” is one that has its roots in Eurocentric history, and goes back to a time where Europe was central to world events, especially during the colonial period and up to the Cold War. However, since the end of the Cold War, the question of what kind of international political system has replaced the older, more traditional bipolar global engagement of superpowers is still being debated in the discipline. There have been a great many shifts in global engagement. Nations have since attempted to adapt to the new transition and to the decline of powerful global ideologies as they reconstruct their security allegiances within power vacuums. Wæver argued that we are currently in a radically different system to that of the past bipolar world where giant powers faced off against each other. So, how did we get to this stage of finding ourselves in a post-Cold War period and, what he called, a post-West period? The answer is in what comes after bipolarity: is it unipolarity or is it multipolarity? Or, is it neither?

The post-Cold War period saw the rise of an ideologically-victorious United States, with power and influence all over the world. However, Wæver argued, it is evident from events of the recent past that the United States can no longer claim power based solely on market or military might. Around 2005, there was a turning point where the centric approach began showing signs of weakness. The Iraq and Afghanistan wars proved to be a poor strategy, and one in which the United States failed to dominate. Further, the 2008 global financial crisis completely damaged US legitimacy as a global market leader. “The US is really not dominant enough to be able to impose order,” he said.

Perhaps then the idea of multipolarilty could be considered a more appropriate definition in its acknowledgement of fluid and shifting alliances, but, Wæver argued, it is still a concept that is unsatisfactory to describe current international system structures. The idea of multipolarity is problematic since within any group of nations, some are more powerful than others. Thus, these concepts are unstable, and we need a new definition of what is taking place in the global balance of power.

Currently, the world is increasingly made up of many great powers with fewer superpowers in neither a unipolar nor a multipolar world. “No one is really thinking of themselves as global players, they are all anchored and rooted in regions, mostly interested in their own regions, somewhat interested in neighboring regions, and occasionally concerned about global questions,” he explained. Thus, if there is no longer an ongoing struggle for the prime position within the global order, we need a different type of definition, and a different type of understanding for this new global configuration.

In conclusion, Wæver said that, ultimately, many of these issues come down to basic assumptions and ways of thinking. In this sense, the current configuration of world politics is post-Western in three very distinct ways: in power politics that is no longer Western-centric; in the value order that is no longer based on a singular framework of interpretation; and, finally, in the understanding of international relations theory and concepts of polarity and global security, where we now see a greater role for theories that emanate out of different geographic and cultural contexts—ones that are not dominated by Western modes of thinking.

Ole Wæver is most known for coining the concept of “securitization” and developing what is commonly referred to as the Copenhagen School in security studies. His research interests include international relations and security theory, sociology of science, religion in international relations, climate change, conflict analysis, and the role of national identity in foreign policy. He has published and broadcast extensively in the field of international relations and securitization theory. His most recent publications include the contribution of a chapter to Capturing Security Expertise: Practice, Power, and Responsibility (Routledge, forthcoming 2015). His most recent peer-reviewed journal article, “The Theory Act: Responsibility and Exactitude as seen from Securitization” appears in International Relations (2014).

Ole Wæver, Professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, and Director of the Center for Resolution of International Conflicts, delivered a CIRS Focused Discussion on October 27, 2014 on the topic “Global Security in a Post-Western World.” Introducing the lecture, Wæver noted that when world events change so quickly and so radically, it is always important to understand the basics of international relations theories, no matter how old-fashioned an idea that may seem. In international relations, it is tradition to want to comprehend the “big picture,” in terms of how one country relates to another and under what kinds of power relations within the international system.

Giving some historical background to the topic, Wæver explained that the idea of the singular “superpower” is one that has its roots in Eurocentric history, and goes back to a time where Europe was central to world events, especially during the colonial period and up to the Cold War. However, since the end of the Cold War, the question of what kind of international political system has replaced the older, more traditional bipolar global engagement of superpowers is still being debated in the discipline. There have been a great many shifts in global engagement. Nations have since attempted to adapt to the new transition and to the decline of powerful global ideologies as they reconstruct their security allegiances within power vacuums. Wæver argued that we are currently in a radically different system to that of the past bipolar world where giant powers faced off against each other. So, how did we get to this stage of finding ourselves in a post-Cold War period and, what he called, a post-West period? The answer is in what comes after bipolarity: is it unipolarity or is it multipolarity? Or, is it neither?

The post-Cold War period saw the rise of an ideologically-victorious United States, with power and influence all over the world. However, Wæver argued, it is evident from events of the recent past that the United States can no longer claim power based solely on market or military might. Around 2005, there was a turning point where the centric approach began showing signs of weakness. The Iraq and Afghanistan wars proved to be a poor strategy, and one in which the United States failed to dominate. Further, the 2008 global financial crisis completely damaged US legitimacy as a global market leader. “The US is really not dominant enough to be able to impose order,” he said.

Perhaps then the idea of multipolarilty could be considered a more appropriate definition in its acknowledgement of fluid and shifting alliances, but, Wæver argued, it is still a concept that is unsatisfactory to describe current international system structures. The idea of multipolarity is problematic since within any group of nations, some are more powerful than others. Thus, these concepts are unstable, and we need a new definition of what is taking place in the global balance of power.

Currently, the world is increasingly made up of many great powers with fewer superpowers in neither a unipolar nor a multipolar world. “No one is really thinking of themselves as global players, they are all anchored and rooted in regions, mostly interested in their own regions, somewhat interested in neighboring regions, and occasionally concerned about global questions,” he explained. Thus, if there is no longer an ongoing struggle for the prime position within the global order, we need a different type of definition, and a different type of understanding for this new global configuration.

In conclusion, Wæver said that, ultimately, many of these issues come down to basic assumptions and ways of thinking. In this sense, the current configuration of world politics is post-Western in three very distinct ways: in power politics that is no longer Western-centric; in the value order that is no longer based on a singular framework of interpretation; and, finally, in the understanding of international relations theory and concepts of polarity and global security, where we now see a greater role for theories that emanate out of different geographic and cultural contexts—ones that are not dominated by Western modes of thinking.

Ole Wæver is most known for coining the concept of “securitization” and developing what is commonly referred to as the Copenhagen School in security studies. His research interests include international relations and security theory, sociology of science, religion in international relations, climate change, conflict analysis, and the role of national identity in foreign policy. He has published and broadcast extensively in the field of international relations and securitization theory. His most recent publications include the contribution of a chapter to Capturing Security Expertise: Practice, Power, and Responsibility (Routledge, forthcoming 2015). His most recent peer-reviewed journal article, “The Theory Act: Responsibility and Exactitude as seen from Securitization” appears in International Relations (2014).

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

Ian Almond Faculty Research Workshop
2014-11-16 09:00 - 17:00
Ian Almond, Professor of World Literature at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, headed a CIRS Faculty Research Workshop on “Dissecting the Native Informant: A Case Study of Nirad C. Chaudhuri” on November 16, 2014. The workshop was held to discuss his latest work examining the related ideas of melancholy, political conservatism, and native informancy. It takes the figure of a twentieth century Indian thinker, Nirad C. Chaudhuri, and considers his oeuvre under the changing optics of a number of different topics—all in an attempt to understand how an Indian intellectual such as Chaudhuri was able to defend passionately the legacy of the British Empire, and even slander the culture and mentality of his fellow Indians. Almond also extended this to present-day “native informants” such as Fareed Zakaria, Fouad Ajami, and Enrique Krauze.

Almond’s book initially began as a straightforward monograph on the Indian writer Nirad C. Chaudhuri (1897-1999), but soon developed—over the four years it took to write it—into a much more nuanced project: the study of how conservative, pro-Western intellectuals are formed in postcolonial environments. What started out as just another book on an infamously Anglophile Bengali writer began to reveal implications for the whole type of the “native informant.” Under the rubric of four different approaches—Islam, the archive, melancholy, and Empire—he not only enters into the intricacies of Chaudhuri’s intellectual constitution, but also develops insights into the internalization and reproduction of ideology. Each chapter tries to articulate the Indian context of the investigation—what Chaudhuri’s peers in the Bengali and wider Indian tradition had to say about Muslims, or sadness, or libraries—but also brings in a strong comparative dimension. In one chapter, for example, the book considers the year 1947 in three different cities—Calcutta, Mexico City, and Istanbul—and examines three melancholy texts that were being written in those cities that year (Autobiography of an Unknown Indian, El Laberinto de la Soledad, and the Turkish novel Huzur).

Almond tries to show how Chaudhuri’s views on Islam—on its cultures, followers, and faith—reveal a jumbled bag of different voices in Chaudhuri, each of which belonged to a different vocabulary, and drew on a different constellation of beliefs. As a consequence, he takes a look at how Chaudhuri made use of the archive—of libraries, galleries, and museums—which not only throws light on the origin of some of these vocabularies, but also illuminates the process of self-alienation which his extensive reading accentuated. It was a process which fissured and undermined Chaudhuri’s notion of Indianness, dethroning it from the center of his persona and opening him up to a wide variety of foreign registers; amongst the many consequences of this alternative intellectual development was an increasing disdain for the culture of his own community, and a growing empathy for the perspective of the Empire which ruled over it. In the penultimate chapter of Almond’s book, the melancholy which arose from this situation is shown to compose of a number of different elements—not just the inevitable tristesse which accompanies all processes of alienation, but also a sense of loss at the withdrawal of the imperial entity whose presence had taken on such a metaphysically central place in his life. In the final chapter, he considers Chaudhuri’s relationship to empire in the context of similar intellectuals from very different regions—the right-wing Mexican intellectual Enrique Krauze, the Arab journalist Fouad Ajami, and the U.S. educated Indian writer Fareed Zakaria.

The participants who came to speak on Almond’s book were based at universities from a variety of different regions. Mahmut Mutman spoke of the relationship between Empire and Literature, and the way imperialist sensibilities were able to foster (in positive as well as negative ways) literary creation; Kathleen Hewett-Smith saw Chaudhuri as someone who seemed to seek in Empire a form of codified knowledge, and compared Chaudhuri’s love of the library to the Turkish novelist Orhan Pamuk’s own interest in the archival. Tariq Mehmood spoke of the need for greater historical context in understanding figures such as Chaudhuri, whilst Sibel Irzik spoke on the Freudian distinction between melancholy and mourning, and asked why some losses for Chaudhuri were necessarily more melancholic than others. “Chaudhuri”, she said, “lost an empire he never had.” Sheetal Majithia alluded briefly to the way World Literature has been promoted as an effort to limit postcolonial studies, and spoke of the ways Chaudhuri could be useful to schools of analysis such as Affect Theory.

Ian Almond received his PhD in English Literature from Edinburgh University in 2000. He is the author of four books, most recently Two Faiths, One Banner (Harvard University Press, 2009) and History of Islam in German Thought (Routledge, 2010), and over forty articles in a variety of journals including PMLA, Radical Philosophy, ELH, and New Literary History. He specializes in comparative world literature, with a tri-continental emphasis on Mexico, Bengal and Turkey. His books have been translated into eight languages, including Arabic, Russian, Turkish, Korean, Serbo-Croat, Persian and Indonesian. He is currently working on a history of Islam in Latin America.

CIRS supported Ian Almond’s book, The Thought of Nirad C. Chaudhuri: Islam, Empire and Loss (Cambridge University Press, 2015), by hosting a research workshop in which selected scholars were invited to the Georgetown University-Qatar campus to discuss the manuscript and to give critical feedback on the book chapters ahead of publication.

Read biographies of the participantsSee the workshop agenda

Buthaina Al Ansari on Female Leaders in Qatar
2014-11-17 18:00 - 20:00
Buthaina Al Ansari, founder and Chairperson of Qatariat T&D Holding Company and Senior Human Resources Director at Ooredoo, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue on the topic of “Sheroes—How Female Leaders are Changing Qatar” on November 17, 2014. Al Ansari introduced the talk, which focused on the status of female leadership in Qatar, by explaining that it is largely males who are recognized for their endeavors and achievements, while women are rarely celebrated to the same degree. “There are male and female achievers, but there are only ‘heroes,’ and I do believe there should be ‘sheroes,’” she said.

Al Ansari is a member of the MENA Business Women’s Networks, an ambassador for Women Leading Change Qatar, a board member of Qatar Business Women’s Association, and a Mentor at the Qatar Professional Women’s Network Circle. She shared her insights on what makes a successful businesswoman, with a particular focus on how Qatari women can achieve a more competitive position within the local and international market. Al Ansari divulged her recipe for success, including the most important ingredients required in any business venture. The first element of success is to have a supportive family structure. She argued that in the Arab World, it is especially important for women to have a family that understands the imperatives of any business endeavor, and the necessities of splitting time and resources equally between the needs of the home and those of the business operation. Once one has the backing and support of one’s family, the second element of success that Al Ansari advocated was a solid foundation in the form of education. She noted that “in Qatar, we have a strong system of education”—especially for women—which should be capitalized upon.

The third element of success, as suggested by Al Ansari, is to take risks, and to not be afraid of challenging the norm. This, she said, is the defining characteristic of any entrepreneur. Al Ansari explained that she had to take personal risks in order to further her business career. She had begun her studies as a biomedical science student, but was always aware that this vocational path was pre-determined by her family’s definition of success. Al Ansari decided to take the risk of changing her degree to business administration in order to fulfill her personal objectives. “I took risks in my thoughts, I took risks in my decisions, and I took risks in my plans, and that has opened a lot of doors and opportunities for me,” she explained. However, Al Ansari did acknowledge that such freedom of choice and deciding for oneself were not necessarily options that were open to all Qatari females.

Once an educated risk-taker has completed the first crucial steps towards achieving a successful business career, Al Ansari’s final piece of advice was to differentiate oneself from the surrounding competition. She argued that it was of vital importance to “market yourself, position yourself, and brand yourself,” and focus on a particular segment of the market. “I chose the women’s segment in Qatar. I want to empower them, I want to guide them, and I want to enable them,” she said. Qatari males represent 68 percent of the Qatari labor force, while Qatari women represent only 32 percent. Thus, Al Ansari argued that it was important for women to work harder and to take on more active roles in order to balance the labor market.

Gender imbalance aside, Al Ansari concluded by saying that “in Qatar, we are at the development phase. Whether you are a mother, a wife, a student, an employee, or a business owner, we have to contribute together to invent the economic scene in Qatar [by] investment in economic capital, education, environment, and health.”

Buthaina Al Ansari holds a Master’s Degree in Business Management & HR Strategic Planning from Qatar University, and a Master’s Degree in Human Resource Management from the American University of Cairo. As an entrepreneur and Chairperson of Qatariat T&D, she collaborates with innovative and best-in-class organizations to raise the benchmark and quality of expertise in Qatar. Qatariat services include—Training & Leadership, Media & Publishing and Business Consulting. In 2012, she received the L’Officiel Qatar’s Most Inspirational Arab Woman of the Year Award. She has been voted by CommsMEA as one the Top 50 Female Telecoms Executives, and for the past several years she has been named by ArabianBusiness.com as one of the 100 Most Powerful Arab Women.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

Youth in the Middle East, Working Group I
2014-11-20 09:00 - 2014-11-21 17:00
On November 20-21, 2014, in partnership with the youth-oriented social initiative organization, Silatech, CIRS launched the “Youth in the Middle East” research initiative with a two day working group meeting. The meeting was hosted by the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS) at the Georgetown University campus in Washington, DC, where participants gathered from various countries of the world and from a multitude of disciplinary backgrounds.

The participants discussed the need for greater definition of the factors that constitute “youth” as a distinct subset of society. Although they agreed that age and maturation were the common determining characteristics of youth, there was less consensus about the specific age ranges within which youth should be bracketed as a unit of analysis. Problematizing this further, they discussed how “youth” as a formative stage of life can differ dramatically depending on particular cultural contexts. In some cases, and especially for those with low or no income or those who inhabit conflict zones, young people are often prematurely obliged to take on adult roles and responsibilities, thus curtailing the notion of “youth” as experienced by their cohorts in other parts of the world. Rather than quantifying youth according to age brackets, the participants argued that the notion of youth could be considered as a fluid and inconsistent network of social relations. The participants highlighted the fact that youth cannot be analyzed as a homogenous category, but must be thought of as having a multitude of variants.

Although the topic of Middle Eastern youth was discussed from different theoretical and practical lenses, some key central themes emerged, including the fact that, in many instances, youth in the Middle East tend to face tough political and economic conditions. Local national youth in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council do not necessarily share the same economic hardships as the young economic South Asian migrants in the GCC, but they do share similar forms of political exclusion as experienced by their counterparts in other areas of the Arab world.

