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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190116T124500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190116T134500
DTSTAMP:20260404T011938
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SUMMARY:Fundamentalist Metamorphosis: Hezbollah’s Ideological Evolution from Idealism to Pragmatism
DESCRIPTION:On January 16\, 2019\, CIRS invited Middle East analyst Massaab Al-Aloosy to discuss his research on “Fundamentalist Metamorphosis: Hezbollah’s Ideological Evolution from Idealism to Pragmatism.” During the talk\, he mapped out the trajectory of Hezbollah (“Party of God”)\, a political and militant Shiʿa Islamist movement\, from its origin to the present. The organization came into existence following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982\, and was primarily concerned with ending Israel’s occupation in Lebanon and supporting the Palestinian cause.  \n \n \nBefore it was officially organized in 1985\, Hezbollah worked as a clandestine operation inspired by several geopolitical events\, including the Iranian Revolution and the overthrow of the shah in 1979\, and Ayatollah Khomeini’s revolutionized Shiʿa theology\, which was exported to Shi’a communities\, including those in Lebanon. Aloosy said that Khomeini “gave a directive for the clergy in ruling the country and being involved in politics. This had great ramifications in the region as a whole\, but specifically for the Shiʿa and the Arab world.” \n \n \nAnother event inspiring Hezbollah’s actions was Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 in its attempt to uproot the Palestinian Liberation Organization from southern Lebanon. According to Al-Aloosy\, “This was a massive shock for the Lebanese and the Arab world\, to see an Arab capital invaded by Israelis forces.” This event profoundly affected the Shiʿa in the Lebanon because of their constant friction with Israel\, leading Hezbollah to launch military operations against Israeli targets\, including an Israeli encampment—one of their most devastating attacks against the Israeli Defense Forces (IDS). \n \n \nHezbollah “reflected much of Iran’s revolutionary rhetoric; the oppressed versus the oppressors; siding with the people; creating revolutions throughout the region.” \n \n \nHezbollah sent an open letter to the world in 1985\, declaring its goals. “It reflected much of Iran’s revolutionary rhetoric; the oppressed versus the oppressors; siding with the people; creating revolutions throughout the region\,” Al-Aloosy said. One goal was to create an Islamic state\, which proved extremely ambitious because Lebanon is a “multi-confessional\, multi-religious\, multi-ethnic\, multi-sectarian country.” Another goal was to destroy Israel; Hezbollah “considered Israel as a cancerous gland\, which should be completely destroyed; and they would not stop until they liberated every inch of Palestine\,” he said.  \n \n \nIn 1989\, Saudi Arabia gathered many Lebanese politicians together and paid them handsomely to sign an agreement to end the Lebanese civil war and amend the divided political system\, he said. Hezbollah was initially against the Taif Agreement\, but later decided it was necessary to engage in Lebanese politics. Taking this pragmatic step\, Al-Aloosy said\, Hezbollah “had a revolutionary outlook that had completely changed with accepting the political system.” \n \n \nDuring the 1990s\, Hezbollah underwent a process of “refashioning Islamism\,” Al-Aloosy said. In the 1980s\, their positions had been quite extremist\, but over time\, “they changed all of this rhetoric\, and they tried to change the interpretation of what they said.” Hezbollah’s focus was on Israel\, and their perspective had become more nationalistic than Islamist. For example\, Al-Alsoosy said that the rhetoric became: “We are here to liberate Lebanese land\, mainly. This is our objective.”  \n \n \nThe quest for an Islamic state remained\, however\, but it was “indefinitely postponed\,” Al-Aloosy noted. Additionally\, Hezbollah acknowledged that the goal of an Islamic state did not mean that it will be imposed by force\, and it had to come with the consensus of all Lebanese. “You can imagine how impossible that would be\,” Al-Aloosy said\, “not even the Shiʿites themselves agree on an Islamic state.” Reaching a consensus among Lebanon’s many communities—including Sunnis\, Christians\, and Druze\, among others—was considered an almost impossible feat\, he said.  \n \n \nFurther\, in 1999\, Ehud Barak was elected Prime Minister of Israel on a platform of withdrawing Israeli forces from Lebanon\, which occurred in 2000. Despite this\, Hezbollah continued its attacks on Israel from 2000 to 2006\, but these were not as intense as those of the 1990s. In 2006\, “a big miscalculation by both Hezbollah and Israel happened\,” he explained. Now under the premiership of Ehud Olmert\, Israel decided it would destroy Hezbollah. In 2006\, a war erupted between Israel and Hezbollah\, lasting for over a month. Hezbollah was not destroyed in this conflict\, but\, since then\, the border between Israel and Lebanon has been comparatively quiet. \n \n \nSyria\, throughout the 1990s\, had been using Hezbollahs’ attacks to pressure the Israelis to the negotiating table\, Al-Aloosy said\, but Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon deprived Syria of a very important negotiating tool with the Israelis. With the civil uprising in Syria in 2011\, “this was yet another event that served to make Hezbollah’s ideology more pragmatic and less idealistic\,” Al-Aloosy said. Instead of siding with the oppressed\, Hezbollah chose to side with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.  \n \n \nIn conclusion\, Al-Aloosy argued that Hezbollah has transformed from an offensive force against the Israelis to liberate the south of Lebanon\, into a deterrent force. Hezbollah continues the rhetoric of liberating Palestine\, he said\, but does not actually do much about it. Hence\, “when it comes to creating an Islamic state\, it is very clear this goal is unattainable especially in the sectarian mosaic of Lebanon. Thus\, they engaged in changing the rhetoric and changed their outlook indirectly.” \n \n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Khansa Maria\, CURA Publications Fellow \n \n \n \nMassaab Al-Aloosy received his PhD and Masters of Art in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Previously\, he worked with the World Peace Foundation and is currently working as a producer with the Al Jazeera Network. He is the author of a forthcoming book\, titled Changing Ideology of the Hezbollah Insurgency and Civil War in the Middle East. \n \n \n 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/fundamentalist-metamorphosis-hezbollahs-ideological-evolution-idealism/
CATEGORIES:Distingushed Lectures,Regional Studies
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190120T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190121T160000
DTSTAMP:20260404T011938
CREATED:20190226T131458Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T092505Z
UID:10001386-1547974800-1548086400@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Russia and the Middle East Working Group I
DESCRIPTION:On January 20-21\, 2019\, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) held the first working group under its research initiative on “Russia and the Middle East.” Over the course of two days\, scholars were convened to discuss different aspects of Russian-Middle Eastern relations\, including: Russian “responsibility to protect” in the Middle East; Russian “sovereign democracy\,” Middle Eastern investments in Russia\, migration between Russia and the Middle East\, ISIS in the North Caucuses\, Russia-GCC relations\, the Yemeni civil war\, and Russia-Iran and Russian-Maghreb relations. \n\nRoy Allison started the working group discussions with his presentation on “Russian vs. Western “Responsibility to Protect” in the Middle East.” Allison suggested that RTP is too narrow for understanding normative claims-making competition between Western States and Russia in the Middle East. He added that Middle East is just one theater among others where Russia and the West have been competing over international norms relating to sovereignty and rights\, as well as international justice and international order. Germane to this discussion\, Allison suggested that the West is not a united bloc when it comes to normative claims making in the region\, as a number of Western countries\, such as the United States\, currently appears to have slightly withdrawn. Allison highlighted a number of areas that could benefit from in-depth study\, among which: the reception of Russian legal and normative claims by Middle Eastern states\, the controversy of international legal claims\, and the development of laws and norms about drones and other efforts to fight transnational terrorism. \n\nFollowing Allison’s discussion\, Viacheslav Morozov presented on the “Prospects of Russian ‘Sovereign Democracy’ in the Middle East.” Morozov argued that while Russia is not actively promoting sovereign democracy as a principle as strenuously as has done previously\, the thinking behind sovereign democracy still exists in Russia’s foreign policy approach. There is complexity to determining exactly whether sovereign democracy is a model of governance that evolved in Russia or whether it is more of an ideology. Sovereign democracy is characterized by direct intervention by the state in running state affairs and the emphasis in “sovereign democracy” is on sovereignty rather than democracy. The rationale is that individual rights can only be protected when there is a strong state that can act as the vanguard of rights. In this line of thinking\, sovereignty is understood as being non-interventionist. But given that democracy is an empty signifier\, similar to “humanity\,” Russia is questioning the universality of international constitutions. Finally\, Morozov discussed the applicability of the Russian model of democracy in the Middle East.  \n\nCaner Bakir shifted the working group discussions to “Russia: An Emerging Market for Middle Eastern Investments?” Bakir claimed that Middle Eastern foreign direct investments in Russia are increasing\, particularly by the United Arab Emirates. However\, the share of Middle Eastern investments in Russia’s inward foreign direct investments is significantly small. Such reality provokes questions around Middle Eastern multinational corporations. Bakir proposed a number of areas related to Middle Eastern multinational corporations that deserve study. Among such topics: the dynamicity\, drivers and challenges of multinationals; the impact of multinationals on state bureaucracy; the difference in multinational corporations’ behavior from one sector to another; the competitive advantages of Middle Eastern multinational corporations; and what Middle Eastern multinational corporations can offer to the Russian economy. \n\nAndrei Korobkov discussed another aspect of Russian-Middle Eastern relations\, particularly: “Contemporary Migration Patterns between Russia and the Middle East.” Korobkov stated that Russia and the Middle East\, given their multiethnic histories\, have always been key players in global migration patterns. However\, particularly with the creation of the modern state in the Middle East and fall of the Soviet Union\, Middle Eastern countries and Russia have followed the European model of immigration\, by developing strict naturalization policies. Korobkov added that while the numbers of Middle Easterners immigrating to Russia—as students\, former students\, refugees\, or spouses of Russians citizens—have been increasing\, only two to three percent of Russians intending to leave Russia say they want to immigrate to the Middle East. Finally\, Korobkov claimed that environmental and political factors will continue to drive migration from the Middle East to Russia.  \n\nSergey Markedonov focused the discussion on “Russia\, the Islamic State\, and Wilayet Qawkaz.” Markedonov argued that the Middle East is of symbolic importance for Russian foreign policy\, particularly with the ongoing Syrian conflict. Russia discovered new horizons in the Middle East that could help in Russia’s desire to compete once again with the United States for global dominance. However\, besides the Russia-US rivalry\, Markedonov claimed that the Islamic States in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is yet another major driver behind Russia’s recent involvement in the Middle Eats. ISIS is seen as one of Russia’s main security threats. The North Caucuses’ allegiance to ISIS and the establishment of the Wilayat Qawkaz have become a security priority to the Russian government. Markedonov delved deeper into investigating Russia’s state-Islam relations.  \n\nNikolay Kozhanov shifted the discussion to “The Drivers of Russia-GCC Relations Post 2011.” Although the Soviet Union always had interest in forming closer ties with the Persian Gulf states for geostrategic motives\, the Soviet Union and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf had had troubled relations instigated by ideological differences. With the fall of the Soviet Union\, and particularly with the ascendance of Vladimir Putin to power\, Russia started becoming increasingly pragmatic in its foreign policy. Kozhanov argued that over the past few years\, Russia has been attempting for a rapprochement with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states; an attempt with high chances of success. However\, Kozhanov highlighted the fact that Russia does not have diplomatic experience is dealing with the GCC states\, with exception of Kuwait to a certain extent. The attempt of rapprochement is driven by Russia’s economic and security interests at the backdrop of sanctions imposed on Russia\, Russia’s relations with the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)\, and the government’s pursuit to maintain a higher oil price. Kozhanov stressed the argument that the willingness for a rapprochement between Russia and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf is not one-sided. For the GCC states\, better relations with Russia are important given Russia’s increasing involvement in the Middle East\, particularly in Syria. As far as oil and gas production are concerned\, it is in Saudi Arabia’s interest to have Russia “dance around” OPEC. Saudi Arabia is also interested in economic diversification. To that end\, Russia could be a potential investor\, and exporter of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) given Saudi’s current troubled relations with its main LNG exporter\, Qatar. However\, it is important not to limit the economic relationship between Russia and the GCC states to merely oil and gas. Russia also has developed economic relations related to high-tech and agriculture in the region. In conclusion\, Kozhanov suggested that Russia’s close relations with Iran will remain an obstacle to solidifying its ties to the GCC. Further complications are caused by the current geopolitical rift between Qatar and its neighbors\, as Russia is reluctant to pick sides in the matter. \n\nSamuel Ramani focused his discussion on “Russia and the Yemeni Civil War.” Ramani argued that Russia has been reluctant to pick sides in Yemen unlike in Syria. However\, it has been trying to bring conflicting parties to the dialogue table. In such attempt\, Russia has been banking on its historical relations with Yemen\, particularly South Yemen. Hence\, Ramani claims that when studying Russia’s current mediation role in Yemen\, one has to consider the Soviet Union’s role in the Yemeni civil war and unification process in 1990. Ramani claimed that one of Russia’s strategic interests in having a stable Yemen is to use it as a naval base to project power in the Red Sea. In addition\, the administration in Russia has been finding ways to project and build up on its soft power to reintroduce itself as a key player in international institutions and multilateral negotiations. These attempts by the current Russian administration are palpable in Russia’s addressing of the humanitarian situation in Hodeidah\, and the sending of a humanitarian convoy to whitewash its image in the Middle East\, and project an image better than that of the “destructive” United States internationally. Ramani added that Russia’s diplomatic engagement with the Houthi rebels is worth exploring. Russia has consistently maintained its stance on inviting Houthis to the negotiation table while supporting the arms embargo and criticizing the Houthis’ missile attacks on Saudi and assassination of Ali Abdullah Saleh. However\, Russia appears to have a disaggregated image of the Houthis. They draw a distinction between radical Houthis and the Houthi leader. Ramani also argued that there seems to be an ostensible synergy between Iran and Russia when it comes to perceived solutions to the Yemeni civil war. Both countries prefer diplomatic dialogue and object American military intervention. \n\nGhoncheh Tazmini sharpened the discussion on Russian-Iranian relations by presenting on “Iran: A Strategic Partner or a Provisional Counterweight?” Tazmini claimed that the relationship between Iran and Russia\, at least on the surface\, is inconsistent. There is a degree of ambiguity around the quality and durability of Russian-Iranian relations. Such ambiguity is stirred by actions such as the Russian delay in constructing a contracted light water reactor in Iran from 1995 to 2003\, and the delay in delivering the Russian S300 missiles\, which were dispatched a decade later. At the same time\, Russia has supported Iran’s economy by inviting it to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana and supporting a three-year provisional free trade agreement between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union in 2018. As far as Iran is concerned\, the Iranian leadership allowed Russian boots-on-ground on its territory\, which is undoubtedly against the Iranian revolutionary\, anti-imperialist narrative. Tazmini also claimed that Russian-Iranian relations have developed after the fall of the Soviet Union. Since then\, the intensity and depth of Russian-Iranian relations have been significant. Having said that\, Tazmini highlighted the importance of studying the Russian-Iranian relations through the prisms of ideations\, preferences\, and identities. \n\nYahia Zoubir concluded the working group discussions with his presentation on “Russia’s Maghreb Moment.” Historically\, particularly during the Soviet Union era\, Zoubir claimed\, Algeria was the Soviets’ only partner in the Maghreb region. While it could be argued that Libya was military aligned with the Soviets\, politically it was not. In recent years\, Russia has been seeking a grand ingress to the Maghreb. Russia sees the Maghreb states as potential economic partners. Hence\, the Russian government is in talks about establishing a free trade zone in Morocco and has recently signed a number of contracts with Maghreb states. These contracts include agricultural agreements with Morocco; tourism agreements with Morocco and Tunisia; and oil and gas\, and infrastructural cooperation with Algeria. Zoubir explained that one of the reasons behind Russia’s increasing interest in the Maghreb is that\, unlike the Americans and Chinese\, the Russians see the Maghreb as an extension of the Mashreq. Hence\, its importance stems from the Middle East’s importance to Russian interests. In addition\, the Maghreb is part of the Mediterranean; a region Russia has interests in. In forging stronger relations with the Maghreb states\, Zoubir claimed that Russia banks on the Russian oil and gas companies operating in Algeria\, and its relations with the Algerian military. \n\nIt is worth mentioning that this research initiative will be published in an edited volume by CIRS in the near future. \n\nTo view the working group agenda\, click hereTo read the participants’ biographies\, click hereRead more about this research initiative\n\nParticipants and Discussants: \n\nRoy Allison\, University of Oxford\, UKZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarCaner Bakir\, Koç University\, TurkeyIslam Hassan\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarAndrei Korobkov\, Middle Tennessee State University\, USNickolay Kozhanov\, European University\, RussiaAnatol Lieven\, Georgetown University in QatarSergey Markedonov\, Russian State University for the HumanitiesSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarViacheslav Morozov\, University of Tartu\, EstoniaAbdul Rehmaan Qayyum\, Georgetown University in QatarSamuel Ramani\, University of Oxford\, UKGhoncheh Tazmini\, London Middle East Institute at SOASTatiana Usova\, Georgetown University in QatarElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarLuciano Zaccara\, Qatar UniversityYahia H. Zoubir\, KEDGE Business School\, France\n\nArticle by Islam Hassan\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/russia-and-middle-east-working-group-i/
CATEGORIES:American Studies,Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190127T124500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190127T134500
DTSTAMP:20260404T011938
CREATED:20190220T131604Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T092502Z
UID:10001385-1548593100-1548596700@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Taking Measure of American Foreign Policy
DESCRIPTION:CIRS invited Richard L. Russell\, professor at the National Defense University in Washington\, DC\, to deliver a talk titled “Taking Measure of American Foreign Policy” on January 27\, 2019\, in which he shed light on the Trump administration’s foreign policy. He began by noting that halfway through Trump’s term in office is an appropriate juncture for an assessment of his administration’s foreign policy\, but a definitive doctrine still cannot be identified. “It’s really hard for me to discern a ‘Trump doctrine.’ I mean\, beyond ‘Make American Great Again’ or ‘America First\,’” Russell said. “Maybe that captures the tone of the administration’s foreign policy\, but it doesn’t\, in my view\, capture a substance.” \n \n \nRussell used two international relations theories—realism and liberalism—to analyze the direction of Trump’s foreign policy\, but noted that it was hard to label Trump as either realist or liberal since the president does not fit into either school. Russell explained that Trump does not qualify as a liberal\, because he pays no regard to global democracy. Typically\, the United States promotes democracy abroad in order to minimize international risks\, but Trump “doesn’t promote democracy\, he doesn’t celebrate it\, and he doesn’t honor it. In fact\, personally\, he favors authoritarian states\,” like Turkey\, Egypt\, and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore\, Russel explained\, Trump has alienated leaders of Western democracies\, including the French\, German\, and British authorities. \n \n \nFurther\, Russell argued that Trump does not fit into the liberal model because of his “disdain for multinational institutions\,” as was evidenced by his backing out of the Paris Agreement on climate change and his scorn for NATO. The president has had harsh words for the United Nations\, the World Trade Organization\, and the World Bank—international institutions that became the fabric of international relations after World War II\, which foster economic\, political\, and social stability internationally\, he said. \n \n \nTrump “doesn’t promote democracy\, he doesn’t celebrate it\, and he doesn’t honor it. In fact\, personally\, he favors authoritarian states.” \n \n \nNeither does Trump fit the realist model\, Russell explained. While some might consider the president to be a realist\, Trump has no appreciation for international balances of power. Traditionally\, nation-states balance power to prevent the outbreak of international violence according to realist theory\, but Trump is not working to accomplish this\, Russell said. For example\, while Trump is concerned about China’s trade policy\, he does not balance militarily or politically against China. Similarly\, the president has not counterbalanced Russia in Europe or the Middle East. Paradoxically\, Russell said\, while the Trump administration’s documents reflect a realist philosophy\, they bear “no resemblance to what President Trump talks about.” \n \n \nRussell explained that Trump thinks in terms of bilateral relationships and emphasizes the importance of nation-states at the expense of multi-actor alliances. “It is true that the nation-state is the pinnacle of power in international society\, but all nation-states operate in a web of interconnected economic\, political\, and cultural exchanges\,” and Trump is not disposed to even acknowledging this fact\, Russell noted. For example\, instead of communicating with Japan and South Korea\, with which the US has formal alliances\, Trump focuses on dialogue with North Korea. “That’s not the way to facilitate the formal treaty obligations that the United States has with the security partners in Asia\,” Russell said. \n \n \nTypically\, a US president surrounds himself with people who share his philosophy or worldview\, but Trump’s government is internally fractured\, Russell noted. Even before his election\, many traditional Republicans refused to support him. As a result\, Trump has relied on congressional and military staff to fill posts in his administration\, in the process blurring the lines between the military and civilian government. This\, coupled with the fact that Trump has removed two national security advisors in two years\, leaves him with an extremely fractured and inefficient team\, Russell said. The interagency process—the multilayered decision-making process used by the executive branch in all recent administrations—is also breaking down\, Russell said. Important decisions\, like withdrawing from Syria\, are made by Trump without consultation or critical expertise\, and by neglecting the diplomatic corps. Currently\, there is no Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East\, for the Pacific\, or for Europe\, and many diplomatic posts are currently vacant. \n \n \nIn conclusion\, Russell argued that Trump has managed to alienate the Intelligence Community during his time in office\, and civil-military relations are at an all-time low. Since the president views the military as his political base\, and has drafted military officers to fill national security positions\, “Trump runs the risk of politicizing the military at the senior levels and in the rank-and-file\,” Russell argued. Contrary to the president’s behavior\, the US has always had “a military that’s apolitical—that is to say\, it serves the US Constitution\, not a president.” As a final word\, Russell noted that the Trump administration is “breaking a lot of traditional norms that have held in both Republican and Democratic administrations in American foreign policy.” \n \n \nRussell noted that the views he shared during this talk were his alone and not the views of the NESA Center or the US government. \n \n \nArticle by Khansa Maria\, CURA Publications Fellow \n \n \n \nRichard L. Russell is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the Near East and South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington\, DC. He also is a Lecturer at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. He received a PhD in Foreign Affairs from the University of Virginia and previously had appointments as Adjunct Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University’s Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service and Research Associate at Georgetown’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. Russell has published three books on intelligence\, American foreign policy\, and weapons proliferation in the Middle East. \n \n \n  \n \n \n 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/taking-measure-american-foreign-policy/
CATEGORIES:American Studies,Distingushed Lectures,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190206T123000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190206T133000
DTSTAMP:20260404T011938
CREATED:20190303T110141Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210829T140025Z
UID:10001387-1549456200-1549459800@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Prospects for a Peaceful Democratic Transition in Sudan
DESCRIPTION:Abdelwahab El-Affendi\, Dean of the School of Social Sciences and Humanities and Professor of Politics at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies\, was invited by CIRS to discuss the current uprisings in Sudan\, with a lecture on “Prospects for a Peaceful Democratic Transition in Sudan” on February 6\, 2019. Giving some background on the ongoing issue\, El-Affendi explained that Omar al-Bashir has been the president of Sudan for three decades\, since coming to power after a military coup in 1989. He is considered a tyrannical leader by many\, and stands accused of crimes against humanity and war crimes by the International Criminal Court. \n \n \nEl-Affendi noted that the recent nationwide uprisings have been the most sustained in the country’s history\, ongoing since December 19\, 2018. “There has never been such widespread public support for a protest in the past. This protest is supported in almost every town of Sudan\, among most classes of people\, even among most along the spectrum—from Islamist to left wing\,” which is unprecedented\, he argued. Large gatherings\, even wedding parties\, have become sites of anti-government demonstrations. In former Sudanese revolutions\, the ruling regimes fell in less than two weeks after the start of protests\, largely because “the army—or sections of it—would side with the people and the regime would be forced away. This did not happen” in the current conflict\, El-Affendi said. Even though the legitimacy of the government has been decreasing over the years\, the military remains in support of it\, and has not voiced opposition. \n \n \n“There has never been such widespread public support for a protest in the past. This protest is supported in almost every town of Sudan\, among most classes of people\, even among most along the spectrum—from Islamist to left wing.” \n \n \nEl-Affendi explained that the current nationwide uprising was sparked by spontaneous anger\, when “people went to their bakeries and found that bread prices had tripled one morning” in Atbara\, a working-class town with a long history of labor unions—elements that contributed to the mobilization of protestors. The protests quickly spread to neighboring ad-Damar\, the capital of the province\, and adjacent Berber. It reached the capital city\, Khartoum\, within twenty-four hours. While the quick spread of the protests was surprising\, it was understandable in the rapidly declining economic climate of Sudan. \n \n \nFollowing a smaller uprising in September 2013\, al-Bashir had tried to placate the public by holding so-called “national dialogues\,” which gave people high hopes of serious reform\, El-Affendi said. However\, “the outcome of the negotiations was not up to expectations.” Essentially\, nothing happened and the buildup of anger and frustration continued. In fact\, El-Affendi argued\, a Sudanese revolution has long been in the making\, and was predicted to erupt years before the 2011 Arab uprisings\, largely because of the controversial division of the country into two separate states\, an excruciating loss for many in the north. “People had been predicting that this would be a trigger for an uprising because people would not accept this division of the country\, and would blame the government for it\,” he said. \n \n \nIn past Sudanese revolutions\, when a regime fell\, a transitional government would be set up by an alliance of political parties\, trade unions and professional organizations\, and there would be new elections\, he said. “Now the revolutionaries are saying no.” The protestors are no longer interested in any form of consensual transition. People are so frustrated with the current regime that they are demanding that the entire structure of the government be dismantled\, El-Affendi said. “The revolutionaries are very radical in their demands. They say we don’t want any negotiations with this government\, we don’t want any talks with them.” As such\, al-Bashir and his administration are on the defensive and mobilizing resources to reassert control. “At the moment\, we are in a kind of deadlock where protests seem to be mounting and sustained\, while the government seems to be able to hold the fort\,” El-Affendi said. \n \n \nIn conclusion\, El-Affendi suggested three possible solutions to the conflict: 1) the military can refuse to serve the government\, similar to what happened in Tunisia and Egypt during the Arab uprisings; 2) the government can escalate the violence and start killing civilians to deter protests; 3) or a mediation effort can be implemented via the international community\, through the African Union\, for example. The former African Union President Thabo Mbeki had intervened in Sudan in the past\, mediating situations like the conflict in Darfur in 2008\, and the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan\, he said. However\, the Sudanese government seems to think it does not need international or outside help. Finally\, El-Affendi characterized the situation as “a kind of Syrian scenario\, where the regime will hold its own\, but the protests will increase\, and will probably become violent.” \n \n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Khansa Maria\, CURA Publications Fellow. \n \n \n \nAbdelwahab El-Affendi is Dean of the School of Social Sciences and Humanities and Professor of Politics at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies. Previously\, he was Head of the Politics and International Relations program at DI\, and Coordinator of the Democracy and Islam program at University of Westminster. He also worked as a diplomat in the Sudanese Foreign Ministry and has worked as Editor or Managing Editor of several publications. He was a Visiting Fellow/Professor at the Christian Michelsen Institute in Norway\, Northwestern University\, Oxford University\, Cambridge University\, and the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization in Malaysia. He is the author of Genocidal Nightmares: Narratives of Insecurity and the Logic of Mass Atrocities (2015).
