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SUMMARY:Sir Tim Lankester on Britain's Foreign Aid
DESCRIPTION:Sir Tim Lankester\, Chairman of the Council of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical ‎Medicine and Advisor on South East Asia to the consulting firm Oxford Analytica\, delivered a ‎CIRS Focused Discussion on “The Politics and Economics of Britain’s Foreign Aid” on October ‎‎8\, 2012. The talk was based on his recent book\,The Politics and Economics of Britain’s Foreign ‎Aid: The Pergau Dam Affair (Routledge\, 2012)\, which he described as “a case study of what can ‎go wrong when you do development assistance badly.”‎ \n \n \nGiving a background of the history of British foreign aid\, Lankester said that the program was ‎initiated in the 1960s and was driven by the British government’s belief that it had a moral ‎obligation to its former colonies as well as practical political interests in those countries. In the ‎‎1980s\, Lankester was the Permanent Secretary of the Overseas Development Administration – ‎the ministry responsible for development aid. During his time in the ministry\, “one of the most ‎controversial projects ever funded by British aid” was taking place. This was the establishment of ‎the Pergau Dam and power-generating project on the Malay-Thai border\, which “was the largest ‎funding in the history of British aid\,” Lankester recalled.‎ \n \n \nThe controversial Pergau Dam project was the result of a private agreement between some key ‎members of the Malay and British governments and was based on Britain providing Malaysia ‎with 200 million pounds worth of civil aid in return for sales of 1 billion pounds of defense ‎equipment. Lankester recalled that an agreement based on the offer of British aid in return for ‎arms sales was both unprecedented and against British policy and was thus divisive from the ‎start. To make matters worse\, once the agreement was signed between the two governments\, the ‎powerful contractors and companies assigned to building the project increased their estimates ‎and the total cost for the project almost doubled. ‎ \n \n \nDespite the increasing costs\, and against the advice of British government officials and ‎economists\, the project went ahead with the support of Mrs. Thatcher and a host of others with ‎special interests. Since both the prime ministers of Malaysia and Britain had backed the project\, ‎the other government departments buckled under the pressure and did not offer sufficient ‎opposition to their leaders. Lankester described the situation as being one that suffered from ‎conflicting policy agendas and the “excessive mixing of politics\, business\, and conflicts of ‎interest.” ‎ \n \n \nIn his capacity as Permanent Secretary\, Lankester was tasked with evaluating whether or not the ‎money for the project was being properly and lawfully spent. Although the legal assessment at ‎the time showed that the project was lawful\, the spend for the project was based on taxpayers ‎money and was so inefficient and uneconomic that Lankester felt obliged to formally ‎disassociate himself and the civil service from it. “This\,” he said “is a story of politics and special ‎interests trumping sound development and sound economics.” Had there been more ‎transparency\, it may have been possible for parliament\, the media\, and other interest groups to ‎formally oppose the project that ultimately damaged British-Malay relations at the time. ‎ \n \n \nIn conclusion\, Lankester said that he was curious to know whether the very same project would ‎have been viable today. His ex-post assessment\, in light of increased gas prices over the years\, ‎was that the project would still be an uneconomic one by today’s calculations. As a final thought\, ‎he advised that the Pergau Dam case study provides valuable lessons for governments\, and his ‎advice was that “it is better to be transparent than obscure\,” “don’t say one thing and do ‎another\,” “when things go wrong\, don’t cover up\,” and\, lastly\, “if you make one mistake\, don’t ‎compound it by making another.”‎ \n \n \nSir Tim Lankester is a member of the joint advisory board of the Georgetown University School ‎of Foreign in Qatar. He was UK Executive Director on the boards of the IMF and World Bank\, ‎and later Permanent Secretary of the Overseas Development Administration. He was Director of ‎the School of Oriental and African Studies\, London University\, and from 2001 to 2009 ‎President of Corpus Christi College\, Oxford. He has published articles and book reviews on aid ‎and development. ‎  \n \n \nArticle by Suzi Mirgani\, Editor and Manager for CIRS Publications
URL:https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/event/sir-tim-lankester-britains-foreign-aid/
CATEGORIES:Dialogue Series,Distingushed Lectures,Regional Studies
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