Since many countries of the Middle East are experiencing a demographic “youth bulge,” unprecedented numbers of young people are all vying for what little resources and opportunities exist. Broader economic structural issues were discussed in relation to the sustainability of the Arab development model and its failures. Many countries of the Middle East are rentier economies that exacerbate ongoing forms of political quiescence. The events of the Arab uprisings did much to highlight the faults associated with autocratic governance, but have not led to any major changes, leaving young people more aware of the problems that plague their nations, and, thus, ever more frustrated.

Access to the economic and political normative activities of society is denied to many in places where the social contract has been poorly adhered to, if at all. Exclusion, however, is context dependent, and each society fashions its own definitions of exclusion. In impoverished neighborhoods that are lacking in infrastructure and opportunities, Middle East youth groups actively create their own forms of distinct social networks that are, in many ways, more intimate and reliable than those of more affluent areas. Thus, such informal youth associations and marginal forms of participation mean that youth are not necessarily socially excluded from their immediate surroundings, but are more likely to be economically and politically excluded from the more “formal” social structures. Such class dimensions play a role in how youth experience their lives and their aspirations for the future, with many young people active in both formal and informal means of participation.

Whether in the public or private sectors, access to the privileges of the formal market is hindered crony capitalism and unfair political concessions, giving rise to increased informal practices among many Arab youths. Autocratic leaders have been benefitting from deregulation, even as they impose restrictions on local markets. The explosive mix of neoliberal policies and simultaneous authoritarian ones has resulted in an anti-competitive environment with little room for small and medium enterprises. This is why there are very few start-ups or entrepreneurial endeavors since there is little encouragement of creative business, skill development, or mobilization of human capital. Neoliberal reforms have benefitted only a small elite group of people, and has done little to improve the lives of the majority.

Because the informal sector operates largely outside of the formal economy, and is mostly extra-legal or illegal, there has been little research conducted into these ventures, including the gender dimension and how women fare in such environments. For the most part, in the academic and popular literature, youth issues tend to be viewed from the perspective of young males, concentrating on the condition of their welfare, education, and employment, with little attention directed at females and the challenges they face.

Increasingly, the vacuum left by failed state structures has been steadily filled by Islamic movements in many countries of the Middle East. These mostly grassroots institutions are becoming increasingly intertwined in youth’s daily lives, and have powerful influences on youth behavior. In order for young people to be directed towards formal channels of economic activity, the participants explained that there needs to be more effort made by the government, as well as businesses and the private sector, to invest in job creation and vocational training, especially for those with low levels of education. The participants advised, however, that there needs to be a fine balance between the valorization of manual labor and the encouragement of schooling and education.

The failed education model in many Arab states is a symptom of the failed state economic model, and often produces a vicious circle. The participants further discussed means of educational reform and how the Arab state promises employment as a reward for education. This often only leads to further frustration when educated youths come up against a variety of entry barriers to the labor market. There are few effective transitions from school to employment, and a severe lack of skills and behavioral competencies development. Further compounding this is the crisis of the social sciences; the Arab educational system rewards technical and technocratic career paths, with little encouragement of alternative careers in the humanities, arts, and cultural avenues. These disciplines are far from institutionalized at the school level, and even less so in the labor market, making the humanities unappealing and often gendered.

Other issues under discussion included Arab refugees and forced migration; nationalization policies across the GCC; and youth voices in public spaces as well online through a variety of information communication technologies and social media channels. In conclusion, the participants encouraged further investigation into broader theoretical questions involving the future of political Islam and democratization efforts. The participants offered a series of policy recommendations that could be implemented across the Middle East and North Africa, and ways of promoting resilience rather than violence through a variety of avenues, including cultural and educational activities, as well as means of removing entry barriers to the market by encouraging grassroots business opportunities and networks. ‎

See the Meeting Agenda
Read Participants Biographies
Read more about this Research Initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Osama Abi-Mershed, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies,Georgetown University
Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
David Beck, Silatech
Dawn Chatty, University of Oxford
Raj Desai, Georgetown University
Kristin Smith Diwan, American University School of International Service
Paul Dyer, Silatech
Sherine El Taraboulsi, University of Oxford
Nader Kabbani, Silatech
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Samer Kherfi, University of Sharjah
Adeel Malik, University of Oxford
Dionysis Markakis, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Jennifer Olmsted, Drew University
Anders Olofsgard, Stockholm School of Economics
Omar Razzaz, King Abdullah II Fund for Development of the Jordan Strategy Forum
Natasha Ridge, Sheikh Saud bin Saqr Al Qasimi Foundation
Michael Robbins, Princeton University
Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, Virginia Tech
Edward Sayre, University of Southern Mississippi
Emad Shahin, Georgetown University
Hilary Silver, Brown University
Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Tarik Yousef, Silatech

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

Neha Vora on "Impossible Citizens: Dubai's Indian Diaspora"
2014-12-01 18:00 - 19:00
On December 1, 2014, Neha Vora, Assistant Professor of Anthropology at Lafayette College, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue on the topic “Impossible Citizens: Dubai’s Indian Diaspora.” Much of the research she conducted was during the “boom” years of Dubai’s economic growth, when “Brand Dubai” was establishing the city as a commercial and tourism hub to attract international attention and investment. During this period, “the landscape of Dubai was shifting drastically […] moving away from the older South-Asian dominated downtown neighborhoods around the Dubai Creek […] and away from older forms of mercantalism and maritime trade,” towards a more corporate, westernized, and multinational capitalist enterprise.

The thrust of Vora’s research questioned the paradox of how the middle-class Indian communities of Dubai have a strong sense of belonging even though there are no certain paths to citizenship or permanent residence. “Indians have practically zero access to any form of permanency in Dubai. They cannot naturalize, or even gain permanent residency” due to the Kafala system that ties people to their employment visas and sponsors, Vora explained. Such a sense of belonging, she argued, occurs through “substantive,” or “unofficial” ideas of community that are not based on the technicalities of citizenship, but, rather on strong senses of historical and cultural affiliation. Because of the historical mercantile and cultural connections, many Indians see the Gulf states as an extension of India and not necessarily as a separate geographical and cultural entity. Indians in Dubai have access to the familiar signs of home including language, food, clothing, and cultural practices and trends.

Debunking the idea that migrants to the Gulf desire assimilation and citizenship, Vora argued that many of the middle-class Indian residents of Dubai see themselves as having temporary economic goals, which, once achieved, signal their return to the homeland. In an anthropological vignette, Vora introduced the audience to Rohit, one of her interlocutors and an architect and long-term Indian resident of Dubai. Even though he has lived for over three decades in Dubai, and it is where his children were born and raised, he still considers himself a temporary economic migrant. Describing Dubai as “an air-conditioned bus” that offers comfort, but is always in transit and thus an unstable place of residence, “Rohit in many ways exemplifies the Indian middle-class dream in Dubai. He had managed to accumulate wealth during his time in the Gulf, had improved the living conditions of his extended and immediate family, and was setting himself up for a comfortable retirement in India,” Vora reported. For many middle-class Indians, such as Rohit, expatriation to the Gulf states is seen as a sign of status and perceived as a privilege, but one that can be terminated at any time. Thus, economic migrants have adapted to feeling simultaneously settled and yet always transient.

Importantly, the middle-class Indian business communities of Dubai see themselves as actively contributing to local economic development and distinguish themselves from others who depend on state “welfare,” be they low-income South Asian laborers, Western expatriate professionals, or even local national beneficiaries of state subsidies. The middle-class Indians that Vora interviewed were keen to describe themselves as economic contributors to Dubai, and as “good self-enterprising foreign residents of the city, not bad welfare-reliant citizens,” she said.

However, despite many describing themselves as purely economic migrants with no desire for ties to the state, the majority of Indian businesspeople and professionals do in fact actively contribute to, and replicate state policies. “Middle-class and elite South Asians, for example, espoused certain neoliberal market values and liberal ideas about citizenship, while participating in non-liberal forms of patronage and exploitation that reproduce social stratification and forms of hierarchical citizenship among the Indian diaspora in Dubai,” Vora argued. By establishing business operations and hiring workers under the Kafala system, they actively promote UAE government’s policies by reproducing local and legal norms.

Vora concluded by explaining that even though Dubai still largely retains its South Asian character, things are changing fast. In Dubai’s effort to modernize older Indian mercantile neighborhoods of the city, and to attract a more “westernized” client, “rents had gone up, formerly lower-middle-class neighborhoods were being turned into luxury apartments, and Indians felt less job security than ever before,” she said. This rapidly changing environment has served to further unsettle the Indian communities that have been living and working for generations in the older areas of Dubai.

Neha Vora’s research focuses on citizenship and belonging within the Gulf Arab states, particularly among South Asian diaspora populations. In addition to a number of journal articles, Vora is the author of Impossible Citizens: Dubai’s Indian Diaspora, was published in 2013 by Duke University Press. A recipient of multiple awards and fellowships, she is currently in Doha working on a project that investigates the impacts of knowledge economy transformation and American branch campus expansion on Qatar.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

Re-Emerging West Asia Working Group I
2015-01-10 09:00 - 2015-01-11 17:00
On January 10-11, 2015, CIRS held the first Working Group under its research initiative on “Re-Emerging West Asia.” Included in the meeting were academics representing the South Caucasus states of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia, as well as scholars from Iran and Turkey. Over the course of two days, the participants discussed a number of relevant issues and identified existing gaps in the literature. Topics discussed during the meeting included, amongst other things, the new geopolitical competition in the South Caucasus and the role of external actors, energy diplomacy, soft power politics, and a variety of societal and ethnic dynamics in the region.

Opening the discussion, participants considered the changing geopolitical environment in the South Caucasus, the rise of competition between external powers, and the emergence of new actors. China has exhibited an increasing interest in expanding its role in the region, an example of which can be seen in the People’s Liberation Army’s agreement with the Armenian military. In Georgia, the Orthodox Church has been receiving Russian money, whereby this and other engagements with civil society demonstrate an interest by Russia to shape domestic policies in its neighborhood. Pipeline politics have also encouraged political and financial connections between Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan in influencing the regional geopolitical competition. While scholarship on the region has tended to view the North and South Caucasus as two distinct areas, Working Group participants suggested that these regions share similar economic and political conditions. Additionally, cross-border and transnational connections such as the Lezgian population in southern Dagestan and northern Azerbaijan continue to draw the involvement of external actors like Russia.

Between the Persian Gulf states, the Middle East, and the Southern Caucasus, economic factors and regional crises may provide comparative points for academic consideration. Comparisons can be drawn between the rentier dynamics in Azerbaijan and the Gulf states. Similarities in governance have also led scholars to speculate whether an event similar to the Arab Spring could take place in Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, one should be cautious when assuming too much similarity between these two regions, as the historical influences shaping their political pathways have been quite distinct. On the issue of religion and ethnicity, Azerbaijan views “Muslim identity” as a threat to its ethnic identity whereby in the case of Georgia, religiousness emerged as a countermovement to Sovietism.

Such sentiments have allowed movements such as the Gulen schools in Central Asia and the South Caucasus states to flourish in receptive societies. Fethullah Gulen’s Islamic movement became active in the 1980s when Turkey entered its liberal economic phase. In 1992, shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Gulen-inspired businessmen and teachers opened their first school in Azerbaijan followed by another in Kazakhstan. The opening of such schools came at a time when several Central Asian and South Caucasus states had a dire need for better quality education, which the secular curriculum of the Gulen schools provided. Prior, to the demise of the Gulen movement’s relationship with the AK party in Turkey, Turkish foreign policy was aligned with Gulen’s vision, perceiving of it as one of the best representations of Turkish soft power in the region. The schools led to the creation of an elite community that was proficient in Turkish and sympathetic to a moderate Islamic ideology, creating significant educational and societal connections between the two regions.

Conventionally, Turkey’s shift in foreign policy in regards to soft power has focused on the AKP’s engagement of state and non-state actors in the Balkans and the broader Middle East. Little is mentioned in soft power literature that focuses on Turkey’s soft power activities in the South Caucasus. Another research gap is that while there are many studies focusing on soft power and non-state actors, more work needs to look at state actors’ effect on soft power. Such studies should focus on the construction of foreign policy narratives, political values and cultural exchanges. Moreover, the subjects of soft power should be better studied in terms of their attraction to soft power, the limitations soft power holds and the relationship between soft and hard power. Participants problematized the difficulty in studying Turkey’s soft power in the South Caucasus considering the differences that exist from one country to another. For instance, there has been a level of resistance to Turkish soft power in Central Asia due to the Islamic undertones it holds.

In terms of hard power, Turkey utilized its role as an energy transit state to sell gas to European markets. Discussant argued that Turkey’s centrality and its geopolitical position as an energy hub has led it to have a more streamlined trading philosophy. Yet, one of the main components of an energy hub requires it to have an open and well-regulated market, something that the AKP party struggles with considering their strong emphasis on trade centrality. Energy was also used a political tool in Azerbaijan and Georgia. In the 1990s, the major goal for energy diplomacy was the implementation of pro-western policies and the consolidation and promotion of support for the regime, a strategy that was only successful up until the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Participants outlined several emerging trends that needed further study, such as Azerbaijan’s economic relationship with East Asia, the possibility of supplying energy to Iran and Iraq and future transit options for the South Caucasus with the newly proposed Nabucco pipeline.

Discussants observed that US policy towards regional development in the South Caucasus has deprived Iran from playing its natural role in the region and expanding its interaction with neighboring states. Based on the developments that took place after the formation of the Islamic Republic, we can see different discourses in Iranian foreign policy towards the Caucasus and mutual perceptions that arise from both the Iranian and Azerbaijani sides. From an Iranian viewpoint, the lesson that was learnt from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is that without the engagement of Russia, security issues can rarely be solved. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, despite the common culture and mutual past shared between Iran and Azerbaijan, relations between the two countries have remained strained over the situation of Azeris in Iran. The Azeris constitute a significant part of the population in Iran, however Azeri ethnic identity and the use of Azeri language, alongside other ethnic languages, has not been taught or practiced in schools in Iran. In return, the Azerbaijani state has counteracted these efforts by embarking on a historical mission to create a national awakening in order to understand their identity and embrace their independence from Iran. Discussants questioned to what extent is the salience of the Iranian-Azeri relationship contingent on the political relations, considering that the ethnic dimension only reappears when relations become strained between the two countries.

In the case of the South Caucasus states, post-Soviet Armenia has been characterized by crime and corruption which have allowed a few businesses to gain exorbitant amounts of power. These oligarchs are closely linked to the state. Selected individuals and companies act as ‘commodity-based cartels’, controlling the export and import rights for key products such as sugar, oil, alcohol and cigarettes. In return these oligarchs deliver to the state assured ballots and votes. Trade embargoes and closed borders have allowed for the corruption of Armenia’s economy and the strengthened the dominance of the oligarchs. Discussants observed that oligarchs in Armenia enter parliament for status and immunity, not understanding the potential power they may have in drafting legislation or by impeding the law. Moreover, more scholarly interest should focus on comparisons of Georgia and Armenia considering their similar variables but radically different political reform strategies.

See the working group agenda

Read participant biographies

Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Hamid Ahmadi, Institute for Middle East Strategic Studies

Haya Al Noaimi, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Leila Alieva, University of Oxford

Meliha Benli Altunışık, Middle East Technical University

Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Bayram Balci, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Michael B. Bishku, Georgia Regents University

Richard Giragosian, Regional Studies Center

Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Elaheh Koolaee, University of Tehran

Alexander Kupatadze, University of St Andrews

Jeffrey Mankoff, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Dionysis Markakis, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Gareth Winrow, Independent Research Analyst and Consultant

Article by Haya Al-Noaimi, Research Analyst at CIRS

CIRS Presents Abdullah Al-Arian's New Book on the Muslim Brotherhood
2015-01-13 18:00 - 19:00
On Tuesday, January 13, 2015, CIRS hosted a book launch and reading by Abdullah Al-Arian, Assistant Professor of History at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar. Answering the Call: Popular Islamic Activism in Sadat’s Egypt, published by Oxford University Press in 2014, “examines the means by which the Muslim Brotherhood was reconstituted during Anwar al-Sadat’s presidency. Through analysis of structural, ideological, and social developments during this period in the history of the Islamic movement, a more accurate picture of the so-called ‘Islamic resurgence’ develops-one that represents the rebirth of an old idea in a new setting.