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/prospects-peaceful-democratic-transition-sudan/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Regional Studies
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190207T123000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190207T163000
DTSTAMP:20260404T011938
CREATED:20190114T083655Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210610T073625Z
UID:10001141-1549542600-1549557000@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:CURA Workshop: Introduction to Research Methods
DESCRIPTION:CIRS hosted its second CURA workshop for GU-Q students on the topic “Introduction to Research Methods” The workshop\, held on February 7\, 2019\, presented a conceptual definition of research methods\, introduced methodological approaches\, addressed practical issues concerning data availability\, and helped students to identify appropriate strategies for tackling their own research projects. \n \n \nJustin Gengler\, Assistant Research Professor at the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI) at Qatar University\, gave a presentation that served to identify methodological and scientific research approaches. He shared the basics of theory building\, including but not limited to\, case studies\, process tracing\, large-N\, surveys\, and randomized experiments. He emphasized the concepts of internal and external validity as tools for evaluating the strengths and weakness of different methods. \n \n \n“After attending the first CURA Workshop\, the second one was definitely beneficial as it allowed me to build on my prior knowledge and work on my research skills.” – Khushboo Shah (class of 2022)\, CURA Administrative Fellow. \n \n \nHis key point was that some approaches are better suited for particular types of research questions\, and that there exists a link between a research question and the method used to investigate it. Gengler led interactive sessions with the students in order for them to identify the best methodological approach given a specific research question. One exercise consisted of determining and explaining the dependent variable and the causal processes of different study cases. \n \n \nThe workshop was facilitated by Elizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS Project Manager\, and Islam Hassan\, CIRS Research Analyst\, with the assistance of Shaza Afifi\, Mohammed Al-Jaberi\, Ameena Almeer\, Chaïmaa Benkermi\, Irakli Gobejishvili\, Irene Promodh\, Abdul Rehmaan Qayyum\, and Khushboo Shah—all current CURA Fellows. The Fellows guided group activities that consisted of matching a research question to the most suitable methodological approach put forward by Gengler. \n \n \n“The workshop taught me much more than just methodological research plans\, but also how to cooperate and compromise as a group and appreciate each other’s contributions\, regardless of how radically different they may seem.” – Irene Promodh (class 2021)\, CURA Research Fellow. \n \n \nThe different exercises\, through both the PollEverywhere interactive medium and individual reflection\, helped students identify the appropriate methodological approach to answer the research question: “How does university study abroad by Qatar-based students influence their attitudes toward gender relations in society and in the family?” After individual reflections\, students formed small groups to come to an agreement on the following criteria for the predetermined question: the scope of the case to be considered; the level of analysis; the indicators and variables to be studied; the theoretical limitations of the chosen approach; and the practical challenges of the chosen approach. The groups then formulated their proposals and presented them to the full group for feedback and evaluation. \n \n \nCURA Research Fellow Abdul Rehmaan Qayyum (class of 2021) commented that the workshop would “help people seeking to publish papers for CURA\, researching for UREP\, or even those who plan on pursuing a master’s degree.” Another participant described the group activity as “extremely helpful\,” notably due to the feedback from CIRS staff and Professor Gengler. \n \n \nSeventeen students from all class years attended the workshop. The workshop was useful for all participants\, from freshmen working on their midterm papers to seniors preparing for their honors. Those who successfully completed the workshop were awarded electronic badges that could be shared on their LinkedIn profiles. \n \n \nCIRS has been promoting students’ research skills and research methodologies through its CURA workshop series. GU-Q students will be able to participate in the next CURA workshop in fall 2019. \n \n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Chaïmaa Benkermi (class of 2021)\, CURA Publications Fellow
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/cura-workshop-introduction-research-methods/
CATEGORIES:Student Engagement
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190213T124500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190213T134500
DTSTAMP:20260404T011938
CREATED:20190319T054658Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T092423Z
UID:10001388-1550061900-1550065500@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Western Higher Education in Global Contexts
DESCRIPTION:Mohanalakshmi Rajakumar is a Qatar-based novelist and community course instructor at VCUarts Qatar who writes on topics related to gender\, race\, and pedagogy. On February 13\, 2019\, she presented a CIRS Focused Discussion\, “Western Higher Education in Global Contexts\,” in which she explored the topic of international branch campuses (IBCs)—such as Georgetown University in Qatar and other universities in Education City—and their growing popularity and impact on international development in education. She recently edited a book by the same title\, published in 2018\, which examines global perspectives on the internationalization of American higher education practices in Europe\, Asia\, and the Middle East. \n \n \nThe premise of the IBC is the agreement between a national entity and a US-based institution that students will earn the same degree they would receive from the main campus\, Rajakumar explained. Due to this arrangement\, IBCs typically do not offer professors specialized training in cultural sensitivity because\, “If it is the exact same degree\, then there would be no additives\, no preservatives\, nothing at all changed\,” she said. Students are also not oriented to the unique nature of studying at an IBC\, which may vary drastically from their previous educational training.   \n \n \nRajakumar shared a case study with the audience to show the importance of understanding the overlapping influences of cultural norms and diversity of values in multicultural classrooms. Such cases are a follow up to the larger project of the book\, intended to feature the “brass tacks and lived realities for the people doing the teaching and learning” in IBCs\, she said. According to Rajakumar\, the main themes within the case study were conflicting norms about timeliness and people’s differing attitudes about authority figures in intercultural settings.  \n \n \n“This is a case that looks at authority; who has authority\, who is allowed to question the authority\, and the ways in which power circulates in a classroom.” \n \n \nThe central conflict in the case raised the critical question of who is in charge and what is open to negotiation in a university classroom. “Some people think rules are rules\,” she explained. Others feel that\, “Rules are rules\, but they shouldn’t apply to ‘me’ because ‘I’ have this exceptional circumstance.” A one-size-fits-all model for teaching in international contexts is impossible to implement\, she said\, because students may find faults with their syllabi depending on the importance of the course to their major. Other factors also influence classroom behavior including gender\, ethnic background\, and personality types; therefore\, there can often be conflict between faculty and students\, as well as among students themselves. \n \n \nUltimately\, Rajakumar explained\, “This is a case that looks at authority; who has authority\, who is allowed to question the authority\, and the ways in which power circulates in a classroom.” She concluded by noting that an unfortunate reality of Western education today is that it is not molded to fit various cultural contexts. Additionally\, professors and students at IBCs are not prepared for the unique learning process they are undertaking. “No matter whether it was Russia\, Japan\, Qatar\, Lebanon—across all of our research sites\, there was little to almost no training given to faculty for their particular cultural setting\,” she said. IBCs seem to be perpetuating a Western narrative in this respect\, and cultural awareness training is necessary for their future success. \n \n \nArticle by Khansa Maria\, CURA Publications Fellow \n \n \n \nMohanalakshmi Rajakumar is a novelist and educator with a PhD in English Literature. Her work has been published in a variety of peer reviewed journals and books including Gender\, Teaching American Literature\, and South Asian Review\, among others. Rajakumar has also been recognized for her work as a novelist. Her contemporary romance\, Love Comes Later\, won the Best Indie Book Award for Romance in 2013\, and her coming-of-age novel\, An Unlikely Goddess\, earned her recognition as a finalist in the SheWrites New Novelist competition in 2011. Her edited volume\, Western Higher Education in Global Contexts\, contributes to the scholarship on the project of implementing and expanding US-influenced curricula in the Middle East and Asia. 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/western-higher-education-global-contexts/
CATEGORIES:American Studies,Dialogue Series,Regional Studies
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190224T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190225T150000
DTSTAMP:20260404T011938
CREATED:20190411T061716Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210829T135928Z
UID:10001391-1550998800-1551106800@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Political Economy of the Contemporary Middle East Working Group I
DESCRIPTION:On February 24-25\, 2019\, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) brought together a number of scholars to commence a new research effort on  the “Political Economy of the Contemporary Middle East.” Over the course of two days\, the participating scholars discussed a wide array of topics\, including: neo-liberal policies post the 2011 uprisings; business interests of Middle Eastern militaries; private security and military companies; economic integration in the Levant and GCC; foreign direct investments (FDI) in North Africa and the GCC; state bureaucracy and the economy in Iran\, as well currency and black market manipulations in Iran; development policies in the post-2011 GCC; and the emerging transformation of state-business relations in the GCC. \n\nAngela Joya began the working group discussions by speaking on the topic of “Neoliberal Policies in the Post-2011 Middle East.” Joya provided a review of public sentiment towards economic conditions across the Middle East\, and focused on different countries in the region in her discussion. Joya suggested that over the past seven years we have seen a range of public protest in the region which focus specifically on the economy and peoples’ grievances over poor economic conditions. The Arab Uprisings commenced with cases of self-immolation in Tunisia\, a brutal form of protest to highlight the lack of financial and material wellbeing for average citizens. Since the Arab Uprisings while this momentum has diminished it has not complete gone away\, and neither have the underlying economic issues. In Morocco public demonstrations erupted over the declining standards of living\, rising costs of everyday goods\, and increasing unemployment. In Egypt\, since 2016\, there has been a dramatic increase in poverty after the IMF-imposed structural reforms\, however public protests have diminished. The economic conditions  in Yemen\, Libya\, and Syria are dire\, while Jordan is also seeing increasing economic dissatisfaction. While in several cases the economy is being aggravated by war and conflict\, we see people trying to escape war and conflict\, but also steady streams of Middle Eastern migrants trying to leave their countries as a result of economic hardship. Joya suggested that further academic exploration is needed to examine the extent of neoliberal reforms in the Middle East and what the implications of the new economic reforms are on social\, economic\, and political conditions. Joya stated that governments initially responded to protests and public signs of dissatisfaction by adopting bigger fiscal policies\, increasing wages\, and pumping money into the market. This led to heavy government borrowing and was then followed by restrictive spending measures\, subsidies being cut\, and then prices being liberalized\, an ongoing cyclical repetition seen in this region. \n\nAhmed Hashim shifted the discussion to “Military Inc.-Private Sector Relations.” Hashim said that while militaries are designed to fight internal and external enemies\, in the Middle East\, they do a great deal more than that. Militaries in the Middle East have frequently engaged in the economy\, often causing significant distortions. This provokes the question: Why and how does the military get involved in the economic sector? The military’s role in the economy increased dramatically as states moved from state-owned to liberal markets. Under the Socialist regime of Nasser in Egypt\, for example\, the military was involved in arms production\, but it was also involved in the private sector and importation of products. Under Sadat the military’s engagement in the economy increased significantly\, and since Mubarak there is no sector of the Egyptian economy that the military is not involved in. Hashim also asked: What impact does the military’s involvement in economy have on the economy and private sector? As Sadat dismantled the Nasser system\, the military expanded dramatically in the economy. And since 2011\, it is estimated that the military controls around thirty percent of the Egyptian economy. The setup encouraged the military’s involvement in real estate rather than expanding the production base. Hashim concluded his presentation with recommending further research on conscripted labors; the impact of the military on the private sector; competition versus collaboration between the military inc. and private sector; and competition among quasi-military inc. \n\nBuilding on Hashim’s presentation\, Shir Hever focused the discussion on “Private Security and Military Companies: The Case of Israel.” Hever highlighted five main areas that deserve in-depth academic study insofar as the Israeli military-industrial complex is concerned. The first area is the privatization of the Israeli security sector. Such privatization expanded to include the military\, police\, and prison services. Second is the Israeli Laboratory Model. In this regard\, arms producing companies in Israel have marketed their products globally as experimented on-ground. However\, Hever alluded that the success of such arms and technologies is questionable if the relationship between political events and the financial reports of companies is tested. He argued that an Israeli arms-producing company’s financial reports reached its peak in 2009 after the war in Gaza\, and reached a second peak in 2012 after the second Gaza invasion. However in 2014 with the third Gaza invasion\, the company’s revenues did not increase. The failure of the company’s arms and technologies to subjugate Palestinians and refrain them from indulging in resistance against the Israeli occupation shows the failure of the Laboratory Model. Finally\, Hever claimed that a study of Private Military & Security Companies (PMSCs) and the internal conflicts between Israeli security\, business\, and state elites are worth studying.  \n\nImad El-Anis shifted the discussion to “The Shifting Boundaries of Economic Integration in the Levant.” El-Anis raised a number of areas worth exploring with regards to economic integration in the Levant. He claimed that commercial institutions do not have the pacification effect\, but information and communication technology (ICT) development could be a driver of economic integration in the region. However\, ICT has been completely ignored in the region. El-Anis also alluded to the importance of special economic and infrastructure zones driven by resources\, such as the aquifer in south of Jordan. He claimed that such resources can serve as modes of cooperation\, reshaping the way production and trading is taking place. Among the topics that deserve studying is energy reserve discoveries in eastern Mediterranean. El-Anis argued that such discoveries are contentious\, exploited by Israel. Finally\, El-Anis claimed that the “pacifying effect” should be studying given that militarized interstate disputes need more attention given their impact on economic cooperation. \n\nLeading the discussion to another significant sub-region of the Middle East\, Mumtaz Hussain Shah presented on “The Puzzle of Foreign Direct Investments in North Africa.” Shah raised four important\, original research questions. The first question has to do with the puzzle of productivity spillover in North Africa. Second is: Why have not FDIs contribute to short-term economic growth? And how can this be solved? Third\, How do GCC states\, despite the structural economic impediments and heavy regulation of the market\, still increasingly receive FDIs? And what are the lessons learned for the Levant? Finally: How to make effective use of MNCs? Shah argued that there is not significant regional FDI investment in North Africa. Thorough and effective implementation of regional integration schemes\, third generation of trade elements\, investment in related expense\, introduction of investor-friendly policies and nondiscriminatory legal and ethical frameworks could significantly improve FDI in the region.   \n\nKian Tajbakhsh presented on “State Bureaucracy and Economy in Iran.” He claimed that the growth of state led developmentalism has been significant since the 1980s. Such phenomenon is not solely ostensible in Iran\, but across the Arab Middle East as well. However\, the lack of up-to-date data on the entire state bureaucracy remains an issue worth exploration. Tajbakhsh also alluded to the importance of studying performance and effectiveness of the state in economic growth\, service delivery\, human development\, etc. This discussion led to the question: How state-bureaucracy is designed at different scales? Finally\, Tajbakhsh argued that there is also a need to conduct a comparative analysis with other countries in the region to understand the impact of Iran’s theocratic system on the country’s economic system\, and which other state bureaucracies in the region are operating under similar paradigms.  \n\nIn sharpening the discussion on Iran\, Esfandyar Batmanghelidj discussed “Currency and Black Market Manipulation.” Batmanghelidj claimed that the Riyal has lost around seventy percent of its value. Such devaluation raises the questions: To what extent is such devaluation a result of sanctions or development policies? And what are the relationships between trade exchange rate and inflation in Iran? In addition\, given that oil revenue contributes substantially to Iran’s foreign currency reserves\, which is important for imports heavy industrialization\, sanctions on Iran’s sales of oil and gas has had an impact on foreign exchange\, and hence on the prices of goods in Iran. Germane to this discussion\, Batmanghelidj claimed that the Iranian Riyal is worthwhile for poor people. While for middle classes\, the pasture of currency exchange is much higher as they seek purchases of imported electronics\, automobiles\, etc. There is an assumption that devaluation can boost exports. However\, this does not hold under sanctions. Exporting of goods despite their low prices is not possible under sanction regimes. Batmanghelidj also highlighted that there are three different foreign currency exchange rates as result of the limited foreign currency reserves: one for essential goods\, another for other goods\, and third for hard currency at exchange shops. In addition to that\, rent seekers have manipulated this system to generate profit\, hence posing more challenge to importers. Finally\, Batmanghelidj concluded his presentation with two questions: How do sanctions put pressure of Iran’s foreign currency reserves? And how do domestic rent seekers respond to the depletion of foreign currency reserves? \n\nYousuf Al Balushi focused his presentation on “Development Policies in the Post-2011 GCC.” He argued that the GCC countries face a number of issues in implementing developmental policies. Among such issues are: the consistency of public policy to achieve development goals; weak economic leadership in the GCC; the economic structure in the GCC states and size of government; and rent-seeking behavior. Al Balushi argued that other structural impediments also have an impact on development policies in the GCC\, including: the state-business-society relations model\, government tenders and societal expectations; the lack of business-led development. Al Balushi concluded his presentation with emphasizing the need to empower that private sector through strategic partnership with the state. Such endeavor would increase production and exports\, which are fundamental to move toward more sustainable FDI mechanisms in the GCC. \n\nBuilding on Al Balushi’s presentation\, Ashraf Mishrif discussed “The Shifting Boundaries of Economic Integration in the GCC.” Mishrif kicked off his presentation by asking: Are we heading back towards globalization? With Brexit\, the failure of NAFTA to remain intact\, and the cracks in the GCC in light of the on-going crisis\, there is a need to re-examine the global economic structure. In this regard\, Mishrif raised the questions: Is the theory of regionalism still valid on the global scale? And what factors contribute toe the retreat of regionalism? There have been consistent setbacks in regionalism efforts in the GCC. This is ostensible in the common market endeavors. Inter-regional trade in the GCC suggests that regional integration in the GCC is marginal. It never amounted more than ten to eleven percent. In addition\, there have not been attempts to use common markets to enhance regional integration in the GCC. It was the United Arab Emirates that was defined as the gateway to the GCC\, leaving out other GCC member states. Hence\, the implementation of regional integration in the GCC is worth exploring. Mishrif argued that one problem with the GCC integration is the hierarchal structure of the organization\, starting with the General Secretariat that does very little in forming strategies. As for bureaucratic structure\, it has failed to claim supranational mandate that could drive economic cooperation among the member states. \n\nAnastasia Nosova concluded the working group discussion with her presentation on “Changes and Continuities in State-Business Relations Post-2011 Arab Uprisings: The Case of the GCC.” Nosova claimed that across the GCC\, there is a class of merchant elite that has disproportionate privileges\, and depends on the state. This class does not influence policies\, with exception of Oman and Kuwait to an extent. It also competes with the rest of society over resources. Since 2017\, state-business relations have appear to have gone through major transformation\, particularly evident in the case of Saudi Arabia. There is a transformation in the nature of business in the GCC from being in the hand of business families and few members of the ruling families to a state instrument of development. For the past two years\, contracts have been distributed on the basis of merit while previously these were awarded more on the basis of networks and connections between the state and business elites. Further studying this emerging trends in state-business relations in the GCC is critical and will be included in this project moving forward. \n\nTo view the working group agenda\, click hereTo read the participants’ biographies\, click hereRead more about this research initiative\n\nParticipants and Discussants:  \n\nAbdullah Al-Arian\, Georgetown University in QatarYousuf Al Balushi\, Central Bank of OmanAlanoud Al Maadeed\, Qatar UniversityZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarEsfandyar Batmanghelidj\, Bourse & Bazaar\, IranImad El-Anis\, Nottingham Trent University\, UKAhmed S. Hashim\, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies\, SingaporeIslam Hassan\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarShir Hever\, The Real News NetworkAngela Joya\, University of Oregon\, USMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarNatalie Koch\, Syracuse University\, USSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarAshraf Mishrif\, Qatar UniversityAnastasia Nosova\, The Risk Advisory Group\, UKAbdul Rehmaan Qayyum\, Georgetown University in QatarKhushboo Shah\, Georgetown University in QatarMumtaz Hussain Shah\, University of Peshawar\, PakistanKian Tajbakhsh\, Columbia University\, USElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar\n\nArticle by Islam Hassan\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/political-economy-contemporary-middle-east-working-group-i/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190311T124500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190311T134500
DTSTAMP:20260404T011938
CREATED:20190410T084334Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210829T135240Z
UID:10001390-1552308300-1552311900@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:A Local East African Newspaper v. the State and Market Forces