When revolutionary hero Gamal Abdel Nasser dismantled and suppressed Egypt’s largest social movement organization during the 1950s, few could have imagined that the Muslim Brotherhood would not only reemerge, but could one day compete for the presidency in the nation’s first ever democratic election. While there is no shortage of analyses of the Muslim Brotherhood’s recent political successes and failures, no study has investigated the organization’s triumphant return from the dustbin of history.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s success in rebuilding its organization rested in large part on its ability to attract a new generation of Islamic activists that had come to transform Egypt’s colleges and universities into a hub for religious contention against the state. Led by groups such as al-Gama’ah al-Islamiyyah (The Islamic Society), the student movement exhibited a dynamic and vibrant culture of activism that found inspiration in a multitude of intellectual and organizational sources, of which the Muslim Brotherhood was only one.

By the close of the 1970s, however, internal divisions over ideology and strategy led to the rise of factionalism within the student movement. A majority of student leaders opted to expand the scope of their activist mission by joining the Muslim Brotherhood, rejuvenating the struggling organization, and launching a new phase in its history.

Answering the Call is an original study of the history of this dynamic and vibrant period of modern Egyptian history, giving readers a fresh understanding of one of Egypt’s most pivotal eras.” Read more from Oxford University Press.

Abdullah Al-Arian received his doctorate in History from Georgetown University. He holds a Master’s degree in Sociology of Religion from the London School of Economics and his BA in Political Science from Duke University. He is co-editor of the Critical Currents in Islam page on the Jadaliyya e-zine. He is also a frequent contributor to the Al-Jazeera English network and website. His first book, entitled Answering the Call: Popular Islamic Activism in Sadat’s Egypt was published by Oxford University Press in 2014. In fall 2014, he was the Carnegie Centennial Visiting Fellow at the University of Denver’s Korbel School of International Studies.

CIRS Presents Suzi Mirgani Film Screening
2015-01-15 12:30 - 13:30
On January 15, 2015, Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications, delivered a Focused Discussion and film screening of her short film “Hind’s Dream.” The screening was followed by a discussion with the writer and director and members of the film’s cast and crew, including Georgetown University in Qatar students Athanasios Sardellis, Razan Al Humaidi, and Haya Al Romaihi. “Hind’s Dream” premiered at the 2014 Abu Dhabi Film Festival. It was also screened as part of the “Made in Qatar” section of the Doha Film Institute’s 2014 Ajyal Film Festival where it won an award for “artistic vision and poetic screenwriting.”

Mirgani outlined how the film reflects the history, modernity, and folklore of Qatar. The film depicts a lonely Bedouin girl as she wanders through a desert landscape long before the discovery of hydrocarbons, which would eventually make Qatar one of the richest countries in the world. Only a few decades ago, Qatar was settled by nomadic tribes who lived a harsh and frugal existence in the open desert, hunting for food and ever searching for sources of water. It was only towards the end of the twentieth century that the country’s natural wealth was fully exploited, transforming it into colossal economic wealth to be reflected in the urban landscape in one of the fastest modernization and urbanization projects the world has ever seen. This rapid overhaul of traditional lifestyles has had a jarring effect on those who still remember the simplicity and isolation of desert existence.

The film presents a tangled landscape of dream and reality, where Hind has a vision of the future as told by an oracle/genie: a common motif in Arab fairy tales. Unbeknownst to her, Hind straddles two radically different worlds—old and new and reality and dream—at the cusp of the new century and a changing world. Beneath the barren desert of Hind’s reality, brews the thick black matter of her subconscious—and just like the bubbling oil in the gas fields around her, rises to the surface in this dreamscape.

The massive infrastructural changes taking place in the Gulf are usually represented in how they affect economic and geopolitical power, and are dealt with in “official” terms whether through academia or the media. These societal transformations are rarely dealt with in terms of the psychological impact of how urban and societal changes in the desert affect the individual. In order to explore these psychological influences, the film depicts the fluid concepts of “time” and the “subconscious,” and how such shifts can have a lasting—and perhaps jarring—effect on ways of thinking.

Producers of the film included Haya Al Romaihi, Dwaa Osman, Suzi Mirgani, Rodney X Sharkey, and Julietta Mirghani. The principle actors were Asli Altinisik and Athanasios Sardellis, while the film’s poetry was translated into Arabic by Haya Al Romaihi and recited by Razan Al Humaidi. Also assisting with the production of the film were Arwa Elsanosi, Salman Ahad Khan, and Badr Rahima.

The film is also screening at the Imagine Science Film Festival in Abu Dhabi on February 20, 2015.

Read more at Al Bawaba.

CIRS Launches Book on Food Security in the Middle East
2015-01-19 18:00 - 19:00
On January 19, 2015, CIRS, held a book launch and signing for the recently released volume on Food Security in the Middle East (Oxford University Press, 2014) edited by Zahra Babar, Associate Director for Research at CIRS, and Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications. The launch was hosted by Shelley Ford, Manager of the Georgetown SFS-Qatar Bookstore.

The book provides empirical case studies of Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Egypt, Yemen, the Gulf States and Iran, with special attention to how these countries have been affected by the events of the Arab uprisings and rising food prices following the global economic crisis of 2007-2008. Some of the major themes examined include the ascent and decline of various food regimes, urban agriculture, overseas agricultural land purchases, national food self-sufficiency strategies, distribution networks and food consumption patterns, and nutrition transitions and healthcare. Collectively, the chapters represent highly original contributions to the disciplines of political science, economics, agricultural studies, and healthcare policy, and reflect the increasing urgency of policy and public debate in this subject.

“Everyone agrees that access to food is one of the most basic human rights. But in reality, food has become politicized. What’s more, unlike health care, education, or housing, food has evolved into a security issue,” said book editor and contributing author, Zahra Babar.

She continued, saying: “Unlike certain parts of the developing world, the Middle East is not known as a region that is facing critical famine or starvation. However, it is one of the least self-sufficient regions in the world for obvious reasons, such as water scarcity, but also for some less obvious reasons, such as land reform that impacts sufficiency. In the GCC in particular, huge migration patterns have outpaced food sufficiency and will likely continue to do so, so this is an issue that is far more complex than some might imagine.”

Director of CIRS, Dr. Mehran Kamrava, also contributed to the newly published volume. He said: “We hope this book sets a base of understanding for the full breadth of food security issues, to benefit the work of scholars, researchers, practitioners and policy makers. There hasn’t been an in depth examination of the social and political issues around food sovereignty and the availability and security of food supplies in the Middle East, and this book is an invaluable tool in understanding some of these critically important questions.”

Suzi Mirgani, co-editor of the book, says that the body of work in this volume reflects a new approach to food security. “Current food security issues are shifting from a largely economics-dominated model where the debate centered on macro-level issues of international development to one where sociopolitical factors are becoming increasingly active in how food is conceived, valued, and distributed as a human right, rather than a market force. This book is an attempt to engage with this new paradigmatic shift.”

“This book is a fresh look at the challenges and opportunities associated with food security faced by the Middle East. The thorough treatment of a broad range of topics from trade to self-sufficiency, and from nutrition to the supermarket revolution and emerging dietary habits, make it a truly unique read,” said Dr. Julian A. Lampietti of The World Bank.

The chapters in this volume, published by Oxford University Press and C. Hurst & Co., grew out of a two-year research initiative held under the auspices of CIRS, and includes contributions from 25 leading experts in food security issues from top universities around the world.

Healthcare Policy and Politics in the Gulf Working Group II
2015-02-08 09:00 - 17:00
On February 8, 2015, CIRS held its second working group on the Healthcare Policy and Politics in the Gulf research initiative in Doha. Participants gathered for the second time to discuss their research findings and obtain feedback from their fellow working group members. The topics discussed during the day covered a wide range of healthcare issues including the historical transformation of health services in the Gulf region to the status of mental health and substance abuse issues that have arisen as a result of changing lifestyle patterns.

The historical overview provided on the transformation of healthcare in the Gulf region showcased four distinctive phases. A common denominator in the situation of healthcare prior to the 1950s amongst the six Gulf states was the role of American and Dutch missionaries in setting up hospitals and health services. Discussants emphasized the fact that the missionaries’ efforts were not intended to be civilizing force but were an extension of the British presence in the region meant to supplement the limited health services already available. Between the 1950s and 2000s, wealth generated by the oil revenues coming from the region invigorated the study and practice of medicine within departments in universities. In the case of Saudi Arabia, several health structures existed in parallel with one another, however, the annual Hajj pilgrimage forced the state to centralize healthcare efforts and create a unified system that would deal with the health epidemics that eventually arise from such events. Currently, the health sector in the Gulf is in need of reform due to the paternalistic feelings the states hold toward the provision of healthcare. Discussants argued that a severe lack of medical educational institutions exist in the Gulf, which is reflective in the quality of physicians and medical services being provided in the region. Moreover, the role of the private sector is in need of further study as there is no explanation as to why patients are shifting from public to private healthcare institutions.

In terms of human resources in the health sector, GCC countries seem to struggle with the workforce not being home grown. The UAE is a unique case whereby data has shown that the nationalities of the doctors practicing within the country encompass 110 different countries. Aside from data records on manpower in the health sector, data collection in the Gulf remains to be sporadic and imprecise. No routine data collection for the WHO exists at the moment, whereby actual data acquired is mere estimates given by hospitals. Also, a more standardized process for recruitment of physicians is necessary because it imposes essential safeguards and helps establish doctors in the region. Revalidation processes have been put into practice recently by the Qatari government to assess the competency of physicians practicing and to identify the quality of work being provided. In the case of the non-physician workforce, the affluent lifestyle enjoyed by many locals in the Gulf is a deterrent to entering the healthcare sector when a socioeconomic need does not exist. Non-physician positions such as nursing or technical staff are often hired from abroad due to the lack of medical institutions that train individuals in these professions. However, these conditions are gradually changing as both Qatar and Oman have recently opened nursing colleges to train the local and expatriate population based on the hiring needs of the local health sector. Participants questioned whether the lack of nationals in the health sector can be attributed to structural limitations of demography and whether the establishment of medical schools can be considered an integral part of the state-building process.

Healthcare in the Gulf region remains to be a political notion. Provision of free healthcare constitutes a facet of the social contract that is provided alongside education and housing by the Gulf ruling families. The lack of non-state actors such a political or civil groups means that healthcare, as a policy, is rarely debated from a bottom to top approach.

In the case of other countries in the region, such as Lebanon, non-state actors and civil society groups provide a good reference loop and prevent policies from becoming ad hoc. In 2015, $42.9 billion was spent collectively on healthcare by the Gulf states, indicating a dire necessity for development in the healthcare structure. A further exploration into the process of policy-making in healthcare is necessary. The rapid modernization faced by many Gulf societies has created a myriad of both mental and physical diseases as a result of unhealthy and affluent lifestyles. Additionally, the high percentage of expatriates within most GCC states impact healthcare policies dramatically because data does not always differentiate between local and non-local populations. As a result, diseases such as obesity, often associated with the local population, can seem to be epidemics even though the overall percentage of people diagnosed as obese is small comparatively, when the expatriate population is accounted for in the data gathering.

Examples of chronic lifestyle diseases that have recently emerged in the region as a byproduct of affluence and rapid modernization are cardiovascular diseases, diabetes and obesity. The profile of such diseases that have emerged alongside the changing lifestyles in the Gulf showcase the lack of exercise and high-fat diet as emerging trends in chronic diseases. Participants tried to quantify the chronic disease profile of the GCC, in comparison with other high and middle-income countries, using OECD base-line data. In addition to previous studies, the data showed that major depressive disorders and road injuries were the leading causes of a disability adjusted lifestyle in comparison to worldwide standards. Nonetheless, more health awareness campaigns are necessary in the Gulf because there seems to be a high level of societal ignorance towards the impact of chronic diseases on life expectancy rates. Awareness campaigns must also extend to mental health issues, whereby the percentage of people who require mental help and actively seek it constitute only 25% of the population. Additionally, the problem with mental health care providers is that they often have to be the primary, secondary and tertiary care providers instead of mental health clinics and support groups.

In terms of substance-use disorders in the Gulf region, the changing patterns in education and family structure have all contributed to an ‘urban drift’ amongst the youth population, who often find themselves unable to belong and relate to their societies. Such sentiments in youth can be problematic because it can lead to self-medication in the form of consuming excessive amounts of alcohol or the use of recreational drugs. Opinions on substance-abuse disorders in the Gulf region often oscillate between the two polar opposite views of approaching it as an immorality or as a disease. Existing scholarship explores the relationship between availability of substances and the level of drug usage however, it was argued that there should be an evolving mechanism that liberalizes some of the less harmful substances in society to combat the prevalence of more detrimental drugs.

Noteworthy to mention is the situation of the healthcare system in the Gulf which has become multi-tiered, primarily due to the lack of proper population health need assessments, including short-term health solutions for low-skilled workers. Even though the Gulf region has attained significant social and economic achievements in a short span of time, healthcare policies are still centered more on curative health and not enough on protective and preventive measures. Discussants argued that the Gulf states spending on healthcare is below average, by WHO standards, which is reflective in the ratios of physicians to residents and number of beds per population. Moreover, in terms of policy, different health policies exist within the healthcare structure for different patients within society. For instance, GCC legislation requires employers to buy health insurance that covers their expatriate workers. However, the insurance plans often only cover basics in healthcare, in comparison to the local population which receives the high-end health services available.

See the working group agenda
Read participant biographies
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Samir Al Adawi, Sultan Qaboos University College of Medicine
Haya Al Noaimi, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Mohamad Alameddine, American University of Beirut
Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Suhaila Ghuloum, Hamad Medical Center
Cother Hajat, Emirates Cardiac Society; UAE University
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Nabil Kronfol, Lebanese Healthcare Management Association; Center for Studies on Ageing
Albert Lowenfels, New York Medical College
Ravinder Mamtani, Weill Cornell Medical College in Qatar
Dionysis Markakis, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
David Rawaf, Imperial College London; St. George’s Hospital Medical School
Salman Rawaf, Imperial College London
Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Article by Haya Al-Noaimi, Research Analyst at CIRS

Jeremy Koons CIRS Faculty Research Workshop
2015-03-08 09:00 - 17:00
The research of Jeremy Koons, associate professor of philosophy at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar (GU-Q), was featured recently in a CIRS Faculty Research Workshop about his co-authored book manuscript Unity Without Uniformity: A Synoptic Vision of the Normative and the Natural. The full day event, held March 8, 2015, included 11 participants from Europe and the greater Middle East region.

The manuscript, co-authored by Koons and Michael P. Wolf, associate professor at Washington and Jefferson College, draws on the pragmatist tradition of philosophers Wittgenstein and Sellars to defend an alternative conception of normative discourse. It also draws on other elements of the pragmatist tradition, stretching from philosophers Peirce to Brandom, to show how normative claims are constrained and how this constraint, combined with the way in which normative claims are accountable to reason and argumentation, prevents any fall into relativism.

The CIRS Faculty Research Workshop is a closed-door, one-day seminar that brings together select renowned scholars for a focused discussion on a GU-Q faculty member’s book manuscript that is in its final stages of development. All participants receive the entire manuscript in advance of the meeting and each scholar leads a focused group discussion on an assigned chapter.

This research workshop featured a talented group of esteemed philosophers who specialize in Sellarsian and pragmatist philosophy. Participants engaged in a series of structured brainstorming sessions that led to a critical and thorough discussion of the book manuscript.

Participant Niklas Möller, associate professor in philosophy at the Royal Institute of Technology (KTH) in Stockholm, Sweden, said “ever since I first read [Brandom’s book] Making It Explicit, I have felt the need for a serious attempt at addressing moral normativity from a socio-pragmatist perspective. And now you are doing exactly that (and more), which I find to be a very exciting project indeed. I think you are doing something very important and impressive, and I am happy to have been invited to engage with the text.”

Attendees included Bana Bashour and Ray Brassier, American University of Beirut; Erhan Demircioglu, Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Turkey; Anjana Jacob, GU-Q; Daniele Mezzadri, United Arab Emirates University; Niklas Moller, The Royal Institute of Technology in Sweden; Jim O’Shea, University College of Dublin; John Ryder, American University in Ras Al Khaimah, United Arab Emirates; Matthew Silverstein, New York University in Abu Dhabi, UAE; Lucas Thorpe, Boğaziçi University, Istanbul; and Jack Woods, Bilkent University, Turkey.

Koons received his Ph.D. in Philosophy from Georgetown University in 1998. He teaches a wide variety of philosophy courses on ethics (theoretical and applied), social and political philosophy, epistemology, philosophy of mind and language, metaphysics, and philosophy of religion. He publishes articles on ethics, epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of religion. His book, Pragmatic Reasons: A Defense of Morality and Epistemology, was published by Palgrave in 2009.