DESCRIPTION:Phoebe Musandu\, professor of History at GU-Q and a scholar of African history\, was invited to discuss her research on Kenyan newspapers in the colonial and post-colonial periods during a CIRS Focused Discussion\, titled “Serve . . . as Best as We Can:” A Local East African Newspaper v. the State and Market Forces\,” on March 11\, 2019. Musandu began by providing some historical background\, explaining that Kenya had been a protectorate as well as a colony of the British from 1895 to 1963. The country was subject to drastic structural reforms from the 1960s\, with the press\, in general\, and newspapers specifically\, playing an important role in shaping the narrative of the day. \n\nIn her research\, Musandu examines the extent to which mass media are vehicles for public opinion. In order to study “not just the information\, but who produces the information\, how they disseminate it\, and the power inherent in the ability to disseminate information and influence people\,” she focused on the first African-owned newspaper in post-colonial Kenya\, the Nairobi Times\, which was established by Hilary Ng’weno in the 1970s. At the time\, two pro-government\, foreign-owned newspapers dominated the market\, the East African Standard and The Nation. \n\nMusandu argued that the odds were against the Nairobi Times from the beginning. This was largely due to a restrictive political environment and to the meager capital base of its owner\, Ng’weno. In the colonial era\, she explained\, Africans had started and successfully managed newspapers\, but the market had changed in the post-colonial era\, such that a significant amount of capital investment was necessary to establish a newspaper. Musandu argued that “this was another challenge Africans faced in the transition to independence\, and in the early years of independence—international banks did not want to give loans to Africans.”  \n\nHowever\, despite these structural setbacks\, Ng’weno was able to obtain loans from the Industrial Development Bank and from the National Bank of Kenya\, which was a parastatal—a business partially controlled by the state. This put Ng’weno in the delicate position of having to report on the government\, even as it was the newspaper’s primary funder\, Musandu said. Repayment of these loans required that the Nairobi Times generate significant income from advertising\, which put it at a great disadvantage to its established competitors.  \n\nMusandu contextualized the environment of news reporting in Kenya in its transition to independence. One of the oldest newspapers was the East African Standard\, founded by influential British settlers and sold to Lonrho—formerly the mining company London Rhodesia—in 1967. The CEO of Lonrho\, Roland Rowland\, had a great sphere of influence in the UK and in Kenya\, which included members of the Parliament\, and President Jomo Kenyatta and his family. Rowland strategically invested in business opportunities through Lonrho\, and every investment he made\, and his interactions with the president and his family members\, were covered extensively in the Standard. This served to increase Rowland’s visibility and power.  \n\n“The newspapers for them\, I argue\, were not about public opinion\, they were not an end—they were a means to an end. The end being the protection and consolidation of economic interests outside of the newspaper itself.” \n\nThe other major daily\, the Daily Nation\, was primarily owned by the Aga Khan—the spiritual leader of the Ismaili branch of Shiite Islam. At a turbulent time when racial minorities\, including many Asians\, were migrating from Kenya due to political and economic uncertainty in the years immediately before and after independence\, the Aga Khan urged Ismailis to remain and make the country their permanent home. He led the way by investing his personal/Ismaili funds in profitable ventures to improve investor confidence in the country and in a bid to contribute to the stabilization of the economy. Musandu said\, “He used this newspaper to essentially communicate to the state the necessity of preserving a political and economic environment that was favorable to everyone—the majority and the minority.” \n\nThe East African Standard and the Daily Nation both allied themselves with the state\, Musandu said. “They were very afraid of contradicting the government\, and I think this was done precisely because they were using their publications to defend their investments.” This behavior revealed a continued trend of newspaper owners engaging centers of power in the interests of capital that dates back to the British colonial era\, she said. “The newspapers for them\, I argue\, were not about public opinion\, they were not an end—they were a means to an end. The end being the protection and consolidation of economic interests outside of the newspaper itself\,” Musandu contended.  \n\nFurthermore\, opposing the government narrative had drastic repercussions\, according to Musandu. She gave an example of a highly regarded newspaper editor who was fired after publishing an article that was critical of government detention of university professors and students. Subsequently\, the newspaper ran a public apology to the government on the front page. Musandu found numerous documents in the archives that showed how the government would summon the editors and owners of different publications in order to interrogate them when they stepped out of line. \n\nThe title of Musandu’s talk\, “Serve as Best as We Can\,” comes from the first edition of the Nairobi Times\, in which Ng’weno outlined his goals for the publication. Musandu argued that he used those words because he understood the political environment in which he was operating\, noting that Ng’weno was intent on taking on the established newspapers. “He wanted to raise the level of political discourse in the country\, and wanted it to be fiercely independent\,” she said. In conclusion\, Musandu argued the prevailing political environment\, in which the dissemination of news was secondary to vested interests in other sectors of the economy\, meant that Ng’weno’s experiment with a free press was short lived\, and he was forced to shut down his newspaper due to bankruptcy. The government bought the newspaper from him and re-branded it as the Kenya Times.  \n\n  \n\nArticle by Khansa Maria\, CURA Publications Fellow \n\nPhoebe Musandu is a scholar of African history. She has research interests in African historical methodology\, mass media and has published papers in women and gender history. Her last major research project resulted in a manuscript she is preparing for publication that examines the establishment and operations of various secular newspapers in East Africa between 1899 and 1990. As a consequence of working on this project\, she has also developed an interest in the history of other forms of mass media as well as African commercial history which she intends to cultivate in the long-term. She is the author of Pressing Interests: The Agenda and Influence of a Colonial East African Newspaper Sector (McGill 2018). \n\n 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/local-east-african-newspaper-v-state-and-market-forces/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Race & Society
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190313T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190313T140000
DTSTAMP:20260404T011938
CREATED:20190714T102903Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T092304Z
UID:10001396-1552467600-1552485600@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Healthcare Access for Single Male Laborers (SML) in Qatar: Research Roundtable II
DESCRIPTION:As part of the partnership between CIRS\, and Qatar-based institutions to investigate the current state of healthcare provision to single male labors (SML)\, a second working group for this project was held on March 13\, 2019. Scholars\, practitioners\, stakeholders\, and government entities participated in the working group with the aim to examine SML’s access to healthcare in Qatar\, and formulate policy recommendations for improvements of the state of migrants’ health. \n\nThe one-day working group served as a follow-up to the April 2018 preliminary brainstorming session. The discussion was divided into four broad themes: overview findings from the first working group\, government services to SML\, challenges and industry-led interventions; and the healthcare perspective. Experts presented their research and insights to provide a better understanding of migrant workers’ health conditions and healthcare delivery within Qatar. 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/healthcare-access-single-male-laborers-sml-qatar-research-roundtable-ii/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190314T123000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190314T133000
DTSTAMP:20260404T011938
CREATED:20190402T073134Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T092248Z
UID:10001389-1552566600-1552570200@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:CURA Seminar: Science and Scientific Production in the Middle East
DESCRIPTION:On March 14\, 2019\, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) held its second CURA Seminar for the 2018-2019 academic year. Coinciding with the second working group meeting on “Science and Scientific Production in the Middle East\,” CURA fellows participated in the seminar discussing two submitted articles as part of the research initiative. Islam Hassan\, CIRS Research Analyst\, started the seminar welcoming the attendees and providing a brief overview of the research initiative then giving the floor to the CURA fellows to summarize and critique their assigned articles. Irakli Gobejishvili (class of 2022) and Khushboo Shah (class of 2022) served as presenters of the two articles\, and Shaza Afifi (class of 2022)\, Khansa Maria (class of 2021)\, Riham Mansour (class of 2019)\, Abdul Rehmaan Qayyum (class of 2021)\, and Chaïmaa Benkermi (class of 2021) served as discussants. \n \n \nGobejishvili presented Tariq Dana’s paper titled: “A Cruel Innovation: Israeli Military and Security Production.” The paper studies the military-industrial complex in Israel as a field of technological advancement\, a source of revenue\, and as a “security apparatus.” The paper problematizes Israel’s arms trade with world regimes accused of committing atrocities\, as the author claims. \n \n \nShah presented Abdelkader Djeflat’s paper titled: “Science\, Technology and Socio-Economic Inequalities: What Inclusive Model for Arab Countries?” Throughout the different sections\, the paper answers the questions: how have social inequalities hampered access to science and technology? How does the elitist access to science and technology work in the region? To what extent has the elitist access been obstructive to the advancement of science and technology? And how could we build a more inclusive and sustainable science\, technology\, and innovation (STI) system? \n \n \nSubsequent to the paper presentations\, the discussants kicked off the group discussion with their critique on the papers’ arguments and structure\, and possible improvements. Two CURA research fellows\, Ameena Almeer (class of 2020) and Irene Promodh (class of 2021)\, served as ambassadors to the Science and Scientific Production in the Middle East working group\, and shared the comments and critique brought up at the CURA seminar. \n \n \n\nFor the participants’ biographies\, please click here\n\n \nArticle by Mohammed Al-Jaberi\, CURA Publications Fellow
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/cura-seminar-science-and-scientific-production-middle-east/
CATEGORIES:American Studies,Race & Society,Regional Studies,Student Engagement
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190317T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190317T170000
DTSTAMP:20260404T011938
CREATED:20190714T112732Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T092134Z
UID:10001398-1552813200-1552842000@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Science and Scientific Production in the Middle East Working Group II
DESCRIPTION:On March 17 2019\, the Center for International and Regional Studies held the second working group under its research initiative on “Science and Scientific Production in the Middle East.” This was a one day meeting where the convened scholars presented and critiqued papers that tackled a wide array of issues\, among which: access to science and technology in the Middle East; Islam and bioethics; consumerism and scientific innovation; the sanction regime in Iran; the inheritance debate in Tunisia; and the military-industrial complex in Israel. \n\nAbdelkader Djeflat started the working group discussion with his paper\, co-authored with Labo Clersé\, on “Science\, Technology and Socio-Economic Inequalities: What Inclusive Model for Arab Countries?” In his paper\, the authors argues that minerals\, such as oil and gas\, have generated enormous wealth in Middle Eastern countries\, particularly the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. However\, inequality prevails and large portions of the populations in the Middle East live in poverty. While most of the scholarship on the rising economic inequality in the region focuses on income distribution\, political regimes\, and social fragmentation\, there is a gap as far as inequality of access to science and technology is concerned. The paper fills this gap by tackling three main questions: first\, how have social inequalities hampered access to science and technology? Second\, how does the elitist access to science and technology work in the region? And to what extent has it been obstructive to the advancement of science and technology? And third\, what would be the impact of a more inclusive and sustainable science\, technology\, and innovation system? \n\nHatem M’henni focused the discussion on “Economic Policies\, Consumerism\, and Scientific Innovation in the Middle East.” In his paper\, M’henni clarifies the theoretical underpinning of the relationship between consumerism and innovation\, and examines this relationship in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Based on his study\, M’henni introduces five main arguments. First\, he states that innovation in the MENA region is still linear in nature. Second\, the Middle Eastern companies continue to treat the consumer as a customer. Third\, successful innovation experiences are\, for the most part\, the result of individual initiative rather than state policies. Fourth\, economic and social needs are the main drivers of innovation. Finally\, as the average level of education in the region is improving significantly\, consumerism will inevitably contribute to innovation in the MENA region. \n\nAyman Shabana shifted the discussion to “Reproductive Genetic Counseling and the Burden of Choice within the Islamic Context.” In his paper\, Shabana examines the process of genetic counseling within the framework of assisted reproduction. The paper investigates the moral burden associated with the choices that modern genetic applications have made available in this area of medical practice from an Islamic perspective. Shabana suggests that the moral consequences of genetic testing have to be analyzed at two related yet distinct ethical-legal and theological levels. At the ethical-legal level these moral consequences have to be evaluated in light of important principles such as procurement of benefit and avoidance of harm. At the theological level\, however\, assessment must reach beyond mere notions of benefit and harm to include core theological concepts such as divine creation and decree. This two-way analysis may help explain and guide the process of genetic counseling within the Muslim context. \n\nSari Hanafi presented his paper\, co-authored with Azzam Tomeh\, on “Beyond Religion and Secularism: Gender Equality in the Inheritance Debate in Tunisia and the Formation of the Non-Authoritarian Reasoning.” The paper discusses the current debate about equal inheritance for both men and women in Tunisia. It challenges many clichés\, such as the religious versus the secular discourse\, and examines whether those binaries hold true in the Tunisian context. The authors argue that the mapping out of the inheritance debate has shown three different logics: jurisprudential/textual\, sociological\, and legal. The authors conclude the paper by highlighting that the discussion occurring in Tunisia over inheritance uses common language\, which allows for the reduction of authoritarian tendencies and polarization through means of dialogue. \n\nElizabeth Wanucha presented Parviz Tarikhi’s article: “Sanctions and the Scientific Community of Iran.” Tarikhi’s article sheds light on the main operatives and interlinks of sanctions and the Iranian scientific community. Although it is hard to estimate quantitatively the impacts of sanctions on the Iranian scientific community\, Tarikhi claims that sanctions\, particularly those imposed in the recent decade\, have negatively impacted the Iranian community and subsequently the scientific community. Sanctions have also contributed to the growth of the Iranian scientific community in diaspora fleeing restrictions at home. Tarikhi also claims that the sanctions regime strengthened extremism and stimulated totalitarianism in the Islamic Republic. \n\nIslam Hassan presented Tariq Da’na’s paper entitled “A Cruel Innovation: Israeli Military and Security Production.” Da’na argues that the Israeli army\, which is the main source feeding Israeli militarism\, is by virtue an instrument of organized violence. Ever since the violent birth of the State of Israel in 1948\, militarism constituted the backbone of its body politic\, national identity\, society\, economy\, culture\, foreign policy and worldview. The institutionalization of Israeli militarism is rooted in Political Zionism. With the formal initiation of the Israeli state-building in 1948\, Zionist leaders espoused a militaristic-nationalist paradigm to underlie the process of nation-building. Hence\, the Israeli military is not solely an institution concerned with external security\, defense\, and war. It was designed to play multiple social and economic functions and promote the culture of militarism. As a result\, Israeli society is a militarized one\, where citizens are actively involved in military activities\, and the military is actively involved in non-military activities. Da’na provides an overview of Israel’s military industries and technologies\, highlighting the interrelationship between Israeli military industries and technological development. He then moves on discuss the characteristics of Israel’s military and security innovation focusing on the dependency on the American system\, the development of unethical technology\, the military industry\, and the complicity in worldwide atrocities. He concludes the paper with a discussion on the testing of weapons on the Great March of Return. \n\nFor the working group agenda\, click hereFor the participants’ biographies\, click hereRead more about this research initiative\n\nParticipants and Discussants:  \n\nAmeena Almeer\, Georgetown University in QatarZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarRana Dajani\, Hashemite University\, JordanTariq Da’na\, Doha Institute of Graduate Studies\, QatarAbdelkader Djeflat\, University of Lille\, FranceMohammed Ghaly\, Hamad Bin Khalifa University\, QatarSari Hanafi\, American University of Beirut\, LebanonIslam Hassan\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarHatem M’henni\, University of Manouba\, Tunisia Suzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarIrene Ann Promodh\, Georgetown University in QatarAyman Shabana\, Georgetown University in QatarJackie Starbird\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarParviz Tarikhi\, Space Science and Technology Specialist\, IranElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar\n\nArticle by Islam Hassan\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/science-and-scientific-production-middle-east-working-group-ii/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190324T124500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190324T134500
DTSTAMP:20260404T011938
CREATED:20190417T065045Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210829T135127Z
UID:10001392-1553431500-1553435100@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:The Impact of Business and Political News on the GCC Stock Market
DESCRIPTION:Alanoud Al-Maadid\, Assistant Professor of Economics at Qatar University\, examined how politics and economics are intertwined in the relationships of the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)\, an alliance founded in 1981 that includes Saudi Arabia\, Kuwait\, the United Arab Emirates\, Qatar\, Bahrain\, and Oman. She explored these dynamics by looking at the effect of news on GCC stock market returns in a Focused Discussion\, titled “The Impact of Business and Political News on the GCC Stock Market\,” at CIRS on March 24\, 2019. \n\nAl-Maadid explained that the forces of supply and demand is a general rule in economics. However\, she said\, behavioral economics—the effects of psychological\, emotional\, cultural\, and social factors on decision making—may often go against what is implied in the standard economic model. “In behavioral economics\, people are sometimes irrational and unpredictable\, and they can make unpredictable choices\,” she said. Thus\, the field of behavioral economics has many practical applications\, and is often used by policymakers\, diplomats\, and marketers. \n\nAl-Maadid focused her presentation on the financial performance of GCC stock markets\, and the high degree of market integration between GCC countries. “GCC stock markets seem to have similar trends\,” she said\, “when oil prices go down\, stock prices go down” across the region. At the start of the GCC crisis in 2017\, in which Saudi Arabia\, the UAE\, Bahrain\, and Egypt instigated a blockade against Qatar\, most of the stock prices in the GCC went down. \n\n“When the stock market goes up\, the news does not affect the stock market so much. However\, when the stock market is down\, if there is negative news\, it affects the stock markets more.” \n\nIn her research\, Al-Maadid found that GDP in the GCC is affected by positive and negative news. She used a linear dynamic model to illustrate how returns of stock prices are affected by both business news and political news. Al-Maadid collected weekly data on GCC news from Bloomberg to create an index of negative and positive political and business news. Control variables such as oil prices\, macroeconomic announcements\, and interest rates were also utilized. \n\nIn the period surveyed (2010–2018)\, Al-Maadid found that negative political news never exceeded the twenty percent mark—meaning that news content in GCC newspapers is predominantly positive. There was\, however\, considerably more negative business news content. “Most of the news coming out of the GCC is positive\, especially political news. In business news\, there is more negative news\, but it is still less than thirty percent” of the total news content\, she said. As part of her investigations\, Al-Maadid used a tool found in financial econometrics\, the Markov switching model\, to measure the dynamics of negative news. She noted that “When the stock market goes up\, the news does not affect the stock market so much. However\, when the stock market is down\, if there is negative news\, it affects the stock markets more.” Results further revealed that political news has less impact than business news\, and the stock market does not react as much to political news. \n\nIn conclusion\, Al-Maadid highlighted the GCC’s “cross-border effect\,” arguing that “When there is news from Saudi Arabia\, Qatar\, and the UAE\, the effects are not only domestic—it affects all the other countries\,” in the GCC. This is attributed to stronger economies and more integrated stock markets. Thus\, Al-Maadid argued\, the impact of the blockade against Qatar has negatively affected all GCC countries. If the blockade is lifted\, it will have a positive cross-boundary impact for all stakeholders involved\, she asserted. \n\n  \n\nArticle by Khansa Maria\, CURA Publications Fellow \n\nAlanoud Al-Maadid is the 2018–2019 CIRS Qatar University Fellow. She received a PhD in Economics and Finance from Brunel University London in 2016 with a dissertation on “Effects of Oil Prices\, Food Prices and Macroeconomic News on GCC Stock Markets.” She is a recognized researcher in the fields of economies of time series\, the GCC stock market\, and behavioral finance\, and has taught courses on the Principles of Macroeconomics and Monetary Policy\, among others.
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/impact-business-and-political-news-gcc-stock-market/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190403T124500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190403T134500
DTSTAMP:20260404T011938
CREATED:20190507T102355Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210829T135047Z
UID:10001393-1554295500-1554299100@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:The Marib Puzzle: A Case of Stability and Economic Activity in War-Torn Yemen
DESCRIPTION:Mohammed Al-Jaberi\, a GU-Q senior majoring in Foreign Service and Arab Studies\, and a CURA Publications Fellow\, presented his research on “The Marib Puzzle: A Case of Stability and Economic Activity in War-Torn Yemen\,” at a CURA Focused Discussion on April 3\, 2019. Al-Jaberi\, a citizen of Yemen\, returned to his country this past year to conduct research towards his academic thesis in which he addresses the complexity of the war in Yemen\, the political symbolism of the city of Marib\, and the war’s sociocultural and political impacts on the country. \n\nFocusing his study at the local level\, Al-Jaberi examined two cities: the port city of Aden\, and the city of Marib in the center of Yemen. His primary research question was: “Why does Marib have more stability and economic activity compared to the temporary capital\, Aden?” Al-Jaberi defined “stability” as the absence of local conflict\, sustainable access to public goods and services\, and the resilience of the local government. In order to answer the central research question\, he examined trade\, commercial activities (semi- and fully-legal)\, and the money injected into Yemen by coalition forces—especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. \n\nGiving background to when the ongoing war in Yemen began\, Al-Jaberi argued that there are two significant and contested dates: September 21\, 2014\, is when Houthi rebels took over the capital city of Sana‘a and overthrew President Hadi; and March 25\, 2015\, is when Saudi Arabia intervened militarily with a coalition force in Yemen. Coalition supporters assert that the war began on the former date\, whereas Houthi rebels deny that the conflict is actually a civil war\, claiming that it is a Saudi-led aggression. The answer to this debate\, Al-Jaberi said\, depends on how one classifies the current conflict\, and he posed the following questions: “Is it a civil war? Is it a transnational aggression? Should we blame Saudi Arabia for it? Should we blame the Houthis?” Thus\, he attempted to address the widespread tendency to oversimplify the war in Yemen by framing it in terms of only two sides. \n\n“Corruption\, poverty\, patronage networks\, the absence of a meaningful nation-state\, and the fragility of the system have all compromised Yemen’s current standing.” \n\nAl-Jaberi identified three major causes of the war: the failure of a transitional process after the 2011 Arab uprisings; the inability to resolve historical grievances in terms of North and South Yemen; and Yemen’s limited role in the international community. “Corruption\, poverty\, patronage networks\, the absence of a meaningful nation-state\, and the fragility of the system have all compromised Yemen’s current standing\,” he said. Because of these issues\, “Yemen has become a playground for international powers to exercise their influence and to enact their hegemony\,” Al-Jaberi argued. \n\nThe reality in Yemen today is its division into three different states: the Sana‘a area is under Houthi control; Aden and the south are controlled by the UAE and its affiliated forces; and “the ‘Marib state’ is a center that contains political actors within President Hadi’s camp who want to maintain a unified Yemen\,” Al-Jaberi argued. Of these three states\, the literature\, media coverage of the war\, and the behaviors and actions of foreign delegations visiting the country conclude that Marib appears to be the only stable region in the country\, he said. Though interviews\, analyses\, and time spent in Yemen\, however\, Al-Jaberi said\, “I found that stability\, and stable economic activity\, in the two regions of Aden and Marib was not absolute\, but a matter of relative reality.” The war in Yemen has become normalized\, and is a “lucrative business\,” he said. \n\nAl-Jaberi concluded by highlighting the two outcomes of his research. He argued that stability in Yemen is being directly affected by two different systems: patronage networks operating in Marib\, on the one hand\, and the UAE and Saudi Arabia operating in Aden\, on the other. The first concerns the shift from the historical center of Yemen—the capital Sana‘a—to Marib. He argued that this was not an example of successful local governance; rather\, it is due to historical political elites “with their tribal\, military\, religious\, technocratic connections” maintaining power by shifting to a different city. Those who operate and control the government of President Hadi “are part of a network of patronage that controls everything\,” Al-Jaberi said. Thus\, the increase of economic activity in Marib is due to redirecting resources\, rather than the actual creation of new businesses. The second concerns how the economy of Yemen is being further politicized by the discrepancies between how the South is being influenced by UAE\, and how the North is being influenced by the Saudi Arabian monarchy. \n\n  \n\nArticle by Khushboo Shah\, CURA Administrative Fellow \n\nMohammed Al-Jaberi (class of 2019) is graduating from Georgetown University in Qatar with a B.S. in Foreign Service and M.A. in Arab Studies. His research interests revolve around development\, state-building\, and political Islam. He is currently working on a documentary film on the economic and personal struggles of young participants of war in Aden. In addition to his role as a CURA Publications Fellow at CIRS since 2016\, he has held internships at Teach for Qatar\, the United States Embassy in Doha\, and Qatar Foundation.
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/marib-puzzle-case-stability-and-economic-activity-war-torn-yemen/
CATEGORIES:Regional Studies,Student Engagement
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190407T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190408T170000
DTSTAMP:20260404T011938
CREATED:20190611T073708Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210829T135023Z
UID:10001395-1554627600-1554742800@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:The GCC Crisis: Qatar and its Neighbors Working Group I
DESCRIPTION:On April 7-8\, 2019\, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) held the first working group under its research initiative “The GCC Crisis: Qatar and its Neighbors.” The two day meeting brought together several scholars to discuss a range of topics. These included\, Qatar’s management of the crisis; the UAE’s perspective and position on the regional crisis; the roles of Oman\, Kuwait\, Iran\, and Turkey during the rupture of GCC relations; the impact of maritime law in the lead up to and the immediate aftermath of the dispute; economic readjustments in Qatar during the embargo; the effects of the crisis on the Qatari stock market; reconfigurations of nationalism and national identity in Qatar; and\, public opinion in Qatar after the blockade. \n\nMehran Kamrava commenced the working group with a presentation titled “Small State: Crisis Politics.” Kamrava highlighted the lack of nuanced\, academic study of the GCC crisis and suggested that the current crisis needs to be contextualized within the context of broader and older tensions in regional relations\, particularly those between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Such tension is a natural result of a small state being in proximity of a much larger state with regional ambitions. Much of the policymaking\, state narrative\, and perspectives of Qatari decision makers is driven by the fact that Qatar is a small state. Kamrava proposed several research questions\, including: What does the crisis tell us about how small states manage their supply chains during times of crisis? Have Qatari nationalism and national identity gained greater salience over tribalism and kinship? What is it about Qatar’s decision-making process that has enabled the state to respond effectively to the current crisis? And\, is there more to the notion of “subtle power?” \n\nDavid Roberts followed with a presentation on “The Unhappy Neighbor: The View from the UAE.” Roberts applied the notion of “ontological security” in international relations to the ongoing GCC crisis. Roberts suggested that the ontological security concept can provide us with interesting insights into the UAE’s foreign policy\, as well as the motivations behind Mohamed bin Zayed’s foreign policy objectives. Roberts argued that states may prioritize ontological security over physical security\, and\, as a result\, often undertake specific actions in the foreign policy domain that may not meet any hard security concerns or interests. Ontological security could be applied to conducting an individual-level analysis by studying the moral principles of the UAE leadership and how these translate into the country’s assertive foreign policy\, as seen in the country’s current leadership’s rise to power in 2004. \n\nMuna Al-Marzouqi discussed “The Blockade of Qatar and Maritime Law\,” highlighting four main research areas. First\, Al-Marzouqi maintained\, there is a need to examine how the maritime blockade on Qatar is contributing to the fostering of international maritime trade and strengthening maritime trade partnerships with countries such as Oman. Second\, there is need for a legal analysis of issues related to disturbed shipping liability caused by the blockade. Third\, there is the issue of the hijacking of Qatari fishing boats by the UAE. Finally\, Al-Marzouqi posed the question of whether the maritime blockade can be considered as an act of aggression under international law. \n\nSteven Wright focused his discussion on “Economic Readjustment in Qatar after the Blockade.” Wright highlighted five areas of potential research. To start\, the shifting trade flows and changing economic linkages that have occurred since the rupture in regional relations need further examination. Wright asked: How has the loss of 40 percent of imports previously coming through Saudi Arabia and the UAE been addressed by Qatar? There was a spike in trade with Iran at the beginning of the blockade\, as Qatar tried to quickly find new means of addressing its need for critical imports\, particularly in food and agricultural products. However\, more recently the percentage of trade between the two states has dipped to even lower than what it was before the blockade. New trade relations have been formed with a number of African and Asian countries\, and the shift away from Iran may well be due to deliberate political considerations and a calculated desire of the Qatari leadership to limit its reliance Iran. \n\nAlso important\, according to Wright\, are the significant changes in the energy sector since the blockade\, most noticeably in the behavior of the large state-owned oil and gas companies. Wright suggested that since the GCC crisis began\, there has been an intensification in the role of Qatar Petroleum\, and in particular its subsidiary Qatar Gas\, in actively undertaking international engagements and building partnerships with international energy companies. These new developments\, and how they impact Qatar’s long-term energy policy\, can benefit from deeper examination. \n\nSince the start of the crisis\, Wright maintained\, a strong narrative has appeared in Qatar around the need to develop self-sufficiency and to more actively involve the private sector towards this goal. Since the blockade\, great emphasis has been placed on achieving self-sufficiency and security in food and agriculture. Two years on since the blockade\, Qatar is now a net exporter of poultry products. Also\, there has been a considerable upsurge in company registration in Qatar’s financial center. Wright proposed that there is a need to study whether this increase indicates anything significant.  \n\nWright’s final point revolved around the question of how the Qatari economy has adjusted to the attack on the country’s currency? Following the blockade\, there was threats of war\, but a more significant threat was that of debasing the currency. However\, Qatar has a strong credit rating\, and there was a massive upsurge in the bond market\, which made it easier for the country to secure its currency. Lastly\, in-depth analysis of Qatar’s logistical supply management during the blockade merits further study. \n\nAlanoud Al-Maadid led a discussion on the impact of the blockade on GCC stock markets. Al-Maadid focused on the financial performance of the stock markets\, the high degree of market integration between GCC countries\, and how positive or negative political and business news have impacted the performance of the regional markets since the Gulf crisis. Al-Maadid’s data demonstrates the most of the political news content in GCC newspapers leans towards the positive\, while economic or business news reporting is often considerably more negative. She noted that when the stock market is in an upwards or strong position\, the impact of negative news appears insignificant. However\, when the stock market is in a weaker position\, the impact of negative news seems to have a significant impact. Additionally\, political news appeared to have less impact of on the stock market than business and economic news. Al-Maadid highlighted the GCC’s “cross-border effect\,” arguing that the boycott of Qatar has negatively affected all GCC countries’ stock markets\, and\, if lifted\, it will have a positive cross-boundary impact for all stakeholders involved. \n\nAbdullah Al-Arian discussed the Muslim Brotherhood factor in the GCC Crisis. Al-Arian provided some insights into why the Muslim Brotherhood is so vigorously targeted by several GCC monarchies\, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Al-Arian suggested that one of the primary reasons behind the distrust and dislike of the Brotherhood is the view that it cannot be “bought off” or co-opted by the Gulf states’ leadership. In addition\, the Brotherhood’s transnational networks allow it to accumulate cross-border support and to potentially mobilize national populations across borders. The Brotherhood has frequently called for political reform\, and its anti-monarchical stance instills unease in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Further complicating the matter is the different variations of Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated organizations in the Middle East\, which makes it challenging to suppress the organization entirely or to it shut it down. \n\nAl-Arian suggested that there are several potentially interesting areas of study to be undertaken. First\, the overall impact of limited movement on the group due the blockade\, needs to be studied. Second\, the study of broader political order\, needs in depth analysis. It is important to study whether Muslim Brotherhood groups are being used as proxies for political gains by the blockading countries. A third question to consider is whether the anti-Muslim Brotherhood stance is a form of regional Islamophobia being deployed by Gulf rulers in order to garner international support. Finally\, it is important to have a deeper understanding of why Qatar has adopted a pro-Muslim Brotherhood position\, and what benefit it perceives to accrue from its relationship with the Brotherhood. \n\nAbdullah Baabood led a session on the role of Oman during the crisis. Baabood stated that Oman has been caught in the crossfire during the blockade\, and while the leadership of Oman has tried to balance its relations with its various Gulf neighbors\, the Omani public has demonstrated a more openly pro-Qatar stance in the midst of the crisis. While Kuwait played a more proactive role to play in mediating between the UAE/Saudi Arabia and Qatar\, Oman has demonstrated an active interest in supporting a resolution of the ongoing dispute. Oman has a more complex and multicultural make-up than most of its GCC neighbours\, as well as a different pattern of historical development\, which has made its leaders more attuned to the need for compromise and peaceful accommodation. Oman is also suffering economic strains\, which has been worsened by plummeting oil prices\, and is facing increasing pressure from its own citizenry for better employment and financial conditions. Powerful neighbors like Saudi Arabia and the UAE have taken advantage of this and at times have further manipulated the situation to gain an upper hand. Economic concerns and domestic political stability are occupying most of the Omani leadership’s attention\, which leaves it with little capacity to actively engage in resolving regional issues or taking a very strong stand in the matter. \n\nJuan Cole focused on Iran’s role in the GCC crisis. Cole suggested that Iranian-Qatari relations are not usually of any great significance or importance to either state\, but every once in a while relations are galvanized as was seen at the onset of the breakdown in GCC relations.  Iran is not a militarily aggressive state\, nor does it have hegemonic interests in Qatar\, although occasionally there are tensions with Qatar in regards to the North Field gas reserves\, which are shared by both states. In Syria\, Iran and Qatar have been supporting opposite sides in the conflict\, not due to ideological reasons\, Cole suggested\, but because Iran has critical\, realist interests in the preservation of the Assad regime.  Cole stated that it would be beneficial to the exciting literature to carry out a study on whether there is any long term traction to the Iran-Qatar relationship—will Qatar aim to strengthen and develop its economic and political relationship with Iran\, or was the closeness early on in GCC crisis just a temporary marriage of convenience? Is there something significant in terms of the GCC crisis serving as a turning point in Qatar-Iran relations\, or will this continue to be a relationship based on ambiguities? \n\nBulent Aras shed light on the role of Turkey during the crisis\, and specifically its active support for Qatar as opposed to Saudi Arabia.  It is important to study Turkey’s military presence\, military cooperation\, and joint defense arrangements with Qatar during the crisis\, and what it signifies about Turkey’s expanding role in the region. Turkey’s deployment of military personnel to Qatar after the blockade directly provoked concern from NATO and European states. But whether the surge in Turkish military presence in Qatar was done out of genuine and strategic considerations or merely for symbolic reasons requires deeper analysis. Do Turkey’s growing military and economic relations with Qatar reflect the AK Party’s broader ideology of supporting the Muslim Brotherhood\, or have these relations expanded as a result of other strategic and realist interests? Aras adduced that it may be a combined reflection of both nationalism and ideology that is driving this relationship\, while also remembering that perhaps the support to Qatar is being extended mainly by Erdogan and the AK Party rather than the country itself. \n\nJocelyn Mitchell discussed how the Gulf crisis has led to reconfigurations in Qatari national identity\, as well as different forms of expressions of nationalism. Mitchell suggested that nationalism can be conceptualized and studied at many different levels. In one respect\, nationalism is ideational and serves as an ideology of who belongs and who does not to a particular imagined political community. Civic nationalism is constructed and developed\, comes with various legal criteria and legal instruments\, and is based on rights and duties of states and citizens towards each other. Civic nationalism can be more exclusive or more inclusive\, based on how it is legally defined. Ethnic nationalism tends to be innately more bounded\, as is based on common language and shared cultural heritage\, which means it is hard to include broader groups within it. The sorts of nationalism that emerge in different contexts and eras change. This change\, Mitchell suggested depends on lived experiences of social groups\, and the means by which states try to develop or integrate parts of both civic and ethnic nationalism. \n\nFollowing on from the GCC crisis\, Mitchell suggested three particular areas of research regarding Qatari nationalism. First\, to what extent is nationalism and national identity in Qatar changing\, especially from one based on a regional ethnic narrative to one that is local ethnic and/or local civic national narratives? Second\, if the various Qatari social groups are being incorporated into a new form of nationalism\, how is this being done\, and what are the mechanisms for new inclusions? Lastly\, if the forms of nationalism and national identity are changing in Qatar\, in what areas are these changes occurring\, especially in the political and legal realms\, or in terms of new socio-cultural behavior and norms? \n\nThe working group’s final presentation was by Justin Gengler. Gengler discussed the importance of public opinion\, especially as a powerful tool for gathering data. Although Qataris have remained politically supportive of their state\, especially since 2017\, research needs to be conducted on various aspects of public opinion\, especially citizens’ negative response to the payment of taxes; how many people blame the state for the crisis; whether or not social relations between citizens and non-citizens have changed; and the changes in tribal differences within the society. Gengler believed that these questions would return interesting results and seeking answers to them is essential to understanding the blockade. \n\nThe scholars discussed a range of issues related to the blockade and also identified key gaps in research. The issues discussed at the working group included the role of various countries\, their ties with Qatar\, and the use of tools such as public opinion. \n\nTo view the working group agenda\, click hereTo read the participants’ biographies\, click hereRead more about this research initiative\n\nParticipants and Discussants:  \n\nAbdullah Al-Arian\, Georgetown University in QatarAlanoud Al-Maadid\, Qatar UniversityMuna Al-Marzouqi\, Qatar UniversityIan Almond\, Georgetown University in QatarBulent Aras\, Sabancı University\, TurkeyAbdullah Baabood\, University of Cambridge\, UKZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarChaïmaa Benkermi\, Georgetown University in QatarJuan R.I. Cole\, University of Michigan\, USJustin Gengler\, Qatar University Islam Hassan\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarJocelyn Sage Mitchell\, Northwestern University in QatarKhushboo Shah\, Georgetown University in QatarJames Reardon-Anderson\, Georgetown University in QatarDavid B. Roberts\, King’s College London\, UKElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarSteven Wright\, Hamad Bin Khalifa University in Qatar\n\nArticle by Islam Hassan\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/gcc-crisis-qatar-and-its-neighbors-working-group-i/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190416T124500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190416T140000
DTSTAMP:20260404T011938
CREATED:20190521T060437Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T092035Z
UID:10001394-1555418700-1555423200@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:The History and Evolution of American Torture and Secret Prisons (1898–2008)
DESCRIPTION:GU-Qatar senior Ritica Ramesh presented her thesis research at a CURA Focused Discussion on April 3\, 2019\, in a talk entitled “History and Evolution of American Torture and Black Sites (1898–2008).” Ramesh outlined the history of the US government’s use of torture as an official policy in its warfare\, going back to the Philippine-American War of 1898. Her initial interest in this topic developed during a semester abroad at Georgetown’s main campus in Washington\, DC\, when she was researching the criminal justice system\, prisons\, and punishment in the US. \n\nRamesh takes the cases of the Philippine-American War (1898–1902)\, the Vietnam War (1965–1972)\, and the Global War on Terror (2001–present)\, to demonstrate how the US government has devoted massive resources to the study and development of torture\, and how various techniques have evolved over the last century—including the construction of “the ideal physical space in which to conduct torture\,” she said.  \n\nRamesh explained that although the United Nations Convention against Torture includes the physical and psychological aspects of torture in its definition of the term\, it is difficult to find a concrete definition of torture due to the political nature of the practice\, and because the definition has changed throughout history. Another important term is “black sites\,” which she said are “usually—but not always—classified facilities that operate in an extralegal capacity\, where clandestine military or intelligence operations are carried out.” The definition of black sites is contested and does not constitute a legal term; this is important because the US government has used black sites extensively to carry out torture. \n\n“After the abolishment of slavery in 1865\, torture against African Americans became more institutionalized\, and this continued in the form of convict leasing and chain gangs.” \n\nWhile Ramesh’s primary thesis was on torture conducted by the US government abroad during wartime\, the development of torture in early American history took place on American soil. “American torture is closely linked to the domination of Native Americans as well as African Americans\,” she said. As part of a domestic imperial project\, American military forces frequently targeted indigenous peoples through reservation policies imposed in the late 1700s. During this time\, people were forced into concentration camps\, starved for days on end\, and torture was used as a form of punishment\, she said.  \n\nSlaves\, especially Africans\, faced horrendous abuses throughout American history. Slavery was a form of torture\, along with practices such as branding people with hot metal\, brutal beatings\, and rape. Ramesh reported\, “After the abolishment of slavery in 1865\, torture against African Americans became more institutionalized\, and this continued in the form of convict leasing and chain gangs.” She pointed out that in the American south\, African Americans “were arrested for pretty much just existing\,” and were compelled to perform exhaustive labor without pay under the convict lease system. When that practice was banned\, another exploitative scheme arose—that of chain gangs. These are examples of how “the use of torture very much existed in America much before the American colonial project moved abroad\,” Ramesh said. \n\n“When the American colonial project began in 1898\, America brought with it a very punitive system of policing and punishment that it fully exploited in the Philippines\,” Ramesh said. During the Philippine-American War\, “local Filipinos were seen as savages who needed harsh methods in order to be civilized like the whites. This really drove much of the American ideology during the Philippine-American War\,” Ramesh said.  \n\nInterrogators in the Philippines experimented with torture techniques\, including stress positions and beatings\, and many Filipinos were imprisoned in concentration camps\, where overcrowding\, starvation\, and diseases were very common\, according to Ramesh. One of the foremost torture techniques used for the purposes of obtaining confessions in the Philippines was the “water cure\,” in which water was forced into a victim’s throat and nose to induce a sensation of drowning. It is extremely painful and known to cause severe psychological trauma. This was a precursor to the torture technique known as waterboarding today\, which is illegal under US and international law. However\, the Central Intelligence Agency was discovered using waterboarding in secret prisons following the 9/11 attacks\, justified as “enhanced interrogation.”  \n\nBy the Vietnam War\, other torture methods had been developed\, particularly psychological control. The US government created a program called MKUltra\, which studied the usefulness of LSD and other drugs for the purposes of interrogation and torture. The Phoenix Program marked the first time in American history that the government recognized the importance of conducting torture in a specialized physical space. Additionally\, Ramesh reported\, the US Army and the CIA created interrogation manuals that were used in military training curricula beginning in the late 1980s\, but especially after 9/11 to increase effectiveness of torture in places like Guantanamo Bay. “The practice of torture abroad as well as in the domestic sphere are closely interlinked and cannot be separated\,” she said. \n\nAfter 9/11\, the CIA opened black sites all around the world\, including in Thailand\, Afghanistan\, Cuba\, and Iraq\, Ramesh said. However\, when these illegal sites were discovered\, public anger over US torture practices drove the government to establish floating prisons\, which allowed the military to evade international law as well as domestic law\, and the practice of torture was continued. \n\nPresident Trump was vocal about his positive views on torture during the election campaign and throughout his presidency. Although a US senate investigation found that torture is not actually effective\, Ramesh said\, Trump has openly said that he would bring back the CIA’s enhanced interrogation program and water boarding\, because he believes that it works. The rise of international law and norms has not deterred the use of torture\, Ramesh said\, but it has only encouraged the US government to come up with new evasive strategies.  \n\nRitica Ramesh (class of 2019) is a Georgetown University in Qatar senior majoring in International History with a certificate in American Studies. She served as president of the Human Rights Club and was a founding member of the Future is Female Program. Her main research interests are American history\, and the US criminal justice system.  \n\n  \n\nArticle by Abdul Rehmaan Qayyum\, CURA Research Assistant 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/history-and-evolution-american-torture-and-secret-prisons-1898-2008/
CATEGORIES:American Studies,Race & Society,Student Engagement
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190610T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190610T170000
DTSTAMP:20260404T011938
CREATED:20190714T120214Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T091838Z
UID:10001399-1560157200-1560186000@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Firat Oruc CIRS Faculty Publication Workshop
DESCRIPTION:On June 10\, 2019\, CIRS hosted a Faculty Publication Workshop for Firat Oruc\, Assistant Professor of English and Humanities at Georgetown University in Qatar\, to discuss his forthcoming book Petromodernity and Film: A Cultural History of the Moving Image in the Arabian Peninsula. Several cinema studies scholars were invited to read parts of the manuscript\, and to share their critiques with the author and each other during the one-day meeting. The research pivots around a key\, yet unanswered\, question: in what ways is the moving image a key source for tracing the cultural and political history of the Arabian Peninsula in the aftermath of the discovery of oil? Although film emerged in the last century as one of the most pervasive forms of communication\, its social\, historical\, and cultural role in the early formations of hydrocarbon modernity in the Arabian Peninsula is yet to be explored. \n\nWith the recent regional and global rise of the Arabian Peninsula as a financial and political power\, the establishment of film industries has been a shared ambition across these countries. As emergent new players in the regional as well as global media landscape\, these countries have not yet achieved a commercially successful and globally influential film industry but have begun laying the foundations for a more sustainable cinematic infrastructure. These efforts toward the development of a film industry not only vary from one country to another but also take place on a peculiar terrain\, where financial capacity clashes with “cultural conservatism;” the backing of the rentier state with abrupt official interventions; commercial goals with the arthouse model of the festival circuits; and global ambitions with local constraints. This project places the current Gulf cinema phenomenon in a historical context. The historical dimension brings forth important genealogies of film culture that are rooted in the early formations of hydrocarbon modernity in the region. \n\nThis project traces the history of film and visual representation in the countries of the Arabian Peninsula—namely\, Qatar\, Kuwait\, the United Arab Emirates\, Bahrain\, Yemen\, Oman\, and Saudi Arabia—in six stages: 1) The colonial emergence of cinema in the Arab Gulf in the 1930s under the regulation and monitoring of the British network of administrative personnel; 2) The use of film for publicity and propaganda purposes by the British Empire’s Gulf stations in the 1940s; 3) The production of documentary films by petroleum companies in the 1950s and 60s to represent (make visible) “the magic of oil;” 4) Visual ethnography and expedition films of the Arabian Peninsula by Western travelers\, sailors\, anthropologists\, and archeologists; (5) The use of “militant filmmaking” to support left-leaning popular movements that emerged in the region in the 1960s and 70s; and 6) The emergence of indigenous filmmaking after independence. I argue that the history of the moving image through these stages and beyond offers us an important critical lens to analyze the modern development of Arabian societies and cultures. \n\nThe project’s primary objectives: The primary objective of the project is to analyze the historical development film and visual culture in the countries of the Arabian Peninsula; namely\, Qatar\, Kuwait\, the United Arab Emirates\, Bahrain\, Yemen\, Oman\, and Saudi Arabia. The project will offer a narrative of the modern development of Arabian societies and cultures through their visual representation.   \n\nScholarly impact: This project will be the first comprehensive study of the history of film and visual culture in the Arabian Peninsula. It will make a unique original contribution to the scholarship on the cultural history of Arabia\, on the one hand\, and to world cinema studies\, on the other. As such\, the project promises to be a key reference source for scholars specializing in these fields. The project is also directly relevant to Qatari society and furthers the priorities established in the Qatar National Vision by constructing a visual cultural history of Qatar (along with other Gulf countries). \n\nExpected outcomes of the project: The project is planned as a monograph for publication with Cornell University Press Persian Gulf Studies series. \n\n  \n\nTo view workshop agenda click hereTo view Participants biographies click here\n\nParticipants and Discussants: \n\nHend F. Alawadhi\, Kuwait University	\n\n		\n\n	Dale Hudson\, New York University Abu DhabiMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarSheetal Majithia\, New York University Abu DhabiBindu Menon\, Delhi University	\n\n		\n\n	Negar Taymoorzadeh\, New York UniversityAlia Yunis\, Zayed University
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/firat-oruc-cirs-faculty-publication-workshop/
CATEGORIES:CIRS Faculty Research Workshops,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190825T213000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190826T170000
DTSTAMP:20260404T011938
CREATED:20190909T081845Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T072822Z
UID:10001413-1566768600-1566838800@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Russia and the Middle East Working Group II