See the workshop agendaRead participant biographies

Unity Without Uniformity: A Synoptic Vision of the Normative and the Natural

Abstract

Our lives ineliminably involve the normative. We make moral judgments. Scientists and laymen alike make epistemic and methodological judgments (judging a theory as rational, a method as biased, and so on). We make prudential judgments. But we have to make the normative fit within our dominant, naturalist view of the world: in some sense, science offers a privileged account of what there is, and other disciplines cannot make claims incompatible with our scientific world-view. A longstanding challenge for philosophers has been to fit the normative within this naturalistic picture of the world.

Dominant naturalist approaches to this challenge try to fit normativity into our scientific world-view by showing how normative claims describe some aspect of physical reality. We argue that this approach is fundamentally misguided, and fails to do justice to the prescriptive (‘ought-to-be’ or ‘ought-to-do’) element of normative discourse.

Drawing on the pragmatist tradition of Wittgenstein and Sellars, we defend an alternative conception of normative discourse. On this conception, to make a normative claim (“You shouldn’t have done that”; “The study results were biased”; “Eating a ghost pepper is foolish”) is not to state a fact, not to make a descriptive claim, at all. Rather, such discourse serves a fundamentally action-guiding role: it prescribes behavior (or proscribes it), or recommends a course of action (or recommends against it), and so on.

Even though normative claims are not descriptive claims, such claims can be true, and indeed non-relatively true. Drawing on other elements of the pragmatist tradition, stretching from Peirce to Brandom, we show how normative claims are constrained by how the world is even though they are not in the business of describing this world. This constraint, combined with the way in which normative claims are accountable to reason and argumentation, prevents any fall into relativism.

Of course, once normative facts drop out of the picture, there is nothing left to offend against a scientific world-view. Thus, we defend not only the objectivity of norms, but also a robust version of naturalism which accords science privilege in describing how the world is and what it contains.

Finally, we show the various ways in which descriptive discourses—such as scientific and social-scientific discourses—and normative discourses mutually contribute to each other in fruitful ways. The result is a picture of normativity that is robust and truth-apt, sewn into a new take on the naturalist tradition.

Victimization or Empowerment? The Case of Saudi Literature
2015-03-10 12:30 - 13:30
Amira El-Zein, Associate Professor at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar and the 2014-2015 CIRS SFS-Q Faculty Fellow, delivered a CIRS Focused Discussion on “Victimization or Empowerment? The Case of Saudi Literature” on March 10, 2015. The lecture focused on several works authored by Saudi female novelists published outside of Saudi Arabia in places like Beirut, Casablanca, and Cairo. El-Zein examined works including Al-Firdaws Al Yabaab (The Barren Paradise) by Leila al-Juhni; Jahiliyyah (Ignorance) and Hind Wa L-Askar (Hind and the Soldiers) by Badriyyah al-Bishr; and Tawq Al Hamam (The Dove’s Collar) by Raja Alem.

In recent years, Saudi Arabia has experienced an increase in female-authored literary fiction, despite the odds. These writings are significant, El-Zein explained, in their facility to carve a space, and indeed flourish, within highly restrictive cultural settings, or, what she calls, a “fundamentalist milieu.” Regardless of the fictive nature of the writing, these works can be considered contemporary cultural documents that question the rigid patriarchal system of knowledge upon which modern Saudi Arabia is founded.

Despite women’s general experiences of powerlessness within the institutional framework of modern Saudi Arabia, discourses about women take a paradoxically central role among the most powerful religious and political entities that all compete to be ordained as “the best supervisor of the moral order in the public sphere,” El-Zein said. In order to highlight these alternative literary testaments of Saudi Arabian life, she notes: “I analyze this conservative perspective through novels, as I consider them important accounts of the Saudi individual’s predicament in both the public and the domestic spheres.”

Through the intertextual juxtaposition of past and present, authors such as Raja Alem and Leila al Juhni situate modern Saudi Arabia within a historical continuum. The significance of this literary strategy alludes to the idea that seemingly entrenched contemporary ideologies have not always held sway, and that existing social, political, and religious infrastructures can be considered unstable and fleeting. In her work, “Alem’s message is that there have been periods of time when women in the kingdom were relatively better off than today, and when segregation between sexes wasn’t enforced as it is today,” El-Zein explained. By grounding contemporary political and religious infrastructures within a historical perspective, the authors reveal them to be brief moments in the long history of the civilization. Through such an empowering writing technique, the authors manage to destabilize contemporary power relations by suggesting that change is not only possible, but inevitable. El-Zein proposes that “through intertextuality, Alem and al-Juhni reclaim history and religion rather than attack them. They look at them, not as ideologies, but rather as emblematic institutions that have been manipulated as ideologies in order to maintain the existing powers.”

In conclusion, El-Zein illustrated how these texts are intricate and complicated, and proposed paying close attention to the novels in order to detect their many defiant qualities that are not immediately apparent. “A first reading of the texts,” she said, “unveils Saudi women as helpless and subdued, and concludes that these texts are victimization texts. A second close reading, however, that is more inquisitive and probing uncovers a different image, that of empowered women.”

Amira El-Zein is author of Islam, Arabs, and the Intelligent World of the Jinn and co-editor of Culture, Creativity and Exile. She translated several French authors into Arabic such as J.M.G Le Clézio, André Malraux, and Antonin Artaud. Her translation of the Palestinian poet, Mahmud Darwish, was nominated for the Pen International Prize of translation. Her poetry was chosen to be included in the United Nations’ Book of Poetry for 2015.

During her fellowship, El-Zein is working on a project titled, “Contemporary Saudi Literature: The Grueling Adaption to Modernity.” The research argues that contemporary Saudi literature conveys the dilemma of Saudi society torn between fascination with everything Western and obligations to unbending traditions. The question of tradition in its extremely arduous adaptation to rapid changes has led to a profound malaise, loss of identity, and confusion, which are characteristic of neocolonialism. The research will interpret several novels and poems that mirror the ordeals Saudi people experience when they challenge the harsh rules of the establishment. Comparisons will be made between Saudi literature and that written by other authors in the Gulf.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

The Gulf Family: Working Group I
2015-03-14 09:00 - 2015-03-15 17:00
On March 14-15, 2015, CIRS held its first working group on “The Gulf Family” where scholars convened to discuss both historical and current issues that affect the Gulf family structure. In contrast to the literature on the family in the greater Middle East, significant gaps in scholarship still exist in relation to the dynamics of the Arab Gulf family. Five grant proposals were awarded to various scholars to conduct fieldwork and original research on topics related to the Gulf family. In conjunction to the grant awards, CIRS held a two-day working group to discuss issues such as tribalism, mixed marriages, and the effects of religious education on family dynamics amongst other topics. Alongside the five grant awardees who presented their research proposals and preliminary findings, working group participants discussed issues currently facing the region.

The Gulf family has witnessed an immense amount of change over the past sixty years. In understanding the historical importance of the Gulf family one has to structure a comprehensive narrative that includes the different tribes and ethnicities which have resided in the region. By challenging the idea that the Gulf family is contingent on consanguinity for its existence, modern discursive narratives can be further disseminated. This illustrates the various historical constructions around nationalism, modernization and class. Housing and rent were examined in an effort to understand how space related to the family in the past and how physical change impacts the structure of the family living within households.

Underlying the presence of the Gulf family lie the notions of tribalism and asabiyya (tribal solidarity). In the Gulf, tribalism is a central feature in understanding the social dynamics prevalent in the region. The functional logic of the system uses kinship to explain solidarity through practice, which can be seen in expressions of tribal unity through literary, legal, political and media outlets. Discussants questioned to what extent was tribalism prevalent in family affairs and the significance of belonging to a tribe upon an individual’s identity. At present, the modern tribal identity is rarely expressed through the nomadic lifestyle it was once associated with, instead permeating societal sentiments and intellectual thought. However, in the case of Yemen, the impact of political and economic instability of the state has pressed citizens to rely upon their respective tribes to provide necessary services such as electricity and water. Rising prices of fuel and declining subsidies offered by the Yemeni government meant that citizens’ access to education and healthcare ultimately deteriorated. The permanence of the tribal order and solidarity in Yemen, amidst the state of political chaos, has helped maintain a sense order and organization within the country. Discussants later questioned the impact of tribalism on the nuclear family and the repercussions of re-tribalizing urban areas within the cities.

Tribalism has also had deeper ramifications on societal issues such as marriage. Amongst the local population, tribal inter-marriages are generally the norm. In the absence of a class system amongst locals in the Gulf, tribal lineage determines the social hierarchy present. In an effort to understand societal forces affecting the institution of marriage in the Gulf, discussants recognized the intensive structural transformations that the Gulf region has been undergoing in the past twenty years. As a result, consanguineous marriage has been undergoing changes, whereby data on Qatar shows mixed marriages are on the rise for men but on the decline for women. Previously, the rate of divorce amongst mixed marriage couples was much higher from 1985-2000 as compared to non-mixed marriages. However, in 2010-2013 the gap between mixed marriages and non-mixed marriages began to diminish. Discussants questioned the reversal of trend in divorce amongst the two groups of marriages hypothesizing the reasons to be increasing globalization, education and transnational flows.

Given the rising statistics on divorce in the Gulf, the legal systems’ negligence towards reforming child custody law has become increasingly problematic. Family law reforms have traditionally focused on the relationship between spouses, often neglecting the parent-child relationship that determines custody and guardianship. Case studies on Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have shown that further development on the concept of “best interest of the child” is in order. More specifically, Qatar has made efforts to promote the concept of “best interest” as a tool to reform custody determination whereas Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates chose to formulate guidelines for judges to follow in cases of custody determination.

While transitions within Gulf society have been taking place over the past decades, the impact of modernization efforts can be witnessed in the religious, linguistic, and educational aspects of family life. The formation of family life in the Gulf in itself is a religious act, encouraged by sunnah and hadith, which is often embraced by couples as a fundamental element to the marital relationship and their childrearing ways. Previous scholarship has explored the role religious education plays in women’s positioning within society. Theoretically, the rise of modern education was seen by scholars as a way to empower women into assuming roles within the public sphere. Yet, case studies have shown that the quality of education women were receiving tended to reproduce the traditional system and enforce gender segregation. Discussants also emphasized the rise of religious education within the household, whereby female Islamic preachers would conduct house visits in segregated spaces in an effort to educate women on relevant Islamic values to the home.

Islamic values within Gulf households have also hindered channels of communication between parent and child on more sensitive issues such as sexual and reproductive health education. As the median age of marriage is increasing, youth are increasingly confronted with their sexuality prior to marriage. The cultivation of shame rather than genuine guilt, especially within the family, is a byproduct of religious and tribal sentiments that dictate social relations in Gulf states. As a result, youth are expected to source their own information on sexual issues often resorting to the internet as an impartial source of education. However, the lack of sexual and reproductive health education amongst Gulf families raises youth’s vulnerabilities when confronted with issues such as rape, sexual harassment, and transmitted diseases. Parents often struggle with establishing open and honest channels of communication with their children, partially due to the linguistic barriers that bi-lingual families face and stigma attached with this sensitive topic. Discussants argued that religious teachings in fact encourage open discussion on such issues, within the scope of legally sanctioned marriage whereas, social pressure and familial inexperience constitute the biggest obstacles in the face of sexual health education.

See the working group agenda
Read the participants’ biographies
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Rogaia Abusharaf, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Nadwa Al Dawsari, Sheba Center for International Development
Sanaa Al Harahsheh, Doha International Family Institute
Haya Al Noaimi, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Barb Gillis, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Sebastian Maisel, Grand Valley State University
Dionysis Markakis, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Mohamed Mohieddin, Doha International Family Institute
Lena-Maria Möller, Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law
Sophia Pandya, California State University at Long Beach
Jihan Safar, College de France, Sciences-Po
Laura Sjoberg, University of Florida
Amira Sonbol, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Ali Kemal Tekin, Sultan Qaboos University
Valbona Zenku, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Article by Haya Al-Noaimi, Research Analyst at CIRS

The Politics of National Narratives: The Evolution of 'Revolution' in Egypt
2015-03-23 18:00 - 20:00
Laurie Brand, the Robert Grandford Wright Professor of International Relations and Middle East Studies at the University of Southern California, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue on “The Politics of National Narratives: The Evolution of ‘Revolution’ in Egypt” on March 23, 2015. The talk reflected some of the main themes presented in her recent book, Official Stories: Politics and National Narratives in Egypt and Algeria, including how ruling elites actively construct a national narrative for political purposes.

Brand described national narratives as collective stories, whether official or popular, that seek to define a country’s identity, history, and mission using particular historical events and heroes, and including purported collective cultural, linguistic, religious, or ethnic markers. As part of a broader study, Brand’s research examines the legitimizing role that national narratives play in regime maintenance, and questions how and why they may change. “I chose to look only at manifestations of an ‘official’ narrative. But even there, a narrative is multi-stranded, and can be quite complex because it includes not just the state’s version of national history, but also a range of values, aspirations, and identity elements,” she said.

In order to understand how national narratives are mobilized by state authorities, Brand explained that they are often employed as a relegitimizing force during times of contested succession or political rupture. National narratives involve “the creation of a ‘usable’ past; that is, the construction of a national history that can be mobilized, that can be channeled, and that can be used by a leadership for a demand, need, or a crisis in the present,” she argued. These narratives can be read in a variety of official and unofficial political, social, and cultural texts, whether through state proclamations, cultural texts the media, or the educational system, among many other outlets for imparting some form of collective instruction.

In particular, Brand analyzed traits of the official story of “revolution” in the case of Egypt, and noted that, since January 2011, many associate the concept of revolution with contemporary Egyptian events. However, the very concept of revolution has been integral to the Egyptian national narrative for well over a century, and, indeed, makes up the founding story of the Egyptian nation state as it emerged after July 1952. The language of revolution has been used throughout Egyptian political history as part of a legitimation strategy, especially during regime changes, whether through anti-colonial struggles, the Free Officers’ 1952 overthrow of King Faruq, or Anwar Sadat’s struggle to consolidate his rule after he succeeded Gamal Abd Al-Nasir. Even during the Mubarak era, fidelity to the 1952 revolution was regularly invoked during ceremonial speeches, but its importance began to wane as the regime moved farther and farther away from the 1952 revolution’s emphasis on economic and social justice to the implementation of neo-liberal economic policies.

In conclusion, Brand returned to the most recent invocations of the revolutionary narrative, and the struggles surrounding it. “The meaning of the term ‘revolution’ was constructed and re-constructed over time in Egypt,” and has evolved over the course of Egyptian history to take on different meanings, demonstrating that even if critical elements of such narratives are rescripted, the elements themselves remain central to the legitimation formulas of successive regimes or leaderships. With the overthrow of Mubarak and Morsi, and the coming to power of Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi, the Egyptian people have been confronted with several overlapping and conflicting narratives of revolution or political change—January 25 and/or June 30—through which they must navigate. “These issues are not simply of academic interest, but are very real battles that are very much a part of ongoing struggles today in Egypt and in other parts of the Middle East over the future of the political system,” she concluded.

Laurie A. Brand directed the University of Southern California’s Center for International Studies from 1997 to 2000, the School of International Relations from 2006 to 2009, and is currently the director of its Middle East Studies Program. Brand served as president of the Middle East Studies Association in 2004, and she has chaired its Committee on Academic Freedom since 2006. A four-time Fulbright scholar to the Middle East and North Africa, a Carnegie scholar 2008 to 2010, and a Rockefeller Bellagio writing residency fellow in fall 2012, she is the author of Palestinians in the Arab World (Columbia University Press, 1988), Jordan’s Inter-Arab Relations (Columbia University Press, 1994), Women, the State and Political Liberalization (Columbia University Press, 1998), Citizens Abroad: States and Emigration in the Middle East and North Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2006), and Official Stories: Politics and National Narratives in Egypt and Algeria (Stanford University Press, 2014).

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

The Future of Nile Cooperation
2015-03-25 12:30 - 13:30
Bart Hilhorst, a water resources specialist and former Chief Technical Advisor for the FAO project on the Nile basin, delivered a CIRS Focused Discussion on “The Future of Nile Cooperation” on March 25, 2015. The lecture centered on the complexities of water cooperation, with a focus on the Nile Basin. Hilhorst introduced the audience to these intricate issues by explaining that “water resources management is not a technical issue. Rather, quintessentially, it is a political issue. It determines who gets what and when.”

Since competition over scarce water resources is increasing at local, national, and regional levels, Hilhorst argued that “we need better tools to deal with these difficult, complex, and emotive issues of water resources management.” One of the tools he recommended was the “scenario approach,” which is a methodology that develops internally consistent and equally plausible stories that describe how the future might unfold. Hilhorst explained that “scenario thinking” is not to predict or to forecast. Rather, by examining the main driving forces in the external environment, there is a gradual understanding of what is driving the “system” and the underlying structural relations. This understanding is critical for making informed decisions. Importantly, scenario thinking takes a “big picture” approach to water resources management by encompassing the various stakeholders and their needs. Since regional water management often results in polarized perspectives, this approach helps to achieve an alignment of views between the various stakeholders, and to establish a common ground from which negotiations can emerge.

Hilhorst elaborated upon the application of scenario thinking to Nile cooperation among the eleven countries that share this valuable, yet somewhat scarce, water resource. “The Nile is a big name, and a long river, but it is a small river in terms of volume of runoff relative to the size of its basin,” he said. The countries through which the Nile flows have a number of developmental issues, including high demographic growth rates, poor infrastructure, and dependency on the Nile waters for most of their water and agricultural needs. Without effective north-south transport connections, there is little that links the eleven states as a group other than the Nile itself. Hence, direct common interests among the riparians are limited.

In order to address some of these overarching development issues, concerted efforts are ongoing to strengthen cooperation among the Nile riparians, including the “Nile Basin Initiative” that was established in 1999. At this point in time, however, the shape and dynamics of Nile cooperation are subject to a number of uncertainties. Will the international donor community continue its current level of support to the regional Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) centers? Can financing be mobilized for the large infrastructure investment projects that will increase the benefits accrued from the Nile waters? When can the NBI centers advance from transitional to permanent status? Will Egypt re-engage in the Nile discussions? It is especially within such dynamic and uncertain environments that scenario thinking thrives in its offering of possible solutions for plausible outcomes. In September of 2014, Hilhorst conducted a scenario exercise with a committee made up of key stakeholders including members of the Nile Technical Advisory Committee as well as representatives from both government and civil society groups.

Hilhorst concluded by highlighting the increasing man-made influences upon the Nile. He explained that, currently, “the Nile is transferring from a natural to a regulated river,” where various water management infrastructures and dams are being established along the length of the river in national attempts to benefit from its flow. Most of these projects are aligned to national development programs, and do not necessarily take into account the regional perspective. Yet, because many of these projects have increased the flood control, hydropower, and irrigation optionality of Nile resource management, they have created a situation wherein “the potential benefits of cooperation has increased dramatically,” for the entire Nile Basin. This, in turn, has sparked the need for increased regional cooperation, and so is a positive drive towards future integration between the nations of the Nile.

Bart Hilhorst has over twenty-five years of experience in land and water resources management, with a focus on transboundary rivers and forward thinking in natural resources development and use. He has extensive field experience in complex transboundary water projects in Africa and Asia, and served as a Chief Technical Advisor for FAO project “Information Products for Nile Basin Water Resources Management.” Hilhorst has particular knowledge of using scenario thinking to support strategy formulation for natural resources management, and to facilitate dialogue processes regarding complex water allocation challenges. He recently facilitated a comprehensive multi-stakeholder scenario process that investigated the complex water-agriculture-energy sector in the Aral Sea basin, and is currently involved in a scenario project on the ‘future of Nile cooperation’ for the Nile Basin Initiative. In February 2015 Bart Hilhorst completed a study on the status of GCC agro-investments in sub-Saharan Africa.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

The Digital Middle East:Working Group II
2015-04-11 09:00 - 2015-04-12 17:00
On April 11-12, 2015, CIRS held its second working group on “The Digital Middle East” research initiative in Doha. Participants gathered to discuss their research papers and obtain feedback from their fellow working group members. The topics discussed during the two days covered a variety of issues relating to the digital world across the region. Discussants provided critical feedback on each of the papers, and found linkages between the different subjects that are being addressed through this book project.

Scholars debated labor and productivity within the digital realm, and how increasingly social media users and content developers actually “work for free.” Observations centered on the fact that users and developers often overlap in social media. Through this “community of practice” both sets of actors are united in their skills exhibiting traits of egalitarian behavior in the digital sphere. In the context of the Middle East, developers usually have a dual role, whereby they engage in remunerated work during the day and then assume activist roles during the night, when they work for free. By doing so, developers often hope to create digital companies that are lucrative enough to sell as a whole, as opposed to selling only the product of their paid labor. In this case, the value of the developers’ labor is being captured by aggregators such as Facebook and Google. Discussants also suggested the need for further research exploring the overall economic impact of ICT in the region, and whether the internet can actually be translated into productivity outcomes. Even though the internet is fast become a universalizing process, the specifics of its relevance to the Middle East is yet to be fully studied.

Another element of discussion at the working group was how multi-modality in the digital sphere has led to changing behavior patterns in relation to the development of friendships and personal relationships in the Middle East. The nature and function of friendships have significantly changed as a result of instantaneous connections made online. Discussants observed behaviorisms such as de-individuation, or the erosion of self-awareness within a group setting, was becoming more prevalent as a result of new technologies. The advancement of technology and media has also acted as a catalyst for women’s political development, not only post-Arab Spring but also after the 1979 revolution in Iran. Even though technology has often facilitated women in advancing their rights within society, paradoxes still exist in the history of the region. For example, in Iran, women played an integral and active role in the Islamic revolution, yet afterwards were relegated to the private sphere and in their homes. Participants around the table offered alternative examples of female mobility through digital media, such as the case of the driving campaign for Saudi women and Palestinian women’s role fighting the occupation through the electronic intifada.

Issues of freedom of the internet and online censorship were raised in relation to state power. States have often greatly benefited from the digital environment as a domain to exert their power. When thinking of civic engagement and digital media, both fields and spaces suffer from being agnostic towards structure. To get past this agnosticism, one must develop an observable appreciation for infrastructure but at the same time, cultivate an understanding of the underlying technocratic issues that exist in digital media. Societal practices, norms and attitudes as communities of practice all must be utilized as tools in the promotion of digital democracy. Discussants noted the problematic nature of framing the Arab Spring as the instigator of change in the region, arguing that political internet processes predate that, as can be viewed in the case of Iran.

Additional areas of research at the working group elaborated on ethnographies showcasing lived experiences of ordinary citizens during the Egyptian revolution and their daily interactions with technology. Participants pushed for a more nuanced definition of mediation arguing that its application to media environments in the Middle East needed further justification.

Videogame development and gaming in the Middle East have played a pivotal role in the digital world acting as cultural artifacts and alternative spaces for contestation. Discoveries made by some of the authors showcased games as domains for role-play within a predefined model world. The global flows of gaming remain underexplored generally whereby game studies have traditionally focused on consumption and popularity in regions such as the US, Europe, and Japan heavily neglecting the Middle East. As a result, discussants in their written work tried to lay a theoretical framework in a broad historical and cultural context by exploring videogames as places of hybridization. It is interesting to note that many developers in the region are driven to develop videogames by personal motivations and not by economic interest.

In the case of intellectual property laws in the Middle East, and the Gulf region in particular, states often struggle with developing a legal framework that deals with issues of copyright and piracy. Discussants observed that several GCC states have attempted to “domesticate” foreign intellectual property laws in an effort to protect traditional knowledge rights. Furthermore, GCC states have started to use intellectual property laws to their advantage by placing a heavy emphasis on digital archiving and protection of traditional knowledge and heritage.

General observations were made as to how Middle Eastern governments and societies were moving towards online platforms. Current data on e-governance in the GCC was showcased in an effort to show the similarities and differences amongst the Gulf states in their progress towards online governance. Results remarkably showed that the smaller less affluent states of Bahrain and Oman had better e-governance portal sites offering a wide array of services for the general public. Data also showed that e-governance world rankings were difficult to maintain, as in the case of the UAE, without a proper all-encompassing digital structure. Additionally, citizens and recipients of e-governance services were often suspicious and untrusting of e-services arguing that cybercrime laws were not stringent enough to protect their information online. Similarly, the same was said for Gulf citizens’ experiences in e-commerce whereby many were reluctant when dealing with this new form of business dealings. Similarities and differences were drawn between the souk and e-commerce websites, however participants argued that the establishment of malls in the region should be considered as the intermediary between the two commercial examples.

See the working group agenda
Read participant biographies
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Ilhem Allagui, Northwestern University in Qatar
Haya Al Noaimi, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Jon Anderson, Catholic University of America
Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
John Downing, Northwestern University in Qatar
Muzammil M. Hussain, University of Michigan
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Joe Khalil, Northwestern University in Qatar
Gholam Khiabany, Goldsmiths University of London
Dionysis Markakis, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Vit Šisler, Charles University in Prague
Annabelle Sreberny, SOAS, University of London
Norhayati Zakaria, Universiti Utara Malaysia
Mohamed Zayani, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Valbona Zenku, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Article by Haya Al-Noaimi, Research Analyst at CIRS

China and the Middle East: Working Group Meeting I
2015-04-25 18:00 - 2015-04-26 18:00
On April 25-26, 2015, the first working group meeting of CIRS’ research initiative on “China and the Middle East” took place. A diverse, multi-disciplinary collective of scholars from China, the Middle East, the US, and elsewhere met in Washington, D.C., over the course of two days, to discuss the main features, trends, and implications of this multi-faceted relationship.

The foundations of China’s engagement with the Middle East have been economic in nature, and primarily based on the trade of energy commodities. As a result, the Middle East has assumed an important position in China’s global economic vision, which sees the region as a key part of its contemporary “Silk Road” flagship initiative, an effort to better connect China to the rest of Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. This economic relationship is evolving steadily. China is increasingly investing capital in the region, as for example in industry and infrastructure, rather than simply relying on the energy trade. Participants of the working group noted the potential of the shale gas revolution to alter the energy equation in the Middle East, with the US set to produce more gas than Saudi Arabia produces oil. China itself has its own substantial shale gas deposits. Another issue raised was China’s investment in green energy, currently the world’s leader, and the global implications of this. What will the above mean for China’s relations with the Middle East? The participants highlighted the need to fully interrogate the impact of China’s economic embedment in the region—in political, economic, and social terms.

An important consequence of this economic relationship has been the growth of a variety of socio-cultural connections between China and the Middle East. Chinese Muslims now reside across the Gulf, with some 200,000 Chinese citizens living in Dubai alone. As part of an Islamic education, a large number of Chinese Muslims study Arabic in China, but also abroad in Syria and Iran. Chinese Muslims have played a role in facilitating ties between China and the Middle East. Likewise, there is a sizeable Arab diaspora in China, who has emigrated to places such as Yiwu, a major Chinese trading hub. What is their impact as a community? Participants noted an increasing perception of China as a fertile ground for religious conversions, with anti-Shia bias taking ground as a result of the influence of Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi Islamic doctrine.

On the political level, China’s engagement of the Middle East is also undergoing significant changes. One area this is reflected is the increasing Chinese trend towards multilateral engagement. This as opposed to the bilateralism that has traditionally characterized China’s relations with Middle Eastern countries. Participants observed that China is increasingly looking to multilateral platforms to formalize cooperation with the Arab world, one example being the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), whose 2014 summit was held in Shanghai. The potential of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)-BRICS relations was also referenced, with discussants noting that while there are no formal ties currently, developments in this area could eventually have a profound impact. In political terms, one of the main variables affecting China’s engagement with the region has been the legacy of the Arab Spring of 2011. China has sought to maintain good relations with both established allies, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, but also with those countries undergoing domestic upheaval, such as Egypt and Syria. Here, the role of China as a “balancing” force in the Middle East is of relevance. Participants noted China’s ability to maintain positive relations with all the important regional actors simultaneously, although they claimed that this will become increasingly difficult in the future; one example raised was China’s 2011 veto of UN sanctions on Syria, which subsequently strained relations with Saudi Arabia and Turkey. China’s inherently pragmatic approach in the region was summarized by one participant as a case of “avoiding enemies, rather than having friends.”

In terms of the regional security architecture, China does not support absolute security for any one power in the region, rather it has sought a system that balances the interests of the various states. As a result, it has sought to encourage collective security arrangements. Yet China’s strategic stance in the region is undergoing change, becoming more pro-active as it consolidates its presence. Under President Xi-Jin Ping, China has adopted a regional security role for the first time, contributing towards maritime security, for instance. Participants argued that this will form an increasingly important area, noting that China’s role in the region has now entered a new phase. This was demonstrated during the Chinese Navy’s evacuation of Chinese citizens from Yemen in 2015, which underscored the increasing need for a physical presence in the region, to protect China’s interests. This reflects a broader evolution in the Chinese military presence in the region, which went from initially supporting construction projects and offering medical support, to now deploying combat units, as part of the UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan for example, as well as during antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.

The possibilities for Chinese and US cooperation were also discussed. Participants noted that while the US and China define regional “stability” in very different terms in the context of the Middle East, great power cooperation remains integral to China’s approach in the region. While the US remains the predominant security guarantor, China’s regional involvement will only grow, although to date it has largely been content to ‘free ride’ in terms of security commitments. As such, it is important to identify the areas where Chinese and US interests align. Here the impact of US attempts to contain China were discussed, through its support of India for example. The participants questioned the extent to which China is rallying against this containment in the Middle East, in terms of its Silk Road initiative, naval expansion, and so forth.

Yet overall, the participants highlighted the lack of an overarching Chinese “grand strategy” in the Middle East. In contrast to say Africa, no “white paper” for the Middle East has been formulated. Instead, they noted China’s posture is predominantly reactive rather than pro-active. This is exacerbated by the fact that China’s knowledge of the Middle East is limited in its depth. Participants highlighted the need to explore internal Chinese discussions about China’s role in the Middle East, in terms of academic and policy institutions for instance. And furthermore to examine the primary state mechanisms guiding Chinese-Arab relations—identifying the key institutional actors within China, their respective roles, and their mutual interactions, so to ascertain a deeper understanding of China in the Middle East.

See the working group meeting agenda
Read biographies of the participants
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Mohammed Al-Sudairi, Gulf Research Centre
Jon B. Alterman, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Jacqueline Armijo, Qatar University
Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Liao Baizhi, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations
Bing Bing Wu, Peking University
Manochehr Dorraj, Texas Christian University
John Garver, Georgia Institute of Technology
Barb Gillis, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Pan Guang, Shanghai Center for International Studies
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Dionysis Markakis, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
James Reardon-Anderson, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service
Joseph Sassoon, Georgetown University
Andrew Scobell, RAND Corporation
Jean-François Seznec, Georgetown University
Yitzhak Shichor, University of Haifa, and Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Degang Sun, Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University
Casimir Yost, Georgetown University

Article by Dionysis Markakis, Research Associate at CIRS

The Changing Security Dynamics of the Gulf: Working Group II
2015-05-13 09:00 - 2015-05-14 17:00
On May 13-14, 2015, CIRS held its second Working Group on the “The Changing Security Dynamics of the Gulf” research initiative. Academics gathered for the second time to discuss their research findings and gather opinions on their papers from their fellow working group members. The topics that emerged covered a wide range of issues such as the politics of succession in Gulf monarchies, the rise of ISIS, business and politics, and the emerging energy landscape.

Scholars debated the strengths and limitations of a succession model in Gulf politics. Research findings showed that in the case of Oman, despite the absence of a son or a publicly designated heir, the political mechanism in place allowed for senior elders to choose the next heir to the throne when a death occurs. In Saudi Arabia, succession tends to be a more complicated process, as sons in line could be skipped based on senior Saudi leaders’ choices. Participants asked for a broader analytical context in order to contextualize the two case studies and further explanation on the rapid pace of change taking place in Saudi Arabia. The United Arab Emirates’ behavior as a small state was also put into question. Due to the size and capacity of the Emirati army and air force, relative to other small states in the region, small state theory could not be applied to the UAE’s foreign policy decisions that encompass both soft and hard power. Participants speculated whether the generational change in power coincided with the distinctive shifts in foreign policy and how this contributed to the UAE’s ‘activist foreign policy’ within the region.