DESCRIPTION:On August 25-26 2019\, the Center for International and Regional Studies held the second working group under its research initiative on “Russia and the Middle East.” Over the course of two days\, the convened scholars presented and received feedback on their papers that tackled a wide array of issues\, including: Russia’s Middle East Policy\, Russia and GCC relations; Russia and the Yemeni civil war\, Russian-Iranian relations\, Russia and the Maghreb\, migration between Russia and the Middle East\, Russian intervention in the Syrian conflict\, and Russia’s state-Islam relationship. \n\nLeonid Issaev initiated the working group discussion with his paper\, on “Domestic Factors in Russia’s Middle East Policy.” In his paper\, Issaev argues that analyses of Russia’s policy towards the Middle East need to be aware of the influence of Russian domestic politics on foreign policymaking. Particularly during President Putin’s second presidential term\, domestic politics has been significant in determining Russian foreign policy. Following the end of the Cold War\, Russia’s desire to avoid confrontation with the United States and as well as their preoccupation with internal matters meant that the Middle East occupied the periphery of Moscow’s attention. The Middle East began to draw significant interest from the Russian leadership Moscow with the onset of the Arab uprisings in 2011-2012. Domestic factors such as the protests against the results of the State Duma elections as well as the impact of lower oil prices on the Russian economy served to make the Middle East more important for Russia. Issaev suggests in his paper that Vladimir Putin also needed a new narrative for public mobilization during his third term in office\, and engagement in the Middle East served this purpose well. For a number of reasons\, Putin’s foreign policy on the Middle East has gained popularity and support from the political elite. However\, Issaev concludes his paper by suggesting that in the current moment\, the Russian public\, especially the youth\, are less interested in foreign policy and more concerned with critical domestic matters. \n\nElizabeth Wanucha presented Viacheslav Morozov’s paper on “Russia’s View of the Post-Cold War Global Order and its Policy in the Middle East.” The paper examines the significance of the Middle East for Russia as it has emerged within the Post-Cold War global order. The author argues that\, despite the end of the Cold War\, Russia’s relations with the West continue to influence its view of global affairs\, and this includes how Russia positions itself in the Middle East. The chapter provides a genealogical account of Russia’s current engagements in the Middle East and focuses particularly on the drivers behind Moscow’s military intervention in Syria. Supporting the core argument of Issaev’s paper\, Morozov suggests that Russian foreign policy is also influenced by domestic factors. As historical evidence of this\, Morozov draws attention to Russia’s backing for the US intervention during the first Gulf war\, suggesting that this was possible as at that time domestic political forces in Russia were decidedly pro-Western. The decision to support President Bashar Al-Assad against the general tide of the US and Western states backing the Syrian opposition was also partially made possible due to a change within Russian domestic politics and the anti-Western sentiments on the rise. The author concludes that Russia’s relationship with the United States and its allies will continue to drive future Russian foreign policymaking. However\, challenging internal economic conditions\, mounting strains on the social security system and increasing domestic protest might mean that Russian authorities are less able to confront the United States and will need to adopt a more measured approach. \n\nSergey Markedonov’s paper also combines domestic issues with foreign policymaking\, as his paper examines “Russia’s State-Islam Relationship: Significance for the Middle East.” Markedonov studies the evolution of Russian foreign policy towards the Middle East through the lens of the state’s complex relationship with domestic Islam. Russia’s position of deliberate non-intervention in the Middle East has transformed considerably over the years\, as its direct role in Syria clearly demonstrates. Markedonov suggests that one of the drivers for Russia’s activist role in the Middle East is the concern that Russian leadership has over the transnational mobilization capacity of political Islam. For the Russian state\, transnational political Islam is seen as threatening primarily due to its indigenous Muslim population. The paper suggests that while there is a lack of adequate data regarding certain estimates suggest that the Muslim population of Russia is around 16-25 million people. The Russian state has a strong role in controlling Islam within the state and has clear red lines regarding what it considers to be unofficial Islam versus “traditional” or state-recognized Islam. Russia’s relationship with Middle Eastern states is at least partially based on its desire to control external influences that might influence its population of Muslim citizens\, and particularly to suppress any political mobilization or radicalization on the basis of Islam.  \n\nZahra Babar presented Mark N. Katz’s paper entitled “Different but Similar: Comparing Moscow’s Middle East Policies in the Cold War and Putin Eras.” In his paper\, Katz examines and compares the Soviet era and Putin’s foreign policies towards the Middle East. Katz argues that the successes and failures of Moscow’s Middle Eastern foreign policies have occurred not only as a result of their deliberate efforts or mistakes but also because of the contexts and conditions in which they were developed and launched. Russia’s efforts in the Middle East have either been hampered or aided by policies pursued by the US and other actors. Katz also suggests that despite the great efforts that the Soviet Union made to engage in the Middle East\, it can be argued that the Putin regime has actually managed to develop a better position for itself than the USSR ever did. With its clearly defined strong alliances that were ideologically based\, the Soviet Union suffered in its ability to reach out to many other states that were in the US or Western alliance system during the Cold War. Some of the successes of Putin’s foreign policy in the Middle East can be attributed to the fact that Putin has managed to establish cordial relations with many different Middle Eastern states and stakeholders\, through its strategy of balancing its multiple relationships without any ideological drivers. However\, Katz does conclude that whether all these relationships will actually enhance or strengthen Russian interests in the region remains unknown at this stage. Russia today does not demonstrate the means or capacity to ensure resolution to regional conflicts it is engaged in\, and without that and a return to stability the investments it has made may not necessarily pay off in any meaningful way. \n\nAndrei Korobkov shifted the discussion to “Migration between the Middle East and Russia and the Post-Soviet Space: Structure\, Scale\, and Dynamics.” Korobkov’s paper looks at the forces at work in terms of migration flows between the Middle East and Russia as well as parts of the former Soviet Union (FSU). The collapse of the of USSR created six Muslim majority states that resulted in the creation of inter-regional migration patterns that have evolved into forms of international migration today. The author focused on flows of migrants from the Middle East to both Russia as well as other parts of the FSU. Korobkhov suggests that there is a potential for the development of existing chains of migration between the two regions that include emigration\, immigration\, and migrant transit. The types of migrant exchange that exists between the two regions include\, trade migrations\, both forced and voluntary\, refugees\, elite migrations such as students and highly skilled migrants\, investment migration\, labors\, as well as traditional migration for settlement which primarily relates to Jewish Russians emigrating to Israel. The paper maintains that majority of these migration patterns are newly created and the percentage of exchange is currently low\, with small numbers of people migrating from the Middle East to Russia and the FSU\, and vis versa. These new migration corridors have a potential for expansion and diversification. However\, this would require the formation of supportive migration policies\, internal reforms\, and simplification of visa and work permit acquisition in Russia.  \n\nGhoncheh Tazmini presented a paper on “Iran: A Strategic Partner or a Provisional Counterweight?” Tazmini’s paper\, which provides an in-depth discussion of Iranian-Russian relations\, states that despite consistent contradicting strategic and ideological stances and frequently conflicting interests\, Russia and Iran share a similar critical view of a global order that exists under Western hegemony. These similar views are shaped by both states’ historical experiences as ex-Imperial powers\, geographic realities\, and worldviews that stand in contrast to those imposed by Western-mandated norms of international relations. The author argues that within Russia’s challenge to the universality of the US-led liberal international order\, Iran stands as a critical partner. Tazmini highlights that there is a methodological gap in the existing literature that does not factor in the role of ideas and identity in foreign policy\, which is key to understanding Iran and Russia’s complex relationship. The paper sheds light on different areas of cooperation and solidarity between the two nations and looks at the patterns of convergence. The author concludes that for Russia\, Iran is a strategic partner\, and more than a bargaining chip to be leveraged to as part of Moscow’s mission to challenge the Western liberal international order. \n\nSamuel Ramani discussed his paper on “Russia and the Yemeni Civil War.” Ramani’s article looks at the Russian policy of strategic non-alignment in the Yemeni civil war\, which is in contrast to their military assertiveness in Syria. Russia’s stance of non-alignment has made it stand out from other nationals involved in the conflict and enabled it to have amiable diplomatic relations with different factions involved in the civil war i.e. President’s Hadi’s coalition\, which is recognized by the UN as the legitimate government in Yemen and is backed by the Saudis\, the Houthis\, who control Northern Yemen and the Southern Transitional Council (STC)\, which has UAE’s support. The author states that this has helped Moscow gain the image of a potential referee and dialogue facilitator\, as well as an important partner to reach any post-conflict resolution to the civil war. This has also situated Russia in a better situation to assume a greater role in securing oil exports through Bab el-Mandeb. The chapter also analyses Russia’s role in the Yemeni civil war and the impact it is having on its strengthening relationship with Iran and the impact on Moscow’s partnership with different Gulf monarchies. The paper concludes that though Russia has gained achievements through its stance of non-alignment in the Yemeni civil war\, its successes are not entirely unquestionable and articulates how their policy would convert into an actual vision of peace settlement in Yemen. \n\nMisba Bhatti presented Roy Allison’s paper on “Russian Normative Claims for its Intervention in the Syrian Conflict since 2015.” Allison argues that analyses of the Russian intervention in Syria\, since 2015\, lacks attention to legal and normative claims that the Russians have used to justify the major use of force in Syria. These claims are important\, as they are not just abstract and juridical but have political and policy consequences. Moscow has tried to construct a convincing legal and normative case to gain the support of the states from the region and international community under the banners of counter-terrorism and upholding the Syrian state sovereignty. Russian leadership asserts that their intervention in Syria is “lawful” and “rightful” on the bases of intervention by invitation by the legitimate Syrian government. Moscow uses this card to question the legality of western state’s military strikes on Syrian territory\, to deflect negative criticism received on the annexation of Crimea and to convey the legality of their intervention to its domestic political elites and public. Despite these efforts\, Russia has received heavy critique from the international community\, regarding the political legitimacy of the military operations\, the legal authority of the Assad’s invitation and the gross violations against civilians by Assad regime. Allison states that despite Russia’s diplomatic response to these criticisms\, Moscow has suffered serious reputation damage among many Middle Eastern states and its legal and normative claims have had little impact in convincing Middle Eastern public of the legitimacy of Russia’s military involvement in Syria.  \n\nNikolay Kozhanov discussed “The Drivers of Russia-GCC Relations Post-2011.” Kozhanov discusses that after the Arab uprisings of 2011\, a complex mixture of factors drive and impact the Russian-GCC relations. These include the ever-changing US-Russian relations\, evolution of the energy markets\, growing Russian presence in the region\, regional rivalry and GCC-US relations. The author looks at Russian relation with two Gulf monarchies\, Saudi Arabia and Qatar during the Arab Spring and Russia’s active support to Assad’s regime and states that though there was a period of geostrategic opposition\, the channels of dialogue resumed in 2015 and now demonstrates a tendency of normalization. Russia’s growing involvement in GCC is concentrated in three arenas; first is political\, to promote Russian option and stance on the world order\, and create leverage to affect US and EU behavior\, second economic\, to ease pressure on Russian economy due to sanctions\, involvement in OPEC+ and protect Russian interests in energy market and lastly security\, to reduce and counter-terrorist threat emerging from the Middle East. The paper concludes that there is a limit on Moscow’s capacities to develop these relations further\, as they are closely tied to Western approaches to the region and Moscow’s ability to fulfill its role as the regional broker. Also tied to this is Russia’s domestic policies that might affect the political relations with the GCC. \n\nYahia Zoubir shifted the discussion to “Making Up Lost Time: Russia and the Maghreb.” Zoubir draws attention to Russia’s increasing involvement in the Maghreb and argues that the Russian involvement in the region never completely ceased to exist but only diminished during the period when Russia was going through internal domestic problems. The paper looks at the history of Russian-Maghreb relations\, particularly the central Maghreb\, i.e.\, Algeria\, Morocco\, and Tunisia\, and states that Putin has been able to capitalize on Soviet efforts in the region\, to build a stronger Russian presence. Moscow has reestablished associations with Algeria and establish ties with traditional pro-Western allies\, such as Morocco and Tunisia. Zoubir highlights that the main reasons for Russia’s growing presence in the Maghreb is its aspiration to reaffirm itself as a superpower and align countries in the region towards its anti-hegemonic sphere against the West. Moscow’s interest in the Maghreb also lies in its counter-terrorism efforts as well as being a market for Russian armaments and military equipment. For the Maghreb\, Russia provides a credible counterweight to the US and is better received\, as it does not impose any ideological conditionality. Zoubir concludes that though Russia cannot compete with China in terms of the resources it can provide\, it is establishing a strategic presence in the Maghreb. \n\nIt is worth mentioning that CIRS plans to publish the aforementioned papers in an edited volume in the near future. \n\nTo view the working group agenda\, click hereTo read the participants’ biographies\, click hereRead more about this research initiative\n\nParticipants and Discussants: \n\nZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMisba Bhatti\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarLeonid Issaev\, National Research University in Moscow\, Russia Mehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarAndrei Korobkov\, Middle Tennessee State University\, USNikolay Kozhanov\, Qatar University Sergey Markedonov\, Euro-Atlantic Security Center at the MGIMO Institute for International Studies\, RussiaJoshua Mitchell\, Georgetown University in QatarSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarSamuel Ramani\, University of Oxford\, UKJackie Starbird\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarGhoncheh Tazmini\, London Middle East Institute at SOAS\, UKElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarYahia H. Zoubir\, KEDGE Business School\, France\n\nArticle by Misba Bhatti\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/russia-and-middle-east-working-group-ii/
CATEGORIES:American Studies,Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190918T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190918T200000
DTSTAMP:20260404T011938
CREATED:20190909T123307Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20240314T072814Z
UID:10001414-1568829600-1568836800@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Karine Walther on "American Missionaries\, ARAMCO\, and the Birth of the US-Saudi Special Relationship\, 1889-1955"
DESCRIPTION:Karine Walther is Associate Professor of History at GU-Q\, and a 2019–2020 CIRS Faculty Fellow. During her fellowship at CIRS\, Walther is completing research on American missions in Saudi Arabia at the end of the nineteenth century and the ways in which the groundwork they laid over subsequent decades paved the way for American oil interests in the area. She presented her talk\, “Spreading the Faith: American Missionaries\, ARAMCO\, and the Birth of the US-Saudi Special Relationship\, 1889–1955\,” also the title of her forthcoming book\, at a CIRS Dialogue lecture on September 18\, 2019. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n\nWalther outlined the historical and ideological ties linking American religious\, commercial\, and political interests in the Middle East\, beginning in 1889\, when medical missionaries under the Reformed Church of America (RCA) arrived in the Arabian Peninsula as the “Arabian Mission.” Western medicine was the primary tool used in the missionaries’ efforts to convert Muslims to Christianity\, and\, within a couple decades\, several mission stations and hospitals were opened in Basra (Iraq)\, Bahrain\, Kuwait\, and Oman. By the end of World War I\, the Mission had become the most important source of western medicine in the Arabian Gulf. \n\nUsing the Mission’s foundational documents\, Walther demonstrated how the missionaries’ religious beliefs overlapped with secular understandings of the world at the time. Arabian societies had been placed on a ladder of historical development\, in which “the United States was understood as occupying the most advanced rung\, with a religious and moral duty to bring about the advancement of non-Christian societies\,” she said. In addition to medical work\, the missionaries opened schools at their mission stations to teach children the English language and industrial skills along with Christian biblical lessons. \n\nOver time\, the RCA missionaries forged close relationships with Gulf rulers\, including the founder of Saudi Arabia\, Ibn Saud\, whom they met in 1914. Over the next three decades\, the missionaries provided medical treatment to Ibn Saud\, his family\, and his soldiers. Walther reported that British political agents in the Gulf were\, at the time\, concerned about increased American political influence brought by the missionaries\, given that establishing hospitals and public health programs was a tactic also employed by the British Empire to solidify its political control in the region. \n\nAccording to Walther\, “American oil developers benefited directly from the missionaries’ network of contacts\, and later relied on their cooperation in advancing their strategic interests in the area.” The connection between American missionary work and the granting of oil concessions was made explicit in 1933\, she said\, when Ibn Saud signed a concession with Standard Oil—later ARAMCO (Arabian American Oil Company). Walther quoted the ruler’s own words: “The British want our oil … but wherever they go they take over. Our experience with Americans has been nothing but good. They’ve helped us. They’ve come here and served us. So I’ve given my concession to the Americans.”   \n\nWalther found substantial claims of America’s many contributions to Saudi Arabia’s development in a public relations book commissioned by ARAMCO in 1955—a time when the company was being accused of economic imperialism. Yet\, Wallace Stegner’s Discovery! The Search for Arabian Oil\, contained no acknowledgment of the missionaries’ role in the country’s development. “ARAMCO had coopted missionary rhetoric about progress and development and adopted the public health and education programs they had put in place in the five decades preceding the arrival of American oilmen in Arabia\,” she said. Furthermore\, while celebrating ARAMCO’s “benevolent presence” in Saudi Arabia\, the book also ignored the company’s well known exploitative and racialized labor practices\, she said. \n\nAccording to Walther\, Discovery! maintained that ARAMCO’s development work served as a “private Four Point program” in Saudi Arabia. This was in reference to US President Truman’s 1949 Point Four program calling for aid to help the Global South become “modern.” Under this Cold War policy\, technical assistance was provided to developing countries in an array of fields such as science\, agriculture\, education\, and economics. Walther said\, “Modernity in this case was largely defined by the United States’ own strategic interests\, the most important of these being the adoption of free market capitalism.” The primary goal of the Point Four program was to ensure developing countries aligned with the US in its ideological battle against Soviet Communism\, she said. \n\nRCA missionaries reflected wider trends in the mission field\, Walther said\, which maintained that missionaries should learn local languages and customs and study the religious faiths of the people they were trying to convert. As such\, “in the first decade of the twentieth century\, this type of missionary education would become more organized\, more institutionalized\, and more global\,” she said. Thus\, specialized schools were opened for the purpose of training missionaries in theological seminaries throughout the US\, including at Harvard\, Yale\, and Princeton. At the same time\, the British opened schools such as the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) for the purposes of training future imperial officers. “This tells us quite a bit about the difference between British and American interests in the Middle East during this time period\,” Walther said. \n\nKnowledge about the Middle East was becoming increasingly important to Americans\, and\, after WWII\, ARAMCO also saw the advantage of its executives understanding the languages\, history\, religious beliefs\, and cultures of Arabia\, Walther reported. By the late 1940s\, the US Department of State began calling for the creation of Middle Eastern Studies departments in American universities\, “again driven by the goal of advancing American strategic interests in the Middle East\,” she said. ARAMCO strongly backed these efforts and contributed substantial funding for these academic programs\, Walther noted. Universities\, in turn\, relied on existing experts in the field\, which included ARAMCO executives\, US Department of State officials\, British orientalists\, and former missionaries. \n\nIn the late 1940s and 1950s\, ARAMCO dramatically expanded its industrial education programs in Saudi Arabia to train young Arabs to work for ARAMCO. It also enlarged its medical facilities and set up malaria eradication programs—initiatives similar to those established by the Mission in previous decades. By the mid-1950s\, the missionaries’ cooperation with ARAMCO brought unintended consequences that would make their own work obsolete in Arabia. Medical missionaries began competing with new facilities and hospitals provided by oil companies and governments. In the 1960s and 1970s\, the Arabian Mission closed most of its hospitals and missionary stations due in part to this redundancy. \n\nIn conclusion\, and “unsurprisingly\, the missionaries’ goals of using technology to convert and ‘occupy’ Arabia were never realized\,” Walther said. Even though Americans working for ARAMCO had more success in achieving their goals\, they too would be forced to leave eventually. “The United States may have succeeded in spreading a certain faith to the Saudi State\, but it was a faith in capitalism\, not Christianity\, that eventually won out\,” she said. \n\nKarine Walther is Associate Professor of History at Georgetown University in Qatar. She is the author of Sacred Interests: The United States and the Islamic World\, 1821–1921 (UNC Press\, 2015). Her second book\, Spreading the Faith: American Missionaries\, ARAMCO and the Birth of the US-Saudi Special Relationship\, 1889-1955\, will be published in 2020 by University of North Carolina Press. Walther is a CIRS Faculty Fellow for the 2019/2020 academic year. \n\nSummary by Jackie Starbird\, CIRS Publications and Projects Assistant
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/karine-walther-american-missionaries-aramco-and-birth-us-saudi-special/
CATEGORIES:American Studies,CIRS Faculty Lectures,Dialogue Series,Race & Society,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190926T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190926T150000
DTSTAMP:20260404T011938
CREATED:20191014T112656Z
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UID:10001416-1569499200-1569510000@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:CURA Seminar: Political Economy of the Contemporary Middle East
DESCRIPTION:On September 26\, 2019\, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) held a CURA Seminar under its CIRS Undergraduate Research Advancement initiative. During the seminar\, CURA Fellows came together for an active discussion of research papers that were submitted to CIRS research initiative on “Political Economy of the Contemporary Middle East.” The papers were critiqued\, and the collective feedback was gathered\, which was later shared with the research working group. CURA was introduced to support the research needs of undergraduate students at Georgetown University in Qatar\, and to provide them with opportunities to enhance their research skills by discussing and analyzing papers from CIRS research initiatives. \n \n \nIrene Ann Promodh (Class of 2021) opened the CURA seminar by presenting Esfandyar Batmanghelidj’s paper titled “The Ins and Outs of Iranian Industrial Resiliency under Sanctions.” The paper explores Iran’s economic situation and ability to sustain its industrial input under sanctions by analyzing the trade patterns between Iran\, China\, and Europe through graphical and statistical data. The author discusses the concept of re-export\, which focuses on the trade patterns between Iran\, Turkey\, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) through which Iran has been able to maintain its supply of European Industrial inputs. The main critique of the paper by the discussants is the structure and lack of explanation of graphs and observed data that describes the trade patterns between Iran and other countries. \n \n \nShaza Afifi (Class of 2022) presented Ashraf Mishrif’s paper titled “GCC’s Unsettled Policy for Economic Integration.” Mishrif examines factors explaining the retreat of economic integration in the GCC through the analysis of global and regional challenges. The paper evaluates the strength and capacity of the GCC as a union and explores how the setbacks of the European Union with Brexit\, and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) affected regional economic integration globally. He argues that economic integration\, in GCC\, is undermined by the slow pace of political integration\, lack of a monetary union\, and the blockade imposed on Qatar in 2017. The main critique of the paper by the discussants is the lack of in-depth exploration and analysis of the GCC region that affected economic integration. \n \n \nFollowing the presentation of each paper\, the CURA fellows engaged in an insightful discussion on the structure and organization of the paper\, the employed theoretical and conceptual frameworks\, and the clarity of the argument. After the discussions\, two CURA fellows\, AbdulRehmaan Qayyum  (Class of 2021) and Khushboo Shah (Class of 2022)\, served as ambassadors to the “Political Economy of the Contemporary Middle East” working group and shared the comments and critique brought up at the CURA seminar.  \n \n \n\nFor the participants’ biographies\, please click here\n\n \nArticle by Salma Hassabou\, CIRS Administrative Fellow
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/cura-seminar-political-economy-contemporary-middle-east/
CATEGORIES:American Studies,Regional Studies,Student Engagement
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190929T093000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20190929T163000
DTSTAMP:20260404T011938
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UID:10001415-1569749400-1569774600@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Political Economy of the Contemporary Middle East Working Group II