Undoubtedly, in the wake of the Arab uprisings in 2011, the Gulf regimes in power have been facing severe policy dilemmas. During the periods of 1980-2003, the three Gulf wars altered the positioning of the GCC states vis-à-vis Iran and Iraq and accelerated their integration into the Western military and security umbrella. The emergence of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the occupation of Iraq demonstrated how non-state violence was replacing inter-state conflict as the primary threat to regional security and stability in the Gulf. During the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the six GCC states provided varying degrees of political and logistical support. Policymakers were placed in the complicated position of having to balance their security relationship with the US against high levels of domestic opposition regarding the invasion. More recently, the threat to regional security posed by the Islamic State is confronting all the Gulf states. Saudi Arabia is particularly at risk from the ideological threat that ISIS presents. ISIS impacts both the internal and external security interest of the GCC, due to the existence of a network of IS cells within the Gulf states, and also as a result of the flow of Gulf nationals who are joining IS fighting forces.

In addition to the rise of ISIS, the United States’ perceived reluctance to intervene more aggressively in the Syrian civil war has also contributed to the GCC states taking on a more active role in regional security. At the current juncture there is an unprecedented willingness by GCC states to embrace military leadership in the region. Yet there is no coherent or coordinated response by the six states. The escalating ideological tensions between different states and the lack of trust and intelligence sharing amongst them have negatively impacted the development of a collective security architecture. From 2011 onwards we have witnessed a distinctive shift in the foreign policies of Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Participants at the working group suggested that this new form of interventionism displayed by some of the GCC states brought with it severe risks that could directly impact Gulf security. For example, GCC interventionism in North Africa has come with extensive financial commitments. Meeting this commitments and managing their relationships with North Africa may increasing pose a challenge to the GCC states particularly if oil prices continue to plummet.

The production of oil and shale gas in the United States as a result of fracking and horizontal drilling has had significant strategic implications for the energy landscape in the Gulf region. Participants hypothesized whether the United States’ changed energy outlook corresponded with a reduction in its military and strategic engagement in the Middle East. India, for example, has an overwhelming dependence on oil from the Gulf, whereby oil imports from the Gulf constitute eighty percent of their annual need. Moreover, approximately $32 billion in annual remittances are sent back to India every year from the six million expatriates that live in the Gulf region. Despite these strong energy and commercial ties, India has been significantly absent in its engagement with the Gulf region, choosing instead to become increasingly closer to the United States and the European Union. Nevertheless, India is a rising, albeit reluctant power in the region.

Diversification of economies in the Gulf has been a long stated goal for the Gulf Cooperation Council, but in light of falling oil prices, the need has become even more essential. In fact, economic diversification may be difficult in the Gulf due to the protective business system in existence. In the majority of the six Gulf states the business communities have a history of political influence and often support the socio-political order in place. In recent years, Gulf ruling family members have entered the business and private sector in growing numbers. This can be attributed to the growing amount of ruling family members who are unable to assume positions in politics, thus pursuing economic ventures. As the Arab Spring has shown, the business elite continue to benefit from the political status quo. Protests and political unease in Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman were initially triggered by youth’s anger and resentment towards the unequal distribution of rent and rising unemployment. Additionally, youth in the region are not separate elements from the tribal networks in place. However, generational differences exist in terms of their perception of themselves as stakeholders in society. Inevitably, ruling elites will face conflicting priorities between the nation’s interests in promoting youth employment, social services and personal stakes they may have as businesspeople. Participants questioned the nature of the new ruling bargain in the Gulf – if ruling families continue to believe that security requirements trump democratization processes, what are the implications for Gulf societies in the future?

See the working group meeting agenda
Read biographies of the participants
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Haya Al Noaimi, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Khalid Almezaini, Qatar University
Alanoud Alsharekh, Supreme Council for Planning and Development, Kuwait
Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Gawdat Bahgat, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Study – National Defense University
Nader Entessar, University of South Alabama
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Joseph A. Kéchichian, King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies; Kéchichian
Dionysis Markakis, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Toby Matthiesen, University of Cambridge
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Marc Valeri, Center for Gulf Studies – University of Exeter
Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Nussaibah Younis, Project on Middle East Democracy

Article by Haya Al-Noaimi, Research Analyst at CIRS

Strengthening the Family in Qatar: Challenges and Required Actions
2015-05-25 18:00 - 20:00
Noor Al Malki Al Jehani, Executive Director of the Doha International Family Institute, delivered the final CIRS Monthly Dialogue of the 2014-2015 academic year with a lecture on “Strengthening the Family in Qatar: Challenges and Required Actions” on May 25, 2015. Al Malki gave an overview of the historical evolution of family policies in Qatar, resulting in “the family cohesion agenda,” in the Qatar Vision 2030 and the National Development Strategy of 2011-2016. As an introductory note, she stated that “while I think that Qatari families should be the primary targets of policymaking in Qatar, these policies should also take in consideration the wellbeing of all families in Qatar,” including expatriates who make up a majority of the population.

Al Malki pointed out that although people tend to view the notion of family through their own personal sets of beliefs and experience, the family structure continues to be the defining basic unit of most societies. This is “because healthy, functioning families play an essential role in individual, human, social, and economic development,” and the dissolution of this structure places a heavy burden on governments, she said.

Historically, the Qatari family structure has evolved differently to that of the predominant Western nuclear family. The formation of the Qatari family is governed by Islamic principles, and incorporates responsibility towards members of the extended family, including inheritance rights. The historical structuring of the Qatari family is also based on tribal affiliations, which is an organizing societal force that predates that of the state in the Gulf region and continues to this day. “The tribe might have lost some of its authority over its member families, and its economic role, but it is still a major force in family life, and is supported by the continuing practice of intermarriage and a unique system of tribe and family-based neighborhoods,” Al Malki explained.

The family as the basic unit of society became enshrined in the Qatar constitution with the establishment of the State of Qatar in the second half of the twentieth century. Various state laws have been built around the family as a social institution in order to further support and regulate it. The first official family policies were introduced in the 1960s, and revolved around the implementation of social security laws to provide monetary and housing assistance to the most vulnerable in society, including low-income families, widows, divorcees, and orphans.

In the 1980s, as the Qatari state developed and grew more prosperous, “Qatari men were growing richer, and they started to explore the Middle East and other countries,” leading to increased marriages between Qatari men and non-Qatari women, Al Malki explained. It was during this time that the government took a step to directly intervene by introducing a law to regulate marriage to non-nationals, with the exception of GCC citizens, as a response to “growing problems related to nationality claims,” she said.

In the 1990s, Her Highness Sheikha Moza Bint Nasser played a major role in the social development of Qatar as President of the Supreme Council for Family Affairs and the founder of a number of private organizations including the Family Development Center, the Family Consultation Center, and the Foundation for the Protection of Children and Women. All the organizations were tasked with a mission of community development by focusing on strengthening the wellbeing of the family, and promoting the rights of women and children in Qatar. Importantly, Al Malki said, Sheikha Moza’s influence was not limited to Qatar, and she established the Doha International Family Institute (DIFI), with a mandate to promote the family at the national, regional, and international levels to research policy and outreach.”

In order to achieve family cohesiveness in the Qatar Vision 2030, “the strategy seeks to address some of the trends affecting Qatari families, such as the rising divorce rates, high proportions of women who marry late or remain single for life, the growing levels of family violence, the dependence on domestic helpers and caring for children, family-work conflict, and the alarming rate of personal debt among Qatari families.” Al Malki noted that the strategy focuses on familial dysfunction, and fails to adopt a more comprehensive approach to strengthening the family. This is because of the lack of civil society organizations and national expertise and capacity geared towards these issues. “Family strategies are multi-sectorial in nature; they cannot be implemented by one ministry alone,” she argued. “The lack of community-based and non-governmental organizations is a major challenge.”

Al Malki concluded by making some recommendations for the future, including an increase in government and private sector funding for civil society organizations, as well as an ease of the strict laws governing the establishment of such entities. As a first step, she recommended establishing degrees in family studies to be given at educational institutions in order to build national expertise. “Achieving Qatar’s Vision of cohesive families requires a partnership between the government, civil society, the private sector, and, first and foremost, families themselves,” she concluded.

Noor Al Malki Al Jehani served as the Secretary General of the Supreme Council for Family Affairs from 2009-2011, and prior to that was the director of the Women’s Department of that same council. She is currently a member of the Board of Directors for Qatar Foundation for Social Work, and was a member of the Qatar National Human Rights Committee from 2003 until 2011. Al Malki was an expert in the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against women from 2013-14. She participated in the drafting of many national strategies and plans, including Qatar’s first national development strategy 2011-16, where she was the chair of the drafting committee of the strategy of family cohesion and women’s empowerment. She also participated in the review and drafting of several legislations pertaining to social and women’s issues.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications.

Re-Emerging West Asia Working Group II
2015-06-14 09:00 - 2015-06-15 17:00
On June 14–15, 2015, CIRS held a second working group meeting under the “Re-Emerging West Asia” research initiative. This project’s geographic focus includes the countries of the Persian Gulf, the Levant, and the three South Caucasus states. Scholars gathered around the table to receive critical feedback and commentary on draft chapters that have been written for the project. At the meeting a range of topics were covered, including a historical overview of the region’s geopolitics, pipeline politics, civil society, the power of non-state actors, and finally, the rise of oligarchs and white-collar criminal networks in the South Caucasus.

Opening the session was a discussion on the impact that history and empire has had on the structure of the region. West Asia has been defined by the rule and collapse of three great imperial powers, and more recently, the problematic rise of the transnational Islamic State. While the post-Soviet countries of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia have remained mostly internally stable after the fall of the Soviet Union, a new regional hegemon to replace the USSR has not emerged to create a new regional order. The modernization project has been difficult due to the need for an ideological and cultural hegemony that can be extended to large sections of the populations. During the course of the discussion, scholars suggested that there is a need for a more nuanced definition of nationalism in relation to the modernization project in the South Caucasus. Discussants also stressed the need to highlight the different experiences of autonomous regions in West Asia have had with the colonizing powers, and the impact this has had on territorial bids for self-determination in the post-Soviet era.

Russia’s soft power relations in the South Caucasus thrives through religious institutions, such as the orthodox churches in Georgia and Armenia, as well quasi-governmental organizations that are equivalent to the role of NGOs in civil society. Project participants suggested that Russia engages in the South Caucasus region by reaching out to close constituencies in order to gain their support. Discussants mentioned the existing contradictions between certain post-Soviet countries’ support of Russia as a state but dislike for the Putin government currently in power. These inherent contradictions highlight the differences between European value-based engagements in the region in comparison to Russia’s engagement model based on political coercion. Participants also stressed the need for further elaboration on alternative forms of soft power such as ethnic nationalism, the Russian language and the diasporas which reside within Russia today.

In the post-Soviet era, issues of ethnicity in Iran and Azerbaijan have influenced political and social relations. Working group participants suggested that in the case of Azerbaijan ethnicity has been used as a political lever in devising policy, whereas in Iran, ethnic issue have taken a back seat in terms of foreign policy relations. This can be explained by understanding the roots of state legitimacy whereby Azerbaijan finds it in its nationalism as opposed to Iran which bases it more on religious sentiment. In the case of the Kurdish question, both Iran and Turkey have struggled with providing this ethnic population with the legitimacy that it needs. More recently, the encroaching power and seizing of territory by the Islamic state in areas such as Kobane has meant that Turkish-Kurdish relations will have to be re-examined in light of these new regional security threats.

In regards to the pipeline politics of the region, the South Caucasus is an area where Turkey, Iran, and Russia have competed for centuries. The significance of this region does not only lie in its natural resources but also the multiple routes that connect the South Caucasus with the larger Caspian Sea reserves. Power leverage differs between the three countries whereby Iran has ample energy resources and is in a good geopolitical position, Turkey has no resources but has a unique location and soft power, and finally Russia has both energy reserves and hard power. In recent weeks, with the recent voting developments in Ankara, Turkey’s newest proposed pipeline project ‘Turkish Stream’ has been facing issues of third-party access to the trans-Adriatic pipeline.

Until the recent elections, the AKP party in Turkey were able to present themselves as a new political force with a distinctive foreign policy in the region. The AKP’s focus, in regards to the Middle East, was on desecuritization and the consolidation of Turkey’s regional status in relation to its neighbors. Turkey was able to brand itself by using soft power through its foreign aid programs and more recently, its acceptance of over 1.5 million Syrian refugees. Participants questioned whether AKP’s behavior could be classified as “Neo-Ottomanism” and whether neighboring countries buy into this narrative. Additionally, discussants emphasized the need for a more thorough analysis of the refugee crisis Turkey is facing and the distinctions between it and other Middle Eastern states who have instead chosen to close down their borders.

Participants also discussed issues of white-collar crime and the rise of oligarchs, noting that the emergence of the economic elite in Armenia has largely distorted reform efforts within the country. More interestingly, during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict the state relied on these oligarchs for consistency in terms of tax collection and the provision of services. Discussants argued that in addition to oligarchs’ influence in the political economy some also resorted to violent means to realize their demands. In the case of Georgia, even though their economic variables are very similar to those of Armenia a divergence has taken place when comparing the corruption levels in the two countries. According to the World Bank, corruption and white-crime levels dramatically plummeted after the 2004 Rose Revolution. Even though the occurrence of the revolution itself does not explain the plummeting of crime and corruption level, the revolution was able to temporarily break down the corrupt structure in place and allowed younger and newer people to assume positions in government.

See the working group agenda
Read participant biographies
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Hamid Ahmadi, Institute for Middle East Strategic Studies
Haya Al Noaimi, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Meliha Benli Altunışık, Middle East Technical University
Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Richard Giragosian, Regional Studies Center
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Elaheh Koolaee, University of Tehran
Alexander Kupatadze, School of International Relations at St Andrews University
Anatol Lieven, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Jeffrey Mankoff, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Dionysis Markakis, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Mahmood Monshipouri, San Francisco State University
Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Gareth Winrow, Independent Research Analyst and Consultant

Article by Haya Al-Noaimi, Research Analyst at CIRS

Art and Cultural Production in the GCC Working Group I
2015-08-30 09:00 - 2015-08-31 17:00
On August 30-31, 2015, CIRS held the first Working Group under its research initiative on “Art and Cultural Production in the GCC.” Included in the meeting were academics, art historians, museum specialists as well as a selection of curators and visual culture specialists. Over the course of two days, the participants discussed a number of relevant issues and identified existing gaps in the literature. Topics discussed during the meeting included, amongst other things, the viability of art as soft power in the GCC region, the role of the Gulf states as patrons of the arts, authenticity, cultural appropriation, and censorship in the region.

Opening the discussion, participants considered the viability of art as soft power amongst the GCC states and the role artists play within these societies. As Bourdieu argues, the value of a work of art is not set by the artist themselves, but by the field of production which produces its value. Hence, when trying to understand how art and cultural production in the Gulf can be utilized for soft power gains, one must not only recognize the direct producers of the art work but also all the agents and institutions, such as critics, curators, collectors, and patrons involved in valuing the art. In the case of the Gulf, artistic development has been taking place in Sharjah and Kuwait since the 1960s and 1970s, yet only recently has international attention formally recognized art and cultural development in the Gulf region as being financially lucrative. This has been largely stimulated by the patronage of the arts, whereby certain Gulf states such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, have began to heavily sponsor and fund such initiatives. By recognizing the different actors involved in the game of soft power, it become easier to understand the intersectionalities that exist between internal and external interests in relation to art and cultural production within the region.

In terms of art, authenticity and cultural appropriation in the Gulf, discussants explored the relationship between authenticity and professionalism, and how that ties into issues of citizenship and nationality. If heritage sites in Abu Dhabi and Qatar were to be perceived as art installations, the issue of cultural appropriation becomes deeply problematic considering such places evoke the idea of a mono-identity by marginalizing the other. A certain level of disconnect exists between the arts and the community the art is being created in, which also extends to the relationship of museums with their surrounding communities. The philosophy behind museums is that they should be embedded within their community by providing a necessary intellectual and cultural service. For example, in Bahrain the Pearling Pathway is an artistic initiative that consists of 21 different historical sites such as mosques, schools and underwater oyster beds which depict traditional Bahraini communities’ lives before the discovery of oil. Likewise, in Oman, Qasab Castle is a newly-converted museum which is funded from top-down and managed from bottom-up, in terms of economics and local employment. Nevertheless, these two examples are often the exception, considering most museums in the Gulf often struggle with engaging non-museum entities.

Feasibility and sustainability plans, something most European museums have to go through in order to apply for national funds, are a rarity in the case of Gulf museums. Most feasibility studies are conducted internally which largely limits community engagement and venues for discussion around such subjects. Similar issues can be perceived when charting the development of contemporary Gulf cinema. Gulf cinema has been a small, but thriving affair since the 1970s, however more recently, there has been a rush of financial support and social interest for young filmmakers from the region. After a while, film festivals and film school programs were downsized dramatically or closed completely. This has partially been due to censorship issues and because correct feasibility and sustainability plans did not take place before the initiative was launched.