DESCRIPTION:On September 29\, 2019\, the Center for International and Regional Studies held the second working group under its research initiative on “Political Economy of the Contemporary Middle East.” During the meeting\, the convened scholars presented and received feedback on their papers that tackled a wide array of issues\, including: economic integration in the Levant and GCC\, the Iranian economy under sanctions\, fiscal decentralization in the Islamic Republic of Iran and anti-extractivist social movements and re-envisioning the political economy in North Africa. \n\nAshraf Mishrif commenced the working group discussion with his paper on\, “The GCC’s Unsettled Policy for Economic Integration.” The paper presents a broad picture of the political-economic (dis)integration of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) since its inception in 1981. The study suggests that the GCC’s ineffective institutional structure and the lack of political will among its member states to implement and reinforce coordinated policies are the main factors that have led to a lack of meaningful integration. Mishrif suggests that currently\, at a global level\, there is a retreat from regionalism\, as can be seen in some of the leading organizations such as the EU and NAFTA. While to retain relevance for its regional integration mission\, the GCC must strengthen its institutional structure. Currently\, the domestic political environment of its member states makes it unlikely that this can occur. GCC member states lack fundamental institutional components\, such as elected parliaments and legislative bodies\, which are needed to institute supranational policy-making. Mishrif also states that ideological differences\, the rise of ambitious young leaders in Gulf ruling families\, and differing foreign policy interests demonstrated by GCC member states have shown that politics and national interest trump economic logic when it comes to the GCC. The paper concludes that there is a low interregional trade between the member states (sixten percent in total) and that there is a need to reexamine and reevaluate the process of integration.   \n\nAngela Joya shifted the discussion to North Africa\, with her paper\, “Alter-globalization in the Middle East and North Africa: The Case of Anti-Extractivism in Algeria\, Tunisia\, and Morocco.” Joya argues that the rise of new grass root rural movements in North Africa indicates that marginalized communities in the Middle East are beginning to press against processes of globalization and neoliberal economic logic. Joya’s paper presents a series of case-studies of different rurally-based social movements in Morocco\, Tunisia\, and Algeria\, as examples of how people are rejecting neoliberal authoritarianism. The case studies suggest that local communities are mobilizing around environmental concerns and resource-extraction projects\, and are demanding an alternative development model that better serves public needs. Mobilization against phosphate mining in the Gafsa basin in Tunisia\, silver mining in Imider\, Morocco and the fracking of shale gas in Ain Salah in Algeria\, demonstrates that anti-extractivism lies at the core of these social movements. People are protesting against government policies that have not brought enough economic development at the local level\, not significantly enhanced the quality of life for the people living in these regions where natural resources are being extracted. Conversely\, some of these resource-extraction projects have led to deepening inequality among the local population\, have had adverse environmental consequences\, depleted local natural resources such as water\, and negatively affected health conditions as a result of pollution. Joya argues that these people’s movements in North Africa show that the public is questioning the effectiveness of the growth-based economy model\, which\, while meant to counter unemployment and bring in investment to the country\, has been capital intensive and has had negative consequences for rural communities. Joya states that these movements are broadening the demands for economic\, social\, and political justice and inclusion of local preferences and knowledge with environmental protection to bring about a change in the current development model. \n\nKian Tajbakhsh discussed his paper on “The Political Economy of Fiscal Decentralization under the Islamic Republic of Iran.” The article looks at the fiscal decentralization of local government in over 90 cities and municipalities in Iran. Using descriptive data and empirical analysis\, the paper provides a detailed study of Iranian municipal finances and examines the extent to which fiscal decentralization has led to strengthening local government. In particular\, Tajbakhsh questions whether the decentralization policy has created structures of local governance that are more responsive and accountable to voters’ preferences. In 1999\, a new reform of establishing elected local government was implemented and backed by four political actors; the ruling Islamists\, the Islamic reformists\, the developmental Islamists\, and the apolitical technocrats. Each had their motivation for supporting decentralization\, which led to three distinct projects. The study conducted reveals that the elected municipalities have a narrow set of responsibilities and limited legal autonomy from the central government. Many of the municipalities collect revenues from local sources; however\, this revenue decentralization is not accompanied by expenditure decentralization\, which has led to a system of “perverse economy.” The author argues that the evolution of the local government in Iran\, over the past two decades\, can be explained by the theory of local electoral authoritarianism\, in which the central government aims to install local electoral institutions to enhance its influence rather than allow dispersal of autonomy.  \n\nEsfandyar Batmanghelidj’s paper\, “The Ins and Outs of Iranian Industrial Resiliency under Sanctions\,” looks at the Iranian economy and industrial resiliency under sanctions and examines the relationship between the availability of industrial inputs and total industrial output and growth of the non-oil exports in Iran. Batmanghelidj argues that the sanctions imposed on Iran have been effective in cutting back Iran’s energy exports. However\, for the past fifteen years\, Iran has steadily increased its non-oil exports\, through which the country is earning its foreign exchange. The increase in non-oil exports also has paved the way for Iran to trade with regional countries\, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. The paper looks at how Iran’s imports are being sustained to maintain industrial output. The author identifies a process of “import reflection” through which Iran is able to maintain the availability of industrial input (intermediary and capital inputs) and steadily increase its industrial output. The study examines the trade data of Iran’s main partners\, EU\, China\, UAE\, and Turkey and Total Productivity Index of Central Bank of Iran\, and demonstrations that the sanctions on Iran temporarily affected the relationship between European industrial exports to Iran and Iranian industrial productivity. However\, Iran was able to substitute European industrial inputs with Chinese inputs and re-export required European goods via UAE and Turkey further\, which enabled it to stabilize industrial productivity and bypass sanction pressures.  \n\nMisba Bhatti presented Imad El-Anis’s article on “Transport Infrastructure and Regional Integration in the Levant.” This chapter contributes to the study of regionalism by investigating the relationship between hard infrastructure and economic integration in the Levant. The author argues that regionalism and economic integration relies on the development of domestic and cross border transport infrastructure. The author assumes that a higher level of trade leads to economic integration\, which leads to interdependency and political cooperation and stability. Despite the presence of commercial institutes\, tariffs\, and international institutions\, such as Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement (GAFTA)\, any previous initiatives to deliver regional public goods and enhance domestic economic progress have been unsuccessful in the Levant. The chapter investigates the physical transportation infrastructure in the Levant and its impact on regionalism by addressing two main questions: 1) What is the condition of domestic and cross-border transport infrastructure in the Levant?; and\, 2) What is the relationship between domestic and cross-border transport infrastructure? As a result of the study conducted\, the chapter concludes that domestic and cross-border transport infrastructure performance is weak in several of the countries studied and that this weakness hinders regional economic integration.  \n\nTo view the working group agenda\, click hereTo read the participants’ biographies\, click hereRead more about this research initiative\n\nParticipants and Discussants:  \n\nAdel Abdel Ghafar\, Brookings Doha Center\, QatarZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarEsfandyar Batmanghelidj\, Bourse & Bazaar\, IranMisba Bhatti\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarAngela Joya\, University of Oregon\, USMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarAshraf Mishrif\, Sultan Qaboos University\, OmanAbdul Rehmaan Qayyum\, Georgetown University in QatarKhushboo Shah\, Georgetown University in QatarJackie Starbird\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarKian Tajbakhsh\, Columbia University\, USElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar\n\nArticle by Misba Bhatti\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/political-economy-contemporary-middle-east-working-group-ii/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20191010T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20191010T160000
DTSTAMP:20260404T011938
CREATED:20191017T125910Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210610T073915Z
UID:10001417-1570708800-1570723200@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:CURA Workshop: The Art of Hearing and Seeing Data
DESCRIPTION:On October 10\, 2019\, CIRS hosted a CURA workshop titled\, “The Art of Hearing and Seeing Data: Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods\,” by Assistant Professor of Government at GU-Q\, Dr. Uday Chandra. The workshop provided participants with an insightful breakdown of the practical fundamentals of qualitative research and data observation. Ranging from freshmen to seniors\, the participants actively engaged with the material and discussions led by Prof. Chandra\, enabling them to build upon each other’s interpretations of the significance of plausible data across various forms of qualitative research. Through a simple ethnography-inspired observation exercise that students were required to complete prior to the workshop\, students were able to contextualize the role of hearing and seeing data at the most rudimentary level\, within the overarching theme of conducting qualitative research. As part of the discussion\, students compared the sights and sounds they observed in public spaces at various campuses\, in comparison with the audio-visual elements of the social atmosphere at the atrium in GU-Q itself\, and explored the interactions between independent variables such as academic concentrations and gender ratios.  \n \n \nThe workshop initially delved into the basics of quantitative and qualitative research\, emphasized that each method has shortcomings\, and can be used only to answer certain\, specific research questions. Recognizing the “seduction of quantification” and the difficulty of demonstrating causation\, not just correlation\, and to accurately reflect social reality\, enabled participants to contextualize the role of qualitative research methods within the wider framework of data observation. Prof. Chandra also highlighted the pitfalls of qualitative research in its inability to identify macro trends\, geospatial mapping of micro-level data\, establish patterns for large numbers of cases or variables\, or even solve existential problems. Students learned that different methodological approaches should be used to strengthen the certainty of their theses.  \n \n \nProf. Chandra used a personal example of his doctoral research titled\, “Negotiating Leviathan: State-making and Resistance in the Margins of Modern India\,” to demonstrate the practical workings of qualitative research. He shared his own experience in overcoming challenges pertaining to fieldwork. Salma Hassabou\, CURA Administrative Fellow and workshop participant\, commented\, “I thoroughly enjoyed listening to Prof. Chandra’s personal experience with qualitative research because much of what we study is mostly theoretical in nature that not everyone knows how to apply it in practical research. The example he shared regarding his fieldwork tied the entire workshop together\, and I found it incredibly helpful.” \n \n \nThe workshop also addressed concerns regarding the importance of credible research design and the need for a focused research question. The conversational nature of the workshop also allowed students to engage with the topic very closely and clarify areas of ambiguity within the spheres of both qualitative and quantitative research methods.  \n \n \nThe workshop had a total of twenty-four participants\, and the attendees who successfully completed all required tasks were awarded electronic badges to certify their enrollment and completion of this CURA workshop. CIRS hosts CURA workshops once every semester to encourage student research and to equip the GU-Q student body with the skills and practical knowledge needed to produce original research in the students’ respective fields of interest.  \n \n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Irene Promodh (class of 2021)\, CURA Research Fellow
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/cura-workshop-art-hearing-and-seeing-data-0/
CATEGORIES:Student Engagement
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20191027T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20191028T170000
DTSTAMP:20260404T011938
CREATED:20191125T115819Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210829T134846Z
UID:10001420-1572166800-1572282000@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Football in the Middle East Working Group I
DESCRIPTION:On October 27-28\, 2019\, the Center for International and Regional Studies held the inaugural working group for its research initiative on “Football in the Middle East.” The meeting brought together regional and international scholars and experts to discuss some of the understudied areas related to football in the region and to identify original research questions in their respective areas of focus. Over the course of two days a number of topics were discussed\, including\, football academies\, women’s football in Turkey\, the FIFA 2022 World Cup in Qatar\, beIN and sports broadcasting rights\, football management and administration\, football players’ perception of national identity\, football clubs in Iran\, Palestinian football players in Lebanon\, youth refugees and football\, football and regime legitimization\, and football fans and protests in Algeria. \n\nThe working group began with Dr. Valter Di Salvo’s talk on Qatar’s strategies to build a high-performance football environment. Dr. Di Salvo\, the Director of Football Performance and Science at Aspire Academy\, compared the football environment of three countries\, Spain\, England\, and Qatar\, and stressed that building a successful football environment in Qatar needed an understanding of the local social context. A seven-goal plan was implemented by Aspire to develop and strengthen the game in Qatar. This included\, data collection on a players’ performance and abilities; recruiting a professional group of staff and trainers; assessing the needs of coaches and players; formulating and implementing a training strategy; building of training facilities and assessment labs; integrating knowledge throughout the process; and finally sharing of knowledge with other partners for development of the game. The last goal led to the formation of the Aspire Fellows Community that presently has representation from 50 globally-renowned football clubs and federations and has 260 presentations in its database for knowledge sharing. \n\nBuilding on the discussion of Qatar’s football development strategy\, Dr. Wadih Ishaq spoke about Qatar’s hosting of the FIFA World Cup in 2022. Dr. Ishaq pointed out that while scholars and analysts have addressed football\, politics\, and socioeconomic issues\, there is little work that offers an internal perspective on the World Cup and its implications for Qatari society\, economy\, and culture. Among other topics\, it is important to study sports and education in Qatar\, and the long term educational opportunities and job security for athletes. \n\nSimon Chadwick spoke about the off-field management of football and highlighted a study by Jasoor Institute that measured the size of the sports economy in the Middle East. The study examined the broader sports landscape in the region and drew attention to major clubs and federations in the GCC member states. Chadwick suggested that in order to address the question of football management in the GCC\, five areas need to be studied; fan engagement\, investment\, sponsorship\, brands and branding\, and industrial networks. Professor Chadwick identified a number of core research questions: How can football in the GCC region establish and build sustainable match day attendances? What role in the development of football in the region should investment play? What purpose do the portfolios of GCC region football sponsors serve? Can football club brands in the GCC region ever rival those of their international rivals? How is football contributing to broader industrial challenges facing the GCC region? \n\nRoss Griffin explored the question of national identity and football players of the Qatari national team. The composition of the Qatari team contains a host of players born in countries such as Sudan\, Iraq\, Algeria\, France\, and Portugal. Their success as a national team presents the opportunity to revisit the complicated relationship between nationalism\, football\, and national identity from a player perspective. The identity dilemmas that inevitably ensue when athletes are naturalized has been given significant consideration by scholars of sport and nationalism. Financial gain\, cultural affinity\, and professional ambition have all been cited as motivating factors influencing an athlete’s decision to switch allegiances. Nevertheless\, the majority of these analyses have been undertaken with the construct of a team\, the fan\, or the nation in mind. Ross Griffin suggested that there is a need to include the subjective perspective of players themselves in their performance of national identity. \n\nJohn McManus stated that creating a strong legacy for the World Cup was an inherent component of Qatar’s bidding pitch. Training and development of sports administrators and industry experts are part of this legacy. McManus argued that the literature on sports administration often focuses on mega sporting events\, and there is very little attention given to other forms of organized sporting competitions. It was suggested that there is a need to examine Qatar’s wider sporting landscape and to look at organizations such as beIN\, Qatar Sports League\, and Aspire Academy and address their roles when it comes to sporting legacy building. Some of the research questions that were put forward included looking at expatriate games and their administrations; examining what it means to be a sports administrator; exploring the administration of football clubs and federations; What is an event gypsy?; as well as moving away from western-centric literature and focusing on the Middle East specific context. \n\nCraig LaMay drew attention to the beIN network and broadcasting rights in the Middle East. Pay television has changed the way people watch sports in the region\, and other broadcasters often view beIN’s monopoly over broadcasting rights as aggressive. The network has 40 percent of global media rights\, and these include copyrights and audio/visual rights over broadcasting. However\, the network is not just limited to sports channels but also has several entertainment stations. Sixty percent of the content produced is in Arabic\, and according to statistics\, 66 percent of total viewership over television for the FIFA 2018 World Cup was through beIN sports channels. An understudied area with regards to the beIN network is the entry of the beOUTQ network\, which is a pirate pay-television broadcaster and is an example of industrial level piracy of broadcasting. The network not only pirates channels from the beIN network but also channels from Europe and the US. Craig LaMay suggested the need to examine the nature of pay television and the issue of piracy in broadcasting and its implications for beIN in the long run. \n\nThe literature on sports gives examples of how sports can be used as a medium through which refugees can be integrated into the social and political fabric of a country. However\, this is not always the case\, as seen with Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The Palestinians in Lebanon are a stateless people\, and the football federation in the country has put a cap on the number of Palestinian players that can play in a team. Each club team is allowed to have only one Palestinian player\, and they cannot play as a goalkeeper. Palestinian are also restricted from holding property in Lebanon as well as are banned from 30 professions\, which is another form of discrimination that they have to face. In response to these restrictions on joining Lebanese football clubs and teams\, Palestinians have formed their leagues under which they have formed teams and hold matches. Danyel Reiche’s presentation shed light on these issues and proposed four areas\, which could be studied in regards to Palestinian football players\, i.e.\, Palestinian diaspora clubs elsewhere\, Palestinian football in Israel\, the condition of Palestinians as stateless people in Lebanon and the efforts to gain statehood by recognition. Reiche’s focus would be to examine the cap on players\, when and why it was introduced\, and discrimination of Palestinian players in Lebanese football. \n\nMiddle Eastern rules have frequently used football as a tool for regime legitimization. While much of the literature on this focus on the soft power aspects of football\, Abdullah Al-Arian\, proposed that there is more to states’ instrumental usage of football than soft power and brand-building. Abdullah Al-Arian suggested that football is used by states to pursue and achieve hard political objectives. States have used football for extending neo-imperial control and power consolidation\, regime legitimization\, countering threats\, political repression\, and to mask unpopular regional and domestic policies or sports-washing. None of these forms of legitimization are mutually exclusive\, and states have used multiple of these at the same time. Furthermore\, emphasis in the literature has been on identifying policies related to the national teams and federations\, and not a lot has been written in regards to economic expansion and using clubs and ownership to explain some of these categories. \n\nMaher Mezahi\, detailed the history of football in Algeria\, with the arrival of the game in the country with colonial rule\, the formation of the first Algerian football club and the national team as a tool of protest against the colonizers and the subsequent use of football stadiums to protest against the political regime after independence. Football fans and club ultras express their political\, social\, and economic demands during matches in forms of songs that they produce and publically distribute. Mehar stated that the protesters who are currently rallying on the streets for regime change replicate the football fan behavior. They gather after Friday prayers\, at a famous square\, peacefully march around the town in Algiers\, sing songs that are produced by football fans\, and display anti-government calligraphy and tifos. The support from organized ultras and football fans has enabled the protesters\, to organize and execute street protests and overcome the fear of law keepers. \n\nRamon Spaaij brought the discussion back to football’s role in the development and inclusion of refugees with a focus on youth refugees. Spaaij expressed that there is a Eurocentric focus and bias on the research conducted on the topic and that there is a mismatch between research sites and the locations where the majority of the world’s displaced people reside\, with Turkey being the main exception. The reliance on policy categories limits academic research by constraining the type of questions asked\, the objects of study\, and the methods and analysis adopted. There is a need for research that uncritically accepts the boundaries of the field imposed by policy categories will tend to confirm and legitimize the assumptions made by actors. Some of research gaps that were identified included; over-emphasis on instrumental dimension vs experiential dimension of football\, decolonizing research\, ethical relationships in research\, looking at different innovative methods\, strengths-based approaches and reframing of refugees in terms of risk\, threat and deficiency and capturing the diverse voices of refugees regarding their own sporting aspirations\, needs and achievements as opposed to merely echoing dominant sport policy agendas. \n\nThe debate around gender issues and sports\, particularly football\, is a prevalent theme in the Middle East. The participants looked at female football players in Turkey for the following session. Yagmur Nuhrat identified three areas for further research on the topic; equality for women\, with focus on the dynamics of equality rather than justice; knowledge production and better education for female football players; and the issue of space and spatiality and how that relates to the environment of playing fields and neighborhoods. Some of the questions that were put forward were; Can we achieve equality\, and what kind of equality are we talking about when it comes to female football players? What are some of the elements of this struggle and resistance? What are the discourses when it comes to physical strength? How women’s’ empowerment is conceptualized by footballers and how they view this discourse? Female athletes may feel physically unsafe if they were not in a structured space. Even if it is exclusionary\, how does this structured space create feelings of safety for women? \n\nAlireza Farsi closed the working group meeting\, with his presentation on politics and football clubs in Iran. Farsi detailed the playing history of the Iranian national team and explained the structure of the football federation in Iran. Iranian federation has sixteen registered teams\, out of which only one is privately owned\, whereas the rest of the fifteen teams are owned and managed by the government. It was proposed that the football in Iran needs a component of social responsibility\, and the main driver behind should be the privatization of the clubs. Farsi gave an example of the income generated by the Premier League in England and stated that the privatization of the game could bring in economic and industrial growth as well as build up the private sector and cash revenues. The presentation also proposed strategies to initiate social responsibility and privatization plans\, which could be applied to various federations across the Middle East. \n\nIn conclusion\, Mehran Kamrava\, Director of CIRS\, thanked the participants for identifying key gaps in the literature on football in the Middle East. It is worth noting that the participants will contribute empirically grounded papers addressing these questions\, among others\, to be published in an edited volume under the auspices of CIRS. \n\nTo view the working group agenda\, click hereTo read the participants’ biographies\, click hereRead more about this research initiative\n\nParticipants and Discussants:  \n\nAhmed Abbasi\, Qatar Football Association\, QatarAbdullah Al-Arian\, Georgetown University in QatarNajwa Al-Thani\, Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy\, QatarMohammed Al-Thawadi\, Aspire Academy\, QatarZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarChaimaa Benkermi\, Georgetown University in QatarMisba Bhatti\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarSimon Chadwick\, emlyon Business School\, FranceValter Di Salvo\, Aspire Academy\, QatarAlireza Farsi\, Shahid Beheshty University\, IranRoss Griffin\, Qatar UniversitySalma Hassabou\, Georgetown University in QatarWadih Ishac\, Qatar UniversityMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarCraig LaMay\, Northwestern University in QatarJohn McManus\, Qatar UniversityMaher Mezahi\, Independent Football Journalist\, Algeria Suzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarYagmur Nuhrat\, Istanbul Bilgi University\, TurkeyIrene Promodh\, Georgetown University in QatarAbdul Rehmaan Qayyum\, Georgetown University in QatarDanyel Reiche\, American University of BeirutKhushboo Shah\, Georgetown University in QatarRodney Sharkey\, Weill Cornell Medical College in QatarRamon Spaaij\, Victoria University\, Australia Betsi Stephen\, Georgetown UniversityElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar\n\nArticle by Misba Bhatti\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/football-middle-east-working-group-i/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20191028T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20191028T193000
DTSTAMP:20260404T011938
CREATED:20191020T064656Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210829T134837Z
UID:10001418-1572285600-1572291000@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Sport\, Politics\, and Society in the Middle East
DESCRIPTION:The Center for International and Regional Studies launched Sport\, Politics\, and Society in the Middle East at a CIRS Dialogue Series event on October 28\, 2019. The edited volume examines the role that sports have played in the contemporary socioeconomic\, cultural\, and political milieus of the region. Danyel Reiche\, Associate Professor for Comparative Politics at the American University of Beirut\, presented an overview of the CIRS research project and the book\, which he coedited with Tamir Sorek\, Professor of Sociology at the University of Florida. \n\nReiche began his talk by emphasizing the growing significance of sports in the Middle East\, notably in the midst of Qatar’s preparations for the FIFA 2022 World Cup. The increased attention on sports in the Middle East is reflected not only in the media\, he said\, but also in academia where a “growing body of scholarship\, particularly on Qatar\,” is shifting to sport studies. Reiche shared his observations of the close ties between the Middle East and the world of sports in the rising number of mega-sport events hosted in the region\, for example\, and in the sponsorship of European football clubs by Middle Eastern countries\, such as Paris Saint-Germain by Qatar and Manchester City by the United Arab Emirates. \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n \n\nThe project’s primary research questions considered the factors behind the establishment of sport in the Middle East\, whether there were common patterns and dynamics throughout the region\, the different roles of sport\, and whether sport is serving societal change. Reiche highlighted the uniqueness of the book in terms of the research process employed. Utilizing a range of interdisciplinary social science approaches\, the ten authors drew from ethnographic research\, academic literature\, archival work\, interviews\, and surveys. The chapters fall under two broad themes: the “politics and economics of sport” and sport as a “contested terrain where struggles over meaning\, resources\, and rights are fought.” \n\n“Sports in the Middle East are much more than an interesting angle through which to popularize academic themes. As major political and economic forces\, they not only reflect\, but also shape both individuals’ lives and large-scale social processes.” \n\nThe development of modern sports in the Middle East arose in the early twentieth century in urban areas such as Istanbul\, Tehran\, Cairo\, Beirut\, and Damascus. According to Reiche\, different dynamics were apparent\, where “men mainly played football and basketball\, while women were particularly into gymnastics.” In the contemporary era\, one author used digital ethnography in researching how female athletes in the Middle East presented themselves to the public through their social media accounts. Among the similarities with Western female athletes were the use of these platforms for “self-branding and to raise awareness on the sport\,” however\, Middle Eastern women tended to “present themselves in a culturally more appropriate manner\,” he said. \n\nAn audience member asked whether the World Cup might lead to liberalization in Qatar—in the media\, for example. Reiche’s response was\, “Qatar will liberalize\, but on its own terms.” He also shared a “new trend in hosting mega-sporting events\,” that is\, co-hosting them. For example\, the European Football Championship in 2000 co-hosted by Belgium and Holland\, and the 2026 FIFA World Cup co-hosted by the US\, Canada\, and Mexico\, among others. Whether Middle Eastern countries might co-host mega-sporting events given persistent problems in the region\, Reiche suggested a scenario where\, for example\, Qatar could “host a world championship and then give few matches to a country like Lebanon.” \n\nIn conclusion\, Reiche stated\, “sports in the Middle East are much more than an interesting angle through which to popularize academic themes.” As major political and economic forces\, sports “not only reflect\, but also shape both individuals’ lives and large-scale social processes\,” he said. \n\nDanyel Reiche is Associate Professor of Comparative Politics at the American University of Beirut. He graduated with distinction from Leibniz University Hannover and joined AUB in 2008 after working as a Visiting Assistant Professor at Georgetown University in Washington\, DC. His past research focused on energy as well as sport policy and politics\, the latter his recent priority. Reiche published Success and Failure of Countries at the Olympic Games (Routledge\, 2016) and edited\, with Tamir Sorek\, Sport\, Politics and Society in the Middle East (Hurst/Oxford University Press\, 2019). His peer-reviewed articles have been published in area study journals such as International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics and Journal of Energy Policy\, and in broader-oriented journals such as Third World Quarterly and The Middle East Journal. He has written op-eds for international newspapers such as The Washington Post and Spiegel Online and is frequently interviewed and quoted by major media outlets such as Le Monde and The New York Times. Reiche chairs the Political Studies Association’s Sport and Politics Study Group. \n\nArticle by Chaïmaa Benkermi\, Publications Fellow