When it comes to understanding the role of the Gulf states as patrons of the arts, discussants problematized the type of vision each art institution and museum was shaping. For instance, at the signing of the contract for the Louvre Abu Dhabi, there was significant concern from the artistic community about the importation of western art considering most of these art collections were curated by foreign art consultants. Similarly in Dubai, art fairs and auctions were market-driven due to the narrative that Dubai was a crossroad for art acquirement in the region. In the case of museums in Sharjah and Kuwait, the vision was focused on supporting local artists through the provision of free art space and educational programs for enrichment of skills. Participants also discussed the educational aspect of the art industry in the Gulf, whereby many art programs train students adequately, but fail to create a critical academic community that is able to nourish a culture beyond state patronage. It is also necessary to examine who is teaching the new generations of artists in the region, since many of the experts are not based locally and happen to be transient.

In regards to censorship in the arts, the Gulf region has had several instance were art fairs and exhibitions were censored due to ‘cultural sensitivities’. In a region as young as the Gulf, the dynamics of the contemporary art world are always in flux. Individuals and collective actors play a crucial role in determining how the art market regulates what is permissible and what is not. For example, certain instances of censorship have targeted pieces of public art because of the level of exposure they had to the public eye. Discussants questioned the nature of public art in Gulf cities that are not pedestrian-friendly, which in turn encourages architectural pieces and buildings to often be the only existing example of art in public space.

Discussants concluded that in the absence of oil fortunes, the Gulf states of Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait, have had to rely on alternative funding opportunities unrelated to the state, pushing them to engage with various community members in order to fund artistic initiatives through cash donations or collection loans. Discussants later noted that sometimes, in the case of the Gulf region, states can benefit from a lack of wealth in regards to creativity and artistic production.

See the meeting agenda
Read participant biographies
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Haya Al Noaimi, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Ian Almond, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Asli Altinisik, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Sheyma Buali, BBC Arabic Festival
Nancy Demerdash, Princeton University
Elizabeth (Beth) Derderian, Northwestern University
Kristin Eggeling, University of Saint Andrews
Amira El-Zein, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Pamela Erskine-Loftus, Northwestern University in Qatar
Karen Exell, University College London in Qatar
Maymanah Farhat, Ayyam Gallery
Lesley Gray, University College London in Qatar
Islam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Robert Kluijver, Paris School of International Affairs
Umber Latafat, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Thomas Leisten, Qatar Museums
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Noof Mohammed, National Museum of Qatar
Nadia Mounajjed, Abu Dhabi University, UAE
Firat Oruc, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Jelena Trkulja, Qatar Museums
Sarina Wakefield, The Open University
Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Mohamed Zayani, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Article by Haya Al Noaimi, Research Analyst at CIRS

The Geopolitics of Natural Resources in the Middle East Working Group I
2015-09-27 09:00 - 2015-09-28 17:00
On September 27–28, 2015, CIRS convened the first Working Group under its research initiative on “The Geopolitics of Natural Resources in the Middle East.” The session was attended by ecologists, geologists, economists, political scientists, and other scholars with expertise on environmental issues in the Middle East. The purpose of the meeting was to present key geopolitical and environmental concerns in the Middle East, and to identify gaps in the existing scholarship on the subject. Over the course of two days, participants debated a number of topics that not only covered a general overview of geopolitics and natural resources in the region, but also included case studies on environmental conditions in specific countries.

The Working Group opened with a debate on applying the theoretical framework of “geopolitics” to the topic of natural resources in the Middle East. Straddling vast reserves of oil and natural gas, this region has been vulnerable to a host of geopolitical forces since the beginning of the twentieth century. Major powers, including European countries, the United States, and Russia, have historically attempted to remain influential in the resource-rich states of the Middle East, and these dynamics of external intervention relating to regional resources have had a substantial impact on the region’s political economy. More recently, shifts in the energy sector accompanied by a significant decrease in global oil prices may end up impacting the geopolitical arrangements in the region. Working group participants considered the possibility of waning U.S. interest in the Middle East as a result of diminishing dependency on Persian Gulf hydrocarbons due to the American surge in domestic shale oil and gas production. Asian powers, including China and India are emerging as key consumers of Middle Eastern hydrocarbons, which could also have geopolitical consequences for the region. Additionally, the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) brings attention to the role of transnational non-state actors and regional natural resources. Working Group participants discussed ISIS’s conquest of territory around the Tigris-Euphrates river system, paying particular attention to the question of whether ISIS is strategically attempting to build a “water” empire or whether it is primarily interested in controlling territory and oil. There was a general consensus amongst the group to conceive of geopolitics, in the context of this research initiative, as a general metaphor for examining the multiple transnational, regional, and domestic dynamics through which politics intersects with the management of environment and resources in the region.

Natural resources have significantly impacted state formation in the Middle East. There has been a continuing sense of instability in the region over the course of the past few years, particularly since the Arab Uprisings and the growth of ISIS. The oil-rich regimes of the Gulf, including that of Bahrain—the primary Gulf state to experience its own significant Arab uprising—were largely able to maintain political stability, and contain any attempts at anti-regime political mobilization. Working group participants as such highlighted the difference between the GCC and other Arab countries in relation to the Arab Spring, and attributed the Gulf states’ relative political stability to their exceptional status as wealthy oil and natural gas states, and the institutional path dependencies and resilience of the regional rentier bargains. In addition, natural resources have also affected economic diversification in the region, not only within the GCC but also as seen in the broader Middle East. Gulf economies are built around capital derived from an abundance of natural resources and an unlimited access to relatively cheap (migrant) labor, as a result of which the theory on economics of scarcity does not appear to apply to this context. Scholars discussed the kind of economy that could actually be built as a result of these particular conditions prevalent in the GCC. There has been an assumption that rentier states are doomed to fail in terms of achieving substantial economic diversification, as the existing political economy does not encourage innovation or high labor productivity. Over the past decade or more GCC countries have attempted to encourage economic diversification through pushing forward state projects on innovation and focusing efforts on the creation of knowledge-based economies. Many of the Gulf states also rely on portfolio diversification and Sovereign Wealth Fund investments as a means by which to move away from their dependence on hydrocarbon based revenues.

As is the case globally, the Middle East has increasingly been adversely affected by climate change. Some of the environmental concerns facing the region include critical groundwater depletion, water salinity, increasing temperatures, and pollution. Additionally, the paucity of rivers and lack of hydropower and coal deposits have proven to be persistent obstacles faced by the states in the region. For much of its history, people in the Middle East have relied upon an abundant livestock with largely sheep and goats being kept due to their ability to handle the climate. However, things have changed with the discovery of oil and natural gas reserves, and states have stepped in to manage the resources with fossil fuels becoming vital to rentier politics. There has been growing urbanization which has led to rural marginalization and degradation of traditional agricultural hubs in the Middle East. Rising income levels have also caused rapid lifestyles changes and the development of consumer culture in the GCC which has a direct impact on environmental resources, straining existing water and energy sources and leading to discussion of how to curtail waste and consumption patterns. While discussing the political ecology of renewable and non-renewable resources and how the GCC landscape has been shaped by its fossil fuel industry, participants raised the need to develop a more robust literature on environmentalism, environmental attitudes, and environment behavior in the Gulf as only a fragmentary collection of data on these topics exist. Since large numbers of foreigners reside in the Middle East, the discussants also stressed the need to learn more about the attitudes and behavior of non-nationals in Gulf in relation to conservation and environment.

In addition to a general overview of the region, the Working Group included country specific studies to highlight certain environmental problems. Mining of a less known natural resource – the sand, to meet the increasing demands of the global construction industry was examined. According to statistics, sand in Morocco is being extracted at a greater rate than it is being renewed. This has a severe impact on the environment resulting in degradation of coastline, destruction of wetlands, rising sea levels and subsequent flooding. Hence, sand mining poses a threat to the Arab World where most of the capital cities are located on the coast. The issue of aforestation and “greening projects” in the United Arab Emirates was also discussed. Dubai has a vision to establish the first Middle East rainforest for educational and cultural purposes by 2020. However, most of the species being used for that purpose are exotic ones that rely on too much water which exacerbates the already water-stressed conditions in the Emirate. During the Working Group experts discussed the need to counter current greening trends in the GCC and invest more energy in researching how indigenous species that use less water and have the ability to withstand high temperatures could be more broadly planted. Across the Middle East there is also a need to invest in genetically engineered crops that have stress-tolerant genes to withstand the frequent droughts that have been recently plaguing the region.

The discussants noted that the Middle East is a very water scarce region, expected to experience acute water shortages in the near future as a result of population pressures and climate change. Rising temperatures and a decrease in precipitation have adversely impacted the water levels. There are more heat waves, prolonged droughts and destructive floods in the region than before. For example, Yemen is facing a serious water crisis with UNICEF anticipating the country to run out of water by 2020. The majority of the population in Yemen lacks access to safe water, and water-borne diseases are widespread. There are studies which attribute the current state collapse to the severe water crisis in the country. Water scarcity is the most direct environmental issue for the Middle East, and has a major impact on food security as agricultural production depends on water availability. Water shortages are devastating for the Yemeni economy as the country is also increasingly food insecure and need to enhance domestic agricultural production. In order to address water and food security concerns, GCC countries have established institutions to increase domestic production despite the precarious nature of their water resources, and also to develop overseas farmland in order to secure their food imports. For example, Qatar, amongst other GCC states, has acquired farmland in Sudan and well as in other destinations, although to date none of these efforts has led to active agricultural production overseas.

While the participants in the Working Group addressed a multitude of topics ranging from geopolitics to environmental problems in the Middle East, they all acknowledged that there is limited scholarship and data available on the environment in the region from a multi-disciplinary perspective. Through this research initiative the hope is to fill some of the existing gaps in literature.

See the working group meeting agendaRead participant biographiesRead more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Madalla Alibeli, United Arab Emirates UniversityZahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarFarid Chaaban, American University of BeirutJill Crystal, Auburn UniversityLaura El-Katiri, Oxford Institute for Energy StudiesAli El-Keblawy, University of SharjahClement Henry, National University of SingaporeMehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarMartin Keulertz, Texas A&M Nexus GroupLaurent Lambert, SESRI – Qatar UniversitySuzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarMaria Snoussi, Université Mohammed V in Rabat, MoroccoJeannie Sowers, University of New Hampshire, DurhamWessel N. Vermeulen, University of OxfordElizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in QatarEckart Woertz, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs

Article by Umber Latafat (SFS ’16) and Zahra Babar, CIRS Associate Director for Research

Environment and Human Insecurity in the Middle East
2015-09-29 18:00 - 20:00
CIRS invited Jeannie Sowers, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of New Hampshire, to deliver the inaugural Monthly Dialogue of the 2015-2016 academic year on September 29, 2015. The lecture titled “Environment and Human Insecurity in the Middle East,” highlighted how human well-being and health are directly and indirectly affected by environmental challenges. Important challenges include the provision of urban infrastructures for water and sanitation and the impacts of man-made climate change on the Middle East and North Africa on water resources.

Sowers introduced the notion of an ecological shadow to highlight how environmental challenges often require decision-making and participation across multiple scales. An ecological shadow, she explained, is the “environmental harm from patterns of production, consumption, and disposal that is displaced elsewhere. This displacement can be to other people, it can be to other places, it can be, of course, displaced to other countries,” as well as to future generations. While environmental awareness has been steadily increasing over time, the conceptual distancing of ecological harm remains a serious and widespread problem all over the world, and is, essentially, a prerequisite of economies driven by mass production and consumption. Industrial and industrializing nations often defer negative ecological costs upon those who are most vulnerable to ecological shifts, including those weakest on the political scale, such as poor communities and other species.

Sowers argued that there are a whole host of everyday issues that are often neglected when considering environmental challenges and the causes of human insecurity. One such example is the ubiquitous plastic water bottle that is widely produced, consumed, and discarded in the countries of the Middle East. Despite the seemingly innocuous everyday use of plastic water bottles, Sowers argued that the material is a local as well as a global hazard at the level of its production and disposal. Around 8 percent of the global production of fossil fuels is used to sustain the plastics industry, as a feedstock and as energy used in manufacturing. Even if Middle Eastern countries made serious efforts to encourage or enforce the reuse and recycling of plastics, there still remains a problem with the material’s non-biodegradability. The seemingly small and everyday issue of plastic water bottles, thus becomes a wider issue of environmental politics related to the political economy of plastic, and the ecological shadow it casts.

Inadequate government policies and activities regarding the collection and disposal of solid waste, especially in the poorer countries of the Middle East and North Africa, means that the accumulation of garbage, and especially plastics, have become serious problems for the surrounding environment, including the contamination of air and water, with direct negative consequences for human health. Such solid waste problems also persist in “developed” countries. Despite some success with recycling efforts, to date, “the dominant strategy of waste management in the United States remains simply putting it somewhere else,” Sowers said.

Landfills are something that can perhaps be tolerated by countries with large, empty landmasses, but for a small and overcrowded country like Lebanon, for example, this solution is unsustainable in the long term. With the closure of the main landfill on the outskirts of Beirut, there was a build-up of solid waste on the streets if the city, and an outcry by the affected residents. “For environmental studies, this whole field of inquiry about ecological shadows has been very closely tied to research on environmental justice, which, of course, calls our attention to the unequal distribution of environmental benefits and harm for a given activity, or a given product,” she said.

Sowers offered Beirut’s “You Stink” campaign as a case study example of the convergence of political failure, the environmental effects of mass production and everyday consumption, and the resulting social activism that calls for environmental justice and government accountability. “The campaign itself,” she said “is very interesting in that it mimics many of the strategies, the tactics, and the discourse that we see not only in other environmental campaigns in the Middle East and North Africa, but also, of course, in the Arab uprisings more broadly.”

Ultimately, the ecological shadows associated with the global fossil fuel economy have a long-term effect on climate change and the disruption of weather patterns, which for the Middle East, is a concern considering the already arid nature of many countries. Climate change and increases in weather and water pattern instability has a direct effect on human health and wellbeing, with many communities becoming increasingly displaced, both internally and internationally.

In conclusion, Sowers asked a basic, but fundamental question: “what can we do to reduce the intensity of these shadows?” She gave several suggestions, including technocratic resource management; increasing resource efficiency for any given product; engaging in demand management; increasing mechanisms for environmental accounting by exposing hidden costs to consumers, producers, and governments; and environmental regulation and taxation. Ultimately, however, none of these suggestions will work successfully unless there is a unified, systemic, and inclusive approach to ecological shadows. “In order to have social engagement, you have to start dealing with patterns of economic and political exclusion,” Sowers concluded.

Jeannie Sowers focuses on the intersections between political economy and environmental issues in the Middle East, particularly in Egypt where she has conducted extensive field research. She holds a PhD from Princeton University and a BA from Harvard University. Selected publications include Environmental Politics in Egypt: Experts, Activists, and the State (Routledge, 2013), The Journey to Tahrir: Revolution, Protest, and Social Change in Egypt (co-edited with C. Toensing, Verso, 2012), and articles in Development and Change, Climatic Change, Middle East Report, and International Environmental Agreements. She is on the editorial boards of the journals Global Environmental Politics and Middle East Report.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for Publications at CIRS

China and the Middle East Working Group Meeting II
2015-10-04 09:00 - 2015-10-05 17:00
On October 4–5, 2015, CIRS held a second working group meeting under its research project on “China and the Middle East.” Contributors were assembled to receive critical feedback and commentary on the draft chapters that they had written on range of topics, including amongst other things, the nature of Chinese foreign policy interests in the region, China’s increasing security engagements in the Middle East, the applicability of the “Chinese Model” to Middle Eastern states, and China’s role in the Iranian nuclear deal negotiations. Case studies were also presented on Israel’s role in the development of Taiwan’s military and defense capabilities, on the Sino-Saudi relationship and on Sino-Turkish relations.

Chinese policy makers tend to view the world through four concentric geographic circles, and rank countries in order of importance to Chinese interests based on their proximity to China. Accordingly, China’s primary attention is devoted to ensuring the security of its domestic realm and sovereign territory, followed by prioritizing relations with those countries that press upon its immediate land and sea borders. Subsequent Chinese foreign policy engagement is more or less active depending on whether or not a state is located close or far to its immediate periphery. Within this analysis, the location of the Middle East may not make it one of the most critical regions drawing Chinese commitment and attention. Yet, for a number of reasons in spite of its somewhat geographic remoteness from the Chinese borders, the Middle East is growing in importance to China. One of the reasons for this is that, in the Chinese imagination, the Middle East is in fact an extension of the Chinese periphery, and particularly if seen through the lens of its cultural and historical connectivity to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. Central Asia and its neighborhood certainly falls into China’s direct realm of hegemony and fundamental interest. Additionally, internal discussions in China on the spillover and impact of extremism and terrorism that may threaten China’s domestic security, Chinese scholars and analysts clearly identify linkages with the Middle East. The Middle East is also increasingly central to China as a source of energy, and Chinese economic investments in the region have been growing exponentially over the past decade.

Despite the growing importance of the Middle East, China continues to demonstrate a reluctance to step outside the parameters of its traditional role in the region, or to change its standard policy line of offending no one, maintaining or attempting to maintain cordial relations with everyone, and avoiding direct conflict or confrontation with any of the states in the region. Working Group participants discussed the obvious mismatch between Chinese interests in the region and China’s efforts to protect those interests, and suggested that in the Middle East China punches below its weight. However, despite the fact that we see no obvious signs of China taking on a stronger military presence in the Middle East, there are indications that Chinese security-related activities are expanding. Amongst other things, Chinese peacekeeping forces have been deployed in the Middle East, combat fleets have been active in the Gulf of Aden, and China has also taken part in joint military exercises. In addition, with the growing presence of Chinese economic investments and infrastructural projects the security of Chinese citizens has become of paramount concern and there are now several Chinese private security contractors operating across several Middle Eastern states.

China also appears to be seeking to develop more robust partnerships within the Middle East and has expanded its diplomatic efforts in the region. A case in point is the initiative shown by Beijing in terms of playing a key role in mediating Iran’s nuclear settlement with the West. China has a long standing history with Iran, and has carefully cultivated this relationship as it sees Iran as one of the pivotal countries in the Persian Gulf sure to play a leading role in the years ahead. At the same time, Chinese engagements in the Middle East are clearly informed by the necessity of avoiding antagonizing the United States or of being perceived as adopting a position contrary to American interests in the region. Up until 2013 in relation to the nuclear issue China adopted a policy of trying to keep both the United States and Iran happy, however post 2013 Beijing adopted a much more proactive role in bringing about some resolution to the ongoing hostility between Iran and the West. Amongst other factors propelling this change in direction were China’s strategic calculations in maintaining stability of Persian Gulf energy supplies, an increasing wariness in China around the possibility of a full scale militarized conflict between the United States and Iran, as well as the ascension of Xi Jinping to the Chinese Presidency and the impact this has had on China’s global engagements.

During the Working Group scholars also discussed the applicability of the “China Model” of political and economic governance to the context of the Middle East. It was suggested that despite the similar authoritarian and state-centric modes of governance visible in China and most of the Middle East, the Chinese Model cannot be easily replicated in the region primarily because of the lack of state capacity, weak institutional structures, and also the very different economic preconditions existing in Middle Eastern states as compared to China. While the China Model of developmentalism may remain appealing to Middle Eastern elites as an ideal type, the necessary requirements for establishing it are lacking in the Middle East.

Working Group participants also presented select case studies on the historical evolution of Taiwanese-Israeli military cooperation, how Islam has informed the Sino-Saudi relationship, and the changing dimensions of Turkey’s relations with China. While Israel has publicly prioritized its relationship with the PRC, it has also actively engaged in working with Taiwan over the decades on developing Taiwanese defense systems, often through private or backdoor engagements. Although Israel has been a provider of both arms and technology to Taiwan, its key contribution has perhaps been in the provision of “software” in the shape of the expertise and knowledge of Israeli scientists who worked actively to develop Taiwanese military capacity.

While the Sino-Turkish relationship has not always been an easy one, at the current juncture both countries consider the other to be a strategic partner with whom they must work. Both states have serious economic incentives which propel them to cooperate, despite the fact that politically they have very different views of the Middle East. Turkey has long been a close ally to the United States and NATO member states, and also has a self-perception as a “civilizational” power in the Middle East and Asia. Turkey considers itself to be a normative regional model for the Middle East, and adopts an agenda for supporting reform across the region. For China it is current quite critical that it inoculate itself from international criticism on how it is managing the Uighur issue, and in this context the relationship with Turkey becomes quite critical. China and Turkey are placing considerable effort in developing their bilateral relationship, albeit primarily fixed in economic cooperation, and showing considerable restraint in terms of avoiding any confrontation on the political or foreign policy front.

Saudi Arabia continues to be one of China’s most important relationships in the Middle East. Existing academic scholarship on the Sino-Saudi relationship tends to focus on the economic and strategic underpinnings of this relationship, quite naturally so given that the Kingdom is a pivotal energy provider to China. Invariably some of these works also address the role that Islam has played in China’s engagements with Saudi Arabia, particularly from the perspective of the state. The Working Group concluded with a broader discussion examining “Islamic connectivities” that have historically existed and have informed the Sino-Saudi relationship. Group discussion touched upon the role of various non-state actors and groups, including Islamic missionaries in Chine and the ways in which Islamic symbols are employed and utilized by the two states.

See the working group meeting agenda
Read participant biographies
Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Mohammed Al-Sudairi, Hong Kong University
Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
John Garver, Georgia Institute of Technology
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Tugrul Keskin, Maltepe University
Michael McCall, Leiden University
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
James Reardon-Anderson, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service
Andrew Scobell, RAND Corporation
Yitzhak Shichor, University of Haifa
Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Article by Zahra Babar, CIRS Associate Director for Research

Managing the Saudi-Iranian Regional Rivalry
2015-10-27 18:00 - 20:00
Ibrahim Fraihat, Senior Fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution’s Doha Center and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University in Qatar, delivered a CIRS Monthly Dialogue lecture on “Managing the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry” on October 27, 2015. With a background in conflict resolution, Fraihat offered an analysis of how to reduce tensions in the Middle East region using two different approaches.

The first approach offered by Fraihat isolates individual conflicts as an exclusive case requiring specific solutions targeted at particular nations. The second approach takes a more regional stance, and perceives of Middle East conflicts as somewhat interrelated. This approach posits that many of the current conflicts, including those in Yemen and Syria, are the result of proxy wars, and are linked, in one way or another, to larger regional rivalries. Fraihat argued that the second approach was more useful in its holistic view of regional conflicts being the result of spillover tensions generated elsewhere.

He explained that “most, if not all, of the conflicts in the region are linked in one way or another to Tehran and Riyadh, or to the Saudi-Iranian relationship…If you are able to reduce the tension, or achieve some rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, then by the time you bring them to the table to sit and talk and have some understanding, then probably 50 percent of the conflicts will disappear.”

Fraihat gave a complex characterization and background to the history of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, arguing that there have been peaks of hostility related to specific regional incidences over the years. Leaving aside the legacy of a centuries-old Arab-Persian enmity, more recent regional concerns were stoked with the onset of Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution and the rise of a rival political and Islamic power prepared to challenge Saudi regional hegemony. Concerns about Iranian dominance led Saudi Arabia to support Iraq in its war against Iran in the 1980s. A further escalation of antagonisms began in the aftermath of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, which, effectively, changed the regional order, and led to a power vacuum in which Saudi Arabia and Iran vied for geopolitical influence. There was a new and sour turning point in the Saudi-Iranian relationship during the events of the 2011 Arab uprisings that fueled the conflict in Syria, further increasing regional tensions.

A central question about the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, and especially one asked from the perspective of the Western media, is whether or not the conflict is sectarian in nature. While sectarianism has been used to fan the flames of the rivalry, and to advance certain agendas, this is an over-simplification that only serves to reduce a longstanding antagonism into a simple sectarian binary. Importantly, the fraught Saudi-Iranian relationship has evolved over the years for a number of different reasons, including those related to national interests, economic development, and gains in geopolitical power, but not all can be properly identified or agreed upon by scholars, analysts, and policymakers. There is a variation of views and opinions on both sides, making the rivalry difficult to manage. “Even within the parties themselves, there is no clear understanding about what the conflict is really about,” Fraihat argued.

The two regional giants tend to take two distinct positions on regional issues, as seen in the cases of Yemen and Syria. However, despite the many instances of opposition, Fraihat argued, there is a surprising amount of overlap between Iran and Saudi Arabia’s mutual needs, especially as they relate to security interests and environmental concerns. “Don’t be led, or misled actually, by the obvious positions of the two countries,” he said.

Fraihat gave several strategies for addressing the finer points of the rivalry, including mediation, dialogue, confidence-building measures, credible peace plans, zones of peace, developing areas of interdependence, and restoring the balance of power. “At the end of the day,” he said, “there is no alternative to the parties talking,” and this is the key first step to mediating any rivalry. Switzerland, Norway, and Qatar have a history of mediation, and they could act as effective hosts for any potential negotiations. This would mean, however, that Saudi Arabia and Iran must be willing to engage with each other in a serious manner.

Another opportunity for mediation is the intervention of a powerful third party. Turkey, the United States, and Pakistan all play a role in the region in one way or another. In addition, Fraihat said, “Iraq here has a huge role to play in minimizing and reducing the tension and contributing to better management of the conflict.” This can only occur if the implicated powers agree to build a free, independent, and democratic Iraq.

In conclusion, Fraihat argued that, when it comes to solving regional tensions, analysts tend to talk about official “track 1” solutions between governments, but the potential of building peace between the two countries can also be advanced with “track 2” diplomacy—unofficial dialogue between influential societal figures like academics and religious leaders to build relationships and encourage new thinking that can inform policymakers. Finally, a conducive “track 3” approach is to encourage citizens of Saudi Arabia and Iran to engage with each other at the grassroots and communal level, which is another approach that could lead to a sustainable peace between the two countries.

Ibrahim Fraihat (also known as Ibrahim Sharqieh) previously taught international conflict resolution at George Washington University and George Mason University. His research focuses on conflict resolution in the Arab world, with a particular emphasis on conflict management and mediation, transitions, national reconciliation, national dialogue, institutional reform, and post-conflict reconstruction. He has published extensively on Middle East politics, with articles appearing in Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Financial Times, Al-Hayat, and the Christian Science Monitor, on the CNN and Al Jazeera websites, and elsewhere. He is the author of the book Unfinished Revolutions: Yemen, Libya, and Tunisia after the Arab Spring (Yale University Press), and the co-author of Libya’s Displacement Crisis: Uprooted by Revolution and Civil War (Georgetown University Press). Professor Fraihat received a PhD in conflict analysis and resolution from George Mason University in 2006. He is the recipient of George Mason University’s Distinguished Alumni Award (2014) for his achievements in the field of conflict resolution. Fraihat can be reached at fraihat.writer@gmail.com. Follow Ibrahim on Twitter @i_fraihat and on Facebook: Ibrahim Fraihat.

Article by Suzi Mirgani, Manager and Editor for CIRS Publications

Youth in the Middle East Working Group Meeting II
2015-11-08 09:00 - 2015-11-09 12:00
On November 8–9, 2015, the Center of International and Regional Studies (CIRS), in collaboration with Silatech, hosted the second working group meeting as part of their research project on “Youth in the Middle East.” Eight distinguished scholars were invited to provide critical feedback and remarks on the draft papers, submitted as part of this project, which covered a wide range of issues faced by youth in the Middle East both domestically and in diaspora. This included themes such as employment, education, religion, political views, gender, fatherhood, economic inclusion, and social cohesion.

For decades, most of the scholarship on youth has been concerned with issues such as human capital, problems and challenges faced by youth, and their contribution to the growth of their respective countries. These concerns have spiked, insofar as the Middle East is concerned, after the wave of uprisings that hit the region in 2011. Numerous social scientists have been addressing youth issues in the transition period post Arab Uprisings; yet, there are still areas that need further in-depth analysis and critical examination. In collaboration with Silatech, CIRS launched the “Youth in the Middle East” project in 2014.

The second working group meeting focused on dynamics and challenges faced by youth in the Middle East. Its aim was to identify gaps in the available literature, suggest areas for further scholarly investigations, and recommend policies to decision-making circles.

The first paper, presented by Samar Farah, examines “The State of Education in the MENA Region and its Implications for Youth.” This paper sheds light on the education system in the Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa by exploring data presented in international assessments in recent years. Farah focuses on three levels of analysis—school, teacher, and student levels—in order to better understand the challenges facing the education systems, and their implications on youth living in the region.

Michael Robbins’s paper examines “Youth, Religion, and Democracy after the Arab Uprisings.” Robbins compares the experiences of youth in Egypt and Tunisia—two countries that experienced dramatic changes after the Arab uprisings—by investigating public opinion data gathered by the Arab Barometer Research Project. Robbins addresses the process of political learning among youths, specifically in the cases of Egypt and Tunisia.

Jennifer Olmsted’s paper focuses on “Gender Priorities and the Arab Uprisings.” Olmsted examines gender equality in the transition period after the Arab Uprisings, explores the various transitions that both males and females generally experience, and focuses on various health outcomes as well as questions about political voice. In doing so, Olmsted examines a number of social and economic indicators in order to address broader questions about control of assets and access to services, equal access to schooling, trends of marriage and household formation, and gendered patterns emerging in labor markets.

Natasha Ridge, Soohyun Jeon, Soha Shami, and Ann-Christine Niepelt, presented a paper on “Conceptualizing the Role and Impact of Fathers in the Arab World.” Using data from a pilot study on Arab fathers collected in the United Arab Emirates, the authors explore the role and impact of Arab fathers retrospectively, as reported by adult children, on involvement and self-esteem. They also examine gender, socioeconomic status, and nationality in order to study the influence of father involvement on the experiences of males and females in the Arab world.

Edward Sayre presented paper titled “Youth Economic Inclusion in the Wake of the Arab Uprisings.” This paper examines the influence of the educational levels of individuals and their parents on their ability to secure employment after leaving school. Using both non-parametric (Kaplan Meier) and parametric approaches, this paper assesses the different roles family background plays in the case of women compared to men. It also addresses the issue of inequality of opportunity and its impact on educational achievement and attainment, as well as labor market outcomes. Sayre relies on the 2013 “School to Work Transition Survey” by the International Labor Organization to estimate the determinants of the length of time to find work after leaving school for young Palestinians, specifically those aged between 15 and 29 years old.

Another paper was presented by Samer Kherfi titled “National Employment Policies in the Gulf: Achievements and Challenges.” This paper links the salient features of the GCC labor market to various governmental efforts aimed at nationalizing employment, particularly in the private sector. It also provides an assessment to decades-old policies to boost employment via the direct imposition of minimum quotas for nationals at the firm, industry, and occupation levels. In addition, the paper examines the recent price-based nationalization measures as well as other active labor market interventions.

The Working Group’s last paper was presented by Sherine El-Taraboulsi and is titled “Navigating British-ness: British-Libyan youth, the Arab unrest and debates on immigration in the United Kingdom”. This paper investigates the discourse on immigration in the United Kingdom, and its implications on the sense of belonging of British-Libyan youth, especially at a time of social and political upheaval in the Arab world. In exploring this issue, El-Taraboulsi unpacks topics related to faith, ethnicity and citizenship of Libyan youth in diaspora.

The second working group meeting was concluded by Mehran Kamrava, the Director of the Center of International and Regional Studies, and Paul Dyre, Senior Consultant at Silatech. As part of a collaborative effort between the two institutions and through facilitating original contributions to the topic by experts, the Working Group moved the study of youth in the contemporary Middle East further along. CIRS and Silatech expect to publish the products of this research initiative in the near future.

It is worth mentioning that this working group is part of the Center of International and Regional Studies Research and Scholarship’s initiatives that aim to fill in existing research gaps, and contribute towards furthering knowledge. Each of these initiatives involves some of the most prominent scholars of the Middle East, North Africa, and the Gulf region who address prevailing issues related to the security, economic stability, and political realm of the region.

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Read more about this research initiative

Participants and Discussants:

Zahra Babar, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Tom Chidiac, Silatech
Brian Chung, Al Qasimi Foundation
Paul Dyer, Silatech
Sherine El Taraboulsi, Overseas Development Institute in London
Samar Farah, Columbia University
Islam Hassan, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Soohyun Jeon, Al Qasimi Foundation
Nader Kabbani, Silatech
Mehran Kamrava, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Samer Kherfi, American University of Sharjah
Suzi Mirgani, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar
Edward Sayre, University of Southern Mississippi
Elizabeth Wanucha, CIRS – Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar

Article by Islam Hassan, Research Analyst at CIRS