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/sport-politics-and-society-middle-east/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20191110T210000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20191111T170000
DTSTAMP:20260404T011938
CREATED:20191202T112816Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20220328T091450Z
UID:10001422-1573419600-1573491600@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Tunisia in the Aftermath of the Arab Uprisings Working Group I
DESCRIPTION:On November 10-11\, 2019\, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) held the first working group under its research initiative\, “Tunisia in the Aftermath of the Arab Uprisings.” This was a Faculty Research Project under the intellectual leadership of a member of the Georgetown University faculty\, Professor Mohamed Zayani. CIRS invited a group of scholars to discuss various topics and identify the gaps in the existing scholarship. The presentations took several different approaches ranging from theoretical deliberations to practical implications to historical narratives. Some of the topics discussed by the participants included political Islam\, civil society in Tunisia\, economic challenges\, social justice\, youth involvement and identity politics\, security challenges\, media dynamics\, power politics\, and authoritarianism in the Middle East. Via a multi-disciplinary approach\, the meeting offered an in-depth discourse on post-revolutionary Tunisian state. \n\nThe initial discussion focused on the persisting conditions of authoritarianism in the Middle East and how they are affecting the transition in Tunisia. It was argued that when taken into context\, the conditions pertaining to transition in the Middle East are very different from other regions\, i.e.\, Latin America and South Africa. The existing literature on transition points towards a degree of awareness on the part of political leaders that a change is required\, which is missing in the context of the Middle East and thus makes it more difficult for a transition to take place. Populations all over the Middle East are weary of the current status quo. The uprisings in these second wave of protests have more of a political element than an economic agenda. However\, the political elites in many of the countries across the region are not ready to introduce change to the existing political arena. Though transitions have been more successful when guided from the top\, in the case of the Middle East\, the transition has to happen in a context that is different\, i.e.\, has to come from the bottom. The relative success in the case of Tunisia can be attributed to limited foreign intervention compared to other countries and the non-politicized nature of the military. However\, there are elements of the old regime still in place\, and the leadership needs to realize that democracy comes with compromise. \n\nThe discussion then shifted to the power politics in Tunisia\, and scholars looked at methods to transform the deep political power frameworks that currently exist. The overshadowing of politics by the state has had severe consequences in the post-revolutionary Tunisia. Some of the research questions that were proposed included examining how Tunisia political culture can translate into real politics; How and what kind of local leadership can emerge in this second phase of the transition; What does the success of Kais Saeed’s success indicate and point to regard political outsiders? What kind of new conflict resolution tools can be expected in the upcoming period? In addition\, the participants discussed the rise of populism in the country and its impact on Tunisian politics. \n\nThe conversation was then centered on the topic of political Islam\, and it was contended that are no political Islamists nor Salafists exist in Tunisia today and that the present-day situation is a reflection of post-2011 Tunisia. Ennahda became a major topic of study after 2011; however\, the question remains as to how much of its Islamists agenda is the party going to pursue now that it is in power. One of the understudied areas in the Tunisian case highlighted was the separation of politics and da’wa and what it meant for Ennahda. Other areas for potential research identified were a reconfiguration of a religious public sphere and examining what is a religious public sphere in Tunisia today\, historical account of the Salafists\, and their specific categorization in Tunisia and Salafist Jihadists. \n\nThe discussion on Tunisia’s reinvigorated civil society expressed the importance of establishing the value of analyzing the formal associational sphere where groups and organizations would\, by necessity\, register through state-established parameters. It then laid out a working definition of civil society and then contextualized the concept within two broad overarching narratives that often run in parallel to one another\, democratization\, and neoliberalism. The number of legally registered associations in Tunisia in 2010 was 9\,996; in 2012\, this number increased by approximately 50 percent to 14\,966\, and as of October 2019\, there are now 22\,954. Some of the research questions proposed were; Is the role of civil society in good governance as it relates to time-dependent democratization serving as a mechanism to plant the seeds/lay the groundwork for stronger and more pluralistic engagement; Are Tunisia’s economic grievances being met by civil society organizations by providing social welfare services to marginalized communities the state is unable/unwilling to reach? Is civil society filling a gap left by the state? Following the uprisings\, is civil society now ’embedded’ in Tunisia? Which institutions would need to be examined to determine civil society’s engagement in good governance and in holding state institutions accountable?; What can we say about the fabric of civil society today – is this a pluralistic space? Where are the exclusions [marginalized groups outside larger urban centers]\, and are there surprising inclusions? Where are the rivalries and divergences in post-uprising Tunisia today? \n\nThe scholars next discussed Tunisia’s economic challenges and it was stated that per capita income in the country had tripled since the revolution and that major leaps had been made in the education sector. Prior to 2010\, Tunisia was in good standing in terms of its macroeconomics with low public debt and inflation rates. However\, inequality in terms of income distribution\, environmental problems\, the impact of globalization\, and corruption were some of the factors that led to the uprisings in 2011. Post-revolutionary Tunisia is still dealing with inequality; the young population in the country is demanding radical change but is hardly aware of what that means. The Islamists party has managed to be the strongest party; however\, the political landscape is very much divided\, and this can impede the democratic transition. There are no plans for an economic strategy and no response to people’s expectations. There is a declining business environment in the country with minimal investments being made. Not much has been done in terms of development; there is higher inflation\, much lower growth in the country\, and very little has been done in terms of improvement of fiscal resources. The need for a new social contract was expressed with better management of micro finances in the country and improving the quality of the services. \n\nPrecarity and social justice were next deliberated. The meaning of the term precarity was debated and examined in the context of Tunisia. An anthropological approach was taken that views precarity as a master term that designates new forms of social mobility and labor regimes. It was expressed that it is applied to a new class of a dangerous heterogeneous group of people and refers to the social condition of vulnerability and capital forms of labor. Precarity in Tunisia can be seen in terms of revolutionary uprisings and may be understood as a resolution of the precariat. The majority of social movements in Tunisia have been about demanding employment from the state\, preferably in the public sector. Work in the private sector is often exploitative because of the absence of a contract and legal safety. Another aspect examined was the mobility practices in post-revolutionary Tunisia. Massive waves of Tunisian youth have migrated after the uprising\, and it was suggested that in order to better understand the cross border survival strategies and mobilization of jihad as a form of migration\, explaining these mobility practices of precarious Tunisian would be necessary. In terms of social justice\, it was suggested that corruption under transition needed to be studied as it has become democratized. More nuanced accounts of channels of corruption and marginalized groups\, such as women and youth from interior regions\, were suggested as an area for further research. \n\nMedia dynamics and freedom was also discussed and was categorized into four main areas in post-revolutionary Tunisia\, the quasi-non-governmental organizations\, particularly the political talk shows on TV and radio\, the political structures and electoral debate\, the advocacy groups\, such as closed Facebook groups and the revival of the Tunisian cinema. Some of the research questions proposed included looking at in what conditions have these quasi-non-governmental organizations have been created in Tunisia? What are some of the strategies that they employ? Which sector has more priority\, and how can we account for these priorities? How could the presidential debate be a precedent for the re-appropriation of TV shows? Looking at the participatory politics of media through these talk shows; studying the performance of citizenship via facebook groups; and lastly examining how the revival of the cinema in Tunisia was the way the movie directors set themselves free from ongoing moral codes\, in terms of the subjects they chose and the type of films they made. \n\nThe discussion was then shifted to Tunisian history and some of the legacies that impact the current political and social dynamics in Tunisia today. Two significant vestiges\, both from the Ottoman and the French colonial eras that are relevant are the land distribution and people’s identity either as an Islamist or secularists. Awqaf was a religious\, administrative institution established during the Ottoman era\, which was demolished during the colonial rule. Ennahda has introduced the idea of reestablishing the system under the current administration\, which has had some opposition. It is seen as a political body that could operate outside the control of the state system and has serious consequences. The two political figures\, Salah ben Youssef and Habib Bourguiba that rose to prominence during the French rule and introduced two different sets of ideologies also have impacted the political system today. It was proposed that further research could look into Tunisian history in three different ways; examine the different periods of history and their impact; look at the development of the political parties in Tunisia; and study the mechanism of reproduction of political alliances and affiliations that are passed down either through familial channels or educational institutions. \n\nThe attention was then shifted to youth involvement and identity politics\, and it was specified that the youth mobilization in a current period different from in 2011. The ongoing narrative among the youth is that the revolution never took place in reality as some elements of the Ben Ali regime are still evident. The majority of the youth and street activism lack leadership and have not been developed into political engagement. The current wave of mobilization is driven by the question of dignity and the struggle for recognition. Some elements of these mobilization share similarities with the demands that are being voiced in western societies\, such as recognition and equal rights of the LGBT community. Youth in Tunisia cannot be perceived as a homogeneous group\, and a clear categorization is required. Youth in Tunisia feel as sub citizens where they are often excluded from the political scene. The problems faced by the youth need to be brought to the forefront\, and the local context and cultural aspects also need further examinations. Some of the research gaps identified were examining the commonalities shared by the older generation and the young Tunisian\, studying and comparing rural youth to their urban counterparts\, and deconstructing the educational system and identifying how it contributes to the current economic divide. \n\nThe attention was then shifted to contestation and social movement in Tunisia after the revolution. The argument made was that the protests are an ongoing process in Tunisia and can be looked at from three different dimensions\, the protests themselves\, the interplay between protestor and state sponsors\, and the role of international actors. The existing literature has looked at the sociological influence of the protests\, and there are different case studies that have been examined. The democratization process has not opened political opportunities and cooperation in Tunisia\, and this leads to the question of whether Social Movement Theory can be applied to the MENA region. Protests erupted over substantial injustices\, i.e.\, provision of necessities and rights\, as well as procedural injustices\, i.e.\, corruption. This lends to institutional questions when talking about protests\, i.e.\, how people organize and what they want in protests? Another important aspect highlighted was the state’s response to the protests and whether there has been any fundamental change? Examining the limited role of IMF and its impact comparatively was also suggested. \n\nThe last topic discussed was Tunisia’s security challenges in terms of policies implemented in the country and radicalization. The group also looked at the help Tunisian security forces have been getting from external actors\, namely the EU and the US\, since the revolution\, such as the creation of G7+ and training programs for the security forces. The various terrorist attacks and political assassination in Tunisian polity have been aimed at creating an international emergency and deem Tunisian as an unsafe state. This leads scholars to question the kind of polity the Tunisian state is leaning to; What are the different rationales behind the various terrorist attacks? As a countermeasure\, local security committees have been formed in various regions and introduced new forms of micro surveillance. Some of the questions posed were\, Why is there a large number of jihadist Tunisians? What are some of the strategies through which the state is empowering the citizens? How can societal resistance be fostered? What are some of the dominant discourses that shape the security agenda in Tunisia? Moreover\, to what extent state security hinders ontological security?  \n\nThe participants will contribute empirically grounded papers addressing these questions\, among others\, to be published in an edited volume under the auspices of CIRS. \n\nTo view the working group agenda\, click hereTo read the participants’ biographies\, click hereRead more about this research initiative\n\nParticipants and Discussants:  \n\nMaram Al-Qershi\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMisba Bhatti\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarAlexandra Blackman\, New York University Abu Dhabi\, UAEAmel Boubekeur\, MENA program at the European Council\, AlgeriaMongi Boughazala\, University of Tunis El-Manar\, TunisiaEdwige Fortier\, SOAS University of London\, UKZouhir Gabsi\, Deakin University\, AustraliaRuth Hanau Santini\, Universita Orientale Naples\, ItalySalma Hassabou\, Georgetown University in QatarMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarEnrique Klaus\, Galatasaray University\, TurkeyFabio Merone\, University of Ghent\, BelgiumAlyssa Miller\, University of Pennsylvania\, USSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMarina Ottaway\, Woodrow Wilson Center\, USIrene Promodh\, Georgetown University in QatarAbdul Rehmaan Qayyum\, Georgetown University in QatarKhushboo Shah\, Georgetown University in QatarElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar Irene Weipert-Fenner\, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt\, Germany Mohamed Zayani\, Georgetown University in Qatar\n\nArticle by Misba Bhatti\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/tunisia-aftermath-arab-uprisings-working-group-i/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20191127T180000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20191127T200000
DTSTAMP:20260404T011938
CREATED:20191126T103327Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210829T134820Z
UID:10001421-1574877600-1574884800@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:CIRS Dialogue Series by H.E. Dr. Hamad Bin Abdulaziz Al-Kawari
DESCRIPTION:On November 27\, 2019\, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) invited H.E. Dr. Hamad Bin Abdulaziz Al-Kawari\, State Minister of Qatar with rank of Deputy Prime-Minister and Georgetown University in Qatar (GU-Q) Ambassador in Residence\, to deliver a talk on his experience with international institutions. In his own words\, this experience “started with UNESCO\, and ended with UNESCO.” \n\nIn his talk\, Al-Kawari highlighted the challenges he faced as he built up his career by “choosing the difficult way of knowledge and education.” While holding the position of ambassador\, he simultaneously earned degrees from several institutions\, including Saint-Joseph University in Beirut\, La Sorbonne\, and Stony Brook University. During his studies\, he became ambassador to five European countries and later became the permanent ambassador to the United Nations Educational\, Scientific\, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). He explained that “opportunity comes\, but if you don’t hold it well\, it goes.” \n\n“The best gift or award that could be given to distinguished Georgetown students would be to send them for one moth to the United Nations during a General Assembly\, as they would acquire a lot of knowledge.” \n\nAfter five years of learning French and two years of studying at La Sorbonne\, he moved to New York which\, along with the United Nations\, are “in themselves some of the biggest schools.” He advised the Georgetown University in Qatar administration that “the best gift or award that could be given to distinguished Georgetown students would be to send them for one moth to the United Nations during a General Assembly\, as they would acquire a lot of knowledge.” Al-Kawari is an advocate of the determination to “learn and re-learn\,” which is also the World Innovation Summit for Education (WISE) motto. \n\nAl-Kawari then discussed the benefits and challenges of working in multilateral organizations\, as opposed to a bilateral ones. He emphasized that “all of the ambassadors work in the same building and see each other every day\,” so “all of the work is collective work.” During his tenure as Ambassador to the United Nations from 1984 to 1990\, Al-Kawari also represented Qatar as official delegate to the UN for the country. He was simultaneously elected Deputy Chairman of the General Assembly of the United Nations at its fortieth session and Chairman of the Special Political Committee (4th Committee) at its 42nd session. As the latter dealt with the Arab-Israeli conflict\, “at that time it was not easy for an Arab to be the head of this organization\,” he said. He later held multiple ministerial functions in Qatar and wrote a “cultural autobiography\,” which he published in the form of a book titled\, The Global Majlis: An Intellectual Autobiography (Doha: Hamad Bin Khalifa University Press\, 2015). \n\n\n\nH.E. Dr. Hamad Bin Abdulaziz Al-Kawari is State Minister with rank of Deputy Prime-Minister and GU-Q’s Ambassador in Residence. He is a Qatari diplomat\, statesman\, and an intellectual. He has been the Minister for Culture\, Arts and Heritage of Qatar from July 2008 to January 2016. He was previously the Ambassador of Qatar for France\, the United States\, the UNESCO and the UN. He is married and the father of three children. Dr. Al-Kawari was Qatar’s candidate for the post of UNESCO Director General. He led the vote in pole position for 4 rounds and lost the fifth for a single vote\, with 28 votes against 30 for the French candidate. \n\nArticle by Chaïmaa Benkermi\, Publications Fellow
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/cirs-dialogue-series-he-dr-hamad-bin-abdulaziz-al-kawari/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20191201T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20191202T170000
DTSTAMP:20260404T011938
CREATED:20200108T092750Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210829T134809Z
UID:10001423-1575190800-1575306000@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:The GCC Crisis: Qatar and its Neighbors Working Group II
DESCRIPTION:On December 1-2\, 2019\, the Center for International and Regional Studies held the second working group for its research initiative on “The GCC Crisis: Qatar and its Neighbors.” Over two days\, the convened scholars presented and received feedback on their papers that tackled a wide array of issues\, including: the Regional implications of the GCC crisis\, impact of the crisis on Qatar’s Supply Chain\, public narratives of nationalism and identity in Qatar after the blockade\, Turkey’s role in the crisis\, ontological security and the GCC crisis\, and post-blockade relations between State and Society in Qatar. \n\nThe working group began with Kristian Coates Ulrichsen’s discussion of his paper on “The Regional Implications of the Gulf Crisis.” Ulrichsen argues that the 2011 Arab spring signaled the transition of Qatar\, Saudi Arabia\, and UAE into assertive regional actors. Differing foreign policy trajectories\, as well as regional actions\, were taken by Doha\, Riyadh\, and Abu Dhabi during and after the Arab Spring strained relations between the three states and limited the chances of future regional cooperation. The rupture of relations between the three Gulf states has highlighted the inherent weakness of the GCC as a meaningful institution through which member states can mediate regional disputes. The GCC\, a loose collection of like-minded states without any significant centralization of authority or decision-making\, has always suffered as a result of being viewed as a Saudi-dominated organization. Following the Arab Spring\, any chance of building greater regional cooperation was further fragmented by a zero-sum mentality of the member states. Ulrichsen’s paper also highlights the pressure faced by the new Qatari leadership from Saudi Arabia and UAE and how this has raised concerns in other GCC states\, namely Kuwait and Oman\, over their own vulnerable positions as they too approach leadership transitions. The paper also examines the new relationship between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi and its impact and implications on the regional order. \n\nFrank Himpel and Willy Kempel drew attention to the impact of the GCC crisis on the supply chain in Qatar with their paper on “Supply Chain Management in Turbulent Time.” The paper focuses on how the blockade impacted Qatar’s ability to import goods and how the State addressed the challenges faced. The authors highlight various strategies that states can adopt to manage their supply chain during times of crisis. In the Qatari case\, the State sought to diversify the external components of its supply chain\, while also developing greater indigenous capacity in areas where this was possible\, with the long term goal of making its supply chain independent from its immediate neighborhood. Qatar sought to build new cooperative relationships at the regional and international level and sought to alleviate the pressure on its supply chain by seeking new routes of import and export via air and sea. The authors highlight that due to Qatar’s successful efforts in building and reinforcing its resources\, the embargoing countries failed to achieve their purpose\, and the long term benefit is that it has led to Qatar further developing its infrastructure and capacities. \n\nJocelyn Mitchell then presented a discussion of her paper “Narratives of Nationalism and Identity in Qatar after 2017\,” which she has co-authored with Mariam Al-Hammadi. In this paper\, the authors examine the impact of the ongoing regional crisis on nationalism and national identity in Qatar and argue that the rupture in regional relations has reduced the salience of a Khaliji identity amongst Qataris while increasing expressions of nationalism and national identity. The paper uses the case study of the recently opened National Museum in Qatar to examine society’s response to the narrative of a unified Qatari national identity represented at the Museum. The authors suggest that Qatari identity\, as represented at the National Museum\, appears to elide historical identity differences amongst Qataris\, and in particular\, do so by refraining from any representations of previously existing ‘badu’ vs. ‘hadar’ affiliations. This is viewed by the authors as a deliberate effort by the state to consolidate a single Qatari identity with the intent of increasing social unity amongst the public. The authors\, through a series of interviews with female Qatari citizens\, attempt to discern how this representation of a solidified and singular Qatari national identity expressed at the Museum is received by the Qatari population\, and whether there are social tensions around identity that are not captured through the Museum’s depictions. \n\nDavid Roberts\, in his article on “Ontological Security and the GCC Crisis: Uncovering the Bitterness at the Heart of Qatari-Emirati Relations\,” attempts to shed light on the UAE’s foreign policy goals and regional behavior by applying the theoretical lens of ontological security. Ontological security argues that individuals and states are driven by the need to secure their complex sense of identity. If a state perceives that its core identity is under threat\, then it will engage in behavior to address the source of that threat. Roberts applies this argument to explain UAE’s reasoning behind their current foreign policies to support Saudi Arabia\, Bahrain\, and Egypt in their blockade against Qatar.  Roberts argued that in the time of regional flux\, UAE simultaneously faces internal challenges and concerns in regards to tackling multiple identities within its territory. With UAE focused on promoting a modern and globalized image\, Qatar’s regional support for Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated groups and political Islam was considered a threat by the leadership in Abu Dhabi. With Qatar and UAE building identities that are mutually incompatible\, it has led to an increase in UAE’s hostility towards Qatar. \n\nJustin Gengler moved the focus to post-blockade State and Society in Qatar with his paper on “Society and State in Post-Blockade Qatar.” With this article\, Gengler examines whether the blockade altered relations within society and between society and state or if it rippled some of the changes that were prevalent even before the blockade. The data was collected via multiple surveys conducted in Qatar before and after June 2017. The analysis of the findings demonstrates that the blockade has not given rise to new waves of mutual trust and acceptance between different social groups\, however\, it has been a factor in decreasing some of the social tensions between different groups. Another result shows that Qatari citizens had a growing interest in politics that experienced an unprecedented spike during the blockade. It is argued that the blockade had a reverse effect than the Arab Spring on the Qataris\, who viewed the blockade as a stabilizing force against external aggression. \n\nThe discussion was brought to a close by Bulent Aras with his paper on “Turkey’s Diplomatic and Military Role in the Gulf Crisis.” Aras discusses Turkey’s geopolitical positioning and its diplomatic and military role in the Gulf region in light of the 2017 blockade against Qatar. The analytics framework of geopolitical reasoning has been applied to explain the foreign policy decisions made. The leaders in Ankara sought to build a regional foreign policy narrative that could be justified both domestically and internationally. Turkey turned to hard power military foreign policy\, which\, according to its leadership\, would raise its regional profile to a new level. For Turkey\, Qatar provides to be an Arab partner that helps deepen its links in the Gulf. In contrast\, policymakers in Ankara are often on the rival end to their counterparts in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Aras concludes that whether this scenario of partnership with Qatar and schism with Saudi Arabia and UAE will persist will depend on the momentum gained from this geopolitical competition. \n\nIt is worth mentioning that CIRS plans to publish the aforementioned papers in either in an edited volume or a special issue of a journal in the near future. \n\nTo view the working group agenda\, click hereTo read the participants’ biographies\, click hereRead more about this research initiative\n\nParticipants and Discussants:  \n\nMariam Ibrahim Al-Hammadi\, Qatar UniversityBülent Aras\, Sabancı University\, TurkeyZahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarMisba Bhatti\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarJustin Gengler\, Qatar University Salma Hassabou\, Georgetown University in QatarFrank Himpel\, Hamad Bin Khalifa University\, QatarMehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarWilly Kempel\, Ambassador of Austria to QatarSuzi Mirgani\, CIRS – Georgetown University in QatarJocelyn Sage Mitchell\, Northwestern University in QatarGerd Nonneman\, Georgetown University in QatarDavid B. Roberts\, King’s College London\, UKKhushboo Shah\, Georgetown University in QatarKristian Coates Ulrichsen\, Rice University\, USElizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar\n\nArticle by Misba Bhatti\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/gcc-crisis-qatar-and-its-neighbors-working-group-ii/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20200113T124500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20200113T134500
DTSTAMP:20260404T011938
CREATED:20200203T124057Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210829T134755Z
UID:10001426-1578919500-1578923100@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:Polarized and Demobilized: Legacies of Authoritarianism in Palestine
DESCRIPTION:Dana El Kurd\, Assistant Professor at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies\, delivered a CIRS talk on January 13\, 2020\, on the effects that authoritarian strategies have had on polarization and collective action in Palestinian society. The talk was based on her recently published book\, Polarized and Demobilized: Legacies of Authoritarianism in Palestine\, which examines the impact of international involvement on political development and state-society relations in the Palestinian territories\, particularly in the deterioration of democratic processes. \n\nEl Kurd explained that the Palestinian Authority (PA) has been in power in the Palestinian territories since 1993 (and today\, just in the West Bank). The PA emerged in the mid-nineties out of the Oslo process\, and was meant to serve as an interim government\, to govern until the expected Israeli withdrawal from territories in the West Bank and Gaza Strip by 1999. However\, Israel did not adhere to this agreement. In the meantime\, the PA bureaucracy quickly expanded\, created various security and police forces\, and became the largest employer in the territory under its control. Furthermore\, international organizations became increasingly involved in Palestinian politics\, and external funding strengthened the power of the PA\, entrenching its position. Numerous Palestinian opposition groups arose to challenge the PA’s centralization of power; these included\, for example\, Hamas and other Islamist groups. \n\nSome have argued that the Palestinian Authority has “acted as a ‘subcontractor of repression’ for the Israeli occupation\, in the sense that they police on behalf of the Israeli occupation. They have become a kind of authoritarian indigenous regime overlaid on top of a foreign occupation.” \n\nAccording to El Kurd\, some argue that the PA has “acted as a ‘subcontractor of repression’ for the Israeli occupation\, in the sense that they police on behalf of the Israeli occupation. They have become a kind of authoritarian indigenous regime overlaid on top of a foreign occupation.” The PA has been able to co-opt large segments of the Palestine population and they have increasingly used repression to control people\, she said. Their security apparatus has greatly expanded since 2007\, following the Hamas victory in the 2006 legislative elections (and subsequent removal from power)\, and there is greater coordination with the Israeli occupation. “There have been well-documented increases in torture and arrests\, and limitations on academic and media freedom\,” she said. \n\n“After the Arab Spring\, we saw this sort of rise in polarization and fragmentation\,” and El Kurd examined the conditions that have divided Palestinians and divested them of political power. “We all know that the main goal of authoritarian regimes is to control their populations\, and they utilize different strategies or combinations of strategies\, such as cooptation or repression\,” El Kurd said. However\, regimes target different groups using different strategies\, and she suspected those strategies themselves might be at the root of social polarization in Palestine and a decline in political mobilization. \n\nEl Kurd conducted a survey experiment in the Palestinian territories in conjunction with the Palestine Survey Research Center\, and she held interviews with Palestinian decision makers to collect their views on democracy and accountability to assess the role of international involvement in determining attitudes. She used lab-in-field experiments\, qualitative data\, and statistical analysis with a protest dataset. Her primary research questions were: What is the effect of varying authoritarian strategies on polarization? And\, how does that polarization affect collective action? \n\nHer theoretical argument links authoritarianism and polarization\, and she explained that authoritarian regimes use strategies selectively\, bringing certain groups into the fold while repressing others. While El Kurd argued that authoritarian strategies generate polarization\, she also explained that the type of strategy matters: “cooptation is inclusionary and repression is exclusionary.” Additionally\, she found inclusionary strategies generate polarization to a smaller degree than exclusionary strategies. Consequently\, she argued that the selective nature of authoritarian strategies is a cause of polarization\, translating into a “lack of capacity for collective action through two main mechanisms: insularity within groups\, and grievances between them.” \n\nEl Kurd was able to measure the Palestinian people’s willingness to engage in collective action in various and diversified ways. Her findings indicate that repression strategies lead to a decline in the willingness to engage in collective action\, specifically for what she considers as targeted groups: the Islamists and leftists. This “exclusionary strategy seems to generate less willingness to cooperate” than the cooptation strategy. \n\nEl Kurd found that exclusionary strategies had the greatest effect on behavior\, with repression causing polarization in society. “In the Palestine case\, this helps to explain why different groups—who might have similar ideas about the Palestinian Authority\, and similar ideas about the occupation—are not coordinating properly\, and they seem to be unable to surmount these coordination problems.” She also explained that this finding applies to dynamics in the broader Arab world\, where authoritarian governments have had similar effects on societal cohesion. \n\nDana El Kurd is a Researcher at the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies\, and Assistant Professor at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies in the Critical Security Studies program. She specializes in comparative politics and international relations. She has published in Foreign Affairs\, The Washington Post’s Monkey Cage blog\, Al-Araby al-Jadeed\, and academic journals such as Parameters\, Journal of Global Security Studies\, Contemporary Arab Affairs\, Middle East Law and Governance\, and the Journal of Arabian Studies\, among others. She is the author of the Polarized and Demobilized: Legacies of Authoritarianism in Palestine (Hurst and Oxford University Press\, 2020). \n\nArticle by Chaïmaa Benkermi (Class of 2021)\, Publications Fellow
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/polarized-and-demobilized-legacies-authoritarianism-palestine/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20200114T120000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20200114T140000
DTSTAMP:20260404T011938
CREATED:20200227T065819Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210610T073828Z
UID:10001428-1579003200-1579010400@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:CURA Open House
DESCRIPTION:On January 14\, 2020\, CIRS hosted its first open house event for GU-Q students to learn more about CIRS and the CURA program for undergraduate research advancement. The CIRS Undergraduate Research Advancement program (CURA) aims to facilitate research opportunities for GU-Q undergraduate students through providing focused mentorship and a chance to publish and present their original research as part of the CURA Paper Series and CURA Lunch Talks. \n \n \nDuring the event\, Professor Mehran Kamrava\, Director of CIRS highlighted that two years ago\, CIRS launched the CURA program to advance undergraduate research. He remarked that\, “the aim of the program is to enhance the research skills of our students and we do that by offering number of opportunities for our Fellows and for the entire student body.” \n \n \nOne aim of CURA is to enhance the undergraduate experience by helping students develop a range of research skills and publish their original research. To this end\, Elizabeth Wanucha\, Operations Manager of CIRS announced a new opportunity for GU-Q students under the ongoing CURA Paper Series. The CURA Paper Series opened a paper competition that will span the Spring 2020 semester\, with a submission deadline of February 12\, 2020. She added\, “the winner of this competition will be coached by CIRS staff through the peer review and editorial process to publish the paper by the end of the semester as a distinguished publication under the CURA Paper Series.” The winner will also be issued an electronic certificate that highlights the achievement on LinkedIn and other social media sites. \n \n \n“The aim of the program is to enhance the research skills of our students and we do that by offering number of opportunities for our Fellows and for the entire student body.” \n \n \nNgoc Nguyen (class of 2021) said that she enjoyed meeting the staff of CIRS at the open house. “It was a great opportunity to learn about research opportunities that CIRS is providing for Georgetown students. I will definitely participate in more CIRS events in the future.” \n \n \nIn addition to the paper competition\, GU-Q students also have the opportunity to showcase their original research by submitting it for consideration to the CURA Paper Series. The process of selecting papers is rigorous and competitive. CIRS has a wide network of scholars\, and publishing with the CURA Paper Series will disseminate the selected research across the globe. CIRS publishes the CURA Papers online\, prints and distributes the hard copies\, and disseminates the research via the CIRS research e-newsletter. \n \n \nCIRS also helps GU-Q undergraduate students develop skills related to research through its CURA fellowship program. CURA Fellows provide research assistance in three areas: publications\, research and administration. Through the CURA peer mentorship program\, fellows learn hands-on about the research field and develop analytical skills by convening one seminar each semester on a current CIRS research project. Fellows are invited to discuss papers written by experts in their respective fields\, and share their conclusions with the authors of the papers in the CIRS Working Group organized around that research project. \n \n \nChaïmaa Benkermi (class of 2021)\, a CIRS publications fellow said\, “Having been part of CIRS for two years has been continuously rewarding. I have acquired unique skills that I have come to apply in all fields and disciplines\, developed new research interests\, and simply gained more confidence in what I do and what I deliver to others\, which is also part of my CURA fellowship experience.” \n \n \n  \n \n \nArticle by Shaza Afifi (Class of 2022)\, CURA Publications Fellow 
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/cura-open-house/
CATEGORIES:Student Engagement
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20200119T090000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20200120T170000
DTSTAMP:20260404T011938
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SUMMARY:Big Data in the Middle East Roundtable
DESCRIPTION:On January 19-20\, 2020\, the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS) hosted a Research Roundtable on Big Data in the Middle East. The meeting was held in order to generate an initial conversation on how big data can be meaningfully applied to deepen our understanding of social and political phenomena in the Middle East. With the growing availability and amount of different data and the enhanced capacity of data scientists to use computational tools for analysis\, social scientists around the world are increasingly turning to big data to address some of their fields of research. How far these innovative developments in research are being demonstrated in the Middle East and how social science research questions can be explored through these new data sources and analytical tools was the primary purpose of this roundtable. Over the course of two days\, participating scholars and experts engaged in a fruitful dialogue that explored several important areas\, including: big data and healthcare\, social media and user-generated content\, analyzing data produced in Arabic language\, social science research\, food security\, big data and museums\, opportunities in the defense sector\, female employment as well as religious discourse on social media and hate speech. \n\nThe discussion was initiated by Dr. Ingmar Weber\, Research Director for Social Computing at the Qatar Computing Research Institute (QCRI). Dr. Weber’s presentation was centered on the topic of changing demographic trends in the Middle East and big data applications to measure these changes. Using Facebook as a platform for accessing user data and using various variables such as places lived and mobile phones used\, it was reasoned that researchers could collect data on wealth distribution and income level of the users. These variables can also be used to extract data from other platforms like Twitter and Snapchat to get demographic data. This\, in turn\, can be used to track\, International migration\, Poverty\, and digital gender gaps. The online digital platforms provide access to over 2 billion users\, and the data can be used to address traditional attributes like interest\, as well as understand the selection bias of users. However\, there are limitations to this as models for bias correction are required and only include people that are online. For future research\, a number of topics were identified that included interdisciplinary research efforts\, conducting surveys to collect data from hard to reach population\, and the use of satellite imagery to get onsite data. \n\nChiara Bernardi then steered the conversation to user-generated content and social impact. It was stated that social data is intervened with social behavior\, and this creates essential knowledge and meaning. The social impact of these can be used to drive policies and legislation. Marketing is one industry where the relevance of this content is widely used; however\, there are limits to this. There is a need to understand how this influences the strategy\, and mixed frameworks are needed to interact with the industry data with the academics settings. In order to bridge the gap and understand what we can learn from user-generated content\, a methodological framework in the Middle East is required. The term big data also needed a clear definition in terms of its volume. Content generated from multiple languages requires mapping and visualizing in order to understand the impact on behavior. Academics need to recognize the role and\, at the same time\, bridge the gaps in order to contextualize behavior on digital media. The structure of the platform and design was also highlighted as an essential component as it leads to different behaviors. \n\nChallenges to analyze data produced in Arabic was next discussed by Wajdi Zaghouani\, who stated that data in Arabic is becoming more and more available\, and that data is the new oil. However\, analyzing this data is difficult\, as Arabic is a very challenging language. There is a lot of ambiguity and variation in the written and spoken format of the language\, which requires new processing tools. In addition\, the romanization of the language also poses a problem when it comes to processing. It was stated that there was a need for tools to separate the noisy data and convert it into a usable format. Fine graining of tools to analyze dialects and less commonly used Arabic variety was also highlighted as a key area. Speech processing and lack of concentrated collaboration of researchers were also identified as gaps. Zaghouani also identified the detection of hate speech\, polarization\, and sarcasm as an understudied area that requires further research. \n\nZahir Irani looked at the topic of food security and big data in the Middle East and argued that much attention has been paid to the food waste from the plate\, but very little to food lost during the supply chain. It was argued that food security was a challenge around both availability and accessibility and that efforts were needs that maintain the sustainability of food production and less fluctuation on the viability. It is estimated that our food needs over the next 40 years will be greater than in the past 10\,000 years. This is attributed to a number of factors\, including food waste and loss\, and an increase in the global population.  Science and technology can be to understand the issues at hand. New technology and geological surveys can present a better picture of the physical environment and lead to increased food production. Irani highlighted that some of the drivers of food (in)security include population\, income\, water supply\, food supply\, soil erosion\, imports\, wastages\, yields\, demands\, seasonality\, consumption\, safety and nutrition\, and health wellbeing. The question of feeding future generations has become a global challenge and safeguarding food disruption\, and consumption through circular economy principles requires quality big data. \n\nThe participants then discussed the topic of big data and healthcare in the Middle East. Mowafa Househ highlighted 3 core research areas; privacy and responsibility\, the cultural and religious dimension of collecting data and Artificial Intelligence (AI) and big data. AI has huge impacts on healthcare. Computing power and data being generated has changed the way healthcare is practiced\, diagnosed\, and cured. Narrow AI and better performing computers can help gain insight into different populations of different social and physical conditions. However\, this data can help detect correlation but not the causation. In terms of privacy laws\, countries like Saudi Arabia\, Qatar\, and Bahrain have certain policies in place however state still have access to the health data of the people\, even with the implementation of privacy laws. What the state can do with the data and what kind of approach can be taken\, is a question that needs further examination. Many countries in the Middle East have a multiple-tier system that separates the people. Data is collected and disseminated differently from different groups (citizens and residents)\, which leads to missing data points. How do academics apply ethical frameworks where there is no discrimination among the various groups and what are the values that you put into the algorithm\, were some of the research gaps identified? Culture and religious sensitivities also need to be taken into consideration when it comes to health data collection in the Middle East. Engaging the local stakeholders and policymakers and involving them in the conversation was also highlighted as a critical area for future research. \n\nLisa Singh addressed different ways big data can benefit social science research and stated that there are different kinds of big data that can be used. Currently\, every discipline has its own methodology\, and there is a need for more integrated ways to use these big data. Researchers need to study big data as a field rather than independently for various case studies. Another area highlighted where big data and social science could collaborate was early warning mechanisms\, which are technically challenging\, and lacks strong political will. Currently\, researchers lack a more holistic picture of the methodology required\, which stresses the need for integration of data and various ways that it can be brought together. \n\nThe participants also discussed social media and religious discourse in the Arab region. Walid Magdy presented examples of how big data is helping answer questions in social sciences. One of the studies conducted included looking at people’s opinions and the change in perception due to major events and trends.  It was highlighted that results from the study indicated that global change in trends does not mean change in individual opinion. In regards to religion and social media\, a case study conducted emphasized that many users used social media platforms to have discussions on topics such as atheism\, share positive tweets about Islam and religion in general and re-share or re-post tweets as a form of ongoing charity.  There is a need to complement these findings with anthropological studies\, and innovation and technology are required for sentiment analysis\, especially for data generated in Arabic. Social media is vast and represents many people\, which in turn presents many opportunities to measure user behavior but requires the collaboration of social and computer scientists. \n\nMarc Owen Jones broadened the discussion on social media by addressing the question of hate speech and propaganda. Jones addressed the issue of data weaponization and colonization\, platform manipulation\, and the notion of ethics. There are different approaches to data collected from diverse sources; this data can be used to gauge audience usage and behavior on social media. In many of the previously observed cases\, hate speech tends to be controlled by automated bot accounts. This leads to the question of who has the power to manipulate the data and how a small number of people have the influence to shape the discussion on social media. In addition\, the question of how data is weaponized to promote certain political views and ideas that are held by a group of people and not the general public needs examination. Other areas for future study involve examining the political economy of the technological companies\, governance of platforms\, and integrity and quality of the data. \n\nGeorgios Papoaiannou shifted the focus of discussion to big data and museums and emphasized that museums collect a large amount of data on a daily basis. This data can be used to address some of the challenges and implications of big data and museums. When it comes to big data and museums\, there is more than one reality and a number of issues that need academic focus. Qatar museum authority opened 4 new museums in the past 5 years. These institutes generate data on a daily basis that can be used to address ways to help make these museums better in various ways. One of the research areas identified was the need for data-driven museums and policies through which correct and meaningful information could be collected. Papoaiannou also stressed addressing sentiment via textual or image data and the pros and cons of doing this\, as a gap in the existing literature. \n\nEid Mohamed analyzed Egyptian culture through big data and looked at the question of whether Egyptians still cared about the Arab Spring. The cultural data can provide evidence of growing revolutionary consciousness in the general masses. Most excitingly\, an analysis of such great masses of source material offers the research community the opportunity to work on the challenge of discovering the appropriate epistemologies for coming to terms with emergent transcultural identities and a transformed Arab world in the making. Digital humanities\, in general\, offer a new set of methods for dealing with such an abundance of materials. The Arab Spring needs to be explored through an approach of localizing the change by using local stories. The pre-2011 context of significance concerns earlier moments when popular resistance came to the fore\, moments that 2011 has been considered to be a continuation of or inspired by. These can be traced to the writings of Taha Hussein and other revolutionary writers. Computational tools are required to analyze the vast body of corpora as well as online and offline activism. \n\nThe dialogue then moved to the discussion of big data and female labor in Turkey. Gunes Asik stated that female employment is essential for development and that big data is not just user-generated data but also can mean large administrative data. This includes population data kept by the government in time series. Though this data is reliable\, it is very difficult to access as government approval is required. Female employment and labor demand\, in general\, is affected by a number of factors\, including discrimination\, government policies\, and the emergence of new sectors. Some of the determinants of female employment include education\, conservatism\, child and elderly care\, health\, and lack of social protection. Asik identified a number of research gaps\, such as the impact of informal employment\, the effect of domestic violence\, and using Google search and social media to collect the data\, as well as the automation of jobs and its impact on different genders. \n\nCharbel Chedrawi talked about opportunities for big data in the defense sector and detailed that defense data is a black box. Data for this sector is not easily accessible\, and there are very few scholars working on the topic. Big data is the strategic assets of the 21st century and is a valuable raw material for security and defense. However\, there are certain barriers in generating and applying this data\, including infrastructure\, human barriers\, such as lack of IT professionals in the organization\, and lack of proper training and financial barrier\, as budget is allocated mainly to weapons rather than research and development. Chedrawi identified 5 areas of further study; identifying the resource gaps in defense sector and the limitations associated with it; the hazards of outsourcing; isomorphism of the institutions; the type of technology required for mining the data and the role of big data in reducing the transaction cost and how can the defense sector benefit from such economies. \n\nAs a general takeaway\, the roundtable discussions indicated that for social scientists studying the Middle East who want to use new data sources\, it is of fundamental importance that they bridge the disciplinary divide and develop partnerships with data scientists. In order to make the best use of the variety of new data available and apply them to critical social sciences research questions in the region\, there is a need to actively develop interdisciplinary collaborations. Working with data scientists who have the requisite expertise in data analytics will help social scientists make sense of and extract meaning from data from multiple sources. Moving forward with the discussions at this roundtable CIRS plans to launch a research project in the near future with a thematic focus on some of the core issue(s) and big data in the Middle East. \n\n  \nFor the roundtable agenda\, click here.	For the research initiative\, click here.\nParticipants and Discussants: \nShaza Afifi\, Georgetown University in Qatar	Gunes Asik\, TOBB Economics and Technology University	Zahra Babar\, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar	Mongoljin Batsaikhan\, Georgetown University in Qatar	Chiara Bernardi\, University of Stirling	Chaïmaa Benkermi\, Georgetown University in Qatar	Misba Bhatti\, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar	Charbel Chedrawi\, Saint Joseph University 	Salma Hassabou\, Georgetown University in Qatar	Mowafa Housef\, Hamad Bin Khalifa University 	Zahir Irani\, University of Bradford 	Marc Owen Jones\, Hamad Bin Khalifa University 	Mehran Kamrava\, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar	Walid Magdy\, University of Edinburgh 	Eid Mohamed\, Doha Institute for Graduate Studies	Emad Mohamed\, University of Wolverhampton 	Phoebe Musandu\, Georgetown University in Qatar	Georgios Papaioannou\, University College of London- Qatar	Khushboo Shah\, Georgetown University in Qatar	Lisa Singh\, Georgetown University 	Elizabeth Wanucha\, CIRS – Georgetown University in Qatar	Ingmar Weber\, Qatar Computing Research Institute	Wajdi Zaghouani\, Hamad Bin Khalifa University\nArticle by Misba Bhatti\, Research Analyst at CIRS
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/big-data-middle-east-roundtable/
CATEGORIES:Focused Discussions,Regional Studies
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DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20200123T123000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Moscow:20200123T160000
DTSTAMP:20260404T011938
CREATED:20200114T063247Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20210610T073816Z
UID:10001424-1579782600-1579795200@cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu
SUMMARY:CURA Workshop: Evaluating Credibility: Sources for Academic Research
DESCRIPTION:On January 23\, 2020\, CIRS hosted a CURA workshop titled\, “Evaluating Credibility: Sources for Academic Research\,” with GU-Q Professor Jim Reardon-Anderson and Librarian Paschalia Terzi. The workshop was focused on scholarly resource analysis and determining the authenticity of sources for research projects. Professor Anderson led the workshop and outlined some of his preferred techniques in determining the authenticity and validity of the sources. The workshop’s interactive nature made it a valuable learning experience. Furthermore\, students gained substantial research strategy skills by engaging in this professional and encouraging environment. \n \n \nProfessor Anderson’s primary experience and scholarly insight further added to the meaningfulness of the workshop. He underlined how the right sources build on the internal validity and reliability and help strengthen the quality of the research project. Borrowing from his rich career experiences\, Professor Anderson shared how he\, as a researcher and historian\, uses primary and secondary sources for his research projects. He outlined the necessity of a detail-oriented analysis to the research process\, which benefited the students and encouraged them to be reflective of their own research experiences. His reflection prompted the students to understand the limitations of their research process and how to overcome some of the hurdles faced. \n \n \n“The most useful and inspiring part of the workshop was Prof. Anderson’s personal description of what a researcher’s life is really like.” – Hussam Aitelqadi\, sophomore at GU-Q. \n \n \nEngaging with Professor Anderson\, students questioned on how to accommodate the variety of sources available; for example\, how to engage with multimedia resources such as newspapers\, magazines\, websites\, and social media platforms\, was one of the quires raised. Professor Anderson narrated how intersectional mediums and methods can boost one’s research and how students can benefit from the vast resources the Georgetown library provides. Hussam Aitelqadi\, a sophomore at GU-Q who attended the workshop\, commented on how participating in the workshop was an enriching learning experience. He reflected that\, “the most useful and inspiring part of the workshop was Prof. Anderson’s personal description of what a researcher’s life is really like.” Another student\, Jawaher Al-Sulaiti\, also reflected on how the workshop helped her to gain a “better understanding of the tools of evaluation.” \n \n \n \n\n\n\n\n\n \n \n \nIn the second half of the session\, GU-Q Librarian Paschali Terzi led the workshop through an interactive exercise. Building on Professor Anderson’s valuable insight\, Paschalia showed students how to apply their practical learnings from the workshop. Students engaged with scholarly material and used a template to determine the credibility of the source. This was facilitated by accessing journals available on research databases and analyzing how social media can be used as part of research. This hands-on activity solidified the workshop experience; by immediately applying what they learned\, students were able to practice new skills and receive feedback on their work from CIRS Staff and Paschalia. All in all\, this workshop aimed at improving the overall research process of Georgetown University in Qatar’s undergraduate students. \n \n \nArticle by Khushboo Shah\, CURA Administrative Fellow
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/cura-workshop-evaluating-credibility-sources-academic-research/
CATEGORIES:Student Engagement
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